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Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor

G.R. No. 96663. August 10, 1999.*


PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, MED-ARBITER NAPOLEON V. FERNANDO & PEPSICOLA SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION-UOEF, respondents.
G.R. No. 103300. August 10, 1999.*
PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND HON. CELENIO N. DAING, in his
capacity as MedArbiter Labor Regional Office No. X, Cagayan de Oro City, CAGAYAN DE ORO PEPSI COLA SUPERVISORS UNION (UOEF), respondents.
Labor Law; Remedial Law; Action; Moot and Academic; It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a moot question. The issue in G.R. No.
96663, whether or not the supervisors union can be affiliated with a Federation with two (2) rank and file unions directly under the supervision of the former, has
thus become moot and academic in view of the Unions withdrawal from the federation. In a long line of cases (Narciso Nakpil, et al. vs. Hon. Crisanto Aragon, et
al., G.R. No. L-24087, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 85; Toribio v. Bidin, et al., G.R. No. L-37960, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 361; Gumaua v. Espino, G.R. No. L36188-37586, February 29, 1980, 96 SCRA 402), the Court dismissed the petition for being moot and academic. In the case of F.C. Fisher v. Yangco Steamship
Co., March 31, 1915, the Court held: It is unnecessary, however to indulge in academic discussion of a moot question. x x x x x x The action would have been
dismissed at any time on a showing of the facts as they were . The question left for the court was a moot one. Its Resolution would have been useless. Its
judgment would have been impossible of execution x x x.
________________
THIRD DIVISION.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for
the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated.In the case of University of San Agustin, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the court
resolved the case, ruling that even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the
guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated. x x x
Same; Labor Unions; Certification Election; An order to hold a certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the
registration certificate of the respondent union. Anent the issue of whether or not the Petition to cancel/revoke registration is a prejudicial question to the petition
for certification election, the following ruling in the case of Association of the Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) vs. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, in her capacity as
Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, et al., 203 SCRA 597, 598, [1991], is in point, to wit: x x x It is a well-settled rule that a certification proceedings is not a
litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a nonadversarial and fact finding character. (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v.
Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]; Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451 [1990]). Thus, the technical rules of evidence do
not apply if the decision to grant it proceeds from an examination of the sufficiency of the petition as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in the
position papers and other documents. At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public respondent that an order to hold a
certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that
at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing the cancellation.
*

Same; Same; Court considers the position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Article 245 as if the disqualification of
confidential employees were written in the provision.In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into consideration the rationale behind the
disqualification of managerial employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, thus x x x if these managerial employees would belong
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Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor
to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become
companydominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interest are well protected. The employer is not
assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members. Collective bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. It is the same
reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of
confidential employees were written in the provision. If confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be
governed by their own motives rather than the interest of the employers.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Fernandez, Zarsadias and Associates for Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc.
Fermente P. Pablo and Gregorio G. Borja for Cagayan de Oro Pepsi-Cola Supervisors Union.
PURISIMA, J.:
These are petitions for certiorari relating to three (3) cases filed with the Med-Arbiter, to wit: MED ARB ROX Case No. R100-9101-RU-002 for Certification Election
filed by Pepsi Cola Supervisors Union-UOEF (Union), MED ARB Case No. R1000-9102-RU-008, Re: Petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/ or Revoke the Charter
Affiliation of the Union, and MED-ARB ROX Case No. R1000-9104-RU-012, for Cancellation of Registration Certificate No. 11492-LC in favor of the Union.
G.R. No. 96663
The facts that matter can be culled as follows:
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Sometime in June 1990, the Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the
exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines, Inc. (PEPSI).
On July 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit statement that it was an affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas
(federation) together with two (2) rank and file unions, Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola Employees Union of the Philippines (PEUP).

On July 23, 1990, PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union, entitled PCPPI
v. PCEU-UOEF and docketed as Case No. 725-90, on the grounds that (a) the members of the Union were managers and (b) a supervisors union can not affiliate
with a federation whose members include the rank and file union of the same company.
On August 29, 1990, PEPSI presented a motion to re-open the case since it was not furnished with a copy of the Petition for Certification Election.
On September 4, 1990, PEPSI submitted its position paper to the BLR in Case No. 725-90.
On September 21, 1990, PEPSI received summons to appear at the pre-trial conference set on September 25, 1990 but which the hearing officer rescheduled
on October 21, 1990.
On October 12, 1990, PEPSI filed a Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal with the Secretary of Labor, questioning the setting of the certification
election on the said date and five (5) days after. It also presented an urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Suspend the Certification Election, which motion was granted on
October 18, 1990.
On November 12, 1990, the Secretary of Labor denied the appeal and Motion for Reconsideration. Even as the Petition to Cancel, Revoke and Suspend Union
Charter Certificate was pending before the BLR, PEPSI found its way to this Court via the present petition for certiorari.
On February 6, 1991, the Court granted the prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.
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Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor
The pivot of inquiry here is: whether or not a supervisors union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2) rank and file unions are likewise members,
without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as amended, by Republic Act 6715, which provides:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees.Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist
or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join,
assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
In its Comment dated March 19, 1991, the Federation argued that:
The pertinent portion of Article 245 of the Labor Code states that, Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank
and file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organization of their own. This provision of law does not prohibit a local union composed of
supervisory employees from being affiliated to a federation which has local unions with rank-and-file members as affiliates.
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x the Petition to Cancel, Revoke or Set Aside the Charter Certificate of the private respondent is anchored on the alleged ground that certain managerial
employees are included as members thereof. The grounds for the cancellation of the registration certificate of a labor organization are provided in Section 7 of Rule
II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, and the inclusion of managerial employees is not one of the grounds. x x x (in this case, the private
respondent herein) remains to be a legitimate labor organization. 1
On April 8, 1991, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sent in a Comment, alleging inter alia, that:
______________
Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Employees Organization-UOEF, Comment, pp. 4-6, Rollo, pp. 71-73.
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Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor


x x x under Article 259 of the New Labor Code, only orders of the Med-Arbiter can be appealed through the Secretary of Labor and only on the ground that the
rules and regulations for the conduct of the certification election have been violated. The Order of the Representation Officer is interlocutory and not appealable.
xxx
x x x until and unless there is a final order cancelling its certificate of registration or charter certificate, a labor organization remains to be a legitimate labor
organization entitled to exercise all the rights and duties accorded to it by the Labor Code including the right to be certified as a bargaining representative. x x x
x x x Public respondent cannot be deemed to have committed grave abuse of discretion with respect to an issue that was never presented before it for
resolution. x x x
Article 245 of the New Labor Code does not preclude the supervisors union and the rank-and-file union from being affiliated with the same federation.
xxx
xxx xxx
A federation of local union is not the labor organization referred to in Article 245 but only becomes entitled to all the rights enjoyed by the labor organization (at
the company level) when it has complied with the registration requirements found in Articles 234 and 237. Hence, what is prohibited by Article 245 is membership
of supervisory employees in a labor union (at the company level) of the rank and file. x x x
x x x In other words, the affiliation of the supervisory employees union with the same federation with which the rank and file employees union is affiliated did not
make the supervisory employees members of the rank and file employees union and vice versa. 2 x x x
PEPSI, in its Reply dated May 7, 1991, asserted:
It is our humble contention that a final determination of the Petition to Set-Aside, Cancel, Revoke Charter Union Affiliation should first be disposed of before
granting the Petition for the Conduct of Certification Election. To allow the conduct of the certification election to proceed would make any decision arrived at by the
_____________
Rollo, pp. 86-89, 92.
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Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor
2

Bureau of Labor Relations useless inasmuch as the same would necessarily be rendered moot and academic. 3
On June 7, 1991, petitioner again filed a Supplemental Reply stressing:
It is likewise stressed that officials of both the PCLU and PEUP are top ranking officers of UOEF, the federation of supervisors union, to wit:
POSITION IN RANK AND FILE UNION
POSITION IN
FEDERATION
1. Rogelio de la Cruz
PCLU - President
General Vice President
2. Felix Gatela
PEUP - President
General Treasurer
3. Carlito Epino
PCLU Board
Educational Research
Member
Director
xxx
xxx
xxx

The respondent supervisory union could do indirectly what it could not do directly as the simple expedient of affiliating with UOEF would negate the manifest
intent and letter of the law that supervisory employees can only join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own and cannot be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank and file employees. 4
On August 6, 1991, the Secretary of Labor and Employment filed a Rejoinder, claiming thus:
x x x an employer has no legal standing to question the validity of a certification election.
x x x For this reason, the Supreme Court has consistently held that, as a rule, a certification election is the sole and exclusive concern of the employees and
that the employer is definitely an intruder or a mere bystander (Consolidated Farms vs. Noriel, L-47752, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals Corporation
vs. Ople, L-43861, September 4, 1981, 107 SCRA 211; Trade Unions of the
____________
Rollo, p. 104.
Rollo, p. 110.
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Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor
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Philippines and Allied Services [TUPAS] vs. Trajano, No. L-61153, January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 64).
xxx
xxx
xxx
In Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. CIR, No. L-35120, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 268, the Supreme Court (then dealing with the interpretation of Section 3 of
the Industrial Peace Act, from which Section 245 of the Labor Code was derived) grappled with the issue in the case at bar. It held that,
There is nothing in the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act which provides that a duly registered local union affiliating with a national union or federation loses its
legal personality, or its independence.
xxx
xxx
xxx
However, there is absolutely nothing in the Labor Code that prohibits a federation from representing or exercising influence over its affiliates. On the contrary,
this is precisely the reason why federations are formed and are allowed by law to exist. 5
On November 8, 1991, the Union also filed a Rejoinder.
On December 9, 1991, the Court resolved to DISMISSthe case for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
In a Resolution dated March 2, 1992, the Second Division of the Court resolved to grant the motion for reconsideration interposed on January 28, 1992.
G.R. No. 103300
What are assailed in this case is Med-Arbiter Order dated May 23, 1991 and the Decision and Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, dated October 4,
1991 and December 12, 1991, respectively.
The decretal portion of the Med-Arbiter Order under attack, reads:
______________
Rejoinder, pp. 2, 3, 10, 14; Rollo, pp. 125, 126, 133, 137.
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Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor

WHEREFORE, premises considered, an order is hereby issued:


1. 1.Dismissing MED ARB ROX CASE NO. R1000-919104-RU-012 and R1000-9102-RU-008 for lack of merit; and
2. 2.Ordering the conduct of a Certification Election to be participated by and among the supervisory workers of the respondent company, Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc. at its plant at Tin-ao, Cagayan de Oro City, including all the satellite warehouse within the territorial coverage and control of the
Cagayan de Oro Pepsi-Cola Plant. The choices are as follows:
1. 1.Cagayan de Oro Pepsi-Cola Supervisors Union (U.O.E.P.)
2. 2.No union
The parties are directed to attend a pre-election conference on June 10, 1991, 2:30 p.m. at the Regional Office to determine the qualification of the voters and
to thresh out the mechanics of the election. Respondent/employer is directed to submit five (5) copies of the names of the rank and file workers taken from the
payroll on October 1-31, 1991, alphabetically arranged (sic) indicating their names and positions and dates of employment and to bring the aforementioned payroll
during the pre-election conference for verification purposes. 6 x x x
The supervisory employees of the Union are:
POSITION
1.
Felipe Valdehueza
Route Manager
2.
Gerberto Vertudazo
C & C Manager
3.
Paul Mendoza
Sales Service Department Manager
4.
Gilberto Emano, Jr.
Route Manager
5.
Jaime Huliganga
Chief Checker
6.
Elias Edgama, Sr.
Accounting Manager
7.
Romanico Ramos
Route Manager
8.
Raul Yacapin
Route Manager
9.
Jovenal Albaque
Route Manager
10. Fulvio Narciso
Route Manager
11. Apolinario Opiniano
Route Manager
______________
OSG Comment, pp. 3-4, Rollo, pp. 145-146.
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12.
Alfredo Panas
Route Manager
13.
Simplicio Nelie
Route Manager
14.
Arthur Rodriguez
Route Manager
15.
Marco Ilano Warehouse
Operations Manager and
16.
Deodoro Ramos
Maintenance Manager
On June 6, 1991, PEPSI appealed the said Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, docketed as Case No.
OS-A-232-91.
On October 4, 1991, the Secretary modified the appealed decision, ruling thus:
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 23 May 1991 is hereby modified to the effect that MED ARB ROX Case No. R1000-9104-RU-012 and R10009102-RU-008 are hereby referred to the Office of the Regional Director which has jurisdiction over these cases. The call for certification election among the
supervisory workers of the Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. at its plant at Tin-ao, Cagayan de Oro City is hereby sustained. 7
On October 19, 1991, PEPSI presented a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order but the same was denied on December 12, 1991.
Meanwhile, the BLR issued Registration Certificate No. 11492-LC in favor of the Union. Dissatisfied therewith, PEPSI brought the instant petition for certiorari,
contending that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS ARE NOT
MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES;
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS PROHIBITED FROM AFFILIATING ITSELF WITH A FEDERATION ALREADY AFFILIATED WITH THE RANK AND FILE UNION;
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE OF (SIC) ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE INSTITUTION
_______________
OSG Comment, p. 5, Rollo, p. 147.
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7

OF A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION REGISTRATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO A PETITION CERTIFICATION
ELECTION.8
The petitions must fail for want of merit. At the outset, it must be stressed that on September 1, 1992, there was a Resolution of the Union withdrawing from the
Federation, to wit:
BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, that this UNION WITHDRAW, as it hereby WITHDRAWS its affiliation from the Union de Obreros Estivadores de
Filipinas, and at the same time, give our thanks to the said federation for its help and guidance rendered to this Union in the past. 9
The issue in G.R. No. 96663, whether or not the supervisors union can be affiliated with a Federation with two (2) rank and file unions directly under the
supervision of the former, has thus become moot and academic in view of the Unions withdrawal from the federation.
In a long line of cases (Narciso Nakpil, et al. vs. Hon. Crisanto Aragon, et al., G.R. No. L-24087, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 85; Toribio v. Bidin, et al., G.R. No.
L-37960, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 361; Gumaua v. Espino, G.R. No. L-36188-37586, February 29, 1980, 96 SCRA 402), the Court dismissed the petition for
being moot and academic. In the case of F. C. Fisher v. Yangco Steamship Co., March 31, 1915, the Court held:

