ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYOGR No.

L-17014, August 11, 1921

FACTS:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived together
as man and wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home with the
intention of living separate from her husband. Marianos efforts to induce her to resume marital
relations were all in vain. Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and crosscomplaint that she had been compelled to leave because of the cruel treatment of her husband. She in
turn prayed that a decree of separation be declared and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as
well as permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before
him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued
ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the
permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other
HELD: NO.
It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the
pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no
other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these
countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows
that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano
B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the
marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt,
entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it
is her duty to return. Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original
complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from
the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The
plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either
instance.

Pelayo vs Lauron 12 phil 453

FACTS:
Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during the child delivery of the
daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just and equitable value of services rendered by him was
P500.00 which the defendants refused to pay without alleging any good reason. With this, the plaintiff
prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants for the sum of P500.00 and
costs.
The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff, contending that their daughter-inlaw had died in consequence of the child-birth, and that when she was alive, she lived with her
husband independently and in a separate house, that on the day she gave birth she was in the house
of the defendants and her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical assistance
rendered to their daughter-in-law.
HELD:
According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157), obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the
Code or in special law, etc., are the only demandable ones.

The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support as provided by the law or the
Code. Consequently, the obligation to pay the plaintiff for the medical assistance rendered to the
defendants daughter-in-law must be couched on the husband.

In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable
services of a physician at such critical moments is especially established by the law and the
compliance therewith is unavoidable.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000

FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He
was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely
Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from
bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio
Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in
Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city.
The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which
caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March
1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging
that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano
from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such
petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos
liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to
discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject
of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to
visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at
liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a
matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil 252

FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on
January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a
month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for
support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste
and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent
maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The
trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support
her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or
divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage.
The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either
by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this
option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful
acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs
and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate
maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989

MOISES JOCSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO
VASQUEZ, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA- G.R. No. 63474, promulgated on April 30, 1980, entitled "MOISES JOCSON, plaintiffappellee, versus AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ and ERNESTO VASQUEZ, defendant-appellants,"
upholding the validity of three (3) documents questioned by Moises Jocson, in total reversal of the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, which declared them as null and void;
and of its resolution, dated September 30, 1980, denying therein appellee's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of
the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of
Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled.
Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972.
As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed
by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share
in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be
declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and
Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
The documents, which were presented as evidence not by Moises Jocson, as the party assailing its
validity, but rather by herein respondents, are the following:
1) "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa," marked as Exhibit 3 (pp. 12-13, Records) for the defendant in the
court a quo, dated July 27, 1968. By this document Emilio Jocson sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez six
(6) parcels of land, all located at Naic, Cavite, for the sum of ten thousand P10,000.00 pesos. On the
same document Emilio Jocson acknowledged receipt of the purchase price, thus:
Na ngayon, alang-alang sa halagang SAMPUNG LIBONG PISO (P10,000) salaping Pilipino na aking
tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob at ang pagkakatanggap ay aking hayagang inaamin sa
pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, sa aking anak na si Agustina Jocson, na may sapat na gulang,
mamamayang Pilipino, asawa ni Ernesto Vasquez, at naninirahan sa Poblacion, Naic, Cavite, ay aking
ipinagbile ng lubusan at kagyat at walang ano mang pasubali ang nabanggit na anim na pirasong lupa
na nasa unang dahon ng dokumentong ito, sa nabanggit na Agustina Jocson, at sa kaniyang
tagapagmana o makakahalili at gayon din nais kong banggitin na kahit na may kamurahan ang ginawa
kong pagbibile ay dahilan sa ang nakabile ay aking anak na sa akin at mapaglingkod, madamayin at
ma-alalahanin, na tulad din ng isa ko pang anak na lalaki. Ang kuartang tinanggap ko na P10,000.00,
ay gagamitin ko sa aking katandaan at mga huling araw at sa aking mga ibang mahahalagang
pangangailangan. [Emphasis supplied]
Na nais ko ring banggitin na ang ginawa kong ito ay hindi labag sa ano mang batas o kautusan,
sapagkat ang aking pinagbile ay akin at nasa aking pangalan. Ang mga lupang nasa pangalan ng aking
nasirang asawa ay hindi ko ginagalaw ni pinakikialaman at iyon ay dapat na hatiin ng dalawa kong
anak alinsunod sa umiiral na batas (p. 13, Records.)

2) "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan,"dated July 27,1968, marked as Exhibit 4 (p. 14, Records). On the
face of this document, Emilio Jocson purportedly sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, for the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, two rice mills and a camarin (camalig) located at Naic, Cavite. As in
the first document, Moises Jocson acknowledged receipt of the purchase price:
'Na alang-alang sa halagang LIMANG LIBONG PISO (P5,000.00) salaping Pilipino na aking tinanggap ng
buong kasiyahan loob sa aking anak na Agustina Jocson .... Na ang halagang ibinayad sa akin ay may
kamurahan ng kaunti ngunit dahil sa malaking pagtingin ko sa kaniya ... kaya at pinagbile ko sa kaniya
ang mga nabanggit na pagaari kahit na hindi malaking halaga ... (p. 14, Records).
3) Lastly, the "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Sale, "dated March 9, 1969, marked
as Exhibit 2 (p. 10-11, Records), whereby Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, without the
participation and intervention of Moises Jocson, extrajudicially partitioned the unsettled estate of
Alejandra Poblete, dividing the same into three parts, one-third (1/3) each for the heirs of Alejandra
Poblete, namely: Emilio Jocson, Agustina Jocson-Vasquez and Moises Jocson. By the same instrument,
Emilio sold his one- third (1/3) share to Agustin for the sum of EIGHT THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS. As
in the preceding documents, Emilio Jocson acknowledged receipt of the purchase price:

Now for and in consideration of the sum of only eight thousand (P8,000.00) pesos, which I, the herein
Emilio Jocson had received from my daughter Agustina Jocson, do hereby sell, cede, convey and
transfer, unto the said Agustina Jocson, her heirs and assigns, administrators and successors in
interests, in the nature of absolute and irrevocable sale, all my rights, interest, shares and
participation, which is equivalent to one third (1/3) share in the properties herein mentioned and
described the one third being adjudicated unto Agustina Jocson and the other third (1/3) portion being
the share of Moises Jocson. (p. 11, Records).
These documents were executed before a notary public. Exhibits 3 and 4 were registered with the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite on July 29, 1968 and the transfer certificates of title covering
the properties therein in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," were cancelled and
new certificates of title were issued in the name of Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Exhibit 2 was not
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds.
Herein petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 27, Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the
then Court of First Instance of Naic, Cavite (docketed as Civil Case No. TM- 531), and which was twice
amended. In his Second Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein petitioner assailed
the above documents, as aforementioned, for being null and void.
It is necessary to partly quote the allegation of petitioner in his complaint for the reason that the
nature of his causes of action is at issue, thus:
8. [With regard the first document, that] the defendants, through fraud, deceit, undue pressure and
influence and other illegal machinations, were able to induce, led, and procured their father ... to sign
[the] contract of sale ..., for the simulated price of P10,000.00, which is a consideration that is
shocking to the conscience of ordinary man and despite the fact that said defendants have no work or
livelihood of their own ...; that the sale is null and void, also, because it is fictitious, simulated and
fabricated contract x x x (pp. 52-53, Record on Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
xxx xxx xxx
12. [With regards the second and third document, that they] are null and void because the consent of
the father, Emilio Jocson, was obtained with fraud, deceit, undue pressure, misrepresentation and
unlawful machinations and trickeries committed by the defendant on him; and that the said contracts
are simulated, fabricated and fictitious, having been made deliberately to exclude the plaintiff from
participating and with the dishonest and selfish motive on the part of the defendants to defraud him of
his legitimate share on said properties [subject matter thereof]; and that without any other business or
employment or any other source of income, defendants who were just employed in the management
and administration of the business of their parents, would not have the sufficient and ample means to

purchase the said properties except by getting the earnings of the business or by simulated
consideration ... (pp. 54-55, Record on Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner explained that there could be no real sale between a father and daughter who are living
under the same roof, especially so when the father has no need of money as the properties supposedly
sold were all income-producing. Further, petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3
and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former,
therefore, cannot validly sell (pp. 53, 57, Record on Appeal). As far as Exhibit 2 is concerned, petitioner
questions not the extrajudicial partition but only the sale by his father to Agustina of the former's 1/3
share (p. 13, Rollo).
The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of petitioner (pp. 59-81, Record on Appeal). It
declared that the considerations mentioned in the documents were merely simulated and fictitious
because: 1) there was no showing that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez paid for the properties; 2) the prices
were grossly inadequate which is tantamount to lack of consideration at all; and 3) the improbability of
the sale between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, taking into consideration the
circumstances obtaining between the parties; and that the real intention of the parties were donations
designed to exclude Moises Jocson from participating in the estate of his parents. It further declared
the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 as conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, because they were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" and
ordered that the properties subject matter of all the documents be registered in the name of herein
petitioners and private respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and
reversed that of the trial court's and ruled that:
1. That insofar as Exhibits 3 and 4 are concerned the appellee's complaint for annulment, which is
indisputably based on fraud, and undue influence, is now barred by prescription, pursuant to the
settled rule that an action for annulment of a contract based on fraud must be filed within four (4)
years, from the discovery of the fraud, ... which in legal contemplation is deemed to be the date of the
registration of said document with the Register of Deeds ... and the records admittedly show that both
Exhibits 3 and 4, were all registered on July 29, 1968, while on the other hand, the appellee's
complaint was filed on June 20, 1973, clearly beyond the aforesaid four-year prescriptive period
provided by law;
2. That the aforesaid contracts, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, are decisively not simulated or fictitious contracts,
since Emilio Jocson actually and really intended them to be effective and binding against him, as to
divest him of the full dominion and ownership over the properties subject of said assailed contracts, as
in fact all his titles over the same were all cancelled and new ones issued to appellant Agustina JocsonVasquez ...;
3. That in regard to Exhibit 2, the same is valid and subsisting, and the partition with sale therein made
by and between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, affecting the 2/3 portion of the subject
properties described therein have all been made in accordance with Article 996 of the New Civil Code
on intestate succession, and the appellee's (herein petitioner) remaining 1/3 has not been prejudiced
(pp. 41-42, Rollo).
In this petition for review, Moises Jocson raised the following assignments of errors:
1. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SUIT FOR THE
ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH THE TRIAL COURT IS "BASED ON FRAUD"
AND NOT ON ITS INEXISTENCE AND NULLITY BECAUSE OF IT'S BEING SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS OR
WHOSE CAUSE IS CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND GOOD CUSTOMS?
II. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY
PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION?
III. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INEXISTENT AND NULL
AND VOID THE CONTRACTS IN QUESTION AND IN REVERSING THE DECLARING DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT? (p. 2, Rollo)

I.The first and second assignments of errors are related and shall be jointly discussed.
According to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner's causes of action were based on fraud. Under
Article 1330 of the Civil Code, a contract tainted by vitiated consent, as when consent was obtained
through fraud, is voidable; and the action for annulment must be brought within four years from the
time of the discovery of the fraud (Article 1391, par. 4, Civil Code), otherwise the contract may no
longer be contested. Under present jurisprudence, discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place at
the time the convenant was registered with the Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman, No. L19060, May 29,1964, 11 SCRA 153). Since Exhibits 3 and 4 were registered on July 29, 1968 but Moises
Jocson filed his complaint only on June 20, 1973, the Court of Appeals ruled that insofar as these
documents were concerned, petitioner's "annulment suit" had prescribed.
If fraud were the only ground relied upon by Moises Jocson in assailing the questioned documents, We
would have sustained the above pronouncement. But it is not so. As pointed out by petitioner, he
further assailed the deeds of conveyance on the ground that they were without consideration since the
amounts appearing thereon as paid were in fact merely simulated.
According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, contracts without cause produce no effect whatsoever. A
contract of sale with a simulated price is void (Article 1471; also Article 1409 [3]]), and an action for
the declaration of its nullity does not prescribe (Article 1410, Civil Code; See also, Castillo v. Galvan,
No. L-27841, October 20, l978, 85 SCRA 526). Moises Jocsons saction, therefore, being for the judicial
declaration of nullity of Exhibits 3 and 4 on the ground of simulated price, is imprescriptible.
II.For petitioner, however, the above discussion may be purely academic. The burden of proof in
showing that contracts lack consideration rests on he who alleged it. The degree of proof becomes
more stringent where the documents themselves show that the vendor acknowledged receipt of the
price, and more so where the documents were notarized, as in the case at bar. Upon consideration of
the records of this case, We are of the opinion that petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the
questioned documents are without consideration.
Firstly, Moises Jocson's claim that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez had no other source of income other than
what she derives from helping in the management of the family business (ricefields and ricemills), and
which was insufficient to pay for the purchase price, was contradicted by his own witness, Isaac
Bagnas, who testified that Agustina and her husband were engaged in the buy and sell of palay and
rice (p. 10, t.s.n., January 14, 1975). Amazingly, petitioner himself and his wife testified that they did
not know whether or not Agustina was involved in some other business (p. 40, t.s.n., July 30, 1974; p.
36, t.s.n., May 24, 1974).

On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged in the business of buying and selling palay
and rice even before her marriage to Ernesto Vasquez sometime in 1948 and continued doing so
thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n., March 15, 1976). Considering the foregoing and the presumption that a contract
is with a consideration (Article 1354, Civil Code), it is clear that petitioner miserably failed to prove his
allegation.
Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because of alleged inadequacy of price. To begin
with, there was no showing that the prices were grossly inadequate. In fact, the total purchase price
paid by Agustina Jocson-Vasquez is above the total assessed value of the properties alleged by
petitioner. In his Second Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged that the total assessed value of the
properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 was P8,920; Exhibit 4, P3,500; and Exhibit 2, P 24,840, while the
purchase price paid was P10,000, P5,000, and P8,000, respectively, the latter for the 1/3 share of
Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal properties of his wife, Alejandra Poblete. And any difference
between the market value and the purchase price, which as admitted by Emilio Jocson was only slight,
may not be so shocking considering that the sales were effected by a father to her daughter in which
case filial love must be taken into consideration (Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-46430-31, April
30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332).
Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate
a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract

(Article 1470, Civil Code) and there is nothing in the records at all to indicate any defect in Emilio
Jocson's consent.
Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale between a father and his daughter is purely
speculative which has no relevance to a contract where all the essential requisites of consent, object
and cause are clearly present.
There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing Exhibits 3 and 4, that the properties
subject matter therein are conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. It is the position
of petitioner that since the properties sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3 were registered
in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the certificates of title he presented as
evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J', pp. 4-9, Records) were enough proof to show that the properties covered
therein were acquired during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under Article 160 of the
Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637, 644, We held that:
Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal assets, the spouses Perez adduced not a
modicum of evidence, although they repeatedly invoked article 160 of the New Civil Code which
provides that ... . As interpreted by this Court, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano [62 Phil. 629, 639], it was held that
"according to law and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the Property was acquired during the
marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property." In the recent case of Maramba vs.
Lozano, et. al. [L-21533, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 474], this Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated
that "the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to property acquired during the
marriage," and then concluded that since "there is no showing as to when the property in question was
acquired...the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative." Similarly, in the case at
bar, since there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were acquired, the fact that they are
registered in the name of the husband alone is an indication that the shares belong exclusively to said
spouse.'
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, No. L-24571, December 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 289, and later in Torela vs. Torela, No.
1,27843, October 11, 1979, 93 SCRA 391.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must
first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient.
The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title
and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title
but merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties
under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only
after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title
as married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were
exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because the words "married to' preceding
"Alejandra Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson Litam v. Rivera, 100 Phil.
354; Stuart v. Yatco, No. L-16467, April 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 1143; Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733,
December 16, 1986, 146 SCRA 282). In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that
Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and
that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.

We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently held that registration of the property in
the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal (See Bucoy vs.
Paulino, No. L-25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248). But this ruling is not inconsistent with the above
pronouncement for in those cases there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name
of only one spouse, were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired during the
marriage of the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse party having
presented proof to rebut the presumption (See Mendoza vs- Reyes, No. L-31618, August 17, 1983, 124
SCRA 154).
In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented sufficient proof to show that the disputed
properties were acquired during his parents' coverture. We would have ruled that the properties,
though registered in the name of Emilio Jocson alone, are conjugal properties in view of the
presumption under Article 160. There being no such proof, the condition sine qua non for the
application of the presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3
are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.
There being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills, which are the subject of Exhibit 4,
were conjugal properties of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they should be
considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson, the burden of proof being on
petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

TODA JR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Benigno Toda, Jr. (Benigno for brevity) and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda (Rose Marie for brevity)
were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two children. Individual differences and the
alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to
file on December 18, 1979 in the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, 2 as Civil Case No. 35566,

a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation
of conjugal funds against Benigno. After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid
further "disagreeable proceedings," filed on April 1, 1981 a joint petition for judicial approval of
dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code, docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 9478, 3 which was consolidated with the aforesaid civil case. This petition which was signed by
the parties on March 30, 1981, embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their
respective shares in the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the said
Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP of the Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this
Court. The said petition and the compromise agreement therein were approved by the trial court
in its order of June 9, 1981. Thereafter, several orders were issued by the lower court pertaining to the
interpretation and implementation of the compromise agreement
ISSUE: When does the compromise agreement became effective?
HELD:
We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the compromise agreement became
effective only on June 9, 1981, the date it was approved by the trial court, and not on March 30, 1981
when it was signed by the parties. Under Article 134 of the Family Code in the absence of express
declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between the spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order hence, the separation of property is not
effected by mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree
of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial
approval, without which it is void. Furthermore, Article 137 of the said code explicitly pro-vides that the
conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property.
TODA, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS
March 26, 1990 (183 SCRA 713)
FACTS:
Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two
children. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal
union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in the former Court of First Instance
of Rizal, as Civil Case No. 35566, a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged
mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further disagreeable proceedings, filed on April
1, 1981 a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of
the Civil Code, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 9478, which was consolidated with the aforesaid
civil case. This petition which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981, embodied a compromise
agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal partnership assets and
dismissing with prejudice the said Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP of the Court of Appeals
and G.R. No. 56121 of this Court. The said petition and the compromise agreement therein were
approved by the trial court in its order of June 9, 1981.
HELD:
We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the compromise agreement became
effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the trial court, and not on March
30,1981 when it was signed by the parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, 14 (i)n the absence of
an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. Hence, the separation of
property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the
decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval,
without which it is void. 15 Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property.
Wong vs. IAC

GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991

FACTS:
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even during the early
years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately. During the marriage
or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the
money borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with
Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina
failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value.
Katrina issued in September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The
spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and
her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court
ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles
City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public
auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption,
Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.

ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through the
conjugal property.

HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with Anita. The
husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into
such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the
husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal
partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband and even though
they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for support of the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico
and the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The
conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter
without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also
no evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against
Katrina, personally and exclusively.

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the
correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is
declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the
contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage
were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial
court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which
parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent
Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of
the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of
Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for
proper recording in the registry of marriages. 2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles
50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during
the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their
father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to
have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares,
plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal
shares.

In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply. 3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as
null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be
governed by the rules on ownership.

The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers
to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the
procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property. 4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should
be held controlling: he argues that:
IArticle 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically
incapacitated.
IIArticles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of
the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared
void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
IIIAssuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
IVIt is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay. 5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; 6 it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the
former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment
to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law)
refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of

eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" 7 of the
Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." 8 Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of
the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property,
without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the coownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common
children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default
thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation 9
or declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however,
are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid
marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. 11
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property,
the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the
marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102
and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized
for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of
Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only,
by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of
the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of
remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the
present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is
not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of the Family
Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of
a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that
the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in
valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or
spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership
subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,

Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the
spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS SPS. CELSO
ATAYAN and NILDA HICBAN and CONSUELO VDA. DE GARCIA, REMEDIOS, ELVIRA, OFELIA, VIRGILIO,
MARILOU, and LOLITA all surnamed GARCIA, and HEIRS OF CASTOR GARCIA and of SANTIAGO GARCIA,
JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 111547 January 27, 1997
Facts:
A parcel of land was inherited by Santiago Garcia. However, the title over the land was issued
in the name of "Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Garcia" when Santiago married to Consuelo. After
the death of Santiago, a writ of preliminary attachment was issued in favour of petitioner against
Consuelo Garcia. The property was sold at public auction and petitioner emerged as the highest bidder.
Spouses Atayan filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and transfer certificate of title with
damages against heirs of Santiago Garcia who sold to them their pro indiviso shares in the parcel of
land:
Issue:
Whether the title to land Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Garcia give rise to
presumption of conjugality.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that statement in a Transfer Certificate of Title describing the owner as
married to somebody does not by itself give rise to the presumption of conjugality. It was said that the
presumption under the law that all properties of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership
applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. The mere fact
that the title was issued when the spouses were already married is not sufficient proof of conjugality
especially where there was no proof as to when the property was acquired.

G.R. No. 111547 January 27, 1997

SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS SPS. CELSO
ATAYAN and NILDA HICBAN and CONSUELO VDA. DE GARCIA, REMEDIOS, ELVIRA, OFELIA, VIRGILIO,
MARILOU, and LOLITA all surnamed GARCIA, and HEIRS OF CASTOR GARCIA and of SANTIAGO GARCIA,
JR., respondents.
The instant controversy involves Lot C of the amended plan Psu-22983 Amd., situated in Barrio
Santisima Cruz, Sta. Cruz, Laguna with an area of 273 square meters. The said parcel of land was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19175 issued in the name of Santiago Garcia who died on
October 2, 1967. Some six years after Santiago Garcia's death, or on March 10, 1973, the then Court of
First Instance of Manila issued an order granting Trinidad Estonina's application for a writ of preliminary
attachment in Civil Case No. 88430 entitled "Trinidad Estonina et al., plaintiffs -versus-Consuelo Garcia
et al., defendants". Consequently, a notice of attachment was inscribed as a memorandum of
encumbrance at the back of TCT No. T-19175 in favor of Trinidad Estonina covering all the rights, title,
interest, and participation that Consuelo Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia, may have in and to the
parcel of land covered by the said title.
As a result of a prior sale made by Santiago Garcia to Anselmo Balasoto of a sixty square meter portion
of the said parcel of land, TCT. No. T-19175 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 77215 was
issued on July 25, 1975 in the name of Santiago Garcia covering the remaining 213 square meters. TCT
No. 77215 was in turn cancelled on June 27, 1977 because of another sale purportedly made during his
lifetime by Santiago Garcia to his wife's niece, Ofelia Garcia, and TCT No. 82229 was issued in the
name of the latter.
On August 14, 1977, the children of Santiago Garcia with his first wife, Adela Isoreta, namely Ofelia,
Remedios, Elvira and Castor, all surnamed Garcia, executed a deed selling, transferring and conveying
unto the spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban (hereinafter referred to as the spouses Atayan for
brevity) their "title, rights, interest and participation which is four tenths (4/10) pro indiviso share" in
the said parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. About a year after, Santiago Garcia's second wife
and widow, Consuelo Garcia and their children, Virgilio, Marilou and Lolita, all surnamed Garcia,
followed suit and also sold to the spouses Atayan, their four-tenths (4/10) pro indidviso share in the
same parcel of land. On February 22, 1980, Estrella R. Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia, Jr.
(Santiago Garcia's son from his first marriage), and their children, Roderick, Elizabeth, Dorothy and
Erlinda, likewise sold to the spouses Atayan, their one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share in the parcel of
land covered by TCT No. T-82229. 1
Subsequent to a favorable decision obtained by Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430 against
Consuelo Garcia, execution pending appeal was made on the parcel of land formerly covered by TCT
No. T-19175 (now covered by TCT No. T-82229) on July 20, 1979. The said parcel of land was sold at a
public auction where Trinidad Estonina was the highest bidder. Consuelo Garcia appealed the decision
in Civil Case No. 88430 before the then Intermediate Appellate Court which, however, ruled in favor of
Trinidad Estonina. Thus, on February 29, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision
declaring "owner's copy of Certificate of Title No. T-82229 a NULLITY and/or CANCELLED". Upon the
finality of the said decision, TCT No. T-82229 was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Laguna and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. T-99961 was issued in favor of "Trinidad Estonina married to Paulino Estonina". 2
On July 25, 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and transfer
certificate of title with damages before Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, impleading as defendants therein the spouses Trinidad and Paulino Estonina (hereinafter
referred to as the spouses Estonina for brevity), Nicanor E. Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier, Edmund R.
Solidum, the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and the heirs of Santiago Garcia who sold to the spouses
Atayan their pro indiviso shares in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. The complaint
prayed:
that the sale at public auction of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 77215 . . . and the Sheriff's final
deed . . . be declared null and void; that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel TCT No. T-99961 in
the name of Trinidad S. Estonina married to Paulino Estonina . . . ; that the plaintiffs be declared
owners of nine-tenths (9/10) pro indiviso interests, shares and participation in the parcel of land
covered by TCT No.

T-77215, . . . , and the Register of Deeds ordered to issue a new certificate of title corresponding
thereto; and that the defendants Nicanor E. Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier and Edmund R. Solidum be
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs spouses and (sic) amount of P30,000 for attorney's
fees, P15,000 for litigation expenses incurred, P20,000 for moral damages and P15,000 for exemplary
damages . . . 3
In their amended answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the spouses Estonina claimed that:
the plaintiffs (spouses Atayan) had acted in bad faith in allegedly purchasing the parcel of land, they
being aware that it was the subject of a lawful and valid attachment; that there was no valid
extrajudicial settlement of agreement executed by the heirs of Santiago Garcia by which their rights
could have been adjusted and settled before doing anything with his property; that the deeds of sale
executed by his heirs were anomalous, fictitious and simulated intended to defeat the adverse
judgment rendered by the Court against them and the writ of attachment issued pursuant thereto as
they were derived from a falsified deed of sale purportedly executed by Santiago Garcia on June 23,
1967; that the property in question is presumed to be conjugal answerable for obligations and
liabilities of the conjugal partnership incurred during the existence of the partnership; and that the
plaintiffs were guilty of laches (pp. 90-99, rec.). 4
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. It found, among
others, that the property covered by TCT No. T-19175 and now covered by TCT No. T-82229, was
acquired during the marriage of Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Gaza, and is presumed to be conjugal in
nature. Upon the death of Santiago Garcia on October 2, 1967, his conjugal share of one-half (l/2) of
the said parcel of land was transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. By the law on intestate
succession, his nine children, five by his first wife and four out of the subsequent marriage, and
Consuelo Garcia, his second wife and widow, inherited the same at one-tenth (1/10) each pro indiviso.
The remaining one-half (1/2) pertained to the conjugal share of Consuelo Garcia. Thus, inasmuch as
Consuelo Garcia inherited one-tenth (1/10) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is
the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 55% (or 1/10 plus 1/2) of
the said parcel of land. 5 Finding as such, the RTC held that what could be attached by the spouses
Estonina and later levied on execution and sold at public auction was only Consuelo Garcia's rights and
interests which is fifty five per cent (55%) of the property. Thus, the RTC ordered the Register of Deeds
of the Province of Laguna, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-99961 in the name of TRINIDAD S.
ESTONINA, married to Paulino Estonina, and issue another one, also in her name, married to the same
person, stating therein that said person is the owner of the property therein covered to the extent of
55% pro indiviso, and the remaining 45% belongs to the heirs of Santiago Garcia pro indiviso. 6

Both the spouses Atayan and the heirs of Santiago Garcia appealed to the herein public respondent
Court of Appeals. After a thorough review of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals concluded
that contrary to the finding of the RTC, the parcel of land in question was not the conjugal property of
Santiago and Consuelo Garcia, but was the former's exclusive property. It was therefore the entire
property that formed part of Santiago Garcia's estate upon his death. When Santiago Garcia died, his
nine children and Consuelo Garcia inherited the said property each to the extent of one-tenth (1/10)
pro indiviso share. Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcia's one-tenth(l/l0) pro indiviso share in the parcel
of land in question which could be validly attached, levied and sold in execution to satisfy the
judgment against her and in favor of Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430. On August 12, 1993,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-99961, covering Lot 2-C (LRC) Psd 223486, situated in Sta. Cruz, Laguna issued
in the name of Trinidad S. Estonina, married to Paulino Estonina . . . , is hereby ordered cancelled and
nullified and the Register of Deeds of Laguna ordered to issue another in lieu thereof covering the
same parcel of land in the name of Trinidad S. Estonina, widow, one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share,
and spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban, nine-tenths (9/10) pro indiviso share. 7
Aggrieved, the spouses Estonina filed this petition and raised the following issues:

I.The Court of Appeals, in declaring the property in question as exclusive property of Santiago Garcia,
DISREGARDED the long established doctrine that the trial court's findings especially as to the
credibility of the witnesses should be respected.
II.The Court of Appeals, in issuing the questioned decision, solely centered on the nature of the
property in question, and conveniently brushed aside the following legal issues raised on appeal
(thereby leading to an erroneous judgment), to wit:
(a) That the plaintiffs-appellant (Sps. Atayan and now private respondents) have no cause of action
and/or lack cause of action against Estoninas (now petitioners). Assuming, arguendo that they have,
the same is now barred by laches. The same is true with the appellants Garcias (now also private
respondents). Hence, the title of Estonina should have been declared valid.
(b) That the plaintiffs-appellants (Sps. Atayan and now private respondents) are not parties to Civil
Case No. 88430 where the writ of attachment was issued and which resulted in the execution pending
appeal. Hence, they cannot attack the validity of the execution in this proceedings especially so when
judgment therein had already attained finality.
III.Consequently, by virtue of the foregoing errors, the Court of Appeals erred in not granting herein
petitioners' prayer that the trial court's findings be modified by upholding Estonina's title to the
property under TCT No. T-99961, and affirming in all other respect the order of the trial court. 8
The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court are deemed conclusive. 9 Thus, the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is generally limited to the
review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. As such, this Court is
generally not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. 10 This is, however, subject to several exceptions, one of which is when there is a
conflict between the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, as in this case,
warranting a review by this Court of such factual findings. 11
In concluding that the parcel of land in question was the conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo
Garcia, the trial court relied solely on the fact that when TCT No. T-19175 covering the said land was
issued, Santiago Garcia was already married to Consuelo Garcia, thus giving rise to the presumption
that the same was indeed conjugal. It found the testimony of Consuelo Garcia that the said property
was inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother to be self-serving and completely
disregarded the said testimony. And as regards the inscription at the back of the TCT No. T-19175 that:
[t]he property described in this title is subject to the claims of the heirs of the deceased Eugenia
Clemente, within two (2) years from January 27, 1961, in accordance with the provision of Section 4,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, 12
the trial court held that "there is no showing at all from said inscription that said property came from
the parents of Santiago Garcia." 13
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in taking the stance that the said land was the exclusive
property of Santiago Garcia, gave credence to the unrebutted testimony of Consuelo Garcia that the
said parcel of land was inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother Eugenia Clemente and
that it used to be part of a big tract of land which was divided among Santiago and his sisters.

The evidence on record as well as established jurisprudence on the matter, lead us to concur with the
finding of the Court of Appeals that the property involved in this dispute is indeed the exclusive
property of the deceased Santiago Garcia. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal
partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.
Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation
of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 14 In the case at bench, the petitioners have
been unable to present any proof that the property in question was acquired during the marriage of
Santiago and Consuelo. They anchor their claim solely on the fact that when the title over the land in

question was issued, Santiago was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the
name of "Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza". This, according to the spouses Estonina, suffices
to establish the conjugal nature of the property. The foregoing contention has no merit. In the case of
Jocson v. Court of Appeals 15 we held that:
The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim in insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that
the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof
are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one
already erdsting . . . . It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when
he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains
why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were
exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because the words "married to" preceding
"Alejandra Poblete" are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson . . . . In other words, the
import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having
been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to AlejandraPoblete. 16
Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question that formed
part of his estate and which passed to his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his death. And as
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, what could therefore be attached and sold at public auction in
Civil Case No. 88430 was only the one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia in the said
parcel of land. The sale at public auction of the disputed property in its entirety by the Sheriff in favor
of Trinidad Estonina over and above the one-tenth (1/10) share of Consuelo Garcia is null and void,
belonging as it does to the other heirs of Santiago Garcia and later to the spouses Atayan. Worth
reiterating is the basic precept that the power of the court in the execution of judgments extends only
over properties uncluestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. The levy by the sheriff of a property
by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as made under the authority of the court only
when the property levied upon belongs to the defendant. 17 For, as the saying goes, one man's goods
shall not be sold for another man's debts. 18
The right of a third-party claimant to file an independent action to vindicate his claim of ownership
over the properties seized is reserved by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. If property levied on be claimed by
any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an affidavit of his title
thereto or his right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of his right or title, and serve the
same upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the officer shall
not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the
officer, indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the
property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the
court issuing the writ of execution.
The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or the keeping of the property, to any third-party
claimant unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action for damages is brought by him
against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. But
nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to
the property by any other proper action.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
As stated in the case of Sy v. Discaya, 19 this "proper action" would have for its object the recovery of
ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the
allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third party claim and it may be brought
against the sheriff and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with him in the
supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself. Such "proper
action", as above pointed out, is and should be an entirely separate and distinct action from that in
which execution has issued, if instituted by a stranger to the latter suit. 20

In the case at bench, the filing by the spouses Atayan of an independent action with the court other
than the one which issued the writ of execution is proper as they were strangers to Civil Case No.
88430. Such an independent action cannot be considered as an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of
a co-equal and coordinate court. 21 While it is true that property in custody of the law may not be
interfered with, without the permission of the proper court, this rule is confined to cases where the
property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has proprietary interests. But when
the Sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger's property, the rule does not apply
and interference with his custody is not interference with another court's custody. 22
The foregoing puts to rest any and all questions raised regarding the propriety of the course of action
taken by the spouses Atayan in vindication of their claim over the land in question. Anent the
contention that the spouses Atayan are guilty of laches, suffice it to state that this residual argument
deserves scant consideration. Being strangers to Civil Case No. 88430 where the writ of execution over
the land in question was issued, they cannot be faulted for filing the "proper action" only in 1985 or six
(6) years after the levy on execution. Besides, it was only in 1984 that the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision finally cancelling the title of their predecessors-in-interest and issuing another one in favor of
Trinidad Estonina. The action filed by the spouses Atayan seeking the annulment of the sheriffs sale
and the transfer certificate of title with damages immediately thereafter or on July 25, 1985 cannot be
considered as undue delay nor does it imply a lack of interest to enforce their claim over the disputed
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
toto.
SO ORDERED.

Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998

FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC).
Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security
agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with
PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and
Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the
principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution.
Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent
spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent
spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the
benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order
paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of
sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.

ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.

HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from
the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.
Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of
his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are given to
another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot,
by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of
PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in
a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which
was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have
resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of
shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must
be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.

GUIANG v. COURT OF APPEALS

June 26, 1998 (291 SCRA 372)

FACTS:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of
the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while she was in Manila seeking
employment (with the consent of her husband), her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses Antonio
and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot on
which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and went back to the
subject property. Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable settlement
between the parties. Feeling that she had the shorter end of the bargain, respondent filed an Amended
Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain
deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and
void.

ISSUE: WON contract without the consent of wife is void

HELD:
Yes. Art 124 of the FC rules that In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Respondents consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent.
The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondents consent. To
constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
A void contract cannot be ratified.
Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and
perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is
clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after
which the barangay authorities secured an amicable settlement and petitioners filed before the MTC
a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the
property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private
respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this
document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.

FERRER VS FERRER
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari which assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated
16 August 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78525, reversing and setting aside the Order[2] dated 16 December
2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 in Civil Case No. MC02-1780. The
Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the Complaint[3] filed by petitioner Josefa Bautista Ferrer
against respondents Sps. Manuel M. Ferrer and Virginia Ferrer, and Sps. Ismael M. Ferrer and Flora
Ferrer in the aforesaid Civil Case No. MC02-1780.
In her Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements, sum of money, and accounting with prayer
for injunction and damages, petitioner alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), a halfbrother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael). Before her marriage to
Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67927.[4] He
applied for a loan with the Social Security System (SSS) to build improvements thereon, including a
residential house and a two-door apartment building. However, it was during their marriage that
payment of the loan was made using the couples conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner
posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that respondent Manuel
occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September 1991,
he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by
virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their
spouses. TCT No. 67927 was cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued and registered in the names of
respondents.
It is petitioners contention that on 2 October 1989, when her husband was already bedridden,
respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported to be his last will and
testament. The document, however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredos lot and the improvements
thereon. Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the RTC of Pasig, a Complaint for Annulment
of the said sale against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 61327.[5] On 22 June 1993, the RTC
dismissed the same.[6] The RTC found that the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, and public policy, and should be complied with by the parties in
good faith, there being no compelling reason
under the law to do otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, on 7
November 1994, this Court, in G.R. No. L-117067, finding no reversible error committed by the
appellate court in affirming the dismissal of the RTC, affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals.[7]
Further, in support of her Complaint, petitioner alluded to a portion of the Decision dated 22 June 1993
of the RTC in Civil Case No. 61327, which stated, to wit:
In determining which property is the principal and which is the accessory, the property of greater value
shall be considered the principal. In this case, the lot is the principal and the improvements the
accessories. Since Article 120 of the Family Code provides the rule that the ownership of accessory
follows the ownership of the principal, then the subject lot with all its improvements became an
exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with an obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership of
the cost of improvements at the time of liquidation of [the] conjugal partnership. Clearly, Alfredo has
all the rights to sell the subject property by himself without need of Josefas consent.[8]
According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows that, when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or
at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for the

cost of the improvements on Alfredos lot. She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted to
P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now
the registered owners of Alfredos lot. She averred that respondents cannot claim lack of knowledge
about the fact that the improvements were constructed using conjugal funds as they had occupied one
of the apartment buildings on Alfredos lot, and even paid rentals to petitioner. In addition, petitioner
prayed that respondents be ordered to render an accounting from September, 1991, on the income of
the boarding house constructed thereon which they had appropriated for themselves, and to remit
one-half thereof as her share. Finally, petitioner sought from respondents moral and exemplary
damages, litigation and incidental expenses.

For their part, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss,[9] contending that petitioner had no cause of
action against them, and that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment.
On 16 December 2002, the RTC rendered an Order,[10] denying the Motion to Dismiss. According to
the RTC, no pronouncement as to the improvements constructed on Alfredos lot has been made in Civil
Case No. 61327, and the payment of petitioners share in the conjugal partnership constitutes a
separate cause of action. A subsequent Order[11] dated 17 January 2003 was issued by the RTC,
denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari,
alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the RTC in denying the
dismissal.
On 16 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the Petition. It held that
petitioners Complaint failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court rationalized as follows:
[W]e believe that the instant complaint is not the proper action for the respondent to enforce her right
of reimbursement of the cost of the improvement[s] on the subject property. As correctly pointed out
by the petitioners, the same should be made and directed in the settlement of estate of her deceased
husband Alfredo Ferrer pursuant to Article 129[12] of the Family Code. Such being the case, it appears
that the complaint herein fails to state a cause of action against the petitioners, the latter not being
the proper parties against whom the subject action for reimbursement must be directed to. A
complaint states a cause of action where it contains three essential elements of a cause of action,
namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the
act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If these elements are absent, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action. Albeit the respondent herein has the legal right to be reimbursed of the cost of the
improvements of the subject property, it is not the petitioners but the estate of her deceased husband
which has the obligation to pay the same. The complaint herein is therefore dismissible for failure to
state a cause of action against the petitioners. Needless to say, the respondent is not without any
further recourse as she may file her claim against the estate of her deceased husband.
In light of the foregoing, we find that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitioners motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.[13]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon. However, on 17 December 2004, the
Court of Appeals rendered a Resolution[14] denying the motion.
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner submits the following grounds for the allowance of the instant Petition, to wit:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS COMPLAINT FAILS TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS, THE LATTER NOT BEING THE PROPER PARTIES
AGAINST WHOM THE SUBJECT ACTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT MUST BE DIRECTED TO.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT, HON.
RIZALINA T. CAPCO-UMALI, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
[RESPONDENTS] MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.[15]
Both arguments raise the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Section 1(g) Rule 16[16] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure makes it clear that failure to make a
sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint warrants the dismissal thereof. Section 2,
Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a
party violates the right of another. It is the delict or the wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff.[17]

A cause of action has the following essential elements, viz:

(1) A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.[18]
A complaint states a cause of action only when it has the three indispensable elements.[19]
In the determination of the presence of these elements, inquiry is confined to the four corners of the
complaint. Only the statements in the Complaint may be properly considered.[20] The absence of any
of these elements makes a complaint vulnerable to a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of a failure to
state a cause of action.[21]
After a reading of the allegations contained in petitioners Complaint, we are convinced that the same
failed to state a cause of action.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts a legal right in her favor by relying on the Decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 61327. It can be recalled that the aforesaid case is an action for Annulment filed by
Alfredo and petitioner against the respondents to seek annulment of the Deed of Sale, executed by
Alfredo in respondents favor and covering the herein subject premises. The Complaint was dismissed
by the RTC, and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court in G.R. No. L-117067.
According to petitioner, while the RTC in Civil Case No. 61327 recognized that the improvements
constructed on Alfredos lots were deemed as Alfredos exclusive and capital property, the court also
held that petitioner, as Alfredos spouse, has the right to claim reimbursement from the estate of
Alfredo. It is argued by petitioner that her husband had no other property, and his only property had
been sold to the respondents; hence, she has the legal right to claim for reimbursement from the
respondents who are now the owners of the lot and the improvements thereon. In fine, petitioner
asseverates that the Complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
because the respondents have the correlative obligation to pay the value of the improvements.
Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or
not to violate her right. While we could concede that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the
right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120[22] of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost

of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the
entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case
the property is sold by the owner-spouse.
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are
made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or
efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of
one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of
the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the
basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations contained in the Complaint
that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can they ever be
deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It
is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who
expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the
obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed.
On this matter, we do not find an act or omission on the part of respondents in violation of petitioners
rights. The right of the respondents to acquire as buyers the subject premises from Alfredo under the
assailed Deed of Sale in Civil Case No. 61327 had been laid to rest. This is because the validity of the
Deed of Sale had already been determined and upheld with finality. The same had been similarly
admitted by petitioner in her Complaint. It can be said, thus, that respondents act of acquiring the
subject property by sale was not in violation of petitioners rights. The same can also be said of the
respondents objection to reimburse petitioner. Simply, no correlative obligation exists on the part of
the respondents to reimburse the petitioner. Corollary thereto, neither can it be said that their refusal
to reimburse constituted a violation of petitioners rights. As has been shown in the foregoing, no
obligation by the respondents under the law exists. Petitioners Complaint failed to state a cause of
action against the respondents, and for this reason, the Court of Appeals was not in error in dismissing
the same.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 16 August 2004 and the Resolution dated 17
December 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP. No. 78525 are AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158040

April 14, 2008

SPOUSES ONESIFORO and ROSARIO ALINAS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA ALINAS,
respondents.
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002, and the CA Resolution2 dated
March 31, 2003, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows.
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime in 1982, with Rosario moving
to Pagadian City and Onesiforo moving to Manila. They left behind two lots identified as Lot 896-B-9-A
with a bodega standing on it and Lot 896-B-9-B with petitioners' house. These two lots are the subject
of the present petition.
Petitioner Onesiforo Alinas (Onesiforo) and respondent Victor Alinas (Victor) are brothers. Petitioners
allege that they entrusted their properties to Victor and Elena Alinas (respondent spouses) with the
agreement that any income from rentals of the properties should be remitted to the Social Security
System (SSS) and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO), as such rentals were believed sufficient to
pay off petitioners' loans with said institutions. Lot 896-B-9-A with the bodega was mortgaged as
security for the loan obtained from the RBO, while Lot 896-B-9-B with the house was mortgaged to the
SSS. Onesiforo alleges that he left blank papers with his signature on them to facilitate the
administration of said properties.
Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were already titled in the name of
respondent spouses.
Records show that after Lot 896-B-9-A was extra-judicially foreclosed, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-118533 covering said property was issued in the name of mortgagee RBO on November 13,
1987. On May 2, 1988, the duly authorized representative of RBO executed a Deed of Installment Sale
of Bank's Acquired Assets4 conveying Lot 896-B-9-A to respondent spouses. RBO's TCT over Lot 896-B-

9-A was then cancelled and on February 22, 1989, TCT No. T-126645 covering said lot was issued in the
name of respondent spouses.
Lot 896-B-9-B was also foreclosed by the SSS and on November 17, 1986, the Ex-Oficio City Sheriff of
Ozamis City issued a Certificate of Sale6 over said property in favor of the SSS. However, pursuant to a
Special Power of Attorney7 signed by Onesiforo in favor of Victor, dated March 10, 1989, the latter was
able to redeem, on the same date, Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS for the sum of P111,110.09. On June 19,
1989, a Certificate of Redemption8 was issued by the SSS.
Onesiforo's signature also appears in an Absolute Deed of Sale9 likewise dated March 10, 1989, selling
Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses. The records also show a notarized document dated March 10,
1989 and captioned Agreement10 whereby petitioner Onesiforo acknowledged that his brother Victor
used his own money to redeem Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS and, thus, Victor became the owner of said
lot. In the same Agreeement, petitioner Onesiforo waived whatever rights, claims, and interests he or
his heirs, successors and assigns have or may have over the subject property. On March 15, 1993, by
virtue of said documents, TCT No. 1739411 covering Lot 896-B-9-B was issued in the name of
respondent spouses.
On June 25, 1993, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City a complaint for
recovery of possession and ownership of their conjugal properties with damages against respondent
spouses.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated November 13, 1995, finding that:
1. Plaintiffs have not proven that they entrusted defendant spouses with the care and administration of
their properties. It was Valeria Alinas, their mother, whom plaintiff Onesiforo requested/directed to
"take care of everything and sell everything" and Teresita Nuez, his elder sister, to whom he left a
"verbal" authority to administer his properties.
2. Plaintiffs have not proven their allegation that defendant spouses agreed to pay rent of P1,500.00 a
month for the occupancy of plaintiffs' house, which rent was to be remitted to the SSS and Rural Bank
of Oroquieta to pay off plaintiffs' loan and to keep for plaintiffs the rest of the rent after the loans would
have been paid in full.
3. Plaintiff Onesiforo's allegation that defendants concocted deeds of conveyances (Exh. "M", "N" &
"O") with the use of his signatures in blank is not worthy of credence. Why his family would conspire to
rob him at a time when life had struck him with a cruel blow in the form of a failed marriage that sent
him plummeting to the depths of despair is not explained and likewise defies comprehension. That his
signatures appear exactly on the spot where they ought to be in Exhs. "M", "N" & "O" belies his
pretension that he affixed them on blank paper only for the purpose of facilitating his sister Terry's acts
of administration.

This Court, therefore, does not find that defendant spouses had schemed to obtain title to plaintiffs'
properties or enriched themselves at the expense of plaintiffs.12
with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment:
1. declaring [respondents] Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with the building
(bodega) standing thereon and affirming the validity of their acquisition thereof from the Rural Bank of
Oroquieta, Inc.;
2. declaring [petitioners] Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-B with the house standing
thereon, plaintiff Onesiforo's sale thereof to defendants spouses without the consent of his wife being
null and void and defendant spouses' redemption thereof from the SSS not having conferred its
ownership to them;

3. ordering [petitioners] to reimburse [respondents] Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas the redemption sum of
P111,100.09, paid by them to the SSS (without interest as it shall be compensated with the rental
value of the house they occupy) within sixty days from the finality of this judgment;
4. ordering [respondents] to vacate the subject house within thirty days from receiving the
reimbursement mentioned in No. 3 above; and
5. reinstating TCT No. T-7248 in the name of [petitioners] and cancelling TCT No. T-17394 in the name
of [respondents].
No costs.
SO ORDERED.13
Only respondent spouses appealed to the CA assailing the RTC's ruling that they acquired Lot 896-B-9B from the SSS by mere redemption and not by purchase. They likewise question the reimbursement
by petitioners of the redemption price without interest.
On September 25, 2002, the CA promulgated herein assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the
assailed decision is AFFIRMED and the rest MODIFIED as follows:
1. declaring [respondents] Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with the building
(bodega) standing thereon and affirming the validity of their acquisition thereof from the Rural Bank of
Oroquieta, Inc.;
2. declaring Onesiforo's sale of Lot 896-B-9-B together with the house standing thereon to
[respondents] in so far as Rosario Alinas, his wife's share of one half thereof is concerned, of no force
and effect;
3. ordering [petitioners] Rosario Alinas to reimburse [respondents] the redemption amount of
P55,550.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the time of redemption until fully paid.
4. ordering the [respondents] to convey and transfer one half portion of Lot 896-B-9-B unto Rosario
Alinas, which comprises her share on the property simultaneous to the tender of the above redemption
price, both to be accomplished within sixty (60) days from finality of this judgment.
5. in the event of failure of [respondents] to execute the acts as specified above, [petitioner] Rosario
Alinas may proceed against them under Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
6. on the other hand, failure of [petitioner] Rosario Alinas to reimburse the redemption price within
sixty (60) days from the finality of this decision will render the conveyance and sale of her share by her
husband to [respondents], of full force and effect.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.14
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the CA denied said motion per herein assailed Resolution
dated March 31, 2003.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
The Honorable Court of Appeals abuse [sic] its discretion in disregarding the testimony of the Register
of Deeds, Atty. Nerio Nuez, who swore that the signatures appearing on various TCTs were not his
own;

The Honorable Court of Appeals manifestly abuse [sic] its discretion in declaring the respondents to be
the owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with the building (bodega) standing thereon when they merely redeemed
the property and are therefore mere trustees of the real owners of the property;
It was pure speculation and conjecture and surmise for the Honorable Court of Appeals to impose an
obligation to reimburse upon petitioners without ordering respondents to account for the rentals of the
properties from the time they occupied the same up to the present time and thereafter credit one
against the other whichever is higher.15
The first issue raised by petitioners deserves scant consideration. By assailing the authenticity of the
Registrar of Deeds' signature on the certificates of title, they are, in effect, questioning the validity of
the certificates.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides, thus:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
Pursuant to said provision, the Court ruled in De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation16 that:
It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered,
changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. x x x
The action of the petitioners against the respondents, based on the material allegations of the
complaint, is one for recovery of possession of the subject property and damages. However, such
action is not a direct, but a collateral attack of TCT No. 236044.17 (Emphasis supplied)
As in De Pedro, the complaint filed by herein petitioners with the RTC is also one for recovery of
possession and ownership. Verily, the present case is merely a collateral attack on TCT No. T-17394,
which is not allowed by law and jurisprudence.
With regard to the second issue, petitioners claim that it was the CA which declared respondent
spouses owners of Lot 896-B-9-A (with bodega) is misleading. It was the RTC which ruled that
respondent spouses are the owners of Lot 896-B-9-A and, therefore, since only the respondent spouses
appealed to the CA, the issue of ownership over Lot 896-B-9-A is not raised before the appellate court.
Necessarily, the CA merely reiterated in the dispositive portion of its decision the RTC's ruling on
respondent spouses' ownership of Lot 896-B-9-A.
It is a basic principle that no modification of judgment or affirmative relief can be granted to a party
who did not appeal.18 Hence, not having appealed from the RTC Decision, petitioners can no longer
seek the reversal or modification of the trial court's ruling that respondent spouses had acquired
ownership of Lot 896-B-9-A by virtue of the sale of the lot to them by RBO.
Furthermore, the CA did not commit any reversible error in affirming the trial court's factual findings as
the records are indeed bereft of proof to support the petitioners allegations that they left the care and
administration of their properties to respondent spouses; and that there is an agreement between
petitioners and respondent spouses regarding remittance to the SSS and the RBO of rental income
from their properties. Thus, respondent spouses may not be held responsible for the non-payment of
the loan with RBO and the eventual foreclosure of petitioners' Lot 896-B-9-A.
Petitioners do not assail the validity of the foreclosure of said lot but argues that respondent spouses
merely redeemed the property from RBO. This is, however, belied by evidence on record which shows
that ownership over the lot had duly passed on to the RBO, as shown by TCT No. T-11853 registered in
its name; and subsequently, RBO sold the lot with its improvements to respondent spouses. Needless
to stress, the sale was made after the redemption period had lapsed. The trial court, therefore,
correctly held that respondent spouses acquired their title over the lot from RBO and definitely not
from petitioners.

However, with regard to Lot 896-B-9-B (with house), the Court finds it patently erroneous for the CA to
have applied the principle of equity in sustaining the validity of the sale of Onesiforos one-half share in
the subject property to respondent spouses.
Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the
sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations are governed by Chapter IV on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code.
The CA ruling completely deviated from the clear dictate of Article 124 of the Family Code which
provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. x x x
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. x x x (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
In Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo,19 the Court categorically stated thus:
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of
both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the
absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. x x x
xxxx
x x x By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be
void. 20
Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal
property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety.
It is true that in a number of cases, this Court abstained from applying the literal import of a particular
provision of law if doing so would lead to unjust, unfair and absurd results.21
In the present case, the Court does not see how applying Article 124 of the Family Code would lead to
injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that Lot 896-B-9-B is
a conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is
without the consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents
do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents,
namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated
March 10, 1989, reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale. As held in
Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares,22 "a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should
put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith."23 Such being the case, no
injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they risked transacting with Onesiforo alone
despite their knowledge that the subject property is a conjugal property.
Verily, the sale of Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses is entirely null and void.
However, in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers expense, the Court
agrees with the CA that petitioners should reimburse respondent spouses the redemption price paid for
Lot 896-B-9-B in the amount of P111,110.09 with legal interest from the time of filing of the complaint.
In Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes, the husband's sale of conjugal property without the consent of the wife was
annulled but the spouses were ordered to refund the purchase price to the buyers, it was ruled that an
interest of 12% per annum on the purchase price to be refunded is not proper. The Court elucidated as
follows:

The trial court, however, erred in imposing 12% interest per annum on the amount due the
respondents. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that interest on obligations
not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) annually. If the purchase price
could be established with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%)
interest should be computed from the date the complaint was filed until finality of the decision. In Lui
vs. Loy, involving a suit for reconveyance and annulment of title filed by the first buyer against the
seller and the second buyer, the Court, ruling in favor of the first buyer and annulling the second sale,
ordered the seller to refund to the second buyer (who was not a purchaser in good faith) the purchase
price of the lots. It was held therein that the 6% interest should be computed from the date of the filing
of the complaint by the first buyer. After the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation
is satisfied, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period being deemed
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Accordingly, the amount of P110,000.00 due the respondent spouses which could be determined with
certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint shall earn 6% interest per annum from June 4, 1986
until the finality of this decision. If the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain
unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time
the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied.24
Thus, herein petitioners should reimburse respondent spouses the redemption price plus interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint, and after the judgment becomes final
and executory, the amount due shall earn 12% interest per annum until the obligation is satisfied.
Petitioners pray that said redemption price and interest be offset or compensated against the rentals
for the house and bodega.
The records show that the testimonial evidence for rentals was only with regard to the bodega.25
However, the Court has affirmed the ruling of the RTC that Lot 896-B-9-A with the bodega had been
validly purchased by respondent spouses from the RBO and a TCT over said property was issued in the
name of respondent spouses on February 22, 1989. Testimonial evidence shows that the bodega was
leased out by respondent spouses only beginning January of 1990 when ownership had been
transferred to them.26 Hence, any rentals earned from the lease of said bodega rightfully belongs to
respondent spouses and cannot be offset against petitioners' obligation to respondent spouses.
As to rentals for Lot 896-B-9-B and the house thereon, respondent Victor testified that they never
agreed to rent the house and when they finally took over the same, it was practically inhabitable and
so they even incurred expenses to repair the house.27 There is absolutely no proof of the rental value
for the house, considering the condition it was in; as well as for the lot respondent spouses are
occupying.
Respondent spouses, having knowledge of the flaw in their mode of acquisition, are deemed
possessors in bad faith under Article 52628 of the Civil Code. However, they have a right
refunded for necessary expenses on the property as provided under Article 54629 of the same
Unfortunately, there is no credible proof to support respondent spouses' allegation that they
more than P400,000.00 to repair and make the house habitable.

to be
to be
Code.
spent

Set-off or compensation is governed by Article 1279 of the Civil Code which provides, thus:
Article 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
1. That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the time a principal creditor of
the other;
2. That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same
kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
3. That the two debts be due;
4. That they be liquidated and demandable;

5. That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the debtor.
Therefore, under paragraph 4 of the foregoing provision, compensation or set-off is allowed only if the
debts of both parties against each other is already liquidated and demandable. To liquidate means "to
make the amount of indebtedness or an obligation clear and settled in the form of money."30 In the
present case, no definite amounts for rentals nor for expenses for repairs on subject house has been
determined. Thus, in the absence of evidence upon which to base the amount of rentals, no
compensation or set-off can take place between petitioners and respondent spouses.
While the courts are empowered to set an amount as reasonable compensation to the owners for the
use of their property, this Court cannot set such amount based on mere surmises and conjecture
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September
25, 2002 is MODIFIED to read as follows:

1. declaring respondent spouses Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with the building
(bodega) standing thereon and affirming the validity of their acquisition thereof from the Rural Bank of
Oroquieta, Inc.;
2. declaring Onesiforo's sale of Lot 896-B-9-B together with the house standing thereon to respondent
spouses null and void ab initio;
3. ordering petitioners to jointly and severally reimburse respondent spouses the redemption amount
of P111,110.09 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint, until finality of
this decision. After this decision becomes final, interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal
and interest (or any part thereof) shall be imposed until full payment;
4. ordering the respondent spouses to convey and transfer Lot 896-B-9-B to petitioners and vacate said
premises within fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision; and
5. in the event of failure of respondent spouses to execute the acts as specified above, petitioners may
proceed against them under Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Docena vs. Lapesura

GR No. 140153, March 28, 2001
FACTS:
Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his
lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed ownership of the land
based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in issuing orders
and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that
the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and
that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the
petitioners.
ISSUE: WON it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the
petitioners.
HELD: In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of
demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery brought against the spouses and is clearly
intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the province of
Samar whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum
shopping that would disauthorize a husbands signing the certification in his behalf and that of his wife
is too harsh.
In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign by all the petitioners in a
case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate signed by Antonio Docena alone should be deemed
to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. The two petitioners in this case are husband and
wife and their residence is the subject property alleged to be a conjugal property. Under the Family
Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and wife jointly. However,
unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint
management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each
spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court
in proper cases.
Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings.
Docena vs Lapesura GR No 140153 Mar 28 2001
FACTS: On June 1, 1977, private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a
parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners
claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial.

RTC rendered judgement in favour of petitioners. CA reversed the decision and ordering
petitioners to vacate the land they have leased excluding the portions reclaimed by petitioners and
which form part of the seashore. Pursuant to the Resolution, the public respondent sheriff issued an
alias Writ of Demolition. The petitioners filed a Motion to Set Aside or Defer the Implementation of Writ
of Demolition. Motion denied. A Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent judge.
Petition for Ceriorari and Prohibition before the CA was also denied for reasons, among others, that the
certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners.
ISSUE: WON the signing of one of the spouses in a certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient
compliance with the requirements for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
RULING: Yes. It has been our previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be
signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is
insufficient. In the case at bar, however, we hold that the subject Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping
signed by the petitioner Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance
with the rules. Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the
husband and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent
of both spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband and
wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to
the intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code.
Petition granted. CA resolution set aside. Case remanded to CA.

THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA

G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the respondents from the
husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some bargaining,
petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of payment. The agreement
handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that he would secure
his wifes consent. Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses
were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written
consent.

HELD:
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not
give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is

required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their
conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to demonstrate consent.
Is the written consent of one spouse required to dispose or encumber conjugal/common property?
There should be no dispute that either spouse cannot alienate or dispose of conjugal property without
the written consent of the other.
The codal reference to this is the second paragraph of Article 96 and 124 of the Family Code which
states:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the common properties, the other spouse my assume the sole powers of administration. These
powers however do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the authority of the court allowing one spouse to dispose or
encumber any common property may be sought only if the other spouse is incapacitated.
The Supreme Court in Thelma a. Jader-Manalo vs. Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa
[G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002] referred to the comment of civil law expert Arturo Tolentino who in
his book said that "As a result of this joint ownership, neither spouse may alienate or encumber any
common property without the written consent of the other, or, if the other spouse is incapacitated,
authorization of the court."
If the other spouse is not incapacitated, his or her written consent to the disposition or encumbrance is
indispensable, subject of course to certain exceptions.
Are there instances where the disposal by one spouse of conjugal property without the written consent
of the other may be valid?
Yes.
In Estela Costuna versus Laureana Domondon, [G.R. 82753 December 19, 1989], the Supreme Court
allowed the husband to sell his share of the conjugal property even without the consent of the wife
because the wife unjustifiably withheld her consent to the sale.
This case tells us that one spouse cannot even sell his own share without the consent of the other
spouse, save only when the refusal to consent was unjustifiable.
In this case, the wife refused to give her consent to the sale of conjugal land even if the proceeds of
the sale were to be used for the sick husbands hospital expenses.
The Court said the wife was greedy because previously, the husband had executed a will naming her
as the sole heir.

Nat G.R. No. 147978

January 23, 2002

THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, petitioner, vs.

NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA, respondents.
The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property
without the wife's written consent.
The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came
across an advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and
Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992
issue, for the sale of their ten-door apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal.

As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila,
she was interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated for the purchase through a real
estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by respondent spouses.1 Petitioner made a visual
inspection of the said lots with the real estate broker and was shown the tax declarations, real property
tax payment receipts, location plans, and vicinity maps relating to the properties.2 Thereafter,
petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses. She made a definite offer to
buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife,
respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker.3 After some bargaining,
petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of P1,500,000.00 for the Taytay property and
P2,100,000.00 for the Makati property4 to be paid on installment basis with downpayments of
P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively, on April 15, 1992. The balance thereof was to be paid as
follows5:
This agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto.6 When petitioner pointed out
the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife's conformity and consent to the
sale.7 The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner. The following
day, petitioner, the real estate broker and Edilberto met in the latter's office for the formal signing of
the typewritten Contracts to Sell.8 After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two
checks, namely, UCPB Check No. 62807 dated April 15, 1992 for P200,000.00 and UCPB Check No.
62808 also dated April 15, 1992 for P100,000.00 in the presence of the real estate broker and an
employee in Edilberto's office.9 The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his
wife's signature.
The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify
some provisions of the contracts.10 To accommodate her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her
lawyer, met with Edilberto and Norma and the real estate broker at Cafe Rizal in Makati.11 During the
meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell, so they arranged to incorporate
the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts.12
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at Edilberto's office for
the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her
that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of
the consideration.13 Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already
been duly perfected and Norma's refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still,
Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance
and damages against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136 on
April 29, 1992, to compel respondent Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
A Motion to Dismiss14 was filed by respondents which was denied by the trial court in its Resolution of
July 21, 1992.15
Respondents then filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim, alleging that it was an agreement
between herein petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa that the sale of the subject properties
was still subject to the approval and conformity of his wife Norma Camaisa.16 Thereafter, when Norma
refused to give her consent to the sale, her refusal was duly communicated by Edilberto to
petitioner.17 The checks issued by petitioner were returned to her by Edilberto and she accepted the
same without any objection.18 Respondent further claimed that the acceptance of the checks returned
to petitioner signified her assent to the cancellation of the sale of the subject properties.19 Respondent
Norma denied that she ever participated in the negotiations for the sale of the subject properties and
that she gave her consent and conformity to the same.20
On October 20, 1992, respondent Norma F. Camaisa filed a Motion for Summary Judgment21 asserting
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact on the basis of the pleadings and admission of
the parties considering that the wife's written consent was not obtained in the contract to sell, the
subject conjugal properties belonging to respondents; hence, the contract was null and void.
On April 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the
ground that under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot intervene to authorize the transaction

in the absence of the consent of the wife since said wife who refused to give consent had not been
shown to be incapacitated. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, considering these premises, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint and ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens by reason of its
filing on TCT Nos. (464860) S-8724 and (464861) S-8725 of the Registry of Deeds at Makati and on TCT
Nos. 295976 and 295971 of the Registry of Rizal.
2. Ordering plaintiff Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant spouses Norma and Edilberto Camaisa, FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Attorney's Fees.
Costs against plaintiff.22
Petitioner, thus, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On November 29, 2000, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the trial court but deleted the award of P50,000.00 as damages and
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals explained that the properties subject of the contracts were conjugal properties
and as such, the consent of both spouses is necessary to give effect to the sale. Since private
respondent Norma Camaisa refused to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected. In fact, the
downpayment was returned by respondent spouses and was accepted by petitioner. The Court of
Appeals also stressed that the authority of the court to allow sale or encumbrance of a conjugal
property without the consent of the other spouse is applicable only in cases where the said spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
Hence, the present recourse assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ENTIRELY AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS ON THE TITLES OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE SALE OF
REAL PROPERTIES BY RESPONDENTS TO PETITIONER HAVE ALREADY BEEN PERFECTED, FOR AFTER THE
LATTER PAID P300,000.00 DOWNPAYMENT, RESPONDENT MRS. CAMAISA NEVER OBJECTED TO
STIPULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PRICE, OBJECT AND TERMS OF PAYMENT IN THE CONTRACT TO SELL
ALREADY SIGNED BY THE PETITIONER, RESPONDENT MR. CAMAISA AND WITNESSES MARKED AS
ANNEX "G" IN THE COMPLAINT EXCEPT, FOR MINOR PROVISIONS ALREADY IMPLIED BY LAW, LIKE
EJECTMENT OF TENANTS, SUBDIVISION OF TITLE AND RESCISSION IN CASE OF NONPAYMENT, WHICH
PETITIONER READILY AGREED AND ACCEDED TO THEIR INCLUSION;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT
CONTRACT OF SALE IS CONSENSUAL AND IT IS PERFECTED BY THE MERE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
AND THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS ARE ARTICLES 1157, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1403, 1405 AND 1475 OF
THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND GOVERNED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUD.23

The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred when it entered a summary judgment in favor of respondent
spouses there being a genuine issue of fact. Petitioner maintains that the issue of whether the
contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses was perfected is a question of fact
necessitating a trial on the merits.
The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one granted by the court upon motion by a party for
an expeditious settlement of a case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact involved, and that therefore the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.24 A perusal of the pleadings submitted by
both parties show that there is no genuine controversy as to the facts involved therein.

Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the sale of four parcels of land between petitioner
and respondent spouses; that petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa came to an agreement as
to the price and the terms of payment, and a downpayment was paid by petitioner to the latter; and
that respondent Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. The issue thus posed for resolution in the
trial court was whether or not the contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses were
already perfected such that the latter could no longer back out of the agreement.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus,
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. (Underscoring ours.)
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that
respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she
denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself
admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of
the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction
is not consent.25
Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the
contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted.
The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of
the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which
will give such authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed
that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give
consent is incapacitated.26
In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her
consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wife's incapacity, court authorization
cannot be sought.
Under the foregoing facts, the motion for summary judgment was proper considering that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact. The only issue to be resolved by the trial court was whether the
contract to sell involving conjugal properties was valid without the written consent of the wife.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
29, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43421 AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED

Carlos vs. Abelardo

GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002

FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan
used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner
issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. The
seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the petitioner inquired
from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in
position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the
extent of making various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand
but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more
than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo
contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts
obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt
from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set
aside trial courts decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth
$25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the
spouses. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.

ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal
partnership.

HELD:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their
conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the
payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction
firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to
the profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of
$25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

G.R. No. 138497

January 16, 2002

IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner, vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, respondent.

The case is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the decision2 of the Court of
Appeals that denied a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's order denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss the case against her inclusion as party defendant therein.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a
petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez and petition Imelda Relucio, docketed as Spec.
Proc. M-3630, in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141. In the petition, private-respondent
alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent,
abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and
exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his
sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that
defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with
herein petitioner since 1976.
"It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their period of cohabitation
since 1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled
corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and
other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of
defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and proxies, have been
acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of money, property and industry of
defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from petitioner Relucio.
"In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and husband, he excluded the private
respondent and their four children from sharing or benefiting from the conjugal properties and the
income or fruits there from. As such, defendant Lopez either did not place them in his name or
otherwise removed, transferred, stashed away or concealed them from the private-respondent. He
placed substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name of petitioner Relucio.1wphi1.nt
"It was also averred that in the past twenty five years since defendant Lopez abandoned the privaterespondent, he has sold, disposed of, alienated, transferred, assigned, canceled, removed or stashed
away properties, assets and income belonging to the conjugal partnership with the private-respondent
and either spent the proceeds thereof for his sole benefit and that of petitioner Relucio and their two
illegitimate children or permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond the reach of the privaterespondent and their four children.
"On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground
that private respondent has no cause of action against her.
"An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio's
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because
some of the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.
"Subsequently thereafter, petitioner Relucio filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Order of the
respondent Judge dated February 10, 1994 but the same was likewise denied in the Order dated May
31, 1994."3
On June 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the trial
court's denial of her motion to dismiss.4
On May 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the petition.5 On June 26,
1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.6 However, on April 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.7
Hence, this appeal.8

The Issues
1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property,
accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against petitioner.
2. Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete
adjudication of the controversy.9
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition. We resolve the issues in seriatim.
First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the proceedings below. "A cause of
action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other."10
The elements of a cause of action are:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.11
A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were
admitted or proved.12
In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the
claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.13
Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in Special Proceedings M-3630, we
assays its allegations.
In Part Two on the "Nature of [the] Complaint," respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez summarized the
causes of action alleged in the complaint below.
The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.
Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes
of action were all against her husband.
The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal
partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is
a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to
wit:
"If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the
family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property,
or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx"
The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all
other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of
action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent
that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action
exists.
The second cause of action is for an accounting "by respondent husband."14 The accounting of
conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage.

Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause
of action can exist against petitioner on this ground.
Respondent's alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in the co-owned
property "acquired during his illicit relationship and cohabitation with [petitioner]"15 and for the
"dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent]."

The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by
him and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J.
Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share, if any
there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner.
Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of Alberto J.
Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results in a breach
of an obligation to respondent and gives rise to a cause of action.16 Such cause of action, however,
pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.
The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a stranger.
The action in Special Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez' own words, one by
"an aggrieved wife against her husband."17 References to petitioner in the common and specific
allegations of fact in the complaint are merely incidental, to set forth facts and circumstances that
prove the causes of action alleged against Alberto J. Lopez.
Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent's claim for moral damages is against Alberto J. Lopez, not
petitioner.
To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must have the character of an action for
interference with marital or family relations under the Civil Code.
A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit."18 In
this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party
is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action.19 Petitioner's participation in
Special Proceedings M-36-30 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment
ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give
support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal partnership with
respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such
judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as one who
is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.20 In
the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto
J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give
support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and
dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with respondent.
The Judgment
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals.21
The Court DISMISSES Special Proceedings M-3630 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 141 as
against petitioner.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,

G.R. No. 153802
March 11, 2005

FACTS:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the
spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject
property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed
only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing
the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the
spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from
petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including
the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of
respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of
Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the
property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned
that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford
sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was
conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real
Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latters
Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null and void
and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the
plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the
attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and
attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE
LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.

HELD: the petition is denied.

1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one
renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to
conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late
Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and
income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their
efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership
apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal
partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of
respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of
conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the
Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his
wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their
conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court)
authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the
disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the

Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial
court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the
subject property for lack of respondents consent.

2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(1)
Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband
alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern
for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains
lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained
by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the
benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently,
the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

NOTES:

In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously
asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in
the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the
benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the
proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted
to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party
but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may
change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation
of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in
the new theory.

G.R. No. 195670

December 3, 2012

WILLEM BEUMER vs. AMORES

FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years,
the RTC of Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision dated November 10,
2000 on the basis of the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family
Code. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated December
14, 2000 praying for the distribution of the properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage. In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2)
residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties
during their marriage.
During trial, petitioner testified that the properties were registered in the name of respondent, these
properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability
benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed
that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to
Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively
from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon,
Triumph and Tupperware.
On February 28, 2007, the RTC dissolved the parties conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of
land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his
exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which were brought out
by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses are hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these
were acquired during their marital union and since there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning

buildings and residential units. Petitioner and respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for
approval their project of partition on the two houses aforementioned.
On appeal, petitioner insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his
own capital funds and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half
(1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in
favor of his estranged ex-wife.
CA affirmed. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition
for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines." Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for
reimbursement.
ISSUE:
W/N the foreigner Beumer can seek reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land
in the petition for separation of his properties and his wifes on the ground that he bought the parcels
using his own disability fund
HELD: No.
It held petitioner cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly
and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine
land24 enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of
the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting
to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondents personal funds were used to purchase
the properties he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same.
Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court
with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given
that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates
the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no
legal effect at all.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As
held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money
spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution.
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has
been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not
apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari
delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso
over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord
Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or

illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in
general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as
between him and the plaintiff."
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is
the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine
land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land
and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on the properties
which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the
purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is
duty-bound to protect.
BEUMER V. AMORES
G.R. 195670 December 3, 2012
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J
FACTS:
Petitioner. a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC Negros
Oriental. Petitioner and Filipina respondents marriage was nullified by basis of the formers
psychological incapacity. Petitioner thus filed for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for
distribution of the properties acquired during their marriage which include 4 lots of land acquired
through purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled that all parcels of land be given to the
respondent, tools and equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 as
co-owned by the parties.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there are no
restrictions to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the two houses
on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned by the parties.

IN RE: PETITION FOR G.R. No. 149615

SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER,
This petition for review on certiorari[1] assails the February 26, 2001 Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the
regime of absolute community of property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the
Resolution[4] dated August 13, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents
parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time,

respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds
for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of
a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438[5] of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition[6] for separation of
properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of
properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the
country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it
ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either
spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property,
therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of
the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal
properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that
inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered
by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which
provides that save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a
voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property. x x x
xxxx
As regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the Registry of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in Antipolo, Rizal and the improvements thereon, the Court shall not
make any pronouncement on constitutional grounds.[7]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial
courts Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the
Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioners
ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals
ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 is hereby
MODIFIED. Respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered to REIMBURSE the petitioner the
amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the
construction of the house situated in Atnipolo, Rizal, deducting therefrom the amount respondent
spent for the preservation, maintenance and development of the aforesaid real property including the
depreciation cost of the house or in the alternative to SELL the house and lot in the event respondent
does not have the means to reimburse the petitioner out of her own money and from the proceeds
thereof, reimburse the petitioner of the cost of the land and the house deducting the expenses for its
maintenance and preservation spent by the respondent. Should there be profit, the same shall be
divided in proportion to the equity each has over the property. The case is REMANDED to the lower
court for reception of evidence as to the amount claimed by the respondents for the preservation and
maintenance of the property.

SO ORDERED.[8]
Hence, the instant petition for review raising the following issues:
ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HEREIN IS
ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT USED TO PURCHASE THE LAND AS WELL AS THE
COSTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE, FOR IN SO RULING, IT INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT
DONE WHICH OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE DIRECTLY x x x DONE, WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION THAT AN ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF
REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.
IITHE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH IS
ACTUALLY A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT IN QUESTION, CLOTHED
UNDER THE GUISE OF CLAIMING REIMBURSEMENT.
Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the
Philippines; that respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same;
and that respondents purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive
possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo property.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely
reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage
to petitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that respondent
should be reimbursed of his personal funds.
The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
The petition has merit.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands.[9] The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In the case of Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds,[10] the Court held:
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the
hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate
their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in
Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources
may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural
lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural
lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x

xxxx
If the term private agricultural lands is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential
lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities, and that they may
validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants,
fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds,
airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural.
(Solicitor Generals Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is
beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof
to this Court.[11] He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner
because of the said prohibition.[12] His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the
said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of
law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of
hereditary succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute.
Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an
existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is
guilty of the fraud.[13] To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.[14] He who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated
maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It
signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has
been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.[15]
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the
fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. As expressly
held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court:[16]
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution ordains that, Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of
this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him
and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated
the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right
over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property
cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a
fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to
militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or
any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money

used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is
not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis added)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February
26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura
Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land
and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution
dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12,
1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862
terminating the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a
separation of property between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in
the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Agapay vs. Palang

GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997

FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few
months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found
evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for
good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein
petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan
Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel
and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate
their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of
concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted
this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to
get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his
cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda
Agapay.

HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their
marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both
parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective
contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved,
there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a
sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but
the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to
Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his
youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court
finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as
correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of
Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of
property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for
the property revealed the falshood of Erlindas claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when
she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and
directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides
that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Tumlos vs Fernandez
GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000

FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina
and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an
apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment for
the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month
while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand was
made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for
the construction of a new building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they
acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in
the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered
the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to
the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

HELD:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The claim was
not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it
except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore
him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly
married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The
property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual
contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care
and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of
common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148.
If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.

allilin vs. Castillo

GR No. 136803, June 16, 2000

FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children but
separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist.
They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner
was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise
acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents name. Due to
irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from
respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been
registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as
husband and wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation.
Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for
summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter.

ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the name
of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living together.

HELD:
The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other and
were living together could not have owned properties in common. Under Article 148, if the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution,
property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even
though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other.
Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due process and
equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is
unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the
properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case.
The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings.

G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003 [Article 147 Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage; Article 36
- Psychological Incapacity]

FACTS:

In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna moved in to Bruno's residence and lived with
him. During the time they lived together, they purchased Suite 204, at LCG Condominium on
installment. They got married in 1985.
In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal properties. The properties were divided
into three: 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 for Bruno and 1/3 for the children. The custody of children was awarded to
Elna, being the innocent spouse. Accordingly, Elna is directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 LCG
Condominium because it was declared to have been the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr, acquired
prior his marriage.
Elna filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held in an order that Art. 147 of the
Family Code should apply, being the marriage void ab initio. However, the court reminded Elna of the
previous agreement in dividing of properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately
among them. It also affirmed of the previous ruling regarding the Suite 204. Elna filed special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in its Decision dismissed the
petition for review for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr.

RULING:
No. SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of Elna and Bruno and the
property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership. Suite

204 was acquired during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code,
said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Article 147 applies in this case because (1) Elna and Bruno are capacitated to marry each other; (2)
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their marriage is void under Article 36. All
these elements are present in the case at bar.
The trial court also erred in its judgment in regards the settlement of the common properties of Elna
and Bruno. The three-way partition only applies to voidable marriages and to void marriages under
Article 40 of the Family Code.

ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent.

This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code filed by
petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of Makati in
March 1997.[1]
After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
property.[2] The dispositive portion of the Decision dated January 30, 1998 states:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the marriage between Elna D. Mercado and Bruno F. Fehr on
March 14, 1985 is hereby declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part
of respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of property existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu
thereof, a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to the rights previously
acquired by creditors.
Custody over the two minor children, MICHAEL BRUNO MERCADO FEHR and PATRICK FRANZ FEHR, is
hereby awarded to petitioner, she being the innocent spouse.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance
with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On August 24, 1999, the trial court issued an Order resolving the various motions[4] filed by
respondent after the case had been decided. The Order pertained to the properties held by the parties,
thus:
After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties, the Court finds the
following properties to be excluded from the conjugal properties, namely:
a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-137232, considering that the
same is owned by petitioners parents, Herminio Mercado and Catalina D. Mercado xxx and
b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735,
considering that the same was purchased on installment basis by respondent with his exclusive funds
prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. xxx
Accordingly, the conjugal properties of the petitioner and respondent shall be distributed in the
following manner:
TO PETITIONER ELNA MERCADO:

a. Ground Floor, LCG Condominium, with an area of 671.84 sq. m., covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 14734; and
b. Tamaraw FX (1995 model)
TO RESPONDENT BRUNO FRANZ FEHR:
a. Upper Basement, LCG Condominium, with an area of 180.81 sq. m. and covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 14733; and
b. Nissan Sentra with Plate No. FDJ-533 (1994 model)
Furthermore, Suite 204, LCG Condominium with an area of 113.54 sq. m. and covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title NO. 14735 is hereby declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of respondent, BRUNO
FRANZ FEHR. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in the name
of respondent, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735, being respondents exclusive
property, acquired prior to his marriage.
Anent the monthly rentals prior to the issuance of this Order of the subject properties, namely the
Ground Floor Front (Fridays Club), Ground Floor Rear Apartment and Upper Basement at LGC
Condominium, all leased by Bar 4 Corporation, the same shall be shared by the parties in common, in
proportion to one-half each or share and share alike, after deducting all expenses for Income Taxes,
Business Permits, Realty Taxes, Municipal License fees, clearances, etc. Accordingly, petitioner is
hereby directed to deliver to respondent the following: a) the balance of his share of the monthly
rentals from February 1998 to May 1998; and b) his one-half share (1/2) of the monthly rentals of the
aforesaid properties from June 1998 up to this date. Thereafter, the parties shall own and enjoy their
respective share of the monthly rentals derived from the properties adjudicated to them as stated
above.

The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly support their minor children, Michael and
Patrick Fehr, for their education, uniforms, food and medical expenses.[5]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204,
LCG Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on
installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in
accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner further claimed that it would not be in the
best interests of the children if she would be made to demand periodically from respondent his share
in the support of the children. She instead proposed that the Upper Basement and the Lower Ground
Floor of the LCG Condominium be adjudicated to her so that she could use the income from the lease
of said premises for the support of the children.[6]
Resolving said motion, the trial court held in an Order dated October 5, 2000 that since the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership should apply
in the liquidation and partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the
Family Code. The court, however, noted that the parties have already agreed in principle to divide the
properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately among them and their children as
follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent and 1/3 for the children. It also affirmed its previous
ruling that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium was acquired prior to the couples cohabitation and therefore
pertained solely to respondent.[7]
On November 28, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the October 5, 2000 Order of the
trial court.[8] Respondent filed an Opposition to the Notice of Appeal.[9] On January 12, 2001,
petitioner withdrew the notice of appeal[10] and instead filed on the following day a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, questioning the findings of the trial court in its
Order dated October 5, 2000.[11]

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 26, 2001, dismissed the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit. The appellate court stated that petitioner has not shown any reason to warrant the
issuance of a writ of certiorari as the errors she raised were mere errors of judgment which were the
proper subject of an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari.[12]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Decision, which was also denied by the appellate
court.[13]
Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the following arguments:
1) Petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 149 in the Court of Appeals in view of the fact that the questioned orders were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of or lack of jurisdiction.
2) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the questioned orders were errors of judgment and not of
jurisdiction.[14]
We shall first address the procedural issue, whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was proper because
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of its Order dated October 5, 2000,
and there were no other speedy and adequate remedies available. She asserts that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium was the
exclusive property of respondent, although it was established that they lived together as husband and
wife beginning March 1983, before the execution of the Contract to Sell on July 26, 1983. Furthermore,
the trial courts ruling dividing their properties into three, instead of two as provided under Article 147
of the Family Code, or four, as allegedly agreed by the parties during a conference with the trial court
judge on May 3, 2000, also constituted grave abuse of discretion.[15]
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioner may no longer avail of any remedy, whether
an appeal or a petition for certiorari, as she had lost all the right to appeal from the time the Decision
of January 30, 1998 became final and executory. He argues that the Order of the trial court dated
October 5, 2000 is no longer assailable because it was merely issued to execute the final and
executory Decision of January 30, 1998. He also submits that the division of the properties into three
and the distribution of 1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent, and their children was proper,
in accordance with Articles 50, 51, 147 and 148 of the Family Code mandating the delivery of the
presumptive legitime of the common children upon dissolution of the property regime. Respondent
further claims Suite 204 of LCG Condominium to be his exclusive property as it was acquired on July
26, 1983, prior to their marriage on March 14, 1985.[16]

A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy, and
adequate remedy at law. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie
if an appeal is the proper remedy such as when an error of judgment or procedure is involved. As long
as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof,
any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable
by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special civil action of certiorari. However, in certain
exceptional cases, where the rigid application of such rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.
Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and
injury to a party where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or
where there may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be
inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of.[17]

The exception applies to the case at bar. We reject respondents submission that all the appellate
remedies of petitioner have been foreclosed when the Decision dated January 30, 1998 became final
and executory. What is being questioned in this petition is not the January 30, 1998 Decision of the trial
court declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity, but the Order of the trial court dated October 5, 2000 dividing the common
properties of petitioner and respondent into three1/3 to petitioner, 1/3 to respondent and 1/3 to their
children, and affirming its previous ruling that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is the exclusive property
of respondent. The issue on the validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has long been
settled in the main Decision and may no longer be the subject of review. There were, however,
incidental matters that had to be addressed regarding the dissolution of the property relations of the
parties as a result of the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The questioned Order pertained to the
division and distribution of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, pursuant to the courts
directive in its main decision to dissolve the conjugal partnership. Said Order is a final Order as it
finally disposes of the issues concerning the partition of the common properties of petitioner and
respondent, and as such it may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals via
ordinary appeal. However, considering the merits of the case, the Court believes that a blind
adherence to the general rule will result in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her
just share in their common property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income to support
their children whom the court had entrusted to her care. We have held that where a rigid application of
the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage
of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.[18]
We now go to the substantive issues. The crux of the petition is the ownership of Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium and how the properties acquired by petitioner and respondent should be partitioned.
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of longdistance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with respondent in the latters residence in
Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on December
3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased on installment a
condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26,
1983 executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller.
Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using the name Elna Mercado Fehr. Upon completion of
payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the name of petitioner.[19]
In light of these facts, we give more credence to petitioners submission that Suite 204 was acquired
during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the
formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. (emphasis supplied)

Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,[20] as in the case at bar. This provision
creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation.
We held in Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City:[21]
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. The term capacitated in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers
to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any male or female of the age of eighteen
years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Article 37 and 38 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.
Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been
shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his
residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under
Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondents psychological incapacity to comply with essential
marital obligations.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26,
1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be
considered as common property of petitioner and respondent.
As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, we hold that the
Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply. There is nothing in the records that support the
pronouncement of the trial court that the parties have agreed to divide the properties into three1/3
share each to the petitioner, the respondent and their children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in her
petition before this Court that the parties have agreed on a four-way division of the properties1/4 share
each to the petitioner and the respondent, and 1/4 share each to their two children. Moreover,
respondents argument that the three-way partition is in accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code does not hold water as said provisions relate only to voidable marriages and exceptionally
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
[22]
In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common
property of petitioner and respondent and the property regime of the parties should be divided in
accordance with the law on co-ownership.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 149 for liquidation of the properties of petitioner and respondent in accordance with
this Courts ruling.
SO ORDERED.

JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA, RTC, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY

FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met
and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their
9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of
these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the
construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties

HELD:
it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former
was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property
regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions Proof of actual contribution is required.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private
respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house.
However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the
record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article
148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their
share shall be presumed to be equal.

Atienza v de Castro
G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006

Facts:
Lupo Atienza hired De Castro as accountant for his two corporations (Enrico Shipping Corporation and
Eurasian Maritime Corporation) in 1983
Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo being a married man! They lived together in the
later part of 1983. They had 2 children, after the second child they parted ways.
Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for a judicial partition of a land between them in the BelAir subdivision
Lupo said Yolanda bought the said property with his own funds Yolanda on the other hand said she
bought it with her own funds.
Trial Court said that the contested property is owned common by him and Yolanda and ordered the
partition into two equal parts.
CA reversed the TC! Saying that it was the exclusive property of Yolanda.

Issues:
WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda

Held: Yes
Ratio:
Since they are not capacitated to marry each other in their cohabitation, FC 148 applies. Under this
regime only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution shall
be owned by them in proportion to their contributions. Absent of proof of contribution, it shall be
presumed to be equal. He did not show any evidence that he contributed in the parcel of land while the
accountant showed bank accounts which apparently shows that she was capacitated to buy the said
land.
Evidence of De Castro: job as accountant and businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading,
money lending, and jewelry retail, promisorry notes of dealings with clients, bank account statements,
and business transactions = had financial capacity on the other hand Atienza merely provided
evidence that Yolanda had no such sufficient funds and didnt provide for evidence regarding his own
capacity to pay for such property.
Property Relationship In A Void Marriage
In Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, Lupo, a married man
cohabited with Yolanda as husband and wife. During their coverture, they allegedly acquired a real
property and registered it under the name of Yolanda. Their cohabitation turned sour, hence, they
parted. He filed an action for partition contending that they owned it in common under the concept of
limited co-ownership. Yolanda contended that she alone was the owner as she acquired it thru her own

savings as a businesswoman. The RTC declared the property subject of co-ownership, but the CA
reversed it as he failed to prove material contribution in the acquisition of the same. On appeal, he
contended that he was not burdened to prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the property
because with or without contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that under Article 484, NCC,
for as long as they acquired the property during their extramarital union, such property would be
legally owned by them in common and governed by the rule on co-ownership. Is the contention
correct? Explain.
Held: No. It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because
Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with Yolanda. Their
property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationship, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both
man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under
this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. (Cario v. Cario, 351 SCRA 127 (2001)). Proof of actual contribution is required.
(Agapay v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302).
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions.
Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal. (Adriano v. CA, 385 Phil. 474 (2000); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650,
April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718; Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006).
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision
was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. (Saguid v. CA, et al., G.R. No.
150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678). Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was
no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. (Tumlos v. Fernandez; Article 256, F.C.).
The applicable law being settled the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined
by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponents defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the
plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the
court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a
fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the
property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise
the amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact
that his claim to the property contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated
March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of
Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said
property, to the exclusion of the petitioner.
The claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he
fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of
documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent.
In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no
relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be
proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere
allegation is not evidence.

True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have
acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated,
petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial
courts finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In
contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present
preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the
respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from
earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading,
money lending and jewelry retain. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing
substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and bank
transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject
property.