Administrative Corruption

Author(s): Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden

Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1977), pp. 301-309
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration
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301

DEVELOPMENTS in RESEARCH
H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, Editor

Administrative Corruption
Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden, University of Southern California

The increased visibility of administrative cor-

accepted behavior, explained its existence by refer-

ruption has become a persistent and disturbing

feature of our times. Almost every issue of the

ence to social mores and deficiencies in economic

daily press brings, it seems, fresh examples of allegedly corrupt behavior on the part of responsible

in which it might elicit approval rather than condemnation. Although this approach contains much
that is appealing, and has paved the way to more

public and private figures. This growing prominence of corruption has coincided with increased

academic interest in a subject long deemed inappropriate for serious research, and still not regarded as a respectable topic for study in certain
circles. Fortunately, obvious objections to research
into corruption - problems of measurement, difficulties of access, bias, and evaluation - have been
largely attenuated, if not overcome. It is accepted
now that it is the responsibility of social scientists
to choose for their research subjects which touch
on or embrace problems central to human society,
and not merely those convenient to the tools they
have to hand.

For those interested in corruption as a social

phenomenon, the traditional approach, which
treated it in a moralistic manner, was inappropriate. Studies of corruption were vague as to defini-

tion, condemned it a priori, and looked for explanations in individual behavior. Social scientists

demanded precise definitions, objectivity, and

some relationship between the workings of society
and the existence of corruption. Thus was born a

"revisionist" approach (6), which defined corrup-

and political systems, and enumerated conditions

serious study of the problem of administrative

corruption by non-revisionists (3) (26) (27) (33),
careful examination of its assumptions and conclu-

sions reveals several misconceptions. These arise

mainly because, although the revisionists deal with
social variables, they still think of corrupt behavior

in individual terms without recognizing the existence of systemic corruption.

The Revisionist Approach

Until recently corruption was treated in a

moralistic manner. Its cause was seen as the gain-

ing of positions of power and trust by evil and

dishonest men. The solution was to "turn the ras-

cals out." Corruption was therefore incidental to

the working of society which might be safeguarded
by appropriate laws and exhortations. But even as
the muckrakers did their work of uncovering graft
and corruption in the turn-of-the-century United

States, suspicion was growing that these phenomena did not exist in isolation. The arch-muckraker,
Gerald E. Caiden is a professor of public administration at

tion in terms of divergence from a specific norm of

the University of Southern California. Previously he

taught at the Australian National University, Hebrew

Prepared under Grant Number 75-NI-99-0117 from

National University in Jerusalem, Haifa University, and

the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal

Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,

U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view or opinions

stated in this document are those of the authors and do

the University of California at Berkeley.

Naomi J. Caiden is an instructor at the University of

Southern California. She has taught at the Australian
National University and was a research associate in the

not necessarily represent the official position or policies

Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California
of the U.S. Department of Justice.

at Berkeley.

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

302

Lincoln Steffens himself, late in his career drewfamily, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of privateattention to the role of incentives fostering corrup-

regarding influence (28).

tion in the private enterprise society, by providing

"ordinary men" with "extraordinary temptations"

As long as no confusion exists regarding the standard from which corrupt practices diverge, i.e., the
A similar disquiet, and concern for corruption
nature of public duty, corruption may clearly be
as rooted in the mores and institutions of society,
defined and recognized. Once, however, the public
stimulated a rejection of moralistic and individualstandard is challenged, or regarded as relative to
istic explanations by students of comparative
circumstances, then considerable ambiguity enters.
administration. As interest grew in non-Western
Who sets the standard to say what behavior is
systems of government and in the workings of deacceptable and what corrupt? What is undue invelopment programs, those concerned with interfluence? What is misuse of authority? What is pub-

(30).

national aid and development encountered apparent and blatant corrupt administrative practices in
poor countries. It was natural to ask "Why do certain societies at particular times appear especially

prone to corruption?" Rejecting the answer of

comparative moral virtue as somewhat out of
keeping with the premises of the comparative
administration movement, the revisionists were led

to the view that corruption stemmed from norms

of politics and administration which differed from
those of the West, and might even fulfil political,
administrative, and economic needs better than

lic irresponsibility? If there is no accepted public

standard, or if the standards of public office and
public duty are regarded as foreign importations
inapplicable in given conditions, is there then innocence of corruption (20)? In short, "Are ideas and

theories offered by Western scholars about the

state of corruption in the developing nations valid
in the light of the divergent social norms that govern the conduct of public office in the West and

those in the transitional societies of Asia" (19)?

