Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Fairchild Source: Journal of Thought, Vol. 13, No. 3 (JULY, 1978), pp. 225-234 Published
by: Caddo Gap Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42588715
this regard. The Greeks understood philosophy as a love of (undifferentiated) wisdom, without
restriction as to the sub- ject matter or content thereof Such subdivisions as are to be found in
philosophy are determined primarily by the types of questions asked
One of the (unargued) theses of this essay is that sport is an especially appropriate subject for
philosophic investigation because sport provides one of the purest opportunities for an interface of
being and consciousness, of facticity and transcendence. (Other notable opportunities for this type
of interface would include artistic crea- tion and sexual orgasm.
Sport, for reasons to be suggested shortly, provides situations which are so constructed that
philosophically significant distinctions and categories are more easily recognized and dealt with.
Specifically, I will argue that a philosophic investigation of competition will allow for clarifications
of such concepts as being and consciousness in such a way that sport can be seen to provide a
unique opportunity for us to express our humanity
In attempting to define sport, it is helpful to distinguish among play, game and sport. The activities
of play, game and sport can be understood as constituting a loose hierarchy in terms of structure,
with play at the bottom or lowest level, game in the middle and sport at the top
Paul Weiss claims that sport is a "traditionalized set of rules exemplified by men who try to be
excellent in and through their bodies
Some of the most important of these functions would seem to be: teaching and training, coaching,
research and development, criticism and archivis
Philosophically, it is sport rather than play or game that provides the clearest expression of the
intersection of being and consciousness. Competition in sports presupposes a minimal level of
proficiency in the performance of the requisite bodily skills, and stresses conscious activity and
adjustment for the advantage that results in victory. Specifically, the conscious activity demanded
by the com- petitive situation in which frequent bodily adjustments must be made to compensate
for changes in the sport-situation is just that conscious activity which enables the body to
function at peak efficiency in the non-sports situation
The sport act is a kind of adventuring, in the sense that it is not a curtailed thrust toward specific
ends, but a facing of the unex- pected. It is a spontaneous testifying to one's existential fullness,
regardless of the extenuating circumstances in a particular situation. It is the courage to remain
open to one's possibilities
Ideally, sport, as a uniquely human endeavor should culminate in the enhancement of human
life by releasing values potentially therein. It is undeniable that some sportsmen can be highly
efficient doers without having any conscious experiences of what that doing entails. The player
performs without giving his doing a second thought, or even a first one. The doing be- gins and
ends, but finds no closure in consciousness. Alternatively, it is possible to be knowledgeable
about the bodily intricacies of a sport and not be able to perform the sport at all. Consciousness
reaches no closure in doing. It is in competition that doing is most likely to reach closure in
consciousness, and that consciousness is most likely to reach closure in doing.
As implied in the Greek term agon, a contest is an encounter in which the participant stretches
himself or herself towards the physical and conscious limits: a con- testant is one who engages in
an activity that calls forth the full exercise of powers.
An appreciation of the Greek context from which our sports heritage has been derimight enable us
not to see our rivals as other men, as it were, but as standards of excellence to which we are
assisted by other men, our so-called opponents.
Standards of excellence can only be obtained by viewing the opponent as an agent who provides the
opportunity for the testing and extension of the self, and for whom the self provides the opportunity
for testing and extension The opponent is thus a facilitator for the activity of the self, and the self
is a facilitator for the opponent. Competition is a cooperative venture.
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport ISSN: 0094-8705 (Print) 1543-2939 (Online) Journal
homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjps20 Taijiquan and the Body without Organs: a
holistic framework for sport philosophy Tien-Deng Yu & Jess Ilundin-Agurruza To cite
this article: Tien-Deng Yu & Jess Ilundin-Agurruza (2016) Taijiquan and the Body
without Organs: a holistic framework for sport philosophy, Journal of the Philosophy of
Sport, 43:3, 424-439, DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2016.1227263 To link to this article:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2016.1227263
Taijiquan is an internal martial art. [] Tendons, bones and muscles are all external; only the
heart-mind and awareness are internal. Taijiquans goal of practicing in a steady and quiet manner
is to cultivate this inner awareness
Other Taijiquan key elements are: neigong , focus on breathing, and qigong , meditative
awareness of energetic and kinetic processes. Explicitly holistic, the latter two integrate movement,
posture, meditation, and breathing overtly with philosophical tenets where individual and cosmos
are seen as a unit. Given this, it is unsurprising that health is paramount for Taijiquan
Specifically, its practice focuses on the accordance of the internal and external, progressing from
Triple Outer Unification (muscle, bone, and skin) to Triple Inner Unification (jin internal
force, qi circulation of energy flow or vibration, and shen internal attention), and ultimately
from microcosm to macrocosm. Jin, qi, and shen are three vital energies with different degrees of
embodiment.
Jin is the most embodied, as it is directly observable in others movements, such as kicks and
punches, and felt kinesthetically by performers. But, being closely connected with song , loose
and soft, suppleness rather than intense effort characterize it. Qi, one of the most important notions
in Chinese philosophy and religion, literally translates as breath or air (the character represents
evaporation over a rice field). It refers to an amalgamation of energy, mood, and disposition that
animates all living beings. For our purposes, it can be likened to the flow of energy in, around, and
through our body. When sportspeople feel energized, electrically charged, or sapped, qi could be
used to describe these. Shen is the least embodied. It can be translated also as spirit and
originally was related to deities and spirits. Presently, it denotes awareness of ones various states,
as when paying attention to how one feels when kicking, whether tired versus feeling energized.
This view requires practitioners to coordinate between triple outer unification (external muscle,
bone, skin) and the triple inner unification (jin, qi, shen).
Two main sets of theories explain the ideal of inside-outside connectivity in Taijiquan. The first
refers to the inside-outside integration between practitioners, opponents, and environment.
Antagonistic sports (football, tennis, and boxing) could benefit most from this framework, as it
would encourage seeing opponents as partners in a mutual quest to excel
The second, known as the inside-outside accordance, propounds the ultimate unification of
practitioners microcosm (inner corporeal harmony) and macrocosm (outer unification with the
universe). Nature sports (sailing, freediving, surfing, and mountaineering) nurture such
connectivity naturally: practitioners often describe their experiences holistically as being fluid
and one with their environment.
Becoming one with the cosmos, Zhuangzi elaborates, is a dynamic process of becoming rather than
a static condition of being, but the co-existence with Heaven and Earth still seems to imply a
sequential process before culminating the ideal. For Zhuangzi, the consummate person, zhrn ,
able to perform expertly, spontaneously, and successfully, embodies and carries this out
In line with the qi element in Taijiquan, for Deleuze, the body is the assemblage of forces or
energies: Every relationship of forces constitutes a body whether it is chemical, biological, social
or political. Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a
relationship (Deleuze 2005, 37).
