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PHILIPPINEJURISPRUDENCEFULLTEXT
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation
G.R.No101724July3,1992
PEOPLEOFTHEPHIL.vs.SANDIGANBAYANETAL.
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No101724July3,1992
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,petitioner,
vs.
THESANDIGANBAYANandCEFERINOS.PAREDES,JR.,respondents.

GRIOAQUINO,J.:
AssailedinthispetitionforcertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCourtistheresolutionpromulgatedonAugust1,1991by
theSandiganbayanwhichgrantedtheprivaterespondent'smotiontoquashtheinformationforviolationoftheAntiGraftand
CorruptPracticesAct(R.A.No.3019)onthegroundofprescriptionofthecrimecharged.
Two lettercomplaints were filed on October 28, 1986 and December 9, 1986, with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio, a
politicalleaderofGovernorValentinaPlaza,wifeofCongressmanDemocritoO.PlazaofAgusandelSur,shortlyafterthe
private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor ofAgusan del Sur in March 1986 (p. 235, Rollo).
Gelacio'scomplaintquestionedtheissuancetoGovernorParedes,whenhewasstilltheprovincialattorneyin1976,ofafree
patenttitleforLotNo.30978,Pls.67,withanareaof1,391sq.m.,moreorless,intheRosariopubliclandsubdivisioninSan
Francisco,AgusandelSur.
On February 23, 1989, the tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of Butuan City who
subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the subpoena was served on, and received by, the Station
CommanderofSanFrancisco,AgusandelSur,whodidnotserveitonParedes.Despitetheabsenceofnotice
toParedes,DeputizedTanodbayan/CityFiscalErnestoM.Brocoyconductedapreliminaryinvestigation ex
parte. He recommended that an information be filed in court. His recommendation was approved by the
Tanodbayan who, onAugust 10, 1989, filed the following information in the Sandiganbayan where it was
docketedasTBPCaseNo.8603368:
ThatonoraboutJanuary21,1976,orsometimepriororsubsequentthereto,inSanFrancisco,Agusandel
Sur,Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,apublicofficer,
being then the ProvincialAttorney ofAgusan del Sur, having been duly appointed and qualified as such,
takingadvantageofhispublicposition,did,thenandthere,wilfullyandunlawfullypersuade,influenceand
inducetheLandInspectoroftheBureauofLands,bythenameofArmandoL.Luisontoviolateanexistingrule
orregulationdulypromulgatedbycompetentauthoritybymisrepresentingtothelatterthatthelandsubjectof
anapplicationfiledbytheaccusedwiththeBureauofLandsisdisposablebyafreepatentwhentheaccused
well knew that the said land had already been reserved for a school site, thus by the accused's personal
misrepresentationinhiscapacityasProvincialAttorneyofAgusandelSurandapplicantforafreepatent,a
reportfavorablyrecommendingtheissuanceofafreepatentwasgivenbythesaidArmandoL.Luison,land
inspector,therebypavingthewaytothereleaseofadecreeoftitle,bytheRegisterofDeedsofAgusandel
Sur,anactcommittedbytheaccused,inoutrightprejudiceofthepublicinterest.(pp.34,Rollo.)
ParedeswasarresteduponawarrantissuedbytheSandiganbayan.Claimingthattheinformationandthewarrantofarrest
werenullandvoidbecausehehadbeendeniedhisrighttoapreliminaryinvestigation.Paredesrefusedtopostbail.Hiswife
filedapetitionforhabeascorpusprayingthisCourttoorderhisrelease(Paredesvs.Sandiganbayan,193SCRA464),but
we denied her petition because the proper remedy was for Paredes to file a bail bond of P20,000 fixed by the
Sandiganbayanforhisprovisionalliberty,andmovetoquashtheinformationbeforebeingarraigned.
OnApril 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash Information and to Recall Warrant of
Arrest"allegingthat:
1.heischargedforanoffensewhichhasprescribed:
2.thepreliminaryinvestigation,aswellastheInformationpreparedbytheTanodbayanandtheWarrantof
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Arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan were invalid for lack of notice to him of the preliminary investigation
conducted by Deputized Tanodbayan Ernesto M. Brocoy and Tanodbayan Prosecutor Josephine Z.
