Statutory Construction (Chill Nation Notes)

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viii. PARI MATERIA RULE
- Statutes are in pari materia when they
relate to the same person or thing, or
have the same purpose or object, or cover
the same specific or particular subject
matter. It is sufficient that the 2 or more
statutes relates to the same specific
subject matter. Statutes in pari materia
should be construed together to attain the
purpose of an express national policy.
- Exception: If 2 or more statutes on the
same subject were enacted at different
times and under different conditions and
circumstances, their interpretation should
be in accordance with the circumstances
or conditions peculiar to each. A statute
will not be construed as repealing prior
acts or acts on the same subject matter.
ix. Reenacted statutes
- in relation to domestic statutes/laws
Montelibano v Ferrer
97 Phil 228
Facts: In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of
which Montelibano is the president and
general manager, leased a lot to Benares
for five years, with an option in favor of
Benares of another five crop years. On
1951, the Subdivision instituted against
Benares an unlawful detainer case which
rendered a decision ordering him to eject
from the said lot. However, Benares
continued planting on the said lot, instead
of delivering it to Subdivision. Acting upon
Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the
land of sugarcane planted by Benares.
Hence, a criminal case was filed by
Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of
arrest was then filed to the petitioners.
Monteibano and his companions filed a
motion to quash the complaint and
warrant of arrest A civil case against
Municipal Judge and Benares was filed
alleging that the said judge had o
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
criminal case.
Issue: Whether or not the municipal court
may entertain the criminal case relying
upon CA 326, section 22 (Charter of the
City of Bacolod) which provides that the
City Attorney shall charge of the
prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors,
and violations of city ordinances, in the
Court of First Instance and the Municipal
Court of Bacolod.

Held: No, the Judge of Municipal Court has

no jurisdiction over the case.
In the interpretation of reenacted statutes
the court will follow the construction which
they received when previously in force.
The legislature will be presumed to know
the effect which such status originally had,
and by reenactment to intend that they
should again have the same effect.
Two statutes with a parallel scope,
purpose and terminology should, each in
its own field, have a like interpretation,
unless in particular instances there is
something peculiar in the question under
consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of
the act relating thereto, requiring a
different conclusion.
In the case at bar, the same provisions
were contested in Sayo v. Chief of Police
wherein it was held that in the City of
Manila, criminal complaints may be filed
only with the City Fiscal who is given the
exclusive authority to institute criminal
cases in the different courts of said city,
under the provisions of its Charter found in
Sec 39 of Act # 183. The provisions of the
Charter of City of Bacolod which are
substantially identical to that of Manila
should then be interpreted the same.
Therefore, the decision appealed
is reversed and the warrant of arrest
issued by the judge shall be annulled.
x. Adopted Statutes
- Where local statutes are patterned after
or copied from those of another country,
the decisions of courts in such country
construing those laws are entitled to great
weight in the interpretation of such local
statutes.
xi. Common Law Principle v Statutory
Provision
- between the two, the latter should
prevail
- the former will only apply if there is no
other law applicable
Alvendia v Intermediate Court
G.R. No. 72138 (January 22, 1990)
&
Bonamy v Justice Paras
G.R. No. 72373 (January 22, 1990)
FACTS: The case traces to a simple
collection suit, (Civil Case No. 5182-M)
filed on September 12, 1977, by Bonifacio
Bonamy against the spouses Jesus F.
Alvendia and Felicidad M. Alvendia before

Statutory Construction (Chill Nation Notes)