Holistically, this emphasizes continuities and erases divisions. It is sans-vision, sans-hearing, sansspeech, sans-odor. In such a state, thinking does not happen in the head only but also limbs and
body parts. The fencers lunge is a flowing sequence of hands, arms, legs, and pe a thinkingin-movement. It is not a matter of the popular yet inaccurate truism of muscle memory, where
actions happen automatically and subconsciously. Rather, the decentered but whole body, more
than the sum of its parts, acts lucid, spontaneous, and without reliance on mental contents or
representations
______________________________________________________________________________
Meditations on Sport: On the Trailof Ortega y Gassets Philosophyof Sportive Existence
David Inglis To cite this article: David Inglis (2004) Meditations on Sport: On the Trailof
Ortega y Gassets Philosophyof Sportive Existence, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport,
31:1, 78-96 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2004.9714651
Ortega argued that in many ways, the figure of the sportsperson represented more than any other
symbol the human beings quintessence, for in the activities of sport, we see dramatically
embodied the individuals striving to overcome the multitude of obstacles with which the cosmos
confronts him or her. It is in the agon of sportive endeavors that is illustrated most fully the
challenge of being human and the ways in which each member of humankind seeks to transcend
the conditions in which he or she finds him or herself.
(La rebelion de las masas) Ortega (27) argues that Western society is increasingly threatened by the
presence and domination of the mass man, a person whose aesthetic and intellectual sensibilities
are strictly of the most mediocre sort. The increasing influence of the thinking of the mass man in
Western cultural life threatens the continuation of the higher culture created and tended by artistic
and intellectual elites, and in so doing it jeopardizes the very lifeblood of the Western world, its
aesthetic and cognitive traditions
The human, on this view, is a problem-solving animal, which is constantly being faced with
dilemmas with which it must somehow find ways of dealing. The human beings primary relation to
objects is whether they help or hinder him or her to achieve whatever practical projects s/he has in
mind. In like fashion to other forms of phenomenological thought, Ortega sees this practical
engagement with the world as prior to, and the basis for, the judgments of reflective consciousness.
In Ortegas terminology, the elementary components of human existence are executive acts, those
activities that pertain in practical, prereflective ways between the human being and the object
world
Ortegas oeuvre, there lies buried a series of reflections on the nature of sports and how these are
symptomatic of more general elements of human existence.
The goal of the meditation is not to describe an object in terms of a priori propositions. Rather, the
meditative method takes various routes around the object, regarding it from different angles, and
seeing what conclusions are reached. The aim 80 INGLIS Meditations on Sport 81 of this procedure
is to extract from the object at hand its essence, the central and guiding idea that gives it its
form and makes it what it is.
Technology in its essential form is always part of an attempt by human beings to free themselves
from the tyranny of labor aimed at meeting the basic necessities of human existence and
reproductionthe collection of foodstuffs, the creation and maintenance of shelter, the
fabrication of clothing and so on. Technology is always based on reducing the time and effort
spent in activities of this sort in favor of living what a particular group of people perceive as the
good life, however that might be defined in a particular society at a given time. In each period,
the good life involves what humans within a given cultural context feel to be not only the most
pleasurable way to live but also the way of life that seems to them to involve a reaching toward
what they see as the most sublime elements of what it means to be a human being.
But if this condition is met, even minimally, a problem arises for the social group in question.
Ortega asks, What is man to do after he has eliminated 82 INGLIS Meditations on Sport 83 [at
least to some degree] what nature compels him to do? What fills his life? For doing nothing means
to empty life, to not-live (23: p. 132). The answer Ortega gives to these questions as to the
existential dilemma of filling ones time up is that although there are many ways of achieving this,
some of the most telling from the philosophers point of view are sportive activities. These are
simultaneously both means of achieving individual enjoyment and expressions of the groups
highest aspirations as to what human life should be like.
some sense of life lived free from external constraints, an autonomous rather than heteronomous
form of existence in Kants terms.1 Such autonomy takes the form of a gamelike attitude toward
life, wherein humans freely decide to adopt and to live by what are, in effect, the conventional
and arbitrary rules of a game, where arbitrary means undetermined by nature and material
wants.
Humans become most human when at play, because they have chosen to adopt the rules under
which sportive activity occurs, rather than operating wholly under the demands of life conditions
not of their choosing. By entering into sportive activities, humans give their mundane destiny
the grace of a game (23: p. 132).
humans are in part extranatural, because although both humans and animals can engage in
play, the latter cannot engage in rule-governed sports or at least cannot fully engage in such
activities. There is an echo here of the work of the later Wittgenstein (40; see also 39), where it is
precisely the rule-governed nature of human life that makes it explicitly human.
Man is what he does. Echoing Heideggers and other existentialists theme of the human beings
thrownness in the world, Ortegas vision of human existence stresses that life is given [to] us,
since we find ourselves in it, without our knowing how or why (20: p. 96). Thus no matter how
much a particular human being is embedded in a particular cultural context, he or she still at
some basic level feels adrift in an alien environment. This is a further reason why humans and
animals are different: Animals are adapted to their environments while man is essentially
unadapted. Man is everywhere a foreigner (20: p. 97).
QUOTE: The life that is given us is not given ready-made, and instead we have to forge it
for ourselves, each one his own life. Life is something we must do, and it gives us a lot to do . . . life
is not a fact, not a factum, but a faciendum, something that has to be accomplished; it is not a
substantive but a gerund. (20: p. 96; emphasis in original)
argument that the central feature of sportive rules is that in each sport the players choose to
renounce the simplest, easiest and most direct approach to achieving . . . a goal is always ruled
out in favour of a more complex, more difficult and more indirect approach. I think that Ortega
would agree with Suits contention that choosing more difficult rather than the most efficient
means for achieving a particular aim is an elemental feature of all sports worth the name.
ennui and anomie
Y es que es el Ennui el resultado del pensamiento Moderno del siglo XIX, en el que el ser
humano est convencido de que sus propias acciones son las que marcan el camino de su
vida, y cuando semejante peso cae en sus hombros, no le queda ms que llegar a la
inaccin como un mecanismo de defensa del s mismo.
Ortegas understanding of the state rests on a distinction analogous to the one described
above, where he identified a fundamental division between 86 INGLIS Meditations on Sport
87 mundane, necessary labor on the one hand, and the activities pursued freely in the
time opened up by technologies on the other. Ortega (28: p. 17), drawing on biological
notions of random mutations, argues that all organic life, both human and animal, is
characterized by two great classes of activity, one original, creative, vital par excellence
that is, spontaneous and disinterested; the other of utilitarian character, in which the
first is put to use and mechanized.
Utility does not create and invent; it simply employs and stabilizes what has been created
without it (28: p. 17).
If the classic instance of the obligatory effort which strictly satisfies a need is to be
found in what man calls work, the other, the effort ex abundantia cordis [from the
overflowing abundance of the human heart], becomes most manifest in sport. . . .