The issue is one of conflict of values. Against
the Western, impersonal, and universalistic norms

the public ethic fostered by aid officials. Corrup-

of bureaucracy are set the values of kinship and

reciprocity. Are these to be denied validity, and
therefore be removed from the realm of the moral
the public servant who fulfils their expectations to
(and unspeakable) to the neutral (and researchbe considered as corrupt? After all,
tion was not incidental but structural: it could

able).
The first problem was "what is corruption?"
Definitions have been classified into three types
(20): public interest, public duty, and market centered. The first, which has largely been rejected by
the revisionists, regards corruption as arising:
whenever a powerholder .. . i.e., a responsible functionary or office holder, is by monetary or other rewards not

legally provided for, induced to take an action which

favors whoever provides the rewards, and thereby does
damage to the public and its interests (17).

Such definition pre-judges the result of corruption,

is imprecise (as the meaning of public interest is

open to different interpretations), and may pre-

clude recognition of corruption until after the

... in a given society, various kinds of norms operate,

some congruent, others inconsistent with one another.

Legal norms may conflict with moral, religious and cultural norms, so that a sample of behavior defined as illegal
may be acceptable using cultural standards (19).

In retaining a residual definition of corruption, but

rejecting the specific substantive standard to which

it pertains, the revisionists have dissolved corruption. In their conception, corruption is by definition exceptional, the departure from the normal
ways of doing business: corruption cannot itself be

the norm. Once corruption, in other words, becomes sufficiently widespread as to constitute a
normal rather than an exceptional mode of behavior, it ceases to exist.

Analysis is taken beyond public ethics by mar-

event only when the public interest can be clarified and judged.

ket-oriented types of definition, such as "Corrup-

The second type of definition, public duty,

appears more promising. Though a number of
variations exist (3) (5) (21) (24) (26), the basic
idea is conveyed by the most often used defini-

model to a free-market model" (31), or "Corruption is an extra-legal institution used by individuals

or groups to gain influence over the actions of the

tion:

tion involves a shift from a mandatory pricing

bureaucracy" (23). Unlike the public duty-type

definitions, there is no doubt as to what "public"

... behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a
ways of doing things represent. It is in the former
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close case a "centralized allocative mechanism" and in

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303

RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS

the latter a stipulated institutionalized decision-inability to provide the services demanded of it.
The centralized allocative mechanism breaks down
making process. But again, the standard is purely
because of disequilibrium between supply and derelative, since these institutions are regarded as so
mand, and the market reasserts itself (31). In poor
inadequate to fulfill the demands placed upon

them that corruption provides an alternative

countries the situation is aggravated by cultural
means of allocation or of access to decision mak-

factors, rising expectations and demands, the preing. Once again corruption is legitimized in termsdominance of government as a supplier of reof its prevalence and of faulty working of West-sources, and lack of alternatives. Similarly, one can
ern-style norms and institutions.
refer to the inability of morally approved strucThese definitions provide the under-pinning for tures to fulfill essential social functions (25).
The "political" aspect of the explanation reexplanations of why corruption is allegedly more
prevalent in certain places, notably poor countries.lates corruption to access to power and political
The "cultural" explanation starts from the
institutionalization. Corruption is seen as primarily
assumption that in "developing" countries there
related to inadequate political channels, and as
exists a gap between law (as imposed Western and
such simply a special case of political influence

alien standards) and accepted informal social

(29). Again, poor countries are good candidates

norms (sanctioned by prevailing social ethics), i.e.,

there is a divergence between the attitudes, aims,
and methods of the government of a country and

for corruption because of the disproportionate impact of government on society, bureaucratic dom-

those of the society in which they operate (24).