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the then Court of First Instance (CFI Bulacan) for the sum of P107,481.50
representing construction materials which
the Alvendias had purchased on credit
from Bonamy.
On January 6, 1978, both parties
submitted to the trial court a "Compromise
Agreement" providing, among other
things:
"(1) That defendants do hereby
acknowledge the indebtedness of their
family corporation, Doa Felisa Village and
Housing Corporation, in the amount of
P107,481.50, representing the cost of
construction materials bought on credit
from plaintiff from June 20 - August 12,
1975 and hereby bind themselves to pay
said obligation out of the first release of
funds from the GSIS for housing units and
lots sold by the said corporation to
members of the GSIS.
"(2) That the plaintiff and defendants shall
thereby join hands in asking the
GSIS to expedite the releases of the funds
due to said corporation; and
"(3) That for and in consideration of this
agreement the plaintiff and defendants
hereby waive any and all further claims
monetary or otherwise against each other
regarding the subject matter of this case.
On the same date, the trial court approved
and adopted the same as the decision of
the case. Subsequently, Bonamy moved
for execution of judgment, alleging that
the Alvendias "have not submitted any
finished project with the GSIS, thereby
preventing the full realization of the
aforesaid decision. In a motion dated April
23, 1980, Bonamy sought the issuance of
an alias writ of execution, the first writ
having been returned unsatisfied. He
admitted though in the same motion that
he received P20,000.00 in cash from the
Alvendias sometime in January 1980 and
an additional amount of P4,000.00 by way
of proceeds of the sale of the Alvendias'
vehicle. Pursuant to the alias writ issued
by the Court on May 2, 1980, the Bulacan
provincial sheriff levied on the Alvendias
"leasehold rights" over a fishpond and a
certificate of sale over said leasehold right
was executed in favor of Bonamy on Sept.
10, 1984.
On February 2, 1982, the spouses moved
for the quashal and annulment of the writ
of execution, levy and sale such motion
was denied and the trial court.
In a nutshell, the spouses argued as
follows: [1] that the writ and the alias writ
of execution levied upon properties not
referred to in the judgment by
compromise; [2] the writs made only the
Alvendias liable, when under the
"agreement" their family corporation was
also supposed to be liable; [3] the writ was

premature because the Compromise

Agreement contained a condition which
had not yet been fulfilled, namely, the
release of a loan from the GSIS; [4] the
fishpond, owned by the government
though leased to the Alvendias, cannot be
a proper subject of a levy on execution;
and [5] the leasehold rights possessed by
the Alvendias had already expired before
the issuance of the order.
ISSUE: WON the judgment debtors may
successfully ask that they be allowed to
pay the judgment debt in cash long after
they have failed to pay or redeem their
properties which have been sold in
execution.
HELD: In any event, it is axiomatic that
there is no justification in law and in fact
for the reopening of a case which has long
become final and which has in fact been
executed. The doctrine of finality of
judgments is grounded on fundamental
consideration of public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error
the judgments of courts must become
final at some definite date fixed by law.
There is no question therefore, that the
Alvendias failed to pay on time the
judgment of which the execution sale was
a necessary consequence. They also failed
to redeem the property within the required
period despite the fact that the Final Deed
of Sale was issued only on January 25,
1983, long past the aforesaid period;
undeniably showing a lack of intention or
capability to pay the same.
Statutory Principle: Equity has been
aptly described as "a justice outside
legality"; which is applied only in the
absence of and never against statutory
law or as in this case, judicial rules of
procedure. The rule is "equity follows the
law" but where a particular remedy is
given by the law and that remedy is
bounded and circumscribed by particular
rules, it would be very improper, for the
court to take it up where the law leaves it
and to extend it further than the law
allows.
Andres v Manufacturers Hanover & Trust
Corp.
G.R. No. 82670 (September 15, 1989)
FACTS: Andres, using the business name
Irenes Wearing Apparel was engaged in
the manufacture of ladies garments,
childrens wear, mens apparel and linens
for local and foreign buyers. Among its
foreign buyers was Facts of the United
States.