We thus feel induced to invert the inveterate hierarchy [which places instrumental
labour over leisure activities]. Sportive activity seems to us the foremost and
creative, the most exalted, serious, and important part of life, while labour ranks
second as its derivative . . . life, properly speaking, resides in the first [i.e., sportive
activity] alone; the rest is relatively mechanic and a mere functioning. (28: p. 18)
homo faber human creator of their own goods
To look askance: in a way that shows a lack of trust or approval
The state does not, as on the Marxian account, arise for utilitarian and rationally
purposeful reasons (such 86 INGLIS Meditations on Sport 87 as the domination of
one class by another) but for irrational reasons, which are themselves part of the
key principle of life, the constantly flowing superabundance of energiesin this
case, human energieswillfully expressing themselves. In the beginning there is
vigour, not utility (28: p. 31).
young men is the most powerful group in such a society, for they have bonded together for the
pursuit of common interests
It is here that the roots of the State lie, for in order to be successful in their aims, the young men
must fight the men of the other tribes. Political organization arises because war calls for a leader
and necessitates discipline, thus bringing into being authority, law, and social structure (28: p.
28). Warfare also requires discipline, and Ortega regards ascesis, a condition described by a Greek
word that refers to the self-imposed hardships undergone by athletes in training, as being
simultaneously sportive and military. Asceticism is seen as having its roots in primitive youth
associations, in which play, sports, the erotic drives of heterosexuality, and the exercise of martial
skills are all mixed up together. Overall, it is the effervescence of youth, rather than directly
utilitarian reasons, that begets the state, and thus its most basic form should be seen as an
association of the young for the purpose . . . of performing all sorts of . . . exploits. Rather than a
parliament or a cabinet of bigwigs, it resembles an athletic club (28: pp. 30-1).
Ortegas focus on the explicitly sportive origins of a phenomenon such as political life is a unique
one among the set of major European thinkers and is thus worthy of our consideration, if not of our
complete acceptance.
The object of Ortegas meditation in this particular case is to hunt down the hunt (24: p. 140).
Ortegas distillation of the essence of hunting can be summarized in this way. The essence of
hunting lies not in the purposes humans engage in it for, either as a utilitarian search for food (as
with Paleolithic man) or as a leisure pursuit (as with modern man). Rather, the essence lies in the
nature of the relationship between hunter and prey. There are three main elements to this
relationship, as Ortega sees it. hunting is a feature not only of humananimal relations but animal
animal relations, too. In both cases, there is an animal (including man) that hunts and an animal that
is hunted. This implies necessarily a relationship of relative strength and relative weakness. If the
hunted were on an equal footing with the hunter, especially in terms of physical strength, then we
would be dealing with combat, rather than hunting proper (24: p. 60). Ortega sees this situation as
rooted in an elementary fact of nature, namely that there pertains a zoological hierarchy
the distinctiveness of hunting rests precisely in that as an activity, it involves the series of efforts
and skills which the hunter has to exercise to dominate with sufficient frequency the countermeasures of the animal which is the object of the hunt (24: p. 62).
In sum, then, hunting is what an animal [including the human animal] does to take possession, dead
or alive, of some other being that belongs to a species basically inferior to its own . . . [yet the]
superiority of the hunter over the prey cannot be absolute. (24: p. 62)
Once it is no longer regarded as a necessary food-gathering activity, it is freed of its obligatory
nature and is thus fully elevated to the rank of a sport (24: p. 40). The process of the hunt
becomes a form of enjoyment per se, for a sport is the effort which is carried out for the pleasure
that it gives in itself and not for the transitory result that the effort brings forth (24: p. 105). It is the
exertion of effort for its own sake that supplies the pleasure post-Paleolithic man takes in hunting.
Once again, Ortega draws a line between necessary labor on the one side and freely chosen pursuits
and leisure activities on the other: Happy occupations, it is clear, are not merely pleasures; they
are efforts, and real sports are effort. It is not possible, then, to distinguish work from sport by a plus
or minus in fatigue. The difference is that sport is an effort made completely freely, for the pure
enjoyment of it, while work is an obligatory effort made with an eye to . . . profit. (24: p. 42)
In utilitarian hunting the true purpose of the hunter . . . is the death of the animal. . . . But in
hunting as a sport, this order of means to ends is reversed. To the sportsman the death of the
game is not what interests him [but rather what is important is] everything that he had to do
to achieve that deaththat is, the hunt. Therefore what was before only a means to an end is
now an end in itself . . . one does not hunt in order to kill; on the contrary, one kills in order
to have hunted. (24: p. 105)
We pointed out above that Ortega in his analysis of the relations between sportive practices and
political organization clearly connects sports and asceticism. If ethics is the child of the
renunciation of impulses and immediate gratifications, then the origins of ethical attitudes toward
animals may be rooted in some fundamental way in sportive hunting
Ortega argues that the hunt as a sport [is] a supremely free renunciation by man of the supremacy
of his humanity (24: p. 63). If he or she is truly a hunter according to Ortegas definition, the
sporting hunter rejects humankinds potentially vast technological superiority over the animal
world, in favor of using weapons that give the prey some chance of escaping. This is not a
humanitarian gesture but one that is necessary if the act of tailing the animal is to be hunting
proper, rather than all too easily achieved slaughter. Entering into a sport means renouncing ones
absolute freedom to do as one will and to achieve ones ends by any means at all, in favor of
playing by certain rules. An ethical attitude toward animal life is arguably in part made possible by
transcending the immediate desideratum to kill for the purposes of collecting meat, in favor of
trapping animals as if it were a game characterized by its own sense of fairness and correct
behavior. It seems highly paradoxical that the genesis of (some form of) ethical treatment of animals
by humans might be connected to, of all activities, hunting, but that is the provocative implication
of Ortegas analysis.
Ahora ya no sabemos lo que va a pasar maana en el mundo, y eso secretamente nos regocija;
porque eso, ser imprevisible, ser un horizonte siempre abierto a toda posibilidad, es la vida
autntica, la verdadera plenitud de la vida.
opinin periclitada, miran de la historia slo la poltica o la cultura, y no advierten que todo
eso es slo la superficie de la historia; que la realidad histrica es, antes que eso y ms hondo
que eso, un puro afn de vivir, una potencia parecida a las csmicas; no la misma, pero s
hermana de la que inquieta al mar, fecundiza a la fiera, pone flor en el rbol, hace temblar a
la estrella.
Cada trozo de tierra no est ya recluido en su lugar geomtrico, sino que para muchos efectos
visuales acta en los dems sitios del planeta. Segn el principio fsico de que las cosas estn all
donde actan, reconoceremos hoy a cualquier punto del globo la ms efectiva ubicuidad. Esta
proximidad de lo lejano, esta presencia de lo ausente, ha aumentado en proporcin fabulosa el
horizonte de cada vida.
