Charting the Tibet Issue

115

Charting the Tibet Issue in the

SinoIndian Border Dispute
Tsering Topgyal
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

In official quarters in Beijing and New Delhi, the Tibet issue figures only as a bargaining chip to regulate
their bilateral relations, not as an issue that has an independent bearing on the intractability or resolution
of the SinoIndian border dispute. Scholars of the SinoIndian border dispute either dismiss the relevance
of the Tibet issue or treat it as only a prop in their framing of the dispute in terms of security, nationalism
and great power rivalry. This article argues that the Tibet issue is more central to the border dispute than
official and scholarly circles have recognised so far. The article demonstrates this through an examination
of the historical roots of the border row, the centrality of Tibet and Tibetans in the boundary claims of
both Beijing and New Delhi and the revelation of concurrent historical developments in the border dispute
and the SinoTibetan conflict. On the place of Tibet in broader SinoIndian relations, the article posits
that while Tibet was a victim of Indias moralisticidealist policies toward China in the 1950s, it has
now become a victim of the new realism pervading Indias policy of engaging and emulating China in
the post-Cold War era.

The continuing border-dispute between China and India is a puzzle for many.
Despite six decades of attempts at resolution, the dispute persists in the face of official
bonhomie and booming trade relations between the two rising giants. It is even more
puzzling considering that China has managed to resolve its landborder disputes
with countries as disparate as North Korea, Mongolia, Nepal, Afghanistan, Burma,
Kazhakstan, Kyrgystan, Pakistan and Russia, often at disadvantageous terms (Kang
2008: 8990; Ramachandran 2008). The Indians are especially exercised by their
observation that while China has long ago settled its territorial dispute with Burma
along the McMahon Line, it has consistently refused to entertain Indian suggestions
for a similar settlement of their dispute in the Eastern sector (Chellaney 2006: 176).
Scholars and observers have put forward various explanations for the protracted dispute
ranging from mutual accusations of territorial greed and expansionism and lack of
sincerity and political will to more complex rationales of nationalism, security and
great power rivalry. In these accounts, Tibet invariably gets mention, but only as a
CHINA REPORT 47 : 2 (2011): 115131
SAGE Publications Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore/Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/000944551104700205

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prop in the framing of the dispute in the terms mentioned above, rarely as having any
significant and independent bearing on its intractability and resolution. Accordingly,
both New Delhi and Beijing have used the Tibet issue only to regulate their broader
bilateral relations, including on the border issue, rather than actively pushing for the
resolution of the SinoTibetan conflict.
In fact, as C. Raja Mohan noticed, Just when the Tibetan cause seemed to
acquire greater international legitimacy and the world leaders toasted the Tibetan
leader, the Dalai Lama, India seemed to go mute (Mohan 2003: 168). The Indian
American scholar Sumit Ganguly excoriated the Indian government for appeasing
and genuflecting before Beijing when the Chinese cracked down on peaceful Tibetan
protesters in March 2008, arguing that such humiliating deference does not behove a
state of Indias capabilities and great power ambitions and goes against Indian national
interests (Ganguly 2008). The Dalai Lama often characterises Indias approach to the
Tibet issue as too cautious. Beijings reluctance to resolve the Tibetan problem needs
no detailing here, but Indias lethargic support for the resolution of the Tibetan issue
raises questions not just about Indian fears of Chinese approach towards separatist
groups in Indias north-east and Kashmir, but also about Indias calculations on what
a SinoTibetan reconciliation would mean for its unresolved border dispute. We will
return to this specific question subsequently, but this leads to my central argument
that the SinoTibetan conflict has deeper relevance to the IndiaChina border dispute
than is recognised in official and scholarly quarters. This association is clear from the
historical roots of the border row, concurrent historical developments on both fronts,
and the centrality of Tibet and Tibetans in the boundary claims of both Beijing and
New Delhi.
Of course, the situation in Tibet also feeds the broader nationalistic, security and
great power competitive compulsions of China and India. That is why this paper first
considers how the transnational Tibetan struggle impinges on the broader bilateral
relations between India and China.

TIBET IN INDIAS CHINA POLICY:

HOSTAGE OF MORALISTIC IDEALISM AND NEW REALISM

Tibet impinges on SinoIndian relations more than any of Chinas other bilateral
relations. As the late Dawa Norbu observed: The crux of the SinoIndian strategic
rivalry is this: if the Chinese power elite consider Tibet to be strategically important
to China, the Indian counterparts think it is equally vital to Indian national security
(Norbu 2001: 297). Independent Indias Tibet policy was defined by Nehrus dreams
of a SinoIndian anti-imperialist and non-aligned alternative to the hegemonic Soviet
and American superpowers. The 1962 border war with China changed Indias practice,
if not its policy, towards the Tibetan refugees. Rajiv Gandhis visit to Beijing in 1989
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brought about a thaw in relations and a return to Indias pre-1962 policy statements
on Tibet, although there have been no discernible practical fall-outs on the Tibetan
exiles. This is, perhaps, in keeping with the new realism in post-Cold War Indias
foreign policy, tempering the idealism in its foreign policy with a strong dose of
realism (Chellaney 2006: 15962; Mohan 2003: xivxv). Mohan writes, Facing its
own acute vulnerabilities in Kashmir, Punjab and the North-East, [India] was unwilling
to confront China on the [Tibet] issue. At the same time, India refused to bend by
reducing or suspending its support to the Tibetan exiles and the Dalai Lama in India
(Mohan 2003: 169). Eventually though, as one Indian analyst counselled, India will
need a more sophisticated policy that goes beyond simply curbing the Dalai Lamas
activities, remaining in a state of denial, or regurgitating its acceptance of Tibet as
a part of China (Stobdan 2009). This is because at some point Beijing will demand
that India should dissolve the Tibetan government-in-exile. The up-shot is that Tibet
remains a key irritant in IndiaChina relations.
There are four major issues that feed the SinoIndian geo-strategic rivalry that have
to do with Tibet: the status of Tibet, Chinese unease with the activities of Tibetan
refugees, including the Dalai Lama, Indian fears over Chinese military presence on
the Tibetan plateau and the long-standing border dispute (Chellaney 2006: 15962,
18994; Mohan 2003: 16871; Norbu 2001: 28397).
First, Indias position on the status of Tibet has changed from the British policy of
recognising the de facto independence of Tibetcompletely Autonomous State
under a vague form of Chinese suzerainty (19471951) (Foreign Office 1943; Goldstein
1989: 634) to accepting Tibet as a part of China in 1954 (Shakya 1999: 119). On
April 29, 1954, India relented to the Chinese insistence on referring to Tibet as Tibet
Region of China Jain 1981f: 6167, 7780). After the 1962 border war, India often
merely used Tibet until the 1988 visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi when the
SinoIndian Joint Press Communique referred to Tibet as an autonomous region
of China (SinoIndian Joint Press Communique, 23 December 1988). In 2003,
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed a declaration which recognised that the
Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the Peoples Republic of China
(Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the
Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of India, 25 June 2003). This position
was reiterated in the Joint Statement during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
to India in 2005 (Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the Peoples Republic
of China, 11 April 2005). These formulations led an Indian scholar to observe that
Indias acceptance of Tibet as a part of China is conditional upon Tibets enjoyment
of autonomy (Interview with Karnad, 10 August, 2007). China, therefore, demands
stronger and more unambiguous statements from New Delhi on Chinas sovereignty
over Tibet, which India has resisted so far (Mohan 2003: 168).
Second, Indias consistent official policy has been to disallow anti-Chinese activities
by Tibetan refugees on Indian soil. In practice, India has allowed the Tibetans to run
a government-in-exile, the Central Tibetan Administration, given material assistance
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for the running of various projects under its aegis, and facilitated the international
political activities of the Dalai Lama. India refuses to bend to Chinese pressure by
reducing or suspending its support to Tibetan exiles and the Dalai Lama in India
(Mohan 2003: 169). A relevant question is whether India will revise this policy after
the demise of the current Dalai Lama. One Indian scholar argues that India will
continue to support Tibetan exiles because it is in Indias national interest (Interview
with Chellaney, 10 August 2007). Another proposes that India should take upon
itself the responsibility to nurture Tibetan language and culture as it faces cultural
genocide in Tibet (Subrahmanyam 2005: 189). For the foreseeable future, Indias
material assistance and facilitating role for the Tibetan struggle will continue. This is
a sore point for China (Cohen 2001: 259).