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Sometime in August 1980, Facts instructed
the First National State Bank (FNSB) of
New Jersey to transfer $10,000 to Irenes
Wearing Apparel via Philippine National
Bank (PNB) Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. FNSB
instructed Manufacturers Hanover and
Trust Corporation (Mantrust) to effect the
transfer by charging the amount to the
account of FNSB with private respondent.
After Mantrust effected the transfer, the
payment was not effected immediately
because the payee designated in the telex
was only Wearing Apparel. Private
respondent sent PNB another telex stating
that the payment was to be made to
Irenes Wearing Apparel.
On August 28, 1980, petitioner received
the remittance of $10,000.
After learning about the delay, Facets
informed FNSB about the situation. Facts,
unaware that petitioner had already
received the remittance, informed private
respondent and amended its instruction y
asking it to effect the payment to
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB) instead of PNB.
Private respondent, also unaware that
petitioner had already received the
remittance, instructed PCIB to pay
$10,000 to petitioner. Hence, petitioner
received another $10,000 which was
charged again to the account of Facets
with FNSB.
FNSB discovered that private respondent
had made a duplication of remittance.
Private respondent asked petitioner to
return the second remittance of $10,000
but the latter refused to do so contending
that the doctrine of solution indebiti does
not apply because there was negligence
on the part of the respondents and that
they were not unjustly enriched since
Facets still has a balance of $49,324.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private
respondent has the right to recover the
second $10,000 remittance it had
delivered to petitioner
HELD: Yes. Art 2154 of the New Civil Code
is applicable. For this article to apply, the
following requisites must concur: 1) that
he who paid was not under obligation to
do so; and 2) that payment was made by
reason of an essential mistake of fact.
There was a mistake, not negligence, in
the second remittance. It was evident by
the fact that both remittances have the
same reference invoice number.

xii. Doctrine of Necessary

Implications
- No statute can be enacted that can
provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission
that may not meet a particular situation.
The doctrine states that what is implied in
a statute is as much a part thereof as that
which is expressed. The principle is
expressed in the maxim, Ex necessitate
legis or from the necessity of law. The
greater includes the lesser, expressed in
the maxim, in eo quod plus sit, simper
inest et minus.
- The term necessary implication is one
that is so strong in its probability that the
contrary thereof cannot reasonably be
supposed. It is one which, under the
circumstances, is compelled by a
reasonable view of the statute, and the
contrary of which would be improbable
and absurd
Chua v Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary
implications. What is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed.
Facts: RA 6683 provided benefits for early
retirement and voluntary separation as
well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Sec. 2 provides for who are
qualified to avail of the benefits of RA
6683
which
includes,
"all
regular,
temporary,
casual
and
emergency
employees."
Petitioner
Lydia
Chua,
believing that she is qualified to avail of
the benefits of the program filed and
application with the respondent NIA which
was denied due to the fact that she is a
co-terminus employee. Her appeal with
respondent Commission was likewise
denied.
Issue: W/N petitioner's status as a coterminus employee is excluded from the
benefits of Ra 6683 (Early Retirement Law)
Held: No. There is no substantial
difference
between
a
co-terminus
employee and a contractual, casual or
emergency employee for all are tenurial
employees with no fixed term, non-career
and temporary. The Early Retirement Law
would violate the equal protection clause
of the constitution if the SC were to
sustain respondent's submission that the
benefits of said law are to be denied a
class of government employees who are
similarly situated as those covered by the
said law. The doctrine of necessary
implications should be applied in this case.

Statutory Construction (Chill Nation Notes)