Fernandezand
3. his constitutional right to due process had been violated by the long delay in the termination of the
preliminaryinvestigation.
Afterthepartieshadfiledtheirwrittenarguments,theSandiganbayanissuedaresolutiononAugust1,1991grantingthe
motiontoquashonthegroundofprescriptionoftheoffensecharged.TheSandiganbayan'sratiocinationofitsresolutionis
quotedbelow:
The crime charged is alleged to have been committed "on or about January 21, 1976" when the accused
allegedly misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the land subject of the herein
movant'sApplicationforaFreePatentwasdisposableland.Thismisrepresentationallegedlyresultedinthe
issuanceofaTorrensTitleunderaFreePatenttothehereinaccusedmovant.This,theInformationavers,was
prejudicialtothepublicinterestbecausethelandinquestionhadbeenreservedforaschoolsiteandwas,
therefore,notdisposable.
Thus, the charge is for the violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 because the accused had allegedly
persuaded,inducedandinfluencedthePublicLandsInspectortoviolateexistinglaw,rulesandregulationsby
recommendingapprovalofthefreepatentapplication.
The accused asserts that since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime (January 21, 1976) the
periodofprescriptionwasten(10)yearsunderSec.11ofR.A.No.3019,thecrimeshouldhaveprescribedin
1986.Theprosecutionseemstoagreewiththemovant'sstatementastothetermoftheprescriptiveperiod
withthequalificationthattheperiodofprescriptionshouldhavecommencedtorunfromMarch28,1985,when
thecomplaintwasallegedlyfiledbytheRepublicforthecancellationofthetitle.
xxxxxxxxx
Thequestionthenisthis:whenshouldtheperiodofprescriptionhavecommencedtorunastothealleged
misrepresentation which persuaded, influenced and induced the Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands
resultingintheapprovaloftheapplicationoftheaccusedforafreepatent?
xxxxxxxxx
TheSupremeCourthasclearlystatedthateveninthecaseoffalsificationofpublicdocuments,prescription
commences from its recording with the Registry of Deeds when the existence of the document and the
avermentsthereintheoreticallybecomeamatterofpublicknowledge.
xxxxxxxxx
Thematterofimproperinducement,persuasionorinfluenceupontheLandsInspectorallegedlyappliedby
the accused through his misrepresentation may have been unknown to others besides the two of them
because their interaction would presumably have been private.The fact of the improper segregation of the
pieceoflandinquestionandthegrantthereoftotheaccused,however,became,presumptivelyatleast,a
matterofpublicknowledgeupontheissuanceofaTorrensTitleoverthatparcelofnondisposablepublicland.
xxxxxxxxx
4.NoticetothewholeworldmustbepresumedattheverylatestonMay28,1976whentheRegisterofDeeds
ofAgusandelSurissuedOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.8379inthenameoftheaccusedasaresultofthe
grantofthepatentontheschoolsitereservation
5.TheactoffilingtheapprovedfreepatentwiththeRegistryofDeedsisnoticedulygiventothevariousoffices
andofficialsofthegovernment,e.g.,theDepartment(Ministry)ofAgricultureandtheBureauofLands,whoare
affectedtherebyspeciallybecauseitistheBureauofLandswhichfilestheapprovedpatentapplicationwith
the Registry of Deeds. If the land in question was indeed reserved for as school site, then the Department
(Ministry)ofEducationwouldalsoknoworwouldbepresumedtoknow.(pp.2833,Rollo.)
