Province of Abra vs Harold Hernando

107 SCRA 104 Political Law Exemption From Taxes The Church
Facts: The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of
Bangued. Judge Harold Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side. Hernando
ruled that there is no question that the real properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra
are properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. Likewise, there is no dispute
that the properties including their produce are actually, directly and exclusively used by the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.
HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the Constitution provides that charitable
institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries are required that for the exemption of lands,
buildings, and improvements, they should not only be exclusively but also actually and directly
used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not favored and is never
presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. However, in this case,
there is no showing that the said properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable
uses.

Abra Valley College v. Aquino

G.R. No. L-39086 June 15, 1988
Paras, J.
Facts:
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the
Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for nonpayment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said Notice of Seizure by
respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the
satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its
questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the
building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and
rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not
being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of
the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme
Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
Issue:
whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes
Held:

Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly
grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to
facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by
law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern
Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the
purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes
mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of
the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the
ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as
incidental to education (residence of the director).

Tan vs. Del Rosario

237 SCRA 324

Facts:
Petitioner seeks declaration of unconstitutionality of RA7496 (also known as Simplified Net Income
Taxation) due to violation of the following constitutional provision:
Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.
The petitioner stressed that it violates the equal protection clause as it only imposed taxes upon one
who practice his profession and not to those who are engaged to single proprietorship.
Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7496 violates the aforestated provision of the constitution

Held:

The SC ruled in the negative. The said law is not arbitrary; it is germane to the purpose of the law
and; applies to all things of equal conditions and of same class.
It is neither violative of equal protection clause due to the existence of substantial difference between
one who practice his profession alone and one who is engaged to proprietorship. Further, the SC said
that RA 7496 is just an amendatory provision of the code of taxpayers where it classifies taxpayers in
to four main groups: Individuals, Corporations, Estate under Judicial Settlement and Irrevocable Trust.
The court would have appreciated the contention of the petitioner if RA 7496 was an independent law.
But since it is attached to a law that has already classified taxpayers, there is no violation of equal
protection clause.

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works GR No. L-10405,December 29,1960

FACTS:
Ra 920 (An act appropriating funds for public works) was enacted in 1953 containing an item for the
construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension of Pasig feeder road terminals currently projected and planned
subdivision roads, which were not yet constructed, within Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose
C. Zulueta. The provincial governor of Rizal, Pascual, questioned the constitutionality of the item in RA
920, it being not for a public purpose. The lower court dismissed the petition upon the ground that
petitioner may not contest the legality because the same does not affect him directly. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Does petitioner have legal standing to sue?
RULING:
Yes.
It is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct
injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are as many decisions nullifying, at the instance
of taxpayers, laws providing the disbursement of public funds.
Thus, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers, have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question
the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.
Thus, the records are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Where the land on which
feeder roads were to be constructed belongs to a private person, an appropriation made by congress
for that purpose is null and void, and a donation to the government made five months after the
approval of the Act does not cure the basic defect of the law.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent
Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that

such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious
purpose for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist and the government just took advantage of an event considered
of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of
the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that Religious freedom, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human
affairs. Emphasizing that, when the Filipino people implored the aid of Divine Providence, they
thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating
influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.
Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague
G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service,
it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than
the budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of

Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to
protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at
stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed
as unconstitutional.

Osmea v Orbos (1993)

Osmea v Orbos
GR No 99886, March 31, 1993
FACTS:
President Marcos created a special account in the General Fund designated as the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designated to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in
crude oil. Subsequently, EO 137 expanded the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for cost
underrecovery. Now, the petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates the Constitution that
if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated as a special fund to be used
only for the purpose indicated.
ISSUE:
Is the OPSF constitutional?
RULING:
Yes. The tax collected is not in pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory
purpose, to provide a means for the stabilization of the petroleum products industry. The levy is
primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State.
PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of
Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are
the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress
themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional
conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds
under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2)
the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be
made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1)
of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is
exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

First Lepanto Ceramics vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]

Facts: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amendedprovided that appeals from decisions of
the Board of Investments(BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a few months after
the 1987 Constitution took effect (July 17, 1987), the OmnibusInvestments Code of 1987 (EO 226)
was promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that such appeals be directly filed with the SC. The
SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, Circular No. 1-91 which confirmed that jurisdiction
of the CA over appealsfrom the decisions of the BOI. SCs Second Division, relying on said Circular,
accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present case. Petitioner now move to
reconsider and question the Second Divisions ruling which provided: .although the right to appeal
granted by Art 82 of EO 226 is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of procedure,
nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal can be brought are only
matters of procedure which this Court hast he power to regulate. They contend that Circular No. 191
(a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded Art 82 of EO 226 (a legislation).
Issue: Was the Court correct in sustaining the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions from the
Board of Investments?
Held: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitutiontook effect February 2, 1987. Thus,
Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is invalid and
therefore never became effective for the concurrence of the Court was no sought in its enactment.
Thus, the OmnibusInvestments Code of 1981 as amended still stands. The exclusive jurisdiction
on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.