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City of Manila v Gomez
No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981)
Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary
implications. What is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed.
Facts: The Revised Charter of Manila fixes
the annual realty tax at 1.5%. On the
other hand, the Special Education Fund
Law imposed an annual additional tax of
1% on the assessed value of real property
in addition to the real property tax
regularly levied thereon but the total
real property tax shall not exceed 3%
Since the maximum limit imposed is 3%,
the municipal board of Manila imposed an
additional .5% to fix the total imposable
tax on real property at 3% which is divided
into the following: 1.5% as per charter of
Manila, 1% as per Special Education Fund
law and .5% as per order of the municipal
board. Private respondent Esso Philippines
paid the additional one-half percent realty
tax under protest and later filed a
complaint for recovery of the said amount.
It contended that the additional one-half
percent is void because it is not
authorized by the city charter or any law.
Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent
imposed by the City of Manila is valid or
legal.
Held: Yes. The Real Property Tax Law
imposes that a city council, by ordinance,
may impose a realty tax of not less than
one-half perfect but not more than two
percent of the assessed value of real
property. The additional one-half percent
then is legal. Furthermore, the doctrine of
implications sustains the contention of the
City of Manila that the additional one-half
percent is sanctioned by the Special
Education Fund Law when the same states
that the total real property tax shall not
exceed a maximum of three per centum.
The doctrine of necessary implications
means that that which is plainly implied
in the language of a statute is as much a
part of it as that which is expressed.
xiii. CASUS OMISSUS
- This rule states that a person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must
be held to have been omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. The principle
proceeds from a reasonable certainty that
a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislative
enumeration.
- In other words, the maxim operates and
applies only if and when the omission has
been clearly established, and is such a
case what is omitted in the enumeration

may not, by construction, be included

therein.
People of the Philippines v Guillermo
Manatan
G.R. No. L-14129 (July 31, 1962)
Statutory rule: The rule of casus
omissus pro omisso habendus est can
operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established.
Facts: Defendant Guillermo Manantan
was charged with a violation of the Section
54 of the Revised Election Code which
provides that No justice, judge, fiscal.
shall aid any candidate in any manner in
any election, except to vote. Defendant
contends that this provision excludes
justice of the peace and as such, he is
excluded from this prohibition. Because of
this, the lower court dismissed the case
against him. The Solicitor General
appealed.
Issue: W/N a justice of the peace is
included in the prohibition of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code.
Held: Yes. Although petitioner argues that
when Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code omitted the words justice of peace
from the Revised Administrative Code
provision from which it was taken and thus
making the intention of the legislature
clear in the omission, the word judge in
the former provision was qualified or
modified by the phrase of first instance.
The term judge in Section 54 is not
modified or qualified, making it broader
and more generic to comprehend all kinds
of judges, like judges of the Courts of First
Instance, Courts of Agrarian Relations,
Courts of Industrial Relations and justices
of the peace. The rule of casus omissus
has no applicability to the case at bar for
the maxim only applies and operate if and
when the omission has been clearly
established.
xiv. STARE DECISIS
- The legal maxim which requires the past
decisions of the court be followed in the
adjudication of cases is known as stare
decisis et non quieta movere. It means
one should follow past precedents and
should not disturb what has been settled.
The rule rests on the desirability of having
stability in the law.
J.M. Tuason and Co, Inc., et al. v Hon.
Mariano
G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 1978)
Statutory rule: Stare Decisis. Follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has
been settled. Matters already decided on

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the merits cannot be relitigated again and
again.
Facts:
Respondents
Aquial
claimed
ownership of a parcel of land located in
Quezon City having an area of 383
hectares. They alleged that it had been
fraudulently or erroneously included in
OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal and that it was registered in the
names of Petitioners Tuason pursuant to a
decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No.
7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735
and the titles derived therefrom be
declared void due to certain irregularities
in the land registration proceeding.
Issue: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid.
Held: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of
OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by
the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin
vs Tuason, Alcantara vs Tuason and Pili vs
Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also
applied in other cases involving the
validity of OCT No. 735. Considerng the
governing principle of stare decisis et non
quieta movere (follow past precedents and
do not disturb what has been settled), the
court ruled that respondents cannot
maintain their action without eroding the
long settled holding of the courts that OCT
No. 735 is valid and no longer open to
attack.
V. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
OF WORDS AND PHRASES
i. Rules
a. When the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish - Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.
The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of
the principle that general words and
phrases in a statute should ordinarily be
accorded their natural and general
significance. The rule requires that a
general term or phrase should not be
reduced into parts and one part
distinguished from the other so as to
justify its exclusion from the operation of
the law. In other words, there should be no
distinction in the application of a statute
where none is indicated.
Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v IAC
G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987)
Statutory rule: When the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
The rule, founded on logic, is corollary of
the principle that general words and
phrases of a statute should ordinarily be
accorded their natural and general
significance.