The individual who assumes a public role is:
... torn between two social forces operating in his world.
Because of the rational, impersonal and universalistic
norms of the bureaucracy, he must accept that a public
office is a public trust, not a personal domain. He must
therefore commit himself to serve the national and com-

inance, a weak sense of nation with a high value

placed on kinship, and a marked gap between citizen and government. There is a heavy burden for
political institutions to carry in terms of capacity

and legitimacy, and corruption fills the gap. Corruption is the equivalent of pressure group influence in more politically developed countries, but
taking place after the passage of legislation rather

munity's need ahead of his personal and family interests.

But there, too, are strong kinship bonds which compel than prior to its passage because of factors such as
him to look after the needs not only of the immediate erratic administration or public discrimination
members of his family but even those of his extended
against minorities (29). Similarly corruption is

family system, otherwise he violates a stronger norm regarded as the result of modernization in the ab-

which is deeply rooted in the personalistic and familistic

outlooks which characterize traditional cultural values. As

sence of political institutionalization (21). Refer-

to his duties to his family and his kin, some of whom may

of public role), the creation of new sources of

he imbibes Weberian ideas in school, including possible ence is made to the disruptive effects of changes in
post-graduate studies abroad, he faces a conflict in regard values (e.g., ascription to achievement; acceptance

have helped him bear the cost of an expensive education wealth and power, the expansion of governmental
(19).

functions and regulation, and the lack of strong

In the resulting role conflict, the Weberian, bu-

political parties. Corruption has much the same

reaucratic role is only one open to the official, and function as violence (and acts as an alternative). Its
not necessarily the most compelling (13). So-called emergence is inversely related to the degree of
corruption appears to be consistent with customs social stratification in the society. The lack of
and traditions, whereas the laws and ethics that
opportunities outside government leads to the use
make it illegal and immoral are alien, imported, or of public office to build private fortunes, and
super-imposed (1). It is also suggested that tradi- foreign business activities tend to encourage local
tional values pre-dispose toward corruption, which corruption (29).
in turn eases the gap between citizen and governAs these explanations have strong functional
ment (29). A variation on this theme is the view overtones, they stress the positive effects of cor-

that corruption is "dislocated" behavior resulting ruption. Since attention is on "developing" counfrom a lag in the value system of the community tries, the main issue raised is the probable effect of
in relation to institutional change (32).
corruption on economic, political, and, to a lesser

The "cultural" explanation blurs into consid- extent, administrative, development. On the

erations of governmental capacity, which have two whole, considerations relating to administrative
major emphases. The first of these might be called development are the most pessimistic, for obvious
"economic," since it relates to the government's reasons, since corruption undermines bureaucratic

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304

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

norms. Cited are non-achievement of goals, risetion

in contributes to the strengthening of political
parties and will itself be defeated in the long run,
the price of administration, diversion of resources
since vigilant and strong political parties will tend
from public purposes, erosion of morale, lowered
to reduce opportunities for corruption (21).
respect for authority, a poor example enhancing
lack of political courage, diversion of energies intoIn sum, poor countries for cultural and historical reasons have a propensity toward corruption,
lobbying, fiddling, etc., resulting in argument and
seen as a violation of Western norms. To this probitterness, delays, and the use of inappropriate

pensity may be added a breakdown in the allocacriteria in decisions (5). On the other hand, cortive mechanisms of society, or economic, political,
ruption is also regarded as a means of surmounting
and administrative reasons, so that corruption
either traditional laws and/or bureaucratic regulasteps in to fulfill the missing functions. Corruption
tion (21) and considered as a means of cutting
is thus legitimized in terms of its prevalence, and
down uncertainty in decision making (29). Nepoof its functionality: indeed, given the inappropritism may even result in the appointment of more
ateness of Western norms and inadequacy of Westcompetent bureaucrats (2).