Mas el crecimiento de la potencialidad vital no se reduce a lo dicho hasta aqu. Ha aumentado
tambin en un sentido ms inmediato y misterioso. Es un hecho constante y notorio que en el
esfuerzo fsico y deportivo se cumplen hoy performances que superan enormemente a cuantas
se conocen del pasado. No basta con admirar cada una de ellas y reconocer el rcord que baten,
sino advertir la impresin que su frecuencia deja en el nimo, convencindonos de que el organismo
humano posee en nuestros tiempos capacidades superiores a las que nunca ha tenido. Porque cosa
similar acontece en la ciencia. En un par de lustros, no ms, ha ensanchado sta inverosmilmente
su horizonte csmico. La fsica de Einstein se mueve en espacios tan vastos, que la antigua fsica de
Newton ocupa en ellos slo una buhardilla. Y este crecimiento extensivo se debe a un crecimiento
intensivo en la previsin cientfica. La fsica de Einstein est hecha atendiendo a las mnimas
diferencias que antes se despreciaban y no entraban en cuenta por parecer sin importancia. El
tomo, en fin, lmite ayer del mundo, resulta que hoy se ha hinchado hasta convertirse en todo un
sistema planetario. Y en todo esto no me refiero a lo que pueda significar como perfeccin de la
cultura eso no me interesa ahora, sino al crecimiento de las potencias subje- 57 tivas que todo
eso supone. No subrayo que la fsica de Einstein sea ms exacta que la de Newton, sino que el
hombre Einstein sea capaz de mayor exactitud y libertad de espritu que el hombre Newton; lo
mismo que el campen de boxeo da hoy puetazos de calibre mayor que los que se han dado nunca.
Slo hay una decadencia absoluta: la que consiste en una vitalidad menguante; y sta slo
existe cuando se siente. Por esta razn me he detenido a considerar un fenmeno que suele
desatenderse: la conciencia o sensacin de que toda poca tiene de su altitud vital.
Y conclua yo haciendo notar el hecho evidentsimo de que nuestro tiempo se caracteriza por una
extraa presuncin de ser ms que todo otro tiempo pasado; ms an: por desentenderse de todo
pretrito, no reconocer pocas clsicas y normativas, sino verso a s mismo como una vida nueva
superior a todas las antiguas e irreductible a ellas. Dudo de que sin afianzarse bien en esta
advertencia se pueda entender a nuestro tiempo. Porque ste es precisamente su problema. Si se
sintiese decado, vera otras pocas como superiores a l, y esto sera una y misma cosa con
estimarlas y admirarlas y venerar los principios que las informaron. Nuestro tiempo tendra ideales
claros y firmes, aunque fuese incapaz de realizarlos. Pero la verdad es estrictamente lo contrario:
vivimos en un tiempo que se siente fabulosamente capaz para realizar, pero no sabe qu
realizar. Domina todas las cosas, pero no es dueo de s mismo. Se siente perdido en su propia
abundancia. Con ms medios, ms saber, ms tcnicas que nunca, resulta que el mundo actual va
como el ms desdichado que haya habido: puramente a la deriva. De aqu esa extraa dualidad de
prepotencia e inseguridad que anida en el alma contempornea.
Este ensayo quisiera vislumbrar el diagnstico de nuestro tiempo, de nuestra vida actual. Va
enunciada la primera parte de l, que puede resumirse as: nuestra vida, como repertorio de
posibilidades, es magnfica, exuberante, superior a todas las histricamente conocidas. Mas
por lo mismo que su formato es mayor, ha desbordado todos los cauces, los principios, las
normas y los ideales legados por la tradicin. Es ms vida que todas las vidas, y por lo mismo
ms problemtica. No puede orientarse en el pretrito. Tiene que inventar su propio destino
Circunstancia y decisin son los dos elementos radicales de que se compone la vida. Es, pues,
falso decir que en la vida deciden las circunstancias. Al contrario: las circunstancias son el
dilema, siempre nuevo, ante el cual tenemos que decidirnos. Pero el que decide es nuestro carcter.
esto vale tambin para la vida colectiva. Tambin en ella hay, primero, un horizonte de
posibilidades, y luego, una resolucin que elige y decide el modo efectivo de la existencia colectiva.
Esta resolucin emana del carcter que la sociedad tenga, o lo que es lo mismo, del tipo de hombre
dominante en ella. En nuestro tiempo domina el hombre-masa; es l quien decide. No se diga que
esto era lo que aconteca ya en la poca de la democracia, del sufragio universal. En el sufragio
universal no deciden las masas, sino que su papel consisti en adherirse a la decisin de una u otra
minora. stas presentaban sus programas excelente vocablo. Los programas eran, en efecto,
programas de vida colectiva. En ellos se invitaba a la masa a aceptar un proyecto de decisin
El poder pblico se halla en manos de un representante de masas. stas son tan poderosas que han
aniquilado toda posible oposicin. Son dueas del poder pblico en forma tan incontrastable y
superlativa, que sera difcil encontrar en la historia situaciones de gobierno tan preponderante como
stas. Y, sin embargo, el poder pblico, el gobierno, vive al da; no se presenta como un porvenir
franco, ni significa un anuncio claro de futuro, no aparece como comienzo de algo cuyo desarrollo o
evolucin resulte imaginable. En suma, vive sin programa de vida, sin proyecto. No sabe a dnde
va, porque, en rigor, no va, no tiene camino prefijado, trayectoria anticipada De aqu que su
actuacin se reduzca a esquivar el conflicto de cada hora; no a resolverlo, sino a escapar de l por
de pronto, empleando los medios que sean, aun a costa de acumular, con su empleo, mayores
conflictos sobre la hora prxima
El hombre-masa es el hombre cuya vida carece de proyectos y va a la deriva
En las escuelas, que tanto enorgullecian al pasado siglo, no ha podido hacerse otra cosa que ensear
a las masas las tcnicas de la vida moderna, pero no se ha logrado educarlas. Se les han dado
instrumentos para vivir intensamente, pero no sensibilidad para los grandes deberes histricos; se
les han inoculado atropelladamente el orgullo y el poder de los medios modernos, pero no el
espritu. Por eso no quieren nada con el espritu, y las nuevas generaciones se disponen a tomar el
mando del mundo como si el mundo fuese un paraso sin huellas antiguas, sin problemas
tradicionales y complejos.
Si no preferimos ser dementes, a sacar estas consecuencias: primera, que la democracia liberal
fundada en la creacin tcnica es el tipo superior de vida pblica hasta ahora conocido;
segunda, que ese tipo de vida no ser el mejor imaginable, pero el que imaginemos mejor tendr
que conservar lo esencial de aquellos principios; tercera, que es suicida todo retorno a formas
de vida inferiores a la del siglo XIX.
La idea de que el historiador es un profeta del revs, resume toda la filosofa de la historia.
Ciertamente que slo cabe anticipar la estructura general del futuro; pero eso mismo es lo
nico que en verdad comprendemos del pretrito o del presente.