The Chinese complain that such open encouragement and support given by the
Indian government to the Tibetan rebel bandits in their traitorous activities constitute
an interference in Chinas internal affairs and harms the progress of SinoIndian
relations (Jain 1981c: 47374). The Indologist Cohen argues that in the minds of
the Chinese elite, Indias gravest threat to China resides in Tibet because of the
sanctuary that India provides to over 100,000 Tibetans and the goal of some Indian
elite to resurrect Tibet as a buffer zone between China and India (Cohen 2001: 259).
The Chinese scholar Wu Xinbo concurs, So long as the exiled community exists,
Tibetan separatism will remain a major concern for PRC leaders (Wu 1998: 130).
Fears of Indian entanglement in Tibet and loss of strategic advantage to India are
long-standing (Whiting 1996: 614). Even when there were very few Indians in Tibet,
Mao told Khrushchev in 1959: The Hindus [Indians] acted in Tibet as if it belonged
to them (Mao Zedong 1959). Although, successive Indian governments have been
extremely wary of rattling the Chinese on Tibet and despite the overall improvement
in SinoIndian relations, Beijing continues to suspect India of bad intentions in
Tibet. The best measure of Chinese vulnerabilities in Tibet vis--vis India, perhaps, is
contained in an essay written by Wang Lixiong who is one of the most liberal Chinese
intellectuals. He wrote in 1999:
As it involves ChineseIndian relations, Tibet becomes an extremely important
factor.... Since its geopolitical position has wedged it between two great powers, it
has to be dependent on either China or India, having no other choice.... Tibet has
always had a high degree of spiritual identification with India...
As stated above, when the Tibetan exiles demand Tibetan independence, or the
Dalai Lama calls for a high degree of self-rule for Tibet, the scope they are referring to
is greater Tibet. But if the 2.5 million sq. km. [sic] of greater Tibet were separated
from China, Chinas western border would shrink towards the interior by up to
a thousand km. If we drew two diagonal lines on the Chinese map, they would
converge in central China at Tianshui, Gansu. If greater Tibet was independent,
Tianshui would be only a little over 100 km from the new border, which would
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make the current centre of China our border. In past Chinese national crises, inland
Sichuan was often seen as our greater rear area, for either partial sovereignty or
as our provisional capital. But Sichuans capital of Chengdu would be only a little
over 100 km from the new border, making it a front-line border defence post. So
once Tibet became independent and was forced to ally itself with India, India would
advance thousands of km without firing a shot, with its armed forces marching
into central China, and its missiles being able to hit all of China from the Tibetan
Plateau. Without the natural Tibetan barrier and the time it would take to cross
the Tibetan Plateau, war would be fought in central China, at a certainly high
cost to life and property. So it is obvious that for China to lose such a vast barrier,
which would expose our fatal underbelly, would be unacceptable from a national
security perspective. Preparing for a possible future conflict with India is the bottom
line as to why the Central Government cannot allow Tibetan independence. The
Central Government cannot retreat or compromise on the demands for Tibetan
independence or covert independence. (Wang 1999. Emphasis mine)1
As pervasive as such calculations are in Chinese officialdom today, it predates the
PRC. Republican Chinese officials in the 1910s expressing similar assessments: Tibet is
a buttress on our national frontiersthe hand, as it were, which protects the faceand
its prosperity or otherwise is of the most vital importance to China (Quoted in Tuttle
2005: 44). The security concerns in Beijing are as strong as they were then.
Third, Indians have their reciprocal fears arising from Chinese military presence
on the Tibetan plateau, history and future uncertainties. The true extent of Chinas
military presence in Tibet cannot be gauged, given the extreme secrecy surrounding
information about the PLA, but rough yet differing estimates are available (Margolis
2002: 266; Norbu 2001: 22859). Margolis notes that in the early 1990s, China had
deployed around 500,000 troops on the Tibetan plateau with some of the best weaponry
(Margolis 2002: 266). Norbu estimates, however, that the likely size of the PLA in
Tibet is around 150,000 in Eastern Tibet and 40,000 in the border between India and
the Tibet Autonomous Region (Norbu 2001: 239).2 The presence of Chinese strategic
forces on the Tibetan plateau adds another dimension to Indias China threat perception
( Margolis 2002: 26768; Norbu 2001: 24246; Subrahmanyam 2005: 22324). Not
lost on the Indian elite are the several airbases and tactical airstrips and the network of
roads that China has built, criss-crossing the Tibetan plateau right up to the Indian,
Nepalese and Pakistani borders with Tibet and Xinjiang, and the expanding railway