As far as economic development is concerned,

ern institutions, corruption does not really exist at
however, corruption is seen as positive in effect,
all - it is simply a different way of doing business.
on the assumption that governmental administraBefore such conceptualization can be accepted,
tion acts as a stifling force against private initiahowever, we have to ask two questions. First, does

tive. Thus corruption may impel better choices,

corruption really disappear once it becomes norincrease the allocation of resources to investment,
mal behavior, or is it a substantive phenomenon,
may exist as normal behavior itself? Second,
improve the quality of public servants, increase which
the
responsiveness of bureaucracy and through nepowhereas corruption may arise because a system is
tism substitute for a public works system (5).
failing to achieve its purpose, might not that purWhile admitting that corruption may lead to capipose be better served by reforming the system
tal outflow, investment distortions and aid forethan acquiescing in corruption?
gone, it may be functional as a source of capital
formation, cutting red tape and offering private
Administrative Corruption as a Norm
incentives to entrepreneurs given certain condiUp to this point, corruption has been treated
tions, viz., a tolerant culture and dominant groups,
as divergence from an acknowledged stanperceived security by elites, and certain societalsimply
or
dard, whose applicability is now felt in some quarinstitutional restraints. Corruption funnels capital
to struggling entrepreneurs, minimizing wastageters
of to be in doubt. It is assumed, therefore, that

until this standard came into being in Western

resources, wresting control of trade and industry
Europe
at the end of the 18th century, corruption
from aliens, and promoting investment through
did not exist: corruption was, in effect, the creapoliticians (2).
tion of bureaucracy.
Finally, corruption is seen as making a positive

contribution to political development, usuallyBefore the clear distinction between public and
standards of behavior which emerged with
viewed in terms of national integration and private
the
the ideas of the French Revolution, the argument
strengthening of political parties. Corruption is
runs, many practices now regarded as corruption,
cited as an acceptable alternative to violence (21)
(28) and as aiding national unification and stabilsuch as venality and nepotism, were not against
the law and were even exploited to their own
ity, helping integration by bringing in groups
otherwise alienated, and increasing participationbenefit
in
by rulers. Corruption, in accordance with a
public affairs (21) (2). It is also argued that corpublic duty definition, did not and could not exist

since no concept of public duty existed. Behavior

ruption reduces pressure for policy change and
weakens the governmental bureaucracy, bothnow
of thought of as corrupt might at most be seen
which are regarded as functional for political instias a special category of "proto-corruption," retutionalization (21). Others stress elite integration:
garded as normal and legitimate by contemporaries
(29).
the bourgeoisie can buy its way into the elite, and

corruption can cement together a conservative

It is true that current concepts of corruption
coalition, while holding back or cancelling out date
the from the ideas of the French Revolution,
effects of growing collective demands and humanwhich swept away private monarchical government
izing government for non-elites. Finally, corrupand replaced it with representative government

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305

RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS

(9). Office became a public trust, and officials

although regarded as wrong.
servants of the community. Public and private
were separated. Privilege and hereditary tenure
Administrative Corruption as Functional
were replaced by qualification for office. Venality
and nepotism were abolished and office holders
That corruption should at times serve certain
even those of the state itself, is not surceased to have private rights in their office. interests,
Offiprising: its very raison d'etre indicates that somecials became full-time, and were paid by salary,
one is profiting. The revisionists, however, have
not from private profits gained from conducting
the government's business. A clear distinction
wasa link between corruption and development,
made
made between the personal lives of officialsby
and
indicating that where political and administrathe conduct expected from them in their work
tive by
systems are deficient, corruption may comthe enforcement of rules. Public accountability
en- and prove of general benefit to developpensate
ment.
tailed continued hierarchical bureaucratic control,

as opposed to sporadic, dilatory judicial interThe problem is to what exactly the revisionists
vention (11).
are referring. They link "corruption" defined in
It is also true that before this transformation