El mundo que desde el nacimiento rodea al hombre nuevo no le mueve a limitarse en ningn
sentido, no le presenta veto ni contencin alguna, sino que, al contrario, hostiga sus apetitos,
que, en principio, pueden crecer indefinidamente. Pues acontece y esto es muy importante
que ese mundo del siglo XIX y comienzos del XX no slo tiene las perfecciones y amplitudes que
de hecho posee, sino que adems sugiere a sus habitantes una seguridad radical en que maana
ser an ms rico, ms perfecto y ms amplio, como si gozase de un espontneo e inagotable
crecimiento. Porque, en efecto, el hombre vulgar, al encontrarse con ese mundo tcnica y
socialmente tan perfecto, cree que lo ha producido la naturaleza, y no piensa nunca en los
esfuerzos geniales de individuos excelentes que supone su creacin. Menos todava admitir la
idea de que todas estas facilidades siguen apoyndose en ciertas difciles virtudes de los
hombres,
Mimar es no limitar los deseos, dar la impresin a un ser de que todo le est permitido y a nada est
obligado. La criatura sometida a este rgimen no tiene la experiencia de sus propios confines. A
fuerza de evitarle toda presin en derredor, todo choque con otros seres, llega a creer
efectivamente que slo l existe, y se acostumbra a no contar con los dems, sobre todo a no
contar con nadie como superior a l. Esta sensacin de la su- 81 perioridad ajena slo poda
proporcionrsela quien, ms fuerte que l, lo hubiese obligado a renunciar a un deseo, a
reducirse, a contenerse. As habra aprendido esta esencial disciplina: Ah concluyo yo y empieza
otro que puede ms que yo. En el mundo, por lo visto, hay dos: yo y otro superior a m
el absurdo estado de nimo que esas masas revelan: no les preocupa ms que su bienestar, y al
mismo tiempo, son insolidarias de las causas de ese bienestar. Como no ven en las ventajas de la
civilizacin un invento y construccin prodigiosos, que slo con grandes esfuerzos y cautelas se
pueden sostener, creen que su papel se reduce a exigirlas perentoriamente, cual si fuesen derechos
nativos. En los motines que la escasez provoca suelen las masas populares buscar pan, y el
medio que emplean suele ser destruir las panaderas
There might be a deceptive tendency to believe that a life born into a world of plenty should be
better, more really a life than one which consists in a struggle against scarcity. Such is not the case
an appearance of superabundance, of excess of riches, of superfluity. A single example of this: the
security seemingly offered by progress (i.e. the ever-growing increase of vital advantages)
demoralised the average man, inspiring him with a confidence which is false, vicious, and
atrophying peoples, germinate in the mass-man. For example: his propensity to make out of games
and sports the central occupation of his life; the cult of the body- hygienic regime and attention to
dress; lack of romance in his dealings with woman; his amusing himself with the intellectual,
while at bottom despising him and at times ordering his flunkeys or his bravoes to chastise him; his
preference for living under an absolute authority rather than under a regime of freediscussion, 34
etc.
English aristocracy seems to be an exception to what we have said. But though the case is an
admirable one, it would suffice to indicate in outline the history of England in order to show that
this exception proves the rule. Contrary to what is usually said, the English nobility has been the
least superabundant of Europe, and has lived in more constant danger than any other. And
because it has always lived in danger, it has succeeded in winning respect for itself- which implies
that it has ceaselessly remained in the breach. The fundamental fact is forgotten that England was
until well on into the XVIIIth Century the poorest country in Western Europe. It was this fact that
saved the nobility. Not being abundant in resources, it had very early to enter into commercial and
industrial occupation- considered ignoble on the Continent- that is to say, it decided
very soon to lead an economic existence creative in character, and not to depend
solely on its privileges.
a law confirmed by palaeontology and biogeography: human life has arisen
and progressed only when the resources it could count on were balanced by
the problems it met with. This is true, as much in the spiritual order as in the
physical.
it allows the aver age man to take his place in a world of superabundance, of which he
perceives only the lavishness of the means at his disposal, nothing of the pains
involved. He finds himself surrounded by marvellous instruments, healing medicines,
watchful governments , comfortable privileges. On the other hand, he is ignorant how
difficult it is to invent those medicines and those instruments and to assure their
production in the future; he does not realise how unstable is the organisation of the
State and is scarcely conscious to himself of any obligations. This lack of balance
falsifies his nature, vitiates it in its very roots, causing him to lose contact with the
very substance of life, which is made up of absolute danger, is radically problematic.
The form most contradictory to human life that can appear among the human species
is the self-satisfied man. when he becomes the predominant type, it is time to raise the alarm
and to announce that humanity is threatened with degeneration, that is, with relative death. On this
view, the vital level represented by Europe at the present day is superior to the whole of the human
past, but if we look to the future, we are made to fear that it will neither preserve the level reached
nor attain to a higher one, but rather will recede and fall back upon lower heights. He is a man who
has entered upon life to do what he jolly well likes. he man of this type thinks that he can behave
outside just as he does at home; believes that nothing is fatal, irremediable, irrevocable.
But destiny- what from a vital point of view one has to be or has not to be- is not discussed, it is
either accepted or rejected. If we accept it, we are genuine; if not, we are the negation, the
falsification of ourselves. 36 Destiny does not consist in what we feel we should like to do; rather
is it recognised in its clear features in the consciousness that we must do what we do not feel
like doing. Well, then, the satisfied man is characterised by his knowing that certain things
cannot be, and nevertheless, for that very reason, pretending in act and word to be convinced of the
opposite
of Europe. Almost all the positions taken up and proclaimed are false ones. The only efforts that are
being made are to escape from our real destiny, to blind ourselves to its evidence, to be deaf to its
deep appeal, to avoid facing up to what has to be.
This cynic did nothing but saboter the civilisation of the time. He was the
nihilist of Hellenism. He created nothing, he made nothing. His role was to
undoor rather to attempt to undo, for he did not succeed in his purpose.
The cynic, a parasite of civilisation, lives by denying it, for the very reason
that he is convinced that it will not fail. What would become of the cynic
among a savage people where everyone, naturally and quite seriously,
fulfils what the cynic farcically considers to be his personal role? What is
your Fascist if he does not speak ill of liberty, or your surrealist if he does
not blaspheme against art? None other could be the conduct of this type of
man bor into a too well-organised world, of which he perceives only the
advantages and not the dangers.
For it is necessary to insist upon this extraordinary but undeniable fact: experimental science has progressed
thanks in great part to the work of men astoundingly mediocre, and even less than mediocre. That is to say,
modern science, the root and symbol of our actual civilisation, finds a place for- the intellectually
commonplace man and allows him to work therein with success. The reason of this lies in what is at the same
time the great advantage and the gravest peril of the new science, and of the civilisation directed and
represented by it, namely, mechanisation.
Anyone who wishes can observe the stupidity of thought, judgment, and action shown to-day in politics, art,
religion, and the general problems of life and the world by the men of science, and of course, behind them,
the doctors, engineers, financiers, teachers, and so on. That state of not listening, of not submitting to
higher courts of appeal which I have repeatedly put forward as characteristic of the mass-man, reaches its
height precisely in these partially qualified men. They symbolise, and to a great extent constitute, the actual
dominion of the masses, and their barbarism is the most immediate cause of European demoralisation.