Facts: Private respondent Sycwin Coating

& Wires Inc. filed a complaint for a
collection of money against Varian
Industrial
Corporation.
During
the
pendency, private respondent attached
some of the properties of Varian Industrial
corporation upon the posting of a
supersedes bond. The latter in turn posted
a counter bond through Petitioner
Philippine British Assurance so the
attached properties were released. The
trial court then rendered a decision
favorable to the private respondent and
Writ of execution was issued in favor of
private respondent. The same was
however returned unsatisfied as varian
failed to deliver the attached personal
properties upon demand. Sycwin thus
prayed that petitioner corporation be
ordered to pay the value of its bond which
was granted.
Issue: W/N the counter bond issued
through Petitioner Corporation covers
execution of a judgment pending appeal.
Held: The counter bond was issued in
accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor
provisions of the counter bond limited its
application to a final and executory
judgment. It applies to the payment of any
judgment that may be recovered by
plaintiff. It is a recognized rule that where
the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Since the law did not
make any distinction nor intended any
exception, when it speaks of "any
judgment" which may be charged against
a counter bond, it should be interpreted to
refer not only to a final and executory
judgment but also a judgment pending
appeal.

Juanito Pilar v COMELEC

G.R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995)
Statutory rule: The rule is well
recognized that where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Facts: On March 22, 1992, petitioner filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position
of
member
of
the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
Three days later, he withdrew his
certificate of candidacy. As a result,
respondent Commission imposed a fine of
P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement
of
contributions
and
expenditures.
Petitioner contends that it is clear from the
law that the candidate must have entered

Statutory Construction (Chill Nation Notes)

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the political contest, and should have
either won or lost.
Issue: W/N petitioner can be held liable
for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures since he
was a "non-candidate", having withdrawn
his certificate of candidacy three days
after its filing.
Held: Yes. Sec. 14 of Ra 7166 states that
"every candidate" has the obligation to file
his statement of contributions and
expenditures. As the law makes no
distinction or qualification as to whether
the candidate pursued his candidacy or
withdrew the same, the term "every
candidate" must be deemed to refer not
only to a candidate who pursued his
campaign, but also to who who withdrew
his candidacy. Sec. 13 of Resolution No.
2348 categorically refers to "all candidates
who filed their certificate of candidacy".

b. Exceptions in the Statute

- Where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it.

Cecilio de Villa v CA
G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991)
Statutory rule: When the law does not
make any exception, courts may not
except something unless compelling
reasons exist to justify it.
Facts: Petitioner Cecilio De Villa was
charged before the RTC of Makati for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the
Bouncing Checks Law. Petitioner contends
that the check in question was drawn
against his dollar account with a foreign
bank and as such, it is not covered by the
Bouncing Checks Law..

People of the Philippines v Evangelista

G.R. No. 110898 (February 20, 1996)

Issue: W/N a foreign check drawn against

a foreign account is covered by BP 22.

Statutory rule: If the law makes no

distinction, neither should the court.

Held: Yes. The law does not distinguish

the currency involved in the case since
what the law only specifies is that checks
drawn and issued in the Philippines,
though payable outside thereof are within
the coverage of the law. It is a cardinal
rule that where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Parenthetically, the rule is that where the
law does not make any exception, courts
may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it.