It is unnecessary, however to indulge in academic discussion of a moot question. x x x


x x x The action would have been dismissed at any time on a showing of the facts as they were. The question left for the court was a moot one. Its Resolution
would have been useless. Its judgment would have been impossible of execution x x x.
_______________
Petition, pp. 8, 13, 14; Rollo, pp. 9, 14, 15.
Annex I, Rollo, p. 213.
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However, in the case of University of San Agustin, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the court resolved the case, ruling that even if a case were moot and
academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated.
x x x10
In Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, 205 SCRA 12 [1992] decided by the Third Division with J. Gutierrez, Jr., asponente and JJ. Feliciano, Bidin,
Romero and now Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as members it was ratiocinated:
x x x
xxx
xxx
Thus, if the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors labor organization would
represent conflicting interests, then a local supervisors union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of union of rank-and-file employees
where that federation actively participates in union activity in the company.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The prohibition against a supervisors union joining a local union of rank and file is replete with jurisprudence. The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not
confined to a case of supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors local union applying for membership in a national
federation the members of which include local unions of rank and file employees. The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the
supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.
Anent the issue of whether or not the Petition to cancel/revoke registration is a prejudicial question to the petition for certification election, the following ruling in the
case of Association of theCourt of Appeals Employees (ACAE) vs. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, in her capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations et al., 203
SCRA 597, 598 [1991], is in point, to wit:
_______________
230 SCRA 761, 770, citing Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) vs. Dans, etc., et al., 137 SCRA 628.
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x x x It is a well-settled rule that a certification proceedings is not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a nonadversarial and fact finding character. (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]; Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation

v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451 [1990]). Thus, the technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant it proceeds from an examination of the sufficiency of the
petition as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in the position papers and other documents.
At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public respondent that an order to hold a certification election is proper despite the
pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union filed its
petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing the cancellation.
xxx
xxx
x x x
As regards the issue of whether or not confidential employees can join the labor union of the rank and file, what was held in the case of National Association of
Trade Unions (NATU)-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter vs. Hon. R. D. Torres, et al., G.R. No. 93468, December 29, 1994, applies to this case.
Citing Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Sanchez, 144 SCRA 628, 635, Golden Farms vs. NLRC, 175 SCRA 471, and Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services,
Inc. vs. Hon. Nieves Roldan-Confesor, et al., G.R. No. 110854, Feb-ruary 14, 1995, the Court ruled:
x x x A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employers property.
While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary
implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed, as elucidated in several case; the latest of which is Chua v. Civil Service Commission where we said:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that
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Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor
may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of the enactment, to be an all embracing legislation maybe inadequate to provide for the unfolding
events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication x x x, Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or
to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis x x x
In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into consideration the rationale behind the disqualification of managerial employees expressed in Bulletin
Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, thus x x x if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their
loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become companydominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union
membership. Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its
representatives, and to see to it that its interest are well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union
members. Collective bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential
employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. If confidential
employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather than the interest of the
employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals
who are supposed to act in the interest of the employers. It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which
they are duty bound to protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held in Golden Farms, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja reiterated in Philips Industrial Development, Inc.,
NLRC, that confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to confidential information, may become the
source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may

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Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor
act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.
The Court finds merit in the submission of the OSG that Route Managers, Chief Checkers and Warehouse Operations Managers are supervisors while Credit &
Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly confidential employees. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of subject
employees. A careful scrutiny of their job description indicates that they dont lay down company policies. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies
since they have to report to their respective superior. The mere fact that an employee is designated manager does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there
would be an absurd situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be a member of a union. In the case of National Steel Corporation
v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 103743, January 29, 1996, it was stressed that:
What is essential is the nature of the employees function and not the nomenclature or title given to the job which determines whether the employee has rank and
file or managerial status, or whether he is a supervisory employee.
WHEREFORE, the petitions under consideration are DISMISSED but subject Decision, dated October 4, 1991, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is
MODIFIED in that Credit and Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly confidential employees not eligible for membership in a supervisors union.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur.
Panganiban, J., In the result.
Petitions dismissed.
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Philex Mining Corporation vs. NLRC
Note.Courts will decide a question which is otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. ( Viola vs. Alunan III, 277 SCRA
409 [1997])
o0o
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


People vs. Manantan

No. L-14129. July 31, 1962.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Electioneering; Officers prohibited from engaging in politics; Justices of the peace.Ajustice of the peace is included
685
VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962
685
People vs. Manantan
among the officers enjoined from active political participation by Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. There was no need of including justices of the
peace in the enumeration in said Section 54 because the Legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term "judge".
Same; Same; "Judge" construed.The term "judge" not modified by any word or phrase, is intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the
courts of first instance, judges of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, and justices of the peace.
Statutory Construction; Rule of "casus omisus" when applicable.The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" can operate and apply only if and
when the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the Legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term"judges." The rule, therefore, has no applicability to the
instant case.
Same; Penal Statutes; Rule of Strict Construction.The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (3
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56). The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would feat the clear purpose of the lawmakers (Crawford, Interpetation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294).
Same;Same; Rule of Exclusion.Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating
them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including
them, the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius,should not be invoked. (Blevins vs. Mullally, 135 P. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519).
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.

12

REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.
686
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Manantan
The records show that the statement of the case and of the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently,
here adopted, to wit:
"In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a
violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime
charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the
ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the
motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support
thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the
peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the
reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the
case cited by the defense."
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a justice of the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
"No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural
police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in any election or take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer."
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He
submits that the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:
687
VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962
687
People vs. Manantan
"SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections.No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and
no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any
manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote."
When, therefore, Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude
justices of the peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was
modified or qualified by the phrase "of First Instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words, justices of
the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified,i.e., judge of the First

13

Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity anymore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the
legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all
kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of
the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A
"judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier Law Dictionary,
"a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to
decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code
688
688
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Manantan
will help to justify and clarify the above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act No. 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act Nos. 1669,
1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No.
1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated in Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several
amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinence to the
case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted
Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until June 21, 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions are
the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again,
during the session of Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Act Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election law, the following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
"No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal,
provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial
fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any
municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term of
5 years: Provided, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election."
(Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6,it was likewise provided:
"x x x No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace, provincial fiscal or officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall
aid any candi689
VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962
689
People vs. Manantan
date or influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived of
his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a term of 5 years: Provided, however, That the foregoing

14

provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election." (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on
September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the provisions in question read:
"SEC.449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections.No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and
no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any
manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote." (italics supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:
"SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election.Anyjudge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province,
any officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service,
who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising the right to vote, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in all cases by
disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years." (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Italics supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section 48:
"SEC. 48. Active Intervention of Public Officers and Employees.No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, the Constabulary of the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert
influence in any manner in any election nor
690
690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Manantan
take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer."
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission
of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Note
carefully, however, that in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge"
which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of
the First Instance", the words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the
peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the
broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records which might have offered some explanation of the discussion of
Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been completely destroyed, all
efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical background of Rep. Act
No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason and equity.
691
VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962
691
People vs. Manantan

15

justice of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the
enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the
Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in the
prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as
provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have
been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.
In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in
nature, has more particular application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the
government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the state.
692
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Manantan
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict
construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world will understand." (Justice
Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 813).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a
particcular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no
such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an
additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions of various
courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S.
vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v.
U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S.
has well said:
"The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the
sense which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose." (U.S. v. Betteridge, 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations
inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See

16

693
VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962
People vs. Manantan

693

also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915, 25 Yale L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc.,
who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend to
eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:
"On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges,
whether of first Instance, justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations." xxx.
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political
activities would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why justices of
the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Courts of First Instance, they are given authority
and jurisdiction over certain election cases. (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123), Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decide inclusion and exclusion cases,
and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do
not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation." (p. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative or executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the
purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for
certiorari and
694
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Manantan
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the
President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the
petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56,
justices of the peace are already expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that with the filing of the said
House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of
said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the
proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons
expressed by the individual members of the legislature, even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute
(Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376),a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.

17

On law, reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To
accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in partisan polities. They were prohibited under the old Election Law
since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another law which expressed the prohibition to
them was Act No.
695
VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962
695
Teresa Realty, Inc. vs. Vda. de Garriz
3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusio alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that
justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. x x x"
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court
of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
"Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other
persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, should not be invoked." (Blevins v. Mullally, 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.)
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,Concepcion, Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.
Order set aside and case remanded to trial court for trial on the merits.
____________

18

VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974


People vs. Tamani

153

Nos. L-22160 & L-22161. January 21, 1974.*


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TEODORO TAMANI, accused-appellant.
_______________
SECOND DIVISION.
154
154
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Tamani
*

Appeal; Perfection of appeal; Statutory construction; Appeal lies 15 days from promulgation of judgment in criminal cases.The assumption that the fifteenday period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served en appellants counsel by registered mail, is not welltaken. The word promulgation in section 6 should be construed as referring to judgment, while the word notice should be construed as referring to order. That
construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis: referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let
each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively.
Same; Same; Case at bar, appeal made out of time given due course.Considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case was lost by reason of
his counsels inadvertence and considering further that the briefs have been submitted, the Court has resolved to review the record to obviate any possible
miscarriage of justice (Cf. Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 135, 2 L. ed. 60, where Chief Justice Marshall discussed the merits of a mandamus action although the
Court held that it had no power to issue that writ.).
Criminal Law; Alibi: Two-kilometer distance from the scene of the crime is a weak alibi.Appellant Tamanis defense of alibi, which can be fabricated with
facility, cannot be given serious consideration. Assuming that he was in Barrio Aniog in the afternoon and night of June 11th, it was physically possible for him to be
at the scene of the shooting at the time that it was perpetrated and return to the house of Vice-Mayor Tamani in Barrio Aniog. That place was only two kilometers
from the store of Pedro Pua. The victims were shot in front of the store.
Same; Same; Alibi when acceptable as a defense.The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable, must be such as to preclude the possibility of the presence
of the accused at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The accused must show that he was at some other place for such a
period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission.
Same; Confessions; Details unknown to investigators indicate voluntariness of confession.NBI agents Almeda and Mendoza testified that Tamanis sworn
statements were freely executed. Tamanis testimony on the alleged maltreatment was not corroborated. As correctly noted by the Solicitor General, certain details
in the confession, which only Tamani could have supplied, are indications of its voluntariness and give it spontaneity and coherence.
155

19

VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974


People vs. Tamani

155

Same; Treachery; Shot from a distance indicates treachery.The act of shooting Siyang at a distance, without the least expectation on his part that he would
be assaulted, is murder because of the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Appellant Tamani deliberately employed a mode of execution which
tended directly and specially to insure the consummation of the killing without any risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim could have made.
Same; Complex Crime; Results of two volleys of shots constitute separate offenses.The infliction of the four fatal gunshot wounds on Siyang and of the
wound in the palm of the mayors right hand was not the result of a single act. The injuries were the consequences of two volleys of gunshots. Hence, the assaults
on Siyang and the mayor cannot be categorized as a complex crime.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. Quinto, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for plaintiff-appellee.
Constancio S. Vitug for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
This is an appeal of defendant Teodoro Tamani y Marinay from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, (a) sentencing him to life imprisonment for
the murder of Jose Siyang and ordering him to indemnify the victims heirs in the sum of P6,000 and (b) further sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor for the attempted murder of Eduardo
Domingo and ordering him to indemnify the victim in the sum of P2,000 (Crim. Cases Nos. II-192 and II-198).
Issue as to dismissal of the appeal.After the appellant had filed his brief, the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
notice of appeal was forty-seven days late. Appellants counsel de oficio did not oppose the motion. Action thereon was deferred until
156
156
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Tamani
this case is considered on the merits. (Resolution of March 7, 1967). The motion to dismiss is reiterated in appellees brief. That preliminary question should first
be resolved.
The lower courts decision convicting defendant Tamani was promulgated on February 14, 1963. A copy thereof was served on his counsel on February 25,
1963. On March 1, 1963 he filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied. A copy of the order of denial was served by registered mail on July 13, 1963 on
defendants counsel through his wife. He had eleven days or up to July 24, 1963 within which to appeal (if the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal should be
computed from the date of notification and not from the date of promulgation of the decision). He filed his notice of appeal only on September 10, 1963 or fortyeight days from July 24th.
Silvestre B. Bello, defendants counsel, filed a sworn statement, accompanying the notice of appeal. In that affidavit, he stated that the trial courts order,
denying his motion for reconsideration, although admittedly received by his wife on July 13th, was never brought to his attention and that he came to know of the
order only on September 7th when he verified the expediente of the case and discovered that an order of denial had been issued. He averred that his wife must
have lost the envelope containing the order.

20

The trial court opined that the wifes affidavit should have been submitted and that the defendant should have filed a motion praying that the tardy appeal be
given due course. After considering the gravity of the two penalties imposed on the accused and the earnest plea of defense counsel, the trial court gave due
course to the appeal without prejudice to the right of the Solicitor General to raise the question of jurisdiction on the ground of a very much belated appeal.
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This
period, for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served
upon the defendant or his attorney.
157
VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974
157
People vs. Tamani
The word must in section 6 is synonymous with ought. It connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. The clear terms of section 6 leave no room for doubt that the
appeal should be effected within fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment.
The counsel for appellant Tamani must have so understood that import of section 6 (which is confirmed by the practice in trial courts) as evinced by the fact that
his motion for reconsideration was filed on March 1st, which was the fifteenth or last day of the reglementary period.
The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellants counsel
by registered mail, is not well-taken. The word promulgation in section 6 should be construed as referring to judgment (see section 6 of Rule 120), while the
word notice should be construed as referring to order. That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis:referring each to each; referring
each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively (76 C. J. S. 175).
Therefore, when the order denying appellants motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellants counsel, he had only one
(1) day within which to file his notice of appeal and not eleven days. That construction is an application by analogy or in a suppletory character of the rule governing
appeals in civil cases which is embodied in section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Appellant Tamanis notice of appeal, filed on Septem-ber 10, 1963, was fifty-eight days late. A regoristic application of section 6 justifies the dismissal of his
appeal, as prayed for by the prosecution.
However, considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case was lost by reason of his counsels inadvertence and considering further that the briefs
have been submitted, the Court has resolved to review the record to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice (Cf. Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 135, 2 L. ed.
60, Where Chief Justice
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Marshall discussed the merits of a mandamus action although the Court held that it had no power to issue that writ).
Uncontroverted facts.There is no dispute that sometime after twilight on the night of June 11, 1953 in the place called Centro at the commercial street of
Angadanan, Isabela, Jose Siyang (Syang), the town assistant sanitary inspector, was mortally wounded by gunfire. Death resulted from internal hemorrhage
caused by the following four (4) through and through gunshot wounds which followed an oblique direction from the point of entry to exit:
1. 1.Entry, chest about 2-1/2 inches from level of the nipple. Exit, at the back level of twelfth dorsal vertebrae to the right side.