Furthermore, they afford the clearest, most striking example of how the civilisation of the last century,
abandoned to its own devices, has brought about this rebirth of primitivism and barbarism.
This degradation is nothing else than the acceptance, as a normal, constituted condition, of an irregularity, of
something which, though accepted, is still regarded as not right. As it is impossible to hange into healthy
normality what is of its essence unhealthy and abnormal, the individual decides to adapt himself to the thing
that is wrong, making himself a part of the crime or irregularity.
In these years we are witnessing the gigantic spectacle of innumerable human lives wandering about lost in
their own labyrinths, through not having anything to which to give themselves. All imperatives, all
commands, are in a state of suspension. The situation might seem to be an ideal one, since every existence is
left entirely free to do just as it pleases- to look after itself. The same with every nation. Europe has
slackened its pressure on the world. But the result has been contrary to what might have been expected.
Given over to itself, every life has been left empty, with nothing to do. And as it has to be filled with
something, it invents frivolities for itself, gives itself to false occupations which impose nothing intimate,
sincere.
But the Spaniard has done just the opposite; instead of resisting a form of authority which his innermost
conscience repudiated, he has preferred to falsify all the rest of his being in order to bring it into line with
that initial unreality.
The goal is not my motion, not my life, it is the something to which I put my life and which
consequently is outside it, beyond it. If I decide to walk alone inside my own existence, egoistically, I
make no progress. I arrive nowhere.
If the European grows accustomed not to rule, a generation and a half will be sufficient to
bring the old continent, and the whole world along with it, into moral inertia, intellectual
sterility, universal barbarism
Incapable of creative, specialised effort, he will be always falling back on yesterday, on
custom, on routine. He will turn into a commonplace, conventional, empty creature, like the
Greeks of the decadence and those of the Byzantine epoch.
I contend that the reflexive model requires a strong theory of moral transformation because of its
deep anthropological assumptions about the moral being of the human. In Murdoch's view, human
beings have a natural orientation to the good that is continually and obsessively distorted by the
egoism of the psyche. The purpose of spiritual exercises is to purify the psyche of its selfish desire
by reorienting its energies towards the world and others (hence the idea of "unselfing")
Foucault's aesthetic approach acknowledges neither a natural orientation of human beings toward
the good, nor a distortion in that orientation. Therefore, his "techniques of the self' are meant
primarily to intensify the experience of subjectivity by effecting a conversion to the self, whereas
Murdoch's "techniques of unselfing" effect a conversion to the real which purifies the self of egoism
and makes a proper relation to the good and hence to others possible.
Resilience J.S. Russell To cite this article: J.S. Russell (2015) Resilience, Journal of the
Philosophy of Sport, 42:2, 159-183, DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2015.1009838 To link to
this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2015.1009838
Resilience is arguably the central virtue in sport. There is even an argument that it is the central, or
at least a cardinal, virtue in a human life. But it is an overlooked virtue.
we define resilience, provisionally for now, as the ability to come back from or to respond
effectively to some sort of setback, failure, or hardship,
Definitions offered by research psychologists often reflect their preoccupations. Thus, researchers
who have focussed on individuals or communities attempts to respond to tragic or deeply
traumatic events such as a serious illness or destruction of communities by cataclysmic events like
war or natural disasters have described resilience as an ability to resume normal or pre-adversity
levels of functioning
resilience do not involve resuming pre-adversity levels of functioning but, rather, they involve
responding to a failure or setback to achieving a desired but previously unattained level of skill,
ability, functioning, or achievement. By contrast, connecting resilience to achieving a previous state
of functioning seems to equate the idea with physical models of resilience, for example, when
engineers measure the capacity of a metal beam to return to its original functional state after stress.
But bouncing back for humans is more complex that simply returning to a previous state. The
examples just discussed imply that human resilience that has a psychological component reflects
something different, an ability to adapt to adversity. This need not imply a full return to a preadversity state. In some cases, it can mean developing beyond a pre-adversity state as we have seen
Resilience is a virtue that is expressed in the ability to adapt positively to significant adversity.
As Aristotle recognized, virtues are not simply traits of individuals, but are complex states that are
realized and expressed habitually in action over time and in appropriate contexts (Aristotle 1098a3
21, 1109a2530). They require experience, training, habit, and favourable external goods and
conditions to be developed and realized (1103a1617, 1103b5, 1099a281099b6), and so are fragile
and not necessarily available to everyone. They are not reflected in a single action (1105a130). A
single brave act does not make a brave person.
Such a process is fundamentally concerned with making correct choices, which is the ultimate aim
of Aristotelian virtue. Thus, a chief characteristic of a virtuous, and indeed a resilient, person
involves the ability to make correct choices and to plan wisely to cope with or overcome significant
adversity
________________________________________________________________________________
On practising in sport: towards an ascetological understanding of sport Kenneth
Aggerholm To cite this article: Kenneth Aggerholm (2016) On practising in sport:
towards an ascetological understanding of sport, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport,
43:3, 350-364, DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2016.1159917
three fundamental dimensions of human existence: excellence (aret), competition (agon) and
practising (asksis). Talent development in sport is in this perspective understood as a striving for
excellence, where the ascetic and agonistic aspects are described as two key dimensions of this
striving.
In the ancient understanding, however, asksis was a central and constructive part of human
existence, and especially in Stoic philosophy it played a central role in living a virtuous and good
life. As Nietzsche, Foucault, Hadot and Sloterdijk, amongst others, have pointed out, the meaning of
the ancient Greek concept asksis was simply practise, training or exercise
asksis was stressed by Nietzsche (1997) in his attempt to remove the ideal of asceticism from the
moral and religious aim of denial or obligation. As a contrast to this, he described how I also want
to make asceticism natural again: in place of the aim of denial, the aim of strengthening; a
gymnastics of the will; () an experiment with adventures and arbitrary dangers (Nietzsche 1967,
483).
Foucault described how the ancient understanding of asksis is different from Christian asceticism
in (at least) three ways: First, asksis is not related to obedience to the law, but a practise of truth or
rather becoming the subject of truth in a practise and exercise of oneself on oneself (Foucault 2005,
317). Second, the object of asksis is not self-renunciation, but to take care of oneself in the sense
of constituting a full, perfect, and complete relationship of oneself to oneself (Foucault 2005,
320). Third, the means to this is not sacrifice or the renunciation of this or that part of oneself. It
involves acquiring something through asksis, so it does not reduce, it equips and provides the
individual with an open and oriented preparation for the events of life (Foucault 2005, 32021).
Sloterdijk (2013) ambition is to reveal religion as merely one way of practising amongst many
others. he sets out to describe how human beings have, albeit in very different ways, at all times and
in all cultural contexts been practising; people have always formed and shaped themselves by
engaging for example in self-overcoming activities such as diets, fasts and meditation, as well as
acrobatics, performative artistry and the bodily self-transcendence as we see it in athletic
endeavours
virtue is acquired through asksis and asksis is the practising of virtue. To understand this process,
it can be useful to look towards Sloterdijks general ascetology, where he argues that there is a
vertical tension inherent in all aspects of human existence.