Diaz v. CA
G.R. No. L-109698 December 5, 1
Bellossillo, J.
Facts:
On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in
service. The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC as of 12 March
1990 at One Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos
(P1,141,774,000.00). On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deducting

Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment
which were not used by DLPC in its operation. On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In our resolution of 8 September
1992, the Supreme Court referred the case for proper disposition to the Court of Appeals which
subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1) the filing of the petition for review with the
Supreme Court was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with the provisions
of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when the petitioners received
notice of the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the date when the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly received
the denial of their motion by ERB.
On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that our
resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the above
circular.
In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.
Issue:
whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
Held:
Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to
have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court of
Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996

FACTS: On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the
declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the
Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by
the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to
join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 199.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the
Subic Special Economic Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the
SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar
of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of
the referendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No.
2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an
amendment of a national law.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848
which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg. 10.
2. Whether or not the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of
Morong to enact; whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

HELD:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started by private
respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent COMELEC made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is
repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The COMMISSION labeled the
exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the
documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and
the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative"
used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As
defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at
the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved
to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and
referendum, the COMELEC exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its
powers over the conduct of elections.

These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or
change the substance or the content of legislation.
The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and
not yet an approved law. The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an
approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It
is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that
rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a
proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. In the
present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to
determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority
in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by
any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has
made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply
included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance
of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

Marcos vs. Manglapus, [G.R. # 88211 September 15, 1989 ]

Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon
Aquinos ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of
Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return
to the Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this
petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation
of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines.
Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a clear and present
danger to the public due to the return? And have the requirements of due process been complied with
in the making of the finding?
HELD: Petition Dismissed. The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of
constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise
of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied. It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments,
and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented,
that there exist factual bases for the President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been
done arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and
order issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of
Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country.

Another reason of the Court...We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to
the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in
a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to
speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign
jurisdictions.
Soliven v Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
FACTS:
Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the
president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory
cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his
contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then
the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would
be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not
be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the President, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit?

HELD:

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the officeholders time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

WHEREFORE finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the public respondents, the court resolved to DISMISS the petitions.

ESTRADA V DESIERTO
Facts:
After Estradas impeachment proceedings were aborted and his resignation from the Presidential post,
a cluster of legal problems started appearing. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office
of the Ombudsman were set in motion including among others, bribery and graft and corruption,
plunder, perjury, serious miscounduct, malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds. A
special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the
charges against the petitioner.Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term
of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted Petitioner also contends that the
respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed
against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent
Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due
process.

Issue:
publicity

Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial

Held: No. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to
a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well
pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information
about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. Our judges are
learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties
to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect
their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. To warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced,
not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show
that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove
that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual

bias and he has not discharged the burden. The court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial
publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair
trial.However,petitioner needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Thus the petition was dismissed.

DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G. R. No. 85468, 07 September 1989

.

FACTS:

Quintin S. Doromal, a public officer and being a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government, participated in a business through the Doromal International Trading
Corporation (DITC), a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company
participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) and the National Manpower & Youth Council (NMYC) .

In connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal
International Trading Corporation which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of
electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to theN THE
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower and Youth Council.

An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said violation and
a preliminary investigation was conducted.

The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of
the Tanodbayan to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
RULE:
Article VII, Section 13 (1) of the Constitution provides:
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
APPLICATION:

The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the
application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a
business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution"
because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect
interest."

That admission allegedly belies the averment in the information that the petitioner
"participated' in the business of the DITC in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by
law from having any interest. (Sec. 3-h, RA No. 3019).

The Sandiganbayan in its order of August 19, 1988 correctly observed that "the presence of a
signed document bearing the signature of accused Doromal as part of the application to bid ...
is not a sine qua non" (Annex O, p. 179. Rollo), for, the Ombudsman indicated in his
Memorandum/Clearance to the Special Prosecutor, that the petitioner "can rightfully be
charged ...with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section
13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which
Doromal has at least an indirect interest." (pp. 107-108, Rollo).

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President,
the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their)
tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business." The constitutional ban is similar
to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that "Pursuit of
private business ... without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations"
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the civil service.

CONCLUSION:
Yes, the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution specifically of Section 13 of
Article VII.