residual rather than substantive terms, and "devel-

practices now thought of as corrupt provided the opment," a concept which has come to mean all
basis of government. Nepotism, venality, exploita- things to all men (12). Further, the relationship
tion of public function for private profit, were not may be far from positive, i.e., rather than "corruponly usual but also served needs of the crown tion" (whatever it might be) aiding "development"
which could not be fulfilled through more legiti- (in mythic terms of whatever one would like it to
mate channels. But even while such practices were be), a particular kind of development may tend to
commonplace, they were by no means accepted. be accompanied by corruption. Often there is an
As long ago as the ancient empires, before even uneasy ambivalence regarding which is to be the
money was in common use, corruption was recog- dependent variable, development (or modernizanized and vigorous attempts made to combat it, as tion) or corruption.
for example in the bureaucracy of Mauryan India
Beyond the semantic problem, however, lies the

(18) (22). In the Athenian city-state, a public

issue of functionality. It is generally accepted that

audit was instituted in order to check corruption

system survival is bound up with a system's ability

and enforce a public role upon officials (7). In to adapt and survive, in turn dependent on its abilrepublican Rome, even while provincial officials
ity to absorb and benefit from change. The reand others were making their fortunes at the ex- visionists handle the problem of change along
pense of the state and its subjects (the current joke classic functional lines, i.e., corruption is a dyswas that a governor needed three years to make his function of the system, which arises because the

fortune - one to pay off his debts, one to provide system cannot accommodate change - it is thus a
a nest-egg for himself, and one to bribe his judges functional dysfunction, whereby the new (and
when he returned to Rome (4) ), awareness of cor- therefore functional) norms it represents replace
ruption existed and orators such as Cicero spoke
outmoded norms. Exactly where this fits into the

out against it. Machiavelli attempted to analyze argument regarding cultural norms or propensity
corruption in the Italy of his day (8). The monar- to corruption is unclear: for here the new norms
chies of Europe all instituted some machinery to
are, in fact, the old (pre-development, non-Westcombat corruption, even though to serve their own ern) norms. There is a further ambiguity in the
needs, they sometimes acquiesced in its subversion "cultural" argument, which does not make it al-

(10) (14) (15) (16).

Lack of bureaucratic standards, entrenchment

and pervasiveness, functionality for the short-run

together clear whether we are discussing actual

traditional norms held by "traditional man" (if he

exists) or the breakdown in these norms impacted

purposes of the regime or participants, did not upon by Western-type development. There is also a

mean that corruption did not exist. Though wide- missing link in the analysis, which should explain
spread and prevalent, the phenomenon of corrup- the actual dynamic whereby new norms are
tion was well recognized and its consequences evolved, and what kind of norms these will be.

realized. As a frequent, and sometimes normal,

accompaniment of government, it was not an ex-

Leaving aside the ambiguities, we have to ask

whether the norms of corruption have been able to

ception from the norm: it was the norm itself, accommodate the needs of societal change. In the

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

306

case of the transition to bureaucratic norms and

do not subvert or sabotage organizational purpose.

public responsibility in Western countries, they

The conceptions of the revisionists, however,

do not appear to stretch to encompass the signifi-

failed to do so. In the end the old ways of conducting state business simply could not cope with
the state's needs for increased mobilization of re-

sources, effective and honest disbursement of

funds, public trust in government, and control
over its activities (9).

The entrenchment of corruption prevented

these changes taking place on an orderly basis. In
the most extreme example, that of 18th-century

France, corruption helped suppress and funnel

opposition to the regime until it reached disastrous
proportions, on the analogy of landscape along a
fault line which remains unaffected by repeated

shocks for a long period and then is completely

transformed by a catastrophic earthquake. In
other words, the more that corrupt practices
approached the dimensions of a norm, or accepted
standard of behavior, the more they impeded both

administrative and societal changes. The impulse

cance of what they often appear to describe,

which is systemic corruption - a situation where
wrong-doing has become the norm, and the stan-

dard accepted behavior necessary to accomplish

organizational goals according to notions of public
responsibility and trust has become the exception
not the rule. In this situation, corruption has be-

come so regularized and institutionalized that

organizational supports back wrong-doing and
actually penalize those who live up to the old
norms. Such systemic corruption is found today in

many countries and jurisdictions, particularly

where society prizes organizational loyalty over
the public interest, where past standards of public
rectitude and personal integrity have been eroded,

and where notions of public responsibility and

trust have been thrust aside with exploitation of
public office for private gain. The key is not so

for change had to come not from within, from the

much the techniques of organizational method,

continuing development and modification of accepted and corrupt means of administration, but

e.g., bureaucracy, as organizational goals and the

qualities necessary to support and maintain them,

from reformers promoting innovation and new

viz., honest administration and public accounta-

norms. Though corruption might prove functional

bility. The issue only becomes tangled where goals

to the interests of certain individuals and groups,

and to the system insofar as it shares those inter-

are displaced, so that specific, substantive, and

public goals are transposed into, on one level,
generalized and hazy development goals, and on

ests, its very functionality is a symptom or indica-

tion of the need for reform. Corruption does not

disappear when it becomes entrenched and accepted: rather it assumes a different form, that of
systemic as opposed to individual corruption.
Individual and Systemic Corruption

Although revisionists have recognized corrup-

tion as a social fact, with structural causes and

consequences, it is our contention that they have
continued to think of it in individual terms. The

definitions they suggest are well suited to individual corruption - the individual who strays from

another particularized benefits for privileged individuals or groups.

Systemic corruption has not been subject to

much specific research. Examples readily come to

mind in many large-scale organizations and at

different levels of government. The Watergate
affair showed that the White House was not im-

mune. The Fitzgerald revelations indicated that

defense contracting was riddled with systemic
corruption, and other brave whistle-blowers have
questioned law enforcement agencies, regulatory

commissions, and public inspection bodies. Sys-

temic corruption occurs whenever the administraa prevailing norm of official public behavior. Sevtive system itself transposes the expected purposes
eral of the hypotheses they put forward may even
of the organization, forces participants to follow
be plausible as long as they are thought of in indiwhat otherwise would be termed unacceptable
vidual terms - informal organizational short-cuts;

ways, and actually punishes those who resist.

the occasional accommodation of personal favor;
Deviant conduct is so institutionalized that no
mutual "understandings." These may, according to
individual can be personally faulted organizationcircumstances, be condonable or reprehensible,
but they still bear the vital characteristics of indi- ally (not morally) for participating, and dysfunction is actually protected. In systemic corruption:
vidual corruption - they can be coped with and
minimized (though rarely if ever eliminated) with(a) the organization professes an external code
in a reasonably effective control system, and they of ethics which is contradicted by internal prac-

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307

RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS

tices;

(b) internal practices encourage, abet, and hide

violations of the external code;
(c) non-violators are penalized by foregoing the
rewards of violation and offending violators;

(d) violators are protected, and when exposed,

treated leniently; their accusers are victimized for
exposing organizational hypocrisy, and are treated
harshly;

(e) non-violators suffocate in the venal atmosphere; they find no internal relief and much external disbelief;
(f) prospective whistle-blowers are intimidated
and terrorized into silence;
(g) courageous whistle-blowers have to be protected from organizational retaliation;

(h) violators become so accustomed to their

practices and the protection given them that, on
exposure, they evidence surprise and claim innocence and unfair discrimination against them;
(i) collective guilt finds expression in rationali-

zations of the internal practices and without

strong external supports there is no serious intention of ending them;

(j) those formally charged with revealing corruption rarely act and, when forced by external
pressure to do so, excuse any incidents as isolated,
rare occurrences.

then the dangers are self-evident and its i

tionalization is obviously dysfunctional to
In most cases, the practices constitute theft

ery, or extortion and probably involve

hypocrisy, and false testimony, and so are

able offenses, even if they fall into the cate
victimless crime.