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2. 2.Entry, above right clavicle (suprasternal notch) middle portion. Exit, at the back at the level of the right angle of scapula.
3. 3.Entry, anterior aspect of left shoulder. Exit, at the back of shoulder about 2-1/2 inches from tip of armpit (left side).
4. 4.Entry, anterior aspect of right forearm middle in slight oblique direction from the point of entry to exit. (Exh. F, Certificate issued by Pablo H, Gaffud,
M.D.).
By means of the same gunfire, an attempt was made to kill Mayor Eduardo Domingo. He sustained a through and through wound in the palm of his right hand
which caused his confinement in the Isabela Provincial Hospital from June 11 to 22, 1953 (Exh. E, Certificate issued by J. L. Maddela, Sr., Resident Physician).
More than three years from the time that tragedy transpired, or on October 2 and 3, 1956, appellant Tamani signed and thumhmarked two sworn statements
before the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), wherein he confessed that he was the one who shot Siyang and Mayor Domingo; that his
companion on the occasion of the shooting was Domingo Cadawan; that on the morning of June 11, 1953 he and Cadawan were dismissed as policemen and that
Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani, Matias de la Fuente and Rufino de los Santos instigated him to liquidate Mayor Domingo (Exh. A and B). The two statements are
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in English, a language which Tamani understands (19 tsn II Valencia).
Inasmuch as the crimes, murder and attempted murder, have been proven, meaning that the corpus delicti had been established, and appellant Tamani had
confessed having committed the same, there should be an airtight case against him. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.An extrajudicial confession made by in accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction,
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (Same as Sec. 96, Rule 123, 1940 Rules of Court).
Tamanis confession is corroborated by the undisputed evidence of the corpus delicti.
However, during the trial, he repudiated his confession. He assailed its voluntariness. He set up the defense of alibi. Through his principal witness, Francisco
Siyang, the father of the deceased Jose Siyang, he endeavored to prove that the latter was shot by Policemen Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor Tumaneng. Thus, a
simple case, where the extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti, became controversial, complicated and perplexing.
Version of the prosecution. In addition to Tamanis extrajudicial confession (Exh. A and B), the prosecution offered the testimonies of complainant Domingo,
Doctor Pablo H. Gaffud, Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra, Emiteria Ibarra, Ilustre D. Mendoza, Mariano G. Almeda, Teodoro Colobong and Martin Caniero.
The prosecutions evidence discloses that Domingo was the mayor of Angadanan since 1947. Prior to June 11, 1953, he was suspended from office by the
Governor. During Domingos suspension, Villamor Tamani, the vice-mayor, functioned as acting mayor. He appointed as policeman his second cousin, appellant
Teodoro Tamani who was then twenty-four years old. The vice-mayor used to appoint Teodoro Tamani as policeman whenever Domingo was suspended. Teodoro
Tamani resigned as policeman shortly before June 11th. In the afternoon of June 10th, Domingo was reinstated and he reassumed the office of mayor.
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The reinstatement of Domingo was obviously resented by Vice Mayor Villamor Tamani because it meant the termination of his tenure as acting mayor. On June
10th Teodoro Tamani and Domingo Cadawan (also a former policeman like Teodoro Tamani) were summoned for a conference by the vice-mayor to his house at

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Barrio Aniog, Angadanan. Present at the conference were the vice-mayor and his men, Matias de la Fuente and Rufino de los Santos. It was decided at that
meeting that Mayor Domingo should be liquidated. De la Fuente handed to Teodoro Tamani a carbine.
Appellant Tamani and Cadawan spent the night in the vice-mayors house. On the following morning of June 11th, Cadawan was sent on a mission to
the poblacion of Angadanan to ascertain the whereabouts of the quarry, Mayor Domingo. At around seven oclock in the evening, Cadawan returned to the vicemayors house and apprised appellant Tamani that Domingo was in front of the store of Pedro Pua at the towns commercial street.
Cadawan and Teodoro Tamani proceeded with dispatch to the poblacion, making shortcuts by passing through the yards of neighboring houses. Tamani carried
the carbine. On entering the yard of the house adjoining Pedro Puas store, Cadawan stumbled. The resulting noise attracted the attention of the owner of the
house, Mrs. Ibarra, who focused a flashlight at Tamani and, on recognizing him, uttered his nickname, Doro. She had known Doro since childhood. She saw that
he was carrying a gun.
She had just taken her supper. She and her daughter, Emiteria Ibarra, were sitting on the veranda. It was while chewing her buyo that Mrs. Ibarra heard
somebody trip in her yard on the cement floor intended as the base of a tank. Almost simultaneously, she heard the grunting ( ngik-ngik) of her pig. When she
trained her flashlight on the intruder and recognized Doro (appellant Tamani) with a gun and called him, the latter answered, Tia (Aunt).
Mrs. Ibarra saw that Teodoro Tamani passed under the eaves of her house, crossed the bamboo fence separating her lot from the vacant lot of Pedro Pua and
proceeded to the
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corner of the vacant lot near the gate of galvanized iron sheets and the edge of the cemented pavement which was in front of Pedro Puas store (see sketch, Exh,
C). As appellant Tamani passed the fence, he produced a cracking noise. Emiteria Ibarra testified:
Q. Who say (saw) Teodoro Tamani? A. My mother and myself, sir.
Q. What was the appearance of Teodoro Tamani when you saw him after your mother lighted him with the light of the flashlight? A. When my mother flashed
the flashlight towards him at the same time my mother called, Doro and then he answered TIA and he was carrying a firearm, air.
Q. Why do you know that when you and your mother heard the cracking of the fence Teodoro Tamani went inside the fence? A. We know it because of the
cracking of the fence, besides that we saw him proceeded towards the fence, sir.
Q. After Teodoro Tamani entered that fence as you say, what happened, if any? A. He proceeded towards the gate of the Chinese, sir.
Q. What happened, if any, after Teodoro Tamani went to that gate? A. Upon arriving at the gate we heard the gun reports, sir.
Q. How many gun reports, if you remember? A. Maybe eight (8) or nine (9), sir.
Q. Do you know where the gun reports came from?
A. Yes, sir, because I saw the sparks of the bullets when they were fired, sir.
Q. Did you know who fired? A. I know, sir.
Q. Who? A. Teodoro Tamani, because he was the only one who entered with a gun, sir (74-75 tsn Jan. 16, 1959).
Q. Who fired? A. Teodoro Tamani, sir.
Q. Why do you say that he was the one who fired? A. Because the gun reports came from the place where he stood at the gate, sir (77 tsn Jan. 16, 1959).
From the place where Cadawan and Tamani had positioned themselves, they had a good view, through the holes of the gate, of Mayor Domingo and his group
standing in front of Puas store (Exh. A). The mayor was engaged in conversation with a group of persons on the cemented pavement ( pasillo or sidewalk) in front
of the store in Centro at the towns commercial street. Standing near the wall of

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People vs. Tamani

the store were Hermoso Alicam, Liberato Tanam, Primitivo Tallog, Martin Caniero, Teodoro Colobong, Gaspar Ibarra, Francisco Siyang and Gonzalo Siyang. Mayor
Domingo was standing in front of the group, walking and gesticulating as he talked. Jose Siyang was leaning against a post somewhat apart from the group (Exh.
C, 6 tsn March 3, 1959).
Mayor Domingo was recounting his experiences in Manila during his suspension. He was standing on the culvert which bridged the canal separating
the pasillo and the street (See Exh. C). As he talked, he gestured and swung his hands up and down with palms open, facing Puas store and his audience. Jose
Siyang, who was apart from the group of listeners, was about two to three meters on Mayor Domingos right, leaning against one of the posts which supported the
roof shading the pasillo or cemented pavement. Jose Siyang was in line with Mayor Domingo while, in contrast, the group of listeners was standing side by side
close to the galvanized iron wall of the store, facing Mayor Domingo who was telling stories.
In the meanwhile, Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan were standing on the vacant lot in close proximity to the gate of galvanized iron sheets where
the pasillo ended. Cadawan opened a hole in the gate, about three inches in diameter, through which Teodoro Tamani inserted the barrel of the carbine. Tamani
fired at Mayor Domingo who was the target. Jose Siyang, a second cousin of Teodoro Tamani, like Vice-Mayor Tamani, was farther on the right side of Mayor
Domingo along the line of fire (Exh. A). Appellant Tamani fired two volleys. Mrs. Ibarra and her daughter saw from the veranda the flashes of fire emitted by the
carbine of Teodoro Tamani. They left the veranda and went inside the house.
At the moment the first volley of gunshots was fired, which was between seven and seven-thirty, Mayor Domingo had raised his right hand. The palm of his right
hand was hit. Jose Siyang was also hit. Domingo and his listeners dispersed and sought refuge inside Puas store. While Domingo ran for cover, a second volley
was fired. The volleys came from behind the iron gate on the vacant lot or from the southwest end of the cemented pavement behind the
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moaning of someone in an agony of pain. That person turned out to be Jose Siyang who had sustained four gunshot wounds and was hovering between life and
death. Siyang died before eleven oclock that same night.
Constabulary soldiers and peace officers arrived at the scene of the shooting and conducted an investigation. Mayor Domingo was taken to the provincial
hospital. Doctor Gaffud conducted an autopsy on the body of Jose Siyang in the municipal building. On the following day empty shells were found by the
Constabulary soldiers near the galvanized iron gate (6 tsn. III Calixto).
Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan left the scene of the shooting. They ran, passing the same route that they had taken in coming, and went direct to the house of
Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani in Barrio Aniog. Teodoro Tamani stayed overnight in the house of the vice-mayor. Cadawan, who reported to the vice-mayor that Mayor
Domingo was dead, proceeded to Barrio Clakcab and returned the murder weapon to Matias de la Fuente.
The trial court accepted the foregoing version as the basis of the judgment of conviction. It noted that in 1956 when NBI Agent Mariano G. Almeda arranged a
confrontation between Teodoro Tamani and Mrs. Ibarra, she identified him as the person whom she saw in her yard in the evening of June 11, 1953. During the
confrontation, Tamani trembled, became pale and remained silent.
Teodoro Tamani sometime after the shooting went into hiding at Cabagan and Santo Tomas, Isabela, where he was arrested by Mayor Domingo by virtue of a
warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Cases Nos. 245 and 246 of the justice of the peace court of Angadanan (Exh. 3, 4. 5 and 6, 11 tsn March 3, 1959). Appellant
went into hiding although his wife was about to deliver her baby.

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As to the motive for shooting Mayor Domingo, Teodoro Tamani explained that Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani, his second cousin, ordered the liquidation of the
mayor so that he could not assume office and the vice-mayor would be163
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People vs. Tamani
come mayor (Exh. A). Appellant Tamani was chosen to execute that task because he had lost his job as policeman when Mayor Domingo was reinstated (Exh. A,
p. 2).
On the other hand, Mayor Domingo said that when Teodoro Tamani was still a policeman, the mayor had scoldedhim for not reporting for work and for working
as cook of Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani and plowing his field. The other motive was that since Teodoro Tamani is a relative of the vice-mayor, who was a political
enemy of the mayor, he (appellant Tamani) could act as a policeman when the vice-mayor became mayor after the elimination of the incumbent mayor (11 tsn
March 3, 1959).
On the credibility of the prosecution eyewitness, Mrs. Ibarra, the trial judge made the following findings:
The Court concentrated attention on the attitude and observed the gestures, features, demeanor and manner of testifying and the emphasis, gestures and
inflection of the voice of prosecution witness Juana Vitorri de Ibarra during all the time she was on the witness stand in the direct and cross-examination, and her
answers were prompt, concise, responsive to interrogatories, outspoken, and entirely devoid of evasion or any semblance of shuffling, and her entire testimony was
given with calm, self-possession, an erect front, and unhesitating accent. The Court is convinced of her sincerity and credibility and the truthfulness of her
testimony, in great contrast with defendants manner of testifying. (pp. 859-60, Record).
The trial court concluded that the intended victim was Mayor Domingo and not Jose Siyang.
Appellants version and contentions. In this appeal appellants counsel de oficio argues that the trial court erred (1) in disbelieving Tamanis alibi; (2) in
assuming that his extrajudicial confession was voluntary; (3) in not giving credence to the testimony of defense witness Francisco Siyang, that his son, Jose
Siyang, was shot by Policemen Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor Tumaneng; (4) in giving credence to circumstantial evidence, and (5) in the alternative, in not holding
that appellant Tamani committed the complex crime of homicide with lesiones graves.
Appellant Tamani, having abjured his confession, gave the following version of the case by means of his testimony
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and the testimony of his other witness, Francisco Siyang (Syang):
Francisco Siyang was the father of Jose Siyang, the town sanitary inspector, who with his wife and four children, resided with Francisco Siyang at his house in
Centro, Angadanan. Francisco Siyang is an uncle of Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani. At around six-thirty in the evening of June 11, 1953 Venancio Respicio dropped
at the house of Jose Siyang and invited him for a walk. Francisco Siyang followed his son to the store of Pedro Pua which was around four blocks from their house.
Francisco Siyang noticed that Jose Siyang was in front of Puas store with Mayor Domingo, Policemen Alfonso Gomez, Gaspar Ibarra, Graciano Manguelod
and Melchor Tumaneng, teachers Primitivo Tallog, Teodoro Colobong and Martin Caniero, Mariano Dalodad (a barber) and Juaning Aliangan, a farmer. Jose
Siyang was leaning against a post, obliquely at the right of Mayor Domingo. Francisco Siyang allegedly approached Jose and told him that his wife and children
were waiting for him so that they could take supper. Jose answered yes, father.
While Francisco Siyang and Jose Siyang were standing side by side in front of Puas store, Mayor Domingo made a signal by stretching and raising his hand
with open palm and bringing it down. Suddenly, Policeman Ibarra, who was standing in front of Jose Siyang, fired his carbine at the latter, hitting Jose Siyang in the