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in
83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish
the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any
official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary,
or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of
Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the
Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art.
VIII.

Aytona vs Castillo

Facts:

December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner (Dominador
Aytona) as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath.
On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the
next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad
interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all in all, 350 midnight or
last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia.
On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo (respondent herein) as ad
interim Governor of the Central Bank.
At first, both exercised the powers of their office; however, later on Castillo was prevented
from holding the office in the Central Bank.
He, petitioner, instituted a case (quo warranto) against respondent, contending that he was
validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should
be considered void.
Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by administrative order no.
2.

Issue:
WoN the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

Held:
No it is not. Such appointments must be decline.
Ratio:
After the proclamation of then Pres. Macapagal, precedent President Garcia administration was no
more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President, and he should not do acts which ought to know, would embarrass
or obstruct the policies of his successor.
An ad interim appointment is exercised by the president as hes special prerogative and is bound to be
prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the
Commission on Appointments or by thereafter explaining to them the reason such selection. It is
expected that the President should exercise double care in extending such appointments. In the case
at bar, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised
double care; and therefore, such appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional
provision granting the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta

AM No. 98-5-01-SC | November 9, 1998

FACTS:
On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido
Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were
deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety."

A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the constitutionality of
appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections.
Senior Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was in the position that election ban had no application to the CA based
on the Commissions records. This hypothesis was then submitted to the President for consideration
together with the Councils nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.

The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the Executive
Secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on March 11, 1998
(day immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments), which implies that the
Presidents Office did not agree with the hypothesis.

The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the list of final
nominees for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution (from Feb 13, date
present vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6 that no session has been
scheduled after the May elections for the reason that they apparently did not share the same view
(hypothesis) proposed by the JBC shown by the uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments.
However, it appeared that the Justice Secretary and the other members of the Council took action
without waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ
received a letter from the President in reply of the May 6 letter where the President expressed his view
that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive appointments, the whole article being entitled
EXECUTIVE DEPT.
He posited that appointments in the Judiciary have special and specific
provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof."
Article 8 Sec 9

"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from the list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacanang, the appointments of the 2 Judges of the RTC mentioned.
Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the Court resolved by refraining
the appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998
claiming he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It should be noted that the
originals of the appointments for both judges had been sent to and received by the CJ on May 12 and
is still in the latters office and had not been transmitted yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so
because of the May 7 Malacanang copy of his appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential election, Art8 shall apply where
vacancies in SC shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art7 must be considered where
the President shall not make any appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the reason for prohibition is
in order not to tie the hands of the incoming Pres through midnight appointments.
ISSUE:
WON the President can fill vacancies in the judiciary pursuant to Article 8 Sec 4 and 9, during the
appointment ban period stated in Article 7 Sec 15.

HELD:
Article 8 Sec 4 and 9 simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within
the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Article7 Sec15. Thus, the President is
neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so. Likewise, the
prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years. The Court also pointed out
that Article8 Sec4 and 9 should prevail over Article7 Sec15 as they may be considered later
expressions of the people when they adopted the Constitution.

The Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, declared the appointments signed by the President on
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta VOID. They are ordered to cease and desist
from discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to which they were respectively appointed on the
said date. They come within the operation of the prohibition on appointments. While the filling of
judiciary vacancies is in the public interest, there is no compelling reason to justify such appointment
within the 2 months appointment ban.

In view of Valenzuelas oath taking, the authenticity of the letter of which was not verified from the
Office of the Court Administrator, SC reiterated the standing practice and procedures in appointments
to the Judiciary that originals of all appointments are to be sent by the Office of the President to the
Office of the Chief Justice. The Clerk of Court of the SC, in the Chief Justices behalf, will advice the
appointee of their appointments as well as the date of commencement of the pre-requisite orientation
seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for new judges.

Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr.

Facts:
Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. He
was designated as general Manager by the Chairman of the PTA Board.
In 1990, Pres. Aquino sent Garrucho, Secretary of Tourism, a memorandum stating that his
designation is invalid because it was not her, the President, who appointed him as what is required by
PD No. 564. As such, he will remain in the position until the President appoints a person to serve in a
permanent capacity.
Held:
Appointment and designation are distinct from each other. The former is defined as the selection, by
the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
When completed, the appointment results in security of tenure. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official and is legislative in
nature. The implication is that he shall hold office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at
will by the appointing authority.

SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE

156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987

FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of
the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento
assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison,
without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with
the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule
in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS SALONGA
G.R. No. 86439 April 13 1989

FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA
because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by
law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad
interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

RULING:

1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution
(2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to
review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution
has reserved to the President alone.
2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for
the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution,
extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is
why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President
solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad
interim appointments.