1
Wang has moved on from such worst-case and zero-sum thinking, but much of the Chinese officialdom is stuck in this hyper-realist worldview.
2
Norbus lower figure takes into account the disengagement that took place in OctoberNovember,
1995 following an agreement during the eighth session of the Joint Working Group (consisting of Indian
and Chinese representatives tasked to find a resolution to the border dispute) in August, 1995.

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network (Margolis 2002: 26667; Norbu 2001: 23138). Chinas management of

water resources emanating from Tibet, which feed the Indian subcontinent, also feature
in Indian security conceptions (Chellaney 2006: 38). The ghosts of 1962as one
Indian strategic analyst put it to refer to the complex of historical memory and sense
of betrayal and humiliation on account of the 1962 war that continues to lacerate the
Indian psychecasts a long shadow over Indian perceptions of China today (Ganguly
2008; Subrahmanyam 2005: 31927). In essence, the complex of security concerns
germane to Tibet reinforces the larger strategic rivalry between these two Asian giants.
Consequently, the Chinese and Indians have reciprocal security concerns that are
germane to Tibet.
Finally, the border dispute continues to elude a resolution ever since they acquired a
common border when the PRC occupied the Tibetan plateau in 19491950 (Chellaney
2006: 16986; Malik 2007; Norbu 2001: 28592, 2956; Subrahmanyam 2005:
21628). The next section examines the historical and contemporary aspects of the
border dispute in relation to Tibet.