Facts: Private respondent Guildo Tugonon

was charged and convicted of frustrated
homicide. He filed a petition for probation.
However, the Chief Probation and Parole
Officer recommended denial of private
respondent's application for probation on
the ground that by appealing the sentence
of the trial, he had already waived his
right to make his application for probation.
The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's
recommendation and granted private
respondent's application on April 23, 1993.
Issue: W/N respondent judge committed a
grave abuse of discretion by granting
private
respondent's
application
for
probation despite the appeal filed by the
private respondent.
Held: Yes. Private respondent filed his
application for probation on December 28,
1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is
thus covered by the prohibition that "no
application
for
probation
shall
be
entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfect the appeal from the judgment
of conviction" and that "the filing of the
application shall deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal." having appealed from the
judgment of the trial court and applied for
probation after the Court of Appeals had
affirmed his conviction, private respondent
was clearly precluded from the benefits of
probation. Furthermore, the law makes no
distinction between meritorious and
unmeritorious appeals so neither should
the court.

c. General and Special Terms

1. Words having a general meaning
- General terms should not be given a
restricted meaning. - General terms in a
statute are to receive a general
construction, unless retrained by the
context or by plain inferences from the
scope and purpose of the act.
- General terms or provisions in a statute
may be restrained and limited by specific
terms or provisions with which they are
associated.
2. Words having a technical meaning
- Special terms in a statute may
sometimes be expanded to a general
signification by the consideration that the
reason of the law is general.
- Special terms refer exclusively to a
specific or particular class.
Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v Hon.
Pedro M. Jimenez
G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961)

Statutory Construction (Chill Nation Notes)

7
Statutory rule: General terms may be
restricted by specific word, with the result
that the general language will be limited
by specific language which indicates the
statutes object and purpose. The rule is
applicable only to cases wherein, except
for one general term, all the items in an
enumeration belong to or fall under one
specific class.
Facts: Petitioner corporation engages in
manufacturing toilet preparations and
household
remedies.
They
import
materials
including
stabilizers
and
flavors is among those petitioner imports.
For every importation, petitioner pays 17%
special excise tax on the foreign exchange
used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and other charges pursuant
to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. However
the same law also provides that foreign
exchanged used for xxx importation to the
Philippines of xxx stabilizers and flavors
xxx shall be refunded to any importer
making application therefore. Petitioner
now seeks a refund of the 17% special
excise tax they paid in the total sum of
P113,343.99.
Issue: W/N the foreign exchange used by
petitioner in the importation of dental
cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt
from the 17% special excise tax imposed
by the Exchange Tax Law so as to entitle it
to a refund.
Held: Yes. The refusal to deny refund was
based on the argument that all the items
enumerated for the tax exemption fall
under one specific class, namely: food
products, book supplies/materials and
medical supplies and that for petitioners
to be exempt, the stabilizers and flavors
they use must fall under the category of
food products. Respondent contends that
since petitioners use these as toothpaste,
the same is not a food product. Court
ruled that although stabilizers and
flavors are preceded by items that might
fall under food products, the following
which were also included are hardly such:
fertilizer, poultry feed, industrial starch
and more. Therefore, the law must be
seen in its entirety. The rule of
construction that general and unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by a
particular recital does not require the
rejection of general terms entirely. It is
intended merely as an aid in ascertaining
the intention of the legislature and is to be
taken in connection with other rules of
construction.
d. Ejusdem Generis
- The general rule is that where a general
word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same

class or where the latter follows the

former, the general word of phrase is to be
construed to include, or to be restricted to,
persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned. This canon
of statutory construction is known as
ejusdem generis (or the same kind or
specie).
- The purpose of the rule ejusdem generis
is to give effect to both the particular and
general words, by treating the particular
words as indicating the class and the
general words as indicating all that is
embraced in said class, although not
specifically named by the particular words.
Republic of the Philippines v Hom.
Eutorpio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson
G.R. No. 89483 (August 30, 1990)
Statutory rule: Applying the rule in
statutory construction known as ejusdem
generis, that is where general words follow
an enumeration of persons or things, such
general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the
same kind or class as those especially
mentioned.
Facts: Acting on information received
which indicated the acquisition of wealth
beyond his lawful income, the Philippine
Anti-Graft Board required private
respondent Lt. Col. Tecson to submit his
explanation or comment, together with
supporting evidence thereto. Private
respondent was unable to provide
supporting evidence because they were
allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper
who ha gone abroad. The anti-graft Board
was created by the PCGG to "investigate
the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel, both retired
and in active service." Private respondent
mainly argues that he is not one of the
subordinates contemplated in Executive
Orders No. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A are acts of
his alone and not connected with being a
crony, business associate or subordinate.
Hence, the PCGG has no jurisdiction to
investigate him.
Issue: W/N private respondent may be
investigated and prosecuted by the Board,
an agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA
3019 and 1379.
Held: No. Applying the rule in statutory
construction, the term "subordinate" as
used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who
enjoys close association or relation with
former President Marcos and/or his wife,
similar to the immediate family member,