QUINTOS-DELES VS COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

G.R. No. 83216 September 4 1989

FACTS:
This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel CoA to
allow Quintos-Deles to perform and ischarege her duties as HoR member representing Women's
Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process.
Quintos-Deles ad three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to
Art. VII Sec 16 p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the HoR to be confirmed
by the CoA.

RULING:

Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is
undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution, referred to in the first
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2 which gives the President the
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress. The records show that Deles appointment was made on
April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the
reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.

CALDERON VS CARALE
208 SCRA 254

FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that
the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all
be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall
come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory
assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the
appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment
saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon
asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in
Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by
the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA.

RULING:
The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of
executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by
the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the
other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
is required.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments

are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to
Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights).

Tarrosa vs Singson
Facts:
Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos. Jesus
Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition questioning the appointment of
Singson for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA). Tarrosa invoked
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7653 which provides that the Governor of the BSP if appointed is subject
to the confirmation of the CA.
In his comment, Singson claimed that the Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the
confirmation by the CA of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. He contended that
an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Issues:

1.
2.

Whether or not Tarrosa has the locus standi to challenge the appointment.
Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs confirmation.
Held:
1. Tarrosa has no legal standing to question the appointment. The petition is in the nature of a quo
warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is
unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil
action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another."
In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 637 (1992), the court held that the petitioner therein, who
did not aver that he was entitled to the office of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not bring
the action for quo warranto to oust the respondent from said office as a mere usurper.
Likewise in Greene v. Knox, 175 N.Y. 432 (1903), 67 N.E. 910, it was held that the question of title to
an office, which must be resolved in a quo warranto proceeding, may not be determined in a suit to
restrain the payment of salary to the person holding such office, brought by someone who does not
claim to be the one entitled to occupy the said office.

2. Appointment to the position of the Governor of the BSP is not one of those that need confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials

not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. (Tarrosa
vs. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994)

FLORES V DRILON
FACTS
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge theconstitutionality of Sec.
13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint
a professional manager as administrator of the SBMAprovided that for the 1st year of its operations,
the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the
Subic Authority.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription againstappointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and
thus an excepted circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double
compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another
post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of thePresident.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which
he may have received pursuant to his appointment.
HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall
be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any publicoffice or position during
his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other governmentpost (as Chairman and
CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation
where
a
local
elective
official
will
work
for
his appointment in
an
executive position in government,
and
thus
neglect
his
constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to
the Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase shall be appointed
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct
to
the
post
of
Mayor
of
Olongapo
City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the
Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may
receive the compensation attached to the cabinet positionif specifically authorized by law.

(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the
Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The
power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of
discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to
appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to
choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be
viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify.
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure
or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached
disqualification
before
he
may
be
considered
fit
for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains
ineligible
for appointment to
anotherpublic office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and
void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled
to such benefits.

Luego v. Civil Service Commission (G. R. No. L-69137)

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by
Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as permanent but the
Civil Service Commission approved it as temporary. On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission
found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and
accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of petitioners position. The private respondent
was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now
invoking his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commissions order
and the private respondents title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the
basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to
determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service
Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission
has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the
Civil Service Commissions resolution is set aside.

Drilon vs Lim

Facts: The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared
Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of
the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation
of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled
Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as
specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by
the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held: Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution
vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection,
bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less
than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court,
is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory
that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and
determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt
is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.

VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

G.R. No. L-46570 April 21 1939

FACTS:
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an
inquiry into the conduct of the Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter was found
to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority ad unauthorized practice of the law
profession. The respondent recommended the suspension of Villena to the President of the Philippines,
in which it was verbally granted. The Secretary then suspended Villena from office. Villena filed a
petition for preliminary injunction against the Sec. to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with
the investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend and order
investigation over Villena.

RULING:

The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena. As to the
power to order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC that Department of Interior was
given the authority to supervise bureaus and offices under its jurisdiction. This was interpreted in
relation to Section 86 of the same Code which granted the said Department of executive supervision
over administration of provinces, municipalities and other political subdivisions. This supervision
covers the power to order investigation because supervision implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render power real and effective.However, unlike this power to order
investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was not provided in any law. There was no express grant
of authority to the Secretary of Interior to suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the
Administrative Code granted the provincial governor the power of suspension. Yet this did not mean
that the grant precluded the Secretary of Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that the acts of the department secretaries,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated
by the President, presumptively the acts of the President. The power to suspend may be exercised by
the President. It follows that the heads of the Department under her may also exercise the same,
unless the law required the President to act personally or that situation demanded him so, because the
heads of the departments are assistants and agents of the President.