TheSandiganbayancouldnotabidethefactthattheLandsInspector(Luison)whowassupposedlyinducedbyParedesto
violatethelaw,andwhodidviolateitbyrecommendingapprovalofParedes'freepatentapplicationwasnotchargedwitha
crime.TheSandiganbayanconcluded:
It would seriously strain credulity to say that while the violation of law, rules or regulation by the Lands
Inspectorwasobviousandpublic(sincetheschoolsitehadbeentitledinthenameoftheallegedinducer
Pimentel**),thebeneficiarythereofcouldnothavebeensuspectedofhavinginducedtheviolationitself.It
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wouldbegrosslyunfairandunjusttosaythatprescriptionwouldruninfavoroftheLandsInspectorwhohad
actually violated the law but not to the public official who had benefitted therefrom and who may have,
therefore,instigatedthefavorablerecommendationforthedispositionofnondisposableland.
Inviewofalltheforegoing,theMotiontoQuashtheInformationisgranted.(p.36,Rollo.)
The Sandiganbayan further observed that since R.A. No. 3019 is a special law, the computation of the period for the
prescriptionofthecrimeofviolatingitisgovernedbySection29ofActNo.3326whichprovidesasfollows:
Sec.2.Prescriptionshallbegintorunfromthedayofthecommissionoftheviolationofthelaw,andifthe
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigationandpunishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begintorunagainiftheproceedingsaredismissedforreasonsnotconstitutingjeopardy.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date for the
commencementoftheperiodofprescription"(p.34,Rollo).
AssumingthatParedesdidinduceLandsInspectorLuisontorecommendapprovalofhisapplicationforfreepatent(which
bothofthemdenieddoing),thedateoftheviolation,forthepurposeofcomputingtheperiodofprescription,wouldbethe
dateoffilinghisapplicationonJanuary21,1976.
The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon the filing of Paredes' application
because no one could have known about it except Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the
Sandiganbayanpointedlyobserved:"itisnotonlytheLandsInspectorwhopassesuponthedisposabilityofpublicland...
other public officials pass upon the application for a free patent including the location of the land and, therefore, the
disposablecharacterthereof"(p.30,Rollo).Indeed,practicallyallthedepartmentpersonnel,whohadahandinprocessing
and approving the application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected the land to ascertain its location and
occupancy:(2)thesurveyorwhoprepareditstechnicaldescription:(3)theregionaldirectorwhoassessedtheapplication
and determined the land classification: (4) the Director of Lands who prepared the free patent: and (5) the Department
Secretarywhosignedit,couldnothavehelped"discovering"thatthesubjectoftheapplicationwasnondisposablepublic
agriculturalland.
TheSandiganbayancorrectlyobservedthatthe"crime"whetheritwasthefilingofParedesapplicationforafreepatentin
January 1976 or his supposedly having induced Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) years later, on
January21,1986.Gelacio'scomplaint,datedOctober28,1986,wasfiledlate.
ThereasonfortheextinctionoftheState'srighttoprosecuteacrimeafterthelapseofthestatutorylimitationperiodforfiling
thecriminalaction,isthat:
StatutesofLimitationareconstruedasbeingactsofgrace,andasasurrenderingbythesovereignofitsright
to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion, and they are considered as equivalent to acts of
amnesty.Suchstatutesarefoundedontheliberaltheorythatprosecutionsshouldnotbeallowedtoferment
endlesslyinthefilesofthegovernmenttoexplodeonlyafterwitnessesandproofsnecessarytotheprotection
ofaccusedhavebysheerlapseoftimepassedbeyondavailability.Theyserve,notonlytobarprosecutions
on aged and untrustworthy evidence, but also to cut off prosecution for crimes a reasonable time after
completion,whennofurtherdangertosocietyiscontemplatedfromthecriminalactivity.(22CJS573574.)
Intheabsenceofaspecialprovisionotherwise,thestatuteoflimitationsbeginstorunonthecommissionofan
offense and not from the time when the offense is discovered or when the offender becomes known, or it
normallybeginstorunwhenthecrimeiscomplete.(22CJS585Emphasissupplied.)