25

chest. Policeman Tumaneng followed by firing with his carbine successive shots at Jose Siyang, hitting the latter in the breast. Tumaneng was on the right side of
Ibarra, obliquely facing Jose Siyang.
After Jose Siyang fell, Francisco Siyang went to his succor and raised him. Jose Siyang told his father: Father, I am dying, my children. When Jose Siyang
was brought to the municipal building, he was breathing feebly. He could not talk anymore. He expired in the municipal building. His body was brought home by
Francisco Siyang.
In the morning of June 12th, Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani with some Constabulary soldiers arrived at the house
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People vs. Tamani
of Francisco Siyang while the remains of Jose Siyang still lay in state. After the burial of Jose Siyang in the afternoon, a Constabulary sergeant investigated
Francisco Siyang and took him to Ilagan, where he was further investigated. He gave a sworn statement accusing Ibarra and Tumaneng of having killed Jose
Siyang (Exh. 1).
On the basis of that statement, a criminal complaint for the murder of Jose Siyang was filed on June 20, 1953 by Constabulary Lieutenant Tomas P. Gonzales
in the justice of the peace court of Angadanan against Venancio Respicio and Policemen Ibarra, Tumaneng and Manguelod (Exh. 2, Crim. Case No. 244). The
complaint was dismissed on August 12, 1953.
Other complaints for the murder of Jose Siyang and for frustrated murder perpetrated on Mayor Domingo were filed in the justice of the peace court against
Villamor Tamani, Teodoro Tamani, Domingo Cadawan, Rufino de los Santos and Matias de la Fuente but they were later dismissed (Exh. 3 to 6, Crim. Cases Nos.
245 and 246).
In October, 1956 Mariano G. Almeda of the NBI headed a team of agents that investigated the shooting of Jose Siyang and Mayor Domingo. Francisco Siyang
was investigated orally in Ilagan by Almeda. The investigation was interrupted by former Congressman Samuel Reyes. It was not finished.
Appellant Tamani, in support of his alibi, testified that Jose Siyang was his second cousin. Tamani was a resident of Centro in the poblacion of Angadanan. At
around three oclock in the afternoon of June 11, 1953 he was in the house of Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani in Barrio Aniog. He wanted a recommendation for a job
in the Angadanan Sawmill. The place known as Centro in the poblacion,where Pedro Puas store is located, is around two kilometers from Barrio Aniog. ViceMayor Tamani gave to Teodoro Tamani the recommendation between four and five oclock. The vice-mayor prevailed upon Teodoro Tamani to stay and they agreed
to go to town on the following day.
So, Teodoro Tamani slept in the house of his cousin, the vice-mayor, on the night of June 11th. On the morning of
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June 12th, Vice-Mayor Tamani and Teodoro Tamani went together to Centro in the poblacion. When they reached Centro, they learned of Jose Siyangs death, for
which reason they viewed his body in the house of Francisco Siyang. They arrived at Siyangs house at around eight and eightthirty in the morning. They learned
that Jose Siyang was shot in front of Pedro Puas store.
Teodoro Tamani did not go to the Angadanan Sawmill on June 12th. He delivered the letter of recommendation on June 13th to the manager of the sawmill. He
worked in the sawmill as laborer for two weeks only. He resigned due to the heavy work. He could not remember the name of the manager of the sawmill.
He denied that he shot Jose Siyang and Mayor Domingo. He did not participate in the commission of the crime. He said that he was in the house of Vice-Mayor
Tamani on the night of June 11th.

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On October 2, 1956 NBI Agent Almeda picked him up from his house for questioning in connection with the shooting of Siyang and Mayor Domingo. Almeda
was accompanied by Alfonso Salvador, a Constabulary soldier. Tamani was brought to the municipal building. From there, he was taken to Ilagan. He was brought
by Almeda to the provincial jail at Calamagui, Isabela, where he (Tamani) was delivered to Pedro Tamayo, a prisoner who acted as mayor of the cell
(brigada). Tamani was formally received by the provincial guard from Almeda at around six and six-thirty in the evening of October 2nd.
Upon delivering Tamani to Tamayo, Almeda allegedly told Tamayo: Bahala kayo rian, Tamayo, at ako ang bahala saiyo. Twenty minutes later, Pedro Tamayo,
Juanito Dassig, Juan Pecano. Ernesto Castaeda and other convicts started maltreating Tamani. The alleged maltreatment consisted of the following:
First, they ordered Tamani to squat on the cemented floor inside the cell (brigada).
Second, after squatting on the cement floor, they ordered Tamani to stand and then started boxing him for one hour.
Third, they removed all his clothings and put Tamani in168
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People vs. Tamani
side a drum where prisoners dropped their human waste. He was required to stay inside the drum for five minutes, after which they brought him out and poured on
him water to wash his body from the human waste.
Fourth, they made Tamani pulverized pepper and they placed the pulverized pepper in his anus, penis and testicles.
Tamani was maltreated because the tormentors wanted him to admit that he was the one who shot Jose Siyang and Mayor Domingo. As he could not endure the
maltreatment, he admitted he had shot Siyang and Domingo. The maltreatment was stopped after he made the admission.
Around ten to ten-thirty on that same night, Almeda returned to the jail and asked Tamayo: Does he admit now? Tamayo answered in the affirmative. Almeda
then took Tamani out of the jail and brought him to the second floor of Purings Restaurant. Almeda called for NBI Agent No. 101 who came out of a room with a
typewriter. Agent No. 101 placed his typewriter on a table. Almeda told Tamani: Now, I am going to take your statement that you shot Jose Siyang and Mayor
Domingo.
At first Tamani told Almeda that he knew nothing about the shooting because he was in Barrio Aniog when Domingo and Siyang were shot. Thereupon, Almeda
told Tamani not to deny the shooting because Juana Vitorri Vda. de Ibarra recognized him when he stumbled before the shooting at a place near the fence
between the lots of Pedro Pua and Mrs. Ibarra. Tamani maintained his innocence about the shooting.
Thereafter, Almeda and NBI Agent No. 101 slapped the face of Tamani. They brought him to a toilet. They pushed his head into the toilet bowl ( iniodoro). They
held his hair and pushed his face toward the mouth of the toilet bowl for five minutes. When Tamani could not endure the torture anymore, he told Almeda that he
would admit the crime. Almeda and Agent No. 101 brought Tamani to the table on the second floor of Purings Restaurant. Almeda told Tamani: You better admit
now that you shot the two victims, that you took the gun from Matias de la Fuente and that Villamor Tamani and Rufino de los Santos are the masterminds.
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Tamani admitted that version for fear that he would again be maltreated. His-affidavit, Exhibit A, was signed at Purings Restaurant on the night of October 2, 1956.
The contents of Exhibit A are all the versions of Director Almeda. Tamani admitted his signatures and thumbmarks in Exhibit A. On the following morning of
October 3rd, Almeda and Agent No. 101 brought back Tamani to the jail.
Tamani admits that he signed Exhibit B also, his supplementary confession. However, he insists that he signed it on the night of October 2nd and not on
October 3rd. He said that he never excluded Domingo Cadawan and that he never incriminated himself as the triggerman. He might have signed Exhibit B in

27

connection with his signing of Exhibit A on the night of October 2nd because when he signed Exhibit A, there were several sheets of paper which he signed and
thumbmarked. He allegedly did not know the contents of Exhibit B when he affixed his signature thereon. He says that the incriminatory statements in Exhibits A
and B are not true. (See pp. 3-4, 17-28, Appellants Brief).
The trial court rejected the foregoing version of the defense after noting the improbabilities in Francisco Siyangs testimony and after concluding that the
appellant had not overcome the presumption that his confession was voluntarily executed.
The shooting incident was undoubtedly another episode in the political rivalry between Mayor Domingo and Vice-Mayor Tamani. That circumstance has given a
political complexion to these two cases. It may explain why the evidence has become muddled, if not baffling. It was to be expected that, to suit the ulterior
motivations of the contending parties, there would be some insidious manipulation of the evidence.
Thus, on June 12th, the day following the shooting and before Jose Siyang was interred, Constabulary soldiers, accompanied by Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani,
investigated Francisco Siyang (51-52 tsn Aug. 26, 1960). On June 14, 1953, or four days after the shooting and while Mayor
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People vs. Tamani
Domingo was in the hospital, Francisco Siyang (the uncle of Villamor Tamani and the star witness for the defense and the father of the victim, Jose Siyang)
executed an affidavit in Ilagan about the shooting. He made it appear in that statement that Patrolmen Ibarra and Tumaneng, two followers of Mayor Domingo, were
the killers of Jose Siyang and that they commenced to shoot Siyang when Mayor Domingo made a prearranged signal (Exh. 1).
As already noted, on the basis of that affidavit, Constabulary Lieutenant Tomas P. Gonzales filed in the justice of the peace court of Angadanan a complaint for
murder against Policemen Ibarra, Tumaneng and Manguelod and one Venancio Respicio, an alleged nephew of the mayor (Exh. 2, Crim. Case No. 244).
According to Francisco Siyangs affidavit, Respicio, a compadre of Jose Siyang, acted as decoy in bringing Jose Siyang to the place where he was assassinated.
Domingo repeatedly denied that Respicio was his relative by consanguinity or affinity. Francisco Siyang made it appear that his son was murdered because he
testified against Domingo in the case where the latter was charged with theft. Because of that theft case Domingo was suspended. That murder complaint (Exh. 2)
against the followers of Mayor Domingo was dismissed.
After the mayor was released from the hospital, he and the chief of police investigated the shooting. The chief of police filed a complaint for murder dated July
8, 1953 against Vice-Mayor Tamani, Teodoro Tamani, Rufino de los Santos, Matias de la Fuente, Arsenio Dayang and Medardo Tamani. The complaint was
amended by including Domingo Cadawan as a defendant and excluding Dayang and Medardo Tamani (Exh. 3 and 4, Crim. Case No. 245). For the shooting of
Mayor Domingo, a complaint for frustrated murder was filed by the chief of police against the same persons (Exh. 5 and 6, Crim. Case No. 246).
Both complaints were dismissed apparently for lack of evidence. As the shooting was an unsolved crime, the intervention of the NBI became necessary.
On June 4, 1956 Francisco Siyang executed an affidavit in Ilagan before NBI Agent No. 39. He deviated from his 1953 affidavit by naming Melchor Tumaneng
alone (Mel171
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chor Tomines) as the assassin of his son, Jose Siyang. He stuck to his original theory that Mayor Domingo masterminded the assassination of his son (Exh. G).
As already noted, four months later, or on October 2 and 3, 1956, an NBI investigating team headed by Mariano G. Almeda, a lawyer and an assistant to the
NBI Director, secured a confession from appellant Teodoro Tamani that he, with the assistance of Domingo Cadawan, shot Mayor Domingo and Jose Siyang (Exh.

28

A and B). It may be assumed that the NBI was asked to handle the case so that political considerations would not color and influence the course and outcome of
the investigation.
Before Tamani executed his confession, Almeda and his agents, assisted by Constabulary soldiers, interviewed several persons in Angadanan and made an
ocular inspection of the scene of the crime. They investigated Mrs. Ibarra and her daughter. They learned that Teodoro Tamani had entered Mrs. Ibarras yard and
was recognized by her and that, immediately thereafter, she heard gunshots from the direction where Tamani had posted himself. Thus, Tamani became a prime
suspect. He was apprehended and brought to the house of Mrs. Ibarra for a confrontation. Almeda testified:
Q. What did you do, if any, when Teodoro Tamani was brought to the house of Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra? A. In the presence of Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra
and her daughter I confronted them and asked Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra and her daughter whether they knew Teodoro Tamani and both claimed that he is the
very same fellow who entered the yard that night with a gun and also they heard shots from the direction of the said accused Teodoro Tamani after which Teodoro
Tamani was trembling and he became pale.
Q. And did Teodoro Tamani say anything when he was pointed out by Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra and her daughter? A. He did not utter anything. He simply
became pale and trembling. (16 tsn June 12, 1958, II Valencia).
Tamanis confession (Exh. A and B) was the basis of the informations for murder and frustrated murder against him in these two cases.
Findings: Appellant Tamanis defense of alibi, which can be fabricated with facility, cannot be given serious conside172
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People vs. Tamani
ration. Assuming that he was in Barrio Aniog in the afternoon and night of June 11th, it was physically possible for him to be at the scene of the shooting at the time
that it was perpetrated and return to the house of Vice-Mayor Tamani in Barrio Aniog. That place was only two kilometers from the store of Pedro Pua. The victim
were shot in front of the store.
The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable, must be such as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The accused must show that he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him
to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission (People vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 764, 768).
Appellants alibi does not satisfy that basic requirement. Moreover, it was not corroborated by Vice-Mayor Tamani or by any other person. Its concocted
character is manifest.
Appellant Tamani argues that he signed his confession, Exhibit A, because he was tortured or maltreated. He claims that he does not remember having signed
his supplementary confession (Exh. B) although he admits the authenticity of his signature and thumbmark therein.
NBI Agents Almeda and Mendoza testified that Tamanis sworn statements were freely executed. Tamanis testimony on the alleged maltreatment was not
corroborated. As correctly noted by the Solicitor General, certain details in the confession, which only Tamani could have supplied, are indications of its
voluntariness and give it spontaneity and coherence.
Those details are (a) that Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan conferred with Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani in the latters house at Aniog at three oclock in the
afternoon of the day preceding the shooting; (b) that Matias de la Fuente and Rufino de los Santos were present at the conference and it was decided to liquidate
Mayor Domingo to enable the vice mayor to act as mayor; (c) that De la Fuente handed
173
VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974
173
People vs. Tamani