I (Aggerholm 2015b) have argued that practising can be seen as a virtue in itself when it comes to
talent development in sport, but in a strict sense practising and athletic ascetics is related to the
process towards virtue, to virtuous activity rather than virtue itself. it concerns the self-forming
practices of ethical behaviour, that is, the formative aspect of ethics and morals, which has,
according to Wimbush and Valantasis (1998),
struggle. Deficiency of overload means that muscles and abilities gradually atrophy, and
existentially a lack of difficulties and struggles is no ideal (see also Aggerholm 2015a, 15052).
In his analysis of this Foucault paid particular attention to Stoic and Cynic philosophy (Seneca and
Demetrius), where athletic endeavours and the athlete of life were often used as a metaphor for
describing ascetic practises of progressing towards wisdom, and where the good athlete appears as
one who practices (Foucault 2005, 321). From this observation Foucault continued to pose the
essential question: But practices what? (Foucault 2005, 321).
The paraskeu will be nothing other than the set of necessary and
sufficient moves, of necessary and sufficient practices, which will
enable us to be stronger than anything that may happen in our life.
This is the athletic training of the sage. (Foucault 2005, 32122, his
emphasis) Foucault 2005, 32122
Following this description of athletic training that aims at prowess (paraskeu), athletic ascetics can
be clarified as a process that is both self-referential and relational as it is aimed at being ready for
what you may meet. This argument is interesting to relate to the Stoic understanding of paraskeu,
which Foucault described as the equipping and preparation of the subject so that it is properly,
necessarily, and sufficiently armed for whatever circumstance of life may arise (Foucault 2005,
240). Like Russells account of resilience, paraskeu enables athletes to resist and cope with
challenges and adversaries.
This implies that for the Stoics, the whole of life must become a test
(Foucault 2005, 431).
of themselves to develop good habits. This can be clarified through two different
understandings of habits, which can furthermore highlight a central difference between an
In other words, unlike steroids, downing beta- blockers doesnt remove an irrelevant
impediment to athletic success but rather a crucial component of that athletic success, which
is precisely why, again unlike steroids, drugs like beta blockers do make us better athletes.
(Morgan 2009, 178) Hence, the kinds of drugs, e.g. steroids, that merely affect the
preparations, do not, in Morgans view, affect the integrity of the social practice under
consideration, whilst drugs that affect the event of competition does, and ought therefore to be
considered unethical.
He also describes this as an ethical distinction, which he traces back to ancient ascetics, where
inequality between humans became related to their different stances towards the challenges of the
practising life (Sloterdijk 2013, 38). It mirrors the discriminating function of testing in Stoic
philosophy, where the good people are distinguished from the wicked depending on their ability to
see and organise their life as a test (Foucault 2005, 440)
if we are able to carefully and thoroughly describe the existential meaning related to the process of
practising, it could contribute to making athletes aware that by using performance-enhancing drugs
they actually deprive themselves of a very fundamental source of meaning in their sportive
endeavours. This can help athletes avoid inclinations to take a quick fix, be it blood transfusion,
growth hormone or other substances, as it would teach them about the meaning and value of
choosing the hard way, and value the burdens that are part of this way.
German History Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 358373 The Author 2009.
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the German History
Society. All rights reserved.doi:10.1093/gerhis/ghp031 Beautiful Bodies,
Exercising Warriors and Original Peoples: Sports, Greek Antiquity and
National Identity from Winckelmann to Turnvater Jahn Felix Saure
a body consciousness developed which, unburdened by modern social practices, was not limited by
prudery or clothing. Early physical exercise enabled these people, favoured by Mediterranean
nature, to develop their noble form . 7 This noble form of the body corresponds to the ideal of
beauty in Greek sculpture that Winckelmann subsumes under the famous phrase of noble
simplicity and quiet grandeur
Beauty as well as ethical exemplarity are based on a harmony between nature and ideal . In
Greek sculpture, the calm movements reveal the ideal simplicity (Simplicity ( Einfalt) here is not
as in contemporary usage a pejorative term for (intellectual) limitations, but means something
like wholeness or unity ) of the soul, which in turn shapes physical appearance.
The intellectual activity of the dialogues is here supplemented by physical exercises . 11
In addition, Winckelmann sees a positive uniformity for physical exercises that prevents the
dissolution of boundaries. The object of Winckelmanns admiration is not the athlete, whose
efforts are geared solely towards maximal physical performance, but the citizen, who
stimulates both body and mind, exercising both.
Also taking a holistic approach, Vieth advocates physical exercises, because in his view they would
benefit body and mind to an equal degree.
At the core of Vieths advocacy of physical exercise lies a social dimension. The goal is to pass
on to the future generation subjects whose intellectual powers are not suffocated by the
memory knowing too much, while their bodies grew up in Spartan education . 34 With
arguments that seem to come from the offerings of modern fitness centres, Vieth advocates
health improvements above all in order to be socially useful which is different from the
individualistic-hedonistic exercising of the twenty-first century. Physical exercise is not just to
serve the individual in his present, but its utility is continued in the abstract future of later
generations.
GutsMuths, just like Vieth, wanted to see state-run sports facilities established that would house
statues of strong men and defenders of the fatherland . 39 The goal was to integrate physical
exercise into public life, as had been the case in ancient Greece, with its statefinanced teachers and
magnificent public buildings for gymnastics, and where philosophers and politicians mixed with
athletes.
Humboldt himself summed up his educational ideal and his idea of man rather succinctly with
a few sentences in his treatise Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grnzen der Wirksamkeit des
Staats zu bestimmen : The true purpose of man not the one prescribed to him by
changing inclination, but by eternally unchanging reason is the highest and most
proportioned formation ( Bildung ) of his powers into a whole .
Thus all striving towards education or Bildung has to originate with the individual who can only
fulfil his destiny by deploying and developing all his powers. In Humboldts thinking, social
integration and the use of education and Bildung are secondary to this goal. His ideas about
physical education in his historical analysis go hand in hand with that postulate.
The value the Greeks placed on a freely formed [ gebildet ] body distinguishes them before all
nations. In it lies the delicate and deep sense that the intellectual must not be separated from the
physical, but rather must express itself in it ... and this care in honouring physical strength and
agility was ... maintained ... by the fame of the winners in the public games.
