7.

Being a good computer

professional: The advantages of
virtue ethics in computing
Richard Volkman
Southern Connecticut State University

Introduction
When smart and well-educated professionals misbehave, ethicists have to
wonder if we could have done anything to prevent it. After all, while it may
be morally satisfying to simply assign full blame for the woes of Enron, Tyco,
Worldcom, and others, to corrupt corporate leaders, such an analysis begs the
further questions: Why did morally deficient actors rise to such prominent
positions in the first place? Why were the prevailing standards, policies, and
practices of professional ethics embodied in implicit and explicit ethical
controls so unable to regulate conduct that in hindsight seems obviously
beyond the pale? One plausible answer has to do with the impotence of standard
utilitarian and deontological styles of reasoning, in the face of prevailing
uncertainty about values and outcomes in the context of the new economy.
These concerns are especially acute in computer ethics; while change and
uncertainty is a problem in business, it is at the very heart of computing and
the circumstance that gives rise to computer ethics (Moor, 1985). In general, if
one cannot rationally determine the outcomes of action or how to evaluate those
outcomes, then utilitarian and deontological reasoning cannot guide action, and
this leaves ample room for rationalisation, and this undermines the efficacy of
these approaches to computer ethics.
In contrast, principles of good character do not derive from statements of eternal,
universal values or fortuitous outcomes; a virtue is a trait of character that is
good for the person who has it, where the value of good character derives from
the agents own commitments. It follows that virtue ethics is not susceptible
to rationalisations based on extrinsic rewards, which are made uncertain by a
prevailing relativism about values or by a volatile economic environment. An
analysis of the culture of computing grounds the classical virtues of integrity,
honesty, courage, and good judgement in the antecedent beliefs and values

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typical of those entering the profession. Virtue helps to flesh out the spirit of
the profession, as this stands behind professional codes and other artefacts of
professional ethics.
The principle aim of this paper is to introduce the educated lay reader, especially
current and future computer professionals, to the basic advantages and strategies
associated with the use of virtue terms in the description and prescription
of ethical conduct. In light of this goal, the essay seeks to capture the main
ideas that motivate a virtue- or character-centred approach to ethics, while
remaining uncommitted with respect to a number of interesting theoretical and
philosophical matters, including even the question of whether the thoughtful
application of virtue terms to practical reasoning should be conceived as any
kind of theory at all. An applied ethics of virtue is found in thinkers as diverse
as Aristotle to Nietzsche, and it is not the aim of this essay to advance one or
another particular approach or to address the metaphysical or epistemological
doctrines that distinguish them. Virtue discourse works as a guide to action, no
matter how these foundational questions should turn out, and that may be the
principle advantage of the virtue ethics approach to applied ethics. If this essay
succeeds in showing that there are good reasons to become fluent in the language
of virtue, then a further examination of the particular accounts of virtues, and
whether virtue ethics is an alternative ethical theory or an alternative to ethical
theory, can be fruitfully explored.

Problems in applying an ethics of rules and

outcomes
At least when applied to the contexts of professional ethics, utilitarian and
deontological ethics generally boils down to a concern for good outcomes, on
the one hand, or obedience to good rules on the other. This way of thinking
about ethics is problematic, however, especially in a cultural and economic
context characterised by relativism and uncertainty. Relativism about values
and uncertainty about outcomes straightforwardly undermine any utilitarian
calculus as a guide to action. One cannot choose the course of action that will
generate the best outcome if one has no standard for evaluating outcomes and
no means of predicting outcomes. The situation is little better for deontology.
If morality is ultimately about acting on the right rules of conduct, then one
cannot figure out how to behave morally unless one is able to determine what
the right rules are and how they apply to a given circumstance. But conditions
of change call established rules into question and can blur the lines between
appropriate and inappropriate application of the rules. To offer a concrete
example, no deontologist (except perhaps for Kant himself) would maintain that
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it is always wrong to lie. In the context of a perceived new economy, it is a

short leap to the view that creative accounting is not really lying, or, if it is
lying, then it is not a case where lying is wrong. After all, the stock just keeps
going up.
Of course, this is plainly mere rationalisation. Utilitarian and deontological styles
of reasoning, however, invite this sort of rationalisation. In both cases, an illusion
of ethical precision combined with the notion that ethics is a constraint on ones
self-interest creates an incentive to find ethical loopholes. Even if professional
philosophers can discern something amiss in this characterisation (and I do
mean if), it is plain enough that business leaders and other professionals could
get this impression. Whatever one thinks about the ultimate grounds of ethics,
the point here is that ethicists need to talk about and emphasise something
more than rules of conduct and calculations of the overall good. If morality
seems to be nothing but a bunch of rules or calculations that operate against
what I would really like to do, and if certain clever considerations seem to show
that a given rule does not apply in this particular case, then there is a strong
incentive to be overly clever. This encourages a lawyerly approach to ethics
that is quite at odds with the spirit of utilitarian or deontological morality, but
entirely predictable if morality is reduced to good outcomes and right rules. If
one tinkers with the calculation or evaluation of outcomes, or if one fuzzes the
rules or their application, then just about anything goes. And the tinkering and
fuzzing do not require willful fudging by the agent. In our current cultural,
economic, and technological circumstance, transformative change does this all
by itself.
Of course, all this applies to the world of computing even more plainly than
the world of business. Jim Moors seminal What is computer ethics? identifies
the field with conceptual vacuums that give rise to policy vacuums as a
consequence of the transformation of social institutions attributable to the
introduction of computing (Moor, 1985). Against this, Don Gotterbarn has
argued that an overbroad conception of computer ethics is unmanageable
and that it makes for unsolvable problems, while appealing to the uniqueness
or transforming effect of computing distracts the field from its proper focus
on professional ethics (Gotterbarn, 1991). In this connection, Gotterbarn and
others have emphasised the importance of articulating the nature and morality
of computing as a profession, culminating in the drafting of the Software
Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional Practice by a joint task force of the
IEEE and the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM).
But it has to be acknowledged that the difficulties noted above for utilitarian
and deontological ethics apply to the creation and application of a code of ethics
(which is, after all, an essentially deontological enterprise). If a code of ethics
encourages professionals to think of ethics as reduced to a collection of rules,
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then lawyerly rationalisations are encouraged, especially insofar as relativism

and change undermine the authority of any particular rule or its application. In
this vein, John Ladd worries that, a code of ethics can be used as a cover-up for
what might be called basically unethical or irresponsible conduct (Ladd,
1980). In anticipation of this concern, the IEEE/ACM code explicitly rejects
reading the code as a moral checklist. The preamble asserts:
It is not intended that the individual parts of the Code be used in isolation
to justify errors of omission or commission.The list of Principles and
Clauses is not exhaustive.The Clauses should not be read as separating
the acceptable from the unacceptable in professional conduct in all
practical situations. The Code is not a simple ethical algorithm that
generates ethical decisions. In some situations, standards may be in
tension with each other or with standards from other sources. These
situations require the software engineer to use ethical judgment to act
in a manner that is most consistent with the spirit of the Code of Ethics
and Professional Practice, given the circumstances.
Of course, this leads one to wonder how to identify the spirit of the code. The
answer seems to lie in the genealogy of the code itself: As this Code expresses
the consensus of the profession on ethical issues, it is a means to educate both
the public and aspiring professionals about the ethical obligations of all software
engineers (IEEE/ACM Joint Task Force, 1999).
This suggests that the spirit of the IEEE/ACM code can be understood as the
consensus of the profession on ethical matters. Before joining the task force,
Michael Davis had argued a code of ethics is primarily a convention between
professionals. According to this explanation, a profession is a group of persons
who want to cooperate in serving the same ideal better than they could if they did
not cooperate (Davis, 1992). The moral force of the code, in this view, comes from
its being the articulation of the considered judgement of those in the profession
about the best way to achieve the values that define the profession. Engineering,
for example, is about the efficient design, construction, and maintenance of
safe and useful objects, and the values embedded in this description of what
engineering is about characterise what it means to be thinking like an engineer
(Davis, 1992). The code of ethics expresses the culture of the profession, and
the process whereby that culture is articulated in a written form is normatively
more important than the precise articulation of the rules or values in the artefact
itself. The culture that animates the code identifies the spirit of the code.
This account goes a long way towards resolving the main problems, noted above,
for utilitarian and deontological ethical approaches. But one needs to see that the
solution is the result of abandoning stereotypical deontological and utilitarian
modes of thinking in favour of thinking like an engineer. Instead of specifying
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the rules of right conduct, the antecedent culture identifies values that generate
reasons for action, even in the absence of clear rules of conduct. Moreover,
the authority of the culture need not be asserted as expressing categorical
judgements of value. Relative assertions will do just fine. The normative force of
the code is settled, at least within the practice of engineers, by correctly noting:
This is who we are; this is what we value; this is how we achieve our goals.
This, however, raises a number of questions. Some have to do with making the
account more clear: Where the particular principles and clauses of the code
break down, how does one guide action? That is, how can one articulate the
spirit of the code when its deontological formulation is questioned? What are
the units for such an analysis? What are the terms of debate when the spirit of
the code is itself in dispute? Other questions have to do with the evaluation of
the written code: Does this code actually express the culture of the profession?
Is that culture worthy of expression in a code? Some of these issues turn on
an empirical description of the culture, while others demand normative and
conceptual clarification. Both sorts of concerns will be addressed below with
respect to the profession of computing. What we find is that the space between
the lines of the code is populated by virtue, and that virtue terms can adjudicate
and articulate moral debate without the problems identified for utilitarianism
and deontology.

The culture of computing

By a culture, I mean the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying
assumptions prevalent among people in a society (Huntington, 2000). The
relevant society in this context consists especially of those involved in the
design and development of computer artifacts (Gotterbarn, 1991), but it also
extends to those consumers of computer artefacts who identify with technology
as an integral part of their lives. In short, I hope to identify something of
the culture of computer geeks. That there is such a culture, antecedent to
philosophical theorising about professional ethics, is indicated by the fact that
everyone has a sense of who the computer geeks are, just as surely as one has
a sense of who is meant by hippies or Bible-thumpers. It is significant that
there is no similar sense of who is picked out by telephone enthusiasts or pealovers. While plenty of people like telephones, no-one seems much interested
in evangelising for them, and people who like telephones probably have very
little else in common. This explains why there is no such thing as telephone
ethics, despite the transforming effect of telephones on society. Telephones
do not represent a way of life. Things differ in important ways in computing.

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Computer technology does have evangelists, and those who embrace computing
sufficiently share values and beliefs such that they represent a coherent social
unit.
On the other hand, as with hippies or Bible-thumpers, there are a host of
subcultures and competing assumptions among computing enthusiasts.
Furthermore, social categories routinely overlap. Some computer geeks are
Bible-thumpers, and some computer geeks are hippies. Fortunately, it turns out
that these complications have very little impact with respect to the main thesis
of this essay. If an appeal to the core values of geek culture is sufficient to ground
the virtues, then it is proved that geek culture combined with Evangelical
Christianity or tree-hugging environmentalism is sufficient to ground the virtues.
It is left open whether these combinations can be coherent and sustained. While
I am sure there is good reason to have other commitments as well, the purpose
of this essay is simply to see how much ethical content can be gleaned from the
culture of computing by itself. For that purpose, what matters is whether the
spirit of professional ethics can be articulated in terms any computer enthusiast
would have to grant simply in virtue of being a computer enthusiast.
The reason for focusing on the culture of the enthusiast instead of what might
be the more enlightened or elevated culture of mature computer professionals
stems from the educational function of professional ethics, and especially the
IEEE/ACM code. (IEEE/ACM, 1999) Appealing to the judgements of mature
members of the profession amounts to little more than preaching to the choir,
unless it can be shown that these judgements are implied by the antecedent
aspirations of the intended audience. Insofar as professional ethics is for the
enculturation of new members to the profession, arguments for more mature
attitudes must appeal to attitudes already consonant with those of prospective
professionals. Students who aspire to become computer professionals are
typically motivated by either the promise of a lucrative career in computing,
or an antecedent enthusiasm for technology (or both). Enthusiasm for money
has little to do with computing, per se; enthusiasm for technology, however,
obviously does. As we shall see, an analysis of the virtues (especially integrity)
shows that mere enthusiasm for wealth is problematic as a way of life, even on
its own terms; but if it is demonstrated that the values of the profession can
be conceived as the mature expression of enthusiasm for technology, then one
important category of serious students can be motivated to think professionally.
The bottom line is that a successful education needs to start where the students
are, and an important category of students has already embraced geek culture.
It may seem that mere enthusiasm for technology is too squalid as a way of life
to ground ethical judgements. A closer look at the cultural artefacts and selfreflecting essays of geek culture, however, reveals values that amply serve as
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raw material for a more substantive ethics. The assertion that Technology is
cool expresses an evaluation that connects with a wide range of other values
and ultimately grounds a coherent conception of the good life.
Wired magazine features a monthly department titled, Fetish: technolust. In
this department, cool new gadgets and technologies are described alongside fullcolour glossy photos. Sometimes the descriptions make it clear why the editors
believe a featured device is desirable enough to be compared to the erotic, but
most of the time it suffices to simply describe what it does. The audience of
Wired does not need to be told what makes something cool. However, such
judgements need not be inarticulate. In fact, just the opposite is the norm.
Product reviews are surely among the most ubiquitous of written artefacts in
geek culture. They are found in magazines like Wired, MacWorld, SysAdmin,
PlanetPDA, and PCWorld; they are the foundation of huge and famous websites
like Toms Hardware Guide, and they are regular subjects of debate on Slashdot.
For the ethicist or cultural anthropologist, what is significant about product
reviews is that they express evaluations based on the common values that help
to define the culture. In this context, the fact that Wired can simply display
certain items as obviously worthy of technolust demonstrates the extent to
which these values can be taken for granted, at least among members of the
culture. The coolness of some objects does not need to be demonstrated; it is
observed.
Judging that a gadget is cool is in large measure an aesthetic judgement. This
aesthetic is exemplified in the behaviour of a high-school friend who used to
compete in computer programming contests at a nearby engineering college.
These events were typically followed by a small trade show where technology
and engineering companies would display their latest work in the hopes of
attracting future employees. (Note, they displayed their works; they did not
advertise salaries). My friend discovered at one of these shows a mini-switch
that completely captivated him. These switches were nothing special to look
at, but he loved the solid, sturdy feel in such a small device, and especially the
tactile and auditory feedback it gave the user. When one clicked the button,
one knew instantly whether the thing had switched. Clickety-click. He handed
one to me, beaming with the same expression a singer friend wore at his first
Broadway musical. Clickety-click. This is a nice switch, he gushed. Clicketyclick. For weeks after, he carried a pocketful of these switches with him,
absentmindedly clicking them in satisfaction as he worked and played. Like
most aesthetic judgements, it is hard to convey the meaning of this experience
to anyone who does not already get it; it is not merely to recognise but truly
to appreciate quality craftsmanship and clever technical solutions to ordinary
problems, the way one might appreciate a painting in a museum or a music
performance.
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I submit that this appreciation reflects a judgement experienced by the

initiated as an immediate observation that the object of appreciation is a
clever, elegant, well-designed, efficient, or otherwise powerful solution to
some technical puzzle. It is in these terms that product reviews tend to extol or
disparage their objects, and it is in these terms that debate rages about the merits
and demerits of competing operating systems, chip architectures, or industrial
design solutions. To be a computer geek is to be fluent in this language, and it
is a language of values with implications beyond what kind of computer to buy.
Many of these enthusiasts aspire to go beyond being connoisseurs of technology
and to design and create their own solutions. These are the students we are
trying to reach in courses about professionalism in computing, and it is
fortunate for us that they are already embedded in a way of life receptive to talk
of objective evaluations. From this commitment stem the other main hallmarks
of geek culture, especially their commitment to reasoning and justification.
In the world of technology, reasoning and know-how matter; mere appeals to
authority are worthless. This is evident in any serious debate on Slashdot, where
the argument is not settled until detailed references are provided. Usually, this
takes the form of links to other sites, so each participant can be satisfied about
the validity of the claims. As in academic debate in other venues, however,
these discussions usually are not settled but are met with competing arguments
and data, similarly referenced.
This commitment to reasoning and justification in debate also indicates that
members of the community are generally self-navigating and resistant to
leadership or indoctrination. To substantiate ones case by linking to external
documentation so anyone can examine the data for herself only makes sense in
a community whose members insist on thinking for themselves. As Jon Katz
has amply documented, the online community does not tolerate self-proclaimed
leaders and does not promote leaders of its own. For geeks, mainstream symbols
of authority and prestige are suspect, while scientists, technologists, and others
who routinely defend their claims against invited criticism, are revered (Katz,
2000). Instead of appealing to the authority of tradition or position, arguments
are expected to stand or fall on their own merits, with the further expectation
that the very best arguments will withstand withering criticism and scrutiny
from the community at large and ultimately emerge as the prevailing view.
Geek culture thus embodies an instinct for Popperian scientific method and the
marketplace of ideas. In contrast to following authoritative leaders, the geek
community sees itself as tracking truth, guided by the invisible hand of reason.
There is a palpable and sometimes snide impatience with those who will not or
cannot justify their claims, as one Slashdot article makes explicit: This is the

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story of one computer professional's explorations in the world of postmodern

literary criticism. Wouldn't it be nice to work in a field where nobody can say
you're wrong?
The idea that there is a best way of doing things and that we can learn what it
is through a process that rationally filters and evaluates distributed knowledge
grounds an optimistic belief in technological progress. The notion of progress
is controversial among some social scientists, but progress is obvious to tech
enthusiasts because they experience it daily. It is manifest that the computers,
cell phones, cameras, and other gadgets they work and play with today are
much better than the ones they worked and played with just a few years ago.
Everything has gotten faster, more powerful, smaller, cleverer, more efficient,
etc. Clickety-click. If things outside of technology and engineering have not
been improving at the same rate, it is because they (the non-geeks who
dominate mainstream society) are too stupid, cowardly and sheeplike to submit
their ideas to the processes of rational scrutiny and justification that generate
real progress. This commitment to progress implies an embrace of change that
is nicely captured by the conclusion of Wireds montage, Change is good: next
to a photo of burning man reads the caption, The future is in Beta (Rossetto
et. al., 1998).
This commitment to progress helps to ground a coherent and ethical way of
life in geek culture because it permits members of the community to conceive
of their lives in the manner of a quest. Practical optimism and progress imply
that things can be made better and that technologists are on the front lines of
making it happen. They are the solution to whatever might be the problem.
Moreover, those who participate in the tech community are each playing a role
in making things better simply by actively participating in the process that
generates and regulates technological change. This notion that embracing the
process of technological change can ground a coherent life plan is perhaps best
illustrated by Steve Jobs legendary wooing of Pepsi CEO John Sculley to serve
as CEO of Apple: Do you want to sell sugar water for the rest of your life, or
do you want to change the world? Geek culture wants to change the world, or
at least surf the wave of technological change to a better life. This is the quest
of geek culture and, as Alasdair MacIntyre notes, making sense of ones life
in terms of a quest is the hallmark of a way of life that can ground the virtues
(MacIntyre, 1984).

The analysis of character

To speak of ones character is to talk about who one is. Describing a persons
character identifies him or her in terms of the values, beliefs, projects,
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commitments, and ordinary ways of reacting to the world that explain and
justify his or her behaviour. We routinely rely on traits of character to predict
behaviour and to thereby justify reliance. For example, we say, He is a hardworking fellow. Im sure hell get the job done. And to be sure, the fact that he
is a hard-working fellow is among the reasons he was entrusted with the task
in the first place. Evaluations of character are standard practice in everyday life
probably more common and useful than evaluations of action. Both positive
terms like sweety, cool, and upbeat; and epithets like creep, jerk, putz,
or bonehead are all evaluations of character in the sense that they speak to
the being of the person evaluated rather than his or her actions. The ethical
terms of everyday life in contrast to the stuffy and stilted evaluations of
academic philosophy are aretaic, not deontic. Notice that these evaluations
and our reliance on them to predict and explain behaviour assume that traits of
character are relatively immutable and deep. For this reason, any agent will have
to take evaluations of her own character very seriously, whatever her particular
projects and other pursuits might be.
Character is typically analysed and evaluated in terms of the virtues. By a virtue
is meant any trait of character that is good for the agent who manifests it, while
a vice is a character trait that is bad for the agent. To say that a person manifests
or lacks a virtue is both to describe and evaluate that person at the same time,
and the description and evaluation cannot be separated without distorting the
meaning of the term. As Philippa Foot notes, virtue terms are not unique in
this respect. For example, one cannot understand what an injury describes
without also understanding that it is bad to be injured. The surgeon does not
injure a patient in the course of performing needed surgery, even if her actions
are accurately described as cutting someone with a sharp knife, leaving a
wound (Foot, 1978). Similarly, one cannot gloss the descriptive meaning of a
virtue or vice without understanding the normative context that would make
the designation appropriate or inappropriate. For example, while honesty is the
virtue related to truth-telling, it would be wrong to say a person is dishonest
because he told a client that last minute changes to a project will be no problem.
It is surely not a mark of bad character that a person takes challenging clients
in stride. Even though his utterance is not the whole truth, dishonesty does not
describe everyone who makes an untrue statement. For proper use of the term,
the evaluation matters as much as the description.
So we need to get clear about the evaluative content of the virtues as well as
their descriptive components. In the Aristotelian tradition, when thinking of
the virtues it is helpful to put things in terms of the Doctrine of the Golden
Mean, which is a sort of heuristic for understanding the way virtue terms
typically work. It must be emphasised that the Doctrine of the Golden Mean
is not a principle for deducing the nature of a virtue, nor is it the last word
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in an analysis of virtue. Indeed, it is hardly the first word. It is, however, a

good first step to take in organising ones thoughts about the content of our
virtue terms. On the Aristotelian view, virtues describe the character of one
with just the right amount of concern for some good, where the evaluative
component of the virtue is unpacked in terms of the right amount of concern
for that good. Failures of character (vices) typically result from having either
too much or too little concern for some good, and virtue is the mean between
these vices of excess or deficiency. To pursue the example of honesty, truthtelling is a good. Too much concern for truth-telling, however, makes one a
stickler. Being a stickler will make it hard to get along with others, thereby
undermining ones pursuit of other goods like friendship or wealth. Even worse
than being a stickler, however, is being dishonest, which is an even greater
threat to friendships and trade relations. Even if one could be dishonest but
appear honest (which is unlikely in any event), such a character could never be
a good friend. Thus, anyone who recognises the value of real friendship and the
relative immutability of character will have to admit the value of honesty.
While relativism about value and uncertainty about outcomes can undermine
utilitarianism and deontology as guides to action, virtue terms do not derive their
normative force from asserting that any particular state of affairs is categorically
good. Instead, virtues relate to things that are more-or-less obviously good for
me (and good for you). While there is endless debate about what is really good,
and what rules if any really count as the categorical command of reason (or
even whether there are any such rules), and while these debates are exacerbated
by the various transformations wrought by the computer revolution, there is
nothing mysterious or controversial about the claim that my own safety is good
for me; at least, no-one generally has to be persuaded of such a claim. If I admit
that safety is good for me, then I have a clear reason to manifest some concern
for my own safety, and if I admit that there are other things that are also good
for me, then I have a reason to manifest just the right amount of concern for
safety no more and no less. That is, I have a reason to manifest courage and to
avoid being rash or cowardly. Instead of endless debate about categorical goods
or uncertain outcomes, a substantive ethics emerges once one identifies the ends
to which one is actually committed. Hence the Socratic dictum, Know Thyself!
and the Nietzschean imperative, Become Who You Are!.
At a more practical level, an emphasis on character that starts from ones present
commitments does not invite overly clever or lawyerly rationalisations of actions
that are contrary to the spirit of morality. Only a fool would expect (or try to
provide) a rigorous refutation of the whole of deontological or consequentialist
thought in a single paper, but it should be plain that an ethics of character enjoys
very real advantages in the sphere of applied ethics. The virtue ethicist is not
trying to convince anyone to abandon or limit the pursuit of her commitments
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in the name of some abstract notion of the moral law or maximum overall
net utility. Rather, virtues are an indispensable means to success in ones own
pursuits. Who does one intend to convince with lawyerly and overly clever
defences? Talking ones self into bad character does the gravest harm to ones
self, on ones own terms. When the ultimate judge and jury consist in the values
to which one is already personally committed, the notion of getting away with
it loses all meaning. Getting away from whom? Yourself? How could that be a
victory? Once this is understood, the more abstract and theoretical concerns of
moral philosophy no longer stand in the way of applied ethics. This is especially
valuable in the context of professional ethics, since an analysis of the culture
and values that define the profession reveals the relevant commitments (and the
ongoing terms of discussion about them within the tradition), such that Know
Thyself! becomes a tractable imperative.
As for guiding action, one must not misunderstand the sense in which attention
to ones own character serves as a guide to action. Sometimes, utilitarian and
deontological ethics have encouraged scholars to mistakenly think that a good
guide to action will churn out a precise list of dos and donts. Against this,
and echoing the IEEE/ACM code cited above, Rosalind Hursthouse notes the
absurdity of thinking that ethics can be reduced to a simple algorithm that
can be mastered by any clever adolescent (Hursthouse, 1991). Ethics involves
reflecting on the nature and meaning of life itself. It is preposterous to suppose
this can be accomplished by simply doing the maths, or that it can be reduced
to one or several simple rules.
Virtue ethics guides action by focusing ones attention on ones striving to be
the sort of person one wants to be. It asks one to reflect on who one is, and to
evaluate ones own way of life in light of the sum total of ones commitments
and values. Of course, not all ways of life can withstand this scrutiny. While
desirable ways of life will ground virtues that form a coherent whole and confer
direction and meaning to ones life, ways of life that do not imply the classical
virtues are generally incoherent or otherwise undesirable. Acknowledging this
presents one with an opportunity to revise ones conception of the good life
and to become the sort of person one wishes to become a person of good
character, on ones own terms. When a person manifests good character, her
actions flow immediately from her character in a manner akin to instinct or
habit. The spirit of ethics guides her action, not the letter of the law.

Good character matters in the culture of

computing
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Virtue ethics is illustrated by showing how the way of life associated with the
culture of computing generates the virtues while close alternatives do not. As we

7. Being a good computer professional: The advantages of virtue ethics in computing

shall see, this analysis makes it clear that those living by the close alternatives
have good reason to adopt the culture of computing instead. As it turns out, the
failure to support virtuous conduct creates serious obstacles to leading the good
life, even if the good life is conceived solely on ones own terms. In contrast,
the culture of computing does support virtuous conduct leading to a coherent
and defensible conception of the good life. In short, advocates of the values that
define the technological enthusiast will be better able to succeed in the pursuit
of these values if they manifest the virtues of integrity, honesty, courage, and
good judgement.
Integrity is the virtue associated with the right amount of steadfastness in
ones defining values, goals, and other commitments. Just as the integrity of
a building is given by its structural soundness, the person of integrity stands
firm and true. Being pig-headed, narrow, or stubborn are vices of excess with
respect to steadfastness, while one who is flighty, unserious, or inconstant is
deficient in this good. In contrast, the person of integrity is open to criticism
and will change her course as necessary, but only in light of good reasons and
due deliberation. The person of integrity can be relied on to be who she is in
spite of temptations or distractions. As one slogan has it, Integrity is doing the
right thing even when no-one is looking. The person of integrity does what she
does because that is what she is all about, not because somebody might or might
not be looking.
For the culture of computing, integrity involves conceiving ones life as a quest
in pursuit of technological progress and embracing the practices and social
institutions necessary for that pursuit. One does not manifest integrity if one
behaves in a manner that will undermine the success of ones core projects. In
light of this, teaching new members of the profession to value the profession
itself can be cast in terms of integrity. As scholars of technology routinely
emphasise, and as contributors to Slashdot often assert, technology is a social
endeavour. Technology consists not only of artifacts and the tools and processes
needed to produce them, but also of the entire social organisation of people and
materials that permits the acquisition of the knowledge and skills needed to
design, manufacture, distribute, use, repair, and eventually dispose of these
artifacts (Winston, 2003). Commitment to the technological project therefore
issues in a commitment to the whole set of social institutions presupposed by
that project. Thus, even for a computer professional who starts with nothing
but an appreciation of cool technology, being true to his conception of the good
requires a commitment to, among other things, the profession itself. The virtue
of personal integrity hereby stands behind the IEEE/ACM codes declaration
that, Software engineers shall advance the integrity and reputation of the
profession consistent with the public interest.

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Less obviously, the integrity of a computer professional also requires

commitment to the wellbeing of end users. After all, they are an indispensable
part of the social milieu of technological progress. This responds to Gotterbarns
worry that a puzzle-solving culture does not sufficiently take users into account
(Gotterbarn, 1991). As conceived here, concern for the user is not an extra burden
for the software engineer but an integral part of the whole pursuit. Gotterbarn
is surely correct to note that those who focus on puzzle-solving are prone to
overlook this. Moreover, the elitism of computer culture tends to exacerbate the
problem by inspiring contempt for the ignorance and irrationality of the lowly
end user. At least for those already embedded in the culture of computing,
however, demonstration of the integral relation between end user satisfaction
and technological progress will do more to address these concerns than any
amount of finger wagging about service or public interest.
Honesty is closely related to integrity. As noted above, it is associated with truthtelling, and it is necessary for trade relationships and friendships of all sorts.
The dishonest computer professional not only brings shame to the profession,
thereby revealing his failure of integrity, but also undermines the general social
circumstances necessary for the creation, implementation, and dissemination
of technological solutions. Hype and marketing are not necessarily dishonest,
even where such communications are not entirely frank. However, when the
vague boundary between hype and fraud is crossed, progress suffers. Similarly,
disseminating FUD (fear, uncertainty, doubt) about a competing product or
announcing vaporware in the hopes that a potential competitor will never
come to market, plainly stands in the way of technological progress. The whole
point of these practices is to protect or gain a market advantage that is out
of proportion to the merits of ones technology, and that plainly subverts the
markets ability to adjudicate competing technologies in favour of the best
solution. This analysis helps the new professional to understand why such
dishonest actions are rightly denounced in the IEEE/ACM code, helping to flesh
out the spirit of the code.
Courage is also a virtue of the good computer professional. The willingness to
embrace innovation and change is not characteristic of the coward; nor does
one who is over concerned with safety submit beliefs and ideas to the rough
and tumble of rational debate. On the other hand, the rash inventor or engineer
will tend to make sometimes-tragic mistakes and, therefore, fail to advance
technology. In geek culture, success requires real courage. In the day-to-day
affairs of the good computer professional, courage reveals itself in standing
up for ones ideas while submitting them to rational scrutiny. In more extreme
cases, the computer professional may need the courage to blow the whistle or
walk away from a project that directly or indirectly conflicts with the integrity
of the profession. For example, a database of medical records that is deficient in
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security undermines the advance of technology, since any harm to the public
will engender fear of similar projects in the future. Especially when money is
tight or when managers do not comprehend the possible consequences of shoddy
work, it can take real courage to maintain ones integrity and the integrity of the
profession.
After integrity, good judgement may be the most important of the virtues since,
without good judgement, the other virtues cannot be relied on to secure ones
goals. If one mistakes technology for the gadgets it produces, or if one does
not accurately foresee how a project might advance or undermine the goal of
technological progress, then ones bad judgement will undermine ones integrity.
Good judgement is difficult to characterise without circularity; one cannot
merely describe good judgement in terms of getting right results, since that
would leave evaluations of character hostage to fortuitous outcomes. Instead,
good judgement needs to be conceived in terms of a method for arriving at
right answers, and this suggests having the right amount of concern for both
rational rigour and educated perception in fixing belief. Reasoning that is
shallow, narrow, or short-sighted will not advance technological solutions, and
may actually retard the progress of technology. On the other hand, pessimistic
scepticism is directly contrary to the ethos of innovation and progress. To avoid
either extreme, the good computer professional needs to develop a fine aesthetic
sensibility for good design and a habit of working out problems through rational
debate within a wider community. Fortunately, the resources of good judgement
are at the very heart of geek cultures embrace of rationality situated in a critical
community of debate and justification.
So it seems that the classical virtues can be grounded in the values of geek
culture. While our discussion has only addressed a handful of the classical
virtues, and only in a cursory way, it should be clear how further discussion
might proceed. In general, once one has uncovered a set of values and beliefs
sufficient to ground a way of life as a quest, showing how the virtues emerge
from such a way of life is a trivial matter. Success in any quest will require
integrity, and integrity will demand coherence and richness in ones conception
of the good such that honesty, courage, good judgement, and the other virtues
more or less immediately follow.
To see this, it helps to contrast the way of life of the good computer professional
with close alternatives. For example, consider the way of life of the script kiddie.
Folks who get their kicks out of exploiting online security vulnerabilities may
have a lot in common with computer geeks, and their actions may be dimly
inspired by the same cultural background. It is clear, however, that script
kiddies lack integrity. As the term kiddie suggests, these people do not have
the technological sophistication to really understand what they are exploiting.
This reveals that they are not motivated by the technological aesthetic, at least
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not in any mature form. Instead, they seem to be operating on the same base
motives as common vandals. Getting kicks from destroying things fails, not only
in terms of geek culture, but on its own terms. The purely negative aim of
destruction depends for its meaning on the work of those who create what is
to be destroyed. But without some positive agenda, it is impossible to conceive
ones life as a quest for something, or to evaluate ones progress with respect to
what is valuable. Because their actions are entirely parasitic on the discoveries
and creations of the geek community, the way of life of the script kiddie has no
intrinsic meaning, and will fail as a way of life. Much the same can be said of
crackers, who make it their business to defeat intellectual property protections
and distribute expensive software packages without compensation for the
authors. While this may require some technical knowhow and sophistication,
crackers are nonetheless parasites on the body of good computer professionals.
These failed ways of life might be contrasted with the info-terrorist or
technological civil disobedient. Those who conceive themselves as fighting a
guerrilla war against the perceived injustices of intellectual property rights,
dangerously sloppy computer artefacts, or even the whole technological
worldview might very well be on a quest. Indeed, they might even defend their
actions in terms drawn straight from computer culture. Information wants to
be free, they might say, or, We exploit security flaws in technology in order to
reveal them and make the technology better. These attempted justifications of
unethical conduct reveal a commitment to the values that guide the computer
profession itself, and the debate is now simply about means. The consensus view
among computer professionals is that civil disobedience is not the best means
for advancing technology. For those who oppose the hoarding of intellectual
property, participation in the creation of Free Software alternatives like Linux
or OpenOffice is a more constructive and rewarding path. Security flaws can be
revealed without handing the exploits over to script kiddies. The justifications
of technological civil disobedience are either short-sighted or they reveal an
arrogance with respect to the considered judgements of the profession and
computing culture. Either way, they reflect bad judgement.
More dangerous and troubling are those who do not embrace technological
culture, but who use technology as a means for other ends. Technology creates
powerful tools that may be put to immoral or selfish purposes. With technical
skills, con artists and other thieves can perpetrate crimes of a scale and breadth
that was previously unthinkable, while maintaining an invisibility or anonymity
that conceals the perpetrator or even the crime. Clearly, such crimes constitute
real obstacles to the advance of technology, and it is the responsibility of the
computing profession to mitigate the risks posed by those who would misuse
technology. Clearly, these behaviours are not an expression of geek culture.
Showing the ethical bankruptcy of the base hedonism that usually motivates
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these alternatives to computing culture is relatively straightforward. How can

the hedonist, the con artist, or parasite conceive of life as a quest? Answering
this question is beyond the scope of this essay, but the analysis here should
indicate how reflecting on the role of character and integrity in pursuit of the
good life already sketches the case to be made against those who would misuse
technology, even as it fleshes out the spirit of those who create and discover it.

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