29

ing; (d) that Cadawan and Tamani slept in the vice-mayors house on the night of June 10, 1953; (e) that Cadawan went to the poblacion in the morning of June
11th in order to ascertain the whereabouts of Mayor Domingo; (f) that Cadawan returned in the afternoon and informed Tamani that Domingo was at Puas store;
(g) that Cadawan stumbled in the yard of Mrs. Ibarra; (h) that after firing the shots, the two returned to the vice-mayors house; (i) that Teodoro Tamani slept in the
house of the vice-mayor after the assassination; (j) that Jose Siyang was standing on the right side of Mayor Domingo along the line of fire; (k) that Jose Siyang
was his second cousin and the second cousin of the vice-mayor and (1) that the hole in the gate was three inches in diameter.
Those circumstances might not have been known if the confession had been executed under duress. NBI Agents Almeda and Mendoza could not have
manufactured all these details.
There is one significant inconsistency in appellant Tamanis testimony on March 26, 1962 which impairs his credibility. He claimed that his supplementary
confession, Exhibit B, was translated to him in Tagalog but that he did not understand Tagalog on or before October 3, 1956 (117 tsn I Valencia). However, when
he testified on January 11, 1962 and he was asked to repeat what NBI Agent Almeda told in Tagalog to the prisoner, Pedro Tamayo, Tamani was able to repeat
verbatim the words: Bahala kayo rian Tamayo at ako ang bahala saiyo (83 tsn II Calixto). He repeated the same Tagalog words in the later part of his testimony
(86 tsn) and at the hearing on April 5, 1962 (127 tsn I Valencia).
Agent Almeda testified that appellant Tamani understands English, being a former policeman, and that Tamani read Exhibit B, which is in English and which
NBI Agent Mendoza translated to him in Ilocano. Tamani did not deny that he knows English. His petition to this Court that he be granted bail, which petition bears
his signature, is in English (See Rollo).
There is no merit in appellant Tamanis contention that
174
174
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Tamani
the trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of Francisco Siyang (Syang) that Jose Siyang was shot by Policemen Ibarra and Tumaneng, the latter
being allegedly a houseboy of Mayor Domingo. The inconsistencies on vital details in Siyangs two affidavits and in his testimony signify that he deliberately
perverted the truth. His testimony exhibits the earmarks of untrustworthiness. It was squarely refuted by Martin Caniero and Teodoro Colobong. It should be
underscored that Francisco Siyang is the uncle of the vice-mayor (58 tsn Aug. 26, 1960).
In his 1953 affidavit (Exh. 1) he declared that Policemen Ibarra and Tumaneng shot his son, Jose Siyang, whereas, in his 1956 affidavit (Exh. G) he alleged that
only Tumaneng (Tomines) shot his son.
Francisco Siyang, a farmer, was already seventy-six years old when he testified in 1960. On direct examination he testified that his son was shot in the breast
by Gaspar Ibarra, who was-immediately followed by Melchor Tumaneng. Tumaneng allegedly hit Jose Siyang in the left part of the breast below the clavicle (48 tsn
I Valencia). That was also Francisco Siyangs declaration in his 1953 affidavit (Exh. 1): that Ibarra fired first
However, Francisco Siyang on cross-examination testified differently. He declared that Tumaneng fired first and that the second shot was fired by Ibarra.
Francisco Siyang said that he was sure that Tumaneng fired first at his son (89, 92, 93 tsn I Valencia), The following is an example of his confusing testimony:
Q. How many shots did Gaspar Ibarra fire at your son?
A. Only one, sir.
Q. Who fired the two first shot?, if you know? A. Melchor Tumaneng, sir.
Q. Did you actually see or not the two successive shots at your son? A. I saw him, sir.
Q. Who fired the other two shots which according to you your son was hit by five (5) gunshots A. Gaspar Ibarra, sir.

30

Q. Do you mean to say that Gaspar Ibarra fired first one shot and then two shots, all in all three shots? A. Gaspar Ibarra fired only one, sir. (93 tsn I
Valencia).
175
VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974
175
People vs. Tamani
Q. Who was the first who shot your son, according to you?
A. Melchor Tumaneng.
Q. Where was Melchor Tumaneng at the moment he shot you? A. He was at the gate of the fence.
Q. But he was inside with the group of persons at the media de agua of the store of Pedro Pua. Is it? A. Yes sir (21 tsn I Calixto).
NBI Agent Almeda, after investigating Francisco Siyang, found his theory incredible. Almeda did not believe that Francisco Siyang could have seen or identified the
assailant who was behind the fence. According to Almeda, Francisco Siyang merely suspected certain persons as the killers of his son. He could not identify
positively the killers.
Other grave inconsistencies in Francisco Siyangs affidavits and testimony are discussed in the trial courts decision.
Appellant Tamani further contends that the trial court erred in relying on thirteen circumstances in order to convince itself that Tamani was the culprit Among
those circumstances are that Tamani went into hiding sometime after the shooting and that the motive for the attempted murder of Mayor Domingo was to prevent
his reinstatement and to enable the vice-mayor to become permanent mayor and insure that appellant Tamani would again become a policeman.
Judge Pedro C. Quintos painstaking analysis of the evidence and his conscientious scrutiny of the discrepancies in the testimony and affidavits of Francisco
Siyang demonstrate that the guilt of Tamani has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. A thorough perusal of the record leads to the conclusion that the trial court
did not commit the errors imputed to it by the appellant.
The act of shooting Siyang at a distance, without the least expectation on his part that he would be assaulted, is murder because of the attendance of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia). Appellant Tamani deliberately employed a mode of execution which tended directly and specially to insure the
consummation of the killing without any risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim could have made (Par. 16, Art 14, Revised Penal
176
176
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Tamani
Code). Siyang, unarmed and without any intimation that the gunshots intended for Mayor Domingo would hit him, was not in a position to defend himself against
the unseen assailant. Treachery may be appreciated even if there was a mistake as to the victim (People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil.
307).
As to Mayor Domingo, the accused was not able to perform all the acts of execution which would consummate the killing (Art. 6, Revised Penal Code). The
accused was not able to do so, not because of his spontaneous desistance, but because he failed to inflict on the mayor a mortal wound. The mayor was able to
avoid the second volley by taking refuge in the store of Pedro Pua. But there is no doubt that the accused was animated by the intent to kill and that the shooting
was perpetrated in a treacherous manner. Hence, the offense against the mayor is attempted murder (People vs. Kalalo, 59 Phil. 715).
The alternative contention of appellant Tamani that he should be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with lesiones graves is not well-taken. As already
pointed out, the killing of Siyang cannot be characterized as homicide. It was qualified by treachery. There was intent to kill in the shooting of the mayor. So, the
wound inflicted on him cannot be regarded as a mere physical injury. It was an overt act manifesting the willful design of the accused to liquidate the mayor.

31

The infliction of the four fatal gunshot wounds on Siyang and of the wound in the palm of the mayors right hand was not the result of a single act. The injuries
were the consequences of two volleys of gunshots. Hence, the assaults on Siyang and the mayor cannot be categorized as a complex crime.
To convict the accused of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder would result in the imposition of the death penalty. That eventuality would be
worse for him.
There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on tire appellant for the killing of Siyang. (Arts.
64[1] and 248,
177
VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974
177
People vs. Tamani
Revised Penal Code). The use of the term life imprisonment is not proper (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Zaldivar, Fernando and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., concurs in the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the judgment of the laws must become final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal. (Sec. 7, Rule 120.)
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Appeal dismissed.
Notes.Difficulties with the Defense of Alibi.To establish an alibi, a defendant must not only show that he was present at some other place about the time of
the alleged crime, but also, that he was at such other place for so long a time, that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was
committed, either before or after the time he was at such other place. People vs. Alban, L-15203, March 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 931.
In a crime with political motivations, the testimony of political affiliates presented to corroborate an accuseds alibi should be received with some
reservation. People vs. Riveral, L-14077, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 462.
Where the accused admitted participation in the crime and was seen by witnesses loitering at the place of the crime, his alibi deserves no credit. People vs.
Maranan, L-18211, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 642.
The claim of appellant that he was apprehended in another municipality for traffic violation at the time of the crime was held not credible where the police blotter
was falsified and was concocted to serve the purpose of the defense. People vs. Valera, L-20286, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 164.
LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE
See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume one, page 84 on Alibi; page 93 on Appeal; and page 570 on Criminal Law.
178
178
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Diaz
See also SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume two, page 1928 on Statutory Construction.
Aquino, R.C., The Revised Penal Code, 2 vols., 1961 Edition.
Feria, L.R., and Gregorio, A.L., Comments on the Revised Penal Code, 1958-59 Editions.
Padilla, A., Criminal Law Revised Penal Code, 3 vols., 1971-72 Editions.

32

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33

76

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Mapa vs. Arroyo

G.R. No. 78585. July 5, 1989.*


JOSE ANTONIO MAPA, petitioner, vs. HON. JOKER ARROYO, in his Capacity as Executive Secretary, and LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.

34

Courts; Findings of an administrative agency, accorded respect; Exceptions.As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, manifest
and grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, the findings of the administrative agency on matters falling within its competence will not be
disturbed by the courts. Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise
gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their jurisdiction. Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they are not supported
by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable
errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.
Same; Contracts; Petitioners insistence on the applicability of P.D. No. 957 must be rejected since the same was issued long after the execution of the
contracts involved; Case at bar.Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 957 must be rejected. Said decree was issued on July 12,
1976 long after the
_______________
SECOND DIVISION.
77
VOL. 175, JULY 5, 1989
Mapa vs. Arroyo
*

77

execution of the contracts involved. Obviously and necessarily, what subsequently were statutorily provided therein as obligations of the owner or developer
could not have been intended by the parties to be a part of their contracts. No intention to give restrospective application to the provisions of said decree can be
gathered from the language thereof. Section 20, in relation to Section 21, of the decree merely requires the owner or developer to construct the facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development but only such as are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans,
brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisements. Other than what are provided in Clause 20 of the contract, no further written
commitment was made by the developer in this respect. To read into the contract the matters desired by petitioner would have the law impose additional obligations
on the parties to a contract executed before that very law existed or was contemplated.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; And is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union. We further reject
petitioners strained and tenuous application of the socalled doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of Section 21. He would
thereby have the enumeration of facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development interpreted to mean that the demonstrative phrase
which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc. refer only to other forms of development and not to facilities, improvements and
infrastructures. While this subserves his purpose, such bifurcation, whereby the supposed adjectival phrase is set apart from the antecedent words, is illogical and
erroneous. The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent,
unless it be prevented by the context. In the present case, the employment of the word and between facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of
development, far from supporting petitioners theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics that and is not meant to separate words but is a
conjunction used to denote a joinder or union.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the decision of the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Francisco T. Mamaug for petitioner.
78

35

78

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Mapa vs. Arroyo
Emiliano S. Samson for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
We are called upon once again, in this special civil action for certiorari, for a pronouncement as to whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the executive branch of Government, particularly in the adjudication of a controversy originally commenced
in one of its regulatory agencies.
Petitioner herein seeks the reversal of the decision of the Office of the President, rendered by the Deputy Executive Secretary on April 24, 1987, 1 which
dismissed his appeal from the resolution of the Commission Proper, Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC, for short), promulgated on January 10,
1986 and affirming the decision of July 3, 1985 of the Office of Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA, for brevity) of HSRC. Petitioner avers that public respondent
gravely transcended the sphere of his discretion in finding that Presidential Decree No. 957 is inapplicable to the contracts to sell involved in this case and in
consequently dismissing the same.2
The established facts on which the assailed decision is based are set out therein as follows:
Records disclose that, on September 18, 1975, appellant Jose Antonio Mapa and appellee Labrador Development Corporation (Labrador, for short),
owner/developer of the Barangay Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, entered into two contracts to sell over lots 12 and 13 of said subdivision. On different months
in 1976, they again entered into two similar contracts involving lots 15 and 16 in the same subdivision. Under said contracts, Mapa undertook to make a total
monthly installment of P2,137.54 over a period of ten (10) years. Mapa, however, defaulted in the payment thereof starting December 1976, prompting Labrador to
send to the former a demand letter, dated May 5, 1977, giving him until May 18, 1977, within which to settle his unpaid installments for the 4 lots amounting to
P15,411.66, with a warning
_______________
Annex K. Petition; Rollo, 35-40.
Rollo, 16-17.
79
VOL. 175, JULY 5, 1989
Mapa vs. Arroyo
1
2

79

that non-payment thereof will result in the cancellation of the four (4) contracts. Despite receipt of said letter on May 6, 1977, Mapa failed to take any action
thereon. Labrador subsequently wrote Mapa another letter, dated June 15, 1982, which the latter received on June 21, 1982, reminding him of his total arrears
amounting to P180,065.27 and demanding payment within 5 days from receipt thereof, but which letter Mapa likewise ignored. Thus, on August 16, 1982, Labrador
sent Mapa a notarial cancellation of the four (4) contracts to sell, which Mapa received on August 20, 1982. On September 10, 1982, however, Mapas counsel sent
Labrador a letter calling Labradors attention to, and demanding its compliance with, Clause 20 of the four (4) contracts to sell which relates to Labradors obligation
to provide, among others, lighting/water facilities to subdivision lot buyers.
On September 10, 1982, Labrador issued a certification holding the implementation of the letter dated August 16, 1982 (re notarial cancellation) pending the
complete development of road lot cul de sac within the properties of Mapa at Barangay Hills Subdivision. Thereafter, on October 25, 1982, Labrador sent Mapa a

36

letter informing him that the construction of road, sidewalk, curbs and gutters adjacent to Block 11 Barangay Hills Subdivision are already completed and further
requesting Mapa to come to our office within five (5) days upon receipt of this letter to settle your account.
On December 10, 1982, Mapa tendered payment by means of a check in the amount of P2,137.54, but Labrador refused to accept payment for the reason that
it was agreed that after the development of the cul de sac, he (complainant) will pay in full the total amount due, which Labrador computed at P260,138.61. On
December 14, 1982, Mapa wrote Labrador claiming that you have not complied with the requirements for water and light facilities in lots 12, 13, 15 & 16 Block 2 of
Barangay Hills Subdivision. The following day, Mapa filed a complaint against Labrador for the latters neglect to put 1) a water system that meets the minimum
standard as specified by HSRC, and 2) electrical power supply. By way of relief, Mapa requested the HSRC to direct Labrador to provide the facilities
aforementioned, and to issue a cease and desist order enjoining Labrador from cancelling the contracts to sell.
After due hearing/investigation, which included an on-site inspection of the subdivision, OAALA issued its decision of July 3, 1985, dismissing the complaint
and declaring that after the lapse of 5 years from complainants default respondent had every right to rescind the contract pursuant to Clause 7 thereof . . .
Per its resolution of January 10, 1986, the Commission Proper,
80
80
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mapa vs. Arroyo
HSRC, affirmed the aforesaid OAALA decision.3
It was petitioners adamant submission in the administrative proceedings that the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 4 and implementing rules form part of
the contracts to sell executed by him and respondent corporation, hence the obligations imposed therein had to be complied with by Labrador within the period
provided. Since, according to petitioner, Labrador failed to perform the aforementioned obligations, it is precluded from rescinding the subject contracts to sell since
petitioner consequently did not incur in delay on his part.
Such intransigent position of petitioner has not changed in the petition at bar and unyielding reliance is placed on the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957
and its implementing rules. The specific provisions of the Decree which are persistently relied upon read:
SEC. 20. Time of Completion.Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development,
including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed
matters, letters or in any form of advertisements, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such
other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
SEC. 21. Sales Prior to Decree.In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be
incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding
section within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance
with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Sections
38 and 39 of this Decree.
_______________
Ibid., 35-36.
The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, effective July 12, 1976.
81
3
4

37

VOL. 175, JULY 5, 1989


Mapa vs. Arroyo

81

Rule V of the implementing rules, on the other hand, requires two (2) sources of electric power, two (2) deepwell and pump sets with a specified capacity and two
standard fire hose flows with a capacity of 175 gallons per minute. 5
The provision, in said contracts to sell which, according to petitioner, includes and incorporates the aforequoted statutory provisions, is Clause 20 of said
contracts which provides:
Clause 20BDIVISION DEVELOPMENTinsure the physical development of the subdivision, the SELLER hereby obliges itself to provide the individual lot buyer
with the following:
1. a)PAVED ROADS
2. b)UNDERGROUND DRAINAGE
3. c)CONCRETE CURBS AND GUTTERS
4. d)WATER SYSTEM
5. e)PARK AND OPEN SPACE
These improvements shall apply only to the portions of the subdivision which are for sale or have been sold.
All improvements except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government shall be completed within a period of three (3) years from
date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER to reasonably comply with the above schedule shall permit the BUYER/S to suspend his monthly installments without
any penalties or interest charges until such time that these improvements shall have been made as scheduled. 6
As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, the findings of the
administrative agency on matters falling within its competence will not be disturbed by the courts. 7 Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded
respect, if not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their jurisdiction.
Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they are
_______________
Rollo, 208.
Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 18.
7
Sagun, et al. vs. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, G.R. No. 44738, June 22, 1988.
82
82
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mapa vs. Arroyo
5
6

38

not supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when
palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.8
A careful scrutiny of the records of the instant case reveals that the circumstances thereof do not fall under the aforesaid excepted cases, with the findings duly
supported by the evidence.
Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 957 must be rejected. Said decree was issued on July 12, 1976 long after the execution of
the contracts involved. Obviousy and necessarily, what subsequently were statutorily provided therein as obligations of the owner or developer could not have been
intended by the parties to be a part of their contracts. No intention to give restrospective application to the provisions of said decree can be gathered from the
language thereof. Section 20, in relation to Section 21, of the decree merely requires the owner or developer to construct the facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development but only such as are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures,
prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisements. Other than what are provided in Clause 20 of the contract, no further written commitment was
made by the developer in this respect. To read into the contract the matters desired by petitioner would have the law impose additional obligations on the parties to
a contract executed before that very law existed or was contemplated.
We further reject petitioners strained and tenuous application of the so-called doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of
Section 21. He would thereby have the enumeration of facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development interpreted to
_______________
Alcuaz, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business Administration, etc. et al., 161 SCRA 7 (1988), citing Ateneo de Manila University vs. Court of Appeals, 145
SCRA 106 (1986).
83
VOL. 175, JULY 5, 1989
83
Mapa vs. Arroyo
8

mean that the demonstrative phrase which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc. refer only to other forms of development and not to
facilities, improvements and infrastructures. While this subserves his purpose, such bifurcation, whereby the supposed adjectival phrase is set apart from the
antecedent words, is illogical and erroneous. The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. 9 Relative words
refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context. In the present case, the employment of the word and between facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development, far from supporting petitioners theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics that and is not
meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union.
Thus, if ever there is any valid ground to suspend the monthly installments due from petitioner, it would only be based on non-performance of the obligations
provided in Clause 20 of the contract, particularly the alleged non-construction of the culde-sac. But, even this is unavailing and is obviously being used only to
justify petitioners default. The on-site inspection of the subdivision conducted by the OAALA and its subsequent report reveal that Labrador substantially complied
with its obligation.10
Furthermore, the initial non-construction of the cul-de-sac, as private respondent Labrador explained, was because petitioner Mapa requested the suspension
of its construction since his intention was to purchase the adjoining lots and thereafter enclose the same. 11 If these were not true, petitioner would have invoked
that supposed default in the first instance. As the OAALA noted, petitioner stopped payments of his monthly obligations as early as December, 1976, which is a
mere five months after the effectivity of P.D. No. 957 or about a year after
_______________

39

See Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 57, citing Brown vs. Brown, Del., 3 Terry 157, 29 A.2d 149, 153.
Rollo, 83.
11
Ibid., 256; TSN, Jan. 24, 1984, 7; TSN, Feb. 6, 1984, 18-19.
84
84
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mapa vs. Arroyo
9

10

the execution of the contracts. This means that respondent still has 1 and 1/2 years to comply with its legal obligation to develop the subdivision under said P.D.
and two years to do so under the agreement, hence, it was improper for complainant to have suspended payments in December, 1976 on the ground of nondevelopment since the period allowed for respondents obligation to undertake such development has not yet expired. 12
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.The Court is not bound by the Commissioners report in fixing price of land in expropriation cases. (Republic vs. Santos, 141 SCRA 30.)
Only legal questions are reviewable by the Supreme Court. (Director of Lands vs. Funtillar, 142 SCRA 57.)
o0o
_______________
Ibid., 84-85.
85
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12

VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 4, 1996

49

40

Paras vs. Commission on Elections


G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996.*
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Election Law; Recall; Statutory Construction; It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is a rule in
statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to
recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official
may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; If the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections which is set by R.A. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996
were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local elections, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the
Local Government Code.Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the
novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK
election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as
erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
Same; Same; Same; In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and
the legislature is not presumed to have
____________________________
EN BANC.
50
*

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

0
Paras vs. Commission on Elections
done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to
enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided
under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
Same; Same; Same; It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. It is likewise
a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local
Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact
a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Same; Same; Same; The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction.Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to
absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition: We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is

41

apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that
vivifieth x x x. The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Local Government Code to construe
regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the
prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immedi51
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 4, 1996
5
1
Paras vs. Commission on Elections
ately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official
concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through
a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local electionas one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Recall; Words and Phrases; The term regular local election must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as distinguished
from the regular election of national officials.However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a regular local election for
purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The term regular local election must be confined to the regular election of elective
local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and
Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of
the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are
not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters.A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those
who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter
pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Sections 113-118). Under the law, the SK includes the youth with
52
5
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
Paras vs. Commission on Elections
ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular
election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local).
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

42

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.


Matias, Pangilinan, Bansale, Tan, Felix, Alberto, Hernal, Buazon & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
Jose P. Balbuena for public respondent.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for
his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. 1 At least
29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view
of petitioners opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall
election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court
issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required peti____________________________
COMELEC Resolution No. 95-3345, September 5, 1995.
53
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 4, 1996
Paras vs. Commission on Elections
1

53

tioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. 2
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for
certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in
behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor Generals manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the
COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. 3
Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74(b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states
that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election,
petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808
on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621,
where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall
election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
____________________________
RTC, Cabanatuan City, Order dated December 20, 1995; Rollo, p. 28.
Rollo, pp. 64-66.
54
2
3

43

54

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Paras vs. Commission on Elections

SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall.(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election. [Emphasis added.]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an
elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such
elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the
phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May
1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted
rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being
construed is defeated, or as otherwise ex____________________________
Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113SCRA 464, 467.
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617, 627.
55
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 4, 1996
55
Paras vs. Commission on Elections
4
5

pressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation of Section
74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following
admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is
usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x 8
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition
against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election

44

for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in
office than a successor elected through a recall
____________________________
Id. at p. 628.
PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674.
8
People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163, 167.
56
56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paras vs. Commission on Elections
6
7

election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election
where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74(b) of the Code considering that the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12,
1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr.,Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa (C.J.), I concur in both majority & concurring opinions.
Padilla, J., I concur in the majority and separate concurring opinions.
Regalado, J., I concur in both the majority and separate opinions.
Davide, Jr., J., Please see separate concurring opinion.
Bellosillo, J., I concur with J. Francisco and with J. Davide in the latters separate concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., I concur with Justice Francisco and so with Justice Davide as well.
Mendoza, J., I join in the majority opinion of Justice Francisco and in the separate opinion of Justice Davide.
____________________________
Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 5; See: Evardone v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464.
57
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 4, 1996
57
Paras vs. Commission on Elections
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
9

DAVIDE, JR., J.:


I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.

45

However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a regular local election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
The term regular local election must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials.
The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors
of provinces, Mayors and ViceMayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and
members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective
officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified
by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of
58
58
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paras vs. Commission on Elections
suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a
registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Sections 113-118).
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are
not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether
national or local).
Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization, and although fully recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with
certain powers and functions, its elective officials have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors (243
SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman is an ex-officiomember of the sangguniang barangayan elective bodythat fact does not
make him an elective barangay official, since the law specifically provides who comprise the elective officials of the sangguniang barangay, viz., the punong
barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang barangaymembers elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the
Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of the barangay. This shows further that the SK election is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under
Section 74 of the Local Government Code.
Petition dismissed.
Note.Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The peoples prerogative to remove a public officer is
an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all government operations. It is frequently described as a
fundamental right of the people in
59
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 13, 1996
59
Constantino vs. Court of Appeals

46

a representative democracy. (Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, 227 SCRA 100 [1993])
o0o
Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

47

[No. 8848. November 21, 1913.]


THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.WILLIAM C. HART, C. J. MILLER, and SERVILIANO NATIVIDAD, defendants and appellants.

48

1. 1.VAGRANCY; LOITERING ABOUT SALOONS, DRAM SHOPS, OR GAMBLING HOUSES; VISIBLE MEANS OF SUPPORT.A person is not guilty of
vagrancy under the second paragraph of section 1 of the Vagrancy Act for frequenting saloons, dram shops, or gambling houses, unless it be shown that
he is without visible means of support.
1. 2.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PUNCTUATION EMPLOYED.If the punctuation of a statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent
accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of a statute as thus punctuated. But
an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give to the
Act the effect intended by the Legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Llorente, J.
150
150
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Hart.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court
Pedro Abad Santos, for appellants Hart and Natividad.
W. H. Booram, for appellant Miller.
Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were arraigned in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy under the provisions of Act No. 519,
found guilty, and were each sentenced to six months' imprisonment, Hart and Miller were further sentenced to a fine of P200, and Natividad to a fine of P100. All
appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution as to the defendant Hart shows that he pleaded guilty and was convicted on a gambling charge about two or three weeks
before his arrest on the vagrancy charge; that he had been conducting two gambling games, one in his saloon and the other in another house, for a considerable
length of time, the games running every night. The defense showed that Hart and one Dunn operated a hotel and saloon at Angeles which did a business,
according to the bookkeeper, of P96,000 during the nineteen months preceding the trial; that Hart was also the sole proprietor of a saloon in the barrio of Tacondo;
that he raised imported hogs which he sold to the Army garrison at Camp Stotsenberg, which business netted him during the preceding year about P4,000; that he
was authorized to sell several hundred hectares of land owned by one Carrillo in Tacondo; that he administered, under power of attorney, the same property; and
that he furnished a building for and paid the teacher of the first public school in Tacondo, said school being under Government supervision.
The evidence of the prosecution as to Miller was that he had the reputation of being a gambler; that he pleaded guilty and was fined for participating in a
gambling game about two weeks before his arrest on the present charge of vagrancy; and that he was seen in houses of prostitution and in a public dance hall in
Tacondo on various occasions. The defense showed without contradiction that Miller had
151
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 21, 1913.
151
United States vs. Hart.

49

been discharged from the Army about a year previously; that during his term of enlistment he had been made a sergeant; that he received rating as "excellent" on
being discharged; 'that since his discharge he had been engaged in the tailoring business near Camp Stotsenberg under articles of partnership with one Burckerd,
Miller having contributed P1,000 to the partnership; that the business netted each partner about P300 per month; that Miller attended to business in an efficient
manner every day; and that his work was first class.
The evidence of the prosecution as to Natividad was that he had gambled nearly every night for a considerable time prior to his arrest on the charge of
vagrancy, in the saloon of one Raymundo, as well as in Hart's saloon; that Natividad sometimes acted as banker; and that he had pleaded guilty to a charge of
gambling and had been sentenced to pay a fine therefor about two weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge. The defense showed that Natividad was a
tailor, married, and had a house of his own; that he made good clothes, and earned from P80 to P100 per month, which was sufficient to support his family.
From this evidence it will be noted that each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or business, quite sufficient to support himself in comfort,
and that the evidence which the prosecution must rely upon for a conviction consists of their having spent their evenings in regularly licensed saloons, participating
in gambling games which are expressly made unlawful by the Gambling Act, No. 1757, and that Miller frequented a dance hall and houses of prostitution.
Section 1 of Act No. 519 is divided into seven clauses, separated by semicolons. Each clause enumerates a certain class of persons who, within the meaning
of this statute, are to be considered as vagrants. For the purposes of this discussion, we quote this section below, and number each of these seven clauses.
"(1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work, and who
152
152
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Hart.
neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
(2) every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support;
(3) every person known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his own confession or by his having been convicted of either of said offenses, and
having no visible or lawful means of support when found loitering about any gambling house, cockpit, or in any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or
dissolute person or associate of known thieves or ladrones who wanders about the country at unusual hours of the night; (5) every idle person who lodges in any
barn, shed, outhouse, vessel, or place other than such as is kept for lodging purposes, without the permission of the owner or person entitled to the possession
thereof; (6) every lewd or dissolute person who lives in and about houses of ill fame; (7) every common prostitute and common drunkard, is a vagrant."
It is insisted by the Attorney-General that as visible means of support would not be a bar to a conviction under any one of the last four clauses of this act, it was
not the intention of the Legislature to limit the crime of vagrancy to those having no visible means of support. Relying upon the second clause to sustain the guilt of
the defendants, the Attorney-General then proceeds to argue that "visible means of support" as used in that clause does not apply to "every person found loitering
about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses," but is confined entirely to "or tramping or straying through the country." It is insisted that had. it been intended
for "without visible means of support" to qualify the first part of the clause ; either the comma after gambling houses would have been omitted, or else a comma
after country would have been inserted.
When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that
construction of the statute which will give it effect. The construction
153
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 21, 1913.
153
United States vs. Hart.

50

finally adopted should be based upon something more substantial than the mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the punctuation, of the statute gives it a
meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words
of the statute as thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation
when necessary, to give to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where
necessary.
The Attorney-General has based his argument upon the proposition that neither visible means of support nor a lawful calling is a sufficient defense under the
last four paragraphs of the section; hence, not being universally a defense to a charge of vagrancy, they should not be allowed except where the Legislature has so
provided. He then proceeds to show, by a "mere grammatical criticism" of the second paragraph, that the Legislature did not intend to allow visible means of
support or a lawful calling to block a prosecution for vagrancy founded on the charge that the defendant was found loitering around saloons, dram shops, and
gambling houses.
A most important step in this reasoning, necessary to make it sound, is to ascertain the consequences flowing from such a construction of the law. What is
loitering? The dictionaries say it is idling or wasting one 's time. The time spent in saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is seldom anything but that. So that
under the proposed construction, practically all who frequent such places commit a crime in so doing, for which they are liable to punishment under the Vagrancy
Law. We cannot believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to penalize what, in the case of saloons and dram shops, is under the law's protection. If it be
urged that what is true of saloons and dram shops is not true of gambling houses in this
154
154
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Hart.
respect, we encounter the wording of the law, which makes no distinction whatever between loitering around saloons and dram shops, and loitering around
gambling houses.
The offense of vagrancy as defined in Act No. 519 is the Anglo-Saxon method of dealing with the habitually idle and harmful parasites of society. While the
statutes of the various States of the American Union differ greatly as to the classification of such persons, their scope is substantially the same. Of those statutes
we have had an opportunity to examine, but two or three contain a provision similar to the second paragraph of Act No. 519. (Mo. Ann. Stat., see. 2228; N. D. Rev.
Codes, sec. 8952; N. M. Comp. Laws 1897, sec. 1314.) That the absence of visible means of support or a lawful calling is necessary under these statutes to a
conviction for loitering around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is not even negatived by the punctuation employed. In the State of Tennessee, however,
we find an exact "counterpart for paragraph 2 of section 1 of our own Act (Code of Tenn., sec. 3023), with the same punctuation:
"* * * or for any person to be found loitering about saloons or dram shops, gambling houses, or houses of ill fame, or tramping or strolling through the country
without any visible means of support."
A further thought suggests itself in connection with the punctuation of the paragraph in question. The section, as statea above, is divided into seven clauses,
separated by semicolons. To say that two classes of vagrants are defined in paragraph 2, as to one of which visible means of support or a lawful calling is not a
good defense, and as to the other of which such a defense is sufficient, would imply a lack of logical classification on the part of the legislature of the various
classes of vagrants. This we are not inclined to do.
In the case at bar, all three of the defendants were earning a living by legitimate methods in a degree of comfort higher than the average. Their sole offense
was gambling, which the legislature deemed advisable to make the subject
155
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 21, 1913.
155

51

United States vs. Saulog.


of a penal law. The games in which they participated were apparently played openly, in a licensed public saloon, where the officers of the law could have entered
as easily as did the patrons. It is believed that Act No. 1757 is adequate, if enforced, to suppress the gambling proclivities of any person making a good living at a
lawful trade or business.
For these reasons, the defendants are acquitted, with the costs de oficio.
Arellano, C. J., Torres and Carson, JJ., concur.
Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur in the result.
Defendants acquitted.
_______________
Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

52

332

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 79869. September 5, 1991.*


FORTUNATO MERCADO, SR., ROSA MERCADO, FORTUNATO MERCADO, JR., ANTONIO MERCADO, JOSE CABRAL, LUCIA MERCADO, ASUNCION
GUEVARA, ANITA MERCADO, MARINA MERCADO, JULIANA CABRAL, GUADALUPE PAGUIO, BRIGIDA ALCANTARA, EMERLITA MERCADO, ROMEO
GUEVARA, ROMEO MERCADO and LEON SANTILLAN, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), THIRD DIVISION; LABOR
ARBITER LUCIANO AQUINO, RAB-III; AURORA L. CRUZ; SPOUSES FRANCISCO DE BORJA and LETICIA DE BORJA; and STO. NIO REALTY,
INCORPORATED, respondents.
Labor Law; Evidence; Administrative decision in matters within the executives jurisdiction can only be set aside upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud
or error of law.The invariable rule set by the Court in reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive Branch of the Government is that the findings of fact

53

made therein are respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; that it is not for the reviewing court
to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the
sufficiency of the evidence; that the administrative decision in matters within the executives jurisdiction can only be set aside upon proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law.
Same; Same; Same; Findings of the Labor Arbiter in this case are ably supported by evidence. A careful examination of the foregoing statements reveals
that the findings of the Labor Arbiter in the case are ably supported by evidence. There is, therefore, no circumstance that would warrant a reversal of the
questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission.
Same; Regular employee, definition of.The first paragraph answers the question of who are regular employees. It states that, regardless of any written or
oral agreement to the contrary, an employee is deemed regular where he is engaged in necessary or desir________________
SECOND DIVISION.
333
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991
*

33
3

Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC


able activities in the usual business or trade of the employer, except for project employees.
Same; Who are deemed casual employees.The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as casual employees, all other employees who do not fall
under the definition of the preceding paragraph. The proviso, in said second paragraph, deems as regular employees those casual employees who have
rendered at least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous or broken.
Same; Project employee, definition of.A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or where the work or service to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season, as in the present case.
Same; Same; Petitioners being project employees or to use the correct term seasonal employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of the
project or the season.Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their employment legally ends
upon completion of the project or the season. The termination of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Servillano S. Santillan for petitioners.
Luis R. Mauricio for private respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the decision ** of the respondent national Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 8 August 1984 which affirmed the
decision of respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino with the slight modification of delet-

54

________________
Penned by Presiding Commissioner of the NLRC, Guillermo C. Medina and concurred in by Commissioners Gabriel M. Gatchalian and Miguel B. Varela.
334
334
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC
**

ing the award of financial assistance to petitioners, and the resolution of the respondent NLRC dated 17 August 1987, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
This petition originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages; non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave
benefits, emergency cost of living allowances and 13th month pay, filed by above-named petitioners against private respondents Aurora L. Cruz, Francisco Borja,
Leticia C. Borja and Sto. Nio Realty Incorporated, with Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, National Labor Relations Commission in San Fernando, Pampanga. 1
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were agricultural workers utilized by private respondents in all the agricultural phases of work on the 7 1/2
hectares of rice land and 10 hectares of sugar land owned by the latter; that Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Leon Santillan worked in the farm of private respondents
since 1949, Fortunato Mercado, Jr. and Antonio Mercado since 1972 and the rest of the petitioners since 1960 up to April 1979, when they were all allegedly
dismissed from their employment; and that, during the period of their employment, petitioners received the following daily wages:
From 19621963P1.50
19631965P2.00
19651967P3.00
19671970P4.00
19701973P5.00
19731975P5.00
19751978P6.00
19781979P7.00
Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners complaint denied that said petitioners were her regular employees and instead averred that she
engaged their services, through Spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, their mandarols, that is, persons who take charge in supplying the number
of workers needed by owners of various farms, but only to do a particular phase of agricultural work necessary
________________
Rollo, p. 23.
335
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991
Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC
1

335

in rice production and/or sugar cane production, after which they would be free to render services to other farm owners who need their services. 2
The other private respondents denied having any relationship whatsoever with the petitioners and state that they were merely registered owners of the land in
question included as corespondents in this case.3

55

The dispute in this case revolves around the issue of whether or not petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers and therefore entitled to the benefits
which they pray for. And corollary to this, whether or not said petitioners were illegally dismissed by private respondents.
Respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino ruled in favor of private respondents and held that petitioners were not regular and permanent workers of the
private respondents, for the nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that they were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite
period of time after which their services would be available to any other farm owner. 4 Respondent Labor Arbiter deemed petitioners contention of working twelve
(12) hours a day the whole year round in the farm, an exaggeration, for the reason that the planting of rice and sugar cane does not entail a whole year as reported
in the findings of the Chief of the NLRC Special Task Force. 5 Even the sworn statement of one of the petitioners, Fortunato Mercado, Jr., the son of spouses
Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, indubitably show that said petitioners were hired only as casuals, on an on and off basis, thus, it was within the
prerogative of private respondent Aurora Cruz either to take in the petitioners to do further work or not after any single phase of agricultural work had been
completed by them.6
Respondent Labor Arbiter was also of the opinion that the real cause which triggered the filing of the complaint by the petitioners who are related to one
another, either by consanguin________________
Rollo, pp. 2324.
Rollo, p. 24.
4
Rollo, pp. 2425.
5
Rollo, p. 25.
6
Ibid.
336
336
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC
2
3

ity or affinity, was the filing of a criminal complaint for theft against Reynaldo Mercado, son of spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, for they even
asked the help of Jesus David, Zone Chairman of the locality to talk to private respondent, Aurora Cruz regarding said criminal case. 7 In his affidavit, Jesus David
stated under oath that petitioners were never regularly employed by private respondent Aurora Cruz but were, on-and-off hired to work and render services when
needed, thus adding further support to the conclusion that petitioners were not regular and permanent employees of private respondent Aurora Cruz. 8
Respondent Labor Arbiter further held that only money claims from years 19761977, 19771978 and 19781979 may be properly considered since all the
other money claims have prescribed for having accrued beyond the three (3) year period prescribed by law. 9 On grounds of equity, however, respondent Labor
Arbiter awarded petitioners financial assistance by private respondent Aurora Cruz, in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be equitably divided
among all the petitioners except petitioner Fortunato Mercado, Jr. who had manifested his disinterest in the further prosecution of his complaint against private
respondent.10
Both parties filed their appeal with the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC). Petitioners questioned respondent Labor Arbiters finding that they were
not regular and permanent employees of private respondent Aurora Cruz while private respondents questioned the award of financial assistance granted by
respondent Labor Arbiter.
The NLRC ruled in favor of private respondents affirming the decision of the respondent Labor Arbiter, with the modification of the deletion of the award for
financial assistance to petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision of the NLRC reads:

56

WHEREFORE, the Decision of Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino dated March 3, 1983 is hereby modified in that the award of P10,000.00
________________
7

Ibid.
Rollo, pp. 2526.
9
Rollo, p. 26 and Article 291, Labor Code of the Philippines.
10
Rollo, p. 26.
337
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991
Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC
8

337

financial assistance should be deleted. The said Decision is affirmed in all other aspects.
SO ORDERED."11
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Third Division of the NLRC dated 8 August 1984; however, the NLRC denied this motion in a
resolution dated 17 August 1987.12
In the present Petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the above-mentioned rulings. Petitioners contend that respondent Labor Arbiter and
respondent NLRC erred when both ruled that petitioners are not regular and permanent employees of private respondents based on the terms and conditions of
their hiring, for said findings are contrary to the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code. 13 They submit that petitioners employment, even assuming said
employment were seasonal, continued for so many years such that, by express provision of Article 280 of the Labor Code as amended, petitioners have become
regular and permanent employees.14
Moreover, they argue that Policy Instruction No. 1215 of the Department of Labor and Employment clearly lends support to this contention, when it states:
PD 830 has defined the concept of regular and casual employment. What determines regularity or casualness is not the employment contract, written or
otherwise, but the nature of the job. If the job is usually necessary or desirable to the main business of the employer, then employment is regular. If not, then the
employment is casual. Employment for a definite period which exceeds one (1) year shall be considered regular for the duration of the definite period.
This concept of regular and casual employment is designed to put an end to casual employment in regular jobs which has been abused by many employers to
prevent so-called casuals from enjoying the bene
________________
Rollo, pp. 2730.
Rollo, pp. 3133.
13
Rollo, p. 13.
14
Rollo, pp. 1314.
15
The Labor Code of the Philippines and its Implementing Rules and Regulations compiled, edited and published by Vicente B. Foz, p. 364 cited in Rollo, p. 14.
338
338
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC
11
12

fits of regular employees or to prevent casuals from joining unions.

57

This new concept should be strictly enforced to give meaning to the constitutional guarantee of employment tenure." 16
Tested under the laws invoked, petitioners submit that it would be unjust, if not unlawful, to consider them as casual workers since they have been doing all phases
of agricultural work for so many years, activities which are undeniably necessary, desirable and indispensable in the rice and sugar cane production business of
the private respondents.17
In the Comment filed by private respondents, they submit that the decision of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by respondent NLRC, that petitioners were only
hired as casuals, is based on solid evidence presented by the parties and also by the Chief of the Special Task Force of the NLRC Regional Office and, therefore,
in accordance with the rule 011 findings of fact of administrative agencies, the decision should be given great weight. 18 Furthermore, they contend that the
arguments used by petitioners in questioning the decision of the Labor Arbiter were based on matters which were not offered as evidence in the case heard before
the regional office of the then Ministry of Labor but rather in the case before the Social Security Commission, also between the same parties. 19
Public respondent NLRC filed a separate comment prepared by the Solicitor General. It submits that it has long been settled that findings of fact of
administrative agencies if supported by substantial evidence are entitled to great weight. 20 Moreover, It argues that petitioners cannot be deemed to be permanent
and regular employees since they fall under the exception stated in Article 280 of the Labor Code, which reads:
________________
Policy Instruction No. 12, The Labor Code of the Philippines and Its Implementing Rules and Regulations compiled, edited and published by Vicente B. Foz,
1991 Edition, p. 364.
17
Rollo, p. 15.
18
Rollo, pp. 151152.
19
Rollo, pp. 152153.
20
Rollo, p. 169.
339
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991
339
Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC
16

The provisions of written agreements to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season."21(italics supplied)
The Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda after which the case was deemed submitted
for decision.
The petition is not impressed with merit,
The invariable .rule set by the Court in reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive Branch of the Government is that the findings of fact made therein
are respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; 22 that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the
conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of
the evidence;23that the administrative decision in matters within the executives jurisdiction can only be set aside upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or
error of law.24

58

The questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter reads:


Focusing the spotlight of judicious scrutiny on the evidence on record and the arguments of both parties, it is our well-discerned opinion that the petitioners are not
regular and permanent workers of
________________
Article 280 of the Labor Code of the Philippines cited in Rollo, pp. 169170.
Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 as cited in Feliciano Timbancaya vs. Vicente, G.R. No. L-19100, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 852.
23
Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 as cited in Feliciano Timbancaya vs. Vicente, G.R. No. L-19100, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 852.
24
Lovina vs. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557.
340
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC
21
22

the respondents. The very nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that the petitioners were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a
definite period, after which their services are available to any farm owner. We cannot share the arguments of the petitioners that they worked continuously the
whole year round for twelve hours a day. This, we feel, is an exaggeration which does not deserve any serious consideration inasmuch as the planting of rice and
sugar cane does not entail a whole year operation, the area in question being comparatively small. It is noteworthy that the findings of the Chief of the Special Task
Force of the Regional Office are similar to this.
In fact, the sworn statement of one of the petitioners Fortunato Mercado, Jr., the son of spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, indubitably shows
that said petitioners were only hired as casuals, on-and-off basis. With this kind of relationship between the petitioners and the respondent Aurora Cruz, we feel
that there is no basis in law upon which the claims of the petitioners should be sustained, more specially their complaint for illegal dismissal. It is within the
prerogative of respondent Aurora Cruz either to take in the petitioners to do further work or not after any single phase of agricultural work has been completed by
them. We are of the opinion that the real cause which triggered the filing of this complaint by the petitioners who are related to one another, either by consanguinity
or affinity, was due to the filing of a criminal complaint by the respondent Aurora Cruz against Reynaldo Mercado, son of spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa
Mercado. In April 1979, according to Jesus David, Zone Chairman of the locality where the petitioners and respondent reside, petitioner Fortunato Mercado, Sr.
asked for help regarding the case of his son, Reynaldo, to talk with respondent Aurora Cruz and the said Zone Chairman also stated under oath that the petitioners
were never regularly employed by respondent Aurora Cruz but were on-and-off hired to work to render services when needed." 25
A careful examination of the foregoing statements reveals that the findings of the Labor Arbiter in the case are ably supported by evidence. There is, therefore, no
circumstance that would warrant a reversal of the questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission.
The contention of petitioners that the second paragraph of
________________
Rollo, pp. 2426.
341
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991
Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC
25

341

Article 280 of the Labor Code should have been applied in their case presents an opportunity to clarify the afore-mentioned provision of law.