Individual cases of corruption can be r

out by the application of organizational san

The wrong-doer is taxed with the evidence
ized for minor offenses, and dismissed, an
bly prosecuted under the criminal code, for

offenses. The scandal is localized and ste

taken to prevent repetition. Systemic corr

cannot be handled so easily. There is no gu
that if the most serious offenders are dismi

if everyone who is guilty is replaced, corr

will not persist. The old patterns will co

with new players. Further, the scandal wil

reinforcing effect. Successors will make sur

will not be caught so easily by examining

their predecessors went wrong and so reorg

to make any repetition of exposure much
The people may change, but the system pe
Moreover, in the wider society, systemic c
tion impedes rather than aids change.

(a) Systemic corruption perpetuates c

politics and restricts access, preventing the

tion of social change in political institution

The point to be stressed above all is that

few
(b) Systemic
corruption suppresses oppos
corrupt practices can be conducted without
collucontributing
to increasing resentment. Th
sion. Few can be kept secret for anyruption
lengthfar
of from being an alternative to vio
time. Violations of public norms are known
toaccompanied
all.
often
by more violence.

As we have previously illustrated, some

re(c) Systemic
corruption perpetuate

visionists argue that, moral judgment apart,

if pubwidens
class, economic, and social divisions

lic business is conducted according to

systemicto societal strain and prevent
tributing

corruption, that is how things are, that hesion.

is how pub-

lic power is exercised, that is the operational

(d) norm
Systemic

corruption prevents

of public administration, and can nochange,

longerparticularly
be
where this works again

market considerations. Individual o

considered corruption. It is merely an mediate
extra-legal
device to gain influence over public policy,
fill
tionalto
interests
are not the best guide to the

interest.
vacuums left by inadequate public laws,
to get

around unrealistic administrative norms, to

(e) bridge
Systemic corruption blocks administr
lags in the value system of the community
in relareform,
and makes deleterious administrativ
tion to institutional change, to reallocate
resources,
tices
profitable, e.g., induced delays.

and services when disequilibrium arises(f)

between
Systemic corruption diverts publi

supply and demand, to stabilize the political

syssources
and contributes to a situation of pr
tem and replace violence, to cut down uncertainty
affluence, public squalor, especially serious
affluence is confined to the few.
in decision making, to cut through bureaucratic

red tape, and to increase the responsiveness

and
(g) Systemic
corruption contributes to so
sensitivity of public organizations. Systemic
anomiecorin shoring up or transmuting trad
ruption may do all these things and values
more,into
butinappropriate areas.

when one reduces the term to specific(h)

actions,
The effects of systemic corruption ar

MAY/JUNE 1977

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

308

imited to a specific case: there is an accumulator11. Caiden, G.E., The Dynamics of Public Administra-

tion (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971).

12. Caiden, N., and A. Wildavsky, Planning and Budgetwhich subverts trust and cooperation far beyond
ing in Poor Countries (New York: Wiley, 1974).
the impact upon the individuals immediately con13. Carino, L.V., "Bureaucratic Behavior and Developcerned.
ment: Types of Graft and Corruption in a Developing Country," paper presented at the Conference on
(i) Systemic corruption is not confined to
the Political Economy of Development, Manila,
poor, developing, or modernizing countries, but

effect upon public perceptions and expectations

17-18 December 1974.

found in all organizational societies.

14. Dent, J., "An Aspect of the Crisis of the Seventeenth
These hypotheses might better form the startCentury: The Collapse of the Financial Administraing point for serious research into administrative tion of the French Monarchy 1653-61," Economic
corruption than the historically inaccurate assump- History Review (August 1967).
15. Crisis in France: Crown, Financiers and Sotions and often unfounded assertions of the reciety in Seventeenth Century France (Newton
visionists, who have confused individual and sysAbbot: David and Charles, 1973).

temic corruption. In contemporary public adminis- 16. Durand, Y., Les Fermiers Generaux au XVIII Siecle
tration, the issue is not so much individual mis(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971).

conduct in public office, serious as that is, as the 17. Friedrich, C.J., "Political Pathology," Political Quarterly, Vol. 37 (1966), reproduced in A.J. Heiden-

institutionalized subversion of the public interest

through systemic corruption.

heimer, Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).
18. Gopal, M.H., Mauryan Public Finance (London:
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30

RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS

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in the New States," Public Administration Review,

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