Statutory Construction (Chill Nation Notes)

8
relative and close associate in E) 1 and the
close relative, business associate, dummy,
agent or nominee in EO 2.
e. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
- The express mention of one person,
thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others. But this maxim is
not applicable where words are used by
example only.
-This maxim and its corollary canons are
generally used in the construction of
statutes granting powers, creating rights
and remedies, restricting common rights,
and imposing penalties and forfeitures, as
well as those statutes which are strictly
construed.
Commissioner of Customs v Court of Tax
Appeals
G.R. Nos. 48886-88 (July 21, 1993)
FACTS: Petitioner contends that the
importation of the foodstuffs in question is
prohibited and the articles thus imported
may be subject to forfeiture under Sec.
2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and
Customs Code. The foodstuffs in question
being articles of prohibited importation
cannot be released under bond.
ISSUE: W/N the imported foodstuffs in
question are not contraband, and are not
as stated by Respondent Court, among the
prohibited importations enumerated in
Sec. 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code
therefore these foodstuffs may be
released under bond as provided in Sec.
2301 of the same code.
HELD: Yes. The imported foodstuffs are
considered prohibited importation under
Sec. 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs
Code
NOTE: Sec. 102. Prohibited
Importations. The importation into the
Philippines of the following articles is
prohibited:
(k) All other articles the importation of
which is prohibited by law.
Sec. 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture
Under Tariff and Customs Laws. Any
vessel or aircraft, cargo, articles and other
objects shall, under the following
conditions, be subject to forfeiture:
(f.) Any article of prohibited importation or
exportation, the importation or
exportation of which is effected or
attempted contrary to law, and all other
articles which, in the opinion of the
Collector, have been used, are or were

intended to be used as instrument in the

importation or exportation of the former.
f. Associated Words (Noscitur a sociis)
- This maxim states that where a
particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be
made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is found or
with which it is associated.
Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et al. v Secretary
Juan Flavier, et al.
G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993)
Statutory Rule: Noscitur a socciis. Where a
particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be
made specific by considering the company of
terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated.
Facts: The private respondents filed an
administrative complaint with the Ombudsman
against the petitioners for violation of the Antigraft and Corrupt Practices Act. In response,
the Ombudsman filed an order directing the
preventive suspension of the petitioner, who
were employees of the national center for
mental health. The respondents argue that the
preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman
under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by
Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987 Constitution,
while petitioner contends that the Ombudsman
can only recommend to the Heads of
Departments
and
other
agencies
the
preventive
suspension
of
officials
and
employees facing administrative investigation
conducted by his office.
Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to
preventively suspend government officials
working in other offices other than that of the
Ombudsman pending the investigation of
administrative complaints.
Held: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to
suspend the employees of the said institution
may it be in punitive or preventive suspension.
When the Constitution vested on the
Ombudsman the power to "recommend the
suspension" of a public official or employees, it
referred to "suspension" as a punitive measure.
All the words associated with the word
"suspension" in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal,
demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of
Noscitur a sociis, the word "suspension" should
be given the same sense as the other words
with which it is associated. Where a particular
word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be
made specific by considering the company of
terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated.