Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Course Notes
200
8
LAW
Of
CONTRACT
with Robert Mackay
2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS
UNIT ONE
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UNIT TWO
FORM - 30
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED TERMS - 31
TERMS IMPLIED BY STATUTE - 34
TERMS IMPLIED BY COMMON LAW - 38
CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES - 39
EXCLUSION AND LIMITATION CLAUSES - 42
STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS - 47
UNIT THREE
UNIT FOUR
DISCHARGE - 78
PERFORMANCE - 78
FRUSTRATION - 84
BREACH OF CONTRACT - 89
UNIT FIVE
COPYRIGHT NOTICE
UNIT ONE
FORMATION OF A CONTRACT
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
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A simple contract (that is, a contract made not under seal) requires an offer
made by one party and accepted by the other, valuable consideration given by
either side, or a common intention that the agreement should be legally binding.
An offer is made when one party makes it clear, by words or actions,that he is
prepared to be bound as soon as the offer is accepted by the person to whom it
is made. An offer is thus quite different from an invitation to treat, though it is
not always easy to distinguish the two.
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the statute and said he had committed no offence: the display was an
invitation to treat, not an offer to sell.
This analysis of the transaction leaves both parties free to change their minds.
The shopkeeper can refuse to sell to a customer whom he does not like (for
example, one who is under age or drunk), and the customer having taken goods
from a supermarket shelf can return them if he changes his mind before going to
the till.
An advertisement is usually an invitation to treat but can be an offer, depending
on its wording and on the circumstances.
P parked his car in DD's car park, paying his money and taking a ticket
from the automatic machine at the entrance. When P returned later to
collect his car, there was an accident in which he was seriously injured; his
action for demages turned on the validity of an exclusion clause printed on
the ticket. Lord Denning MR said a motorist buying a ticket [or presumably
any other goods] from a machine is irretrievably committed when he puts
the money in the machine, and that the contract must be completed at
that time. The car park owners made an offer when they held out the
machine as ready to receive money, and the motorist accepted the offer
when he put the necessary coins in the slot.
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The growth of internet shopping has led to further developments in this area of
law. Where a company advertises goods or services on its web site this is
normally (depending on the wording used) an invitation to treat, and the
customer makes an offer by sending in an order. So far, so good. If the company
sets up an automatic e-mail reply system, this (again depending on its wording)
may amount to an acceptance of the offer, and this may have unfortunate
consequences for the company if there is any error (e.g. 100 as a misprint for
1000) in the published details.
Public authorities are required by law to invite tenders for many services, and
some other bodies do so even when not so required. The offer in such cases is
clearly made by the tender or and accepted by the authority, but the situation is
more complex than it might seem.
Two parties were invited to bid secretly for a block of shares, on the
understanding that the shares would be sold to whoever bid higher. PP bid
$2 175 000, while the other party bid "$2 100 000, or $10 000 more than
any other cash bid, whichever is higher". The House of Lords said the
referential bid was ineffective and that PP's cash bid should have been
accepted. The use of referential bids, they said, defeated the whole
purpose of confidential competitive tendering and was not to be
encouraged.
PP and six other parties were invited to submit tenders for the concession
to run pleasure flights from Blackpool Airport. PP submitted a tender in
due form, but this was not considered owing to a clerical error. DD argued
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that PP had merely made an offer which they (for whatever reasons) had
not accepted, but the Court of Appeal said there was an implied collateral
warranty. The Council had selected the parties invited to tender and thus
knew them all, and had set out in detail the procedure to be followed; this
implied that any invitee conforming with that procedure would be entitled
to have his tender properly considered.
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WITHDRAWL
As a general rule, an offer can be withdrawn at any time before it has been
accepted; any purported acceptance after withdrawal is ineffective.
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cancelling the reward, and this was published in a similar manner. Five
months after that, P (who was aware of the original advertisement but not
that the reward had been cancelled) identified one of the wanted men and
claimed the reward. The Supreme Court said that since the offer had been
made by general advertisement rather than to him personally, he should
have realised that it might be withdrawn in the same way.
D decided to buy a car on hire purchase and signed a form supplied by the
dealer which declared that the HP agreement became binding only when
signed by the finance company PP. D paid a first instalment and took the
car away, but returned it two days later saying he had changed his mind.
The court said this was an effective withdrawal, and that PP's purported
acceptance five days after the car was returned was too late. (In fact, the
car was stolen from the dealer's forecourt during the five days and was
recovered in a damaged state; PP were thus unable to fulfil their part of
the bargain to supply the car as originally seen, giving another reason for
their purported acceptance to be ineffective.)
Exchequer
D made an offer in June to buy shares in PP's company, but heard nothing.
PP made an allocation of shares in November, and purported to accept D's
offer, but D refused to go ahead. The court said that although the offer
had not been formally withdrawn, it would expire after "a reasonable
time", and given the fluctuating nature of the subject matter the
time interval had gone beyond what was reasonable.
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A father bought a house for his son and daughter-in-law DD to live in,
paying 250 in cash and borrowing the other 500 from a building society.
The house was put into the father's name, but he said that as long as DD
paid the instalments he would transfer it to them as soon as the mortgage
was discharged. After some fifteen years the father died, and his widow P
sued for possession of the house. The Court of Appeal said there was a
unilateral contract: DD were not bound to go on paying, but if they did so
that father was bound to transfer the house to them in accordance with
his promise. Denning LJ said (perhaps obiter) that a unilateral contract
cannot be revoked once the potential acceptor has embarked upon
performance.
PP sought to buy various properties from DD, and draft contracts were
prepared. DD undertook that if PP produced the draft contract and a
bankers' draft by a certain time they would enter into a full contract. PP
obtained the bankers' draft and attended at DD's offices before the
deadline, but DD refused to go ahead. PP's claim for damages was
dismissed by Brightman J and the Court of Appeal because the collateral
contract (relating to an interest in land) did not conform with the Law of
Property Act 1925 s.40, but Goff LJ said obiter that while the offeror of a
unilateral contract is entitled to require full performance of his condition
and short of that is not bound, there must be an implied obligation on his
part not to prevent the condition becoming satisfied, and that obligation
arises as soon as the offeree starts to perform. Until then the offeror can
revoke the whole thing, but once the offeree has embarked on
performance it is too late for the offeror to revoke his offer.
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ACCEPTANCE
No contract comes into existence until an offer is accepted and, in most cases,
that acceptance is communicated to the offeror.
P discussed the purchase of a horse from his nephew J, and prices were
discussed. On 2 January P wrote to J saying "If I hear no more about him, I
consider the horse is mine at 30-15-0" [30.75]. J did not reply, no money
was paid, and the horse remained in J's possession. J decided to sell the
horse to P and told an auctioneer D to withdraw it from a sale, but D forgot
this instruction and sold the horse elsewhere. P now sued D in conversion,
claiming the horse was his property. The Court of Common Pleas (whose
judgment was affirmed on appeal) said there was no contract: P's letter
was an open offer that had not been accepted.
Although the offeror cannot stipulate that the offeree's silence is to be taken as a
sign of his acceptance of the offer, he can generally specify the method by which
acceptance is to be communicated.
487, CA
AA negotiated to buy some steel from RR, and RR made an offer with a
stipulation that acceptance be notified only on a pre-printed form. AA
accepted by letter and then sought to cancel their acceptance. The Court
of Appeal said there was no valid acceptance and hence no binding
contract, but added obiter that it might be possible to say in some cases
that those in RR's position had waived the condition as to the mode of
acceptance, expressly or
by their conduct.
D offered to buy a quantity of flour from P, and wrote asking for a reply
"by return of wagon". P replied by post to D's other address, which took
considerably longer, by the time the letter arrived D had already bought
from other sources all the flour he needed. D refused to accept the
purported contract as binding, and the court supported his view. The court
said that the actual mode of reply was unimportant, and that any means
might be used as long as the reply was received no later than would be
expected by the method specified, but a different address and a
substantial delay were enough to invalidate the acceptance.
P wrote to D asking for a price on 800 tons of iron. D offered the iron at
69s [69 shillings, or 3.45] per ton and asked for a reply "by return". It was
conceded that since the offer was not in fact accepted by return of post
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A regularly supplied RR with coal, and suggested after some years that
they should enter into a formal contract. A contract was drafted by RR and
sent to A, who returned it with comments, but it was never formally
executed. However, A supplied coal and RR paid for it for some time
thereafter as if the draft contract had come into force. The House of Lords
said that mere mental assent to the contract would not have been
enough, but the fact that both parties acted upon it was enough to show
acceptance of its terms as from the completion of the first delivery (or
possibly, from the placing of the first order after the return of the draft).
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COUNTER OFFERS
A counter-offer is not an acceptance, and actually kills the original offer. The
majority of the court in Tinn v Hoffman above thought this would be true even
where the counter-offer contains exactly the same terms as the original offer,
though a minority dictum of Honeyman J suggests the contrary.
D wrote to P offering a quantity of iron at 40s [40 shillings] a ton, net cash.
P telegraphed back asking whether D would accept 40s. for delivery over
two months, or if not, what time they would give. Four hours later, having
had no reply, P telegraphed accepting the original offer, to find D had
already sold the iron elsewhere. P sued for breach of contract, and the
judge said there was no counter-offer, merely an enquiry that should have
been answered.
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D wrote to P offering to sell some wool, and asked for a reply "in course of
post". This offer was delayed two days in the post, and consequently P's
acceptance was late in coming back. On the day before it arrived (but
after it had been expected), D sold the wool elsewhere. The court said P
was entitled to damages: his acceptance was complete when his letter
was posted, before the wool was sold to the third party.
This "postal rule" applies only to acceptances, not to withdrawals or other
communications, but applies even if the letter is lost or delayed in the post
unless the loss or delay is caused by the acceptor's error. It is a special principle
limited to letters sent by ordinary post, however, and is restricted to situations in
which the parties would reasonably have expected acceptance to be signified in
that way.
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been made outside the jurisdiction (i.e. in Vienna), and the House of Lords
agreed. Lord Wilberforce said there was no general rule that could cover
all the possible situations that might arise with the use of Telex machines:
each case must be resolved by reference to the intention of the parties, to
sound business practice, and in some cases to a judgment as to where the
risks should lie.
The growth of electronic communication has raised new (and as yet unanswered)
questions about the applicability of the postal rule to communications by e-mail
and via the world-wide web. On the one hand, there are those who argue that email is virtually simultaneous and that the postal rule should not apply, but this
takes no account of the fact that e-mail messages are sometimes rejected by the
server and that the recipient may not read the message immediately it arrives.
The majority of academic commentators have therefore tended to the view that
e-mail should be treated as a form of mail to which the postal rule should
normally apply (subject to its exclusion by the parties' clear intention).
Where the offeror sets up a web site that includes a reply form, this comes closer
to instantaneous communication because the offeree can tell at once whether
his acceptance has been received. There is a substantial body of opinion to the
effect that the postal rule should not apply here (and a quite sustainable view
that a web page, like a shop window, normally constitutes an invitation to treat
rather than an offer). But given the speed at which electronic communication is
still developing, there are strong policy reasons for ensuring that the rules for
electronic acceptance are the same no matter which particular form of software
is being used.
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CONSIDERATION
A contract not made under seal must be supported by valuable consideration. In
Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Exch 153 Lush J defined this as "some right, interest,
profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or
responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other". Consideration must be
of some value, but the courts have consistently refused to look at its adequacy.
P was the widow of J, who before his death had instructed his executors to
convey to her a cottage for the rest of her life in return for a payment of
1 a year towards the ground-rent. This was a very small sum even in
those days, and the executors' motive in agreeing was no doubt respect
for J, but the court found there was an enforceable contract. The 1 a year
was valuable consideration, and that was enough to complete the
contract.
A farmer granted his son an option to purchase the farm at a low price,
but then sold the farm worth at least 40000) to his wife for 500. The son
sought to recover the farm from the wife, but the House of Lords said the
wife took free of the option because it was void (for the purposes of the
Law of Property Act 1925) against the purchaser of a legal estate for
money or money's worth. The 500 was valuable consideration, even
though it was manifestly inadequate.
P bought a horse from D, and after the sale D promised that the horse
would be "sound and free from vice". In fact the horse proved to be vicious
and very hard to control, and P sued for breach of contract. The court said
he had no case; the only consideration he had given (the sale price of the
horse) was past by the time the promise was made, and the contract was
merely that D would deliver the horse on request.
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promised to pay for this work. When they did not do so the occupants
sued, but without success: the consideration for that promise was past
and there was no contract.
D, who had killed a man, asked P to try to get him a royal pardon. P went
to the King and was successful in obtaining the pardon, whereupon D
promised to pay him 100. When he did not pay, P sued in assumpsit and
won. The majority of the bench said that where the promisor makes a
request that the other do him some service, and (after the service is
performed) promises to pay for it, the promise and the request go
together and the contract is binding.
An expert witness P attended court for six days under D's subpoena, but
was not in fact called to give evidence. D subsequently promised to pay
him a fee of six guineas [6.30] for his time, but did not do so, and P sued.
Lord Tenterden CJ said that since the subpoena imposed a legal duty on P
to appear at court, his doing so was not consideration that could support
D's promise.
AA were the owners of a colliery affected by a strike, and feared that the
strikers would bring out the safety men, which would result in flooding.
They asked the police to provide them with extra protection; the local
inspector said he thought the existing mobile force was sufficient, but
eventually agreed to provide 70 men in exchange for a written promise to
pay for the services provided. The extra police were sent to the mine, and
remained until the end of the strike. AA then refused to pay, and
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counterclaimed for the cost of feeding and housing the police at the
colliery. Affirming the decision of Bailhache J and the Court of Appeal, the
House of Lords said the police undoubtedly have a general duty to do
what they think necessary to keep the peace and prevent crime, and no
one can be made to pay extra for that. But when individuals desire special
services which although not within the obligations of the police can most
effectively be rendered by them, the police authorities may "lend" the
services of constables for that purpose in consideration of payment. If the
inspector believed in good faith that the garrison at the colliery was
unnecessary and agreed to provide it only to meet AA's request, they were
entitled to treat that as a special duty and charge for it.
The unmarried parents of a child separated; the mother P took the child,
and the father D offered to pay her 1 a week provided the child was well
looked after and happy. After some time D stopped paying, and when P
tried to enforce the payments he claimed there was no consideration for
his promise: P had undertaken to do only what she was already legally
bound to do. The Court of Appeal disagreed: by promising to "keep it
happy" she had gone beyond her statutory duty to maintain the child, and
that was consideration enough. An alternative explanation was offered by
Denning LJ, who said P had provided consideration inasmuch as D had
obtained what he wanted without the trouble of enforcing it in court, and
thereby derived a factual if not a legal benefit. Such an explanation
certainly avoids the rather forced ratio of the majority, and finds an echo
in the more recent decision in Williams v Roffey below.
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A ship left England with a crew of 36, but as a result of desertions these
were reduced to only 19, including just five able seamen, who were
promised extra pay if they would help to sail the ship back to England. The
court said this promise was enforceable: the crew was so reduced that it
was dangerous to sail on and the captain would have had no right to
demand it. The original contract had come to an end, and the seamen
were free to make a new contract on whatever terms might be agreed.
Special problems arise when a debtor (with his creditor's agreement) seeks to
settle a debt by part payment. He has given no consideration for the creditor's
promise to cancel the balance of the debt, and so cannot enforce this promise if
the creditor subsequently changes his mind.
D owed a debt to P and was due to pay 8-10-0 [8.50]in November; at P's
request he paid 5-2-2 [5.11] in October and P accepted this in full
settlement. P then sued for the balance and succeeded on a technicality of
pleading, but the whole court made some further points of importance.
Payment of a lesser sum on the day of satisfaction of a greater, cannot
satisfy the debt as a whole; but where payment is made in a different form
(e.g. goods instead of cash) or at an earlier time or a different place from
that previously specified, with the creditor's agreement, the court will
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generally assume without enquiring too deeply that the creditor derived
some benefit from the change sufficient to provide consideration for his
agreement to forgive the balance of the debt.
D owed P 1000, but an action for debt was settled when P agreed to
accept promissory notes for 300 in full satisfaction. After one of the notes
had been met, P sued again for the original debt, but the court said he
must fail. It is undoubtedly true, said Alderson B, that payment of a portion
of a liquidated demand, in the same manner as the whole ought to be
paid, is payment only in part. But if you substitute a piece of paper or a
stick of sealing-wax it is different, and the bargain may be carried out. A
man may give in satisfaction of a debt of 100, a horse worth 5 but not
5 itself. In the present case, if for money you give a negotiable security,
you pay in a different way. The security may be worth more or less: it is of
uncertain value.
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Denning J
In 1937 the owners PP leased a block of flats in London to DD at an agreed
rent. When war broke out, many flats were left empty as people moved
out to escape the bombing, and PP agreed to reduce the rent by half. DD
paid the reduced rent until the end of the war, and PP then claimed for the
"arrears". Denning J said that although PP were once again entitled to the
rent originally agreed after the war ended, they could not go back on their
promise to accept a reduced rent for the earlier years. When a party to a
contract makes a promise to the other, which he knows will be acted on,
that he will not enforce his strict legal rights, the equitable principle of
promissory estoppel makes that promise binding on him until such time as
he gives reasonable notice of his intention to resume those rights.
W was granted a divorce nisi from her husband H. H promised to allow her
100 per annum after tax by way of maintenance, and so W did not apply
to the court for a formal maintenance order. After the divorce was final, H
made no payments and W sued. Byrne J gave judgment in her favour, but
the Court of Appeal said this was not a case in which promissory estoppel
could be used. Denning LJ said the principle stated in High Trees does not
create new causes of action where none existed before; it only prevents a
party from insisting on his strict legal rights when it would be unjust to
allow him to enforce them. Birkett and Asquith LJJ were equally clear that
promissory estoppel must be used as "a shield and not a sword", though
that is not to say that it can only ever be used by a defendant.
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PP were a small firm in some financial difficulties, who were owed nearly
500 by D for work they had done. Eventually D's wife offered to pay 300
in full settlement, saying that if this was not accepted nothing would be
paid. PP reluctantly agreed, but subsequently sued for the balance. The
Court of Appeal upheld their claim, distinguishing Sibree v Tripp and
disapproving some later decisions, and saying that a cheque was no
different from cash. Where a genuine agreement was reached that the
creditor would accept a lesser sum in settlement of a debt, said Lord
Denning MR, equity might then intervene to prevent his insisting on his full
legal rights if it would be unjust and unreasonable for him to do so, but
this was not such a case.
In Alan v El Nasr [1972] 2 All ER 127, a rather complicated commercial case, Lord
Denning MR said the principle of waiver (that is, promissory estoppel under
another name) is that if one party by his conduct leads another to believe that
the strict rights arising under the contract will not be insisted upon, intending
that the other should act on that belief, and he does act upon it, then the first
party will not afterwards be allowed to insist on the strict legal rights when it
would be inequitable for him to do so. Stephenson LJ, concurring in the decision
on the facts, left open the question whether the other party's action could be any
alteration of his position or must be to his detriment.
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PRIVITY
It is a fundamental principle of English law that no one can derive rights or
obligations from a contract to which he has given no consideration and is hence
not a party. This doctrine, known as privity of contract, is still substantially valid
but has been modified in various ways.
A man P married a woman G. P's father and G's father agreed between
themselves that they would give 100 and 200 respectively to P as a
marriage portion and dowry, but both fathers died before G's father had
paid up. P sued G's father's executor for the promised money, but the
court said he was not privy to the contract and his action must therefore
fail.
Dunlop and Dew made a contract for the sale and purchase of motor tyres,
with a condition that they should not be resold below a certain price. Dew
and Selfridge then made a contract containing a similar terms. When
Selfridge broke their agreement and sold the tyres to the public at less
than the agreed price, Dunlop were unable to enforce the agreement: they
had not been party to the contract with Selfridge.
P went to a caf with a friend, who bought her a bottle of ginger beer.
After drinking most of it, P found a decomposed snail in the bottle and
became ill. P had no contract with the caf, so she sued the manufacturers
in delict (the Scottish equivalent of tort). The House of Lords said the
manufacturers had a duty of care to the consumer of their product.
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A party to a contract may assign to a third party his right to enforce the contract
and so obtain the benefits there under: the right thereby transferred is known as
a "chose in action". Assignment takes place automatically when a person dies the contracts to which he is party can (with a few exceptions) be enforced by or
against his personal representatives - or when he becomes bankrupt and most of
his contractual rights devolve upon his trustee in bankruptcy.
MH removed the asbestos from a building under a contract with SC, who
then sold the building to PP. The work was defective and PP suffered
financial loss as a result. The House of Lords held that where the original
contractor was aware that the building was to be sold on, so that defective
work could lead a third party to suffer loss of essentially the same nature
as the original buyer would suffer if the building were not sold, such loss
was damage for which the original buyer (if he had not assigned his rights
to the purchaser) could sue on the purchaser's behalf.
Covenants over land may operate in favour of (or against) future owners of the
land involved, and s.56 of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that a
person may take an ... interest in land or other property ... although he may not
be named as a party to the conveyance or other interest. This consolidates some
of the earlier common law rules relating to real property, which clearly saw
certain rights and obligations as belonging to the land rather than to any
individual.
Smith & Snipes Hall v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 All
ER 179, CA
D had contracted with the former owners of a piece of land to keep the
river banks in good repair; the Court of Appeal allowed the new owner and
lessee of the land to enforce this agreement, since it was clearly intended
to attach to the land rather than to the individual who originally made it.
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Several cases have turned on the question of the validity or otherwise of a third
party exclusion clause.
A contract between the owner of goods and a carrier purported to limit the
liability of the carrier's subcontractor. Lord Reid said that there might be a
contract between owner and subcontractor, making this limitation
effective, if four conditions were satisfied. The clause must clearly extend
to the subcontractor, the carrier must clearly be acting as agent for the
subcontractor (in making the contract) as well as on his own account, such
agency must be authorised or ratified by the subcontractor, and the
subcontractor must have provided some consideration for a contract
between himself and the owner. In the instant case the fourth condition
was not satisfied and the contract could not be shown to exist, so the
clause was ineffective.
The facts were similar to those in Scruttons, but in this case the
subcontractors had performed their part of the agreement and unloaded
the ship. Although they were already under a contractual obligation, this
obligation was to the carrier and not to the owner, and so could form new
consideration in respect of a "third party".
A contract for a major shopping development provided that the owner (not
the contractor) was to bear all fire risks, and a sub-contractor had dealt
with the main contractor on that basis. When fire damage was caused
through the sub-contractor's negligence and the owner sued in tort, the
court said it would not be just and reasonable to exclude the subcontractor from the protection of the clause, even though he was not party
to the contract in which it was contained.
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 now provides that a third
party has the right to enforce a contract if the contract expressly states that it is
to be enforceable by that third party or if it purports to confer a benefit on him,
and that the third party's right to enforce cannot be taken away without his
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consent once he has informed the contracting parties of his acceptance of the
contract or has acted in reliance on the contract. The third party's rights are
subject to the same defences as the parties have against one another, but
otherwise are additional to, and not in substitution for, existing third-party rights.
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A civil servant D was about to return to his work in Ceylon, leaving his wife
P in England. D promised to pay P 30 a month until he returned, in
exchange for her agreement to support herself without calling on him for
any other maintenance. They subsequently divorced, and P sought to
enforce D's promise. The Court of Appeal said that although there was
consideration in P's promise, there was no contract. There are many
agreements, said Atkin LJ, including most agreements between husband
and wife, which the parties never intended they might be sued upon.
Agreements such as these are outside the realm of contracts altogether.
P and D were 17, and each commonly rode in the other's car. On one
occasion, P was injured through D's careless driving, and claimed against
D's insurance. P had paid 10s [50p] towards the cost of petrol, and it was
necessary to decide whether there was a contract of carriage. The judge
said there was not: there was merely a friendly agreement to go on this
particular trip, giving rise to no legal obligations or rights except those
which the general law of the land imposes.
A husband H left his wife W and went to live with another woman. H
promised to pay D 40 a month, and they made a written agreement that
in consideration of W's paying off the mortgage on their jointly-owned
house, H would transfer it to her sole ownership. The Court of Appeal
upheld Stamp J's ruling that this was a legally enforceable contract. In
these cases, said Lord Denning MR, the court looks at the situation in
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which they were placed and asks whether reasonable people would regard
this agreement as one intended to be binding.
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785, CA
A company DD issued "letters of comfort" asserting that their policy was
to ensure that a subsidiary company had at all times sufficient resources
to meet its obligations. Hirst J said the ambiguous language of the letters
was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that commercial agreements
(in this case, an implied guarantee) are legally binding, but the Court of
Appeal disagreed. The letters contained a statement of present intention,
they said, not an undertaking as to future conduct, and in the absence of
misrepresentation could not be interpreted as giving rise to any binding
obligation.
A woman X told her part-time gardener P that she intended to leave him
her house in her will; P said he would not accept any payment for the
gardening he did or other help he gave. X subsequently made three wills
in which P was her residuary legatee, but in a fourth will she left the
residue to someone else. X died, and P sought a declaration that he was
entitled to X's residuary estate. Refusing the declaration, the judge said
there had been a statement by either side, but no offer and acceptance,
and hence no agreement capable of amounting to a binding contract.
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Even if there were an agreement, X's obligation was merely to make a will
in P's favour, not to refrain from revoking it. And in any case, there was no
intention to create a legal relationship.
In 2004 the then Prime Minister promised both inside and outside
Parliament that the government would not ratify the EU Constitutional
Treaty unless and until it was approved by a referendum. That treaty was
abandoned following its rejection by France and the Netherlands, but a
new Treaty of Lisbon (containing many similar provisions) was agreed in
2007 and put forward for ratification in 2008. The applicant sought to
challenge the government's decision to ratify this new treaty without a
referendum. Rejecting the challenge on several grounds, the
Administrative Court said the subject-matter, nature and context of a
promise of this kind place it in the realm of politics, not of the courts, and
the question whether the government should be held to such a promise is
a political rather than a legal matter.
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PP brought a petition of right (an old form of legal action against the
Crown) claiming it had been agreed they should be permitted to purchase
all the surplus tentage to be disposed of up to March 1923. The alleged
contract stipulated that the prices and dates should be agreed upon from
time to time between the parties, subject to arbitration if no agreement
could be reached. The House of Lords said that there was no concluded
contract between the parties: an agreement in which some critical part of
the contract matter is left undetermined is no contract at all. A contract
may leave something still to be determined, but that determination must
not depend on the further agreement of the parties.
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Two groups negotiating over the sale of a business agreed that so long as
AA provided a bankers' letter by a certain date RR would not negotiate
with any third party, and would continue to negotiate with AA in good
faith. The House of Lords said the agreement was unenforceable for lack
of certainty. AA claimed the obligation to negotiate only with them
continued until such time as RR had "a good reason" to break off, giving
the necessary certainty, but Lord Ackner said this was inherently
repugnant to the essentially adversarial position of parties in negotiation.
Each side had the right to pursue its own best interests, and the right to
withdraw from further negotiation was an essential bargaining tool. An
agreement to "use best endeavours" to negotiate might be enforceable
since it set an objective standard, but "good faith" was too subjective a
concept for the courts to enforce. Similarly, an agreement not to negotiate
with any other party during a fixed period was prima facie enforceable,
but an agreement to negotiate only with AA "for a reasonable period" was
too vague, and could not in any case impose a positive duty to negotiate.
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UNIT TWO
FORM OF CONTRACT
FORM
Although there are some exceptions (e.g. contracts relating to interests in land,
of beneficial interests under a trust) the terms of a contract may be written, or
oral, or a mixture. A written contract was traditionally regarded as complete in
itself, but the modern tendency is to admit evidence of other oral terms where
this is appropriate.
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said a term might be implied if it was necessary for business efficiency, and the
contract could not work without it; or if it was obvious that the parties would
have included it had their minds been directed to the point; or if the contract
were one of a common type, obvious gaps in which could be filled by the terms
normally expected in such contracts. Other writers say terms may be implied
according to the presumed intention of the parties, by custom, by statute, or by
common law. As a general rule, the parties may by agreement (explicit or
implicit) exclude any such implied terms, though there are certain statutory
limitations on this.
AA were the owners of a wharf, and agreed that it should be used by R's
ship for loading cargo. The ship grounded and was damaged because of
the condition of the river bed, which was not under AA's control. The court
said AA were liable for this damage; it was an implied term that they had
taken reasonable steps to ensure the river bed adjacent to their wharf was
safe.
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A final year law student P was offered employment with a firm of solicitors
DD, to begin when he completed his studies. He failed his final exams and
DD refused to take him on. The Court of Appeal declined to imply a term in
the agreement that the offer was conditional on his passing the
examinations, even though such a clause was reasonable and quite usual,
because it could have been that the parties had they considered the point
would have made some other equally reasonable arrangement.
Terms may also be implied by the custom of a particular trade, and a series of
contracts between the same two parties, always on the same terms, will usually
lead the court to imply the same terms (insofar as they are not inconsistent with
the express terms) in the present contract.
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for which the goods are being bought, there is an implied condition that
the goods are reasonably fit for that purpose.
15(2) In the case of a contract for sale by sample there is an implied
condition ... that the bulk will correspond with the sample in quality.
Sections 8-11 of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 apply
ss.12-15 of the 1979 Act above mutatis mutandis to hire purchase contracts.
Part I of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 applies ss.12-15 of the
1979 Act above mutatis mutandis to hire contracts and to other contracts under
which goods are to be transferred. Part II includes three further implied terms in
contracts for services.
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claim: since DD had not been made aware of the vessel's peculiarities,
they could not exercise care and skill to deal with them. There was no
breach of the implied condition of fitness for purpose.
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When the landlords PP of a block of flats sought possession for nonpayment of rent, a tenant D alleged that PP were in breach of an implied
term that they would keep the common areas in good repair. The House of
Lords said since the contract contained no covenants by the landlord, the
court could imply the necessary terms taking into account all the
circumstances. There was an implied term that the landlord would
maintain the stairs, lifts and rubbish chutes in good repair; but there was
also an implied term that the tenants would behave reasonably, and since
on the facts the problems were at least partly the fault of the tenants or of
outside vandals, there was no breach of the landlord's obligations.
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A motor cycle was first registered in 1930, but through an error its
documents gave the date of registration as 1941. D told P that it was a
1941 model and pointed to the logbook, and a week later P bought the
motor cycle in a written contract making no reference to its age. P
subsequently discovered the error and sued for breach of contract; the
Court of Appeal said there was no warranty but only a misrepresentation,
and this not being fraudulent (before the 1967 Act) P had no remedy.
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misrepresentation was innocent of any fault, but here the dealer should
have known better.
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DD chartered a ship which was to be "in every way fitted for ordinary
cargo service", but which in fact was in a poor state of repair and
incompetently crewed. DD sought to terminate the contract, but the Court
of Appeal said this was a warranty rather than a condition, and the proper
remedy was an award of damages. Diplock LJ said in such cases the
seriousness of the consequences of a breach of contract - whether the
other party is deprived of substantially the whole benefit which it was
intended he should obtain - should determine whether repudiation or
damages was the more appropriate remedy, and that this rather than any
prior classification should decide whether the term was to be treated as a
condition or a warranty.
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A contract for the sale of soya bean meal provided for a delivery to be
made in June, the buyers giving fifteen days' notice of their readiness to
collect it. They gave such notice on 17 June, and the sellers claimed the
right to repudiate for breach of an essential term. Section 41 of the Law of
Property Act 1925 says a stipulation as to the time of performance is not
to be regarded as being of the essence of the contract, but the House of
Lords said there were exceptions to this. Here the contract itself expressly
stipulated that time conditions must be strictly complied with, and since it
was the parties' intention that a breach of these conditions should give a
right to terminate, that right would be upheld.
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P left his bag in a railway cloakroom, paid 2d (twopence), and was given a
ticket on which were the words "See back"; on the back of the ticket was a
notice excluding liability for any package worth over 10. There was also a
notice to the same effect visible in the cloakroom. The bag was lost, P
sued, and DD relied on the exclusion clause. The court said it was a matter
of fact whether or not DD had done all that was reasonably necessary to
give notice of the clause, and in this case they had.
P went on a railway excursion, and was given a ticket with the words
"Excursion: for conditions see back". On the back was a notice referring
customers to the conditions printed in the company's timetables (which
cost 6d each); these conditions excluded liability for any injury. P was
injured on the journey, but lost her claim. The Court of Appeal said the
ticket was a contractual document, and the fact that P could not read did
not alter the legal position. She should have realised that the special
excursion price might imply special conditions.
P ordered a slot machine from DD, and signed a standard printed order
form including (in very small print) a clause excluding any kind of
warranty. The machine did not work, and P claimed not to be bound by the
exclusion clause which she had not read. The court found against her: in
the absence of misrepresentation, a party who signs a document is
normally bound by its contents whether or not he has read them.
P hired a deckchair belonging to DD, paid the hire fee, and took a ticket
without reading it. The chair collapsed and P was injured; DD relied on a
clause printed on the ticket excluding liability for any injury. The Court of
Appeal said the ticket was not a contractual document - no reasonable
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P was a guest at DD's hotel, and her fur coat was stolen from her
bedroom. In the bedroom was a notice excluding liability for theft of
articles not handed to the manageress for safe keeping, and DD relied on
this. The Court of Appeal said this notice could not have been part of the
contract, which was concluded at the reception desk before P entered the
bedroom.
P parked his car in DD's car park, paying his money and taking a ticket
from the automatic machine at the entrance. On the ticket, in small print,
was a notice referring to conditions displayed in the car park; these were
not visible from outside, and were quite lengthy, including one excluding
liability for any injury to a customer. When P returned later to collect his
car, there was an accident in which he was seriously injured, and he sued.
The Court of Appeal struck out this exclusion clause, holding (i) that so
wide-ranging and unusual an exclusion called for exceptionally clear and
explicit notice, and (ii) that in any case, the contract was complete when
the money was put into the machine at the entrance, before there could
be any possibility of reading the conditions.
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which he did not read. When he came to collect the barrels he found them
empty, but PP pointed to an exemption clause on the receipt. D argued
that this clause could not be part of the contract because he had not been
sent it until. The Court of Appeal said there had been a consistent course
of dealing, and terms from the previous contracts could be implied in the
present case as long as they were not inconsistent with express
provisions.
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A asked his brother-in-law McSporran to send A's car via RR's ferry. McS
took the car to the ferry terminal, paid the freight charge and was given a
receipt. The ferry sank during the voyage and the car was lost. A sued for
its value, and RR sought to rely on an exclusion in their printed conditions
of carriage. These conditions were printed on the receipt and displayed in
the office, but neither A nor his agent McS had read these conditions (the
receipt in any case having been given only after the oral contract had
been concluded) and McS had not been asked to sign the "risk note" on
which the conditions were repeated. RR alleged that McS knew of the
conditions from a previous course of dealings, but the course was not
consistent: sometimes McS had been asked to sign a risk note and
sometimes he had not. Where conduct is not consistent, said Lord Pearce,
there is no reason why it should still produce an invariable contractual
result. Previous contracts had been written, but this one was oral; there
was no implication that the conditions would necessarily be the same.
O'Brien v Mirror Group (2001) Times 8/8/01, CA
A scratch-card game in the Daily Mirror offered a top prize of 50 000, and
the game was designed to produce one or two winners each week. On one
particular day, through a printing error, over a thousand winning cards
were printed and 1473 people claimed the prize. In accordance with the
competition rules, which had not been printed in that day's paper but
which had appeared previously and were referred to on the card, the
paper chose one claimant at random to receive 50 000 and provided an
extra 50 000 to be shared between the other claimants (about 35 each).
C, who had had a "winning card" but who received only 35, claimed he
was entitled to receive the full amount. Dismissing his claim, the Court of
Appeal said the rule had been properly incorporated into the contract. The
term was not particularly onerous or outlandish - C had done very little to
win his prize - and DD had done enough to bring it to his attention.
Contra proferentem
Any ambiguity or uncertainty in the interpretation of an exclusion clause,
however contrived the ambiguity might be, is normally construed contra
proferentem - against the party seeking to rely on it.
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of PP. The policy covered all sums awarded "as compensation", and this
was open to more than one interpretation. In cases of ambiguity where
other rules of construction fail, an instrument should be construed more
strongly against its maker.
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Fundamental breach
No exclusion clause can protect a party who is "in fundamental breach" of the
contract. In consumer contracts this common-law rule has been strengthened by
s.3(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (below), but in purely
commercial contracts the courts are inclined to take a broader view if they are
satisfied that the clause represents the parties' true intentions.
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STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
Various statutory provisions invalidate or limit purported exclusion clauses. The
most important parts of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (which in spite of
its name applies to tort as well as contract), apply only to business liability. This
includes government departments and other public authorities, but international
contracts, marine contracts, contracts for insurance, land, patents and
copyrights, or for the formation of companies, is largely excluded. It deals with
both exclusion and limitation clauses, including those which impose restrictive
conditions such as clauses which deny liability unless notice of any complaint is
given within a specified time.
Much of the Act is concerned with the protection of consumers, and a consumer
is defined in s.12 as amended as a legal person who does not make the contract
in the course of business, nor purport to do so, while the other party does. In the
case of an individual that is enough; where the buyer is a corporate body the
goods must be of a type normally supplied for private consumption. The
definition excludes a person (even an individual) buying second-hand goods at
public auction, as well as a person who obtains goods (even for private use) by
using a cash-and-carry card at a wholesale warehouse.
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Clarke
P took photographs at a friend's wedding, and took the film to DD for
processing. A sign on the counter limited DD's liability for lost or damaged
films to the cost of replacement. The films were lost through DD's
negligence, and P sued for the distress caused by the loss, these being the
only photographs taken at the wedding in question. The judge said the
limitation was unreasonable; it allowed DD to provide a cheap service for
the majority of photographers whose films were not valuable, but there
was no alternative service available for the minority who might be
prepared to pay more for greater protection.
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not clearly wrong, and added that in deciding whether a clause was
reasonable the courts would look at its effect rather than its form.
The contract was essentially the same as in Phillips v Hyland, and P's
husband was killed through the driver's negligence. P sued both the
owners and the hirers of the excavator, and succeeded against the hirer.
The Court of Appeal said s.2(1) of UCTA did not apply to arrangements
made to share liability with a third party, and the indemnity clause as
between two businesses was not unreasonable.
PP sued for damages in respect of faulty software, which had led to losses
of 1.3 million in poll tax collection. The Court of Appeal agreed with Scott
Baker J that a limitation clause limiting DD's liability to 100k was not
shown to be fair and reasonable. They had insurance cover up to 50
million, and the loss would otherwise be borne by a surcharge on the local
taxpayers.
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EUROPEAN LAW
The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Directive 93/13)
came into effect on 1 January 1995, and the relevant UK regulations took effect
six months later. However, it subsequently appeared that the original regulations
had not properly implemented the Directive, and revised regulations (the Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, SI 1999/2083) were
made to replace them.
The Directive and the domestic Regulations are limited to consumer contracts
(including oral contracts) for the supply of goods and services, including financial
services (subject to some limitations), insurance and real property. They are
wider than UCTA in that they apply to all types of clause, not only exclusion and
limitation clauses, but narrower inasmuch as they apply only to consumer
contracts - a consumer is defined as a natural person acting for purposes outside
his trade, business or profession - and only to terms that have not been
individually negotiated.
A term is regarded as not having been individually negotiated when it has been
drafted (by the non-consumer) in advance and the consumer has therefore not
been able to influence its content, particularly in the context of a standard form
contract. The fact that some terms of a contract may have been individually
negotiated will not protect the rest if an overall assessment shows that the
contract as a whole is a standard form contract. A term that has not been
individually negotiated is automatically regarded as unfair if contrary to the
requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights
and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.
Terms that define the main subject matter of the contract, and the adequacy of
the price in relation to the goods or services supplied, are outside the scope of
the regulations so long as they are expressed in plain intelligible language: value
for money is not the law's concern. But the definition and value for money can be
taken into account in determining whether other terms may be unfair: if secondhand or slightly damaged goods are sold cheaply, a limited warranty may well be
regarded as fair. A term identified as unfair is not binding on the consumer, but if
the rest of the contract is capable of operating without the unfair term it will
continue to bind both parties.
Schedule 2 of the Regulations sets out an indicative and non-exhaustive list of
terms which may be regarded as unfair. These include terms which have the
object or effect of (a) excluding or limiting legal liability for the death of or personal injury to the
consumer;
(b) inappropriately excluding the consumer's rights in the event of total or partial
non-performance by the other (the supplier);
(c) making the agreement binding on the consumer while leaving the provision
of services by the supplier dependent on his own decision;
(d) allowing the supplier to retain a deposit paid by the consumer in the event of
cancellation, without providing similar compensation for the consumer if the
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UNIT THREE
VITIATING FACTORS
Even when a contract has apparently been properly made, and its terms are
clear, it may for various reasons be void or voidable or unenforceable. On this
page we consider the reasons why such a thing might happen, and the
consequences of any such occurrence.
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A security guard P was injured while trying to stop a van carrying stolen
property. The driver X was convicted (inter alia) of causing grievous bodily
harm, and when he failed to pay the compensation ordered by the
magistrates P sought payment from the MIB. The Court of Appeal said
those injured by motor vehicles are covered by motorists' insurance even
where "ordinary" crimes are involved, and if the driver is not insured (as
was the case here) the MIB must pay.
Armhouse Lee v Chappell (1996) Times 7/8/96, CA
DD were pornographers who operated a number of telephone sex
chatlines; their advertising agents PP sued for m in unpaid advertising
charges. DD argued that since the contract was for the promotion of
immorality they should not be required to pay, but the courts disagreed.
However shocking some ordinary decent people might find the
advertisements, said Simon Brown LJ, they could hardly be said to be
"destructive of the very fabric of society", and to call the defence
unmeritorious would seriously understate the unattractiveness of DD's
case!
Any contract prejudicial to the status of marriage, such as an agreement never
to marry, is traditionally regarded as "simply void" at common law. A contract
that purports to oust the jurisdiction of the courts is also generally regarded as
void, although "arbitration-first" clauses have been upheld and "honour-only"
agreements are treated as unenforceable.
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RESTRAINT OF TRADE
A contract is "in restraint of trade" if one party restricts his future liberty to carry
on his trade, business or profession in such manner or with such persons as he
may choose, and such a contract may be void under some circumstances. The
most common examples of such contracts occur where a skilled employee
undertakes not to set up his own business in competition with his former
employers, and where the seller of a business undertakes not to compete with
the buyer.
A gunmaker A sold his business to DD, and agreed not to carry on any
competing business for the next 25 years. When RR sought to enforce that
agreement the House of Lords said any restraint of trade clause is prima
facie void, and the party seeking to enforce it must show its validity. To do
this, he must show that the restraint is reasonable, both as between the
parties and as regards the public interest; the test of what is reasonable
will vary from one case to another. Any restraint will be upheld only
insofar as it protects a legitimate
interest of the other party.
A reporter D agreed never in the rest of his life to work for any other paper
within 20 miles. This contract was held to be unreasonable and therefore
void.
A hairdresser agreed not to work within mile for 12 months: the aim
was to ensure that the employee did not unfairly steal his former
employer's business, and this clause was upheld as valid.
A doctor agreed not to practise within the defined practice area within
three years of terminating the partnership, and the clause was held to be
reasonable on the basis that it meant "practise as a GP" (i.e. in direct
competition with the former partnership).
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A boxer made a contract giving his manager exclusive control over the
selection of his fights. This was held to be an unreasonable restraint on his
right to work, particularly with a potential conflict of interest between the
manager's role as such and his role as a fight promoter.
In determining whether a restraint is reasonable, the courts take into account
the nature of the restriction, the interest to be protected, the extent of time and
distance, and any special inducement given to the employee to accept the
restriction.
The judge upheld an agreement that W would not deal in insurance for
two years,
since he had received an extra two years' salary in compensation.
The plaintiff entered a contract of service with the defendant, under which
the plaintiff's future conduct was purportedly restricted after the
termination of the contract "howsoever occasioned". After the plaintiff left
that employment, the defendant sought an injunction to enforce the
restrictive term. The Court of Appeal, reversing the trial judge and
overruling a decision of Laws J in D v M 1996, said such a clause was not
necessarily unreasonable. If an employee was wrongfully dismissed, this
might amount to a repudiation of the contract on the employer's part,
justifying the employee in treating the contract as being at an end so that
he was no longer bound by it. This did not make the clause generally
unreasonable.
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CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGALITY
Where a contract is illegal from the beginning, because it requires one party to
do an illegal act, or where both parties intend that it shall be performed in an
illegal way or for an illegal purpose, then it is wholly illegal and void. Neither
party can generally assert any right or remedy under such a contract - money
paid cannot be recovered, for example, and the court will veto any attempt at
enforcement even though the defendant may be just as guilty as the plaintiff.
Where a contract is prima facie lawful, however, and one party (unknown to the
other) executes it for an illegal purpose or in an illegal way, the remedies of the
innocent party are preserved. The guilty party loses any legal rights and
remedies he might have sought under the contract, but the innocent party is
protected in respect of anything he does before learning of the illegality. Even a
guilty party may not always be wholly without remedies.
DD were seed merchants who had bought seed from a third party T and
sold it to P without complying with certain legal formalities. The contract
was thus illegal, but the Court of Appeal allowed P to sue when the seed
was found to be defective, and DD in turn were allowed to refer to this suit
when claiming an indemnity under their (entirely legal) contract with T.
A landlord who failed to provide a rent book as required by law was still
allowed to sue for the rent. The Court said that although the criminal law
imposed penalties for non-compliance, the rent book was not an essential
feature of the contract of letting and there was no reason why the landlord
should not be entitled to claim his rent.
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Two women together had bought a house, but legal title had been vested
in the appellant alone to assist in a fraud on the Department of Social
Security. The House of Lords said the respondent could still assert her
equitable rights because her claim was based on a resulting trust and not
on the illegal contract per se. Lord Browne-Wilkinson said property in
chattels and land can still pass under a contract which is illegal and
therefore unenforceable as a contract, and a plaintiff can enforce property
rights so acquired provided that he does not need to rely on the illegal
contract for any purpose other than providing the basis of his claim to a
property right. It is irrelevant whether the illegality of the underlying
agreement is pleaded or emerges in evidence: if the plaintiff has acquired
legal title under the illegal contract, that is enough. The maxim that equity
would assist only those with clean hands was no longer applicable: equity
and law had been fused for more than a hundred years, and English law
now had a single law of property made up of legal and equitable interests.
Miss Milligan claimed under a resulting trust: she had provided part of the
purchase money, and claimed a common intention that the property
should belong to both of them. That was enough to establish her case: the
reason for this common intention was irrelevant.
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UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS
There are certain types of contract - principally third party guarantees, consumer
credit agreements and contracts for the sale of land - which, even though they
are quite valid and theoretically binding, will not be enforced by the courts
unless in the proper form. All contracts for the sale of land (or interests in land)
must be made in writing and signed by both parties, and following the Statute
of Frauds 1677 as amended, a special promise to answer for the debt or
default of another person - a "guarantee" in modern terms - must be supported
by evidence in writing. A promise not thus supported is unenforceable rather
than void, however, and even though it is itself unenforceable its validity may be
important in some other case. Moreover, the contract itself need not normally be
set down in writing as long as there is a written note or memorandum
incorporating the essential details.
The Consumer Credit Act 1974 makes hire purchase and credit sale
agreements generally unenforceable unless they are "properly executed", the
consumer having signed and having received a copy together with notice of his
rights to cancel. Once again the agreement not in due form is unenforceable
rather than void - it can be enforced by a court order, but such is unlikely to be
given unless the formal defect is trivial - but this time the agreement itself must
be in writing and a mere memorandum is insufficient.
All credit agreements must be in writing using approved forms; if not, the
agreement is unenforceable. Where the agreement is signed outside trade
premises (e.g. at the consumer's home), the consumer has a five-day "coolingoff period" within which he may change his mind and cancel the agreement. If
the terms of a credit agreement are "grossly extortionate", the court has a
discretionary power to amend the terms to what it considers fair.
If the consumer does not keep up the repayments, the lender must warn him and
allow him seven days to make good the default before taking steps to repossess
the goods; where one-third or more of the total amount has already been paid,
the lender cannot repossess without a court order. If the consumer voluntarily
returns the goods, he need not pay more than half the agreed total price.
Under the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, a contract
for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land can only be made in writing
and only by incorporating all the terms (expressly or by reference) in a single
document, to be signed by or on behalf of each party. This clearly requires more
than just evidence of a verbal contract: it seems that the written contract will be
conclusive and any verbal agreement wholly void rather than just unenforceable,
but as yet there has not been time for any substantial body of case law to be
developed.
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CONTRACTS BY MINORS
A minor in law is a young person under the age of 18, but earlier case law dating
from the time when legal infancy ended at 21 is still relevant. A contract made
by a minor may be valid and enforceable, if it is for the supply of "necessary"
goods or services or is a "beneficial contract of service", or may alternatively be
voidable at the minor's option in any other case. The Infants' Relief Act 1874
made certain classes of contract "absolutely void", but this was repealed by the
Minors' Contracts Act 1987 and such contracts are now merely voidable.
A contract made by a minor for the supply of necessary goods or services is
binding on both parties, but under the Sale of Goods Act 1893 the minor need
pay only a reasonable price and not necessarily the contracted price.
"Necessary" is taken broadly; the Sale of Goods Act 1979 refers to "things
which are suitable to the station in life of the infant and to his actual needs at
the time of sale and delivery".
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claim failed: although it might have been necessary for P to hire a car to
collect his luggage, it was not necessary for him to enter a contract
containing such an onerous clause as this, and accordingly the contract
was voidable. (Note that it is the entire contract which is voidable, and not
merely the offending clause.)
A minor may bind himself by a contract of apprenticeship or service which is for
his benefit on the whole, even though some terms of the contract may be to his
disadvantage.
A contract for dancing training was set aside because of its overall
unreasonableness - it required that B should not marry nor accept outside
engagements for 7 years, but made no guarantee of any engagements
arranged by D.
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to restore any property acquired under the contract, or property representing it,
and cannot recover any money he has paid over unless there has been a total
failure of consideration by the other party.
A minor P entered a contract for the lease of a flat, and agreed to buy the
furniture in it. He subsequently avoided the contract, and sought to
recover the money he had already paid towards the purchase of the
furniture. His claim failed in the County Court, and his appeal was
dismissed. Coleridge CJ said P had had the use of the furniture for several
months, and since he could not return this benefit he was not entitled to
the return of his own consideration.
Pearce v Brain [1929] 2 KB 310, DC
A minor P traded in his motor-cycle in part-exchange for a car, but later
repudiated the contract. Affirming the decision of the County Court judge,
Swift J said P could not recover his motor-cycle because he had had the
use of the car and that was consideration enough.
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MISREPRESENTATION
Statutes such as the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 and the Property
Misdescriptions Act 1991 create offences relating to certain types of
misrepresentation in the course of business, but our concern here is with the civil
rather than the criminal consequences. A misrepresentation is a untrue
statement of fact which induces a party to enter a contract, but which is not
itself part of the contract. There must therefore be a statement of some kind,
although a representation need not always be verbal: payment by cheque
implies a representation that the bank will honour the cheque. Mere silence
cannot constitute misrepresentation even when it is obvious that the other party
is mistaken as to the facts, subject to three qualifications.
First, where the contract requires uberrima fides (utmost good faith) the party is
bound to disclose all material facts. The best-known uberrima fides contracts are
those of insurance, where the insured party is required to disclose all material
facts whether or not he is asked about them. A company is in a similar position in
respect of the sale of shares, and in potential "undue influence" cases (see
below) similar good faith is required of the party supposed to be in the stronger
position.
Second, if a party makes any representation on a particular matter, it must be
full and frank, and silence may not be used to distort a positive representation.
A doctor D sought to sell his medical practice, and told P that the annual
income for the past three years had been about 2000 and that there
were 1480 patients on the "panel". These statements were true when they
were made, but D then fell ill and was unable to work. By the time the
contract was signed, the number of "panel" patients had fallen to 1260
and four months had passed during which there had been almost no
income. When P discovered these facts (which D had not disclosed) he
sought to rescind the contract. The Court said a party who makes a
representation and then discovers that the situation has changed is under
a duty to disclose that fact, since the representation is deemed to
continue up to the time that the contract is made.
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The vendor R of a farm that had never run sheep gave it as his opinion
that it would support about 2000 of them. This turned out not to be the
case, and the purchaser A sought the return of his purchase money.
Rejecting his appeal, the Privy Council said the statement had not been a
representation of fact but merely an expression of R's honestly held
opinion.
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Types of misrepresentation
Fraudulent misrepresentation occurs when a party makes a false statement
without honestly believing it to be true: it may be a deliberate lie, or it may be a
statement made recklessly. In such a case the innocent party may affirm the
contract and claim damages for consequential loss, suing for the tort of deceit;
or repudiate the contract and claim damages and/or rescission.
D was induced to lease a new filling station on the basis of PP's estimate
of its likely turnover. This estimate turned out to be substantially too high,
and D was unable to make a profit or even to pay for the petrol that had
been supplied to him. He counterclaimed for his own losses, alleging
negligent misrepresentation, and succeeded on tortious as well as on
contractual arguments.
PP bought shares in F plc with a view to taking it over, and bought more
after seeing F's auditors' report. The shares then fell in value, and PP sued
the auditors for their negligence in preparing their report. The House of
Lords said the auditors did not owe a duty of care to investors thinking of
buying shares: the damage suffered by PP was foreseeable, but there was
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no sufficient proximity to give rise to a duty of care where the loss was
purely economic.
P and other Lloyds "names" sued their underwriting agents for negligent
mismanagement of their affairs, and the House of Lords held in
interlocutory proceedings that their claims in tort should go for trial. A
claimant who has parallel remedies available in tort and in contract, said
Lord Goff, is free to choose whichever appears to him to be the most
advantageous so long as the contract does not expressly preclude this.
Innocent misrepresentation occurs when neither of the other two applies and the
misrepresentation was made without any fault.
In general, a misrepresentation makes a contract voidable rather than void. On
discovering the misrepresentation, no matter whether fraudulent, negligent or
innocent, the other party may affirm or rescind the contract, explicitly or by his
conduct, but this decision once made is irrevocable. A decision to rescind must
be communicated to the other party within a reasonable time, and takes effect
from that moment.
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MISTAKE
Various mistakes may occur in the negotiations leading to the formation of a
contract, and they are not all treated the same. We distinguish three kinds of
mistake, though different writers use different names and different
classifications. A common mistake, we shall say, occurs when both parties make
the same mistake (eg as to the existence, ownership or nature of the subjectmatter of the contract). A mutual mistake occurs when each party is mistaken as
to the intentions of the other in respect of the contract, and a unilateral mistake
occurs when just one party is mistaken as to the identity or intention of the
other, or as to the nature of a document being signed.
Common mistake
Two kinds of common mistake render the contract void. If the contract concerns
res extincta - that is, subject matter which at the time of the contract no longer
exists, or which never existed at all - the contract is void.
A contract was made for the sale of a cargo of corn which (unknown to
either party) had already been sold. The House of Lords did not declare
the contract void directly - it is common commercial practice to buy "a
risk" rather than a cargo as such - but denied the seller's claim for
payment.
A contract involving a common mistake as to res sua, where the subject matter
already belongs to the supposed buyer, is also void. The "seller" is giving no
value for the consideration given by the "buyer".
P leased from D a salmon farm which, it later emerged, was P's property
all the time. The House of Lords held the contract void for common
mistake, but made an order in its equitable jurisdiction that D should have
a charge on the property based on the value of the improvements he had
made.
In general, any other common mistake - as to the quality of goods sold, for
example - will not invalidate a contract even if it relates to a matter of
fundamental importance.
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It was formerly thought that the courts' equitable discretion might be called into
play to relieve the hardship of the common law in cases where a common
mistake is not enough to invalidate the contract. Specific performance might be
refused, for example, or rescission ordered on such terms as the court considers
just. However, a recent decision of the Court of Appeal casts grave doubt on this.
The parties negotiated the lease of a flat they believed was not rentcontrolled; when they discovered the mistake, P sought repayment of the
excess rent and succeeded. D's claim to avoid the contract for common
mistake failed in the Court of Appeal even though the mistake was clearly
fundamental to the negotiations, but the Court agreed that it might be set
aside in equity on such terms as the court considered just and reasonable.
The tenant should be given the choice of surrendering the lease or of
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continuing it at the agreed rent as soon as this had been legitimated. [But
see now Great Peace below.]
P's motor insurance policy was in fact void for innocent misrepresentation.
When this was discovered, the parties settled a claim for 600 by a
payment of 385, and D then claimed common mistake as to the validity
of the former policy. The Court of Appeal held that the contract for 385
was valid at common law, but ordered its rescission in equity.
Mutual mistake
Where each party is mistaken as to the intentions of the other, there is no
consensus ad idem and hence no contract: a mutual mistake of this kind may be
distinguished from a unilateral mistake (below) by the absence of any objective
right answer.
Unilateral mistake
A unilateral mistake occurs when just one party is mistaken as to some aspect of
the contract, and the other is or is presumed to be aware of this mistake. Such a
mistake may be the result of misrepresentation or may be a mere error by the
mistaken party. At common law, in the absence of any misrepresentation, a
unilateral mistake does not generally invalidate a contract, but the courts have
increasing used equity to set aside a contract where the other party took unfair
advantage.
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P offered some oats for sale, and D agreed to buy them: P knew they were
new oats and thought that was what D wanted; D wanted old oats and
thought that was what he was getting. The Court of Queen's Bench said
the contract was valid, since the two minds were ad idem on the purchase
and sale of oats, and at variance only as to their quality. The contract was
quite clear - it was for a quantity of oats, a sample of which D had
inspected - and there had been no misrepresentation, so P could not rely
on a mistake induced by his own carelessness. Where a specific article is
offered for sale without any express or implied warranty, said Cockburn CJ,
and the buyer has every opportunity of inspecting the goods for himself,
the principle caveat emptor applies.
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PP offered various amounts of hemp and tow at auction, and put up two
lots with identical markings. D inspected one, found it to be hemp, and bid
for the other on the assumption that it was hemp too. Since the price of
hemp is considerably higher than that of tow, the auctioneer realised the
mistake but said nothing. Although at first this appears to be a unilateral
mistake, in that the second bale did objectively contain tow, the judge
found a mutual mistake in that one could not state with certainty which
commodity formed the basis of the contract. The catalogue description of
the lots was not clear and a reasonable person could easily have believed
that two bales of hemp were being offered; the contract was therefore
void.
DD offered to sell P 30000 hare skins, and quoted a certain price "per
pound", and PP accepted. This was an error: the price should have been
"per piece", and since all the preliminary negotiations had been on a "per
piece" basis (as was the custom of the trade). The judge dismissed P's
claim for delivery at the quoted price: he could not reasonably have
supposed that the offer expressed DD's real intention, and must have
known it to be a mistake.
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A ship owned by PP, carrying arms exported by DD, was delayed in port
while it was searched by Nigerian officials. DD accepted liability for the
delay and offered $155k in compensation, but PP refused. DD's solicitors
then sent a letter offering 150k, which PP accepted; this was a double
error, as the letter should have repeated the original offer of $155k. PP
sued for the agreed payment, and the judge said equitable relief was
available in principle in cases such as this, particularly where the results
were grave. But in the instant case, the error was not so obvious as to
make the contract void.
Mistaken identity
A special situation arises where one party makes a unilateral mistake as to the
identity of the other because of a deliberate deception. Although remedies for
misrepresentation may then be available, the law has imposed a fairly stringent
test in order to protect an innocent third party to whom the goods in question
may have been resold. A party seeking to avoid a contract on grounds of
mistaken identity, even as a misrepresentation, must therefore show that he
intended to contract with some particular person other than the one with whom
he contracted in fact - a mere false name is not sufficient; that the other was
aware of this intention, although in cases of deception this is usually fairly
obvious; that at the time of the contract he regarded this matter of identity as
being of crucial importance; and that he took reasonable steps to verify the
other's identity.
It is in respect of the third requirement that avoidance most often fails. Where
the contract is one involving some particular skill (eg ability as a painter) then it
is fairly easy to show that it was considered important to contract with Picasso
and no one else, but in most contracts for the sale of goods the seller will sell
happily to anyone who is prepared to pay the price. Five cases show the
difficulties the courts have encountered in this area.
A man X went into a jeweller's shop and asked to see some jewellery. He
selected about 3000 worth and wrote out a cheque, pretending to be Sir
George Bullough. The jeweller P checked the address X gave in a directory
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and then allowed X to take the jewellery. X (a rogue) then vanished and
the cheque bounced: P sought to recover the jewellery from D, who had
bought it from X in good faith, but failed. The judge distinguished Cundy v
Lindsay as dealing with contracts made by post; in the instant case P had
intended to sell to X face-to-face, even though he was mistaken as to X's
identity, and property had therefore passed.
A man X called on two sisters PP advertising a car for sale and agreed to
buy it, persuading PP to accept a cheque by claiming to be a Mr
Hutchinson of a certain address. Having checked the address in the
telephone directory, PP reluctantly took the cheque and allowed X to take
the car. X disappeared, the cheque bounced, and PP sought to recover the
car from an innocent third party D to whom X had sold it. The Court of
Appeal distinguished Phillips v Brooks (without actually overruling it in
view of its age) and said the offer to sell by cheque had been made only to
Mr Hutchinson; the contract of sale was therefore void and PP were
entitled to the car.
As Lord Denning MR pointed out in Lewis v Averay, frauds of this sort almost
always result in a conflict between two quite innocent parties, and there will
always be hard cases. Sedley LJ (dissenting in Shogun v Hudson) said the law is
still unclear: this is evidently true, and it is wrong that the courts should resort to
very technical distinctions to decide essentially similar cases in different ways.
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The law should be clear one way or the other, and that cannot happen unless the
doctrine of stare decisis is properly applied.
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A woman A signed a transfer of lease in the belief that it was a deed of gift
of the same property, and sought to avoid the document. The House of
Lords said she was bound by her signature: the difference between the
two documents was not sufficiently radical for non est factum to apply.
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ER 1170, Mocatta J
DD had agreed to build a tanker at a price to be paid in five instalments in
dollars. When the international value of the dollar dropped, DD demanded
an increase in the agreed payments and threatened not to complete the
ship unless such an increase was given; PP made the extra payments
under protest and then took delivery. Eight months later they sought to
recover the excess, but failed: the judge said PP had a good argument
based on duress, but had delayed before taking action and so affirmed the
later contract by their conduct.
Dimskal Shipping v ITWF (The Evia Luck) (No.2) [1990] 1 Lloyds Rep
319, HL
A ship in a Swedish dock was visited by representatives of the ITWF, who
threatened to "black" the ship and its cargo unless the captain and owners
agreed to certain conditions including new contracts for the crew and
payments to the ITWF. The owners reluctantly agreed, but once at sea
sought a declaration that the contracts were void and orders for
repayment and additional damages. Having established that English law
applied to the situation (because of the terms of the disputed
"agreement"), the House of Lords said that although industrial action of
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A son forged his father's signature on several promissory notes, and the
bank threatened to prosecute the son (the possible penalty being
transportation for life) unless the father gave them a mortgage covering
the value of the notes. The House of Lords held this was improper
pressure, though not duress, and that the mortgage contract was
consequently invalid. (A second reason for the decision was the illegality
of a contract to suppress a prosecution.)
A wife who was joint owner of the family home signed documents agreeing
to its being put up as collateral for a loan made to the husband's failing
business. When the loan was not repaid and the bank sought possession
of the house, she alleged undue influence by her husband acting as the
bank's agent. The House of Lords said the informality of business dealings
between spouses raises a substantial risk that the husband has
(negligently or otherwise) not accurately stated to his wife the nature of
the liability she is undertaking, and this risk (coupled with the fact that the
wife's guarantee is not on its face to her financial advantage) should put
the lender on enquiry. Each case would turn on its own facts, said Lord
Browne-Wilkinson, but it would generally be sufficient for the creditor to
insist that the wife attend a meeting in the absence of her husband, at
which she should be warned of the risk she was taking and urged to take
independent legal advice. The same principles, he said, should apply to
other cohabitees tied by an emotional relationship.
Even given a manifestly disadvantageous contract, the weaker party must show
that the other did in fact exert undue influence upon him. The burden of proof is
generally on him, but he is powerfully assisted by a rebuttable presumption of
undue influence in cases where a confidential relationship exists in which the
other party is clearly dominant. Once given the manifest disadvantage, for
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UNIT FOUR
DISCHARGE OF A CONTRACT
A contract may provide or imply that performance is due from each party at a
certain time. In the case of an executed contract, of course, one party has
already performed his obligations and it only remains for the other to
reciprocate, but with an executory contract there may be room for manoeuvre.
In a contract of employment, for example, the employer's obligation to provide
safe working conditions comes before the employee's duty to do the work, which
in turn precedes the employer's duty to pay wages.
Where a party fails to perform his obligations, he may offer one of a number of
excuses which will prevent his being in breach of contract. He may claim, for
example, that the contract has been discharged or varied by agreement between
the parties, or that it has been frustrated, or has become impossible to perform
in circumstances falling short of frustration (e.g. when an employee is
temporarily too sick to attend work), or that there is an express contractual
provision allowing non-performance, or that he has exercised his right to
terminate the contract in view of the other party's prior or anticipated breach.
PERFORMANCE
The old common-law rule is that one party to a contract is entitled to insist on
the other's performing his obligations to the letter.
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did not mean "about half an inch", and if a seller wanted a margin he
should stipulate for it.
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Partial performance
It may be, of course, that a party performs part of his obligation but fails to
complete it. Once again, the common-law rule in such cases is that he cannot
claim any payment or performance from the other party.
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consideration for D's promise not to make such a claim, and D could not
be held to that promise.
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FRUSTRATION
The old common law, as illustrated in Paradine v Jane (1647) 82 ER 897, had a
doctrine of absolute contract under which contractual obligations were binding
no matter what might occur. The fact that land was occupied by a foreign army
during the English Civil War did not excuse the tenant from his obligation to pay
rent for the land. The doctrine of frustration was developed as a way of easing
the hardship this rule might cause in cases where the contract could not be
properly fulfilled through no fault of either party. The original theory was that
frustration discharged the contract through an implied term to that effect, but
the modern view is that the parties' actual intentions are irrelevant and that it is
up to the courts to impose a just and reasonable solution.
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was not the sole foundation of the agreement and the cruise around the
fleet could still have taken place.
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BREACH OF CONTRACT
An innocent party has the right to terminate a contract if the other is in
fundamental breach - that is, either a breach of a condition or a breach of an
innominate term causing very serious consequences. The innocent party can
choose to treat the contract as still in force (in which case its terms remain
binding on both sides) and sue for damages, or can treat the contract as
terminated from the moment he communicates that fact to the other. In the
latter case, all future obligations are then annulled, but past obligations remain
in force and past transactions are not reversed.
In contracts for the sale or supply of goods, the buyer has the right to reject the
goods and terminate the contract if the goods supplied are not up to standard. If
he accepts the goods, however, the right to reject is lost and the buyer is limited
to damages. Acceptance is deemed to take place when the buyer intimates to
the seller that he has accepted the goods, or when the goods have been
delivered to him and he does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent
with the ownership of the seller, or when after the lapse of a reasonable time the
buyer retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he has rejected
them. Deemed acceptance does not occur, however, unless the buyer has had a
reasonable opportunity to examine the goods or (if the contract is for sale by
sample) to compare the bulk with the sample.
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contract for which the charterers were entitled to damages. The owners'
subjective desire to maintain the contract was irrelevant: it was the overt
act amounting to repudiation that counted.
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The innocent party's decision to terminate for anticipatory breach must be clear,
and must be communicated to the other party, though this communication may
be by conduct.
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UNIT FIVE
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Where one party is in breach of his contractual obligations, the remedies open to
the other depend in part on the seriousness of the breach. An action for
damages is possible in almost every case, and in some cases an order for
specific performance, but where the breach is serious the innocent party may
prefer to abandon the contract altogether. There is also the possibility of
rescission in some cases of mistake or misrepresentation.
DAMAGES
Where an innocent party has suffered financial loss following another's breach of
contract, the court must decide whether the breach actually caused the loss,
whether the party at fault is legally liable for it (which is not the same thing), and
how much compensation is payable. Causation is largely a matter of fact, and
the rules in contract are similar (but not identical) to those in tort.
P hired a garage for six months and equipped it to meet his own particular
needs: D terminated the contract ten weeks early, and P sued for the
expense of equipping the garage. This part of his claim was rejected: he
would have incurred that expense in any event, and the early termination
had merely accelerated (not caused) the loss.
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Even with causation, a party in breach of contract is not always legally liable for
the entire loss.
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Once D's liability for P's losses has been established, the court must then
consider an appropriate measure of damages. Three possible measures are
applicable: expectation damages putting P in the position he would have been
had the contract been completed, reliance damages restoring P to the position
he would have been in had the contract never been made, or restitution
damages compelling D to restore any benefits he may have received from P.
Contract law generally awards damages for P's loss of expectation. If P pays
100 for a painting worth 200, and D fails to deliver it, he is liable in damages
for the value of the painting rather than for the amount paid; the same is true if
the painting is found to be worth only 50. In cases such as this, the valuation
normally applied is the open market price at the time of the breach, or a
previously agreed resale price if there is no open market. But where an expected
profit is incalculable, or in any case where it seems just and reasonable, the
judge may award reliance damages instead. Restitution damages are not
generally awarded in contract.
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The owner of two hairdressing salons sold one of them on the fraudulent
misrepresentation that the sale included all the goodwill of the business,
but then lured many customers away to the other salon. The Court of
Appeal said damages for loss of profit should be calculated not "as if the
representation had been true", but rather "as if the contract had never
been made" and the plaintiffs had opened a similar business elsewhere in
the area.
A local authority sold land to a building firm and took covenants that no
more than a certain number of homes would be built on the site. The
builders broke the covenants and built more than the agreed number of
homes, increasing their profits substantially. Ferris J and the Court of
Appeal said the Council were entitled to nominal damages for the breach
of covenant but no more: their remaining land had not lost value because
of the breach, and they had suffered no other loss. Their claim for a share
in the excess profits was wholly unfounded.
White Arrow v Lamey's Distribution [1995] NLJ 1504, CA
A mail order firm PP2 contracted with DD for the distribution of their
goods, and paid extra for an enhanced level of service. PP2 then alleged
that DD had in fact provided only the basic service, and claimed damages
equivalent to the difference in price between the two services. In
interlocutory proceedings, the Court of Appeal upheld the judge's ruling
that such a claim was unfounded and that only nominal damages could be
awarded. Bingham MR said it is elementary that a breach of contract
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without actual loss does not entitle the innocent party to more than
nominal damages. An equitable claim in quasi-contract might be possible,
George Blake, who escaped after being imprisoned as a Soviet spy and
now lived in Moscow, wrote an autobiography (in breach of his contract of
employment and in clear violation of the Official Secrets Act), describing
inter alia his work as a member of the British intelligence services. The
Court of Appeal granted an injunction restraining B from receiving or
authorising anyone to receive on his behalf any profits resulting from the
sale of the book, and ordered that formal notice of this be given to B's
publishers. Lord Woolf MR said obiter that although in general damages for
breach of contract are compensatory, the law is now sufficiently mature to
recognise in exceptional cases a restitutionary claim for loss of profits
where compensatory damage would be inadequate. The fact that D's
breach of contract is deliberate and cynical, or has enabled him to make a
more profitable contract with someone else, is not in itself a good reason
for departing from the normal basis in which contract damages are
awarded. But where there is "skimped performance", or where (as here) D
has obtained his profit by doing the very thing he contracted not to do, his
profit flows directly from the breach and restitutionary damages may be
needed to defend P's legitimate interest in having the contract properly
performed.
If P agrees to sell his car for 500 to a buyer who then refuses to go through with
the deal, P's damages are usually limited to the difference between 500 and the
market price of the car (if that is lower), since he is presumed to be able to sell
to another buyer and has a duty to try to do so. If the market price is 500 or
above, P has lost nothing except perhaps his out-of-pocket expenses and will be
awarded very little. If P is a dealer who relies on trade for his living, the situation
may be a little different.
D agreed to buy from a dealer P a certain model of Vanguard car, but then
refused to go through with the deal. P claimed damages for his lost profit
and succeeded: the supply of Vanguard cars at that time exceeded the
demand, so D's repudiation represented a lost sale.
The facts were almost identical except that the car was a Hillman, the
demand for which was well in excess of the supply. Since P would have
had no difficulty in selling the car to another customer and had not in fact
lost a sale, the Court of Appeal said he was entitled to nominal damages
only.
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misrepresented at the time of the sale, and the judge decided that had the
colt been correctly described its value at that time would have been
24700. PP claimed rescission of the contract together with all expenses
incurred in the care and training of the horse; DD offered only the
difference between the actual and proper sale prices. The judge said the
animal sold was "altogether different" from that contracted for, and
awarded damages equal to the difference between the original price and
the horse's present value.
In matters other than direct financial loss, a valuation must often be little more
than a shot in the dark, though now contract claims are no longer tried by juries
there is greater chance of consistency.
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DD were in breach of their contract to repair P's Rolls Royce car within a
certain time, and P was awarded some 10000 in damages. P's appeal
against the judge's refusal to allow further damages for loss of enjoyment
(deriving from the display of ownership of such a prestigious car) was
dismissed; Beldam LJ said a contract such as this was not within the
narrow class of contracts in which damages for distress might be awarded.
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The House of Lords, reversing the Court of Appeal and restoring the
decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, held that in cases of unfair
dismissal an Employment Tribunal has no jurisdiction to award damages
for non-pecuniary losses such as hurt feelings. In Norton Tool Co v Tewson
[1973] 1 All ER 183 the National Industrial Relations Court had applied the
common-law rule in Addis to the new statutory framework, and this
decision had been followed for the past thirty years. Lord Hoffmann's
comments in Johnson v Unisys, where he doubted the correctness of this
rule, were obiter and should not be followed.
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DD were builders who failed to carry out certain terms of their contract.
The Official Referee reduced the assessed damages by 40% because PP
had failed to exercise adequate supervision to ensure the work was
carried out, but the Court of Appeal said unanimously that such a
reduction was inappropriate. Where the breach is of a strict term (rather
than one requiring the exercise of reasonable care and skill), they said,
contributory negligence is wholly irrelevant.
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EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Specific performance
There are a limited number of cases in which a breach of contract cannot
adequately be compensated by purely monetary damages. It is in such cases
that the equitable decree of specific performance comes into play, whereby the
offending party is ordered (on pain of imprisonment) to fulfil his part of the
bargain.
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D and her husband were co-owners of a house which they agreed to sell to
P. D's husband became bankrupt, and D herself contracted bone cancer
and had to have a leg amputated; these events coincided with the births
of two more children. D spoke little English and relied heavily on the
support of her friends and relatives. The Court of Appeal set aside an order
for specific performance and awarded damages instead, saying that in all
the circumstances such a decree would cause undue hardship, even
though this did not relate directly to the subject matter of the contract.
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A farmer P sold part of his land to DD, but retained for himself a right of
way over a track on the land sold giving access to his retained land. DD
covenanted that they would not raise the level of the track above the level
of the surrounding land, but when they surfaced the track they actually
raised it by several inches and thus interfered with the use of P's farm
machinery. P sued for an injunction requiring DD to remove the surfacing,
and DD (admitting liability) offered damages in lieu. The judge said that
although P should not be denied a legitimate remedy merely because it
would be disadvantageous to D, he should not be entitled to insist on a
form of relief that would be materially detrimental to D while conferring no
appreciable benefit on himself. In this case he took the unusual step of
granting an injunction suspended it for three years, during which time DD
might undertake other remedial work to resolve the problem.
Neither an order for specific performance nor an injunction will normally be
granted where damages would be an adequate remedy; nor in employment
contracts or other contracts for personal services (though an injunction may be
granted forbidding similar performance for a competitor); nor for the delivery of
goods bought, unless they are unique objects of special value; nor where P gave
no consideration for a contract under seal, since "equity will not assist a
volunteer".
Rectification
Where it can be shown clearly that a document such as a will or a contract does
not reflect the true intentions of the parties (or where one party to a contract
took unfair advantage of a mistake made by the other) the court has power to
rectify the document to make it show the true position.
A testator T left most of his property to "my wife Rose Posner", though in
fact the woman concerned, with whom T lived, was married to someone
else and was not T's legal wife. In interlocutory proceedings the judge said
that unless fraud could be proved the words "my wife" could be deleted so
that T's intentions could be carried out.
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reference to arbitration, and the Court of Appeal agreed: where one party
knows the document does not reflect both parties' intention, he is
estopped from resisting rectification to take advantage of the other's
error.
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Rescission
If a contract is rescinded, then it is as if it had never existed, and the parties are
restored to their original positions. A party discovering a relevant mistake, or the
victim of a misrepresentation, may affirm or rescind the contract, explicitly or by
his conduct, but this decision once made is irrevocable.
P's motor insurance policy was actually invalid but neither P nor his
insurers DD knew this. DD agreed to pay a claim, but then refused to pay
up when they discovered the invalidity. The court said the agreement to
pay was binding in common law, but ordered its rescission in equity.
Since the effect of rescission is to nullify the contract, it is available only where
restitutio in integrum is possible and the parties can be restored to their original
positions. The courts interpret this fairly widely, however, as is appropriate in
matters of equity, and are prepared to make consequential orders as necessary.
The right to rescind for misrepresentation is lost if the representee has affirmed
the contract, if restitutio in integrum is impossible, if too much time has elapsed
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P advertised a car and sold it to X in exchange for a cheque. X sold the car
to D, who bought it in good faith, but when X's cheque bounced P sought
to rescind the first sale and recover the car. The Court of Appeal said a
contract based on misrepresentation is voidable rather than void ab initio;
X had acquired a voidable title and D's title was thus established before
the purported rescission. It would be unfair to disturb D's title now, and P's
claim against D must be denied. (P would, of course, have a good claim for
damages against X, always supposing that X could be traced and had
assets worth suing for.)
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A dealer sold a car to a customer and gave false information to the finance
company as to its price and the deposit paid. The customer subsequently
sold the car and disappeared without completing his payments and the
finance company, having discovered the misrepresentation, sued the
dealer for their losses. The Court of Appeal considered the wording of
s.2(1) and said damages were to be assessed as in tort rather than as in
contract. The statute says that if the representor would be liable to
damages ... had the misrepresentation be made fraudulently, he shall be
so liable notwithstanding that it was not, and the Court said this meant
that damages were to be assessed as if in the tort of deceit. Not only does
this open up the possibility of exemplary damages (though these are
unlikely where mere negligence is involved) but it means tortious rather
than contractual tests of remoteness are to be applied. D was liable for all
the losses flowing from his misrepresentation whether foreseeable or not,
and the dishonest sale of the car by the customer was not novus actus
interveniens breaking the chain of causation.
Under s.2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 the courts have a further
power in cases of non-fraudulent misrepresentation to award damages in lieu of
rescission if it would be equitable to do so, and may refuse rescission unless it
can be shown to be fair and equitable. This may include even cases of innocent
misrepresentation, where damages would not otherwise be available.
It is not absolutely clear whether damages can be awarded where rescission
would be impossible: a dictum of Mustill J in Atlantic Lines v Hallam, The Lucy
[1983] 1 Lloyds Rep 188 suggests not, but there are some writers who disagree.
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A company PP took over DD's carpet business and later alleged negligent
misrepresentation in various statements made to them before the
takeover concerning the profitability of the business. The judge found the
allegations proved on the facts, but acknowledged rescission was
impossible because the business had been restructured since the
takeover. However, he said, the power to award damages "in lieu of
rescission" in s.2(2) does not depend on the right to rescission still being
extant, but only on the plaintiff's having had such a right in the past.
Moreover, s.2(2) is independent of s.2(1), so that damages can be
awarded in lieu of rescission even where the defendant can rely on the
"innocence" defence in s.2(1), though their amount is in the discretion of
the court and in the absence of negligence would probably be lower.
RIGHT TO REJECT
In contracts for the sale or supply of goods, the buyer has the right to reject the
goods and terminate the contract if the goods supplied are not up to standard. If
he accepts the goods, however, the right to reject is lost and the buyer is limited
to damages. Acceptance is deemed to take place when the buyer intimates to
the seller that he has accepted the goods, or when the goods have been
delivered to him and he does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent
with the ownership of the seller, or when, after the lapse of a reasonable time,
the buyer retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he has rejected
them. Deemed acceptance does not occur, however, unless the buyer has had a
reasonable opportunity to examine the goods or (if the contract is for sale by
sample) to compare the bulk with the sample.
P bought a new car, and over the next three weeks made two or three
short trips totalling 140 miles to try it out. The engine then seized up
because of a drop of sealant that had got into the lubrication system when
the car was being assembled. The judge said P had accepted the vehicle
by keeping it for three weeks without sending it back; a reasonable time
for inspection and trying out the vehicle had passed. What was reasonable
timewise, he added, depended on the nature of the goods: longer would
be needed for a nuclear
submarine than for a bicycle.
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purported to reject the car on the grounds that it was not of merchantable
quality and the court of Appeal said they were entitled to do so: the
expectations of the purchaser of a Range Rover were higher than those of
the purchaser of an ordinary car.
CC bought a yacht from DD, but found it was not of satisfactory quality.
They complained to DD, and after some inconclusive discussions as to the
work that would be needed to rectify the faults, CC rejected the yacht
three weeks later and sought return of their money. The Court of Appeal
said that if goods are not of satisfactory quality, the buyer's rejection does
not have to be reasonable: he can reject for any reason at all, and the only
question is whether he has lost that right by accepting the goods. As to
that, the time taken in ascertaining what repairs would be needed is to be
taken into account in determining "a reasonable time". Bernstein v
Pamsons has been much criticised and was decided before the Act was
amended in 1994: it no longer represents the law.
Acceptance is not deemed merely because the buyer has asked for or agreed to
the repairing of the goods by or under an arrangement with the seller. Moreover,
since 1995 the buyer can reject just part of a consignment and accept the rest:
specifically, he can reject all the goods, or accept those which conform with the
contract and reject the rest, or accept those which conform and some of those
which do not, and reject the rest, or accept all the goods. But the buyer must still
reject within "a reasonable time", the duration of which is a matter of fact in
each case.
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EXTINCTION OF REMEDIES
The remedies for breach of contract are extinguished by accord and satisfaction,
where one party agrees (for valuable consideration) not to enforce his rights
against the other; or by a release under seal; or by lapse of time.
Limitation Act 1980 s.5
An action founded on simple contract shall not be brought after the
expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
Limitation Act 1980 s.11
(1) This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance
or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of
provision made by or under a statute or independently) where the
damages claimed by the plaintiff include damages in respect of personal
injuries to the plaintiff or any other person.
(2) None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act
shall apply to an action to which this section applies.
(3) An action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the
expiration of [three years].
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