Evenifthetenyearprescriptiveperiodcommencedtorunfromtheregistrationandissuanceofthefreepatenttitlebythe
RegisterofDeedsonMay28,1976,registrationbeingconstructivenoticetothewholeworld,theprescriptiveperiodwould
havefullyrunitscourseonMay28,1986,orfive(5)monthsbeforeGelaciofiledhiscomplaint,andmorethanthirteen(13)
yearsbeforejudicialproceedingswereinitiatedintheSandiganbayanonAugust10,1989bythefilingoftheinformation
therein.
BatasPambansaBlg.195whichwasapprovedonMarch16,1982,amendingSection11R.A.No.3019byincreasingfrom
ten(10)tofifteen(15)yearstheperiodfortheprescriptionorextinguishmentofaviolationofthe
AntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct,maynotbegivenretroactiveapplicationtothe"crime"whichwascommittedbyParedes
inJanuary1976yet,foritshouldbeprejudicialtotheaccused.Itwoulddeprivehimofthesubstantivebenefitoftheshorter
(10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he
committedit.
Protectionfromprosecutionunderastatuteoflimitationisasubstantiveright.Wherethestatutefixesaperiod
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of limitation as to a prosecution for a particular offense, the limitation so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time
within which the offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact, it being necessary that the indictment or
informationbeactuallyfiledwithinthetimeprescribed.(22CJS574.)
Factthatthestatuteoflimitationsisjurisdictionalnecessarilydeterminedthataprosecutionwithintheperiod
specifiedisanessentialelementoftheoffense.(Peoplevs.Allen,118P2d,927,Emphasissupplied.)
Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective in their terms, they do not apply to crimes previously
committed(22CJS576Peoplevs.Lurd,12Hun282Martinevs.State,24Tex61Emphasisours.)
ToapplyB.P.Blg.195toParedeswouldmakeitanexpostfactolawforitwouldafterhissituationtohisdisadvantageby
makinghimcriminallyliableforacrimethathadalreadybeenextinguishedunderthelawexistingwhenitwascommitted.An
expostfactolawisdefinedas:
Alawpassedaftertheoccurrenceofafactorcommissionofanact,whichretrospectivelychangesthelegal
consequencesorrelationsofsuchfactordeed.ByArt.I,Sec.10ofU.S.Const.,thestatesareforbiddento
pass"anyexpostfactolaw".Mostallstateconstitutionscontainsimilarprohibitionsagainstexpostfactolaws.
An"expostfactolaw"isdefinedasalawwhichprovidesfortheinflictionofpunishmentuponapersonforan
actdonewhich,whenitwascommitted,wasinnocentalawwhichaggravatesacrimeormakesitgreaterthan
when it was committed a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexedtothecrimewhenitwascommittedalawthatchangestherulesofevidenceandreceiveslessor
different testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
offenderalawwhich,assumingtoregulatecivilrightsandremediesonly,ineffectimposesapenaltyorthe
deprivationofarightwhich,whendone,waslawfulalawwhichdeprivespersonsaccusedofcrimeofsome
lawfulprotectiontowhichtheyhavebecomeentitled,suchastheprotectionofaformerconvictionoracquittal,
oroftheproclamationofamnestyeverylawwhich,inrelationtotheoffenseoritsconsequences,altersthe
situationofapersontohisdisadvantage.Wilenskyv.Fields,Fla.,267So.2d1,5.(Black'sLawDictionary,Fifth
Edition,p.520.)
Sinceanexpostfacto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22,Article 111, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan
committednoreversibleerrorinrulingthatParedesmaynolongerbeprosecutedforhissupposedviolationofR.A.3019in
1976,six(6)yearsbeforeB.P.Blg.195wasapprovedonMarch16,1982.Thenewprescriptiveperiodunderthatlawshould
applyonlytothoseoffensewhichwerecommittedaftertheapprovalofB.P.195.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionforreviewisDENIEDforlackofmerit.TheresolutiondatedAugust1,1991oftheSandiganbayan
inCrim.CaseNo.13800isAFFIRMED.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa,C.J.,Gutierrez,Jr.,Cruz,Paras,Feliciano,Padilla,Bidin,Medialdea,Regalado,Davide,Jr.,Romero,Noconand
Bellosillo,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
**Paredes.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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