45 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Latium und Hellas oder Betrachtungen ber das classische Alterthum , in Humboldt, Werke ,
vol. 2, pp. 25 64, 49.
activity; they took place in leisure free from business 48 and served the development of
powers in free play, because for Humboldt true freedom can only exist in liberation from
any utilitarian precondition that would have a limiting effect, at least potentially. It is
important
that athletic competition [in ancient Hellas] was not serious, but rather a mere game, a completely
free re-
lease of energies. Any serious contest, because of its earnest nature, would have had more effect on
the reason or the heart, and suppressed or diverted the imagination. However, if a contest was athletic, this
elevated
it to the level of a light game. 49
It is only taking part in games that can promote a proper balance between the different
aspects of a person. Participation in games is thus educative in the sense of the
Humboldtian notion of education or Bildung . An
Jahn in fact draws similar conclusions to his
predecessors. He argues against a merely one-sided intellectualization and excessive
refinement in the present, saying that through gymnastics this must be countered
with an awareness of true physicality and regained manliness in order to restore the
lost balance in human education [ Bildung ] . 67 For Jahn, the art of gymnastics is therefore
an anthropological necessity a concern for humanity .
atendiendo slo a las acciones, la vida plena nos aparece siempre como
un esfuerzo, pero este esfuerzo es de dos clases: el esfuerzo que
hacemos por la simple delectacin de hacerlo y el esfuerzo obligado a
que una necesidad impuesta y no inventada o solicitada por nosotros
nos apura y arrastra. Y como este esfuerzo obligado, en que
estrictamente satisfacemos una necesidad, tiene su ejemplo mximo en
lo que suele el hombre llamar trabajo, as aquella clase de esfuerzos
superfluos encuentra su ejemplo ms claro en el deporte.
como preferira la tesis socialista, sino la clase de los hombres maduros, la de los jvenes y la de los
viejos. No hay otras distinciones, y, por supuesto, no existe an la familia. Tan no existe, que todos
los pertenecientes a la clase joven se llaman entre s hermanos y llaman padres a todos los de la
clase de ms edad.
hubo evidentemente una poca de enorme proliferacin que densifica la poblacin. Las hordas
viven cerca unas de otras. Este aumento de poblacin es sntoma de una mayor vitalidad en la
especie, de un desarrollo y perfeccionamiento en sus facultades. Y acaece que los muchachos de dos
o tres hordas pr ximas, impulsados por ese instinto de sociabilidad coetnea, deciden juntarse,
vivir en comn. Claro es que no para permanecer inactivos: el joven es sociable, pero a la par es
hazaoso, necesita acometer empresas. Indefectiblemente, entre ellos surge un temperamento, o
ms imaginativo, o ms audaz, o ms diestro, que propone la gran osada. Sienten todos, sin que
sepan por qu, un extrao y misterioso asco hacia las mujeres parientes consanguneas con
quienes viven en la horda, hacia las mujeres conocidas, y un apetito de imaginacin hacia las
mujeres otras, las desconocidas, las no vistas o slo entrevistas. Y entonces ha lugar una de las
acciones ms geniales de la historia humana, de que han irradiado ms gigantescas
consecuencias: deciden robar las mozas de hordas lejanas. Pero esto no es empresa suave: las
hordas no toleran impunemente la sustraccin de sus mujeres. Para robarlas hay que
combatir, y nace la guerra como medio al servicio del amor. Pero la guerra suscita un jefe y
requiere una disciplina: con la guerra que el amor inspir surge la autoridad, la ley y la estructura
social. Pero unidad de jefe y disciplina trae consigo, y, a la vez, fomenta la unidad de espritu, la
preocupacin en comn por todos los grandes problemas. Y, en efecto, en estas asociaciones de
muchachos comienzan el culto a los poderes mgicos, las ceremonias y los ritos.
La vida en comn inspira la idea de construir un albergue estable y capaz, que no sea la
guarida transitoria o la simple pantalla contra el viento. Y as ocurre que la primera casa que
el hombre edifica no es la casa de la familia aun inexistente, sino el casino de los jvenes. En
ella preparan sus expediciones, cumplen sus ritos; en ella se dedican al canto, a la bebida y al
frentico banquete comn. Es decir, que el club es, quirase o no, ms antiguo que el hogar
domstico, como el casino que la casa.
Porque es un hecho sorprendente que estas primitivas asociaciones juveniles suelen tener el
carcter de sociedades secretas, de frrea disciplina interna, donde se cultivan las destrezas
vitales de la caza y la guerra con un severo entrenamiento.
oculta a nadie. Fue el robo, el rapto, el primer matrimonio, del que quedan residuos y huellas
simblicas en muchas formas posteriores de la ceremonia conyugal, y hasta el vocabulario
amoroso que llama arrebato, es decir, rapto, al impetuoso empuje del sentimiento ertico.
Tenemos,
File significa tribu, pero no como unidad de consanguneos, sino como cuerpo organizado
de guerreros. Fratra significa hermandad, y hetaira, compaa. Antes de que exista la
polis, la ciudad con su Constitucin, el pueblo griego se hallaba estructurado en esas otras
formas. Ahora bien; la fratra o hermandad, que tiene entre los arios asiticos su
correspondencia en la sabha, no es ms que la clase de edad de los jvenes, organizada en
asociacin de fiesta y guerra. No se olvide que, como he dicho, primitivamente los jvenes
llaman padres a todos los hombres de la clase ms provecta, y se llaman entre s hermanos. En
cuanto a hetaira, o compaa, claramente indica su nombre el principio asociativo de
sociedad secreta, que rene en torno a un jefe a los varones mozos. Es exactamente lo mismo
que los germanosllamaron Gefolgschaft; es decir, los que siguen a uno lealmente, los
secuaces. En nuestro vocabulario militar perdura este sentido originario en la palabra
compaa
La gente tica era demasiado inteligente, y la agudeza mental es una sublime inquietud y
como una neurastenia maravillosa, que deshace fcilmente el organismo. Por eso en Atenas
todo lo tradicional se borr pronto, y el cuerpo social entra, desde luego, en un proceso de
reformas utpicas, que acaban por aniquilarlo. Por esta razn quedan en el Atica tan escasos
residuos de la organizacin primitiva. Esparta, por el contrario, piensa menos y vive ms
reciamente. All encontramos las fratras en pleno vigor, bajo la especie de organizacin
militar. Los guerreros viven juntos y aparte de sus familias; la solidaridad de su asociacin
cultural y blica se simboliza en las famosas cenas, donde se tomaba la sopa negra, que era
un manjar ritual. Y no es extrao que aqu sea donde se localiza el mito del Tobo de Helena,
que era primero una divinidad lunar y luego una mujer extranjera
Si un exceso de agudeza e inquietud intelectual forzoso es reconocerlo, porque la historia
nos lo demuestra reiteradamente descompone, como un lcali, el Estado, llega ste a su
mayor solidez y perduracin cuando un pueblo moderadamente inteligente posee cierto
extrao y nativo don de mando. Este fue el caso de Roma, como hoy lo es de Inglaterra. Y,
notable semejanza, ambos son pueblos que se caracterizan por su manitica conservacin del
pasado.
Los sostenes del Estado son los ricos homes. Rico es el poderoso el Recke (Sigfrido y, en
general, los nobles de la pica son Recken) jayn o mozo aguerrido. Su podero es Reich, y
adonde su podero alcanza, Reichland. Conste, pues, que rico no significa poseedor de
cuantas econmicas. El rico-home no era rico porque fuese "propietario de los instrumentos
de la produccin", sino, al revs, era dueo de tesoros porque era rico, valiente, aguerrido.