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G.R.No.L2017

TodayisThursday,July21,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L2017November24,1906
THEMUNICIPALITYOFOAS,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
BARTOLOMEROA,defendantappellant.
DelPan,OrtigasandFisher,forappellant.
EnriqueLlopizforappellee.

WILLARD,J.:
TheplaintiffbroughtthisactionfortherecoveryofatractoflandinthepuebloofOas,claimingthatitwasapart
of the public square of said town. The defendant in his answer alleged that he was the owner of the property.
Judgmentwasrenderedinfavoroftheplaintiffandthedefendanthasbroughtthecaseherebybillofexceptions.
Aswelookatthecase,theonlyquestioninvolvedisoneoffact.Wasthepropertyinquestionapartofthepublic
squareofthetownofOas?Thetestimonyuponthispointinfavoroftheplaintiffconsistedofstatementsmadeby
witnesses to the effect that this land had always been a part of the public square, and of certain resolutions
adoptedbytheprincipaliaofthepueblorecitingthesamefact,themostimportantofthesebeingtheminutesof
the meeting of the 27th of February, 1892. In that document it is expressly stated that this land was bought in
1832 by the then parish priest for the benefit of the pueblo. It recites various proceedings taken thereafter in
connectionwiththisownership,includingamongthemanorderofthecorregidorofNuevaCaceresprohibitingthe
erection of houses upon the land by reason of the fact above recited namely, that the land belonged to the
pueblo.Thisresolutionterminatedwithanordertotheoccupantofthebuildingthenstandingupontheproperty
thatheshouldnotrepairit.Thedefendantsignedthisresolution.
Itfurtherappearsthatthesamebuildingwasalmostentirelydestroyedbyabaguioonthe13thand14thofMay,
1893,andthattheauthoritiesofthepueboorderedthecompletedemolitionthereof.Theresolutionofthe31stof
May, 1893, declared that the then owner of the building, Jose Castillo, had no right to reconstruct it because it
wassituateduponlandwhichdidnotbelongtohim.Thisresolutionwasalsosignedbythedefendant.
Theevidenceonthepartofthedefendanttendstoshowthatin1876JuanaRicarteandJuanaRiquizasoldthe
landinquestiontoJuanRoco,andthatonthe17thdayofDecember,1894,JoseCastillosoldittothedefendant.
NodeedofconveyancefromJuanRocotoJoseCastillowaspresentedinevidence,butCastillo,testifyingasa
witness,saidthathehadboughtthepropertybyverbalcontractfromRoco,hisfatherinlaw.Thedefendant,after
hispurchasein1894,procuredapossessoryofinformationwhichwasallowedbyanorderofthejusticeofthe
peaceofOasonthe19thdayofJanuary,1895,andrecordedintheRegistryofPropertyonthe28thofMarchof
thesameyear.
In this state of the evidence, we can not say that the proof is plainly and manifestly against the decision of the
court below. Unless it is so, the finding of fact made by that court can not be reversed. (De la Rama vs. De la
Rama,201U.S.,303.)
The two statements signed by Roa, one in 1892 and the other in 1893, are competent evidence against him.
Theyareadmissionsbyhimtotheeffectthatatthattimethepueblowastheownerofthepropertyinquestion.
They are, of course, not conclusive against him. He was entitled to, and did present evidence to overcome the
effect of these admissions. The evidence does not make out a case of estoppel against him. (sec. 333, par. 1,
CodeofCivilProcedure.)
TheadmissibilityofthesestatementsmadebyRoadonotrestuponsection278oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,
whichrelatestodeclarationsoradmissionsmadebypersonsnotapartytothesuit,butitrestsupontheprinciple
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thatwhenthedefendantinasuithashimselfmadeanadmissionofanyfactpertinenttoissueinvolved,itcanbe
receivedagainsthim.
Thisactionwascommencedonthe17thofDecember,1902.Thereisnoevidenceofanyadverseoccupationof
thislandforthirtyyears,consequentlytheextraordinaryperiodofprescriptiondoesnotapply.Thedefendantcan
notrelyupontheordinaryperiodofprescriptionoftenyearsbecausehewasnotaholderingoodfaith.Heknew
atthattimeofhispurchasein1894,andhadsostatedinwriting,thatthepueblowastheowneroftheproperty.
So that, even if the statute of limitations ran against a municipality in reference to a public square, it could not
availthedefendantinthiscase.
ItappearsthatRoahasconstructedupontheproperty,andthattherenowstandsthereon,asubstantialbuilding.
As early as 1852 this land had been used by the municipality constructed thereon buildings for the storage of
propertyoftheState,quartersforthecuadrilleros,andothersofalikecharacter.Itthereforehadceasedtobe
propertyusedbythepublicandhadbecomeapartofthebienespatrimonialesofthepueblo.(CivilCode,arts.
341,344.)TothecaseareapplicablethoseprovisionsoftheCivilCodewhichrelatetotheconstructionbyone
personofabuildinguponlandbelongingtoanother.Article364oftheCivilCodeisasfollows:
Where there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sowed, or planted on
another'sland,butalsoonthepartoftheownerofthelatter,therightsofbothshallbethesameasifthey
hadactedingoodfaith.
Badfaithonthepartoftheownerisunderstoodwhenevertheacthasbeenexecutedinhispresencewith
hisknowledgeandtoleranceandwithoutobjection.
The defendant constructed the building in bad faith for, as we have said, he had knowledge of the fact that his
grantorwasnottheownerthereof.Therewasabadfaithalsoonthepartoftheplaintiffinaccordancewiththe
expressprovisionsofarticle364sinceitallowedRoatoconstructthebuildingwithoutanyoppositiononitspart
andtosooccupyitforeightyears.Therightsofthepartiesmust,therefore,bedeterminedasiftheybothhad
actedingoodfaith.Theirrightsinsuchcasesaregovernedbyarticle361oftheCivilCode,whichisasfollows:
Theownerofthelandonwhichthebuilding,sowing,orplantingisdoneingoodfaithshallhavearightto
appropriateashisownthework,sowing,orplantingaftertheindemnitymentionedinarticles453and454,
or,toobligethepersonwhohasbuiltorplanted,topayhimthevalueofthelandandtoforcetheperson
whosowedtopaytheproperrent.
Thejudgmentofthecourtbelowissomodifiedastodeclarethattheplaintiffistheownerofthelandandthatit
hastheoptionofbuyingthebuildingthereon,whichisthepropertyofthedefendant,orofsellingtohimtheland
onwhichitstands.Theplaintiffisentitledtorecoverthecostsofbothinstances.
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After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and at the proper time
thereafterlettherecordberemandedtothecourtbelowforproperaction.Soordered.
Johnson,CarsonandTracey,JJ.,concur.
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