THE INDIACHINA BORDER DISPUTE AND TIBET

The historical roots of the SinoIndian border dispute can be traced to the imperial
era Great Game between British India, Czarist Russia and Qing China over Tibet
and Central Asia. Empires thrived on fuzzy bordersfrontiers were more preferable
to imperial powersas clearly demarcated borders constrained their own ambitions
and strategic flexibility. In addition, the inhospitable terrain of the high Himalayas,
the absence of sophisticated surveying technologies and existence of a functioning
Tibetan state made the delimitation of Indias northern border either unnecessary
or difficult (Hoffman 1990; Lamb 1991: 930). However, in the mid-20th century,
when two equally nationalistic and territorial states gained control over the Indian
and Chinese empires, some parts of which were only tenuously linked to the imperial
centres, ambiguous borders made for a combustible recipe for conflict.
In 1950, China and India came to share 4057 kilometres of border which has
never been comprehensively delimited by a treaty, let alone between the post-colonial
regimes of the Republic of India and the Peoples Republic of China. Specifically, India
claims that China is occupying 38,000 square kilometres in Aksai Chin in the NorthEastern corner of Jammu and Kashmir. India also claims that Beijing is holding 5180
square kilometres of land in Kashmir ceded to it by Pakistan in 1963. For their part,
the Chinese claim 90,000 square kilometres in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh,
which they call Southern Tibet (Malik 2007). Six decades after Indias independence
and the founding of the PRC, the border row remains a major obstacle for SinoIndian
relations (Garver 1996: 337). What has happened in the course of these 60 years in
terms of efforts to reconcile their conflicting claims? What setbacks have thwarted
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these reconciliation attempts? The following overview traces the historical roots of the
border row to Tibets relations with British India and previous Himalayan kingdoms,
the centrality of Tibet and Tibetans in the boundary claims of both Beijing and
New Delhi, and reveals the coincidence of key events in the IndiaChina border
dispute and the SinoTibetan conflict.
When India became independent in 1947, followed by the founding of the PRC
in 1949, which announced the liberation of Tibet as an immediate goal, New Delhi
turned its gaze towards the security of its northern borders. However, the dominant
Indian thinking on the border as represented by Jawaharlal Nehru was shaped by
two strands of thought. First, the Indian leaders assumed that because they believed
that its northern border has already been settled through agreements between their
British predecessors and the Tibetan government and demarcated by well-defined
geographical features, Beijing would respect those agreements (Jain 1981o: 11012).
Especially after the signing of the IndiaChina Agreement on Trade and Intercourse
between Tibet Region of China and India (April 29, 1954) in which India for the
first time accepted Tibet as a part of China, Nehru and his associates thought that the
boundary was no longer an issue, that the Chinese accepted the historical status quo.
Nehru wrote of this to Zhou Enlai in 1958 as the border issue heated up:
When the SinoIndian Agreement in regard to the Tibet region of China was
concluded, various outstanding problems, including some relating to our border
trade, were considered.... No border questions were raised at that time and we were
under the impression that there were no border disputes between our respective
countries. In fact we thought that the SinoIndian Agreement, which was happily
concluded in 1954, had settled all outstanding problems between our countries.
(Jain 1981n: 103)
He expressed shock at seeing maps printed in China showing certain Indian areas
to be parts of China.
Second, friendship with China was of over-riding importance; the border issue
was less important and the status of Tibet expendable (Garver 2001: 8990; Norbu
2001: 284). As Susan Shirk writes, Anti-imperialism bound the new Chinese and
Indian governments together during their first decade of existence in the 1950s (Shirk
2004: 76.). This search for SinoIndian friendship, whether out of a common antiimperialist agenda or Asian solidarity, pervaded all aspects of Indian policy towards
China, exhibiting a mind-boggling degree of naivet or a rare act of selflessness in
international politics. Indeed, India worked assiduously to not just befriend China
but also to promote its membership in the United Nations, even as the boundary
dispute worsenedthis becomes clear from several letters sent by Indian Permanent
Representative, Arthur S. Lall, to the UN Secretary General regarding Chinas representation in the UN (see Jain 1981h; 1981i; 1981j; 1981k).
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Even after the violent suppression of the Tibetan uprising on March 10, 1959 and
the escape of the Dalai Lama, the Indian Ambassador to the United Nations wrote to
the Secretary General, The Government of India hopes that the forthcoming session
of the General Assembly will remove this shortcoming [of Chinese absence] and agree
to China being properly represented in the United Nations by the representatives of
the Peoples Government of China (Jain 1981k: 13738). Nehru himself told the
UN General Assembly that despite the ongoing border dispute, India saw Chinas
membership in the UN as essential: It appears most extra-ordinary that any argument
should be advanced to keep out China and to give the seat meant for China to those
who certainly do not and cannot represent China (Jain 1981p: 17677). Both Nehru
and the Indian Representative to the UN made it clear that the border controversies and
conflicts....however painful and however much it may be a violation of the principles
of coexistence would not dissuade India from her fundamental goal to promote
Chinas entry into the UN and as a permanent member of the Security Council (Jain
1981p: 17677; 1981q: 17778). As Chellaney writes, Nehru was such an unabashed
panda-hugger that he even rejected the notion of India taking Chinas place in the
United Nations Security Council (Chellaney 2007: 160). The point is that the urge
for friendship induced the Indian leaders to indulge in the illusion that the McMahon
Line that was agreed between British India and the Tibetan government in 1914 formed
the border until contrary Chinese assertions disabused them off this fantasy.
Moreover, as Norbu pointed out, for sacrificing Tibet in the above-mentioned 1954
SinoIndian agreement on Tibet, Nehru expected a quid pro quo from China in the
form of respecting Indian claims in the Himalayas (Norbu 2001: 285). The problem
was that in the agreement, while the concessions that Beijing demanded, principally
recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, were clearly spelt out, Indias were not
(Norbu 2001: 28586). As Henry Kissinger warned in Diplomacy, diplomatic goods
that are already delivered are rarely compensated, and China consistently frustrated
Nehrus imagined trade-off between Tibet and the border.
The Chinese argued that the common border had never been delimited through an
agreement between China and regimes that ruled India (Jain 1981d; 1981e: 14243).
For the Chinese, Tibet was even more central to their boundary claims. With regard
to the Western sector of the disputed border (Aksai Chin), Garver writes, Control of
Aksai Chin was essential to Chinese control of western Tibet and very important to
its control over all of Tibet (Garver 2001: 83). The Chinese construction of a road
connecting Xinjiang and Tibet through Aksai Chin, which Indians assumed belonged
to them, led to the SinoIndian war in 1962. The Chinese claim in the Eastern Sector
(Arunachal Pradesh or Southern Tibet) was based on the argument that the Tibetan
government ruled over this region until the British imperialists incorporated it into
their empire through an unequal treaty. As Norbu found, this was true of both Aksai
Chin and Arunachal Pradesh:

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Chinas claims are primarily based on Tibetannot Chinesedocuments, which

would be valid only if India recognised Tibet as a part of China. Zhou Enlai himself
acknowledged this in a letter dated 5 November 1962, sent to Asian and African
leaders concerning the boundary dispute, in which he cited only Tibetan evidence
to support PRC claims. In this letter he concedes that the names of rivers, passes,
and other places in the eastern sector (NEFA/Arunachal Pradesh) are in the Tibetan
language. Also the inhabitants of the middle sector are nearly all Tibetans and
Tibetan archival documents indicate that the local government had consistently
exercised its jurisdiction over the TibetSikkim border area. Zhou bases Chinas
claims over the Aksai Chin by declaring that it was once a part of Tibets Zinjiang
and Ngari District. (Norbu 2001: 287)
Jagat Mehta, a protagonist in the border negotiations on the Indian side recalled
that most of the 245 pieces of evidence produced by the Chinese were official Tibetan
documents (Cited in Norbu 2001).
Moreover, Chinas strategy on the border dispute in the early years of its occupation
of Tibet was to get Indias acceptance of its sovereignty over Tibet, for without Indian
acquiescence to that, Beijings boundary claims would have limited legitimacy. As
Norbu wrote, Once this occurred [in the form of the 1954 agreement on Tibet],
China then began officially to claim territory along the Indo-Tibetan border, using the
provisions of the 1954 treaty as its rationale (Norbu 2001: 286). Indeed, only three
months after signing this agreement, China fired its first salvo, accusing Indian soldiers
of trespassing into Wu-Je (Ngari, Tibet) and violating the principles of non-aggression
and coexistence and the recently issued Joint Communiqu (Jain 1981b: 75). India
responded with a denial and a reciprocal charge of Chinese incursions into Hoti Plain
(Uttar Pradesh) (Jain 1981g: 76). The border dispute had begun in earnest.
There is also evidence that the instabilities inside Tibet and the activities of
Tibetan exiles in India added to the temperature of SinoIndian relations generally
and directly sparked skirmishes along the border. After the Chinese occupation of
Central Tibet in 1950, many Tibetan officials and merchants had left Tibet and settled
in Kalimpong, a town in West Bengal. On July 10, 1958, China complained to the
Indian government that Americans and Nationalists from Taiwan were conspiring with
migr Tibetans to organise resistance against China in Tibet (Jain 1981a: 9798).
The Indian government expressed surprise at this complete misunderstanding of
facts, denied any evidence of American and Taiwanese activities in Kalimpong and
vowed not to allow foreign countries to do so (Jain 1981g: 99). The Indian Ministry of
External Affairs reported how the disturbances in Tibet and the exile of the Dalai Lama
and thousands of other Tibetans adversely affected various aspects of the SinoIndian
relations ranging from the mistreatment of Indian citizens and representatives in
Tibet, trade restrictions, cancellations of student exchange programmes and official
delegations (Jain 1981l: 16768). Most pertinently, the massive deployment of

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Chinese soldiers along the border to check the flow of Tibetan refugees or to pursue
Tibetan guerrillas also clashed with Indian border patrols on a number of occasions
in various locations, which eventually escalated into the 1962 war (Jain 1981l: 168).
As the recriminations and denials of the use of Kalimpong by migr Tibetans and
America confirm, the rising temperature of the border dispute in the midlate 1950s
coincided with the spread of the violent uprising taking place in Eastern Tibet since the
mid-1950s. Indeed, as subsequent scholarship would reveal and Indian protestations
notwithstanding, Kalimpong was a beehive of spies and the nerve-centre of Tibetan
attempts to gain military and diplomatic support for the Tibetan cause and the
rebellion inside Tibet (Knaus 1999). This sort of coincidence between key events in
the SinoIndian border and SinoTibetan conflict has been a recurring pattern as will
be subsequently shown.
The jury is still out as to who initiated the 1962 war, but beginning on October 20,
1962, China initiated simultaneous operations in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh
(Jain 1981m: 208). It inflicted an embarrassing defeat on Indian forces, invading
deep into Indian-controlled territory and then sought to gain the moral high-ground
by unilaterally withdrawing to its previous positions. While the Chinese referred to
the war as teaching India a lesson, the Indians have never properly recovered from
the shock and humiliation of that defeat (Ganguly 2004: 115). The defeat however
impelled India to make some fundamental adjustments in foreign and defence policies,
including some subtle shifts in its Tibet policy (Ganguly 2004: 115; Norbu 2001:
29394). In 1963, a Special Frontier Force code-named 22 under the direct command
of the Prime Minister, consisting of able-bodied Tibetan men was created with the
aim of using them against China inside Tibet. In stark contrast to its stance on earlier
UN Resolutions on Tibet, India supported the Resolution in 1965. More importantly,
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was to have legally recognised the Tibetan
government-in-exile if he had not died during a summit in Tashkent (Norbu 2001:
29394). China responded by supplying weapons to the separatist Nagas and Mizos
in Indias North-East (Ganguly 2004: 11920). The Ghosts of 1962 still haunts the
psychology of the strategic and political elite of India (Subrahmanyam 2005: 31927).
Again, the point is that the occupation of Tibet by China, by virtue of which it gained
a common border with India, and the rebellion inside Tibet on account of Chinese
policies led to the 1962 war (Garver 2001: 60). The Chinese suspected Indian plans
to resurrect Tibet as a buffer between China and India or in collusion with America to
restore Tibets status before 194950 ( Garver 2001: 5860). For the Chinese, more
than just a border conflict, it was a war to secure its occupation of Tibet. The 1962 war
put SinoIndian relations, including border negotiations, in deep-freeze without any
diplomatic relations until 1976. Indias 1971 war of liberation of Bangladesh, the 1975
annexation of Sikkim and Chinas invasion of Vietnam in 1979 to teach it a lesson as
the Chinese declared, when the then Indian Foreign Minister Atal B. Vajpayee was in
Beijing, vitiated any possibility of reconciliation (Ganguly 2004: 12021).
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Serious border discussions resumed only in 1981 and eight rounds of dialogue
took place between 1981 and 1988, which failed to produce any fundamental breakthrough. In 1987, India and China almost went to war in the North-Eastern frontier
region of Sumdorung Chu, Arunachal Pradesh (Subrahmanyam 2005: 21628).
Subramanyam draws similarities between the 1962 war and the 1987 incident in terms
of the political situations in India and China ( Subrahmanyam 2005: 216), but there
also seemed to be a connection between developments on the boundary dispute and
the Tibetan struggle just as there were in 1962.
First, the breakdown in SinoIndian border negotiations in 1986 amidst mutual
suspicions of troop-concentrations along the border coincided with the break-down
of the SinoTibetan dialogue that has been going on since 1979. Second, in 1987 for
the first time India allowed the Dalai Lama to visit Western countries for the express
mission of seeking political support for the Tibetan causeinternationalisation of
the Tibet issue as it is understood in Tibetan studies circles (Goldstein 1997: 7578;
Norbu 2001: 27273; Shakya 1999: 40916). The Dalai Lamas first port of call in
this strategy was appropriately Washington DC. As Shakya observed:
The Indian Government too seemed to have been aware that the visit was going
to be different. In the past, whenever the Dalai Lama travelled abroad, an Indian
government official accompanied him. During this visit, however, the GOI withdrew
their official, so that they could not be implicated in the eyes of the Chinese. It
also indicated that the Indians knew what was going to happen. (Shakya 1999:
41415)
Close observers of Tibetan affairs will know that the Dalai Lamas activities in
Capitol Hill partly contributed to the series of pro-independence protests that rocked
the Tibetan capital city, Lhasa, from September 1987 to 1993 (Schwartz 1994).
Although Rajiv Gandhis visit to Beijing in 1988 temporarily relieved tensions,
not the least because of Indian acquiescence on Tibet, it did not accomplish much
in terms of a resolution of the border dispute, save that of creating a Joint Working
Group to seek a political solution. A number of Confidence Building Measures agreed
subsequently and more rounds of boundary talks fared no better. As one scholar notes,
[A] settlement of the border question still appears illusory (Ganguly 2004: 124).
Prime Minister Vajpayees visit to Beijing in 2003 gave fresh impetus and expectation
of a solution as Vajpayees declaration of the Tibet Autonomous Region as a part of
China was reciprocated with what seemed to be Chinese acceptance of Sikkim as a
part of India (Malik 2007). The sense of optimism increased after the signing of the
Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of
the Boundary Question during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabaos visit to India in April
2005, but the euphoria proved short-lived.
The prospects for a resolution quickly dimmed and the border issue became more
contentious (Malik 2007). A week before Hu Jintaos visit to India in 2006, the
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Chinese ambassador in New Delhi, Sun Yuxi, raised temperatures in India when he
said, In our position, the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory.
And Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all of that (Rediff India
Abroad 2006). Tawang is important because it is the site of one of the biggest Tibetan
Buddhist monasteries and the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama. In May 2007, China
refused to give a visa to an Indian MP from Arunachal Pradesh to visit China, arguing
that he did not require a visa in his own country. India responded by allowing then
Taiwanese presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou to visit Delhi and hold talks with
senior Indian officials in June 2007. Not long after that, Indian media reported border
incursions by Chinese soldiers and the supply of small arms to separatist insurgents in
Indias violence-torn North-East. Reports of Chinese military incursions into Sikkim
in June 2008, despite the apparent Chinese recognition of Indias ownership of it
back in 2003, reveal the volatility of the border issue (Indian Express 2008). Some
of these incursions seem to arise from the fact that the two countries have not even
managed to demarcate on the ground a mutually agreed-upon line of control, although
officially they refer to it as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) (Chellaney 2007: 169).
Interestingly enough, between May and June 2008, when the border issue was heating up and the Tibetan plateau was convulsed in the biggest unrest since the 1950s,
India allowed the 17th Karmapa to travel abroad (America) for the first and only time
(Arpi 2010; Sehgal 2010).3
Once again, it is noteworthy that while the relatively positive atmosphere on the
SinoIndian border discussions in the early 2000s was matched by the resumption of
SinoTibetan dialogue in September 2002, the increasing temperatures on both sides
of the border and downturn in the border talks was occasioned by growing unrest in
Tibet, especially in Eastern Tibet (ICT 2006; 2007),4 and the international victories
of sorts for the Tibetan exiles on account of the Dalai Lamas meetings with German
Chancellor Angela Merkel and the awarding of the Congressional Gold Medal by the
US President George W. Bush. The latest flare-up in the SinoIndian border took
place in 2009 when the Indian media was filled with reports of Chinese incursions

3
The Karmapa is the head of the Karma Kagyu sub-sect of Tibetan Buddhism and regarded as the
third highest lama in Tibet. After having been recognised by both the Dalai Lama and the Communist
Party of China as the reincarnation of the 16th Karmapa and groomed by the Chinese government to be a
patriotic lama, he escaped under dramatic circumstances in 2000. The Indian government has so far kept
the Karmapa on a tight leash when it comes to international travel in deference to Chinese sensitivities.
After allowing the Karmapa to travel to America in 2008, the Indian government blocked his scheduled
tours to Europe and America in 2010.
4
For instance, Tibetans inside Tibet responded immediately to the Dalai Lamas advice against indulging
in the traditional Tibetan custom of lining their dresses with the skin of animals such as tigers, leopard
and otters, by a vigorous campaign of burning animal pelt in public. In 2007, during a popular traditional
horse-racing festival in Eastern Tibet, a Tibetan man named Rungyal Adrak took to the stage and called
for Tibetan unity and the return of the Dalai Lama right in front of the officials arrayed on the stage. His
arrest led to a tense stand-off between Chinese paramilitary soldiers and the local Tibetans.

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127

and shooting at Indian border patrols and criticism of their government for hiding
these incidents just as Nehru and his associates kept the Indian public in the dark
about Chinese incursions and road-building on Indian soil prior to the clash in 1962
(Baruah 2009; Smith 2009). The Chinese media responded with counter-charges of
military movements on the Indian side and warned the Indians to consider whether
or not it could afford the consequences of a potential confrontation with China
(Global Times 2009). All of this happened only a year after China endured in 2008
the most widespread and violent Tibetan challenge to its rule (On the 2008 Tibetan
uprising, see Smith 2010; Topgyal 2011; Wang and Shakya 2009. For a daily record
of the uprising, see Woeser 2008).
I now return to the observation and question I posed in the introduction with regard
to the apparent official neglect of the Tibetan issue other than as a bargaining chip
by both India and China. Specifically, while Chinas need to ignore the Tibetan issue
is well-documented, Indias deafening silence is more puzzling. While the dominant
explanation is that India is worried about the likely Chinese response in Indias own
separatist regions, there is another more realist or cynical rationale. Although there
is no way of confirming this, India could be concerned about the implications of
the resolution of the Tibetan issue for the border dispute. If the Dalai Lama and the
exile elite return to Tibet under an agreement, they will come under Beijings pressure
to support its boundary claims. The Chinese have already required the Dalai Lama
both through the dialogue process and state media that he should not support Indias
position on the disputed territory of Arunachal Pradesh (China Daily 2008). With
the Dalai Lama and other leading Tibetans behind them, the Chinese claims will gain
more legitimacy. From Indias standpoint, therefore, it would be more advantageous if
the order of resolution is the border dispute first and the SinoTibetan conflict next.
The current SinoTibetan deadlock suits India fine in this sense as the Dalai Lama
and the key figures in the Tibetan government in exile have lined up behind Indias
position, whether voluntarily or due to gentle prodding from the Indian authorities
(Times of India, 2008; Rediff News 2008; Asia Sentinel 2009). This probably
explains the lack of activism in New Delhi for the resolution of the Tibetan issue.
This also chimes well with the new realism that has characterised Indias China policy
of engagement and emulation since the 1990s. Hence, the place of Tibet in Indias
China policy could be summed in these words: Tibet was a victim of Indias moralistic
idealism in the 1950s; in the post-Cold World War era, Tibet may become a victim
of Indias new realism.
Yet, there are analysts in both China and India who counsel that a resolution of
the Tibet issue one way or another other holds the key to not just solving the border
row, but easing the larger strategic rivalry (Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 29; Chellaney
2006: 263). Chellaney wrote, A genuine ChinaIndia rapprochement fundamentally
demands a resolution of the Tibet issue through a process of reconciliation and healing initiated by Beijing with its Tibetan minority (Chellaney 2006: 263). Malik,
meanwhile, opines that until Tibet has been totally pacified and [s]inicised as Inner
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Mongolia, China would prefer an undefined border as a bargaining chip because of

its suspicions that India prefers an independent Tibet and aids Tibetan separatists
(Malik 2007). Norbu argues that Tibet has shaped the informal and invisible dynamics
of SinoIndian relations and politics from 1950 to the present.... Tibet is the legal
foundation on which both Indias and Chinas border claims rest (Norbu 2001: 296).
For the reasons given above, India is reluctant to countenance Chellaneys advice to
condition any final border delineation between China and India to an agreement
between Beijing and the Dalai Lama. On the other hand, some Chinese scholars also
advised Beijing in 2001 that resolving the Tibet issue with the Dalai Lama would reduce
Chinas strategic risks in the volatile region of the Indian sub-continent (Rabgey and
Sharlho 2004: 29). Hard-liners in China undercut their advice and nothing came of
it as the current difficulty in the TibetanChinese dialogue process shows. Hence, the
SinoTibetan conflict is closely entwined with the SinoIndian strategic rivalry and
territorial dispute.

CONCLUSION

The persistence of the ChinaIndia boundary dispute is in contrast to the successful

resolution of most of Chinas other landborder disputes. Scholars have provided a
range of explanations ranging from nationalism, security and great power rivalry. While
agreeing with and indeed developing these rationalizations further, this papers main
contribution is to reveal the more fundamental connections between the ChinaIndia
border dispute and the SinoTibetan conflict. Specifically, this paper examined the
Tibetan roots of the border dispute, the centrality of Tibet in the boundary claims
of both China and India and the coincidence of key historical developments on the
boundary dispute and the SinoTibetan conflict. As the paper sought to show towards
the end, with regard to Indias approach to the Tibetan issue, the nexus between the
two is more complex than might meet the eyes.

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Authors address: 52 Whitehouse Avenue, Borehamwood, Hertfordshire WD6 1HD, United Kingdom.
E-mail: T.Topgyal@lse.ac.uk

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