Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11005

October 31, 1957

SIARI VALLEY ESTATES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
FILEMON LUCASAN and Hon. W. M. ORTEGA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte, respondents.
Orendain and Sarmiento for petitioner.
Hon. Wenceslao M. Ortega in his own behalf.
Barrios, Barrios and Lucasan for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
This is an offshoot of our decision in G.R. No. L-7046, Siari Valley Estate Inc, vs. Filemon
Lucasan,1 wherein we affirmed, on appeal, the judgment of Hon. Patricio Ceniza, of the
Zamboanga court of first instance in its Civil Case No. 134. The dispositive part of such affirmed
judgment read as follows:
Valley Estate all the cattle that may be found in the cattle ranch ". . . judgment is hereby
rendered adjudicating to the Siari of Filemon Lucasan specially the 321 heads that had
been entrusted to his care as receiver or trustee of this Court and ordering the defendant
to deliver to the plaintiff all said cattle or their value amounting to P40,000 to pay
damages to the Siari Valley Estate for the 400 heads of cattle that he sold since 1946 up
to the date of the trial at the rate of P100 per head or P40,000 plus interest at the rate of 6
per cent from the date of the trial of this case in January, 1951 and to pay the cost of the
proceeding. In addition, the defendant is hereby ordered to allow the Siari Valley Estate
to round up all the buffaloes that may be found in his cattle ranch after the Siari Valley
Estate shall have posted a bond in the amount of P5,000 to answer for whatever damages
the operation may cause to him.
With regard to the contempt proceedings, Filemon Lucasan is hereby found guilty of the charges
and he is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P500 pursuant to section 6 Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of one day every P2.50
that he falls to pay.
With regard to the three causes of action the counter-claim of the defendant, all of them are
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Upon petition by the intervenors, the intervention had been dismissed in a previous order of this
Court, without prejudice to the filing of an independent action. (emphasis ours.)
After our decision had become final, the expediente was returned to the court below for
execution. Thereupon a dispute arose whether we had affirmed also that part of Judge Ceniza's
judgement underlined in the above quotation (concerning buffaloes) Lucasan pointed out that, in
quoting the dispositive paragraphs of the appealed judgment, our decision had omitted the
underlined portion. Therefore, he argued, the affirmance of the judgment did not include the
directive about buffaloes. As the respondent judge sustained Lucasan's contention, this petition
for mandamus and other auxiliary remedies was promptly filed.
Knowing the extent and scope of our decision in said appealed case, we issued a preliminary
injunction designed to protest petitioner's interests. And now, after the parties have been heard,
we turn to the principal question, which is: did we uphold the right given to plaintiff by the court
below "to round up the buffaloes"? The answer must be: we did. In the concluding part of our
decision we found the appealed judgment to be substantially in accordance with the facts and the
law; and then we adjudged: "Therefore it is hereby affirmed with appellant."
Ordinarily the affirmed judgment is that contained in its dispositive part; in the said Siari Valley
appealed case, the above-quoted four paragraphs.
It is true that in the opening statements our decision quoted the dispositive part of the appealed
judgment as follows:
Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudicating to the Siari Valley Estate
all the cattle that may be found in the cattle ranch of Filemon Lucasan, specially the 321
heads that had been entrusted to his care as receiver or trustee of this Court and ordering
the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff all said cattle or their value amounting to P40,000,
to pay damages to the Siari Valley Estate for the 400 heads of cattle that he sold since
1946 up to the date of the trial at the rate of P100 per head or P40,000 plus interest at the
rate of 6 per cent from the date of the trial of this case in January, 1951 and to pay the
costs of the proceeding.
With regard to the contempt proceedings, Filemon Lucasan is hereby found guilty of the
charges and he is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P500 pursuant to section 6, Rule 64,
of the Rules of Court or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate
of one day for every P2.50 that he fails to pay.
thereby omitting the portion regarding buffaloes. But observe that we used elliptical signs, i. e.
several *'s which indicated the omission of some portion or portions. This did not evince any
intention to "modify" the judgment by eliminating the omitted portion.2 The judgment, we
decreed in concluding, "is hereby affirmed". We did not say, it is hereby modified. Neither did
we say, "the quoted portion of the judgment is hereby affirmed". For that matter, would
respondents maintain likewise the last two paragraphs of the dispositive part of the appealed
judgment (regarding the counterclaim and the intervenors) were not equally affirmed, because
they were not quoted?

We explained in Contreras vs. Felix, 78 Phil., 570, 44 Off. Gaz., 4306 that "the final judgment as
rendered is the judgment of the court, irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the
decision", and that the judgement must be distinguished from the opinion. Our decree was one
affirming the appealed judgment. If any statement in the opinion preceding the decree seemingly
excluded a portion (which we deny), it must be overlooked, because the judgment or the decree
prevails over the opinion.
In construing confirmatory decisions of appellate courts the practice is to regard the whole of the
appealed judgment to have been upheld3 even if several points thereof have not been discussed
"or touched upon such confirmatory decision."4
The truth is, as may be verified from our decision itself, our statement omitted the portion
concerning buffaloes because it was immaterial for the purpose of the appeal. It was not a point
necessary to understand or decide the questions then before us.5 Indeed the whole decision made
no reference to the subject of buffaloes, even as appellant's brief (Lucasan) failed to debate such
aspect of the appealed judgment.
The argument is advanced that inasmuch as the plaintiff "never claimed the buffaloes in its
amended complaint (and) the (lower) court could not have granted that which was not prayed",
therefore the Supreme Court most probably had excluded the matter (of buffaloes) from its
confirmatory order. Such reasoning has no valid foundation because Lucasan was not in default,
there was trial, and under the circumstances the plaintiff could be granted any relief that was
supported by the evidence "although not specified in his pleadings."6 The other argument
addressed to the proposition that the Court shouldn't have, and couldn't have affirmed that phase
of the judgment is too late, if not impertinent. The affirmance without modification of the
judgment is final. And the parties should realize that the matter of buffaloes was not such plain
error (supposing it was error) as to call for special consideration by this Court even if ignored7 by
appellant's counsel in his brief.
All the foregoing shows the respondent judge's mistake in declining to permit Siari Valley Inc. to
round up its buffaloes roaming on Lucasan's ranch. But the latter's resistance to such roundingup, founded on a rather technical plea, despite his knowledge that he had complained of such
buffaloes grazing on his land (R. A. in L-7046 p. 140), was not a mere mistake but a rather sharp
practice transcending the limits of good faith. However-overruling petitioner's contentionLucasan will not be declared to have committed contempt of court considering on the one hand
that his ground of objection appeared to be not so flimsy8 as to make his conduct a "willful
disregard or disobedience"9 or a "clear and contumacious refusal to obey"10 and on the other
hand remembering that the power to punish for contempt should be conservatively exercised.
Wherefore, the petition for mandamus is granted, the respondent judge, and whoever may be
acting in his place, is hereby ordered to enforce, and the other respondent Filemon Lucasan is
ordered to obey, the aforementioned judgment in full of Judge Ceniza which was totally affirmed
by this Court on appeal. Costs of this proceeding shall be paid respondent Lucasan. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ, concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997]
FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the
Family Code be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of
said Code?
Statement of the Case
This is the principal question posed by petitioner in assailing the Decision of Respondent Court
of Appealsi[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 18906 promulgated on February 21, 1990 and its Resolution
promulgated on March 21, 1991, affirming the orders issued by the trial court commanding the
issuance of various writs of execution to enforce the latters decision in Civil Case No. 53271.
The Facts
Petitioner Florante F. Manacopii[2] and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446square-meter residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00.iii[3] The property,
located in Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 174180.
On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against
petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner
and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent, the salient
portion of which provides:
c. That defendants will undertake to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means
permit, but expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be collected. (sic)
On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise
agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986,
private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted on September 23,
1986. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several
vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt,
these chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly
issued by the sheriff.

On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of
execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the
judgment was not yet executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet
matured as there was no showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their
receivables had in fact been collected. They buttressed their motion with supplements and other
pleadings.
On August 11, 1989, private respondent opposed the motion on the following grounds: (a) it was
too late to question the September 23, 1986 Order considering that more than two years had
elapsed; (b) the second alias writ of execution had been partially implemented; and (c) petitioner
and his company were in bad faith in refusing to pay their indebtedness notwithstanding that
from February 1984 to January 5, 1989, they had collected the total amount of P41,664,895.56.
On September 21, 1989, private respondent filed an opposition to petitioner and his companys
addendum to the motion to quash the writ of execution. It alleged that the property covered by
TCT No. 174180 could not be considered a family home on the grounds that petitioner was
already living abroad and that the property, having been acquired in 1972, should have been
judicially constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution.
On September 26, 1989, the lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and the
prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner
and his company had not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables
amounting to P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the case had become final and executory.
It also ruled that petitioners residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly
constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
Hence, petitioner and his company filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
assailing the lower courts Orders of September 23, 1986 and September 26, 1989. On February
21, 1990, Respondent Court of Appeals rendered its now questioned Decision dismissing the
petition for certiorari. The appellate court quoted with approval the findings of the lower court
that: (a) the judgment based on the compromise agreement had become final and executory,
stressing that petitioner and his company had collected the total amount of P57,224,319.75 but
still failed to pay their indebtedness and (b) there was no showing that petitioners residence had
been duly constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution. On the second finding, the
Court of Appeals added that:
x x x. We agree with the respondent judge that there is no showing in evidence that petitioner
Maacops residence under TCT 174180 has been duly constituted as a family home in accordance
with law. For one thing, it is the clear implication of Article 153 that the family home continues
to be so deemed constituted so long as any of its beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 actually
resides therein. Conversely, it ceases to continue as such family home if none of its beneficiaries
actually occupies it. There is no showing in evidence that any of its beneficiaries is actually
residing therein. On the other hand, the unrefuted assertion of private respondent is that
petitioner Florante Maacop had already left the country and is now, together with all the
members of his family, living in West Covina, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

Petitioner and his company filed a motion for reconsideration of this Decision on the ground that
the property covered by TCT No. 174180 was exempt from execution. On March 21, 1991, the
Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Resolution denying the motion. It anchored its ruling
on Modequillo v. Breva,iv[4] which held that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to this case, the Court of Appeals explained:
The record of the present case shows that petitioners incurred the debt of P3,468,000.00 from
private respondent corporation on February 18, 1982 (Annex `A, Petition). The judgment based
upon the compromise agreement was rendered by the court on April 18, 1986 (Annex `C, Ibid).
Paraphrasing the aforecited Modequillo case, both the debt and the judgment preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Verily, the case at bar does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided under Article 155 of the Family Code.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari arguing that the Court of
Appeals misapplied Modequillo. He contends that there was no need for him to constitute his
house and lot as a family home for it to be treated as such since he was and still is a resident of
the same property from the time it was levied upon and up to this moment.
The Issue
As stated in the opening sentence of this Decision, the issue in this case boils down to whether a
final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of
the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said
Code.
The Courts Ruling
We answer the question in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error.
On the contrary, its Decision and Resolution are supported by law and applicable jurisprudence.
No Novel Issue
At the outset, the Court notes that the issue submitted for resolution in the instant case is not
entirely new. In Manacop v. Court of Appeals,v[5] petitioner himself as a party therein raised a
similar question of whether this very same property was exempt from preliminary attachment for
the same excuse that it was his family home. In said case, F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. filed a complaint
for a sum of money. As an incident in the proceedings before it, the trial court issued a writ of
attachment on the said house and lot. In upholding the trial court (and the Court of Appeals) in
that case, we ruled that petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Hence, petitioners family home was not exempt from
attachment by sheer force of exclusion embodied in paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code
cited in Modequillo, where the Court categorically ruled:

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family
who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others
who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family
home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family
home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family
home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1960 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it is provided that `the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of
said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not
state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited? No.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered
by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on

August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code.vi[6] (Underscoring supplied.)
6

Article 153 of the Family Code Has No Retroactive Effect

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that his residence was not exempt from
execution in view of his failure to show that the property involved has been duly constituted as a
family home in accordance with law. He asserts that the Family Code and Modequillo require
simply the occupancy of the property by the petitioner, without need for its judicial or
extrajudicial constitution as a family home.vii[7]
Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988,viii[8] the subject property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in
Article 153 of said Code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family
Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure
mandated by the Civil Codeix[9] had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such.
There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home, it follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by
petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court
issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of
the Family Code.
List of Beneficiary-Occupants Restricted to Those Enumerated in the Code
In view of the foregoing discussion, there is no reason to address the other arguments of
petitioner other than to correct his misconception of the law. Petitioner contends that he should
be deemed residing in the family home because his stay in the United States is merely temporary.
He asserts that the person staying in the house is his overseer and that whenever his wife visited
this country, she stayed in the family home. This contention lacks merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by
any of its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually
existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive.x[10] Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically.
Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated by Article 154 of the
Family Code.
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of the family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the
head of the family for lead support.

This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the
husband and wife.xi[11] But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the
beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. Consequently, occupancy of a family home by an
overseer like Carmencita V. Abat in this case xii[12] is insufficient compliance with the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit. This Decision is
immediately executory. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Republic!of!the!Philippines!
Supreme!Court!
Manila!
THIRD!DIVISION!
VILMA!G.!ARRIOLA!and!
G.R.!No.!177703!
ANTHONY!RONALD!G.!
ARRIOLA,!
Present:!
Petitioners,!
YNARESKSANTIAGO,!J.,!
Chairperson,!
AUSTRIAKMARTINEZ,K!versus!K!
CORONA,*!
NACHURA,!and!
REYES,!JJ.!
JOHN!NABOR!C.!ARRIOLA,!
Promulgated:!
Respondent.!
January!28,!2008!
x!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!K!x!
D!E!C!I!S!I!O!N!
AUSTRIAKMARTINEZ,!J.:!
Before!this!Court!is!a!Petition!for!Review!on!Certiorari!under!Rule!45!of!the!Rules!of!Court,!assailing!the!
November!30,!2006!Decision[1]!and!April!30,!2007!Resolution[2]!of!the!Court!of!Appeals!in!CAKG.R.!SP!
No.!93570.!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
The!relevant!facts!are!culled!from!the!records.!
John!Nabor!C.!Arriola!(respondent)!filed!Special!Civil!Action!No.!03K0010!with!the!Regional!Trial!Court,!
Branch!254,!Las!Pias!City!(RTC)!against!Vilma!G.!Arriola!and!Anthony!Ronald!G.!Arriola!(petitioners)!for!
judicial!partition!of!the!properties!of!decedent!Fidel!Arriola!(the!decedent!Fidel).!Respondent!is!the!son!
of!decedent!Fidel!with!his!first!wife!Victoria!C.!Calabia,!while!petitioner!Anthony!is!the!son!of!decedent!
Fidel!with!his!second!wife,!petitioner!Vilma.!
On!February!16,!2004,!the!RTC!rendered!a!Decision,!the!dispositive!portion!of!which!reads:!
WHEREFORE,!premises!considered,!judgment!is!hereby!rendered:!
1.!Ordering!the!partition!of!the!parcel!of!land!covered!by!Transfer!Certificate!of!Title!No.!383714!(84191)!
left!by!the!decedent!Fidel!S.!Arriola!by!and!among!his!heirs!John!Nabor!C.!Arriola,!Vilma!G.!Arriola!and!
Anthony!Ronald!G.!Arriola!in!equal!shares!of!oneKthird!(1/3)!each!without!prejudice!to!the!rights!of!
creditors!or!mortgagees!thereon,!if!any;!
2.!Attorney's!fees!in!the!amount!of!TEN!THOUSAND!(P10,000.00)!PESOS!is!hereby!awarded!to!be!
reimbursed!by!the!defendants!to!the!plaintiff;!
3.!Costs!against!the!defendants.!
SO!ORDERED.[3]!
The!decision!became!final!on!March!15,!2004.[4]!
As!the!parties!failed!to!agree!on!how!to!partition!among!them!the!land!covered!by!TCT!No.!383714!
(subject!land),!respondent!sought!its!sale!through!public!auction,!and!petitioners!acceded!to!it.[5]!
Accordingly,!the!RTC!ordered!the!public!auction!of!the!subject!land.[6]!The!public!auction!sale!was!
scheduled!on!May!31,!2003!but!it!had!to!be!reset!when!petitioners!refused!to!include!in!the!auction!the!
house!(subject!house)!standing!on!the!subject!land.[7]!This!prompted!respondent!to!file!with!the!RTC!an!
Urgent!Manifestation!and!Motion!for!Contempt!of!Court,[8]!praying!that!petitioners!be!declared!in!
contempt.!
The!RTC!denied!the!motion!in!an!Order[9]!dated!August!30,!2005,!for!the!reason!that!petitioners!were!
justified!in!refusing!to!have!the!subject!house!included!in!the!auction,!thus:!
The!defendants![petitioners]!are!correct!in!holding!that!the!house!or!improvement!erected!on!the!
property!should!not!be!included!in!the!auction!sale.!
A!cursory!reading!of!the!aforementioned!Decision!and!of!the!evidence!adduced!during!the!exKparte!
hearing!clearly!show!that!nothing!was!mentioned!about!the!house!existing!on!the!land!subject!matter!of!
the!case.!In!fact,!even!plaintiff's![respondent's]!initiatory!Complaint!likewise!did!not!mention!anything!
about!the!house.!Undoubtedly!therefore,!the!Court!did!not!include!the!house!in!its!adjudication!of!the!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
subject!land!because!it!was!plaintiff!himself!who!failed!to!allege!the!same.!It!is!a!wellKsettled!rule!that!
the!court!can!not!give!a!relief!to!that!which!is!not!alleged!and!prayed!for!in!the!complaint.!
To!hold,!as!plaintiff!argued,!that!the!house!is!considered!accessory!to!the!land!on!which!it!is!built!is!in!
effect!to!add!to!plaintiff's![a]!right!which!has!never!been!considered!or!passed!upon!during!the!trial!on!
the!merits.!
In!the!absence!of!any!other!declaration,!obvious!or!otherwise,!only!the!land!should!be!partitioned!in!
accordance!to[sic]!the!aforementioned!Decision!as!the!house!can!not!be!said!to!have!been!necessarily!
adjudicated!therein.!Thus,!plaintiff!can!not!be!declared!as!a!coKowner!of!the!same!house!without!
evidence!thereof!and!due!hearing!thereon.!
The!Decision!of!the!Court!having!attained!its!finality,!as!correctly!pointed!out,!judgment!must!stand!
even!at!the!risk!that!it!might!be!erroneous.!
WHEREFORE,!the!Urgent!Manifestation!and!Motion!for!Contempt!of!Court!filed!by!plaintiff!is!hereby!
DENIED!for!lack!of!merit.!
SO!ORDERED.[10]!
The!RTC,!in!its!Order!dated!January!3,!2006,!denied!respondent's!Motion!for!Reconsideration.[11]!
Respondent!filed!with!the!CA!a!Petition!for!Certiorari[12]!where!he!sought!to!have!the!RTC!Orders!set!
aside,!and!prayed!that!he!be!allowed!to!proceed!with!the!auction!of!the!subject!land!including!the!
subject!house.!
In!its!November!30,!2006!Decision,!the!CA!granted!the!Petition!for!Certiorari,!to!wit!
WHEREFORE,!the!petition!is!GRANTED.!The!assailed!orders!dated!August!30,!2005!and!January!3,!2006!
issued!by!the!RTC,!in!Civil!Case!No.!SCA!03K0010,!are!REVERSED!and!SET!ASIDE,!and!the!sheriff!is!ordered!
to!proceed!with!the!public!auction!sale!of!the!subject!lot!covered!by!TCT!No.!383714,!including!the!
house!constructed!thereon.!
SO!ORDERED.[13]!(Emphasis!supplied.)!
Petitioners!filed!a!motion!for!reconsideration!but!the!CA!denied!the!same!in!its!Resolution[14]!of!April!
30,!2007.!
Hence,!the!present!petition!on!the!sole!ground!that!the!CA!erred!in!holding!that!the!RTC!committed!
grave!abuse!of!discretion!in!denying!the!motion!for!contempt!of!court.!
The!assailed!CA!Decision!and!Resolution!must!be!modified!for!reasons!other!than!those!advanced!by!
petitioners.!
The!contempt!proceeding!initiated!by!respondent!was!one!for!indirect!contempt.!Section!4,!Rule!71!of!
the!Rules!of!Court!prescribes!the!procedure!for!the!institution!of!proceedings!for!indirect!contempt,!viz:!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Sec.!4.!How!proceedings!commenced.!Proceedings!for!indirect!contempt!may!be!initiated!motu!proprio!
by!the!court!against!which!the!contempt!was!committed!by!an!order!or!any!other!formal!charge!
requiring!the!respondent!to!show!cause!why!he!should!not!be!punished!for!contempt.!
In!all!other!cases,!charges!for!indirect!contempt!shall!be!commenced!by!a!verified!petition!with!
supporting!particulars!and!certified!true!copies!of!documents!or!papers!involved!therein,!and!upon!full!
compliance!with!the!requirements!for!filing!initiatory!pleadings!for!civil!actions!in!the!court!concerned.!If!
the!contempt!charges!arose!out!of!or!are!related!to!a!principal!action!pending!in!the!court,!the!petition!
for!contempt!shall!allege!that!fact!but!said!petition!shall!be!docketed,!heard!and!decided!separately,!
unless!the!court!in!its!discretion!orders!the!consolidation!of!the!contempt!charge!and!the!principal!
action!for!joint!hearing!and!decision.!(Emphases!supplied.)!
Under!the!aforecited!second!paragraph!of!the!Rules,!the!requirements!for!initiating!an!indirect!
contempt!proceeding!are!a)!that!it!be!initiated!by!way!of!a!verified!petition!and!b)!that!it!should!fully!
comply!with!the!requirements!for!filing!initiatory!pleadings!for!civil!actions.!In!Regalado!v.!Go,[15]!we!
held:!
As!explained!by!Justice!Florenz!Regalado,!the!filing!of!a!verified!petition!that!has!complied!with!the!
requirements!for!the!filing!of!initiatory!pleading,!is!mandatory!x!x!x:!
This!new!provision!clarifies!with!a!regularity!norm!the!proper!procedure!for!commencing!contempt!
proceedings.!While!such!proceeding!has!been!classified!as!special!civil!action!under!the!former!Rules,!
the!heterogenous!practice!tolerated!by!the!courts,!has!been!for!any!party!to!file!a!motion!without!
paying!any!docket!or!lawful!fees!therefore!and!without!complying!with!the!requirements!for!initiatory!
pleadings,!which!is!now!required!in!the!second!paragraph!of!this!amended!section.!
Henceforth,!except!for!indirect!contempt!proceedings!initiated!motu!propio!by!order!of!or!a!formal!
charge!by!the!offended!court,!all!charges!shall!be!commenced!by!a!verified!petition!with!full!compliance!
with!the!requirements!therefore!and!shall!be!disposed!in!accordance!with!the!second!paragraph!of!this!
section.!
Even!if!the!contempt!proceedings!stemmed!from!the!main!case!over!which!the!court!already!acquired!
jurisdiction,!the!rules!direct!that!the!petition!for!contempt!be!treated!independently!of!the!principal!
action.!Consequently,!the!necessary!prerequisites!for!the!filing!of!initiatory!pleadings,!such!as!the!filing!
of!a!verified!petition,!attachment!of!a!certification!on!nonKforum!shopping,!and!the!payment!of!the!
necessary!docket!fees,!must!be!faithfully!observed.!
The!provisions!of!the!Rules!are!worded!in!very!clear!and!categorical!language.!In!case!where!the!indirect!
contempt!charge!is!not!initiated!by!the!courts,!the!filing!of!a!verified!petition!which!fulfills!the!
requirements!on!initiatory!pleadings!is!a!prerequisite.!Beyond!question!now!is!the!mandatory!
requirement!of!a!verified!petition!in!initiating!an!indirect!contempt!proceeding.!Truly,!prior!to!the!
amendment!of!the!1997!Rules!of!Civil!Procedure,!mere!motion!without!complying!with!the!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
requirements!for!initiatory!pleadings!was!tolerated!by!the!courts.!At!the!onset!of!the!1997!Revised!Rules!
of!Civil!Procedure,!however,!such!practice!can!no!longer!be!countenanced.[16]!(Emphasis!ours.)!
The!RTC!erred!in!taking!jurisdiction!over!the!indirect!contempt!proceeding!initiated!by!respondent.!The!
latter!did!not!comply!with!any!of!the!mandatory!requirements!of!Section!4,!Rule!71.!He!filed!a!mere!
Urgent!Manifestation!and!Motion!for!Contempt!of!Court,!and!not!a!verified!petition.!He!likewise!did!not!
conform!with!the!requirements!for!the!filing!of!initiatory!pleadings!such!as!the!submission!of!a!
certification!against!forum!shopping!and!the!payment!of!docket!fees.!Thus,!his!unverified!motion!should!
have!been!dismissed!outright!by!the!RTC.!
It!is!noted!though!that,!while!at!first!the!RTC!overlooked!the!infirmities!in!respondent's!unverified!
motion!for!contempt,!in!the!end,!it!dismissed!the!motion,!albeit!on!substantive!grounds.!The!trouble!is!
that,!in!the!CA!decision!assailed!herein,!the!appellate!court!committed!the!same!oversight!by!delving!
into!the!merits!of!respondent's!unverified!motion!and!granting!the!relief!sought!therein.!Thus,!strictly!
speaking,!the!proper!disposition!of!the!present!petition!ought!to!be!the!reversal!of!the!CA!decision!and!
the!dismissal!of!respondent's!unverified!motion!for!contempt!filed!in!the!RTC!for!being!in!contravention!
of!Section!4,!Rule!71.!
However,!such!simplistic!disposition!will!not!put!an!end!to!the!dispute!between!the!parties.!A!seed!of!
litigation!has!already!been!sown!that!will!likely!sprout!into!another!case!between!them!at!a!later!time.!
We!refer!to!the!question!of!whether!the!subject!house!should!be!included!in!the!public!auction!of!the!
subject!land.!Until!this!question!is!finally!resolved,!there!will!be!no!end!to!litigation!between!the!parties.!
We!must!therefore!deal!with!it!squarely,!here!and!now.!
The!RTC!and!the!CA!differed!in!their!views!on!whether!the!public!auction!should!include!the!subject!
house.!The!RTC!excluded!the!subject!house!because!respondent!never!alleged!its!existence!in!his!
complaint!for!partition!or!established!his!coKownership!thereof.[17]!On!the!other!hand,!citing!Articles!
440,[18]!445[19]!and!446[20]!of!the!Civil!Code,!the!CA!held!that!as!the!deceased!owned!the!subject!
land,!he!also!owned!the!subject!house!which!is!a!mere!accessory!to!the!land.!Both!properties!form!part!
of!the!estate!of!the!deceased!and!are!held!in!coKownership!by!his!heirs,!the!parties!herein.!Hence,!the!
CA!concludes!that!any!decision!in!the!action!for!partition!of!said!estate!should!cover!not!just!the!subject!
land!but!also!the!subject!house.[21]!The!CA!further!pointed!out!that!petitioners!themselves!implicitly!
recognized!the!inclusion!of!the!subject!house!in!the!partition!of!the!subject!land!when!they!proposed!in!
their!letter!of!August!5,!2004,!the!following!swappingKarrangement:!
Sir:!
Thank!you!very!much!for!accommodating!us!even!if!we!are!only!poor!and!simple!people.!We!are!very!
much!pleased!with!the!decision!of!Presiding!Judge!Manuel!B.!Fernandez,!Jr.,!RTC!Br.!254,!Las!Pias,!on!the!
sharing!of!oneKthird!(1/3)!each!of!a!land!covered!by!Transfer!Certificate!of!Title!No.!383714!(84191)!in!
Las!Pias!City.!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
However,!to!preserve!the!sanctity!of!our!house!which!is!our!residence!for!more!than!twenty!(20)!years,!
we!wish!to!request!that!the!1/3!share!of!John!Nabor!C.!Arriola!be!paid!by!the!defendants!depending!on!
the!choice!of!the!plaintiff!between!item!(1)!or!item!(2),!detailed!as!follows!
(1)!Swap!with!a!500Ksquare!meters![sic]!lot!located!at!Baras!Rizal!x!x!x.!
(2)!Cash!of!P205,700.00!x!x!x.!
!
We!agree!that!the!subject!house!is!covered!by!the!judgment!of!partition!for!reasons!postulated!by!the!
CA.!We!qualify,!however,!that!this!ruling!does!not!necessarily!countenance!the!immediate!and!actual!
partition!of!the!subject!house!by!way!of!public!auction!in!view!of!the!suspensive!proscription!imposed!
under!Article!159!of!The!Family!Code!which!will!be!discussed!forthwith.!
It!is!true!that!the!existence!of!the!subject!house!was!not!specifically!alleged!in!the!complaint!for!
partition.!Such!omission!notwithstanding,!the!subject!house!is!deemed!part!of!the!judgment!of!partition!
for!two!compelling!reasons.!
First,!as!correctly!held!by!the!CA,!under!the!provisions!of!the!Civil!Code,!the!subject!house!is!deemed!
part!of!the!subject!land.!The!Court!quotes!with!approval!the!ruling!of!the!CA,!to!wit:!
The!RTC,!in!the!assailed!Order!dated!August!30,!2005!ratiocinated!that!since!the!house!constructed!on!
the!subject!lot!was!not!alleged!in!the!complaint!and!its!ownership!was!not!passed!upon!during!the!trial!
on!the!merits,!the!court!cannot!include!the!house!in!its!adjudication!of!the!subject!lot.!The!court!further!
stated!that!it!cannot!give!a!relief!to[sic]!which!is!not!alleged!and!prayed!for!in!the!complaint.!
We!are!not!persuaded.!
To!follow!the!foregoing!reasoning!of!the!RTC!will!in!effect!render!meaningless!the!pertinent!rule!on!
accession.!In!general,!the!right!to!accession!is!automatic!(ipso!jure),!requiring!no!prior!act!on!the!part!of!
the!owner!or!the!principal.!So!that!even!if!the!improvements!including!the!house!were!not!alleged!in!the!
complaint!for!partition,!they!are!deemed!included!in!the!lot!on!which!they!stand,!following!the!principle!
of!accession.!Consequently,!the!lot!subject!of!judicial!partition!in!this!case!includes!the!house!which!is!
permanently!attached!thereto,!otherwise,!it!would!be!absurd!to!divide!the!principal,!i.e.,!the!lot,!
without!dividing!the!house!which!is!permanently!attached!thereto.[23]!(Emphasis!supplied)!
Second,!respondent!has!repeatedly!claimed!that!the!subject!house!was!built!by!the!deceased.[24]!
Petitioners!never!controverted!such!claim.!There!is!then!no!dispute!that!the!subject!house!is!part!of!the!
estate!of!the!deceased;!as!such,!it!is!owned!in!common!by!the!latter's!heirs,!the!parties!herein,[25]!any!
one!of!whom,!under!Article!494[26]!of!the!Civil!Code,!may,!at!any!time,!demand!the!partition!of!the!
subject!house.[27]!Therefore,!respondent's!recourse!to!the!partition!of!the!subject!house!cannot!be!
hindered,!least!of!all!by!the!mere!technical!omission!of!said!common!property!from!the!complaint!for!
partition.!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
That!said!notwithstanding,!we!must!emphasize!that,!while!we!treat!the!subject!house!as!part!of!the!coK
ownership!of!the!parties,!we!stop!short!of!authorizing!its!actual!partition!by!public!auction!at!this!time.!
It!bears!emphasis!that!an!action!for!partition!involves!two!phases:!first,!the!declaration!of!the!existence!
of!a!state!of!coKownership;!and!second,!the!actual!termination!of!that!state!of!coKownership!through!the!
segregation!of!the!common!property.[28]!What!is!settled!thus!far!is!only!the!fact!that!the!subject!house!
is!under!the!coKownership!of!the!parties,!and!therefore!susceptible!of!partition!among!them.!
Whether!the!subject!house!should!be!sold!at!public!auction!as!ordered!by!the!RTC!is!an!entirely!different!
matter,!depending!on!the!exact!nature!of!the!subject!house.!
Respondent!claims!that!the!subject!house!was!built!by!decedent!Fidel!on!his!exclusive!property.[29]!
Petitioners!add!that!said!house!has!been!their!residence!for!20!years.[30]!Taken!together,!these!
averments!on!record!establish!that!the!subject!house!is!a!family!home!within!the!contemplation!of!the!
provisions!of!The!Family!Code,!particularly:!
Article!152.!The!family!home,!constituted!jointly!by!the!husband!and!the!wife!or!by!an!unmarried!head!
of!a!family,!is!the!dwelling!house!where!they!and!their!family!reside,!and!the!land!on!which!it!is!situated.!
Article!153.!The!family!home!is!deemed!constituted!on!a!house!and!lot!from!the!time!it!is!occupied!as!a!
family!residence.!From!the!time!of!its!constitution!and!so!long!as!any!of!its!beneficiaries!actually!resides!
therein,!the!family!home!continues!to!be!such!and!is!exempt!from!execution,!forced!sale!or!attachment!
except!as!hereinafter!provided!and!to!the!extent!of!the!value!allowed!by!law.!(Emphasis!supplied.)!
One!significant!innovation!introduced!by!The!Family!Code!is!the!automatic!constitution!of!the!family!
home!from!the!time!of!its!occupation!as!a!family!residence,!without!need!anymore!for!the!judicial!or!
extrajudicial!processes!provided!under!the!defunct!Articles!224!to!251!of!the!Civil!Code!and!Rule!106!of!
the!Rules!of!Court.!Furthermore,!Articles!152!and!153!specifically!extend!the!scope!of!the!family!home!
not!just!to!the!dwelling!structure!in!which!the!family!resides!but!also!to!the!lot!on!which!it!stands.!Thus,!
applying!these!concepts,!the!subject!house!as!well!as!the!specific!portion!of!the!subject!land!on!which!it!
stands!are!deemed!constituted!as!a!family!home!by!the!deceased!and!petitioner!Vilma!from!the!
moment!they!began!occupying!the!same!as!a!family!residence!20!years!back.[31]!
It!being!settled!that!the!subject!house!(and!the!subject!lot!on!which!it!stands)!is!the!family!home!of!the!
deceased!and!his!heirs,!the!same!is!shielded!from!immediate!partition!under!Article!159!of!The!Family!
Code,!viz:!
Article!159.!The!family!home!shall!continue!despite!the!death!of!one!or!both!spouses!or!of!the!
unmarried!head!of!the!family!for!a!period!of!ten!years!or!for!as!long!as!there!is!a!minor!beneficiary,!and!
the!heirs!cannot!partition!the!same!unless!the!court!finds!compelling!reasons!therefor.!This!rule!shall!
apply!regardless!of!whoever!owns!the!property!or!constituted!the!family!home.!(Emphasis!supplied.)!
The!purpose!of!Article!159!is!to!avert!the!disintegration!of!the!family!unit!following!the!death!of!its!
head.!To!this!end,!it!preserves!the!family!home!as!the!physical!symbol!of!family!love,!security!and!unity!
by!imposing!the!following!restrictions!on!its!partition:!first,!that!the!heirs!cannot!extraKjudicially!partition!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
it!for!a!period!of!10!years!from!the!death!of!one!or!both!spouses!or!of!the!unmarried!head!of!the!family,!
or!for!a!longer!period,!if!there!is!still!a!minor!beneficiary!residing!therein;!and!second,!that!the!heirs!
cannot!judicially!partition!it!during!the!aforesaid!periods!unless!the!court!finds!compelling!reasons!
therefor.!No!compelling!reason!has!been!alleged!by!the!parties;!nor!has!the!RTC!found!any!compelling!
reason!to!order!the!partition!of!the!family!home,!either!by!physical!segregation!or!assignment!to!any!of!
the!heirs!or!through!auction!sale!as!suggested!by!the!parties.!
More!importantly,!Article!159!imposes!the!proscription!against!the!immediate!partition!of!the!family!
home!regardless!of!its!ownership.!This!signifies!that!even!if!the!family!home!has!passed!by!succession!to!
the!coKownership!of!the!heirs,!or!has!been!willed!to!any!one!of!them,!this!fact!alone!cannot!transform!
the!family!home!into!an!ordinary!property,!much!less!dispel!the!protection!cast!upon!it!by!the!law.!The!
rights!of!the!individual!coKowner!or!owner!of!the!family!home!cannot!subjugate!the!rights!granted!under!
Article!159!to!the!beneficiaries!of!the!family!home.!
Set!against!the!foregoing!rules,!the!family!home!KK!consisting!of!the!subject!house!and!lot!on!which!it!
stands!KK!cannot!be!partitioned!at!this!time,!even!if!it!has!passed!to!the!coKownership!of!his!heirs,!the!
parties!herein.!Decedent!Fidel!died!on!March!10,!2003.[32]!Thus,!for!10!years!from!said!date!or!until!
March!10,!2013,!or!for!a!longer!period,!if!there!is!still!a!minor!beneficiary!residing!therein,!the!family!
home!he!constituted!cannot!be!partitioned,!much!less!when!no!compelling!reason!exists!for!the!court!to!
otherwise!set!aside!the!restriction!and!order!the!partition!of!the!property.!
The!Court!ruled!in!Honrado!v.!Court!of!Appeals[33]!that!a!claim!for!exception!from!execution!or!forced!
sale!under!Article!153!should!be!set!up!and!proved!to!the!Sheriff!before!the!sale!of!the!property!at!
public!auction.!Herein!petitioners!timely!objected!to!the!inclusion!of!the!subject!house!although!for!a!
different!reason.!
To!recapitulate,!the!evidence!of!record!sustain!the!CA!ruling!that!the!subject!house!is!part!of!the!
judgment!of!coKownership!and!partition.!The!same!evidence!also!establishes!that!the!subject!house!and!
the!portion!of!the!subject!land!on!which!it!is!standing!have!been!constituted!as!the!family!home!of!
decedent!Fidel!and!his!heirs.!Consequently,!its!actual!and!immediate!partition!cannot!be!sanctioned!
until!the!lapse!of!a!period!of!10!years!from!the!death!of!Fidel!Arriola,!or!until!March!10,!2013.!
It!bears!emphasis,!however,!that!in!the!meantime,!there!is!no!obstacle!to!the!immediate!public!auction!
of!the!portion!of!the!subject!land!covered!by!TCT!No.!383714,!which!falls!outside!the!specific!area!of!the!
family!home.!
WHEREFORE,!the!petition!is!PARTLY!GRANTED!and!the!November!30,!2006!Decision!and!April!30,!2007!
Resolution!of!the!Court!of!Appeals!are!MODIFIED!in!that!the!house!standing!on!the!land!covered!by!
Transfer!Certificate!of!Title!No.!383714!is!DECLARED!part!of!the!coKownership!of!the!parties!John!Nabor!
C.!Arriola,!Vilma!G.!Arriola!and!Anthony!Ronald!G.!Arriola!but!EXEMPTED!from!partition!by!public!
auction!within!the!period!provided!for!in!Article!159!of!the!Family!Code.!
No!costs.So!ORDERED.!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

FIRST DIVISION

PERLA G. PATRICIO,

G.R. No. 170829

Petitioner,
Present:

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),

- versus -

Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.

MARCELINO G. DARIO III and

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

Promulgated:

APPEALS, Second Division,

Respondents.

November 20, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
December 9, 2005xii[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed the
complaint for partition filed by petitioner for being contrary to law and evidence.

On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his

wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and
private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a
parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon
situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the
Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755)
square meters, more or less.xii[2]

On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent,

extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

30731 (175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of
petitioner, private respondent and Marcelino Marc.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private

respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the coownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner
and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and
raffled to Branch 78.

On October 3, 2002,xii[3] the trial court ordered the partition of the subject
property in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario,
1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the
property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In
case of failure, the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the
aforestated manner.xii[4]

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by

the trial court on August 11, 2003,xii[5] hence he appealed before the Court of
Appeals, which denied the same on October 19, 2005. However, upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate
court partially reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed
Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home
should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor
beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the
minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario
and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.xii[6]

Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19, 2005 WHICH
AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 03
OCTOBER 2002 GRANTING THE PARTITION AND SALE BY PUBLIC
AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF
THE FAMILY CODE ON FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLES 495 AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON
CO-OWNERSHIP.xii[7]

The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of
the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor
beneficiary still resides in the said home.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home
duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while
a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the
grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in the
family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age.
Private respondent insists that even after the expiration of ten years from the date
of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject
property continues to be considered as the family home considering that his minor
son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family home,
still resides in the premises.

On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a
family home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July
5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent. Petitioner
argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III were
already of age at the time of the death of their father,xii[8] hence there is no more
minor beneficiary to speak of.

The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of
cherished memories that last during ones lifetime.xii[9] It is the dwelling house
where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the
land on which it is situated.xii[10] It is constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family.xii[11] The family home is deemed
constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by
law.xii[12]

The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the
owner thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is
something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to
something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need
not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be
occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which
may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the
husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are
not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.xii[13]

Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a
family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of
a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family
home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1)

they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

(2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon
the head of the family.

Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home
shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of
the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary,
and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home.

Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death occurs to
persons who constituted the family home. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino comments on
the effect of death of one or both spouses or the unmarried head of a family on the
continuing existence of the family home:

Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who
constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of
his or her separate property as family home, the property will remain as family
home for ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If
there is no more beneficiary left at the time of death, we believe the family home
will be dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for its existence. If
there are beneficiaries who survive living in the family home, it will continue
for ten years, unless at the expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary
becomes of age.
After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the heirs.
May the heirs who are beneficiaries of the family home keep it intact by not
partitioning the property after the period provided by this article? We believe that

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

although the heirs will continue in ownership by not partitioning the property, it
will cease to be a family home.xii[14] (Emphasis supplied)

Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this
manner:

The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its
continued existence is dependent upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary
residing therein. For as long as there is one beneficiary even if the head of the
family or both spouses are already dead, the family home will continue to exist
(Arts. 153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years
and within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same except when there
are compelling reasons which will justify the partition. This rule applies
regardless of whoever owns the property or who constituted the family
home.xii[15] (Emphasis supplied)

The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this
wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it
will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary
becomes of age.

It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the
family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of
the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of
the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

family home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family
home shall be preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of
majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the
minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of
supporting himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor
beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in
Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario
IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under
Article 154 of the Family Code.

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The
husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2)
Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants contemplates all
descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without
distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great
grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of
deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the

family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the
decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or
within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second
requisite.

However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot

demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable
of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who
is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal
support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their
default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his

grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his
being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot
be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not
fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal
age.

Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by

law, comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.xii[16] Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It
is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is
intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is
free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in
amount.xii[17]

Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support

directly from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree)
who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order
of support under Art. 199.xii[18] We agree with this view.

The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the
closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus,
the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for
support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their
default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his

son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal
grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandsons legal support.
On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property which
shows an intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for
its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject
property.

The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes

it results in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be
afforded every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent
these situations from arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos,xii[19] no co-owner ought to be compelled
to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common
property at any time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be
barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
common property.xii[20]

Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo should
have ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Rules of Court. Not more than three competent and disinterested persons should be
appointed as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to
the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as
the court shall direct.

When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a

portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the
parties, the court may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the
same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the
commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the
property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order
the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall
sell the same accordingly.xii[21]

The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the
rule embodied in Art. 996 of the Civil Code.xii[22] Under the law of intestate
succession, if the widow and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same
share as that of each of the children. However, since only one-half of the conjugal
property which is owned by the decedent is to be allocated to the legal and
compulsory heirs (the other half to be given exclusively to the surviving spouse as
her conjugal share of the property), the widow will have the same share as each of
her two surviving children. Hence, the respective shares of the subject property,
based on the law on intestate succession are: (1) Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2)
Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals,xii[23] we held that an action for

partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation
and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court
after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court
may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action.xii[24]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City,

Branch

78,

who

is

directed

to

conduct

PARTITION

BY

COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical partition of the subject property,
as well as the improvements that lie therein, in the following manner: Perla G.
Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial
court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds of the
property and the proper share appertaining to each heir, including the
improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made
to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided
without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court a quo may order it
assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the
other parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable,
unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so
assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real
estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

thereafter distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share of each
heir. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

THIRD DIVISION

JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, G.R. No. 185920

ALMA
RAMOS
WORAK,
MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA
R. ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST,
ELVIRA
P.
MUNAR,
and
OFELIA R. LIM,
Present:
Petitioners,
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
- versus -

BRION,
BERSAMIN,

DANILO
PANGILINAN,
RODOLFO
SUMANG,
LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and
ROLANDO ANTENOR,

ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Respondents.

Promulgated:

July 20, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondents filed in 2003 a complaintxii[1] for illegal dismissal against
E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the
patriarch of herein petitioners. By Decisionxii[2] of April 15, 2005, the Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay
the aggregate amount of P1,661,490.30 representing their backwages, separation
pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay.

The Decision having become final and executory and no settlement having
been forged by the parties, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 8, 2005 a writ of
executionxii[3] which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name covered
by TCT No. 38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan property).

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt
from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to
quash the writ of execution.xii[4] Respondents, however, averred that the
Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in Antipolo,
and the Pandacan property in fact served as the companys business address as
borne by the companys letterhead. Respondents added that, assuming that the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Pandacan property was indeed the family home, only the value equivalent to
P300,000 was exempt from execution.

By Orderxii[5] of August 2, 2006, the Labor Arbiter denied the motion to

quash, hence, Ramos and the company appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the
Labor Arbiters Order.

Ramos and the company appealed to the Court of Appeals during the
pendency of which Ramos died and was substituted by herein petitioners.
Petitioners also filed before the NLRC, as third-party claimants, a Manifestation
questioning the Notice to Vacate issued by the Sheriff, alleging that assuming that
the Pandacan property may be levied upon, the family home straddled two (2) lots,
including the lot covered by TCT No. 38978, hence, they cannot be asked to vacate
the house. The Labor Arbiter was later to deny, by Decision of May 7, 2009, the
third-party claim, holding

that Ramos death and petitioners substitution as his compulsory heirs would not
nullify the sale at auction of the Pandacan property. And the NLRCxii[6] would
later affirm the Labor Arbiters ruling, noting that petitioners failed to exercise their
right to redeem the Pandacan property within the one 1 year period or until January
16, 2009. The NLRC brushed aside petitioners contention that they should have
been given a fresh period of 1 year from the time of Ramos death on July 29, 2008
or until July 30, 2009 to redeem the property, holding that to do so would give

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

petitioners, as mere heirs, a better right than the Ramos.

As to petitioners claim that the property was covered by the regime of

conjugal partnership of gains and as such only Ramos share can be levied upon, the
NLRC ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate such claim and that the phrase in
the TCT indicating the registered owner as Ernesto Ramos, married to Juanita
Trinidad, Filipinos, did not mean that both owned the property, the phrase having
merely described Ramos civil status.

Before the appellate court, petitioners alleged that the NLRC erred in ruling
that the market value of the property was P2,177,000 as assessed by the City
Assessor of Manila and appearing in the documents submitted before the Labor
Arbiter, claiming that at the time the Pandacan property was constituted as the
family home in 1944, its value was way below P300,000; and that Art. 153 of the
Family Code was applicable, hence, they no longer had to resort to judicial or
extrajudicial constitution.

In the assailed Decisionxii[7] of September 24, 2008, the appellate court, in

denying petitioners appeal, held that the Pandacan property was not exempted from
execution, for while Article 153xii[8] of the Family Code provides that the family
home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence, [it] did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such that
all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.

The appellate court went on to hold that what was applicable law were
Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code, hence, there was still a need to either
judicially or extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property as petitioners family
home before it can be exempted; and as petitioners failed to comply therewith,
there was no error in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.

The only question raised in the present petition for review on certiorari is the
propriety of the Court of Appeals Decision holding that the levy upon the
Pandacan property was valid.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling
place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family
the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting
it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special
cases.xii[9]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.xii[10] lays down the rules relative to
the levy on execution over the family home, viz:

No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it

was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home
was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of
a family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and
the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties
of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive
properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property of the
unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not
exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas
and P200,000 in rural areas.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home
judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity
of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of
law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the
family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if
it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be
shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant
to the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied)

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made
as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements
must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such
privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code
or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or
extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil
Code.xii[11] Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a
verified petition before the courts and the registration of the courts order with the
Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile,
extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242xii[12] of the Civil
Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be
registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these
two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the
privilege.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or
judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154xii[13] actually resides therein.
Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with
consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending
upon the area where it is

located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155xii[14] for which the family home is made answerable
must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is
not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property
is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved.xii[15]

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was
constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the
procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the
Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos
family home, the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners.
Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute
the judgment but failed because Ramos bank accountsxii[16] were already closed
while other properties in his or the companys name had already been
transferred,xii[17] and the only property left was the Pandacan property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

!
!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124814. October 21, 2004]
CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS,
respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
March 15, 1996 decision{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" } of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which compelled petitioner Camelo
Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give
support to the latter in the amount of P 500 per month.
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born
on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her
husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as petitioners household help. It was while working there as a
maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at
the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioners child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on
suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent her home. But petitioner instead
brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982,
assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child,
private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a
businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the
course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return
to work the following morning. This displeased petitioners wife, hence she was told to look for
another job.
In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Years
Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner
offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual
intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told
him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioners house
hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioners wife was in need of one, she was
re-hired. However petitioners wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about the
father of the unborn child. She told petitioners wife that the baby was by her husband. Because
of her condition, she was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.
Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias counsel. She
was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the
alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to
Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex
with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its
discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive.
Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:
The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the
personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the
child of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia Regodos.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the evidence of the plaintiff in
support of the claim to be meritorious; defendant admitted having a sexual intercourse with the
plaintiffs mother, Florencia Regodos, but denied paternity to the child. The child was presented
before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the
child, then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with
plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia Regodos.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" }
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:
The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she was a widow should not
prejudice the right of petitioner-appellee. As held by the Supreme Court, even where a witness
has been found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required that
the whole of her testimony be rejected (People vs. Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is perfectly
reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with
respect to other facts (People vs. Delas, 199 SCRA 574, 575). There is therefore no reason to
disbelieve Florencia that her first intercourse with appellant occurred on January 2, 1982 and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

nine (9) months later or on September 9, 1982, she gave birth to appellee (TSN, Hearing of June
10, 1991 and Exhibit A).
In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence adduced before the trial court and
there being no evidence that the latter had overlooked or misappreciated, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the trial courts findings.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" }
Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE
CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o
"" }
Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts. As a
general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual findings of the trial
court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal except (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooks certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, justifies a different conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence
on record. The Court is convinced that this case falls within one of the exceptions.{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o
"" }
The trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was
based on the testimony of the childs mother and the personal appearance of the child.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" } An order

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the
family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" }
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx xxx xxx
Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of
which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar
has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third
person.{ HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l
"_ftn8" \o "" }
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" } Thus,
certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to
prove the same.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" }
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang,
Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate
court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was
a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony.
We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage
between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate
even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" } The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is
grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o
"" }
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to
prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Private respondents petition for recognition and support is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA
ALMONTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care,
including appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth.{!HYPERLINK!
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn1"!} In case of assault on
his rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his
defense with the single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa
Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December
29, 1989.{!HYPERLINK!"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn2"!
} After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas parents in Fairview, Quezon City.{!
HYPERLINK!"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn3"!} Almost a
year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.{!HYPERLINK!
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn4"!}

Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19,
1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
bigamy.{!HYPERLINK!"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn5"!}

He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had
married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled.{!HYPERLINK!
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn6"!} Gerardo also found
out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.{!HYPERLINK!
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn7"!}

Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred
that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.{!HYPERLINK!
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn8"!}

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose
Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma.
Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.{!HYPERLINK!
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn9"!}

Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held
him responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the
above decision INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner
so-called visitation rights between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday.{!
HYPERLINK!"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn10"!} She
argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father
of an illegitimate child.{!HYPERLINK!
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn11"!} She further
maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her
maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of Concepcion
as Jose Gerardos surname.
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion and
made the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the other,
something they should never do if they want to assure the normal development and well-being of
the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father, especially
as he is a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize something that the mother alone
cannot give. Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and psychological well-being of the
boy would be better served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with his father.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this matter, the Court
invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, to wit:
In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall
be the paramount consideration.
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby DENIED.{!
HYPERLINK!"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"!\l!"_ftn12"!}

Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the trial
court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardos
surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared illegitimate
and should therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" }
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a putative
father visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the best interest of
the child policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that [a]t bottom, it (was) the childs welfare
and not the convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting
visitation rights a few hours once a week.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" }
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mothers surname motu
proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry.{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn15"
\o "" }
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate
court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate
the issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court
resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo
was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case that the appellant [Ma.
Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage
with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called marriage with the latter was void ab initio. It was
[Gerardo] himself who had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was
legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8,
1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law is the legitimate child of the legal and
subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

illegitimate child of the void and non-existent marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo],
but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing marriage between [Ma.
Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly
saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo.
Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis
(even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend
to destroy the existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible
rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate
relationship.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" }
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose
Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth certificate showing that he was
born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist that appellee and the
appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, We
cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her
legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed
father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate
children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth
certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely
supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not
what a parent says it is.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" }
(Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same
was denied.{ HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm"
\l "_ftn18" \o "" } Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o "" } Article
164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" }
As a guaranty in favor of the child{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" } and to
protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn22"
\o "" } We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of {!HYPERLINK!
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/124814.htm"!}{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o "" }:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based
on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on
the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b){ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" } of the
Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only
Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case,{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o "" } his heirs,
who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" }
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional
cases, his heirs.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" } Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her
husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during
the period of conception.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o "" } To
overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to
father the child.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" } Sexual
intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is
rebutted by evidence to the contrary.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o "" }
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn31" \o "" }
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital
intimacy impossible.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn32" \o "" } This may

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never
together during the period of conception.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn33" \o "" } Or, the
husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took
place through the violation of prison regulations.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn34" \o "" }
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon
City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola
Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all
was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the
separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to
make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should
be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the
presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma.
Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn35" \o "" } to the
petition for annulment of marriage{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn36" \o "" } that she
never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual relation
between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.
Gerardos argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with
Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an avowal by the mother that
her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family
Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of
her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an
instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred
absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She
never claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose
Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of
physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right
exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn37" \o "" } A mother
has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn38" \o "" } Hence,
Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no
intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn39" \o "" } The
proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes
the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn40" \o "" }
Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court
and in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo
admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an
agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it
would be tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her
child and consenting to the denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband.
These are the very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn41"
\o "" } Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary
value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the
court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn42" \o "" }
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth.{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn43"
\o "" } Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the
filiation of a child,{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn44" \o "" } as the
status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the
legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days
following the termination of marriage is sought to be established.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn45" \o "" }

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be
contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs.
Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn46"
\o "" } As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more
preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein by the interested parties.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn47" \o "" } Between
the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasiconclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his
legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive
to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardos
illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the childs interests at heart. The law, reason and
common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the
law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the
surnames of both his father and mother, full support and full inheritance.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn48" \o "" } On the
other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the surname and be under the parental authority
only of his mother. He can claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only
half of that of his legitimate counterpart.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn49" \o "" }
Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of
society, a bastard is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state,
the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the very
persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was
made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an
innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He
is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now
comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his
infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario
and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames.{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn50"
\o "" } A persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

on from parent to child.{ HYPERLINK

"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn51" \o "" } Hence,
Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to
him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the
civil register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family
Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such
visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each others company.
There being no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable
right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines
is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of
tender years.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm" \l "_ftn52" \o "" } Through
its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their
eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case,
the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Carpio-Morales, J., no part.

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002]
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner, vs. JUANITA
TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA
CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394xii[1] which reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the
illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao,
Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and
acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled
to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed
Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory
recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao against herein
respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina
Liyao.xii[2] The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime."xii[3]
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than
ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late
William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975.
They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2) children from her subsisting marriage,
namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in Quezon City
and Manila. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate children, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao.
Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which
Corazon and William were then vice president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of
her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his
signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the
advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision
was registered under the name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial
Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her
and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and
clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his
confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He
likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Companyxii[4] and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.xii[5] William Liyao would
bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken
together.xii[6]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others,
William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyaos legal
staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio.xii[7] Corazon also presented pictures in court to
prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings
and other important meetings.xii[8] During the occasion of William Liyaos last birthday on
November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged
Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, Hey, look
I am still young, I can still make a good looking son."xii[9] Since birth, Billy had been in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of
William Liyao by the latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his
food, clothing and other material needs. However, after William Liyaos death, it was Corazon
who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills.
William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and
laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G. Garcia and
William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She used to visit Corazon and William
Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely,
Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids lived with Corazon and William
Liyao as one family. On some occasions like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita
would sleep in the couples residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would
usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was
pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in
Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a close
friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy.
She continuously visited them at White Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living with
her friend Corazon, gave support by way of grocery supplies, money for household expenses and
matriculation fees for the two (2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyaos
birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy
and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage, Look, this is
my son, very guapo and healthy.xii[10] He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy
before Christmas. He intended to make it engrande and make the bells of San Sebastian Church
ring.xii[11] Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao passed away on December 2,
1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyaos funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even
recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and grayxii[12] which Mr. Liyao wore in a photographxii[13]
as well as another shirt of lime greenxii[14] as belonging to the deceased. A note was also
presented with the following inscriptions: To Cora, Love From William.xii[15] Maurita
remembered having invited the couple during her mothers birthday where the couple had their
pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon
is still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally
separated from her said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao with
Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house when she
usually visited Corazon.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew that Billy is
the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her
customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazons house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the
Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even
more so when the couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time
Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so
he insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon
how to play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong
sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house,
paid the salary of the maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria
knew that Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had any
occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time
that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old
when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the latters death on December 2,
1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified
several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques
testimony was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures
showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were
in the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao,
were legally married.xii[16] Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village,
Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact
and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings
in court. Her father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even
during out of town business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father
would change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father
reportedly had trouble sleeping in other peoples homes. Linda described him as very
conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate
for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what he believed
in and did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his
death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974 and
was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for two (2) to three (3) months for
his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In
the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the
collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was
bedridden and had personally changed. He was not active in business and had dietary
restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter part of September to
October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days and went back to work. He felt
depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the office unlike
before and tried to spend more time with his family.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not
legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate
that the couple obtained any annulmentxii[17] of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced
upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Immediately after the
death of Lindas father, Corazon went to Lindas office for the return of the formers alleged
investments with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas
and Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able
to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office.
There was one instance when she was told by the guards, Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out
things again.xii[18] Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office upstairs but
her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of
clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases full of
mens clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been
separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time
of her fathers death on December 2, 1975.xii[19] Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular
arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack sometime between April and May
1974, his speech and hands were affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months
under strict medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr.
Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level control.xii[20] Tita Rose testified that
after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita
Rose also stated that her family never received any formal demand that they recognize a certain
William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the
position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her late
father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita
Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal
collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of
William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo
Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the
evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime
between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to
report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly.
Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added
that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was
buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called
inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to
massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao
died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to
arrive at the hospital.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the
Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon
Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the
office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale,
represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. He freely
relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic Supermarket once in
1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the latters law office. Being the
driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that he remembered having driven the
group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio
for a vacation together with the lawyers wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao,
he does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like
shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of the
minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the
deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao,
Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao, entitled to all succesional
rights as such; and
(d) Costs of suit.xii[21]
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence
that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the
time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court observed that herein
petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the
deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner
through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging
petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his
legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors
the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and the presumption of legitimacy is

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between husband and wife
was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil
Code. The appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents
that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured legal
separation, were seen in each others company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited
with the deceased William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and
the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not
sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased,
William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates and considering that his
signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that neither do family pictures
constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was presented as
evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the
same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyaos
signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues
which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of
filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked
the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim
from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate.xii[22] The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a
declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.xii[23]
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Codexii[24] provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access
was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years
from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it
was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was
conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, Contract of
Separation,xii[25] executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all
claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.xii[26]
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the
time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the
child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in
proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.xii[27]
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.xii[28] It is
only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these
cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his
memory.xii[29]
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of
the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William
Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child
born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.xii[30] We cannot allow
petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the
husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born
in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the
husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of
the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour.
On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the
paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.xii[31]
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with
Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the
latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are
allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of
the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself
through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled
that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented
by both parties on the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any
event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his
alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

Today!is!Sunday,!September!25,!2016!
!

!
!!!!Republic!of!the!Philippines!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!SUPREME!COURT!
!!!!Manila!
!
!!!!SECOND!DIVISION!
!
!!!!!!
!
!!!!G.R.!No.!105625!January!24,!1994!
!
!!!!MARISSA!BENITEZKBADUA,!petitioner,!
!!!!vs.!
!!!!COURT!OF!APPEALS,!VICTORIA!BENITEZ!LIRIO!AND!FEODOR!BENITEZ!AGUILAR,!respondents.!
!
!!!!Reynaldo!M.!Alcantara!for!petitioner.!
!
!!!!Augustus!Cesar!E.!Azura!for!private!respondents.!
!
!!!!!!
!
!!!!PUNO,!J.:!
!
!!!!This!is!a!petition!for!review!of!the!Decision!of!the!12th!Division!of!the!Court!of!Appeals!in!CAKG.R.!No.!
CV!No.!30862!dated!May!29,!1992.!1!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!The!facts!show!that!the!spouses!Vicente!Benitez!and!Isabel!Chipongian!owned!various!properties!
especially!in!Laguna.!Isabel!died!on!April!25,!1982.!Vicente!followed!her!in!the!grave!on!November!13,!
1989.!He!died!intestate.!
!
!!!!The!fight!for!administration!of!Vicente's!estate!ensued.!On!September!24,!1990,!private!respondents!
Victoria!BenitezKLirio!and!Feodor!Benitez!Aguilar!(Vicente's!sister!and!nephew,!respectively)!instituted!
Sp.!Proc.!No.!797!(90)!before!the!RTC!of!San!Pablo!City,!4th!Judicial!Region,!Br.!30.!They!prayed!for!the!
issuance!of!letters!of!administration!of!Vicente's!estate!in!favor!of!private!respondent!Aguilar.!They!
alleged,!inter!alia,!viz.:!
!
!!!!xxx!xxx!xxx!
!
!!!!4.!The!decedent!is!survived!by!no!other!heirs!or!relatives!be!they!ascendants!or!descendants,!whether!
legitimate,!illegitimate!or!legally!adopted;!despite!claims!or!representation!to!the!contrary,!petitioners!
can!well!and!truly!establish,!given!the!chance!to!do!so,!that!said!decedent!and!his!spouse!Isabel!
Chipongian!who!preKdeceased!him,!and!whose!estate!had!earlier!been!settled!extraKjudicial,!were!
without!issue!and/or!without!descendants!whatsoever,!and!that!one!Marissa!BenitezKBadua!who!was!
raised!and!cared!by!them!since!childhood!is,!in!fact,!not!related!to!them!by!blood,!nor!legally!adopted,!
and!is!therefore!not!a!legal!heir;!.!.!.!
!
!!!!On!November!2,!1990,!petitioner!opposed!the!petition.!She!alleged!that!she!is!the!sole!heir!of!the!
deceased!Vicente!Benitez!and!capable!of!administering!his!estate.!The!parties!further!exchanged!reply!
and!rejoinder!to!buttress!their!legal!postures.!
!
!!!!The!trial!court!then!received!evidence!on!the!issue!of!petitioner's!heirship!to!the!estate!of!the!
deceased.!Petitioner!tried!to!prove!that!she!is!the!only!legitimate!child!of!the!spouses!Vicente!Benitez!
and!Isabel!Chipongian.!She!submitted!documentary!evidence,!among!others:!(1)!her!Certificate!of!Live!
Birth!(Exh.!3);!(2)!Baptismal!Certificate!(Exh.!4);!(3)!Income!Tax!Returns!and!Information!Sheet!for!
Membership!with!the!GSIS!of!the!late!Vicente!naming!her!as!his!daughter!(Exhs.!10!to!21);!and!(4)!
School!Records!(Exhs.!5!&!6).!She!also!testified!that!the!said!spouses!reared!an!continuously!treated!her!
as!their!legitimate!daughter.!On!the!other!hand,!private!respondents!tried!to!prove,!mostly!thru!
testimonial!evidence,!that!the!said!spouses!failed!to!beget!a!child!during!their!marriage;!that!the!late!
Isabel,!then!thirty!six!(36)!years!of!age,!was!even!referred!to!Dr.!Constantino!Manahan,!a!noted!
obstetricianKgynecologist,!for!treatment.!Their!primary!witness,!Victoria!BenitezKLirio,!elder!sister!of!the!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
late!Vicente,!then!77!years!of!age,!2!categorically!declared!that!petitioner!was!not!the!biological!child!of!
the!said!spouses!who!were!unable!to!physically!procreate.!
!
!!!!On!December!17,!1990,!the!trial!court!decided!in!favor!of!the!petitioner.!It!dismissed!the!private!
respondents!petition!for!letters!and!administration!and!declared!petitioner!as!the!legitimate!daughter!
and!sole!heir!of!the!spouses!Vicente!O.!Benitez!and!Isabel!Chipongian.!The!trial!court!relied!on!Articles!
166!and!170!of!the!Family!Code.!
!
!!!!On!appeal,!however,!the!Decision!of!the!trial!court!was!reversed!on!May!29,!1992!by!the!17th!Division!
of!the!Court!of!Appeals.!The!dispositive!portion!of!the!Decision!of!the!appellate!court!states:!
!
!!!!WHEREFORE,!the!decision!appealed!from!herein!is!REVERSED!and!another!one!entered!declaring!that!
appellee!Marissa!Benitez!is!not!the!biological!daughter!or!child!by!nature!of!the!spouse!Vicente!O.!
Benitez!and!Isabel!Chipongian!and,!therefore,!not!a!legal!heir!of!the!deceased!Vicente!O.!Benitez.!Her!
opposition!to!the!petition!for!the!appointment!of!an!administrator!of!the!intestate!of!the!deceased!
Vicente!O.!Benitez!is,!consequently,!DENIED;!said!petition!and!the!proceedings!already!conducted!
therein!reinstated;!and!the!lower!court!is!directed!to!proceed!with!the!hearing!of!Special!proceeding!No.!
SPK797!(90)!in!accordance!with!law!and!the!Rules.!
!
!!!!Costs!against!appellee.!
!
!!!!SO!ORDERED.!
!
!!!!In!juxtaposition,!the!appellate!court!held!that!the!trial!court!erred!in!applying!Articles!166!and!170!of!
the!Family!Code.!
!
!!!!In!this!petition!for!review,!petitioner!contends:!
!
!!!!1.!The!Honorable!Court!of!Appeals!committed!error!of!law!and!misapprehension!of!facts!when!it!
failed!to!apply!the!provisions,!more!particularly,!Arts.!164,!166,!170!and!171!of!the!Family!Code!in!this!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
case!and!in!adopting!and!upholding!private!respondent's!theory!that!the!instant!case!does!not!involve!
an!action!to!impugn!the!legitimacy!of!a!child;!
!
!!!!2.!Assuming!arguendo!that!private!respondents!can!question!or!impugn!directly!or!indirectly,!the!
legitimacy!of!Marissa's!birth,!still!the!respondent!appellate!Court!committed!grave!abuse!of!discretion!
when!it!gave!more!weight!to!the!testimonial!evidence!of!witnesses!of!private!respondents!whose!
credibility!and!demeanor!have!not!convinced!the!trial!court!of!the!truth!and!sincerity!thereof,!than!the!
documentary!and!testimonial!evidence!of!the!now!petitioner!Marissa!BenitezKBadua;!
!
!!!!3.!The!Honorable!Court!of!Appeals!has!decided!the!case!in!a!way!not!in!accord!with!law!or!with!
applicable!decisions!of!the!supreme!Court,!more!particularly,!on!prescription!or!laches.!
!
!!!!We!find!no!merit!to!the!petition.!
!
!!!!Petitioner's!insistence!on!the!applicability!of!Articles!164,!166,!170!and!171!of!the!Family!Code!to!the!
case!at!bench!cannot!be!sustained.!These!articles!provide:!
!
!!!!Art.!164.!Children!conceived!or!born!during!the!marriage!of!the!parents!are!legitimate.!
!
!!!!Children!conceived!as!a!result!of!artificial!insemination!of!the!wife!with!sperm!of!the!husband!or!that!
of!a!donor!or!both!are!likewise!legitimate!children!of!the!husband!and!his!wife,!provided,!that!both!of!
them!authorized!or!ratified!such!insemination!in!a!written!instrument!executed!and!signed!by!them!
before!the!birth!of!the!child.!The!instrument!shall!be!recorded!in!the!civil!registry!together!with!the!birth!
certificate!of!the!child.!
!
!!!!Art.!166.!Legitimacy!of!child!may!be!impugned!only!on!the!following!grounds:!
!
!!!!1)!That!it!was!physically!impossible!for!the!husband!to!have!sexual!intercourse!with!his!wife!within!the!
first!120!days!of!the!300!days!which!immediately!preceded!the!birth!of!the!child!because!of:!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!a)!the!physical!incapacity!of!the!husband!to!have!sexual!intercourse!with!his!wife;!
!
!!!!b)!the!fact!that!the!husband!and!wife!were!living!separately!in!such!a!way!that!sexual!intercourse!was!
not!possible;!or!
!
!!!!c)!serious!illness!of!the!husband,!which!absolutely!prevented!sexual!intercourse.!
!
!!!!2)!That!it!is!proved!that!for!biological!or!other!scientific!reasons,!the!child!could!not!have!been!that!of!
the!husband!except!in!the!instance!provided!in!the!second!paragraph!of!Article!164;!or!
!
!!!!3)!That!in!case!of!children!conceived!through!artificial!insemination,!the!written!authorization!or!
ratification!of!either!parent!was!obtained!through!mistake,!fraud,!violence,!intimidation,!or!undue!
influence.!
!
!!!!Art.!170.!The!action!to!impugn!the!legitimacy!of!the!child!shall!be!brought!within!one!year!from!the!
knowledge!of!the!birth!or!its!recording!in!the!civil!register,!if!the!husband!or,!in!a!proper!case,!any!of!his!
heirs,!should!reside!in!the!city!or!municipality!where!the!birth!took!place!or!was!recorded.!
!
!!!!If!the!husband!or,!in!his!default,!all!of!his!heirs!do!not!reside!at!the!place!of!birth!as!defined!in!the!first!
paragraph!or!where!it!was!recorded,!the!period!shall!be!two!years!if!they!should!reside!in!the!
Philippines;!and!three!years!if!abroad.!If!the!birth!of!the!child!has!been!concealed!from!or!was!unknown!
to!the!husband!or!his!heirs,!the!period!shall!be!counted!from!the!discovery!or!knowledge!of!the!birth!of!
the!child!or!of!the!fact!of!registration!of!said!birth,!which!ever!is!earlier.!
!
!!!!Art.!171.!The!heirs!of!the!husband!may!impugn!the!filiation!of!the!child!within!the!period!prescribed!in!
the!preceding!Article!only!in!the!following!case:!
!
!!!!1)!If!the!husband!should!die!before!the!expiration!of!the!period!fixed!for!bringing!his!action;!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!2)!If!he!should!die!after!the!filing!of!the!complaint,!without!having!desisted!therefrom;!or!
!
!!!!3)!If!the!child!was!born!after!the!death!of!the!husband.!
!
!!!!A!careful!reading!of!the!above!articles!will!show!that!they!do!not!contemplate!a!situation,!like!in!the!
instant!case,!where!a!child!is!alleged!not!to!be!the!child!of!nature!or!biological!child!of!a!certain!couple.!
Rather,!these!articles!govern!a!situation!where!a!husband!(or!his!heirs)!denies!as!his!own!a!child!of!his!
wife.!Thus,!under!Article!166,!it!is!the!husband!who!can!impugn!the!legitimacy!of!said!child!by!proving:!
(1)!it!was!physically!impossible!for!him!to!have!sexual!intercourse,!with!his!wife!within!the!first!120!days!
of!the!300!days!which!immediately!preceded!the!birth!of!the!child;!(2)!that!for!biological!or!other!
scientific!reasons,!the!child!could!not!have!been!his!child;!(3)!that!in!case!of!children!conceived!through!
artificial!insemination,!the!written!authorization!or!ratification!by!either!parent!was!obtained!through!
mistake,!fraud,!violence,!intimidation!or!undue!influence.!Articles!170!and!171!reinforce!this!reading!as!
they!speak!of!the!prescriptive!period!within!which!the!husband!or!any!of!his!heirs!should!file!the!action!
impugning!the!legitimacy!of!said!child.!Doubtless!then,!the!appellate!court!did!not!err!when!it!refused!to!
apply!these!articles!to!the!case!at!bench.!For!the!case!at!bench!is!not!one!where!the!heirs!of!the!late!
Vicente!are!contending!that!petitioner!is!not!his!child!by!Isabel.!Rather,!their!clear!submission!is!that!
petitioner!was!not!born!to!Vicente!and!Isabel.!Our!ruling!in!CabatbatKLim!vs.!Intermediate!Appellate!
Court,!166!SCRA!451,!457!cited!in!the!impugned!decision!is!apropos,!viz.:!
!
!!!!Petitioners'!recourse!to!Article!263!of!the!New!Civil!Code![now!Article!170!of!the!Family!Code]!is!not!
wellKtaken.!This!legal!provision!refers!to!an!action!to!impugn!legitimacy.!It!is!inapplicable!to!this!case!
because!this!is!not!an!action!to!impugn!the!legitimacy!of!a!child,!but!an!action!of!the!private!
respondents!to!claim!their!inheritance!as!legal!heirs!of!their!childless!deceased!aunt.!They!do!not!claim!
that!petitioner!Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim!is!an!illegitimate!child!of!the!deceased,!but!that!she!is!not!the!
decedent's!child!at!all.!Being!neither!legally!adopted!child,!nor!an!acknowledged!natural!child,!nor!a!
child!by!legal!fiction!of!Esperanza!Cabatbat,!Violeta!is!not!a!legal!heir!of!the!deceased.!
!
!!!!We!now!come!to!the!factual!finding!of!the!appellate!court!that!petitioner!was!not!the!biological!child!
or!child!of!nature!of!the!spouses!Vicente!Benitez!and!Isabel!Chipongian.!The!appellate!court!exhaustively!
dissected!the!evidence!of!the!parties!as!follows:!
!
!!!!.!.!.!And!on!this!issue,!we!are!constrained!to!say!that!appellee's!evidence!is!utterly!insufficient!to!
establish!her!biological!and!blood!kinship!with!the!aforesaid!spouses,!while!the!evidence!on!record!is!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
strong!and!convincing!that!she!is!not,!but!that!said!couple!being!childless!and!desirous!as!they!were!of!
having!a!child,!the!late!Vicente!O.!Benitez!took!Marissa!from!somewhere!while!still!a!baby,!and!without!
he!and!his!wife's!legally!adopting!her!treated,!cared!for,!reared,!considered,!and!loved!her!as!their!own!
true!child,!giving!her!the!status!as!not!so,!such!that!she!herself!had!believed!that!she!was!really!their!
daughter!and!entitled!to!inherit!from!them!as!such.!
!
!!!!The!strong!and!convincing!evidence!referred!to!us!are!the!following:!
!
!!!!First,!the!evidence!is!very!cogent!and!clear!that!Isabel!Chipongian!never!became!pregnant!and,!
therefore,!never!delivered!a!child.!Isabel's!own!only!brother!and!sibling,!Dr.!Lino!Chipongian,!admitted!
that!his!sister!had!already!been!married!for!ten!years!and!was!already!about!36!years!old!and!still!she!
has!not!begotten!or!still!could!not!bear!a!child,!so!that!he!even!had!to!refer!her!to!the!late!Dr.!
Constantino!Manahan,!a!wellKknown!and!eminent!obstetricianKgynecologist!and!the!OB!of!his!mother!
and!wife,!who!treated!his!sister!for!a!number!of!years.!There!is!likewise!the!testimony!of!the!elder!sister!
of!the!deceased!Vicente!O.!Benitez,!Victoria!Benitez!Lirio,!who!then,!being!a!teacher,!helped!him!(he!
being!the!only!boy!and!the!youngest!of!the!children!of!their!widowed!mother)!through!law!school,!and!
whom!Vicente!and!his!wife!highly!respected!and!consulted!on!family!matters,!that!her!brother!Vicente!
and!his!wife!Isabel!being!childless,!they!wanted!to!adopt!her!youngest!daughter!and!when!she!refused,!
they!looked!for!a!baby!to!adopt!elsewhere,!that!Vicente!found!two!baby!boys!but!Isabel!wanted!a!baby!
girl!as!she!feared!a!boy!might!grow!up!unruly!and!uncontrollable,!and!that!Vicente!finally!brought!home!
a!baby!girl!and!told!his!elder!sister!Victoria!he!would!register!the!baby!as!his!and!his!wife's!child.!Victoria!
Benitez!Lirio!was!already!77!years!old!and!too!weak!to!travel!and!come!to!court!in!San!Pablo!City,!so!that!
the!taking!of!her!testimony!by!the!presiding!judge!of!the!lower!court!had!to!be!held!at!her!residence!in!
Paraaque,!MM.!Considering,!her!advanced!age!and!weak!physical!condition!at!the!time!she!testified!in!
this!case,!Victoria!Benitez!Lirio's!testimony!is!highly!trustworthy!and!credible,!for!as!one!who!may!be!
called!by!her!Creator!at!any!time,!she!would!hardly!be!interested!in!material!things!anymore!and!can!be!
expected!not!to!lie,!especially!under!her!oath!as!a!witness.!There!were!also!several!disinterested!
neighbors!of!the!couple!Vicente!O.!Benitez!and!Isabel!Chipongian!in!Nagcarlan,!Laguna!(Sergio!Fule,!
Cecilia!Coronado,!and!Benjamin!C.!Asendido)!who!testified!in!this!case!and!declared!that!they!used!to!
see!Isabel!almost!everyday!especially!as!she!had!drugstore!in!the!ground!floor!of!her!house,!but!they!
never!saw!her!to!have!been!pregnant,!in!1954!(the!year!appellee!Marissa!Benitez!was!allegedly!born,!
according!to!her!birth!certificate!Exh.!"3")!or!at!any!time!at!all,!and!that!it!is!also!true!with!the!rest!of!
their!townmates.!Ressureccion!A.!Tuico,!Isabel!Chipongian's!personal!beautician!who!used!to!set!her!
hair!once!a!week!at!her!(Isabel's)!residence,!likewise!declared!that!she!did!not!see!Isabel!ever!become!
pregnant,!that!she!knows!that!Isabel!never!delivered!a!baby,!and!that!when!she!saw!the!baby!Marissa!in!
her!crib!one!day!she!went!to!Isabel's!house!to!set!the!latter's!hair,!she!was!surprised!and!asked!the!
latter!where!the!baby!came!from,!and!"she!told!me!that!the!child!was!brought!by!Atty.!Benitez!and!told!
me!not!to!tell!about!it"!(p.!10,!tsn,!Nov.!29,!1990).!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
!!!!The!facts!of!a!woman's!becoming!pregnant!and!growing!big!with!child,!as!well!as!her!delivering!a!
baby,!are!matters!that!cannot!be!hidden!from!the!public!eye,!and!so!is!the!fact!that!a!woman!never!
became!pregnant!and!could!not!have,!therefore,!delivered!a!baby!at!all.!Hence,!if!she!is!suddenly!seen!
mothering!and!caring!for!a!baby!as!if!it!were!her!own,!especially!at!the!rather!late!age!of!36!(the!age!of!
Isabel!Chipongian!when!appellee!Marissa!Benitez!was!allegedly!born),!we!can!be!sure!that!she!is!not!the!
true!mother!of!that!baby.!
!
!!!!Second,!appellee's!birth!certificate!Exh.!"3"!with!the!late!Vicente!O.!Benitez!appearing!as!the!
informant,!is!highly!questionable!and!suspicious.!For!if!Vicente's!wife!Isabel,!who!wads!already!36!years!
old!at!the!time!of!the!child's!supposed!birth,!was!truly!the!mother!of!that!child,!as!reported!by!Vicente!in!
her!birth!certificate,!should!the!child!not!have!been!born!in!a!hospital!under!the!experienced,!skillful!and!
caring!hands!of!Isabel's!obstetricianKgynecologist!Dr.!Constantino!Manahan,!since!delivery!of!a!child!at!
that!late!age!by!Isabel!would!have!been!difficult!and!quite!risky!to!her!health!and!even!life?!How!come,!
then,!that!as!appearing!in!appellee's!birth!certificate,!Marissa!was!supposedly!born!at!the!Benitez!home!
in!Avenida!Rizal,!Nagcarlan,!Laguna,!with!no!physician!or!even!a!midwife!attending?!
!
!!!!At!this!juncture,!it!might!be!meet!to!mention!that!it!has!become!a!practice!in!recent!times!for!people!
who!want!to!avoid!the!expense!and!trouble!of!a!judicial!adoption!to!simply!register!the!child!as!their!
supposed!child!in!the!civil!registry.!Perhaps!Atty.!Benitez,!though!a!lawyer!himself,!thought!that!he!could!
avoid!the!trouble!if!not!the!expense!of!adopting!the!child!Marissa!through!court!proceedings!by!merely!
putting!himself!and!his!wife!as!the!parents!of!the!child!in!her!birth!certificate.!Or!perhaps!he!had!
intended!to!legally!adopt!the!child!when!she!grew!a!little!older!but!did!not!come!around!doing!so!either!
because!he!was!too!busy!or!for!some!other!reason.!But!definitely,!the!mere!registration!of!a!child!in!his!
or!her!birth!certificate!as!the!child!of!the!supposed!parents!is!not!a!valid!adoption,!does!not!confer!upon!
the!child!the!status!of!an!adopted!child!and!the!legal!rights!of!such!child,!and!even!amounts!of!
simulation!of!the!child's!birth!or!falsification!of!his!or!her!birth!certificate,!which!is!a!public!document.!
!
!!!!Third,!if!appellee!Marissa!Benitez!is!truly!the!real,!biological!daughter!of!the!late!Vicente!O.!Benitez!
and!his!wife!Isabel!Chipongian,!why!did!he!and!Isabel's!only!brother!and!sibling!Dr.!Nilo!Chipongian,!
after!Isabel's!death!on!April!25,!1982,!state!in!the!extrajudicial!settlement!
!!!!Exh.!"E"!that!they!executed!her!estate,!"that!we!are!the!sole!heirs!of!the!deceased!ISABEL!
CHIPONGIAN!because!she!died!without!descendants!or!ascendants?"!Dr.!Chipongian,!placed!on!a!
witness!stand!by!appellants,!testified!that!it!was!his!brotherKinKlaw!Atty.!Vicente!O.!Benitez!who!
prepared!said!document!and!that!he!signed!the!same!only!because!the!latter!told!him!to!do!so!(p.!24,!
tsn,!Nov.!22,!1990).!But!why!would!Atty.!Benitez!make!such!a!statement!in!said!document,!unless!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
appellee!Marissa!Benitez!is!not!really!his!and!his!wife's!daughter!and!descendant!and,!therefore,!not!his!
deceased!wife's!legal!heir?!As!for!Dr.!Chipongian,!he!lamely!explained!that!he!signed!said!document!
without!understanding!completely!the!meaning!of!the!words!"descendant!and!ascendant"!(p.!21,!tsn,!
Nov.!22,!1990).!This!we!cannot!believe,!Dr.!Chipongian!being!a!practicing!pediatrician!who!has!even!
gone!to!the!United!States!(p.!52,!tsn,!Dec.!13,!1990).!Obviously,!
!!!!Dr.!Chipongian!was!just!trying!to!protect!the!interests!of!appellee,!the!fosterKdaughter!of!his!deceased!
sister!and!brotherKinKlaw,!as!against!those!of!the!latter's!collateral!blood!relatives.!
!
!!!!Fourth,!it!is!likewise!odd!and!strange,!if!appellee!Marissa!Benitez!is!really!the!daughter!and!only!legal!
heir!of!the!spouses!Vicente!O.!Benitez!and!Isabel!Chipongian,!that!the!latter,!before!her!death,!would!
write!a!note!to!her!husband!and!Marissa!stating!that:!
!
!!!!even!without!any!legal!papers,!I!wish!that!my!husband!and!my!child!or!only!daughter!will!inherit!what!
is!legally!my!own!property,!in!case!I!die!without!a!will,!
!
!!!!and!in!the!same!handwritten!note,!she!even!implored!her!husband!!
!
!!!!that!any!inheritance!due!him!from!my!property!!when!he!die!!to!make!our!own!daughter!his!sole!
heir.!This!do![sic]!not!mean!what!he!legally!owns!or!his!inherited!property.!I!leave!him!to!decide!for!
himself!regarding!those.!
!
!!!!(Exhs.!"FK1",!"FK1KA"!and!"FK1KB")!
!
!!!!We!say!odd!and!strange,!for!if!Marissa!Benitez!is!really!the!daughter!of!the!spouses!Vicente!O.!Benitez!
and!Isabel!Chipongian,!it!would!not!have!been!necessary!for!Isabel!to!write!and!plead!for!the!foregoing!
requests!to!her!husband,!since!Marissa!would!be!their!legal!heir!by!operation!of!law.!Obviously,!Isabel!
Chipongian!had!to!implore!and!supplicate!her!husband!to!give!appellee!although!without!any!legal!
papers!her!properties!when!she!dies,!and!likewise!for!her!husband!to!give!Marissa!the!properties!that!
he!would!inherit!from!her!(Isabel),!since!she!well!knew!that!Marissa!is!not!truly!their!daughter!and!could!
not!be!their!legal!heir!unless!her!(Isabel's)!husband!makes!her!so.!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!Finally,!the!deceased!Vicente!O.!Benitez'!elder!sister!Victoria!Benitez!Lirio!even!testified!that!her!
brother!Vicente!gave!the!date!
!!!!December!8!as!Marissa's!birthday!in!her!birth!certificate!because!that!date!is!the!birthday!of!their!
(Victoria!and!Vicente's)!mother.!It!is!indeed!too!much!of!a!coincidence!for!the!child!Marissa!and!the!
mother!of!Vicente!and!Victoria!to!have!the!same!birthday!unless!it!is!true,!as!Victoria!testified,!that!
Marissa!was!only!registered!by!Vicente!as!his!and!his!wife's!child!and!that!they!gave!her!the!birth!date!of!
Vicente's!mother.!
!
!!!!We!sustain!these!findings!as!they!are!not!unsupported!by!the!evidence!on!record.!The!weight!of!these!
findings!was!not!negated!by!documentary!evidence!presented!by!the!petitioner,!the!most!notable!of!
which!is!her!Certificate!of!Live!Birth!(Exh.!"3")!purportedly!showing!that!her!parents!were!the!late!
!!!!Vicente!Benitez!and!Isabel!Chipongian.!This!Certificate!registered!on!December!28,!1954!appears!to!
have!been!signed!by!the!deceased!Vicente!Benitez.!Under!Article!410!of!the!New!Civil!Code,!however,!
"the!books!making!up!the!Civil!Registry!and!all!documents!relating!thereto!shall!be!considered!public!
documents!and!shall!be!prima!facie!evidence!of!the!facts!therein!stated."!As!related!above,!the!totality!
of!contrary!evidence,!presented!by!the!private!respondents!sufficiently!rebutted!the!truth!of!the!
content!of!petitioner's!Certificate!of!Live!Birth.!of!said!rebutting!evidence,!the!most!telling!was!the!Deed!
of!ExtraKJudicial!Settlement!of!the!Estate!of!the!Deceased!Isabel!Chipongian!(Exh.!"E")!executed!on!July!
20,!1982!by!Vicente!Benitez,!and!
!!!!Dr.!Nilo!Chipongian,!a!brother!of!Isabel.!In!their!notarized!document,!they!stated!that!"(they)!are!the!
sole!heirs!of!the!deceased!Isabel!Chipongian!because!she!died!without!descendants!or!ascendants".!In!
executing!this!Deed,!Vicente!Benitez!effectively!repudiated!the!Certificate!of!Live!Birth!of!petitioner!
where!it!appeared!that!he!was!petitioner's!father.!The!repudiation!was!made!twentyKeight!years!after!
he!signed!petitioner's!Certificate!of!Live!Birth.!
!
!!!!IN!VIEW!WHEREOF,!the!petition!for!review!is!dismissed!for!lack!of!merit.!Costs!against!petitioner.!
!
!!!!SO!ORDERED.!
!
!!!!Narvasa,!C.J.,!Padilla,!Regalado,!JJ.,!concur.!
!
!!!!Nocon,!J.,!is!on!leave.!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
!!!!!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Republic!of!the!Philippines!
SUPREME!COURT!
Manila!
!
FIRST!DIVISION!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
G.R.!No.!LK69679!October!18,!1988!
!
VIOLETA!CABATBAT!LIM,!LIM!BIAK!CHIAO!and!CALASIAO!BIJON!FACTORY,!petitioners,!
vs.!
INTERMEDIATE!APPELLATE!COURT,!CONSORCIA!FRIANEZA!GOLEA,!MARIA!FRIANEZA!VERGARA,!
BENEDICTA!FRIANEZA!MAYUGBA!BONIFACIA!FRIANEZA!HEIRS!OF!DOMINGO!FRIANEZA!namely,!
DECIDERIA!Q.!VDA.!DE!FRIANEZA!FRANCISCO,!DONA,!VILMA!and!DECIDERIA,!all!surnamed!FRIANEZA!
HEIRS!OF!DANIEL!FRIANEZA!namely,!ADELA!V.!VDA.!DE!FRIANEZA!in!her!behalf!and!as!Guardian!ad!litem!
of!Minors,!DARLENE,!DANIEL!JR.,!DUSSEL!and!DAISY!GLEN,!all!surnamed!FRIANEZA!respondents.!
!
Ethelwoldo!R.!de!Guzman!for!petitioners.!
!
Tomas!B.!Tadeo,!Sr.!for!private!respondents.!
!
!!
!
GRIOKAQUINO,!J.:!
!
This!case!involves!a!contest!over!the!estate!of!the!late!Dra.!Esperanza!Cabatbat!wherein!the!
protagonists!are!her!sisters!and!the!children!of!her!deceased!brothers!on!one!hand,!and!the!petitioner!
Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim!who!claims!to!be!her!only!child.!
!
Petitioners!Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim,!her!husband!Liam!Biak!Chiao,!and!the!Calasiao!Bijon!Factory!assail!the!
decision!dated!October!25,!1984!of!the!Intermediate!Appellate!Court,!now!Court!of!Appeals!(ACKG.R.!
No.!CV!67055),!which!affirmed!the!trial!court's!decision!finding!that!petitioner!Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim!is!
not!the!offKspring,!hence,!not!a!legal!heir!of!the!late!Esperanza!Cabatbat.!
!
The!private!respondents,!sisters!of!the!late!Esperanza!FrianezaKCabatbat,!filed!a!complaint!in!the!Court!
of!First!Instance!of!Pangasinan!(Civil!Case!No.!DK3841),!praying!for!the!partition!of!the!estate!of!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Esperanza!Frianeza!Cabatbat,!who!died!without!issue!on!April!23,!1977.!Part!of!her!estate!was!her!
interest!in!the!business!partnership!known!as!Calasiao!Bijon!Factory,!now!in!the!possession!of!Violeta!
Cabatbat!Lim!who!claims!to!be!the!child!of!the!spouses!Esperanza!and!Proceso!Cabatbat.!
!
Esperanza!FrianezaKCabatbat!was!survived!by!her!husband,!Proceso!Cabatbat,!her!sisters,!Consorcia!
Maria,!Benedicta,!Bonifacia,!all!surnamed!Frianeza!and!the!children!of!her!deceased!brothers!Daniel!and!
Domingo.!In!their!complaint,!the!private!respondents!alleged!that!Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim!is!not!a!child!of!
Esperanza,!but!was!only!a!ward!(ampon)!of!the!spouses!Esperanza!and!Proceso!Cabatbat!who!sheltered!
and!supported!her!from!childhood,!without!benefit!of!formal!adoption!proceedings.!
!
Private!respondents'!evidence!on!the!nonKfiliation!of!Violeta!to!Esperanza!Cabatbat!were:!1)!the!
absence!of!any!record!that!Esperanza!Cabatbat!was!admitted!in!the!hospital!where!Violeta!was!born!
and!that!she!gave!birth!to!Violeta!on!the!day!the!latter!was!born;!2)!the!absence!of!the!birth!certificate!
of!Violeta!Cabatbat!in!the!files!of!certificates!of!live!births!of!the!Pangasinan!Provincial!Hospital!for!the!
years!1947!and!1948,!when!Violeta!was!supposedly!born;!3)!certification!dated!March!9,!1977,!of!the!
Civil!Registry!coordinator!Eugenio!Venal!of!the!Office!of!the!Civil!Registrar!General,!that!his!office!has!no!
birth!record!of!Violeta!Cabatbat!alleged!to!have!been!born!on!May!26,!1948!or!1949!in!Calasiao,!
Pangasinan;!4)!certification!dated!June!16,!1977!of!Romeo!Gabriana,!Principal!II,!that!when!Violeta!
studied!in!the!Calasiao!Pilot!Central!School,!Proceso!Cabatbat!and!Esperanza!Cabatbat!were!listed!as!her!
guardians!only,!not!as!her!parents;!5)!testimony!of!Amparo!Reside!that!she!was!in!the!Pangasinan!
Provincial!Hospital!on!May!21,1948!to!watch!a!cousin!who!delivered!a!child!there!and!that!she!became!
acquianted!with!a!patient!named!Benita!Lastimosa!who!gave!birth!on!May!26,!1948!to!a!baby!girl!who!
grew!up!to!be!known!as!Violeta!Cabatbat.!
!
Pitted!against!the!evidence!of!the!plaintiffs!are!the!evidence!of!herein!petitioners!consisting!of.!1)!
Violeta!Cabatbat's!birth!record!which!was!filed!on!June!15,1948!showing!that!she!was!born!on!May!26,!
1948!at!the!Pangasinan!Provincial!Hospital!and!that!she!is!a!legitimate!child!of!the!spouses!Proceso!and!
Esperanza!Cabatbat;!2)!testimony!of!Proceso!Cabatbat!that!Violeta!is!his!child!with!the!deceased!
Esperanza!Frianeza;!3)!testimony!of!Benita!Lastimosa!denying!that!she!delivered!a!child!in!the!
Pangasinan!Provincial!Hospital!and!that!Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim!is!that!child;!4)!the!marriage!contract!of!
Violeta!and!Lim!Biak!Chiao!where!Esperanza!appeared!as!the!mother!of!the!bride;!5)!Deed!of!Sale!dated!
May!14,!1960,!wherein!the!vendee!Violeta!Cabatbat,!then!a!minor,!was!represented!and!assisted!by!her!
"mother,"!Dra.!Esperanza!Cabatbat;!and!6)!another!Deed!of!Absolute!Sale!dated!April!21,!1961,!wherein!
Violeta!Cabatbat!was!assisted!and!represented!by!her!"father,"!Proceso!Cabatbat.!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Upon!the!evidence,!the!trial!court!held!on!August!10,!1979!that!Violeta!Cabatbat!is!not!a!child!by!nature!
of!the!spouses!Esperanza!and!Proceso!Cabatbat!and!that!hence,!she!is!not!a!legal!heir!of!the!deceased!
Esperanza!Cabatbat.!The!dispositive!portion!of!the!trial!court's!decision!reads:!
!
WHEREFORE,!judgment!is!hereby!rendered!as!follows:!
!
(1)!Finding!that!defendant!VIOLETA!CABATBAT!LIM!is!not!a!child!by!nature!of!the!spouses,!decedent!
Esperanza!Frianeza!and!defendant!Proceso!Cabatbat,!and!not!a!compulsory!heir!of!the!said!decedent;!
!
(2)!Declaring!that!the!heirs!of!the!decedent!are!her!surviving!husband,!defendant!Proceso!Cabatbat!and!
her!sisters,!plaintiffs!Consorcia!MARIA,!BENEDICTA!alias!JOVITA,!and!BONIFACIA!alias!ANASTACIA,!all!
surnamed!FRIANEZA!her!brothers!deceased!DANIEL!FRIANEZA!represented!by!his!surviving!spouse,!
Adela!Vda.!de!Frianeza,!and!their!children,!Darlene,!Daniel,!Jr.,!Dussel!and!Daisy!Glen,!all!surnamed!
FRIANEZA!and!deceased!DOMINGO!FRIANEZA!represented!by!his!surviving!spouse!Decideria!Q.!Vda.!de!
Frianeza!and!their!children,!Francisco,!Dona,!Vilma!and!Decideria,!all!surnamed!FRIANEZA!
!
(3)!Finding!that!the!estate!left!by!the!decedent!are!the!thirty!properties!enumerated!and!described!at!
pages!13!to!19!supra!and!an!equity!in!the!Calasiao!Bijon!Factory!in!the!sum!of!P37,961.69!of!which!
P13,221.69!remains!after!advances!obtained!by!the!deceased!during!her!lifetime!and!lawful!deductions!
made!after!her!death;!
!
(4)!That!of!the!real!properties!adverted!to!above,!threeKfourth!(3/4)!proK!indiviso!is!the!share!of!
defendant!Proceso!Cabatbat,!as!the!surviving!spouse,!oneKhalf!()!as!his!share!of!the!conjugal!estate!
and!oneKhalf!()!of!the!remaining!oneKhalf!as!share!as!heir!from!his!wife!(decedent's)!estate,!while!the!
remaining!oneKhalf!()!of!the!other!half!is!the!group!share!of!the!heirs!of!the!brothers!and!sisters!of!his!
wife!and!of!the!children!of!the!latter!if!deceased,!whose!names!are!already!enumerated!hereinbefore!in!
the!following!proportions:!oneKsixth!(1/6)!each!proKindiviso!to!Consorcia!Maria,!Benedicta!alias!Jovita,!
and!Bonifacia!alias!Anastacia;!oneKsixth!(1/6)!to!Adela!B.!Vda.!de!Fraineza!Darlene,!Daniel,!Jr.,!Dussel!and!
Daisy!Glen,!as!a!group!in!representation!of!deceased!brother!DANIEL!FRIANEZA!and!one.!sixth!(1/6)!to!
Decideria!Q.!Vda.!de!Frianeza,!Francisco,!Dona,!Vilma!and!Decideria!as!a!group!in!representation!of!
deceased!brother!DOMINGO!FRIANEZA!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(5)!That!of!the!balance!of!the!equity!of!the!deceased!in!the!CALASIAO!BIJON!FACTORY!in!the!sum!of!
P13,221.69,!threeKfourths!(3/4)!or!P9,916.29!is!the!share!of!Proceso!Cabatbat!as!surviving!spouse!and!as!
heir!of!his!deceased!wife,!and!the!remaining!oneKfourth!(1/4)!to!the!plaintiffs!under!the!sharing!already!
stated!in!the!preceding!paragraph;!(a)!but!because!defendant!Proceso!Cabatbat!has!overdrawn!his!share!
he!is!ordered!to!return!to!the!estate!the!sum!of!P796.34!by!depositing!the!same!with!the!Clark!of!Court;!
and!(b)!defendant!Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim,!not!being!an!heir,!is!ordered!to!return!to!the!estate!the!sum!of!
P2,931.13!half!of!what!she!and!her!codefendant!Proceso!Cabatbat!withdrew!from!the!equity!of!the!
deceased!under!Exhibit!29,!receipt!dated!April!30,!1977;!
!
(6)!Ordering!jointly!defendant!a!Proceso!Cabatbat!and!Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim!to!pay!attorney's!fees!in!the!
sum!of!P5,000.00,!the!sum!of!P4,000.00!from!defendant!Proceso!Cabatbat!and!Pl,000.00!from!
defendant!Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim,!and!litigation!expenses!in!the!sum!of!Pl,000.00!from!defendant!Proceso!
Cabatbat!and!P200.00!from!defendant!Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim,!to!the!plaintiffs,!and!to!pay!the!costs.!
!
SO!ORDERED.!(pp.!236K239,!Record!on!Appeal.)!
!
Petitioners!appealed!to!the!Intermediate!Appellate!Court!which!affirmed!the!decision!of!the!trial!court!
on!October!25,!1984.!
!
A!motion!for!reconsideration!filed!by!the!petitioners!was!denied!by!the!Intermediate!Appellate!Court.!
!
Petitioners!have!elevated!the!decision!to!Us!for!review!on!certiorari,!alleging!that!the!Intermediate!
Appellate!Court!erred:!
!
1.!In!finding!that!petitioner!is!not!the!child!of!Prospers!and!Esperanza!Cabatbat;!
!
2.!In!ignoring!the!provisions!of!Section!22!of!Rule!132,!Rules!of!Court;!
!
3.!In!not!considering!the!provision!of!Article!263!of!the!New!Civil!Code;!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4.!In!disregarding!Exhibits!8,!9,!10,!and!11!of!petitioner!Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim!
!
Petitioners'!first!and!fourth!assignments!of!error!raise!factual!issues.!The!finding!of!the!trial!court!and!
the!Court!of!Appeals!that!Violeta!Cabatbat!was!not!born!of!Esperanza!Cabatbat!is!a!factual!finding!based!
on!the!evidence!presented!at!the!trial,!hence,!it!is!conclusive!upon!Us.!Well!entrenched!is!the!rule!that!
"factual!findings!of!the!trial!court!and!the!Court!of!Appeals!are!entitled!to!great!respect"!(Vda.!de!Roxas!
vs.!IAC,!143!SCRA!77;!Republic!vs.!IAC,!144!SCRA!705).!Section!22,!Rule!132!of!the!Rules!of!Court!which!
provides!that:!"Where!a!private!writing!is!more!than!thirty!years!old,!is!produced!from!a!custody!in!
which!it!would!naturally!be!found!if!genuine,!and!is!unblemished!by!any!alterations!or!circumstances!of!
suspicion,!no!other!evidence!of!its!execution!and!authenticity!need!be!given"!does!not!apply!to!
petitioners'!Exhibit!"5,"!the!supposed!birth!registry!record!of!defendant!Violeta!Cabatbat!showing!that!
she!was!born!on!May!26,1948,!at!the!Pangasinan!Provincial!Hospital!in!Dagupan!City,!and!that!her!father!
and!mother!are!Proceso!Cabatbat!and!Esperanza!Frianeza,!respectively.!In!rejecting!that!document,!the!
trial!court!pointedly!observed:!
!
This!is!very!strange!and!odd!because!the!Registry!Book!of!admission!of!the!hospital!does!not!show!that!
Esperanza!Frianeza!was!ever!a!patient!on!May!26,!1948.!Indeed,!Esperanza!Frianeza!was!never!admitted!
in!the!hospital!as!an!obstetrics!case!before!or!after!May!26,!1948,!that!is!from!December!1,!1947!to!June!
15,!1948!(Stipulation!of!Facts,!PreKTrial!Order!of!May!23,!1977,!Record!on!Appeal,!p.!117).!
!
On!May!26,!1948,!the!day!defendant!Violeta!Cabatbat!was!alleged!to!have!been!delivered!by!Esperanza!
Frianeza!in!the!Pangasinan!Provincial!Hospital,!the!records!of!the!hospital!show!that!only!one!woman!by!
the!same!of!the!Benita!Lastimosa!of!Tagudin,!Ilocos!Sur,!not!Esperanza!Frianeza,!gave!birth!to!an!
illegitimate!child!who!was!named!by!her!mother!Benita!Lastimosa!as!Baby!Girl!Lastimosa!(Exhibit!S.!
Plaintiffs'!Folder!of!Exhibits,!p.!39,!Record!on!Appeal,!pp.!117K118).!Furthermore,!the!record!of!birth!
certificates!of!Pangasinan!Provincial!Hospital!for!the!years!1947!and!1948!does!not!carry!the!birth!
certificate!of!defendant!Violeta!Cabatbat!and!the!only!birth!certificate!in!the!file!of!birth!certificates!of!
the!hospital!for!May!26,!1948!is!that!of!Baby!Girl!Lastimosa!whose!mother's!name!is!Benita!Lastimosa.!
(pp.!3K4,!CA!Decision,!pp.!13K14,!Record!on!Appeal.)!
!
Furthermore,!the!absence!of!a!record!of!the!birth!of!petitioner!Violeta!Cabatbat!in!the!Office!of!the!Civil!
Registrar!General,!puts!a!cloud!on!the!genuineness!of!her!Exhibit!5.!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Petitioners'!recourse!to!Article!263!of!the!New!Civil!Code!is!not!wellKtaken.!This!legal!provision!refers!to!
an!action!to!impugn!legitimacy.!It!is!inapplicable!to!this!case!because!this!is!not!an!action!to!impugn!the!
legitimacy!of!a!child,!but!an!action!of!the!private!respondents!to!claim!their!inheritance!as!legal!heirs!of!
their!childless!deceased!aunt.!They!do!not!claim!that!petitioner!Violeta!Cabatbat!Lim!is!an!illegitimate!
child!of!the!deceased,!but!that!she!is!not!the!decedent's!child!at!all.!Being!neither!a!legally!adopted!
child,!nor!an!acknowledged!natural!child,!nor!a!child!by!legal!fiction!of!Esperanza!Cabatbat,!Violeta!is!not!
a!legal!heir!of!the!deceased.!
!
WHEREFORE,!the!petition!is!denied!for!lack!of!merit.!The!appealed!decision!is!affirmed,!but!with!
modification!of!paragraphs!2!and!4!of!the!dispositive!portion!thereof,!by!excluding!the!widows!Adela!B.!
Vda.!de!Frianeza!and!Decideria!Q.!Vda.!de!Frianeza,!who!are!not!legal!heirs!of!Esperanza!Frianeza!
Cabatbat!from!participating!with!their!children!and!the!surviving!sisters!of!the!deceased!in!the!oneK
fourth!share!of!the!estate!pertaining!to!the!latter!under!Article!1001!of!the!Civil!Code.!
!
SO!ORDERED.!
!
Narvasa,!Cruz,!Gancayco!and!Medialdea,!JJ.,!concur.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Republic!of!the!Philippines!
SUPREME!COURT!
Manila!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
SECOND!DIVISION!
!
!!
!
G.R.!No.!121027!July!31,!1997!
!
CORAZON!DEZOLLER!TISON!and!RENE!R.!DEZOLLER,!petitioners,!
vs.!
COURT!OF!APPEALS!and!TEODORA!DOMINGO,!respondents.!
!
!!
!
REGALADO,!J.:!
!
The!present!appeal!by!certiorari!seeks!the!reversal!of!the!judgment!rendered!by!respondent!Court!of!
Appeals!on!June!30,!1995!1!which!affirmed!the!Order!of!December!3,!1992!issued!by!the!Regional!Trial!
Court!of!Quezon!City,!Branch!98,!granting!herein!private!respondent's!Demurrer!to!Plaintiff's!Evidence!
filed!in!Civil!Case!No.!QK88K1054!pending!therein.!
!
The!present!appellate!review!involves!an!action!for!reconveyance!filed!by!herein!petitioners!against!
herein!private!respondent!before!the!Regional!Trial!Court!of!Quezon!City,!Branch!98,!docketed!as!the!
aforesaid!Civil!Case!No.!QK88K1054,!over!a!parcel!of!land!with!a!house!and!apartment!thereon!located!at!
San!Francisco!del!Monte,!Quezon!City!and!which!was!originally!owned!by!the!spouses!Martin!Guerrero!
and!Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero.!It!appears!that!petitioners!Corazon!Tison!and!Rene!Dezoller!are!the!
niece!and!nephew,!respectively,!of!the!deceased!Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero!who!is!the!sister!of!
petitioner's!father,!Hermogenes!Dezoller.!Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero!died!on!March!5,!1983!without!any!
ascendant!or!descendant,!and!was!survived!only!by!her!husband,!Martin!Guerrero,!and!herein!
petitioners.!Petitioners'!father,!Hermogenes,!died!on!October!3,!1973,!hence!they!seek!to!inherit!from!
Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero!by!right!of!representation.!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
The!records!reveal!that!upon!the!death!of!Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero,!her!surviving!spouse,!Martin,!
executed!on!September!15,!1986!an!Affidavit!of!Extrajudicial!Settlement!2!adjudicating!unto!himself,!
allegedly!as!sole!heir,!the!land!in!dispute!which!is!covered!by!Transfer!Certificate!of!Title!No.!66886,!as!a!
consequence!of!which!Transfer!Certificate!of!Title!No.!358074!was!issued!in!the!name!of!Martin!
Guerrero.!On!January!2,!1988,!Martin!Guerrero!sold!the!lot!to!herein!private!respondent!Teodora!
Domingo!and!thereafter,!Transfer!Certificate!of!Title!No.!374012!was!issued!in!the!latter's!name.!
!
Martin!Guerrero!died!on!October!25,!1988.!Subsequently,!herein!petitioners!filed!an!action!for!
reconveyance!on!November!2,!1988,!claiming!that!they!are!entitled!to!inherit!oneKhalf!of!the!property!in!
question!by!right!of!representation.!
!
At!the!preKtrial!conference,!the!following!issues!were!presented!by!both!parties!for!resolution:!
!
(1)!whether!or!not!the!plaintiffs!(herein!petitioners)!are!the!nephew!and!niece!of!the!late!Teodora!
Dezoller;!
!
(2)!whether!or!not!the!plaintiffs!are!entitled!to!inherit!by!right!of!representation!from!the!estate!of!the!
late!Teodora!Dezoller;!
!
(3)!whether!or!not!defendant!(herein!private!respondent)!must!reconvey!the!reserved!participation!of!
the!plaintiffs!to!the!estate!of!the!late!Teodora!Dezoller!under!Section!4,!Rule!74!of!the!Rules!of!Court!
which!was!duly!annotated!on!the!title!of!the!defendant;!
!
(4)!whether!or!not!the!plaintiffs!are!entitled!to!damages,!moral!and!exemplary,!plus!attorney's!fees!for!
the!willful!and!malicious!refusal!of!defendant!to!reconvey!the!participation!of!plaintiffs!in!the!estate!of!
Teodora!Dezoller,!despite!demands!and!knowing!fully!well!that!plaintiffs!are!the!niece!and!nephew!of!
said!deceased;!and!
!
(5)!whether!or!not!the!subject!property!now!in!litigation!can!be!considered!as!conjugal!property!of!the!
spouses!Martin!Guerrero!and!Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero.!3!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
During!the!hearing,!petitioner!Corazon!Dezoller!Tison!was!presented!as!the!lone!witness,!with!the!
following!documentary!evidence!offered!to!prove!petitioners'!filiation!to!their!father!and!their!aunt,!to!
wit:!a!family!picture;!baptismal!certificates!of!Teodora!and!Hermogenes!Dezoller;!certificates!of!
destroyed!records!of!birth!of!Teodora!Dezoller!and!Hermogenes!Dezoller;!death!certificates!of!
Hermogenes!Dezoller!and!Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero;!certification!of!destroyed!records!of!live!birth!of!
Corazon!and!Rene!Dezoller;!joint!affidavits!of!Pablo!Verzosa!and!Meliton!Sitjar!attesting!to!the!parents,!
date!and!place!of!birth!of!Corazon!and!Rene!Dezoller;!joint!affidavit!of!Juliana!Cariaga!and!Manuela!
Cariaga!attesting!to!the!fact!of!marriage!between!Martin!Guerrero!and!Teodora!Dezoller;!and!the!
marriage!certificate!of!Martin!and!Teodora!Guerrero.!4!Petitioners!thereafter!rested!their!case!and!
submitted!a!written!offer!of!these!exhibits!to!which!a!Comment!5!was!filed!by!herein!private!
respondent.!
!
Subsequently,!private!respondent!filed!a!Demurrer!to!Plaintiff's!Evidence!on!the!ground!that!petitioners!
failed!to!prove!their!legitimate!filiation!with!the!deceased!Teodora!Guerrero!in!accordance!with!Article!
172!of!the!Family!Code.!It!is!further!averred!that!the!testimony!of!petitioner!Corazon!Dezoller!Tison!
regarding!her!relationship!with!her!alleged!father!and!aunt!is!selfKserving,!uncorroborated!and!
incompetent,!and!that!it!falls!short!of!the!quantum!of!proof!required!under!Article!172!of!the!Family!
Code!to!establish!filiation.!Also,!the!certification!issued!by!the!Office!of!the!Local!Civil!Registrar!of!
Himamaylan,!Negros!Occidental!is!merely!proof!of!the!alleged!destruction!of!the!records!referred!to!
therein,!and!the!joint!affidavit!executed!by!Pablo!Verzosa!and!Meliton!Sitjar!certifying!to!the!date,!place!
of!birth!and!parentage!of!herein!petitioners!is!inadmissible!for!being!hearsay!since!the!affiants!were!
never!presented!for!crossKexamination.!6!
!
On!December!3,!1992,!the!trial!court!issued!an!order!granting!the!demurrer!to!evidence!and!dismissing!
the!complaint!for!reconveyance.!7!
!
In!upholding!the!dismissal,!respondent!Court!of!Appeals!declared!that!the!documentary!evidence!
presented!by!herein!petitioners,!such!as!the!baptismal!certificates,!family!picture,!and!joint!affidavits!are!
all!inadmissible!and!insufficient!to!prove!and!establish!filiation.!Hence,!this!appeal.!
!
We!find!for!petitioners.!
!
The!bone!of!contention!in!private!respondent's!demurrer!to!evidence!is!whether!or!not!herein!
petitioners!failed!to!meet!the!quantum!of!proof!required!by!Article!172!of!the!Family!Code!to!establish!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
legitimacy!and!filiation.!There!are!two!points!for!consideration!before!us:!first!is!the!issue!on!petitioner's!
legitimacy,!and!second!is!the!question!regarding!their!filiation!with!Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero.!
!
I.!It!is!not!debatable!that!the!documentary!evidence!adduced!by!petitioners,!taken!separately!and!
independently!of!each!other,!are!not!per!se!sufficient!proof!of!legitimacy!nor!even!of!pedigree.!It!is!
important!to!note,!however,!that!the!rulings!of!both!lower!courts!in!the!case!are!basically!premised!on!
the!erroneous!assumption!that,!in!the!first!place,!the!issue!of!legitimacy!may!be!validly!controverted!in!
an!action!for!reconveyance,!and,!in!the!second!place,!that!herein!petitioners!have!the!onus!probandi!to!
prove!their!legitimacy!and,!corollarily,!their!filiation.!We!disagree!on!both!counts.!
!
It!seems!that!both!the!court!a!quo!and!respondent!appellate!court!have!regrettably!overlooked!the!
universally!recognized!presumption!on!legitimacy.!There!is!no!presumption!of!the!law!more!firmly!
established!and!founded!on!sounder!morality!and!more!convincing!reason!than!the!presumption!that!
children!born!in!wedlock!are!legitimate.!8!And!well!settled!is!the!rule!that!the!issue!of!legitimacy!cannot!
be!attacked!collaterally.!
!
The!rationale!for!these!rules!has!been!explained!in!this!wise:!
!
The!presumption!of!legitimacy!in!the!Family!Code!.!.!.!actually!fixes!a!civil!status!for!the!child!born!in!
wedlock,!and!that!civil!status!cannot!be!attacked!collaterally.!The!legitimacy!of!the!child!can!be!
impugned!only!in!a!direct!action!brought!for!that!purpose,!by!the!proper!parties,!and!within!the!period!
limited!by!law.!
!
The!legitimacy!of!the!child!cannot!be!contested!by!way!of!defense!or!as!a!collateral!issue!in!another!
action!for!a!different!purpose.!The!necessity!of!an!independent!action!directly!impugning!the!legitimacy!
is!more!clearly!expressed!in!the!Mexican!Code!(Article!335)!which!provides:!"The!contest!of!the!
legitimacy!of!a!child!by!the!husband!or!his!heirs!must!be!made!by!proper!complaint!before!the!
competent!court;!any!contest!made!in!any!other!way!is!void."!This!principle!applies!under!our!Family!
Code.!Articles!170!and!171!of!the!code!confirm!this!view,!because!they!refer!to!"the!action!to!impugn!
the!legitimacy."!This!action!can!be!brought!only!by!the!husband!or!his!heirs!and!within!the!periods!fixed!
in!the!present!articles.!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Upon!the!expiration!of!the!periods!provided!in!Article!170,!the!action!to!impugn!the!legitimacy!of!a!child!
can!no!longer!be!brought.!The!status!conferred!by!the!presumption,!therefore,!becomes!fixed,!and!can!
no!longer!be!questioned.!The!obvious!intention!of!the!law!is!to!prevent!the!status!of!a!child!born!in!
wedlock!from!being!in!a!state!of!uncertainty!for!a!long!time.!It!also!aims!to!force!early!action!to!settle!
any!doubt!as!to!the!paternity!of!such!child,!so!that!the!evidence!material!to!the!matter,!which!must!
necessarily!be!facts!occurring!during!the!period!of!the!conception!of!the!child,!may!still!be!easily!
available.!
!
xxx!xxx!xxx!
!
Only!the!husband!can!contest!the!legitimacy!of!a!child!born!to!his!wife.!He!is!the!one!directly!confronted!
with!the!scandal!and!ridicule!which!the!infidelity!of!his!wife!produces;!and!he!should!decide!whether!to!
conceal!that!infidelity!or!expose!it,!in!view!of!the!moral!and!economic!interest!involved.!It!is!only!in!
exceptional!cases!that!his!heir!are!allowed!to!contest!such!legitimacy.!Outside!of!these!cases,!none!!
even!his!heirs!!can!impugn!legitimacy;!that!would!amount!to!an!insult!to!his!memory.!9!
!
The!issue,!therefore,!as!to!whether!petitioners!are!the!legitimate!children!of!Hermogenes!Dezoller!
cannot!be!properly!controverted!in!the!present!action!for!reconveyance.!This!is!aside,!of!course,!from!
the!further!consideration!that!private!respondent!is!not!the!proper!party!to!impugn!the!legitimacy!of!
herein!petitioners.!The!presumption!consequently!continues!to!operate!in!favor!of!petitioners!unless!
and!until!it!is!rebutted.!
!
Even!assuming!that!the!issue!is!allowed!to!be!resolved!in!this!case,!the!burden!of!proof!rests!not!on!
herein!petitioners!who!have!the!benefit!of!the!presumption!in!their!favor,!but!on!private!respondent!
who!is!disputing!the!same.!This!fact!alone!should!have!been!sufficient!cause!for!the!trial!court!to!
exercise!appropriate!caution!before!acting,!as!it!did,!on!the!demurrer!to!evidence.!It!would!have!
delimited!the!issues!for!resolution,!as!well!as!the!time!and!effort!necessitated!thereby.!
!
Ordinarily,!when!a!fact!is!presumed,!it!implies!that!the!party!in!whose!favor!the!presumption!exists!does!
not!have!to!introduce!evidence!to!establish!that!fact,!and!in!any!litigation!where!that!fact!is!put!in!issue,!
the!party!denying!it!must!bear!the!burden!of!proof!to!overthrow!the!presumption.!10!The!presumption!
of!legitimacy!is!so!strong!that!it!is!clear!that!its!effect!is!to!shift!the!burden!of!persuasion!to!the!party!
claiming!illegitimacy.!11!And!in!order!to!destroy!the!presumption,!the!party!against!whom!it!operates!
must!adduce!substantial!and!credible!evidence!to!the!contrary.!12!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
Where!there!is!an!entire!lack!of!competent!evidence!to!the!contrary,!13!and!unless!or!until!it!is!
rebutted,!it!has!been!held!that!a!presumption!may!stand!in!lieu!of!evidence!and!support!a!finding!or!
decision.!14!Perforce,!a!presumption!must!be!followed!if!it!is!uncontroverted.!This!is!based!on!the!
theory!that!a!presumption!is!prima!facie!proof!of!the!fact!presumed,!and!unless!the!fact!thus!
established!prima!facie!by!the!legal!presumption!of!its!truth!is!disproved,!it!must!stand!as!proved.!15!
!
Indubitably,!when!private!respondent!opted!not!to!present!countervailing!evidence!to!overcome!the!
presumption,!by!merely!filing!a!demurrer!to!evidence!instead,!she!in!effect!impliedly!admitted!the!truth!
of!such!fact.!Indeed,!she!overlooked!or!disregarded!the!evidential!rule!that!presumptions!like!judicial!
notice!and!admissions,!relieve!the!proponent!from!presenting!evidence!on!the!facts!he!alleged!and!such!
facts!are!thereby!considered!as!duly!proved.!
!
II.!The!weight!and!sufficiency!of!the!evidence!regarding!petitioner's!relationship!with!Teodora!Dezoller!
Guerrero,!whose!estate!is!the!subject!of!the!present!controversy,!requires!a!more!intensive!and!
extensive!examination.!
!
Petitioners'!evidence,!as!earlier!explained,!consists!mainly!of!the!testimony!of!Corazon!Dezoller!Tison,!
the!baptismal,!death!and!marriage!certificates,!the!various!certifications!from!the!civil!registrar,!a!family!
picture,!and!several!joint!affidavits!executed!by!third!persons!all!of!which!she!identified!and!explained!in!
the!course!and!as!part!of!her!testimony.!
!
The!primary!proof!to!be!considered!in!ascertaining!the!relationship!between!the!parties!concerned!is!
the!testimony!of!Corazon!Dezoller!Tison!to!the!effect!that!Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero!in!her!lifetime,!or!
sometime!in!1946,!categorically!declared!that!the!former!is!Teodora's!niece.!16!Such!a!statement!is!
considered!a!declaration!about!pedigree!which!is!admissible,!as!an!exception!to!the!hearsay!rule,!under!
Section!39,!Rule!130!of!the!Rules!of!Court,!subject!to!the!following!conditions:!(1)!that!the!declarant!is!
dead!or!unable!to!testify;!(2)!that!the!declarant!be!related!to!the!person!whose!pedigree!is!the!subject!
of!inquiry;!(3)!that!such!relationship!be!shown!by!evidence!other!than!the!declaration;!and!(4)!that!the!
declaration!was!made!ante!litem!motam,!that!is,!not!only!before!the!commencement!of!the!suit!
involving!the!subject!matter!of!the!declaration,!but!before!any!controversy!has!arisen!thereon.!
!
There!is!no!dispute!with!respect!to!the!first,!second!and!fourth!elements.!What!remains!for!analysis!is!
the!third!element,!that!is,!whether!or!not!the!other!documents!offered!in!evidence!sufficiently!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
corroborated!the!declaration!made!by!Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero!in!her!lifetime!regarding!the!pedigree!
of!petitioner!Corazon!Dezoller!Tison!or,!if!at!all,!it!is!necessary!to!present!evidence!other!than!such!
declaration.!
!
American!jurisdiction!has!it!that!a!distinction!must!be!made!as!to!when!the!relationship!of!the!declarant!
may!be!proved!by!the!very!declaration!itself,!or!by!other!declarations!of!said!declarant,!and!when!it!
must!be!supported!by!evidence!aliunde.!The!rule!is!stated!thus:!
!
One!situation!to!be!noted!is!that!where!one!seeks!to!set!up!a!claim!through,!but!not!from,!the!declarant!
and!to!establish!the!admissibility!of!a!declaration!regarding!claimant's!pedigree,!he!may!not!do!by!
declarant's!own!statements!as!to!declarant's!relationship!to!the!particular!family.!The!reason!is!that!
declarant's!declaration!of!his!own!relationship!is!of!a!selfKserving!nature.!Accordingly!there!must!be!
precedent!proof!from!other!sources!that!declarant!is!what!he!claimed!to!be,!namely,!a!member!of!the!
particular!family;!otherwise!the!requirement!to!admissibility!that!declarant's!relationship!to!the!
common!family!must!appear!is!not!met.!But!when!the!party!claiming!seeks!to!establish!relationship!in!
order!to!claim!directly!from!the!declarant!or!the!declarant's!estate,!the!situation!and!the!policy!of!the!
law!applicable!are!quite!different.!In!such!case!the!declaration!of!the!decedent,!whose!estate!is!in!
controversy,!that!he!was!related!to!the!one!who!claims!his!estate,!is!admissible!without!other!proof!of!
the!fact!of!relationship.!While!the!nature!of!the!declaration!is!then!disserving,!that!is!not!the!real!ground!
for!its!admission.!Such!declarations!do!not!derive!their!evidential!value!from!that!consideration,!
although!it!is!a!useful,!if!not!an!artificial,!aid!in!determining!the!class!to!which!the!declarations!belong.!
The!distinction!we!have!note!is!sufficiently!apparent;!in!the!one!case!the!declarations!are!selfKserving,!in!
the!other!they!are!competent!from!reasons!of!necessity.!17!(Emphasis!ours.)!
!
The!general!rule,!therefore,!is!that!where!the!party!claiming!seeks!recovery!against!a!relative!common!
to!both!claimant!and!declarant,!but!not!from!the!declarant!himself!or!the!declarant's!estate,!the!
relationship!of!the!declarant!to!the!common!relative!may!not!be!proved!by!the!declaration!itself.!There!
must!be!some!independent!proof!of!this!fact.!18!As!an!exception,!the!requirement!that!there!be!other!
proof!than!the!declarations!of!the!declarant!as!to!the!relationship,!does!not!apply!where!it!is!sought!to!
reach!the!estate!of!the!declarant!himself!and!not!merely!to!establish!a!right!through!his!declarations!to!
the!property!of!some!other!member!of!the!family.!19!
!
We!are!sufficiently!convinced,!and!so!hold,!that!the!present!case!is!one!instance!where!the!general!
requirement!on!evidence!aliunde!may!be!relaxed.!Petitioners!are!claiming!a!right!to!part!of!the!estate!of!
the!declarant!herself.!Conformably,!the!declaration!made!by!Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero!that!petitioner!
Corazon!is!her!niece,!is!admissible!and!constitutes!sufficient!proof!of!such!relationship,!notwithstanding!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the!fact!that!there!was!no!other!preliminary!evidence!thereof,!the!reason!being!such!declaration!is!
rendered!competent!by!virtue!of!the!necessity!of!receiving!such!evidence!to!avoid!a!failure!of!justice.!20!
More!importantly,!there!is!in!the!present!case!an!absolute!failure!by!all!and!sundry!to!refute!that!
declaration!made!by!the!decedent.!
!
From!the!foregoing!disquisitions,!it!may!thus!be!safely!concluded,!on!the!sole!basis!of!the!decedent's!
declaration!and!without!need!for!further!proof!thereof,!that!petitioners!are!the!niece!and!nephew!of!
Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero.!As!held!in!one!case,!21!where!the!subject!of!the!declaration!is!the!
declarant's!own!relationship!to!another!person,!it!seems!absurb!to!require,!as!a!foundation!for!the!
admission!of!the!declaration,!proof!of!the!very!fact!which!the!declaration!is!offered!to!establish.!The!
preliminary!proof!would!render!the!main!evidence!unnecessary.!
!
Applying!the!general!rule!in!the!present!case!would!nonetheless!produce!the!same!result.!For!while!the!
documentary!evidence!submitted!by!petitioners!do!not!strictly!conform!to!the!rules!on!their!
admissibility,!we!are!however!of!the!considered!opinion!that!the!same!may!be!admitted!by!reason!of!
private!respondent's!failure!to!interpose!any!timely!objection!thereto!at!the!time!they!were!being!
offered!in!evidence.!22!It!is!elementary!that!an!objection!shall!
be!made!at!the!time!when!an!alleged!inadmissible!document!is!offered!in!evidence,!23!otherwise,!the!
objection!shall!be!treated!as!waived,!24!since!the!right!to!object!is!merely!a!privilege!which!the!party!
may!waive.!25!
!
As!explained!in!Abrenica!vs.!Gonda,!et!al.,!26!it!has!been!repeatedly!laid!down!as!a!rule!of!evidence!that!
a!protest!or!objection!against!the!admission!of!any!evidence!must!be!made!at!the!proper!time,!
otherwise!it!will!be!deemed!to!have!been!waived.!The!proper!time!is!when!from!the!question!addressed!
to!the!witness,!or!from!the!answer!thereto,!or!from!the!presentation!of!the!proof,!the!inadmissibility!of!
the!evidence!is,!or!may!be!inferred.!
!
Thus,!a!failure!to!except!to!the!evidence!because!it!does!not!conform!with!the!statute!is!a!waiver!if!the!
provisions!of!the!law.!That!objection!to!a!question!put!to!a!witness!must!be!made!at!the!time!the!
question!is!asked.!An!objection!to!the!admission!of!evidence!on!the!ground!of!incompetency,!taken!
after!the!testimony!has!been!given,!is!too!late.!27!Thus,!for!instance,!failure!to!object!to!parol!evidence!
given!on!the!stand,!where!the!party!is!in!a!position!to!object,!is!a!waiver!of!any!objections!thereto.!28!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
The!situation!is!aggravated!by!the!fact!that!counsel!for!private!respondent!unreservedly!crossKexamined!
petitioners,!as!the!lone!witness,!on!the!documentary!evidence!that!were!offered.!At!no!time!was!the!
issue!of!the!supposed!inadmissibility!thereof,!or!the!possible!basis!for!objection!thereto,!ever!raised.!
Instead,!private!respondent's!counsel!elicited!answers!from!the!witness!on!the!circumstances!and!
regularity!of!her!obtention!of!said!documents:!The!observations!later!made!by!private!respondent!in!her!
comment!to!petitioners'!offer!of!exhibits,!although!the!grounds!therefor!were!already!apparent!at!the!
time!these!documents!were!being!adduced!in!evidence!during!the!testimony!of!Corazon!Dezoller!Tison!
but!which!objections!were!not!timely!raised!therein,!may!no!longer!serve!to!rectify!the!legal!
consequences!which!resulted!therefrom.!Hence,!even!assuming!ex!gratia!argumenti!that!these!
documents!are!inadmissible!for!being!hearsay,!but!on!account!of!herein!private!respondent's!failure!to!
object!thereto,!the!same!may!be!admitted!and!considered!as!sufficient!to!prove!the!facts!therein!
asserted.!29!
!
Accordingly,!the!Certificate!of!Marriage!(Exhibit!S)!wherein!it!is!indicated!that!the!parents!of!Teodora!
Dezoller!are!Isabelo!Dezoller!and!Cecilia!Calpo,!as!well!as!the!Certificates!of!Baptism!of!Teodora!Dezoller!
30!(Exhibit!H)!and!Hermogenes!Dezoller!(Exhibit!J)!which!both!reflect!the!names!of!their!parents!as!
Isabelo!Dezoller!and!Cecilia!Calpo,!to!show!that!Hermogenes!Dezoller!is!the!brother!of!Teodora!Dezoller!
Guerrero;!and!the!Death!Certificate!of!Hermogenes!Dezoller!(Exhibit!K)!the!entries!wherein!were!made!
by!petitioner!Corazon!Dezoller!Tison!as!his!daughter,!together!with!the!Joint!Affidavits!of!Pablo!Verzosa!
and!Meliton!Sitjar!(Exhibits!N!and!P),!to!prove!that!herein!petitioners!are!the!children!of!Hermogenes!
Dezoller!!these!can!be!deemed!to!have!sufficiently!established!the!relationship!between!the!declarant!
and!herein!petitioners.!This!is!in!consonance!with!the!rule!that!a!prima!facie!showing!is!sufficient!and!
that!only!slight!proof!of!the!relationship!is!required.!31!Finally,!it!may!not!be!amiss!to!consider!as!in!the!
nature!of!circumstantial!evidence!the!fact!that!both!the!declarant!and!the!claimants,!who!are!the!
subject!of!the!declaration,!bear!the!surname!Dezoller.!32!
!
III.!The!following!provisions!of!the!Civil!Code!provide!for!the!manner!by!which!the!estate!of!the!
decedent!shall!be!divided!in!this!case,!to!wit:!
!
Art.!975.!When!children!of!one!or!more!brothers!or!sisters!of!the!deceased!survive,!they!shall!inherit!
from!the!latter!by!representation,!if!they!survive!with!their!uncles!or!aunts.!But!if!they!alone!survive,!
they!shall!inherit!in!equal!portions.!
!
Art.!995.!In!the!absence!of!legitimate!descendants!and!ascendants,!and!illegitimate!children!and!their!
descendants,!whether!legitimate!or!illegitimate,!the!surviving!spouse!shall!inherit!the!entire!estate,!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
without!prejudice!to!the!rights!of!brothers!and!sisters,!nephews!and!nieces,!should!there!be!any,!under!
Article!1001.!
!
Art.!1001.!Should!brothers!and!sisters!or!their!children!survive!with!the!widow!or!widower,!the!latter!
shall!be!entitled!to!oneKhalf!of!the!inheritance!and!the!brothers!and!sisters!or!theirs!children!to!the!
other!half.!
!
Upon!the!death!of!Teodora!Dezoller!Guerrero,!oneKhalf!of!the!subject!property!was!automatically!
reserved!to!the!surviving!spouse,!Martin!Guerrero,!as!his!share!in!the!conjugal!partnership.!Applying!the!
aforequoted!statutory!provisions,!the!remaining!half!shall!be!equally!divided!between!the!widower!and!
herein!petitioners!who!are!entitled!to!jointly!inherit!in!their!own!right.!Hence,!Martin!Guerrero!could!
only!validly!alienate!his!total!undivided!threeKfourths!(3/4)!share!in!the!entire!property!to!herein!private!
respondent.!Resultantly,!petitioners!and!private!respondent!are!deemed!coKowners!of!the!property!
covered!by!Transfer!Certificate!of!Title!No.!374012!in!the!proportion!of!an!undivided!oneKfourth!(1/4)!
and!threeKfourths!(3/4)!share!thereof,!respectively.!
!
All!told,!on!the!basis!of!the!foregoing!considerations,!the!demurrer!to!plaintiff's!evidence!should!have!
been,!as!it!is!hereby,!denied.!Nonetheless,!private!respondent!may!no!longer!be!allowed!to!present!
evidence!by!reason!of!the!mandate!under!Section!1!of!revised!Rule!3!of!the!Rules!of!Court!which!
provides!that!"if!the!motion!is!granted!but!on!appeal!the!order!of!dismissal!is!reversed!he!shall!be!
deemed!to!have!waived!the!right!to!present!evidence."!33!
!
WHEREFORE,!the!questioned!judgment!of!respondent!Court!of!Appeals!is!hereby!REVERSED!and!SET!
ASIDE,!and!herein!petitioners!and!private!respondent!are!declared!coKowners!of!the!subject!property!
with!an!undivided!oneKfourth!(1/4)!and!threeKfourths!(3/4)!share!therein,!respectively.!
!
SO!ORDERED.!
!
Romero,!Puno!and!Mendoza,!JJ.,!concur.!
!
Torres,!Jr.,!J.,!is!on!leave.!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondent.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
REGALADO, J.:
1

of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga and Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution
2
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Said decision, now before us for review, dismissed
petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial
of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the
subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy.
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision

In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of
minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against
herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The operative
allegations in said complaint are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the
father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the defendant is the known
administratrix of the real and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty.
Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983;
3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now
and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship
with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened
Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;
4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles
City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love
and care by his putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable
letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of
which are hereunder reproduced;
. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for
me all the time. As I have now I shall save my heart to you and to Chad.
. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Nio for our sake and for the
child sake.
. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.
. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him and you. Let
me bless him by my name and let me entitle him to all what I am and
what I've got.
. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.
. . . How is CHAD and you . . .
. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the whole
world. After all we love each other and CHAD is the product of our love.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share
in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the
surviving heirs;
6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real
and personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of
Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of pesos;
7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant
and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise
been ascertained;
8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children,
namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said
minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant complaint is filed;
9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and
relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and
imperative that said child be extended financial support from the estate of his putative
father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to grant Chad's
lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant failed and refused and still fails
and refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the
3
estate of the late Atty. Ocampo;
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an
inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine
and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him support
pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987, disputing the
material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way of affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the
complaint states no cause of action; that the action is premature; that the suit as barred by prescription;
that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court was
4
no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder of causes of action.
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses, the trial court
issued the following order on October 20, 1987:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further proceedings to
adduce evidence on the various claims of the parties so as to hear their respective sides
WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the nature of a
motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the meantime held in abeyance. The
5
Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case as set for pre-trial . . .

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19, 1987, petitioner filed on
December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein
as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2,
1989 and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the
7
complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter denied the
motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order
dated October 24, 1989, resolving the said motion in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court now resolves:
No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor of the
plaintiff. A cause of action being the "primary right to redress a wrong" (Marquez vs.
Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently on the face of the complaint, plaintiff has a right
to enforce through this case. Defendant's protestation that there is no sufficient cause of
action is therefore untenable.
No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It is exactly
filed in order to prove filiation, and then recognition. To go about the step by step
procedure outlined by the defendant by filing one action after another is definitely
violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of action.
No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It is (her)
spurious child that she represents as natural guardian that is instituting the action.
No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may file an action for
recognition within four years from his attainment of majority (New Civil Code. Art, 285,
No. 2). Whether the letters of the putative father, Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that should
be inquired into in a hearing on the merits.
No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was done in this case.
The defendant's claim that there was a misjoinder is untenable.
No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special jurisdiction, such as
a probate court has capacity to entertain a complaint such as the one now before it.
The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not control the body of the
complaint.
From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient' in form and
substance and, therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be granted until after trial on
the merits in which it should be shown that the allegations of the complaint are unfounded
or a special defense to the action exists.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8
9

As a consequence, another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990
with respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24,
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on January 30, 1990.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing the petition,
and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated September 5, 1990,
hence the present petition for review on certiorari.
In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:
a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT providing clear exceptions to the general rule that
interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the special civil action of certiorari;
b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court and before Respondent Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF
SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by this Honorable Court, such as the
interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil Code requiring judicial approval
when the recognition of an illegitimate minor child does not take place in a record of birth
or in a will: of Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing
for the prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate filiation; and
of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the
action for recognition of a natural child; and
c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional Trial Court from the
10
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in behalf of
the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause of action, she submits
that the recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father
must first be established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in the estate of
the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of such recognition in the complaint
denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid
claim and, consequently, the complaint should be dismissed.
11

The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., wherein the petitioner, as plaintiff,
brought an action against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel them to give her share of
inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she is the
illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate had
been commenced in court; and that the defendants had refused and failed to deliver her share in the
estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her
aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no
cause of action and that, even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of the filing of the
complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age of majority, whereas the
claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to
support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter.
We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and
recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right
to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of
acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed
by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the
deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered
as one to compel recognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the
other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
12
al., wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can any event
maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time
to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which, in the opinion of this court
must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the
joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In, other
words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment
should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action
in which that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there
is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule
should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. . .
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is
undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in
numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child
having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally
acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his co-heirs . . .; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of these
situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree
compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and
the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed.
Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition, private
respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought to be proved by
means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then under paragraph 2,
Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering that the complaint
was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action has prescribed and this is another ground for the
dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the
case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect.
The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law being merely procedural in
nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a
final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private
handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if
the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate
child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed
13
that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have
been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the
ground of prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling
and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed
within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes
essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a
vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child
bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the
14
effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the
15
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested
in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with
the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a
new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is procedural in
nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and
proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it
may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since procedure
must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially where
vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application
to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and,
consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the
complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil
Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of the court below
denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the case at bar, are obviously not
present and may not be relied upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of respondent
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998]
FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON,
respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the 27 April 1995
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860xii[1] which reversed the
decision of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Civil Case No.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

16373.xii[2] The latter dismissed the complaint of private respondent Monina Jison
(hereafter MONINA) for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison
(hereafter FRANCISCO).
In issue is whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible
error, which, in this instance, necessitates an inquiry into the facts. While as a general
rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court, nevertheless, in light of the
conflicting findings of facts of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, this case falls
under an exception to this rule.xii[3]
In her complaintxii[4] filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that
FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of
1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar
(who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a
result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had
enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by
his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her
support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became
a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of
FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial
declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as
such.
In his answer,xii[5] FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with
Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be
in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then; further,
he never recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As
affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no right or
cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or
prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages
due to the malicious filing of the complaint.
After MONINA filed her reply,xii[6] pre-trial was conducted where the parties stipulated on
the following issues:
1.
Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza Am[o]lar about
the end of 1945 or the start of 1946?
2.
Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the
latters own acts and those of his family?
3.
Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present action by
estoppel, laches and/or prescription?
4.

Damages.xii[7]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses, namely:
herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma,
Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz
and Lope Amolar.
Ruben Castellanes, Sr., a 63-year old resident of Iloilo City, testified that he had worked
for FRANCISCO for a total of six (6) years at Nelly Garden, FRANCISCO's Iloilo
residence. Towards the end of the Japanese occupation, FRANCISCOs wife suffered a
miscarriage or abortion, thereby depriving FRANCISCO of consortium; thereafter,
FRANCISCOs wife managed a nightclub on the ground floor of Nelly Garden which
operated daily from 6:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of the following day, thereby allowing
FRANCISCO free access to MONINAs mother, Esperanza Amolar, who was nicknamed
Pansay.
Adela Casabuena, a 61-year old farmer, testified that she served as the yaya (nanny) of
Lourdes from July 1946 up to February 1947. Although Pansay had left Nelly Garden
two (2) weeks before Adela started working for the Jisons, Pansay returned sometime in
September 1946, or about one month after she gave birth to MONINA, to ask
FRANCISCO for support. As a result, Pansay and Lilia Jison, FRANCISCO's wife,
quarreled in the living room, and in the course thereof, Pansay claimed that
FRANCISCO was the father of her baby. To which, Lilia replied: I did not tell you to
make that baby so it is your fault. During the quarrel which lasted from 10:30 till 11:00
a.m., FRANCISCO was supposedly inside the house listening.
Arsenio Duatin, a 77-year old retired laborer, testified that from 1947 until 1977, he
worked as FRANCISCOs houseboy at the latters house on 12th Street, Capitol
Subdivision, Bacolod City. Arsenio met MONINA in 1967, when Felipe Lagarto, the
bookkeeper at Nelly Garden, informed Arsenio that MONINA, FRANCISCOs daughter,
would arrive at Bacolod City with a letter of introduction from Lagarto.
Initially, Arsenio identified seven (7) black-and-white photographs (Exhs. X-5 to X-11) of
MONINA,xii[8] and as he paid for the telephone bills, he likewise identified six (6)
telephone cards (Exhs. G to L). Arsenio then declared that when MONINA arrived in
Bacolod City, she introduced herself to him as FRANCISCOs daughter. She stayed at
FRANCISCOs house, but when the latter and his wife would come over, Arsenio would
conceal the presence of MONINA because Mrs. Jison did not like to see her face. Once,
Arsenio hid MONINA in the house of FRANCISCOs sister, Mrs. Luisa Jison Alano, in
Silay City; another time, at the residence of FRANCISCOs cousin, Mrs. Concha Lopez
Cuaycong. Finally, Arsenio declared that the last time he saw MONINA was when she
left for Manila, after having finished her schooling at La Salle College in Bacolod City.
On re-direct and upon questions by the court, Arsenio disclosed that it was
FRANCISCO who instructed that MONINA be hidden whenever FRANCISCO and his
wife were around; that although FRANCISCO and MONINA saw each other at the
Bacolod house only once, they called each other through long distance; and that

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

MONINA addressed FRANCISCO as Daddy during their lone meeting at the Bacolod
house and were affectionate to each other. Arsenio likewise declared that MONINA
stayed at FRANCISCO's Bacolod house twice: first for a month, then for about a week
the second time. On both occasions, however, FRANCISCO and his wife were abroad.
Finally, Arsenio recalled that FRANCISCO likewise bade Arsenio to treat MONINA like
his (FRANCISCOs) other daughters.
The testimony of Zafiro Ledesma, a 74-year old banker and former mayor of Iloilo City,
initially touched on how he and his wife were related to FRANCISCO, FRANCISCO's
wife and MONINA. Zafiro first identified Exhibit R, a diagram of the family trees of the
Jison and Lopez families, which showed that former Vice-President Fernando Lopez
was the first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, then told the court that the family of VicePresident Lopez treated MONINA very well because she is considered a relative xxx by
reputation, by actual perception. Zafiro likewise identified Exhibits X-13 to X-18,
photographs taken at the 14 April 1985 birthday celebration of Mrs. Fernando Lopez,
which showed MONINA with the former Vice-President and other members of the Lopez
family.
Zafiro further testified that while MONINA lived with Mrs. Cuaycong, the latter paid for
some of MONINAs school needs and even asked MONINA to work in a hospital owned
by Mrs. Cuaycong; and that another first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, a certain
Remedios Lopez Franco, likewise helped MONINA with her studies and problems, and
even attended MONINAs graduation in 1978 when she obtained a masteral degree in
Business Administration, as evidenced by another photograph (Exh. X-12). Moreover,
upon Remedios recommendation, MONINA was employed as a secretary at Merchant
Financing Company, which was managed by a certain Danthea Lopez, the wife of
another first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, and among whose directors were Zafiro
himself, his wife and Dantheas husband. In closing, Zafiro identified MONINAs Social
Security Record (Exh. W), which was signed by Danthea as employer and where
MONINA designated Remedios as the beneficiary.
Danthea Lopez, a 58-year old housekeeper, declared that FRANCISCO was the first
cousin of her husband, Eusebio D. Lopez; and that she came to know MONINA in the
latter part of 1965 when Remedios Franco recommended MONINA for employment at
Merchant Financing Co., which Danthea managed at that time. Remedios introduced
MONINA to Danthea as being reputedly the daughter of Mr. Frank Jison; and on several
occasions thereafter, Remedios made Danthea and the latters husband understand that
MONINA was reputedly the daughter of [FRANCISCO]. While MONINA worked at
Merchant Financing, Danthea knew that MONINA lived with Remedios; however, in the
latter part of 1966, as Remedios left for Manila and MONINA was still studying at San
Agustin University, Danthea and her husband invited MONINA to live with them. During
MONINAs 6-month stay with them, she was not charged for board and lodging and was
treated as a relative, not a mere employee, all owing to what Remedios had said
regarding MONINAs filiation. As Danthea understood, MONINA resigned from Merchant

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Financing as she was called by Mrs. Cuaycong, a first cousin of Dantheas husband who
lived in Bacolod City.
Romeo Bilbao, a 43-year old seaman, testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO
from 1969 up to 1980 at Nelly Garden in various capacities: as a procurement officer,
hacienda overseer and, later, as hacienda administrator. Sometime in May, 1971,
Romeo saw and heard MONINA ask her Daddy (meaning FRANCISCO) for the money
he promised to give her, but FRANCISCO answered that he did not have the money to
give, then told MONINA to go see Mr. Jose Cruz in Bacolod City. Then in the middle of
September that year, FRANCISCO told Romeo to pick up Mr. Cruz at the Iloilo pier and
bring him to the office of Atty. Benjamin Tirol. At said office, Atty. Tirol, Mr. Cruz and
MONINA entered a room while Romeo waited outside. When they came out, Atty. Tirol
had papers for MONINA to sign, but she refused. Atty. Tirol said that a check would be
released to MONINA if she signed the papers, so MONINA acceded, although Atty. Tirol
intended not to give MONINA a copy of the document she signed. Thereafter, Mr. Cruz
gave MONINA a check (Exh. Q), then MONINA grabbed a copy of the document she
signed and ran outside. Romeo then brought Mr. Cruz to Nelly Garden. As to his motive
for testifying, Romeo stated that he wanted to help MONINA be recognized as
FRANCISCOS daughter.
Rudy Tingson, a 45-year old antique dealer, testified that in 1963-1964, he was
employed by FRANCISCOs wife at the Baguio Military Institute in Baguio City; then in
1965, Rudy worked at FRANCISCOs office at Nelly Garden recording hacienda
expenses, typing vouchers and office papers, and, at times, acting as paymaster for the
haciendas. From the nature of his work, Rudy knew the persons receiving money from
FRANCISCOs office, and clearly remembered that in 1965, as part of his job, Rudy
gave MONINA her allowance from FRANCISCO four (4) times, upon instructions of a
certain Mr. Lagarto to give MONINA P15.00 a month. Rudy likewise recalled that he first
met MONINA in 1965, and that she would go to Nelly Garden whenever FRANCISCOs
wife was not around. On some of these occasions, MONINA would speak with and
address FRANCISCO as Daddy, without objection from FRANCISCO. In fact, in 1965,
Rudy saw FRANCISCO give MONINA money thrice. Rudy further declared that in April
1965, FRANCISCOs office paid P250.00 to Funeraria Bernal for the funeral expenses of
MONINAs mother. Finally, as to Rudy's motives for testifying, he told the court that he
simply wanted to help bring out the truth and nothing but the truth, and that MONINAs
filiation was common knowledge among the people in the office at Nelly Garden.
On re-direct, Rudy declared that the moneys given by FRANCISCOs office to MONINA
were not reflected in the books of the office, but were kept in a separate book, as Mr.
Lagarto explained that FRANCISCOs wife and children should not know [of] this. Rudy
further revealed that as to the garden meetings between FRANCISCO and MONINA,
Rudy saw MONINA kiss FRANCISCO on the cheek both upon arriving and before
leaving, and FRANCISCOs reaction upon seeing her was to smile and say in the
Visayan dialect: Kamusta ka iha? (How are you, daughter?); and that MONINA was free

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

to go inside the house as the household staff knew of her filiation, and that, sometimes,
MONINA would join them for lunch.
Alfredo Baylosis, a 62-year old retired accountant, testified that he worked for
FRANCISCO at Central Santos-Lopez in Iloilo from 1951 up to 1961, then at Nelly
Garden from 1961 until 1972. Alfredo first served FRANCISCO as a bookkeeper, then
when Mr. Lagarto died in 1967 or 1969, Alfredo replaced Mr. Lagarto as office manager.
Alfredo knew MONINA since 1961 as she used to go to Nelly Garden to claim her
P15.00 monthly allowance given upon FRANCISCOs standing order. Alfredo further
declared that MONINAs filiation was pretty well-known in the office; that he had seen
MONINA and FRANCISCO go from the main building to the office, with FRANCISCOs
arm on MONINAs shoulder; and that the office paid for the burial expenses of Pansay,
but this was not recorded in the books in order to hide it from FRANCISCOs wife.
Alfredo also disclosed that the disbursements for MONINAs allowance started in 1961
and were recorded in a separate cash book. In 1967, the allowances ceased when
MONINA stopped schooling and was employed in Bacolod City with Miller, Cruz & Co.,
which served as FRANCISCOs accountant-auditor. Once, when Alfredo went to the
offices of Miller, Cruz & Co. to see the manager, Mr. Atienza, and arrange for the
preparation of FRANCISCOs income tax return, Alfredo chanced upon MONINA. When
Alfredo asked her how she came to work there, she answered that her Daddy,
FRANCISCO, recommended her, a fact confirmed by Mr. Atienza. Alfredo then claimed
that Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., was the most trusted man of
FRANCISCO.
Dominador Savariz, a 55-year old caretaker, testified that he worked as FRANCISCOs
houseboy at Nelly Garden from November 1953 up to 1965. One morning in April 1954,
MONINA and her mother Pansay went to Nelly Garden and spoke with FRANCISCO for
about an hour, during which time, Dominador was vacuuming the carpet about six (6) to
seven (7) meters away. Due to the noise of the vacuum cleaner, FRANCISCO and
MONINA spoke in loud voices, thus Dominador overheard their conversation. As
FRANCISCO asked Pansay why they came, Pansay answered that they came to ask
for the sustenance of his child MONINA. FRANCISCO then touched MONINA's head
and asked: How are you Hija?, to which MONINA answered: Good morning, Daddy.
After FRANCISCO told Pansay and MONINA to wait, he pulled something from his
wallet and said to Pansay: I am giving this for the child.
In May 1954, Dominador saw MONINA at Mr. Lagartos office where Dominador was to
get the days expenses, while MONINA was claiming her allowance from Mr. Diasnes.
The next month, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden and heard in the office that
MONINA was there to get her allowance from her Daddy. In December 1960,
Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden, in the room of Don Vicente (father of
FRANCISCOs wife), where she asked for a Christmas gift and she was calling Don
Vicente, Lolo (grandfather). At that time, FRANCISCO and his wife were not around.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Then sometime in 1961, when Dominador went to Mr. Lagartos office to get the
marketing expenses, Dominador saw MONINA once more claiming her allowance.
Dominador further testified that in February 1966, after he had stopped working for
FRANCISCO, Dominador was at Mrs. Francos residence as she recommended him for
employment with her sister, Mrs. Concha Cuaycong. There, he saw MONINA, who was
then about 15 years old, together with Mrs. Francos daughter and son. Mrs. Franco
pointed at MONINA and asked Dominador if he knew who MONINA was. Dominador
answered that MONINA was FRANCISCOs daughter with Pansay, and then Mrs.
Franco remarked that MONINA was staying with her (Mrs. Franco) and that she was
sending MONINA to school at the University of San Agustin.
Lope Amolar, a 50-year old resident of Dingle, Iloilo, and the younger brother of
Esperanza Amolar (Pansay), testified that he worked for FRANCISCO as a houseboy
from March to November 1945 at Nelly Garden. Thereafter, FRANCISCO sent Lope to
work at Elena Apartments in Manila. By November 1945, Pansay was also working at
Elena Apartments, where she revealed to Lope that FRANCISCO impregnated her.
Lope then confronted FRANCISCO, who told Lope dont get hurt and dont cause any
trouble, because I am willing to support your Inday Pansay and my child. Three (3) days
after this confrontation, Lope asked for and received permission from FRANCISCO to
resign because he (Lope) was hurt.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she was 40
years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that as evidenced by certifications
from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and baptismal certificates
(Exhs. C and D), she was born on 6 August 1946 in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to
Esperanza Amolar (who passed away on 20 April 1965) and FRANCISCO.xii[9] MONINA
first studied at Sagrado where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952
until 1955 (up to Grade 4), her father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and other
school expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from Mr.
Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give money to her mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay
Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied in different schools,xii[10] but
FRANCISCO continuously answered for her schooling.
For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but she later
dropped due to an accident which required a week's hospitalization. Although
FRANCISCO paid for part of the hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most
of them. In 1963, she enrolled at the University of San Agustin, where she stayed with
Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for books, school
supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At the start of each
semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask
her to canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After finishing two (2)
semesters at University of San Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of records (Exh.
Z showing that FRANCISCO was listed as Parent/Guardian [Exh. Z-1]), she transferred
to De Paul College, just in front of Mrs. Francos house, and studied there for a year.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at Western Institute of Technology (WIT), where she

obtained a bachelors degree in Commerce in April 1967. During her senior year, she
stayed with Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She
passed the CPA board exams in 1974, and took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University
as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA), wherein FRANCISCO was likewise listed as
Guardian (Exhs. AA-1 and AA-2).
MONINA enumerated the different members of the household staff at Nelly Garden, to
wit: Luz, the household cook; the houseboys Silvestre and Doming; the housemaid
Natang; the yaya of the adopted triplets, Deling; the yaya of Lolo Vicente, Adelina; and
others. MONINA likewise enumerated the members of the office staff (Messrs. Baylosis,
Lagarto, Tingson, Diasnes, Jalandoni, Supertisioso, Doroy, and others), and identified
them from a photograph marked as Exhibit X-2. She then corroborated the prior
testimony regarding her employment at Merchant Financing Co., and her having lived at
Hotel Kahirup and at Mrs. Cuaycongs residence in Bacolod City, while working at the
hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong.
MONINA further testified that in March 1968, she went to Manila and met FRANCISCO
at Elena Apartments at the corner of Romero and Salas Streets, Ermita. She told
FRANCISCO that she was going for a vacation in Baguio City with Mrs. Francos
mother, with whom she stayed up to June 1968. Upon her return from Baguio City,
MONINA told FRANCISCO that she wanted to work, so the latter arranged for her
employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City. MONINA went to Bacolod City, was
interviewed by Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller & Cruz, who told her she would start
working first week of September, sans examination. She resigned from Miller & Cruz in
1971 and lived with Mrs. Cuaycong at her Forbes Park residence in Makati. MONINA
went to see FRANCISCO, told him that she resigned and asked him for money to go to
Spain, but FRANCISCO refused as she could not speak Spanish and would not be able
find a job. The two quarreled and FRANCISCO ordered a helper to send MONINA out
of the house. In the process, MONINA broke many glasses at the pantry and cut her
hand, after which, FRANCISCO hugged her, gave her medicine, calmed her down,
asked her to return to Bacolod City and promised that he would give her the money.
MONINA returned to Bacolod City by plane, using a Filipinas Orient Airways plane ticket
(Exh. M) which FRANCISCO gave. She called Mr. Cruz, then Atty. Tirol, as instructed
by Mr. Cruz. These calls were evidenced by PLDT long distance toll cards (Exhs. G to
L), with annotations at the back reading: charged and paid under the name of Frank L.
Jison and were signed by Arsenio Duatin (Exhs. G-1 to L-1). PLDT issued a certification
as to the veracity of the contents of the toll cards (Exh. BB). Likewise introduced in
evidence was a letter of introduction prepared by Mr. Cruz addressed to Atty. Tirol, on
MONINA's behalf (Exh. N).
MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she would have to go to Iloilo
and sign a certain affidavit, before Mr. Cruz would turn over the money promised by
FRANCISCO. She went to Atty. Tirols office in Iloilo, but after going over the draft of the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

affidavit, refused to sign it as it stated that she was not FRANCISCOs daughter. She
explained that all she had agreed with FRANCISCO was that he would pay for her fare
to go abroad, and that since she was a little girl, she knew about her illegitimacy. She
started crying, begged Atty. Tirol to change the affidavit, to which Atty. Tirol responded
that he was also a father and did not want this to happen to his children as they could
not be blamed for being brought into the world. She then wrote a letter (Exh. O) to
FRANCISCO and sent it to the latters Forbes Park residence (Bauhinia Place) by JRS
courier service (Exhs. O-5 to O-7). MONINA subsequently met FRANCISCO in Bacolod
City where they discussed the affidavit which she refused to sign. FRANCISCO told her
that the affidavit was for his wife, that in case she heard about MONINA going abroad,
the affidavit would keep her peace.
MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty. Tirols office, she was
accompanied by one Atty. Fernando Divinagracia, who advised her that the affidavit
(Exh. P)xii[11] would boomerang against FRANCISCO as it is contrary to law. MONINA
returned to Bacolod City, then met with Atty. Tirol once more to reiterate her plea, but
Atty. Tirol did not relent. Thus, on the morning of 20 or 21 September 1971, she signed
the affidavit as she was jobless and needed the money to support herself and finish her
studies. In exchange for signing the document, MONINA received a Bank of Asia check
for P15,000.00 (Exh. Q), which was less than the P25,000.00 which FRANCISCO
allegedly promised to give. As Atty. Tirol seemed hesitant to give her a copy of the
affidavit after notarizing it, MONINA merely grabbed a copy and immediately left.
MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which purpose, she procured letters of
introduction (Exhs. S and T) from a cousin, Mike Alano (son of FRANCISCOs elder
sister Luisa); and an uncle, Emilio Jison (FRANCISCOs elder brother), addressed to
another cousin, Beth Jison (Emilios daughter), for Beth to assist MONINA. Exhibit S
contained a statement (Exh. S-1) expressly recognizing that MONINA was
FRANCISCOs daughter. Ultimately though, MONINA decided not to go abroad, opting
instead to spend the proceeds of the P15,000.00 check for her CPA review, board exam
and graduate studies. After finishing her graduate studies, she again planned to travel
abroad, for which reason, she obtained a letter of introduction from former Vice
President Fernando Lopez addressed to then United States Consul Vernon McAnnich
(Exh. V).
As to other acts tending to show her filiation, MONINA related that on one occasion, as
FRANCISCOs wife was going to arrive at the latters Bacolod City residence,
FRANCISCO called Arsenio Duatin and instructed Arsenio to hide MONINA. Thus,
MONINA stayed with Mrs. Luisa Jison for the duration of the stay of FRANCISCOs wife.
MONINA also claimed that she knew Vice President Fernando Lopez and his wife,
Mariquit, even before starting to go to school. Thus, MONINA asked for a
recommendation letter (Exh. U) from Mrs. Mariquit Lopez for possible employment with
Mrs. Rosario Lopez Cooper, another second cousin of FRANCISCO. In Exhibit U, Mrs.
Lopez expressly recognized MONINA as FRANCISCOs daughter. As additional proof of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

her close relationship with the family of Vice President Lopez, MONINA identified
photographs taken at a birthday celebration on 14 April 1985.
MONINA finally claimed that she knew the three (3) children of FRANCISCO by wife,
namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr. (Junior) and Elena, but MONINA had met only Lourdes
and Junior. MONINA's testimony dealt lengthily on her dealings with Junior and the two
(2) occasions when she met with Lourdes. The last time MONINA saw FRANCISCO
was in March 1979, when she sought his blessings to get married.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo
Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. As additional witnesses,
FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes
Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal.
FRANCISCO declared that Pansays employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that
while employed by him, Pansay would sleep with the other female helpers on the first
floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the second
floor. At that time, his household staff was composed of three (3) female workers and
two (2) male workers. After Pansay left in October 1944, she never communicated with
him again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied
having had sexual relations with Pansay and disavowed any knowledge about
MONINAs birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for MONINAs tuition fees, in
person or otherwise, and asserted that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these
fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees
despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He likewise categorically
denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or
Remedios Franco, that MONINA was his daughter.
FRANCISCO also disclosed that upon his return from the United States in 1971, he
fired Alfredo Baylosis upon discovering that Alfredo had taken advantage of his position
during the formers absence. FRANCISCO likewise fired Rudy Tingson and Romeo
Bilbao, but did not give the reasons therefor.
Finally, FRANCISCO denied knowledge of MONINAs long distance calls from his
Bacolod residence; nevertheless, when he subsequently discovered this, he fired
certain people in his office for their failure to report this anomaly. As regards the
caretaker of his Bacolod residence, FRANCISCO explained that since MONINA lived at
Mrs. Cuaycongs residence, the caretaker thought that he could allow people who lived
at the Cuaycong residence to use the facilities at his (FRANCISCOs) house.
Nonito Jalandoni, bookkeeper and paymaster at Nellys Garden from 1963 up to 1974,
then from 1980 up to 1986, the assistant overseer of Hacienda Lopez, testified that he
did not know MONINA; that he learned of her only in June 1988, when he was informed
by FRANCISCO that MONINA had sued him; and that he never saw MONINA at Nellys

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Garden, neither did he know of any instructions for anyone at Nellys Garden to give
money to MONINA.
Teodoro Zulla, FRANCISCOs bookkeeper and paymaster from 1951 up to 1986,
testified that FRANCISCO dismissed Alfredo Baylosis due to certain unspecified
discrepancies; and that he never saw MONINA receive funds from either Mr. Lagarto or
Mr. Baylosis. Upon questions from the trial court, however, Teodoro admitted that he
prepared vouchers for only one of FRANCISCOs haciendas, and not vouchers
pertaining to the latters personal expenses.
Iigo Supertisioso testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Nellys Garden from 1964
up to 1984 as a field inspector, paymaster, cashier and, eventually, officer-in-charge
(OIC). He confirmed Alfredo Baylosis dismissal due to these unspecified irregularities,
then denied that FRANCISCO ever ordered that MONINA be given her allowance.
Likewise, Iigo never heard FRANCISCO mention that MONINA was his (FRANCISCOs)
daughter.
Lourdes Ledesma, FRANCISCOs daughter, testified that she saw (but did not know)
MONINA at the Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, on the occasion of the birth of Lourdes first
son, Mark. Over lunch one day, Lourdes aunt casually introduced Lourdes and MONINA
to each other, but they were referred to only by their first names. Then sometime in
1983 or 1984, MONINA allegedly went to Lourdes house in Sta. Clara Subdivision
requesting for a letter of introduction or referral as MONINA was then job-hunting.
However, Lourdes did not comply with the request.
Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., testified that MONINA worked at Miller &
Cruz from 1968 up to 1971, however, he did not personally interview her before she
was accepted for employment. Moreover, MONINA underwent the usual screening
procedure before being hired. Jose recalled that one of the accountants, a certain Mr.
Atienza, reported that MONINA claimed to be FRANCISCOs daughter. Jose then told
Mr. Atienza to speak with MONINA and see if he (Mr. Atienza) could stop her from
spreading this rumor. Mr. Atienza reported that he spoke with MONINA, who told him
that she planned to leave for the United States and needed P20,000.00 for that
purpose, and in exchange, she would sign a document disclaiming filiation with
FRANCISCO. Thus, Jose instructed Mr. Atienza to request that MONINA meet with
Jose, and at that meeting, MONINA confirmed Mr. Atienzas report. Jose then informed
Atty. Tirol, FRANCISCOs personal lawyer, about the matter.
Atty. Tirol told Jose to send MONINA and her lawyer to his (Atty. Tirols) office in Iloilo.
Jose then wrote out a letter of introduction for MONINA addressed to Atty. Tirol. Jose
relayed Atty. Tirols message to MONINA through Mr. Atienza, then later, Atty. Tirol told
Jose to go to Iloilo with a check for P15,000.00. Jose complied, and at Atty. Tirols office,
Jose saw MONINA, Atty. Tirol and his secretary reading some documents. MONINA
then expressed her willingness to sign the document, sans revisions. Jose alleged that

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

he drew the P15,000.00 from his personal funds, subject to reimbursement from and
due to an understanding with FRANCISCO.
Dolores Argenal, a househelper at Nelly Garden from May 1944 up to May 1946,
testified that she knew that Pansay was Lourdes nanny; that Lourdes slept in her
parents room; that she had not seen FRANCISCO give special treatment to Pansay;
that there was no unusual relationship between FRANCISCO and Pansay, and if there
was any, Dolores would have easily detected it since she slept in the same room as
Pansay. Dolores further declared that whenever FRANCISCOs wife was out of town,
Pansay would bring Lourdes downstairs at nighttime, and that Pansay would not sleep
in the room where FRANCISCO slept. Finally, Dolores declared that Pansay stopped
working for FRANCISCO and his wife in October, 1944.
The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties filed their respective
memoranda.
It need be recalled that Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr. presided over trial up to 21
October 1986, thereby hearing only the testimonies of MONINAs witnesses and about
half of MONINAs testimony on direct examination. Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr. heard
the rest of MONINA's testimony and those of FRANCISCOs witnesses.
In its decision of 12 November 1990xii[12] the trial court, through Judge Devera,
dismissed the complaint with costs against MONINA. In the opening paragraph thereof,
it observed:
This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child instituted by plaintiff Monina
Jison against defendant Francisco Jison. This complaint was filed on March 13, 1985 at
the time when plaintiff, reckoned from her death of birth, was already thirty-nine years
old. Noteworthy also is the fact that it was instituted twenty years after the death of
plaintiffs mother, Esperanza Amolar. For the years between plaintiffs birth and
Esperanzas death, no action of any kind was instituted against defendant either by
plaintiff, her mother Esperanza or the latters parents. Neither had plaintiff brought such
an action against defendant immediately upon her mothers death on April 20, 1965,
considering that she was then already nineteen years old or, within a reasonable time
thereafter. Twenty years more had to supervene before this complaint was eventually
instituted.
The trial court then proceeded to discuss the four issues stipulated at pre-trial, without,
however, summarizing the testimonies of the witnesses nor referring to the testimonies
of the witnesses other than those mentioned in the discussion of the issues.
The trial court resolved the first issue in the negative, holding that it was improbable for
witness Lope Amolar to have noticed that Pansay was pregnant upon seeing her at the
Elena Apartments in November 1945, since Pansay was then only in her first month of
pregnancy; that there was no positive assertion that copulation did indeed take place

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

between Francisco and Esperanza; and that MONINAs attempt to show opportunity on
the part of FRANCISCO failed to consider that there was also the opportunity for
copulation between Esperanza and one of the several domestic helpers admittedly also
residing at Nellys Garden at that time. The RTC also ruled that the probative value of
the birth and baptismal certificates of MONINA paled in light of jurisprudence, especially
when the misspellings therein were considered.
The trial court likewise resolved the second issue in the negative, finding that MONINAs
evidence thereon may either be one of three categories, namely: hearsay evidence,
incredulous evidence, or self-serving evidence." To the first category belonged the
testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis, whose knowledge of MONINAs
filiation was based, as to the former, on utterances of defendants wife Lilia and
Esperanza allegedly during the heat of their quarrel, while as to the latter, Alfredo's
conclusion was based from the rumors going [around] that plaintiff is defendants
daughter, from his personal observation of plaintiffs facial appearance which he
compared with that of defendants and from the way the two (plaintiff and defendant)
acted and treated each other on one occasion that he had then opportunity to closely
observe them together. To the second category belonged that of Dominador Savariz,
as:
At each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nellys Garden and allegedly on
those occasions when defendants wife, Lilia was in Manila, this witness was there and
allegedly heard pieces of conversation between defendant and Esperanza related to the
paternity of the latters child. xxx
The RTC then placed MONINAs testimony regarding the acts of recognition accorded
her by FRANCISCOs relatives under the third category, since the latter were never
presented as witnesses, for which reason the trial court excluded the letters from
FRANCISCOs relatives (Exhs. S to V).
As to the third issue, the trial court held that MONINA was not barred by prescription for
it was of the perception that the benefits of Article 268 accorded to legitimate children
may be availed of or extended to illegitimate children in the same manner as the Family
Code has so provided; or by laches, which is [a] creation of equity applied only to bring
equitable results, and addressed to the sound discretion of the court [and] the
circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff filed this case immediately upon
the death of her mother Esperanza in 1965 or twenty years thereafter in 1985, xxx there
seems to be no inequitable result to defendant as related to the situation of plaintiff.
The RTC ruled, however, that MONINA was barred by estoppel by deed because of the
affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2) which she signed when she was already twenty-five years, a
professional and under the able guidance of counsel.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Finally, the RTC denied FRANCISCOs claim for damages, finding that MONINA did not
file the complaint with malice, she having been propelled by an honest belief, founded
on probable cause.
MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 32860) and
sought reversal of the trial courts decision on the grounds that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUSLY PREDISPOSED TO ADJUDGE THIS
CASE AGAINST APPELLANT DUE TO ITS MISPERCEPTION THAT APPELLANTS
DELAY IN FILING HER COMPLAINT WAS FATAL TO HER CASE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE TESTIMONIES OF
APPELLANTS WITNESSES AS TAILOR-MADE, INADEQUATE AND INCREDIBLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
CERTIFIED COPIES OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT AS
PART OF HER EVIDENCE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REQUIREMENT THAT A WITNESS TO THE
ACTUAL ACT OF COPULATION BETWEEN THE APPELLEE AND APPELLANTS
MOTHER SHOULD HAVE POSITIVELY TESTIFIED TO SAID EFFECT.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DULY
IDENTIFIED NOTES AND LETTER OF THE RELATIVES OF THE APPELLEE AS
HEARSAY.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANTS AFFIDAVIT (EXH.
P) SERVED AS A BAR AGAINST HER CLAIM FOR RECOGNITION INSTEAD OF
REINFORCING SAID CLAIM.xii[13]
Expectedly, FRANCISCO refuted these alleged errors in his Appellees Brief.xii[14]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

In its decision of 27 April 1995,xii[15] the Court of Appeals initially declared that as no
vested or acquired rights were affected, the instant case was governed by Article 175, in
relation to Articles 172 and 173, of the Family Code.xii[16] While the Court of Appeals
rejected the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo (Exhs. E
and F) as FRANCISCO did not sign them, said court focused its discussion on the other
means by which illegitimate filiation could be proved, i.e., the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child or, by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, such as the baptismal certificate of the child, a judicial
admission, a family bible wherein the name of the child is entered, common reputation
respecting pedigree, admission by silence, testimonies of witnesses xxx.xii[17] To the
Court of Appeals, the bottom line issue was whether or not MONINA established her
filiation as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter by preponderance of evidence, as to
which issue said court found:
[N]ot just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record to prove that [MONINA] is
the illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] and that she had continuously enjoyed such
status by direct acts of [FRANCISCO] and/or his relatives.
In so ruling, the Court of Appeals observed that the testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela
Casabuena and Dominador Savariz were already sufficient to establish MONINAs
filiation:
As adverted to earlier, the trial court discredited Lope Amolars testimony by saying that
Lope could not have detected Esperanzas pregnant state in November, 1945 since at
that point in time [sic] she was still in the initial stage of pregnancy. Apparently, the trial
court paid more emphasis on the date mentioned by Lope Amolar than on the tenor and
import of his testimony. As xxx Lope xxx was asked about an incident that transpired
more than 41 years back, [u]nder the circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect that
Lope could still be dead right on the specific month in 1945 that [he] met and confronted
his sister. At any rate, what is important is not the month that they met but the essence
of his testimony that his sister pointed to their employer [FRANCISCO] as the one
responsible for her pregnancy, and that upon being confronted, [FRANCISCO] assured
him of support for Esperanza and their child. It would appear then that in an attempt to
find fault with Lopes testimony, the trial court has fallen oblivious to the fact that even
[FRANCISCO], in his deposition, did not deny that he was confronted by Lope about
what he had done to Esperanza, during which he unequivocally acknowledged paternity
by assuring Lope of support for both Esperanza and their child.
The Court of Appelas further noted that Casabuena and Savariz testified on something
that they personally observed or witnessed, which matters FRANCISCO did not deny or
refute. Finally, said court aptly held:
Taking into account all the foregoing uncontroverted testimonies xxx let alone such
circumstantial evidence as [MONINAs] Birth Certificates xxx and Baptismal Certificates
which invariably bear the name of [FRANCISCO] as her father, We cannot go along

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

with the trial courts theory that [MONINAs] illegitimate filiation has not been satisfactorily
established.
xxx
Significantly, [MONINAs] testimony finds ample corroboration from [FRANCISCOs]
former employees, Arsenio Duatin, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. xxx
xxx
Carefully evaluating appellants evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an
illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] vis-a-vis [FRANCISCOs] controversion thereof,
We find more weight in the former. The positive testimonies of [MONINA] and [her]
witnesses xxx all bearing on [FRANCISCOs] acts and/or conduct indubitably showing
that he had continuously acknowledged [MONINA] as his illegitimate daughter have not
been succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact, [FRANCISCO] himself, in his deposition, only
casually dismissed [MONINAs] exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and with
respect to those given by [MONINAs] witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired
[them] from their employment. Needless to state, [FRANCISCOs] vague denial is
grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight of [MONINAs] testimonial
evidence.
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does
not hold sway in the face of [MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree to
sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly
complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was only
for the consumption of his spouse xxx. Further, the testimony of Jose Cruz concerning
the events that led to the execution of the affidavit xxx could not have been true, for as
pointed out by [MONINA], she signed the affidavit xxx almost five months after she had
resigned from the Miller, Cruz & Co. xxx
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled
for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured [MONINAs] sworn
statement xxx On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the cost
of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his
paternity of [MONINA]. xxx
In fine, We hold that [MONINAs] filiation as [FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter has
been conclusively established by the uncontroverted testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela
Casabuena and Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee himself had admitted his
paternity of the appellee, and also by the testimonies of appellant, Arsenio Duatin,
Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis unerringly demonstrating that by his
own conduct or overt acts like sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees,
school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado Corazon de
Jesus, defraying appellants hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellants mother, acknowledging

appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija or child, instructing his office
personnel to give appellants monthly allowance, recommending appellant for
employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod
and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in
his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his
surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5),
appellee had continuously recognized appellant as his illegitimate daughter. Added to
these are the acts of [FRANCISCOs] relatives acknowledging or treating [MONINA] as
[FRANCISCOs] daughter (Exh U) or as their relative (Exhs T & V). On this point,
witness Zafiro Ledesma, former Mayor of Iloilo City, whose spouse belongs to the
Lopez clan just like [FRANCISCO], testified that [MONINA] has been considered by the
Lopezes as a relative. He identified pictures of the appellee in the company of the
Lopezes (Exhs X-16 & X-17). Another witness, Danthea H. Lopez, whose husband
Eusebio Lopez is appellees first cousin, testified that appellant was introduced to her by
appellees cousin, Remedios Lopez Franco, as the daughter of appellee Francisco
Jison, for which reason, she took her in as [a] secretary in the Merchants Financing
Corporation of which she was the manager, and further allowed her to stay with her
family free of board and lodging. Still on this aspect, Dominador Savariz declared that
sometime in February, 1966 appellees relative, Ms. Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to
appellant as the daughter of appellee Francisco Jison.
Finally, the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle (Exhs E and F) as well as
[MONINAs] Baptismal Certificates (Exhs C & D) which the trial ocurt admitted in
evidence as part of [MONINAs] testimony, may serve as circumstantial evidence to
further reinforce [MONINAs] claim that she is [FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter by
Esperanza Amolar.
True it is that a trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great
respect on appeal. But the rule admits of certain exceptions. One such exception is
where the judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses
testify. [citations omitted] The other is where the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. [citations omitted] In
the present case, both exceptions obtain. All of [MONINAs] witnesses xxx whose
testimonies were not given credence did not testify before the judge who rendered the
disputed judgment. xxx
The Court of Appeals then decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and
another one is hereby entered for appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the
illegitimate daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights and privileges
granted by law.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Costs against appellee.

SO ORDERED.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution of 29 March 1996,xii[18] FRANCISCO filed the instant petition. He urges us to
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, alleging that said court committed errors
of law:
I.
IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AS THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF PETITIONER, CONSIDERING
[THE] IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEXUAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S MOTHER AT THE TIME CONCEPTION WAS
SUPPOSED TO HAVE OCCURRED.
II.
IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY AND FILIATION IS NOT
CLEAR AND CONVINCING.
III.
IN GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS EVIDENCE OF FILIATION CONSIDERING THAT THE
SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF-SERVING AND CANNOT BIND THE PETITIONER
UNDER THE BASIC RULES OF EVIDENCE.
IV.
IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S SWORN STATEMENT (EXH.
P/EXH. 2) IN A MANNER NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
V.
IN NOT CONSIDERING THE LONG AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN THE FILING OF
THE PRESENT PATERNITY SUIT AS EQUIVALENT TO LACHES.
As regards the first error, FRANCISCO insists that taking into account the second
paragraph of MONINAs complaint wherein she claimed that he and Pansay had sexual
relations by about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, it was physically impossible for

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

him and Pansay to have had sexual contact which resulted in MONINAs birth,
considering that:
The normal period of human pregnancy is nine (9) months. If as claimed by private
respondent in her complaint that her mother was impregnated by FRANCISCO at the
end of 1945 or the start of 1946, she would have been born sometime in late September
or early October and not August 6, 1946 xxx. The instant case finds factual and legal
parallels in Constantino vs. Mendez,xii[19] thus: xxx
FRANCISCO further claims that his testimony that Pansay was no longer employed by
him at the time in question was unrebutted, moreover, other men had access to Pansay
during the time of or even after her employment by him.
As to the second error, FRANCISCO submits that MONINAs testimonial evidence is
shaky, contradictory and unreliable, and proceeds to attack the credibility of her
witnesses by claiming, in the main, that: (a) Lope Amolar could not have detected
Pansays pregnancy in November 1945 when they met since she would have been only
one (1) month pregnant then; (b) Dominador Savariz did not in fact witness the meeting
between FRANCISCO, Pansay and MONINA; (c) Zafiro Ledesma had an ulterior motive
in testifying for MONINA as he owned a bank in Iloilo which was then under Central
Bank supervision and MONINA was the Bank Examiner assigned to Iloilo; and (d)
Danthea Lopez was not related to him by blood and whatever favorable treatment
MONINA received from Danthea was due to the formers employment at Merchants
Financing Company and additional services rendered at Kahirup Hotel; besides,
Danthea admitted that she had no personal knowledge as to the issue of paternity and
filiation of the contending parties, hence Sections 39 and 40xii[20] of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court did not come into play. FRANCISCO likewise re-echoes the view of the
trial court as regards the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis.
FRANCISCO further asserts that MONINAs testimony that he answered for her
schooling was self-serving and uncorroborated by any receipt or other documentary
evidence; and assuming he did, such should be interpreted as a manifestation of
kindness shown towards the family of a former household helper.
Anent the treatment given by his relatives to MONINA as his daughter, FRANCISCO
points to the fact that Pansay was the former laundrywoman of Mrs. Franco; MONINA
resided with the families of Eusebio Lopez and Concha Cuaycong because she was in
their employ at Kahirup Hotel and Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, respectively; MONINA
failed to present Mrs. Franco, Eusebio Lopez and Mrs. Cuaycong; and MONINAs
employment at the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz & Co. was attributable to her
educational attainment, there being absolutely no evidence to prove that FRANCISCO
ever facilitated her employment thereat. Hence, in light of Baluyot v. Baluyot,xii[21] the
quantum of evidence to prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence, not merely a
preponderance thereof, was not met.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

With respect to the third assigned error, FRANCISCO argues that the Court of Appeals
reliance on the certifications of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and Baptismal
Certificates (Exhs. C and D) as circumstantial evidence is misplaced. First, their
genuineness could not be ascertained as the persons who issued them did not testify.
Second, in light of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,xii[22] the contents of the baptismal
certificates were hearsay, as the data was based only on what was told to the priest
who solemnized the baptism, who likewise was not presented as a witness. Additionally,
the name of the father appearing therein was Franque Jison, which was not
FRANCISCOs name. Third, in both Exhibits E and F, the names of the childs parents
were listed as Frank Heson and Esperanza Amador (not Amolar). FRANCISCO further
points out that in Exhibit F, the status of the child is listed as legitimate, while the fathers
occupation as laborer. Most importantly, there was no showing that FRANCISCO
signed Exhibits E and F or that he was the one who reported the childs birth to the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar. As to MONINAs educational records, FRANCISCO
invokes Baas v. Baasxii[23] which recognized that school records are prepared by school
authorities, not by putative parents, thus incompetent to prove paternity. And, as to the
photographs presented by MONINA, FRANCISCO cites Colorado v. Court of
Appeals,xii[24] and further asserts that MONINA did not present any of the persons with
whom she is seen in the pictures to testify thereon; besides these persons were, at
best, mere second cousins of FRANCISCO. He likewise assails the various notes and
letters written by his relatives (Exhs. S to V) as they were not identified by the authors.
Finally, he stresses that MONINA did not testify as to the telephone cards (Exhs. G to L)
nor did these reveal the circumstances surrounding the calls she made from his
residence.
Anent the fourth assigned error, FRANCISCO contends that the Court of Appeals
interpretation of MONINAs affidavit of 21 September 1971 ran counter to Dequito v.
Llamas,xii[25] and overlooked that at the time of execution, MONINA was more than 25
years old and assisted by counsel.
As to the last assigned error, FRANCISCO bewails the Court of Appeals failure to
consider the long and unexplained delay in the filing of the case.
In her comment, MONINA forcefully refuted FRANCISCOs arguments, leading
FRANCISCO to file his reply thereto.
On 20 November 1996, we gave due course to this petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda, which they subsequently did.
A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support petitioner.
Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of preliminary matters
relating to the applicable law and the guiding principles in paternity suits. As to the
former, plainly, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209) governs
the present controversy. As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, Uyguangcoxii[26]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

served as a judicial confirmation of Article 256 of the Family Codexii[27] regarding its
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold true
here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the child has passed away and the
former having actually resisted the latters claim below.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children.
Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established, thus:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1)

The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2)

An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1)

The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2)

Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second
paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence
mentioned in the first paragraph, a high standard of proofxii[28] is required. Specifically, to
prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must
be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection
and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature
that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have
and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.xii[29]
By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular
length of time.xii[30]
The foregoing standard of proof required to establish ones filiation is founded on the
principle that an order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be
issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.xii[31]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on
evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence,
and the shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the
burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The
concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability
of truth.xii[32]
With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy.
FRANCISCOs arguments in support of his first assigned error deserve scant
consideration. While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not be
presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence,xii[33] this does not
favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only
witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding
paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably
redounds to the victims or mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers
protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs mother could no longer testify as to the fact
of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution of the
complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA could no longer prove her
filiation. The fact of her birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other
than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is whether MONINAs
evidence is coherent, logical and natural.xii[34]
The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay by about the
end of 1945. We agree with MONINA that this was broad enough to cover the fourth
quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual
relations between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother. In any event, since it was
established that her mother was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at the time MONINA
was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between
FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the
overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered MONINA, has
recognized her as his daughter and that MONINA has been enjoying the open and
continuous possession of the status as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter.
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her
narration of circumstances and events that occurred through the years, concerning her
relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses,
overwhelmingly established the following facts:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

1) FRANCISCO is MONINAs father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was in the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and
conduct which the Court of Appeals took pains to enumerate, thus:
[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms,
books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying
appellants hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly allowance,
paying for the funeral expenses of appellants mother, acknowledging
appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija or child, instructing
his office personnel to give appellants monthly allowance, recommending
appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his
house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having
appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes
residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other
records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5)
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
years publicly,xii[35] spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted
manner.xii[36]
Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the second assigned error
must fail.
There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the probative value of
some of MONINAs documentary evidence.
MONINAs reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her
birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of
paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to
record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person.xii[37]
Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying
the information himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is
null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is
not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latters part.xii[38] In like manner,
FRANCISCOs lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates (Exhs.
C and D) and school records (Exhs. Z and AA) renders these documents incompetent
to prove paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the administration of the
sacrament of baptism on the date so specified.xii[39] However, despite the inadmissibility
of the school records per se to prove paternity, they may be admitted as part of
MONINAs testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her education.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued
by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as
circumstantial evidence to prove MONINAs filiation. Since they are per se inadmissible
in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
As to Exhibits S, T, U and V, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs
relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez,
respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINAs filiation, while their due execution and
authenticity are not in issue,xii[40] as MONINA witnessed the authors signing the
documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents
may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or
unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA
shown by evidence other than the documents in question.xii[41] As to the admissibility of
these documents under Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires further
elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of
any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be
also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles
or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may
be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing
the first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the
documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the
witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored phrase. What must
then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private documents, fall within the
scope of the clause and the like as qualified by the preceding phrase [e]ntries in family
bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits.
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this
provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are
commonly known as family possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect, a
familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.xii[42] These have been
described as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family,xii[43] or those which,
if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition.xii[44] Other
examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or
tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones,xii[45] monuments or coffin
plates.xii[46]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions"

as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither
may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common
reputation,xii[47] it having been observed that:
[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute,
the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that
is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx [Thus] matters of
pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the
neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may
be proved by common reputation in the community.xii[48]
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V, inclusive, may, in like manner as
MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen
her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.
We now direct our attention to MONINAs 21 September 1971 affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2),
subject of the fourth assigned error, where she attests that FRANCISCO is not her
father. MONINA contends that she signed it under duress, i.e., she was jobless, had no
savings and needed the money to support herself and finish her studies. Moreover, she
signed Exhibit P upon the advice of Atty. Divinagracia that filiation could not be waived
and that FRANCISCOs ploy would boomerang upon him. On the other hand,
FRANCISCO asserts that full credence should be afforded Exhibit P as MONINA was
already 25 years old at the time of its execution and was advised by counsel; further,
being a notarized document, its genuineness and due execution could not be
questioned. He relies on the testimony of Jose Cruz, a partner at the accounting firm of
Miller & Cruz, who declared that he intervened in the matter as MONINA was spreading
rumors about her filiation within the firm, which might have had deleterious effects upon
the relationship between the firm and FRANCISCO.
On this issue, we find for MONINA and agree with the following observations of the
Court of Appeals:
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does
not hold sway in the face of [MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree to
sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly
complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was only
for the consumption of his spouse xxx.
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled
for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured [MONINAs] sworn
statement xxx On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the cost
of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his
paternity of [MONINA]. xxx

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter, it would have
been unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that MONINA
denounce her filiation. For as clearly established before the trial court and properly
appreciated by the Court of Appeals, MONINA had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5)
months prior to the execution of the sworn statement in question, hence negating
FRANCISCOs theory of the need to quash rumors circulating within Miller & Cruz
regarding the identity of MONINAs father. Hence, coupled with the assessment of the
credibility of the testimonial evidence of the parties discussed above, it is evident that
the standard to contradict a notarial document, i.e., clear and convincing evidence and
more than merely preponderant,xii[49] has been met by MONINA.
Plainly then, the burden of evidence fully shifted to FRANCISCO.
Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCOs defense beg to be addressed: First, that his
testimony was comprised of mere denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated responses
such as That is not true, I do not believe that, or None that I know. In declining then to
lend credence to FRANCISCOs testimony, we resort to a guiding principle in adjudging
the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his statements, laid down as early as
1921:
The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the
natural limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to
fabricate and deliver in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost
certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily
refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message.
For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the incidents
immediately related to the principal fact about which they testify, and when asked about
collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers not infrequently
take the stereotyped form of such expressions as I dont know or I dont remember.
xxxxii[50]
Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were
unspecified or likewise unsubstantiated, hence FRANCISCOs attempt to prove illmotive on their part to falsely testify in MONINAs favor may not succeed. As may be
gleaned, the only detail which FRANCISCO could furnish as to the circumstances
surrounding the dismissals of his former employees was that Baylosis allegedly took
advantage of his position while FRANCISCO was in the United States. But aside from
this bare claim, FRANCISCOs account is barren, hence unable to provide the basis for
a finding of bias against FRANCISCO on the part of his former employees.
As to FRANCISCOs other witnesses, nothing substantial could be obtained either.
Nonito Jalandoni avowed that he only came to know of MONINA in June 1988;xii[51] that
during his employment at Nelly Garden from 1963 up to 1974, he did not recall ever
having seen MONINA there, neither did he know of any instructions from FRANCISCO

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

nor Mr. Lagarto (FRANCISCOs office manager before passing away) regarding the
disbursement of MONINAs allowance.xii[52] Teodoro Zulla corroborated Jalandonis
testimony regarding not having seen MONINA at Nelly Garden and MONINAs
allowance; declared that Alfredo Baylosis was dismissed due to discrepancies
discovered after an audit, without any further elaboration, however; but admitted that he
never prepared the vouchers pertaining to FRANCISCOs personal expenses, merely
those intended for one of FRANCISCOs haciendas.xii[53] Then, Iigo Superticioso
confirmed that according to the report of a certain Mr. Atienza, Baylosis was dismissed
by Mr. Jison for irregularities, while Superticioso was informed by FRANCISCO that
Tingson was dismissed for loss of confidence. Superticioso likewise denied that
MONINA received money from FRANCISCOs office, neither was there a standing order
from FRANCISCO to release funds to her.xii[54]
It is at once obvious that the testimonies of these witnesses for FRANCISCO are
likewise insufficient to overcome MONINAs evidence. The former merely consist of
denials as regards the latters having gone to Nelly Garden or having received her
allowance from FRANCISCOs office, which, being in the form of negative testimony,
necessarily stand infirm as against positive testimony;xii[55] bare assertions as regards
the dismissal of Baylosis; ignorance of FRANCISCOs personal expenses incapable of
evincing that FRANCISCO did not provide MONINA with an allowance; or hearsay
evidence as regards the cause for the dismissals of Baylosis and Tingson. But what
then serves as the coup de grce is that despite Superticiosos claim that he did not know
MONINA,xii[56] when confronted with Exhibit H, a telephone toll ticket indicating that on
18 May 1971, MONINA called a certain Eing at FRANCISCOs office, Superticioso
admitted that his nickname was Iing and that there was no other person named Iing in
FRANCISCOs office.xii[57]
All told, MONINAs evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the success
of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions
regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws; moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere
preponderance of evidence.
The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince. The essential
elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom
he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay
in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of
the defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint would assert
the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.xii[58] The last
element is the origin of the doctrine that stale demands apply only where by reason of
the lapse of time it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.xii[59]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

As FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon him to

prove the existence of its elements. However, he only succeeded in showing MONINAs
delay in asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last element. In any event,
it must be stressed that laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat
justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.xii[60] Since the instant case involves paternity
and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her action well within the period granted
her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would
clearly be inequitable and unjust.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860
is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[G.R. No. 122906. February 7, 2002]

DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL,
respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of two (2) Resolutions dated
August 29, 1995 and November 29, 1995 issued by the former Second Divisionxii[1] of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35971. The first resolution modified the appellate courts decision
promulgated in the said case, and granted custody of the minor, Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, to
private respondent. The second resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birthxii[2] to Gardin Faith Belarde
Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was then
a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a time
and lived with private respondents parents and sister in the latters house in Quezon City where
the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where she
found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private
respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On March 9,
1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the
minor, Gardin Faith.
Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court rendered in Sp. Proc. No. Q92-11053 only on April 1, 1992. Accordingly, on May 27, 1992, she filed a petition for relief
from judgment. In a resolution dated September 15, 1992, the trial court set aside its original
judgment and allowed petitioner to file her opposition to private respondents petition. The latter,
in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In a related incident, petitioner filed on October 4,
1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her.
On November 18, 1994, the trial court issued a resolution denying private respondents motion
for reconsideration and granting petitioners motion for custody of their child, Gardin. Petitioner
moved for immediate execution of the said resolution.
Due to the adverse turn of events, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35971, questioning the actuations of the trial

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

court. On March 21, 1995, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of
merit. However, after private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, the appellate court
issued a Resolutionxii[3] dated August 29, 1995 modifying its decision, as follows:
Although We do find the Petition dismissible, insofar as it assails the September 15, 1993
Resolution of the respondent Court, giving due course to private respondents Petition for Relief
from Judgment, and the November 18, 1995 Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration,
We discern a good ground to let physical custody of subject child, Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog,
continue under the petitioner, with whom the said child had been living, since birth.
While it is understandable for private respondent, as mother, to assert and seek enforcement of
her legal and natural rights as the natural guardian of her child, the emotional and psychological
effects upon the latter of a change in custody should be considered. To be sure, transfer of
custody of the child from petitioner to private respondent will be painful for the child who, all
her life, has been in the company of petitioner and her paternal grandparents.
Now, inasmuch as the issue of guardianship and custody over the same child is still pending
determination before the respondent Court, the possibility of petitioners appointment as the
guardian cannot be discounted. It would certainly wreak havoc on the childs psychological
make-up to give her to the custody of private respondent, only to return her to petitioner should
the latter prevail in the main case. Subjecting the child to emotional seesaw should be avoided. It
is thus more prudent to let physical custody of the child in question be with petitioner until the
matter of her custody shall have been determined by final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Decision, promulgated here on March 21, 1995 is accordingly MODIFIED,
and status quo with respect to the physical custody of the child, Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, is
ordered. It is understood that the latter shall remain with petitioner until otherwise adjudged.
Petitioner thus interposed the instant appeal after the appellate court denied her motion for
reconsideration in its Resolutionxii[4] dated November 29, 1995.
Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of
law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the
mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from her since she
had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears
that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of
the child.xii[5] In arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should be given, the
court must take into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
contending parents.xii[6]
In turn, the parents right to custody over their children is enshrined in law. Article 220 of the
Family Code thus provides that parents and individuals exercising parental authority over their
unemancipated children are entitled, among other rights, to keep them in their company. In legal

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

contemplation, the true nature of the parent-child relationship encompasses much more than the
implication of ascendancy of one and obedience by the other. We explained this in Santos, Sr. v.
Court of Appeals: xii[7]
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental
authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully
assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the
latters needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose
of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, there is no
power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for
the welfare of the minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal,
the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a
definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as
illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate
children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the
Family Code provides that [n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be observed that in
both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in
Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As
explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her
baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her
child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the
good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If
she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree
(relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction
will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.xii[8]
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of
their children. Indeed, we have recognized that both parents complement each other in giving
nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional,
psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.xii[9] Neither does the law nor
jurisprudence intend to downplay a fathers sense of loss when he is separated from his child:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent,
whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot
say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering,
pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.xii[10]
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven
years of age for compelling reasons. Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness.xii[11] If older than seven years of age, a child
is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may
exercise its discretion by disregarding the childs preference should the parent chosen be found to
be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.
xii[12]

In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been
terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the
minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that
the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the
meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her
familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to
which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.xii[13] It should be recalled that in a
petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position
to assess the parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another
sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the
statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the
choice of which parent should have the custody over her person.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference
toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioners fitness to have final
custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present and until
finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the
private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to
immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Quisumbing, J., abroad, on official leave.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

FIRST DIVISION

EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by G.R. No. 175080

TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES,
MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN Present:
GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA.
ANGELA S. REYES,
CORONA, C.J.,
Petitioners,
Chairperson
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
-versus-

PERALTA,* and
PEREZ, JJ.

LIBRADA
F.
MAURICIO
(deceased) and LEONIDA F. Promulgated:
MAURICIO,
Respondents.
November 24, 2010
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

PEREZ, J.:

Subject of this petition is the Decisionxii[1] of the Court of Appeals dated

10 August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148, affirming the Decision dated 7 July
1998 and Resolution dated 28 September 2004 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four thousand five hundred
twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title came from and cancelled TCT
No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of
Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an
extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of
Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now deceased,
and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract
denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties.
Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession with
damages.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo
Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio
through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his
death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and
introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a
residential house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit,
strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document
denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the
subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G.
Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary
Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan were not read
nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the weakness, age,
illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of
the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been
employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property.
Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an
order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and
cultivation of the subject property. Respondents likewise demanded payment of
damages.xii[2] During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract executed
between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement.xii[3]

Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and

respondents. He clarified that Godofredos occupation of the subject premises was
based on the formers mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing
a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her

signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the
document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day
of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the
DARAB since the principal relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the
contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio also
asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the present suit. xii[4]

Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the Provincial

Adjudicatorxii[5] concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and
Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful possession
of the subject land. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of plaintiff Librada Mauricio and against defendant Eugenio R. Reyes and
order is hereby issued:
1.

4.

Declaring the kasunduan null and void;

2.
Ordering defendant to respect the peaceful possession of herein plaintiff
Librada Mauricio over the subject landholding;
3.
Ordering plaintiff to return the amount of P50,000.00 to herein defendant;
No pronouncement as to costs.xii[6]

On appeal, two issues were presented to and taken up by the DARAB,

namely: (1) Whether or not there is tenancy relation between the parties; and (2)
whether or not the Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 is valid and enforceable.
The DARAB held that the Mauricios are former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

that when Spouses Reyes died, siblings Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among
others inherited the subject property. Under the law, they were subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of their late parents as the agricultural
lessors over the farmholding tenanted by respondents. Moreover, the DARAB
banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or the leasehold contract executed
by Susana in favor of Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore,
the DARAB declared the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the evaluation of
the Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter into such a
contract.xii[7]

Eugenio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the

DARAB on 28 September 2004.xii[8]

Aggrieved by the DARAB ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals. On 10 July 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute
Librada, who died during the pendency of the case.xii[9] On 10 August 2006, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB. It sustained
the factual findings of the DARAB with respect to the tenancy relation between
Godofredo and Spouses Reyes and the nullity of the Kasunduan.xii[10]

Undaunted, Eugenio filed the instant petition. Eugenio submits that no

tenancy relationship exists between him and respondents. He insists that the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan allegedly executed between Godofredo and

Susana in 1993 giving the former the right to occupy and cultivate the subject
property is unenforceable against Eugenio, having been entered into without his
knowledge and consent. Eugenio further asserts that per records of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), no leasehold contract was entered into by Godofredo
and Eugenio with respect to the disputed property. Eugenio attributes error on the
part of the Court of Appeals in concluding that a tenancy relationship existed
between the parties despite the absence of some of the essential requisites of a
tenancy relationship such as personal cultivation and the subject land being
agricultural. Finally, Eugenio defends the validity of the Kasunduan entered into
between him and Librada wherein the latter agreed to vacate the subject property,
in that it was voluntarily entered into and the contents thereof were mutually
understood by the parties.xii[11]

In a Resolution dated 7 February 2007, this Court denied the petition for
failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its
challenged decision and resolution. The Court also dismissed the issues raised as
factual. However, upon filing of a motion for reconsideration by Eugenio, this
Court reinstated the petition and required respondent Leonida to comment on the
petition.xii[12]

In her comment, respondent prayed for the denial of the petition because the
jurisdiction of this Court is limited to review of errors of law and not of
facts.xii[13]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between

him and Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond the province of this Court in
a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only questions
of law may be raised.xii[14] Absent any of the obtaining exceptionsxii[15] to this
rule, the findings of facts of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB
and especially by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court.

The DARAB ruling outlined how the tenancy relationship between

Godofredo and the Mauricios came about, thus:

This Board, after a thorough evaluation of the evidences, is convinced that

the Mauricios are former tenants of the parents of the herein DefendantAppeallant. A perusal of Exhibit H which is the Tax Declaration of the property
in controversy proves that upon the death of the parents of Defendant-Appellant,
the property was the subject matter of their extra-judicial partition/settlement and
this property was initially under the ownership of the appellants sisters, Eufracia
and Susana Reyes until the same property was finally acquired/transferred in the
name of Respondent-Appellant. Obviously, in order to re-affirm the fact that the
Mauricios are really the tenants, Susana Reyes had voluntarily executed the
Leasehold Contract with Godofredo Librada being the tenant on the property and
to prove that she (Susana Reyes) was the predecessor-in-interest of RespondentAppeallant Eugenio Reyes. x x x. The Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan alleging
that their tenancy relationship began in the year 1973 and their agreement as to
the rental shall remain until further revised.xii[16]

This is a contest of Kasunduans. Respondents rely on a Kasunduan of

tenancy. Petitioners swear by a Kasunduan of termination of tenancy.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Librada claims that her late husband had been working on the land since
1936 until his death in 1994. She presented the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan
dated 26 May 1993 and executed by Godofredo and Susana which reaffirmed the
leasehold tenancy over the subject land. On the other hand, Eugenio disputes the
claims of Librada and presented another Kasunduan executed between him and
Librada on 28 September 1994 which effectively terminates the leasehold tenancy
when the latter allegedly agreed to vacate the subject premises in exchange of
monetary considerations.

This second Kasunduan is the subject of the instant complaint. In its

disquisition, the DARAB nullified the second Kasunduan, to wit:

x x x Insofar as this Kasunduan is concerned, and after reading the transcript of

the testimony of the old woman Librada Mauricio, this Board is convinced that
indeed the purpose of the document was to eject her from the farmholding but that
Librada Mauricio wanted to return the money she received because the contents
of the document was never explained to her being illiterate who cannot even read
or write. This Board is even further convinced after reading the transcript of the
testimonies that while the document was allegedly signed by the parties in Turo,
Bocaue, Bulacan, the same document was notarized in Pasig, Metro Manila, thus,
the Notary Public was not in a position to explain much less ascertain the veracity
of the contents of the alleged Kasunduan as to whether or not Plaintiff-Appellee
Librada Mauricio had really understood the contents thereof. This Board further
adheres to the principle that it cannot substitute its own evaluation of the
testimony of the witnesses with that of the personal evaluation of the Adjudicator
a quo who, in the case at bar, had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witness Librada Mauricio while testifying on the circumstances relevant to the
execution of the alleged Kasunduan. Furthermore, this Board adheres to the
principle that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

mental weakness or other handicap, the courts (and in the case at bar, this Board)
must be vigilant for his protection (Art. 24, New Civil Code). In the case at bar,
Plaintiff-Appellee is already eighty-one (81) years old who can neither read nor
write, thus, she just simply signs her name with her thumbmark.xii[17]

Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by this
Court, we defer to the factual ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by
DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which clearly had the opportunity to closely
examine the witnesses and their demeanor on the witness stand.

Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is

void, our conclusion remains. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a tenancy
relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a
leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of
the landholding. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy
Act provides:

SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. The tenancy relationship is

extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or incapacity
of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household may
continue to work the land until the close of the agricultural year. The expiration
of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, and the sale or alienation
of the land does not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter
case, the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of
the former landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the
landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and obligations.
(Emphasis supplied)

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms

of the Philippines) likewise provides:

SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration

of Period, etc. The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor
by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In
case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of
the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to
the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
(Emphasis supplied)

As an incidental issue, Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed

by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the
death of Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that
Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.xii[18]

We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio
cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition.xii[19]

It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.xii[20] Wellknown civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book Civil Code of the Philippines,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence, noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a

collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in
the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a
child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void. This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be
brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the
present articles.xii[21]

In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros

Occidental,xii[22] the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack.xii[23]

The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject
to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,xii[24] this Court reiterated that adoption
cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents
estate.xii[25] Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes,xii[26] the Court declared that the
legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action
brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.xii[27]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of

Leonida from the case for annulment of the Kasunduan that supposedly favors
petitioners cause.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for

review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

SECOND(DIVISION!
JESSE(U.(LUCAS,!
Petitioner,!

G.R.$No.$190710$
(!

!!

Present:!

!!

(!

!!
!!
K!versus!K!
(!
(!
(!
(!
(!
JESUS(S.(LUCAS,!
Respondent.!

CARPIO,!J.,$!
Chairperson,!
NACHURA,!!
PERALTA,!!
ABAD,!and!
MENDOZA,!JJ.!
!!
Promulgated:!
!!
June!6,!2011!

(!
$$
xKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKx!
!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!

DECISION!
(!
NACHURA,(J.:!
(

!!
!

Is!a!prima$facie!showing!necessary!before!a!court!can!issue!a!DNA!testing!

order?!In!this!petition!for!review!on!certiorari,!we!address!this!question!to!guide!
the!Bench!and!the!Bar!in!dealing!with!a!relatively!new!evidentiary!tool.!Assailed!in!
this! petition! are! the! Court! of! Appeals! (CA)! Decisionxii[1]! dated! September! 25,!
2009!and!Resolution!dated!December!17,!2009.!!

The!antecedents!of!the!case!are,!as!follows:!

!!
!

On! July! 26,! 2007,! petitioner,! Jesse! U.! Lucas,! filed! a! Petition! to! Establish!

Illegitimate! Filiation! (with! Motion! for! the! Submission! of! Parties! to! DNA!
Testing)xii[2]! before! the! Regional! Trial! Court! (RTC),! Branch! 72,! Valenzuela! City.!
Petitioner!narrated!that,!sometime!in!1967,!his!mother,!Elsie!Uy!(Elsie),!migrated!
to!Manila!from!Davao!and!stayed!with!a!certain!Ate!Belen!(Belen)!who!worked!in!
a! prominent! nightspot! in! Manila.! Elsie! would! oftentimes! accompany! Belen! to!
work.! On! one! occasion,! Elsie! got! acquainted! with! respondent,! Jesus! S.! Lucas,! at!
Belens!workplace,!and!an!intimate!relationship!developed!between!the!two.!Elsie!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

eventually! got! pregnant! and,! on! March! 11,! 1969,! she! gave! birth! to! petitioner,!
Jesse! U.! Lucas.! The! name! of! petitioners! father! was! not! stated! in! petitioners!
certificate! of! live! birth.! However,! Elsie! later! on! told! petitioner! that! his! father! is!
respondent.!On!August!1,!1969,!petitioner!was!baptized!at!San!Isidro!Parish,!Taft!
Avenue,!Pasay!City.!Respondent!allegedly!extended!financial!support!to!Elsie!and!
petitioner! for! a! period! of! about! two! years.! When! the! relationship! of! Elsie! and!
respondent! ended,! Elsie! refused! to! accept! respondents! offer! of! support! and!
decided! to! raise! petitioner! on! her! own.! While! petitioner! was! growing! up,! Elsie!
made! several! attempts! to! introduce! petitioner! to! respondent,! but! all! attempts!
were!in!vain.!!
!!
!

Attached! to! the! petition! were! the! following:! (a)! petitioners! certificate! of!

live! birth;! (b)! petitioners! baptismal! certificate;! (c)! petitioners! college! diploma,!
showing! that! he! graduated! from! Saint! Louis! University! in! Baguio! City! with! a!
degree!in!Psychology;!(d)!his!Certificate!of!Graduation!from!the!same!school;!(e)!
Certificate!of!Recognition!from!the!University!of!the!Philippines,!College!of!Music;!
and!(f)!clippings!of!several!articles!from!different!newspapers!about!petitioner,!as!
a!musical!prodigy.!
!

Respondent! was! not! served! with! a! copy! of! the! petition.! Nonetheless,!

respondent! learned! of! the! petition! to! establish! filiation.! His! counsel! therefore!
went!to!the!trial!court!on!August!29,!2007!and!obtained!a!copy!of!the!petition.!!
!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Petitioner! filed! with! the! RTC! a! Very! Urgent! Motion! to! Try! and! Hear! the!

Case.!Hence,!on!September!3,!2007,!the!RTC,!finding!the!petition!to!be!sufficient!
in! form! and! substance,! issued! the! Orderxii[3]! setting! the! case! for! hearing! and!
urging! anyone! who! has! any! objection! to! the! petition! to! file! his! opposition.! The!
court!also!directed!that!the!Order!be!published!once!a!week!for!three!consecutive!
weeks! in! any! newspaper! of! general! circulation! in! the! Philippines,! and! that! the!
Solicitor!General!be!furnished!with!copies!of!the!Order!and!the!petition!in!order!
that!he!may!appear!and!represent!the!State!in!the!case.!
!!
!
!

On!September!4,!2007,!unaware!of!the!issuance!of!the!September!3,!2007!

Order,!respondent!filed!a!Special!Appearance!and!Comment.!He!manifested!inter$
alia!that:!(1)!he!did!not!receive!the!summons!and!a!copy!of!the!petition;!(2)!the!
petition! was! adversarial! in! nature! and! therefore! summons! should! be! served! on!
him! as! respondent;! (3)! should! the! court! agree! that! summons! was! required,! he!
was! waiving! service! of! summons! and! making! a! voluntary! appearance;! and! (4)!
notice!by!publication!of!the!petition!and!the!hearing!was!improper!because!of!the!
confidentiality!of!the!subject!matter.xii[4]!
!!
!

On! September! 14,! 2007,! respondent! also! filed! a! Manifestation! and!

Comment! on! Petitioners! Very! Urgent! Motion! to! Try! and! Hear! the! Case.!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Respondent! reiterated! that! the! petition! for! recognition! is! adversarial! in! nature;!
hence,!he!should!be!served!with!summons.!
!

After!learning!of!the!September!3,!2007!Order,!respondent!filed!a!motion!

for! reconsideration.xii[5]! Respondent! averred! that! the! petition! was! not! in! due!
form! and! substance! because! petitioner! could! not! have! personally! known! the!
matters!that!were!alleged!therein.!He!argued!that!DNA!testing!cannot!be!had!on!
the! basis! of! a! mere! allegation! pointing! to! respondent! as! petitioners! father.!
Moreover,!jurisprudence!is!still!unsettled!on!the!acceptability!of!DNA!evidence.!!
!

On! July! 30,! 2008,! the! RTC,! acting! on! respondents! motion! for!

reconsideration,! issued! an! Orderxii[6]! dismissing! the! case.! The! court! remarked!
that,! based! on! the! case! of! Herrera$ v.$ Alba,xii[7]! there! are! four! significant!
procedural!aspects!of!a!traditional!paternity!action!which!the!parties!have!to!face:!
a!prima$facie!case,!affirmative!defenses,!presumption!of!legitimacy,!and!physical!
resemblance! between! the! putative! father! and! the! child.! The! court! opined! that!
petitioner! must! first! establish! these! four! procedural! aspects! before! he! can!
present!evidence!of!paternity!and!filiation,!which!may!include!incriminating!acts!
or! scientific! evidence! like! blood! group! test! and! DNA! test! results.! The! court!
observed! that! the! petition! did! not! show! that! these! procedural! aspects! were!
present.! Petitioner! failed! to! establish! a! prima$ facie! case! considering! that! (a)! his!
mother!did!not!personally!declare!that!she!had!sexual!relations!with!respondent,!
and! petitioners! statement! as! to! what! his! mother! told! him! about! his! father! was!
clearly!hearsay;!(b)!the!certificate!of!live!birth!was!not!signed!by!respondent;!and!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

(c)!although!petitioner!used!the!surname!of!respondent,!there!was!no!allegation!
that! he! was! treated! as! the! child! of! respondent! by! the! latter! or! his! family.! The!
court!opined!that,!having!failed!to!establish!a!prima$facie!case,!respondent!had!no!
obligation!to!present!any!affirmative!defenses.!The!dispositive!portion!of!the!said!
Order!therefore!reads:!
WHEREFORE,!for!failure!of!the!petitioner!to!establish!compliance!with!the!four!
procedural! aspects! of! a! traditional! paternity! action! in! his! petition,! his! motion! for! the!
submission! of! parties! to! DNA! testing! to! establish! paternity! and! filiation! is! hereby!
DENIED.!This!case!is!DISMISSED!without!prejudice.!
!

SO!ORDERED.xii[8]!

!!
!

Petitioner!seasonably!filed!a!motion!for!reconsideration!to!the!Order!dated!

July!30,!2008,!which!the!RTC!resolved!in!his!favor.!Thus,!on!October!20,!2008,!it!
issued!the!Orderxii[9]!setting!aside!the!courts!previous!order,!thus:!
!

WHEREFORE,!in!view!of!the!foregoing,!the!Order!dated!July!30,!2008!is!hereby!
reconsidered!and!set!aside.!
!!
Let!the!Petition!(with!Motion!for!the!Submission!of!Parties!to!DNA!Testing)!be!
set!for!hearing!on!January(22,(2009(at(8:30(in(the(morning.!
!!
x!x!x!x!
!!
SO!ORDERED.xii[10]!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
!

!!
!

This! time,! the! RTC! held! that! the! ruling! on! the! grounds! relied! upon! by!

petitioner! for! filing! the! petition! is! premature! considering! that! a! fullKblown! trial!
has!not!yet!taken!place.!The!court!stressed!that!the!petition!was!sufficient!in!form!
and!substance.!It!was!verified,!it!included!a!certification!against!forum!shopping,!
and! it! contained! a! plain,! concise,! and! direct! statement! of! the! ultimate! facts! on!
which!petitioner!relies!on!for!his!claim,!in!accordance!with!Section!1,!Rule!8!of!the!
Rules!of!Court.!The!court!remarked!that!the!allegation!that!the!statements!in!the!
petition!were!not!of!petitioners!personal!knowledge!is!a!matter!of!evidence.!The!
court!also!dismissed!respondents!arguments!that!there!is!no!basis!for!the!taking!
of!DNA!test,!and!that!jurisprudence!is!still!unsettled!on!the!acceptability!of!DNA!
evidence.!It!noted!that!the!new!Rule!on!DNA!Evidencexii[11]!allows!the!conduct!
of!DNA!testing,!whether!at!the!courts!instance!or!upon!application!of!any!person!
who!has!legal!interest!in!the!matter!in!litigation.!
!!
Respondent!filed!a!Motion!for!Reconsideration!of!Order!dated!October!20,!
2008!and!for!Dismissal!of!Petition,xii[12]!reiterating!that!(a)!the!petition!was!not!
in! due! form! and! substance! as! no! defendant! was! named! in! the! title,! and! all! the!
basic! allegations! were! hearsay;! and! (b)! there! was! no! prima$ facie! case,! which!
made!the!petition!susceptible!to!dismissal.!
!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

The! RTC! denied! the! motion! in! the! Order! dated! January! 19,! 2009,! and!

rescheduled!the!hearing.xii[13]!
!!
Aggrieved,! respondent! filed! a! petition! for! certiorari! with! the! CA,!
questioning!the!Orders!dated!October!20,!2008!and!January!19,!2009.!
!!
On!September!25,!2009,!the!CA!decided!the!petition!for!certiorari!in!favor!
of!respondent,!thus:!
!!
WHEREFORE,! the! instant! petition! for! certiorari! is! hereby! GRANTED! for! being!
meritorious.! The! assailed! Orders! dated! October! 20,! 2008! and! January! 19,! 2009! both!
issued!by!the!Regional!Trial!Court,!Branch!172!of!Valenzuela!City!in!SP.!Proceeding!Case!
No.! 30KVK07! are! REVERSED! and! SET! ASIDE.! Accordingly,! the! case! docketed! as! SP.!
Proceeding!Case!No.!30KVK07!is!DISMISSED.xii[14]!
!!

The! CA! held! that! the! RTC! did! not! acquire! jurisdiction! over! the! person! of!
respondent,! as! no! summons! had! been! served! on! him.! Respondents! special!
appearance!could!not!be!considered!as!voluntary!appearance!because!it!was!filed!
only!for!the!purpose!of!questioning!the!jurisdiction!of!the!court!over!respondent.!
Although!respondent!likewise!questioned!the!courts!jurisdiction!over!the!subject!
matter!of!the!petition,!the!same!is!not!equivalent!to!a!waiver!of!his!right!to!object!
to!the!jurisdiction!of!the!court!over!his!person.!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

!!
The!CA!remarked!that!petitioner!filed!the!petition!to!establish!illegitimate!
filiation,!specifically!seeking!a!DNA!testing!order!to!abbreviate!the!proceedings.!It!
noted!that!petitioner!failed!to!show!that!the!four!significant!procedural!aspects!of!
a! traditional! paternity! action! had! been! met.! The! CA! further! held! that! a! DNA!
testing!should!not!be!allowed!when!the!petitioner!has!failed!to!establish!a!prima$
facie!case,!thus:!!
!!
While!the!tenor![of!Section!4,!Rule!on!DNA!Evidence]!appears!to!be!absolute,!the!rule!could!not!
really!have!been!intended!to!trample!on!the!substantive!rights!of!the!parties.!It!could!have!not!
meant! to! be! an! instrument! to! promote! disorder,! harassment,! or! extortion.! It! could! have! not!
been!intended!to!legalize!unwarranted!expedition!to!fish!for!evidence.!Such!will!be!the!situation!
in!this!particular!case!if!a!court!may!at!any!time!order!the!taking!of!a!DNA!test.!If!the!DNA!test!in!
compulsory! recognition! cases! is! immediately! available! to! the! petitioner/complainant! without!
requiring!first!the!presentation!of!corroborative!proof,!then!a!dire!and!absurd!rule!would!result.!
Such!will!encourage!and!promote!harassment!and!extortion.!
!!
!

x!x!x!x!

!!
!
At!the!risk!of!being!repetitious,!the!Court!would!like!to!stress!that!it!sees!the!danger!of!
allowing!an!absolute!DNA!testing!to!a!compulsory!recognition!test!even!if!the!plaintiff/petitioner!
failed! to! establish! prima$ facie! proof.! x! x! x! If! at! anytime,! motu$ proprio! and! without! preK
conditions,!the!court!can!indeed!order!the!taking!of!DNA!test!in!compulsory!recognition!cases,!
then! the! prominent! and! wellKtoKdo! members! of! our! society! will! be! easy! prey! for! opportunists!
and!extortionists.!For!no!cause!at!all,!or!even!for![sic]!casual!sexual!indiscretions!in!their!younger!
years!could!be!used!as!a!means!to!harass!them.!Unscrupulous!women,!unsure!of!the!paternity!
of!their!children!may!just!be!taking!the!chancesKjust!in!caseKby!pointing!to!a!sexual!partner!in!a!
long! past! oneKtime! encounter.! Indeed! an! absolute! and! unconditional! taking! of! DNA! test! for!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
compulsory! recognition! case! opens! wide! the! opportunities! for! extortionist! to! prey! on! victims!
who!have!no!stomach!for!scandal.xii[15]!

!!
Petitioner! moved! for! reconsideration.! On! December! 17,! 2009,! the! CA!
denied!the!motion!for!lack!of!merit.xii[16]!
In! this! petition! for! review! on! certiorari,! petitioner! raises! the! following!
issues:!
I.!
WHETHER! OR! NOT! THE! COURT! OF! APPEALS! ERRED! WHEN! IT! RESOLVED! THE! ISSUE! OF!
LACK! OF! JURISDICTION! OVER! THE! PERSON! OF! HEREIN! RESPONDENT! ALBEIT! THE! SAME!
WAS!NEVER!RAISED!IN!THE!PETITION!FOR!CERTIORARI.!
!!
I.A!
WHETHER! OR! NOT! THE! COURT! OF! APPEALS! ERRED! WHEN! IT! RULED!
THAT! JURISDICTION! WAS! NOT! ACQUIRED! OVER! THE! PERSON! OF! THE!
RESPONDENT.!
!!
I.B!
WHETHER!OR!NOT!THE!COURT!OF!APPEALS!ERRED!WHEN!IT!FAILED!TO!
REALIZE! THAT! THE! RESPONDENT! HAD! ALREADY! SUBMITTED!
VOLUNTARILY!TO!THE!JURISDICTION!OF!THE!COURT!A$QUO.!
!!
I.C!
WHETHER! OR! NOT! THE! COURT! OF! APPEALS! ERRED! WHEN! IT!
ESSENTIALLY!RULED!THAT!THE!TITLE!OF!A!PLEADING,!RATHER!THAN!ITS!
BODY,!IS!CONTROLLING.!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!
II.!
WHETHER!OR!NOT!THE!COURT!OF!APPEALS!ERRED!WHEN!IT!ORDERED!THE!DISMISSAL!
OF!THE!PETITION!BY!REASON!OF!THE!MOTION!(FILED!BY!THE!PETITIONER!BEFORE!THE!
COURT!A$QUO)!FOR!THE!CONDUCT!OF!DNA!TESTING.!
!!
II.A!
WHETHER! OR! NOT! THE! COURT! OF! APPEALS! ERRED! WHEN! IT!
ESSENTIALLY!RULED!THAT!DNA!TESTING!CAN!ONLY!BE!ORDERED!AFTER!
THE!PETITIONER!ESTABLISHES!PRIMA!FACIE!PROOF!OF!FILIATION.!
!!
III.!
WHETHER!OR!NOT!THE!COURT!OF!APPEALS!ERRED!WITH!ITS!MISPLACED!RELIANCE!ON!
THE!CASE!OF!HERRERA!VS.!ALBA,!
!!
ESPECIALLY! AS! REGARDS! THE! FOUR! SIGNIFICANT! PROCEDURAL! ASPECTS! OF! A!
TRADITIONAL!PATERNITY!ACTION.xii[17]!

!!
!

Petitioner!contends!that!respondent!never!raised!as!issue!in!his!petition!for!

certiorari$ the! courts! lack! of! jurisdiction! over! his! person.! Hence,! the! CA! had! no!
legal!basis!to!discuss!the!same,!because!issues!not!raised!are!deemed!waived!or!
abandoned.! At! any! rate,! respondent! had! already! voluntarily! submitted! to! the!
jurisdiction!of!the!trial!court!by!his!filing!of!several!motions!asking!for!affirmative!
relief,!such!as!the!(a)!Motion!for!Reconsideration!of!the!Order!dated!September!
3,!2007;!(b)!Ex$Parte!Motion!to!Resolve!Motion!for!Reconsideration!of!the!Order!
dated!November!6,!2007;!and!(c)!Motion!for!Reconsideration!of!the!Order!dated!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

October! 20,! 2008! and! for! Dismissal! of! Petition.! Petitioner! points! out! that!
respondent!even!expressly!admitted!that!he!has!waived!his!right!to!summons!in!
his! Manifestation! and! Comment! on! Petitioners! Very! Urgent! Motion! to! Try! and!
Hear!the!Case.!Hence,!the!issue!is!already!moot!and!academic.!!
!!
!

Petitioner! argues! that! the! case! was! adversarial! in! nature.! Although! the!

caption!of!the!petition!does!not!state!respondents!name,!the!body!of!the!petition!
clearly!indicates!his!name!and!his!known!address.!He!maintains!that!the!body!of!
the!petition!is!controlling!and!not!the!caption.!
!!
!

Finally,!petitioner!asserts!that!the!motion!for!DNA!testing!should!not!be!a!

reason! for! the! dismissal! of! the! petition! since! it! is! not! a! legal! ground! for! the!
dismissal! of! cases.! If! the! CA! entertained! any! doubt! as! to! the! propriety! of! DNA!
testing,!it!should!have!simply!denied!the!motion.xii[18]!Petitioner!points!out!that!
Section!4!of!the!Rule!on!DNA!Evidence!does!not!require!that!there!must!be!a!prior!
proof! of! filiation! before! DNA! testing! can! be! ordered.! He! adds! that! the! CA!
erroneously!relied!on!the!four!significant!procedural!aspects!of!a!paternity!case,!
as! enunciated! in! Herrera$ v.$ Alba.xii[19]! Petitioner! avers! that! these! procedural!
aspects! are! not! applicable! at! this! point! of! the! proceedings! because! they! are!
matters!of!evidence!that!should!be!taken!up!during!the!trial.xii[20]!
!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

In!his!Comment,!respondent!supports!the!CAs!ruling!on!most!issues!raised!

in! the! petition! for! certiorari! and! merely! reiterates! his! previous! arguments.!
However,!on!the!issue!of!lack!of!jurisdiction,!respondent!counters!that,!contrary!
to!petitioners!assertion,!he!raised!the!issue!before!the!CA!in!relation!to!his!claim!
that!the!petition!was!not!in!due!form!and!substance.!Respondent!denies!that!he!
waived!his!right!to!the!service!of!summons.!He!insists!that!the!alleged!waiver!and!
voluntary!appearance!was!conditional!upon!a!finding!by!the!court!that!summons!
is!indeed!required.!He!avers!that!the!assertion!of!affirmative!defenses,!aside!from!
lack! of! jurisdiction! over! the! person! of! the! defendant,! cannot! be! considered! as!
waiver!of!the!defense!of!lack!of!jurisdiction!over!such!person.!
!!
The!petition!is!meritorious.!
!!
Primarily,! we! emphasize! that! the! assailed! Orders! of! the! trial! court! were!
orders! denying! respondents! motion! to! dismiss! the! petition! for! illegitimate!
filiation.! An! order! denying! a! motion! to! dismiss! is! an! interlocutory! order! which!
neither! terminates! nor! finally! disposes! of! a! case,! as! it! leaves! something! to! be!
done! by! the! court! before! the! case! is! finally! decided! on! the! merits.! As! such,! the!
general! rule! is! that! the! denial! of! a! motion! to! dismiss!cannot! be! questioned! in! a!
special!civil!action!for!certiorari,!which!is!a!remedy!designed!to!correct!errors!of!
jurisdiction! and! not! errors! of! judgment.! Neither! can! a! denial! of! a! motion! to!
dismiss!be!the!subject!of!an!appeal!unless!and!until!a!final!judgment!or!order!is!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

rendered.!In!a!number!of!cases,!the!court!has!granted!the!extraordinary!remedy!
of! certiorari! on! the! denial! of! the! motion! to! dismiss! but! only! when! it! has! been!
tainted! with! grave! abuse!of! discretion! amounting! to! lack! or! excess! of!
jurisdiction.xii[21]!In!the!present!case,!we!discern!no!grave!abuse!of!discretion!on!
the!part!of!the!trial!court!in!denying!the!motion!to!dismiss.!!
!!
The! grounds! for! dismissal! relied! upon! by! respondent! were! (a)! the! courts!
lack!of!jurisdiction!over!his!person!due!to!the!absence!of!summons,!and!(b)!defect!
in!the!form!and!substance!of!the!petition!to!establish!illegitimate!filiation,!which!
is!equivalent!to!failure!to!state!a!cause!of!action.!
!!
We!need!not!belabor!the!issues!on!whether!lack!of!jurisdiction!was!raised!
before! the! CA,! whether! the! court! acquired! jurisdiction! over! the! person! of!
respondent,!or!whether!respondent!waived!his!right!to!the!service!of!summons.!
We!find!that!the!primordial!issue!here!is!actually!whether!it!was!necessary,!in!the!
first!place,!to!serve!summons!on!respondent!for!the!court!to!acquire!jurisdiction!
over! the! case.! In! other! words,! was! the! service! of! summons! jurisdictional?! The!
answer! to! this! question! depends! on! the! nature! of! petitioners! action,! that! is,!
whether!it!is!an!action!in$personam,$in$rem,$or$quasi$in$rem.!!!
!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

An! action!in$ personam!is! lodged! against! a! person! based! on! personal!

liability;!an!action!in$rem!is!directed!against!the!thing!itself!instead!of!the!person;!
while! an! action!quasi$ in$ rem!names! a! person! as! defendant,! but! its! object! is! to!
subject!that!person's!interest!in!a!property!to!a!corresponding!lien!or!obligation.!A!
petition!directed!against!the!"thing"!itself!or!the!res,! which!concerns!the!status!of!
a! person,! like! a! petition! for! adoption,! annulment! of! marriage,! or! correction! of!
entries!in!the!birth!certificate,!is!an!action!in$rem.xii[22]!

In! an! action$in$ personam,! jurisdiction! over! the! person! of! the! defendant! is!
necessary! for! the! court! to! validly! try! and! decide! the! case.!! In! a! proceeding!in$
rem!or!quasi$ in$ rem,! jurisdiction! over! the! person! of! the! defendant! is! not! a!
prerequisite! to! confer! jurisdiction! on! the! court,! provided! that! the! latter! has!
jurisdiction! over! the!res.$ $Jurisdiction! over! the! res! is! acquired! either! (a)! by! the!
seizure! of! the! property! under! legal! process,! whereby! it! is! brought! into! actual!
custody! of! the! law,! or! (b)! as! a! result! of! the! institution! of! legal! proceedings,! in!
which!the!power!of!the!court!is!recognized!and!made!effective.!xii[23]!!
!!
The!herein!petition!to!establish!illegitimate!filiation!is!an!action!in$rem.!By!
the! simple! filing! of! the! petition! to! establish! illegitimate! filiation! before! the! RTC,!
which! undoubtedly! had! jurisdiction! over! the! subject! matter! of! the! petition,! the!
latter! thereby! acquired! jurisdiction! over! the! case.! An!in$ rem!proceeding! is!
validated!essentially!through!publication.! Publication!is!notice!to!the!whole!world!
that!the!proceeding!has!for!its!object!to!bar!indefinitely!all!who!might!be!minded!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

to! make! an! objection! of! any! sort! to! the! right! sought! to! be! established.xii[24]!
Through!publication,!all!interested!parties!are!deemed!notified!of!the!petition.!
!!
If!at!all,!service!of!summons!or!notice!is!made!to!the!defendant,!it!is!not!for!
the! purpose! of! vesting! the! court! with! jurisdiction,! but! merely! for! satisfying! the!
due!process!requirements.xii[25]!This!is!but!proper!in!order!to!afford!the!person!
concerned!the!opportunity!to!protect!his!interest!if!he!so!chooses.xii[26]!Hence,!
failure! to! serve! summons! will! not! deprive! the! court! of! its! jurisdiction! to! try! and!
decide!the!case.!In!such!a!case,!the!lack!of!summons!may!be!excused!where!it!is!
determined! that! the! adverse! party! had,! in! fact,! the! opportunity! to! file! his!
opposition,!as!in!this!case.!We!find!that!the!due!process!requirement!with!respect!
to! respondent! has! been! satisfied,! considering! that! he! has! participated! in! the!
proceedings!in!this!case!and!he!has!the!opportunity!to!file!his!opposition!to!the!
petition!to!establish!filiation.!!
!!
To! address! respondents! contention! that! the! petition! should! have! been!
adversarial!in!form,!we!further!hold!that!the!herein!petition!to!establish!filiation!
was! sufficient! in! form.! It! was! indeed! adversarial! in! nature! despite! its! caption!
which! lacked! the! name! of! a! defendant,! the! failure! to! implead! respondent! as!
defendant,! and! the! nonKservice! of! summons! upon! respondent.! A! proceeding! is!
adversarial!where! the! party! seeking! relief! has! given! legal! warning! to! the! other!
party! and! afforded! the! latter! an! opportunity! to! contest! it.xii[27]! In! this!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

petitionclassified! as! an! action! in$ remthe! notice! requirement! for! an! adversarial!
proceeding!was!likewise!satisfied!by!the!publication!of!the!petition!and!the!giving!
of!notice!to!the!Solicitor!General,!as!directed!by!the!trial!court.!!
!!
The! petition! to! establish! filiation! is! sufficient! in! substance.! It! satisfies!
Section!1,!Rule!8!of!the!Rules!of!Court,!which!requires!the!complaint!to!contain!a!
plain,!concise,!and!direct!statement!of!the!ultimate!facts!upon!which!the!plaintiff!
bases!his!claim.!!A!fact!is!essential!if!it!cannot!be!stricken!out!without!leaving!the!
statement!of!the!cause!of!action!inadequate.xii[28]!A!complaint!states!a!cause!of!
action!when!it!contains!the!following!elements:!(1)!the!legal!right!of!plaintiff,!(2)!
the! correlative! obligation! of! the! defendant,! and! (3)! the! act! or! omission! of! the!
defendant!in!violation!of!said!legal!right.xii[29]!

The!petition!sufficiently!states!the!ultimate!facts!relied!upon!by!petitioner!
to!establish!his!filiation!to!respondent.!Respondent,!however,!contends!that!the!
allegations!in!the!petition!were!hearsay!as!they!were!not!of!petitioners!personal!
knowledge.! Such! matter! is! clearly! a! matter! of! evidence! that! cannot! be!
determined! at! this! point! but! only! during! the! trial! when! petitioner! presents! his!
evidence.!
!!
!

In! a! motion! to! dismiss!a! complaint! based! on! lack! of! cause! of! action,! the!

question! submitted! to! the! court! for! determination! is! the! sufficiency! of! the!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

allegations!made!in!the!complaint!to!constitute!a!cause!of!action!and!not!whether!
those!allegations!of!fact!are!true,!for!said!motion!must!hypothetically!admit!the!
truth!

of!

the!

facts!

alleged!

in!

the!

complaint.xii[30]!

The!inquiry!is!confined!to!the!four!corners!of!the!complaint,!and!no!other.xii[31]!
The!test!of!the!sufficiency!of!the!facts!alleged!in!the!complaint!is!whether!or!not,!
admitting! the! facts! alleged,! the! court! could! render! a! valid! judgment! upon! the!
same!in!accordance!with!the!prayer!of!the!complaint.xii[32]!!!
!!
!

If!the!allegations!of!the!complaint!are!sufficient!in!form!and!substance!but!

their!veracity!and!correctness!are!assailed,!it!is!incumbent!upon!the!court!to!deny!
the!motion! to! dismiss! and! require! the! defendant! to! answer! and! go! to! trial! to!
prove!his!defense.!!The!veracity!of!the!assertions!of!the!parties!can!be!ascertained!
at!the!trial!of!the!case!on!the!merits.xii[33]!!
!!
The! statement! in! Herrera$ v.$ Albaxii[34]! that! there! are! four! significant!
procedural!aspects!in!a!traditional!paternity!case!which!parties!have!to!face!has!
been!widely!misunderstood!and!misapplied!in!this!case.!A!party!is!confronted!by!
these!soKcalled!procedural!aspects!during!trial,!when!the!parties!have!presented!
their! respective! evidence.! They! are! matters! of! evidence! that! cannot! be!
determined! at! this! initial! stage! of! the! proceedings,! when! only! the! petition! to!
establish! filiation! has! been! filed.! The! CAs! observation! that! petitioner! failed! to!
establish! a! prima$ facie! casethe! first! procedural! aspect! in! a! paternity! caseis!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

therefore!misplaced.!A!prima$facie!case!is!built!by!a!partys!evidence!and!not!by!
mere!allegations!in!the!initiatory!pleading.!!
!!
Clearly! then,! it! was! also! not! the! opportune! time! to! discuss! the! lack! of! a!
prima$facie!case!visKKvis!the!motion!for!DNA!testing!since!no!evidence!has,!as!yet,!
been! presented! by! petitioner.! More! essentially,! it! is! premature! to! discuss!
whether,!under!the!circumstances,!a!DNA!testing!order!is!warranted!considering!
that!no!such!order!has!yet!been!issued!by!the!trial!court.!In!fact,!the!latter!has!just!
set!the!said!case!for!hearing.!!
!!
At!any!rate,!the!CAs!view!that!it!would!be!dangerous!to!allow!a!DNA!testing!
without! corroborative! proof! is! well! taken! and! deserves! the! Courts! attention.! In!
light!of!this!observation,!we!find!that!there!is!a!need!to!supplement!the!Rule!on!
DNA! Evidence! to! aid! the! courts! in! resolving! motions! for! DNA! testing! order,!
particularly!in!paternity!and!other!filiation!cases.!We,!thus,!address!the!question!
of! whether! a! prima$ facie! showing! is! necessary! before! a! court! can! issue! a! DNA!
testing!order.!
!!
The!Rule!on!DNA!Evidence!was!enacted!to!guide!the!Bench!and!the!Bar!for!
the!introduction!and!use!of!DNA!evidence!in!the!judicial!system.!It!provides!the!
prescribed! parameters! on! the! requisite! elements! for! reliability! and! validity! (i.e.,!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

the!proper!procedures,!protocols,!necessary!laboratory!reports,!etc.),!the!possible!
sources!of!error,!the!available!objections!to!the!admission!of!DNA!test!results!as!
evidence!as!well!as!the!probative!value!of!DNA!evidence.!It!seeks!to!ensure!that!
the! evidence! gathered,! using! various! methods! of! DNA! analysis,! is! utilized!
effectively! and! properly,! [and]! shall! not! be! misused! and/or! abused! and,! more!
importantly,! shall! continue! to! ensure! that! DNA! analysis! serves! justice! and!
protects,!rather!than!prejudice!the!public.xii[35]!
!!
Not!surprisingly,!Section!4!of!the!Rule!on!DNA!Evidence!merely!provides!for!
conditions! that! are! aimed! to! safeguard! the! accuracy! and! integrity! of! the! DNA!
testing.!Section!4!states:!!
!!
!
SEC.! 4.!!Application$ for$ DNA$ Testing$ Order.! The! appropriate! court! may,! at! any!
time,!either!motu$proprio$or!on!application!of!any!person!who!has!a!legal!interest!in!the!
matter! in! litigation,! order! a! DNA! testing.!! Such! order! shall! issue! after! due! hearing! and!
notice!to!the!parties!upon!a!showing!of!the!following:!!
(a)!A!biological!sample!exists!that!is!relevant!to!the!case;!
(b)! The! biological! sample:! (i)! was! not! previously! subjected! to! the! type! of! DNA!
testing!now!requested;!or!(ii)!was!previously!subjected!to!DNA!testing,!but!
the!results!may!require!confirmation!for!good!reasons;!!
(c)!The!DNA!testing!uses!a!scientifically!valid!technique;!!
(d)!The!DNA!testing!has!the!scientific!potential!to!produce!new!information!that!
is!relevant!to!the!proper!resolution!of!the!case;!and!!
(e)! The! existence! of! other! factors,! if! any,! which! the! court! may! consider! as!
potentially!affecting!the!accuracy!or!integrity!of!the!DNA!testing.!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
This!Rule!shall!not!preclude!a!DNA!testing,!without!need!of!a!prior!court!order,!
at! the! behest! of! any! party,! including! law! enforcement! agencies,! before! a! suit! or!
proceeding!is!commenced.!

!!
This!does!not!mean,!however,!that!a!DNA!testing!order!will!be!issued!as!a!
matter!of!right!if,!during!the!hearing,!the!said!conditions!are!established.!!
!!
In! some! states,! to! warrant! the! issuance! of! the! DNA! testing! order,! there!
must!be!a!show!cause!hearing!wherein!the!applicant!must!first!present!sufficient!
evidence!to!establish!a!prima$facie!case!or!a!reasonable!possibility!of!paternity!or!
good! cause! for! the! holding! of! the! test.! xii[36]! In! these! states,! a! court! order! for!
blood!testing!is!considered!a!search,!which,!under!their!Constitutions!(as!in!ours),!
must!be!preceded!by!a!finding!of!probable!cause!in!order!to!be!valid.!Hence,!the!
requirement!of!a!prima$facie!case,!or!reasonable!possibility,!was!imposed!in!civil!
actions! as! a! counterpart! of! a! finding! of! probable! cause.! The! Supreme! Court! of!
Louisiana!eloquently!explained!!
!!
Although! a! paternity! action! is! civil,! not! criminal,! the! constitutional! prohibition! against!
unreasonable!searches!and!seizures!is!still!applicable,!and!a!proper!showing!of!sufficient!
justification!under!the!particular!factual!circumstances!of!the!case!must!be!made!before!
a!court!may!order!a!compulsory!blood!test.!Courts!in!various!jurisdictions!have!differed!
regarding!the!kind!of!procedures!which!are!required,!but!those!jurisdictions!have!almost!
universally! found! that! a! preliminary! showing! must! be! made! before! a! court! can!
constitutionally! order! compulsory! blood! testing! in! paternity! cases.! We! agree,! and! find!
that,!as!a!preliminary!matter,!before!the!court!may!issue!an!order!for!compulsory!blood!
testing,!the!moving!party!must!show!that!there!is!a!reasonable!possibility!of!paternity.!
As!explained!hereafter,!in!cases!in!which!paternity!is!contested!and!a!party!to!the!action!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
refuses!to!voluntarily!undergo!a!blood!test,!a!show!cause!hearing!must!be!held!in!which!
the! court! can! determine! whether! there! is! sufficient! evidence! to! establish! a!prima$
facie!case!which!warrants!issuance!of!a!court!order!for!blood!testing.xii[37]!

!!
The! same! condition! precedent! should! be! applied! in! our! jurisdiction! to!
protect!the!putative!father!from!mere!harassment!suits.!Thus,!during!the!hearing!
on!the!motion!for!DNA!testing,!the!petitioner!must!present!prima$facie!evidence!
or!establish!a!reasonable!possibility!of!paternity.!

Notwithstanding! these,! it! should! be! stressed! that! the! issuance! of! a! DNA!
testing!order!remains!discretionary!upon!the!court.!The!court!may,!for!example,!
consider! whether! there! is! absolute! necessity! for! the! DNA! testing.! If! there! is!
already!preponderance!of!evidence!to!establish!paternity!and!the!DNA!test!result!
would! only! be! corroborative,! the! court! may,! in! its! discretion,! disallow! a! DNA!
testing.!!
(!
WHEREFORE,!premises!considered,!the!petition!is!GRANTED.!The(Court!of!
Appeals!Decision!dated!September!25,!2009!and!Resolution!dated!December!17,!
2009! are! REVERSED! and! SET( ASIDE.! The! Orders! dated! October! 20,! 2008! and!
January!19,!2009!of!the!Regional!Trial!Court!of!Valenzuela!City!are!AFFIRMED.!
(!
SO(ORDERED.!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001]
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by
their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN
GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN
DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD
MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful
wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective
shares in the latters estate under the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during
this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon
died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock
in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for Partition with Inventory
and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina
de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to
dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and
15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case
to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the
conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the trial considering that the birth certificates
presented by respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners allegation of
illegitimacy.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions,
respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as
being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was
merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able to establish their status as such
heirs. It was contended, in fine, that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to
likewise ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in
an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the
complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper.xii[1] It decreed that the
declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were
seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on
certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of
the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as
such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine
enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.xii[2]
In their comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is
inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation in
Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on
the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,xii[3] which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot
be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in a
direct action frontally addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this
matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In
the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.xii[4] The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.xii[5] In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.xii[6] Where, instead, a
claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity,
i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic
writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to
establish the childs acknowledgment.xii[7]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.xii[8] This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.xii[9] Quite remarkably, upon the
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,xii[10] and in proper cases Article 171,xii[11] of the
Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes
fixed and unassailable.xii[12]
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption
of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,xii[13] or in
exceptional instances the latters heirs,xii[14] can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has
been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said
case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for
partition filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an acknowledged spurious child by
virtue of a private document, signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition.
It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody elses illegitimate children.
Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances
particularly, to declare that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to
the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes
petitioners alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any
relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged
illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been
first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,xii[15] one that can
only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.xii[16] Indeed,
a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.xii[17]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No

costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Top of Form

Bottom of Form

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157043

February 2, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt1" } seeks to set
aside the Court of Appeals (CA) decision{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt2" } dated
January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 23 of San Juan, Southern Leyte dated September 14, 1999 granting a
petition for change of name.
Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni
N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In Special Proceeding No. R-481,{
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l
"fnt3" } Capote as Giovannis guardian ad litem averred:
xxx xxx xxx
1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while minor GIOVANNI N.
GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen, sixteen (16) years old and both are residents of
San Juan, Southern Leyte where they can be served with summons and other court
processes;

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni N. Gallamaso by

virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459, dated [August 18, 1998] xxx xxx
authorizing her to file in court a petition for change of name of said minor in accordance
with the desire of his mother [who is residing and working abroad];
3. Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided in San Juan, Southern Leyte,
Philippines for more than fifteen (15) years prior to the filing of this instant petition, the
former since 1970 while the latter since his birth [in 1982];
4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet nine (9) years old
up to the present;
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P.
Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9, 1982 [,] prior to the
effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the
natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has been
known by that name since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil
Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte];
6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and up to the
present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical,
emotional and spiritual concerns. [Giovannis pleas] for attention along that line [fell] on
deaf ears xxx xxx xxx;
7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have
his surname changed to that of his mothers surname;
8. [Giovannis] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the United States
and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may
complicate [his] status as natural child; and
9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI
NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
xxx xxx xxx{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt4" }
Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change of name on
Giovannis birth certificate. Having found respondents petition sufficient in form and substance,
the trial court gave due course to the petition.{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt5" } Publication
of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Southern Leyte once a
week for three consecutive weeks was likewise ordered.{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt6" } The trial
court also directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order.{ HYPERLINK

"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt7" }
Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her
evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the
Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt8" }
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with
a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary
proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed
the RTC decision ordering the change of name.{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt9" }
In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial courts decision
which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties.{
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l
"fnt10" } Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. Labrador{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt11" } and
claims that the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the
childs change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.{
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l
"fnt12" }
We deny the petition.
"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to distinguish
him from all others; this symbol is his name."{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt13" }
Understandably, therefore, no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt14" } This is a
reasonable requirement for those seeking such change because a persons name necessarily
affects his identity, interests and interactions. The State must be involved in the process and
decision to change the name of any of its citizens.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of name. Here, the
appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103,{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt15" } a separate
and distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or clerical errors thereon).{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt16" }
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the court a quo is
intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The point is whether the proceedings were
sufficiently adversarial.
Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since the reason for their
conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is not sufficient to deal with substantial or
contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of name, meaning, legitimacy as well as
successional rights.{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt17" } Such
issues are ventilated only in adversarial proceedings wherein all interested parties are impleaded
and due process is observed.{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt18" }
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code of
the Philippines),{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt19" } the
pertinent provision of the Civil Code then as regards his use of a surname, read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the
father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of
the recognizing parent. (emphasis ours)
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers surname from birth. The
records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovannis putative father to actually
recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article
366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis ours)
Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt20" } is
enlightening:
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally
use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers
surname.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father
bears only a given name and his mother surname, and does not have a middle name. The
name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when
the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged
by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his
mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his
status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged child.1awphi1.net{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt21" }
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons name to his
identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or
illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who
may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with
all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court
affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he
was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A
change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to
his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the
United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt22" } in support
of its position deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a proceeding
separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of name. Those cases deal with the
application and interpretation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while this case was correctly
filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on
respondents case. While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name
should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its
own failure to participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial
proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103
cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not
fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or
typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the
civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding
change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name. In this regard, [appellee]
Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a
newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also
furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the
court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in
nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the
petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded.
Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex
parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the
lower court were not adversarial enough.{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt23" } (emphasis
supplied)
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.{ HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l "fnt24" }
Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules.{
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_157043_2007.html" \l
"fnt25" } With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered
bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving
a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were
satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were
afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003 decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995

DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is
a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed
by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City
sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but
after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school
year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondent:
1. the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner
Daisie T. David;
2. respondent is hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a month to the subject minor Christopher J.
T. David, Christine David and Cathy Mae David to take effect upon the finality of this decision; and
3. to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding:
We agree with the respondent-appellant's view that this is not proper in a habeas corpus case.
Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case
contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated. This is so because under the
Family Code, the father and mother have joint parental authority over their legitimate children and in case of separation
of the parents there is need to determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not hold true in an
adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a relationship is under the parental authority of
the mother by express provision of the law. Hence, the question of custody and support should be brought in a case
singularly filed for the purpose. In point of fact, this is more advisable in the case at bar because the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the other minor children of the petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant and, therefore,
cannot properly provide for their support.
Admittedly, respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas, petitioner-appellee
depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially supported petitioner-appellee and her three
minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody
of respondent-appellant until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED dismissing the petition
for habeas corpus in Special Proceeding No. 4489.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision.
Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases
where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot
1
arise in any other situation. For example, in the case of Salvaa v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the

proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in
the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man
against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father,
private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As
such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother,
2
the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since,
admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is
entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by
law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
3
reasons to order otherwise."
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her
children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they
were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC
decision was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System
Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so
that she can personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for
time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three
children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the
family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the
child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support
her children according to her means.
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount
of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did
not give any support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of P500.00 a week which
he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a rich man who professes love for his children. In fact he
filed a motion for the execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had observed his
son "to be physically weak and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and amenities
he was accustomed to when in the former custody of the respondent." He prayed that he be given the
custody of the child so that he can provide him with the "proper care and education."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this
case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child.
The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child.
Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person
who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at
least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now
that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because
the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code,
courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit"
and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if
private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his
custody to him (private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED
to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give
him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G. R. No. 143256. August 28, 2001]
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND and
WIFE, EDDIE C. FERNANDEZ and LUZ FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES, petitioners, vs. ROMEO
FERNANDEZ, POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, JULITA
FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM FERNANDEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
FERNANDEZ, GERARDO FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and GREGORIO
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decisionxii[1] of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated December 22, 1999 affirming the decisionxii[2] of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 40, Dagupan City in an action for nullity of contracts, partition, recovery of possession
and damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees, herein respondents.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:xii[3]
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered owners
of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City covered by TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194
sq. meters, and the two-storey building constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-5921. It is undisputed that Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died when he was
only twelve (12) years old as paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug. 31,
1994, pp. 9-14) it was revealed that the late Spouses being childless by the death of their son,
purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The boy being referred
to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care
of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. He lived with the couple
until they became old and disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife Generosa A. de Venecia and
Rodolfo Fernandez and an estate consisting of the following:
(a)
A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan,
Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal,
City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE. by Lot No. 9134; on the SW.
by the Arellano Street; and on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred
Ninety Four (194) square meters, more or less. Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 525
(T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of Deeds.
(b)
A two (2) storey residential building made of concrete and wood, G.I. roofing with a
floor area of 154 square meters and 126 square meters of the first and second floor, respectively.
Declared under Tax Decl. No. 22-592-1 and assessed therein at P26,000.00.
On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a)

119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;

(b)

Whole residential house above-mentioned;

To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the land.

On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie
Fernandez, appellants son over the following:
A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-Half (119.5) Square meters including the building
and/or all existing thereon to be taken from the southwestern portion of the parcel of land
described as follows, to wit:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan,
Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal,
City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE by Lot No. 9134; on the SW.
by the Arellano Street; and on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred
and Ninety-Four (194), Square Meters, more or less, covered by TRANSFER CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE NO. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of Deeds (Exh. 8, Exhibits for the
Defendants)
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro,
Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the
deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21,
1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio
(docketed as Civil Case No. 94-00016-D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants), motivated by unmitigated greed,
deliberate and malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff and other heirs (herein appellees) of the
deceased spouses, without basis of heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance,
taking advantage of the total physical and mental incapacity of the deceased Generosa de
Venecia aggravated by unlawful scheme confederated, colluded and conspired with each other in
causing the fake, simulated grossly inauthentic contracts purporting to be executed on August 31,
1989 and jointly on the same date, caused the execution of the deed of absolute sale purportedly
signed by Generosa de Venecia covering the same property described in the deed of extrajudicial partition and by virtue of the said acts, appellants were able to secure new land titles in
their favor (Records, pp. 3-4, Complaint). Appellees thus prayed that the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition, Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54641 be declared void
from the beginning.
Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa were husband and wife blessed with
one child the herein defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez whom they acknowledged during their
lifetime. (underscoring supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
the late Generosa de Venecia and defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez which are

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

now in question were all made with the full knowledge, consent and approval
of the parties thereto and for value. (Records, pp. 20-21, Answer).
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the
dispositive portion reads:xii[4]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants;
1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. 3), the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. 8), the TCT No. 54641, and the TCT No. 54693 null
and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to peacefully surrender to the plaintiffs the
possession of the house and lot in question;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay to plaintiffs the following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a
legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence
Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses. Rodolfos claim as a son of the deceased spouses
Fernandez was negated by the fact that (1) he only reached high school and was told to stop
studying so that he could help in the clinic of Dr. Fernandez, (2) he failed to present any birth
certificate, (3) the book entitled Fercolla clan which was compiled and edited by respected
people such as Ambassador Armando Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita CoquiaSison, showed the geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez without a child;
a pedigree may be admitted in evidence to prove the facts of genealogy and that entries in a
family bible or other family books or charts, engravings or rings, family portraits and the like,
may be received as evidence of pedigree,xii[5] (4) the certification issued by the Records
Management and Archives Office that there was no available information about the birth of
petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses Fernandez, (5) the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for
backpay certificate naming petitioner Rodolfo as his son was doubtful considering that there
were blemishes or alteration in the original copy; (6) that Rodolfos baptismal certificate was
spurious and falsified since there were no available records of baptism with the parish from June
7, 1930 to August 8, 1936, while Rodolfos baptismal certificate which was issued in 1989
showed that he was baptized on November 24, 1934. The court found that the extra-judicial

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

partition and the deed of absolute sale were prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual and
irregular circumstances which rendered the documents null and void.
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial courts judgment in its assailed decision dated December 22, 1999.
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved into the legitimacy of defendant-appellant
Rodolfo Fernandez filiation with the deceased spouses. It found that appellants evidence which
consisted of a certificate of baptism stating that he was a child of the spouses Fernandez and the
application for recognition of rights to back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez,
wherein the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire evidentiary weight to prove his
filiation. The appellate court concluded that while baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they were evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the
dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with
respect to his kinsfolk; that while the application for back pay was a public document, it was not
executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein
appellant; that the public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code referred to
the written admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an
admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was
executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No. 897.
Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a
resolution dated May 17, 2000.xii[6]
Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for review with the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS, PETITIONERS HEREIN, TO RECONVEY TO,
AND PEACEFULLY SURRENDER TO THE PLAINTIFFS, RESPONDENTS HEREIN, THE
POSSESSION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION BECAUSE THE SAID ORDER IS
PALPABLY CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a)
THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE ADMITTED BY THE PARTIES TO BE
CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND
GENEROSA DE VENECIA, AND
(b)
RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO GENEROSA DE VENECIA BY
CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT HER INTESTATE HEIRS AND CANNOT SUCCEED AB
INTESTATO TO HER INTESTATE ESTATE.
II

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL

COURT DECLARING (1) THE DEED OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION DATED
AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. 3), THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE ALSO DATED AUGUST
31, 1989 (EXH. 8), TCT NO. 54641, AND TCT NO. 54693 NULL AND VOID FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a)
IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD, AND
(b)
RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES TO THE QUESTIONED DEEDS, HAVE
NO PERSONALITY TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF SAID DOCUMENTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING
THAT THE PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES
DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA DE VENECIA BECAUSE
(a)
THE FILIATION OF PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ COULD NOT BE
COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
DOCUMENTS, PARTITION, RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, AND;
(b)
THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT
DECLARE IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION THEREOF THAT PETITIONER RODOLFO
FERNANDEZ IS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE FERNANDEZ AND
GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO FACTUAL BASIS IN
THE AFFIRMED DECISION TO JUSTIFY SUCH AWARD.
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of the parties to the conjugal
property of the deceased spouses Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-judicial partition executed by
petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa Fernandez, widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and
void because the former allegedly failed to prove legitimate filiation to his putative father, the
late Dr. Jose Fernandez. Petitioners, contend, however, that the burden of proof lies with the
respondents because they were the ones contesting the filiation of Rodolfo Fernandez. They
insist that both lower courts had no power to pass upon the matter of filiation because it could
not be collaterally attacked in the present action but in a separate and independent action directly
impugning such filiation.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

We are not persuaded.

It must be noted that the respondents principal action was for the declaration of absolute nullity
of two documents, namely: deed of extra-judicial partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an
action to impugn ones legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner
Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfos right to the deed of extra-judicial partition as
the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. While we are aware that ones legitimacy
can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has
no application in the instant case considering that respondents claim was that petitioner Rodolfo
was not born to the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a situation
wherein they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncles wife. The case of
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals,xii[7] which has a similar factual backdrop is instructive:
A careful reading of the above articlesxii[8] will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like
in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as
his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the
legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have
been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the
prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning
the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to
apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not where the heirs of the late
Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is
that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 170 of the Family Code) is not
well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this
case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not
claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is
not the decedents child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural
child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased.
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to the
deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the
property subject of the extra-judicial partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo
Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was
squarely raised by petitioners in their pre-trial briefxii[9] filed before the trial court, hence they are
now estopped from assailing the trial courts ruling on Rodolfos status.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his
filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. Such is a factual issue which has been thoroughly
passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry
even more weightxii[10] when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial
court.xii[11] We accordingly find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent courts
evaluation of the evidence presented, thus:xii[12]
The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any records of the birth of appellant
Rodolfo Fernandez. On October 11, 1995, it issued a certification worded as follows:
This is to certify that the Register of Births for the Municipality of Dagupan, Pangasinan in the
year 1984 is not on file with the National Archives, hence, there is no available information
about the birth of Rodolfo V. Fernandez alleged to have been born on November 24, 1934 to the
spouses Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia in Dagupan, Pangasinan (Records, p. 146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under
Act No. 897 is a public document and a conclusive proof of the legitimate filiation between him
and the deceased spouses (Rollo, p. 41, Appellants Brief). We do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897
is a public document nevertheless, it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez
with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant. The public document contemplated in Article
172 of the Family Code refer to the written admission of filiation embodied in a public document
purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the
public document was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay under
Republic Act No. 897. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 32. Public documents as evidence Documents consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise
to their execution and of the date of the latter.
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public document are conclusive
evidence against the contracting parties as to the truthfulness of the statements made therein.
They constitute only prima facie evidence of the facts which give rise to their execution and of
the date of the latter. Thus, a baptismal certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the Spanish
regime constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts certified to by the parish priest from his own
knowledge such as the administration of the sacrament on the day and in the place and manner
set forth in the certificate; but it does not constitute proof of the statements made therein
concerning the parentage of the person baptized (Francisco, Evidence, 1994 ed., p. 516, citing
Garcia vs. Gajul, 53 Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193;
Siguion vs. Siguion, 8 Phil. 7). Public documents are perfect evidence of the fact which give rise
to their execution and of the date of the latter if the act which the officer witnessed and certified
to or the date written by him are not shown to be false; but they are not conclusive evidence with

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties (Martin, Rules
of Court in the Philippines with Note and Comments, vol. 4, p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is only a
proof that Jose K. Fernandez filed said application on June 5, 1954 in Dagupan City but it does
not prove the veracity of the declaration and statement contained in the said application that
concern the relationship of the applicant with herein appellant. In like manner, it is not a
conclusive proof of the filiation of appellant with his alleged father, Jose K. Fernandez the
contents being, only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimate
child of the spouses openly and continuously until they died (Rollo, p. 42; Appellants Brief).
Open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the
child of the position and privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such as
bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family of the child as legitimate,
constant attendance to the childs support and education, and giving the child the reputation of
being a child of his parents (Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 245-246).
However, it must be noted that, as was held in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590, possession
of status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child
to compel recognition by his assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child appellant presented a baptismal
certificate issued by Fr. Rene Mendoza of the St. John Metropolitan Cathedral of Dagupan City
on August 10, 1989 stating therein that appellant is a child of the late spouses having been born
on November 15, 1934 and baptized on November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1 Exhibits for the
Defendants). As stated, while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they
are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified,
but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk
(Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one
of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation but in this
case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de
Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a
certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August
8, 1936 were all damaged (Records, p. 148, Exh. G). Neither the family portrait offered in
evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation Pictures do not constitute proof of filiation
(Reyes vs. Court of Appeals) (supra). In fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not acquire
evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the Extra-Judicial Partition dated August
31, 1989 executed by appellant Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null and void.
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses
Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez , thus the subject deed of extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo
is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concernedxii[13] pursuant to Art.1105 of the New Civil Code
which states:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with
respect to such person.
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the property in question was the conjugal
property of the late spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia, thus when Dr. Jose
Fernandez died intestate in 1982, his estate consisted solely of pro indiviso of the conjugal
property and the other half belonged to his wife Generosa de Venecia; that granting Dr. Jose
Fernandez was only survived by his wife, the respondents nephews and nieces of Dr. Jose are
entitled to inherit the share of the decedents estate while the share of the conjugal property will
still belong to Generosa as the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, hence the trial courts order
reconveying the possession of the subject lot and building to respondents was contrary to the
admitted facts and law since respondents are not related by consanguinity to Generosa vda de
Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall
be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided in the above-quoted Article
1001, she is entitled to the of the inheritance and the respondents to the other . In effect, pro
indiviso is the share of Generosa as the surviving spouse, i.e., as her share of the conjugal
property estate and of the remaining as share as heir from her husbands estate. Thus, we find
well taken the petitioners assertion that the annulment of the extra-judicial partition between
Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo does not necessarily result in respondents having exclusive
right to the conjugal property, as erroneously found by the respondent court. Generosa, during
her lifetime, had the right to enjoy and dispose of her property without other limitations than
those established by law,xii[14] which right she exercised by executing a deed of sale in favor of
petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
Petitioners assails respondents right, not being heirs of Generosa, to question the validity of the
deed of sale since the action for the annulment of contracts may only be instituted by all who are
thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily.xii[15]
We disagree.
As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party obliged principally or
subsidiarily under a contract. However, when a contract prejudices the rights of a third person, he
may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to
one of the contracting parties, and can show detriment which would positively result to him from
the contract in which he had no intervention.xii[16] As we have discussed above, respondents are
entitled to the of the entire conjugal property, ie., lot and building; however considering that

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

widow Generosa, during her lifetime , sold the entire building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez,
respondents had been deprived of their share therein, thus the deed of sale was prejudicial to the
interest of respondents as regards their share in the building. Respondents therefore, have a cause
of action to seek the annulment of said deed of sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in declaring null and void the deed of
sale executed between Generosa and petitioner Eddie Fernandez concluding that the same was
simulated or false and in affirming the trial courts findings that the deed was prepared and
executed under abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances without however, particularly
stating the circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and simulated because there was no
consideration for the sale. However, this assertion was controverted by vendee petitioner Eddie
Fernandez declaration, that the money he paid for the sale came from his savings as overseas
contract worker in Saudi Arabia from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to controvert by
presenting evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration
cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration.xii[17] Under Art. 1354 of
the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the deed of sale was not that of Generosa
because she was already bedridden with both legs amputated before she died. Forgery cannot be
presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidencexii[18] and whoever alleges
it has the burden of proving the same;xii[19] a burden respondents failed to discharge. The
respondents had not presented any convincing proof to override the evidentiary value of the duly
notarized deed of sale. A notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal
manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all
these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.xii[20]
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez,
i.e. she did not only sell her undivided share in the building but also the share of the respondents.
We rule, that such a sale of the entire building without the consent of the respondents is not null
and void as only the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer,
petitioner Eddie , a co-owner of the share of the building together with the respondents who
owned the share therein.xii[21]
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and attorneys fees awarded by the trial
court, we find them to be bereft of factual basis. A party is entitled to an adequate compensation
for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proven.xii[22] Such damages, to be
recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty.xii[23] Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages.xii[24] The testimony of respondent Romeo
Fernandez that he suffered around P100,000 actual damages was not supported by any
documentary or other admissible evidence. We also agree with the petitioners that the respondent

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

court should not have awarded moral damages in the amount of P100,000 since they also failed
to show proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. Attorneys fees should likewise be deleted for lack of
factual basis and legal justification. Both the lower courts did not cite specific factual basis to
justify the award of attorneys fees, which is in violation of the proscription against the imposition
of a penalty on the right to litigate.xii[25]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is hereby Affirmed with
Modification, as follows:
1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the share of the conjugal
lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez who died childless and
intestate;
2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner Rodolfo in the
conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;
3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the share of Generosa sold to petitioner
Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and a new title should be issued in the names of
petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents as co-owners of the and shares respectively in the
conjugal building.
4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorneys fees are deleted.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005]
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION
OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as
JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG,
duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL
REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.
DECISION

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner
sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their
son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they
will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in
Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried
in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against
because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might
also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan
sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is,
they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is
requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn1" }
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn2" } The trial court
found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner
Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid
not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is
merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person,
names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family
Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and
there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he
is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn3" }
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a resolution
dated 20 May 2004.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn4" } The trial court
maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the
dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The
dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of
the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name
would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to
grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn5" }
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45){ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn6" } arguing that the
trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is:
whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn7" }
of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that [W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a
need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust
to his new environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration
the best interest of the child.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn8" } It is argued that
convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice
the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name Carulasan will cause him undue
embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social
acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error
for the trial court to have denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the age of
majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to previous cases{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn9" } decided by this
Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn10" }
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition. The
OSG filed its Comment{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn11" } positing that
the trial court correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under
Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their
father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same.
According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan
is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition
for change of name and/or cancellation of entry.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn12" } The OSG also
adds that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioners allegation that the continued use of the
middle name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The
OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the childs middle
name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence,
while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both
use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop
the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually
proscribed by Singaporean law.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn13" }
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne
by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege
and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in
his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn14" }
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for
which the change is sought.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn15" } To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason
therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn16" }
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause
is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to
the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in
the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged
in the courts.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn17" }
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek to
change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name
usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving
requests for change of the given name{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn18" } and none on
requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the
middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this point. We quote, thus:
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the
identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the
essential thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or
misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at
birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the
individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody
can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may
be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of
man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn19" }
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle
names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal
lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the
same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally
use the surname of the father.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn20" } The Family
Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn21" }
while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn22" }
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears
only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate
child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a
public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his
middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child
or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the
middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a
surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would
help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support, he
cites Oshita v. Republic{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn23" } and Calderon
v. Republic,{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn24" } which,
however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena Bartolome,
and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to
Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the following considerations: she
had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who had
also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mothers surname; she was embarrassed
to bear a Japanese surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World
War; and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose
or that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate minor
child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her name to
Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her
mothers husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be
granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into consideration
the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which
she would carry if she continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court
pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to
improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the
interests of the State or of other people.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,{ HYPERLINK

"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn25" } in arguing that
although Article 174 of the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames
of the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one family
name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate
daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S.
Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her school records and in her voters
registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that
while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use
the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm
other to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to
grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards set
in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to
say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all analogous to
the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon,
where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name.
Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing
the effects of their decision to change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that
the reason for the grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence
of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible
animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in
addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court
granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by a name different
from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in her school records and
voters registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in behalf
of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that he does not
have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in
Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount
consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition
for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.{ HYPERLINK

"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/159966.htm" \l "_ftn26" } As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn1" } to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn2" } that her mother
is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn3" } the trial court
rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of
any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is
qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition
would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The
Court further holds that the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the
present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the
petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn4" }
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration{
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn5" }
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn6" } the trial court
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname
of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to
have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her
right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle
name Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued
use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for
the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of
that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother
as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of
the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the
Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of
the mother.{ HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm"
\l "_ftn7" }
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn8" } It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or
family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled
is fixed by law.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn9" }

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use
of surname{ HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm"
\l "_ftn10" } of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or
a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally
use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname,
unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use
such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the
word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 176{ HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm"
\l "_ftn11" } of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what
middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in
case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case,
the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365
of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent
on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters
and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname
and that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family to which he belongs,
for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if
he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will
his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it
should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the
case of the surname of the mother.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364, which
reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce
Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him
Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is
David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it
shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the
surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they
take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article
(10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered
in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that
the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the
American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which
is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee approved the suggestion.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn12" } (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters.{ HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l
"_ftn13" } Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as
a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn14" }
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn15" } It is a
juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn16" } The modern
trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn17" } This was,
indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the
Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to
favor the adopted child.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn18" } Republic Act
No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn19" } secures these
rights and privileges for the adopted.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn20" }
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn21" } of the Family
Code and Section 17{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn22" } Article V of
RA 8552.{ HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm"
\l "_ftn23" }
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above.
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article
189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn24" }, Article V of
RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her
natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and
Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers
surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her
mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn25" } The interests
and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn26" } hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn27" }
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some
way of interpreting the law.{ HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/148311.htm" \l "_ftn28" }
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not
be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname GARCIA as her middle
name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.
SO ORDERED.