59

Article 280 of the Labor Code reads in full:


Article 280. Regular and Casual Employment.The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the
parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where e the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one
year of service whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such actually exists.
The first paragraph answers the question of who are regular employees. It states that, regardless of any written or oral agreement to the contrary, an employee is
deemed regular where he is engaged in necessary or desirable activities in the usual business or trade of the employer, except for project employees.
A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season,26 as in the present case.
The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as casual employees, all other employees who do not fall under the definition of the preceding paragraph; The
proviso, in said second para________________
Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 85323, 20 June 1989, 174 SCRA 191.
342
342
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC
26

graph, deems as regular employees those casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be
continuous or broken.
Petitioners, in effect, contend that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 is applicable to their case and that the Labor Arbiter should have considered
them regular by virtue of said proviso. The contention is without merit.
The general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that
it immediately follows.27 Thus, it has been held that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is
attached, and not to the statute itself or to other sections thereof. 28 The only exception to this rule is where the clear legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only
the phrase immediately preceding it (the proviso) but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole. 29
Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of Labor and Employment discloses that the concept of regular and casual employees was designed to put an end
to casual employment in regular jobs, which has been abused by many employers to prevent so-called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular employees or
to prevent casuals from joining unions. The same instructions show that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 was not designed to stifle small-scale
businesses nor to oppress agricultural land owners to further the interests of laborers, whether agricultural or industrial. What it seeks to eliminate are abuses of
employers against their employees and not, as petitioners would have us believe, to prevent small-scale businesses from engaging in legitimate methods to realize

60

profit. Hence, the proviso is applicable only to the employees who are deemed casuals' but not to the project employees nor the regular employees treated in
paragraph one of Art. 280.
________________
Statutory Construction by Ruben Agpalo, 1986 ed., p. 173.
Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil. 469 (1951); Arenas v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. 24024, April 5, 1978, 82 SCRA
318 (1978).
29
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055 (1960).
343
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991
343
Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals
27
28

Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of the
project or the season. The termination of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal. 30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission affirming that of the Labor Arbiter, under review, is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., On leave.
Petition dismissed. Decision affirmed.
o0o
Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

61

62

G.R. No. 171427.March 30, 2011.*


STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) and JOAQUIN G. MENDOZA, in his capacity as
General Manager of LLDA, respondents.
Administrative Agencies; Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 4850 to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region.The LLDA was created by R.A. No. 4850 to carry out the development of
the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration, and pollution.
Same; Same; The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was granted the power to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and
projects proposed by the local government offices/agencies within their regions, by public corporations, and by private persons or enterprises.The LLDA was
granted the power to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by the local government offices/agencies within their
regions, by public corporations, and by private persons or enterprises, where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the Authority for the
development of the region, as well as to
_______________

76

* SECOND DIVISION.
676
6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA)

issue the necessary clearance for the approved plans, programs and/or projects.
Same; Same; In Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) Resolution No. 41, Series of 1997, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) specified
the development activities, projects, and installations required to secure a clearance from the LLDA before these can be constructed, operated, maintained,
expanded, modified, or implemented by any government office/agency or government corporation or private person or enterprise.In LLDA Resolution No. 41,

63

Series of 1997, the LLDA specified the development activities, projects, and installations required to secure a clearance from the LLDA before these can be
constructed, operated, maintained, expanded, modified, or implemented by any government office/agency or government corporation or private person or
enterprise. Section 2 of the LLDA Resolution then set out the activities exempted from complying with the clearance requirement.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is a doctrine of long-standing that factual findings of administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise
should be accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if they are not overwhelming or preponderant .It is a
doctrine of long-standing that factual findings of administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but
even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if they are not overwhelming or preponderant. Courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge
of such agency.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Joseph Cohon for petitioner.
Eduardo L. Torres and Marilou R. Remullar for respondents LLDA, et al.
Mario C.V. Jalandoni for respondents-intervenors.
677
VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011
677
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
NACHURA,J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Sterling Selections Corporation (petitioner) is assailing the
Decision1 dated May 30, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated January 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79889.
Petitioner is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewelry. Its products are manufactured in the home of its principal stockholders, Asuncion
Maria and Juan Luis Faustmann (Faustmanns), located in Barangay (Brgy.) Mariana, New Manila, Quezon City. 3
Sometime in 1992, one of petitioners neighbors in Brgy. Mariana filed a complaint with the Office of the Chairman of Brgy. Mariana against petitioner for
creating loud unceasing noise and emitting toxic fumes, coming from the manufacturing plant of the latters predecessor, Unson, Faustmann and Company,
Inc.4 During conciliation proceedings, petitioners management undertook to relocate its operations within a month. The parties signed an Agreement to that
effect.5 However, petitioner failed to abide by the undertaking and continued to manufacture its products in its Brgy. Mariana workshop.
On January 16, 1998, Alicia P. Maceda (Maceda), another neighbor of petitioner, wrote a letter to the Brgy. Chairman to complain about the loud noise and
offensive toxic fumes coming from petitioners manufacturing plant. 6She also filed a formal complaint with the Department of Environment and
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; Rollo, pp. 40-51.
2 Id., at pp. 55-56.
3 Id., at p. 12.
4 Id., at p. 357.
5 Id.

64

6 Id., at pp. 41-42.


678
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
Natural Resources (DENR)-National Capital Region office. The complaint was endorsed by the DENR to one of the agencies under it, respondent Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA), which had territorial and functional jurisdiction over the matter. 7
Subsequently, the Monitoring and Enforcement Section-Pollution Control Division of LLDA conducted an inspection of petitioners premises. According to the
LLDA, it was observed that the wastewater generated by petitioners operations was drained directly to the sewer canal. However, since the wastewater was not yet
for disposal, no sample could be collected during the inspection.
On November 19, 1998, a Notice of Violation and a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) were served on petitioner after it was found that it was operating without an
LLDA Clearance and Permit, as required by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850. 8
Meanwhile, Macedas complaint was endorsed by the LLDA to the Office of the Mayor of Quezon City. After hearing and investigation, the Office of the Mayor
issued a Closure Order against petitioner after finding that it was operating without the requisite business permit, since it was running a jewelry manufacturing plant
with an Office Only permit, and for violation of Zoning and Environmental Laws. 9
Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167, Pasig City. Contending that, as a cottage industry, its jewelry
business is exempt from the requirement to secure a permit from the LLDA, petitioner asked the court to order the latter to issue a certificate of exemption in its
favor. The RTC denied the petition, ruling that mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Nonetheless, the RTC allowed peti_______________
7 Id., at p. 42.
8 Id., at p. 393.
9 Id., at p. 42.
679
VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011
679
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
tioner to file an amended petition for certiorari and mandamus.10
In its amended petition, petitioner averred that its business was classified as a cottage industry. It argued that under R.A. No. 6977, the law prevailing at the
time of its registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in December 1996, cottage industry was defined as one with assets worth P50,001.00
to P500,000.00.11 Since, based on its Articles of Incorporation and Certified Public Accountant (CPA)s Balance Sheet, its total assets when it was incorporated
amounted only to P312,500.00, it qualified as a cottage industry.
Intervenors Maceda, Ma. Corazon G. Logarta (Logarta), and Rosario Charito Planas (Planas) filed a motion for intervention. Their Answer-in-Intervention was
subsequently admitted by the RTC.
On April 1, 2002, the RTC promulgated a decision12denying the petition. In rejecting petitioners claim that it was a cottage industry, the RTC said:

65

While it is true that plaintiff [petitioner]s economic activity is carried on in a home, which incidentally gained the ire of the neighbors that culminated in a
complaint against the plaintiff, it was manned not with the members of the family but by at least two hundred employees who were strangers and not known to the
community. Moreso, being an accredited exporter recognized by the Bureau of Export Trade Promotion, Department of Trade and Industry, seemed a deviation
from the connotation of small scale.
Worthy to note is the observation of respondent-intervenors that to be considered a cottage industry, plaintiff should have been registered under the [National
Cottage Industries Development Authority (NACIDA)], Section 12 of R.A. [No.] 3470 substantially
_______________
10 Id., at p. 43.
11 R.A. No. 6977, Sec. 3.
12 Penned by Judge Lorifel Lacap-Pahimna; records, Vol. II, pp. 241-248.
680
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
provides; (sic) that the plaintiff corporation who desires to avail of the benefits and assistance of the law should have registered with the board. In the absence of
any indication that affirm the status of the plaintiff corporation as a cottage industry, proof to the contrary may be reasonably accepted, for he who alleged the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof and in this aspect plaintiff miserably failed.
On the contention that LLDA Resolution No. 41, series of 1997, exempt the plaintiff corporation from the requirements imposed by the LLDA, the interpretation
given by [the] government agency itself should be given greater probative value. As a regulatory and quasi-judicial body, the LLDA is mandated to pass upon,
approve or disapprove all plans, programs and project[s] proposed by local government offices/agencies, public corporations and private [corporations]. It is in the
position to construe its own rules and regulation. By implication, plaintiff corporation arrogates unto itself the privilege bestowed upon a cottage industry. However,
there is nothing in the Resolution that includes jewelry making as included in the term cottage industry. 13
Thus, the RTC held that petitioner must subscribe to the rules and regulations of the LLDA governing clearance. 14
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision. The same was denied in an Order dated May 17, 2002. Hence, it filed a Notice of Appeal.
Subsequently, it filed its appeal with the CA.
In a Decision15 dated May 30, 2005, the CA dismissed the appeal. The CA brushed aside the issue of whether petitioner qualified as a cottage industry. It said
that even if petitioner belonged to that category, it still needed to prove that its business was exempted by law from the coverage of LLDA Resolution No. 41, Series
of 1997.
Specifically, the CA cited Section 2(30) of said resolution, to wit:
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 246-247.
14 Id., at p. 247.
15 Supra note 1.
681

66

VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011


681
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
Section2.Exemptions.The following activities, projects, and installations are exempt from the above subject requirements:
xxxx
30.Cottage Industries, including
- stuffed toys manufacturing
- handicrafts, and
- rattan/furniture manufacturing.16
The CA held that, following the principle of ejusdem generis, the enumeration in the foregoing provision must be taken to include businesses of the same kind,
which were, as averred by the LLDA, not as environmentally critical as those enumerated. 17 Thus, the CA declared that the LLDA did not contemplate the inclusion
of the manufacture of jewelry in the exemptions. 18 Additionally, the CA held that the opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or
implement administrative laws command respect and weight. 19 The CA further held that since petitioner was claiming to be within the exemption, it had the duty to
prove that the law intended to include it, or that it is within the contemplation of the law, to be exempted. 20
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Decision, but the CA denied the same in a Resolution dated January 31, 2006. Hence, petitioner filed this
petition for review.
Petitioner argues that the CA committed the following errors:
1.The appellate court erred when it failed or refused to make a definitive pronouncement as to whether petitioner qualifies as a cottage industry. This, even
after the appellate court (on page 7 of the assailed Decision) scored
_______________
16 Rollo, p. 48.
17 Id., at p. 49.
18 Id., at p. 48.
19 Id., at p. 49.
20 Id., at p. 50.
682
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
the trial court for having failed to consider the fact that the predicament of Sterling rests primarily on the determination of its status, i.e., whether petitioner is a
cottage industry or not.
2.The appellate court erred when it deliberately ignored the provisions of various statutes and regulations pertaining to cottage industries, which if the same
had been taken into account and accorded due consideration, would have led the appellate court to correctly conclude that petitioner is indeed a cottage
industry.

67

3.The appellate court erred when it declared, after misapplying the rules of statutory construction, that No. 30 of Sec. 2 of LLDA Resolution No. 41, Series of
1997, does not serve to exempt petitioner from the clearance requirement. 21
Petitioner also argues that Section 2(30) of LLDA Resolution No. 41, Series of 1997, contains no restriction limiting the exemptions to only certain kinds of
cottage industries.22 It contends that the word including connotes a sense of containing or comprising, and not a sense of exclusivity or exclusion. The
provision, petitioner points out, is devoid of any restrictive or limiting words; thus, the LLDA should avoid limiting the kinds or classes of cottage industries exempted
from the clearance requirement.23
Next, petitioner avers that the CA erred when it refused to rule on whether it qualified as a cottage industry. It claims that the CA deliberately ignored the
provisions in various statutes and regulations pertaining to cottage industries, which would have led to the conclusion that petitioner was such, and thus would fall
within the exemption.24 Petitioner argues that its total assets were worth only P312,500.00 during its incorporation, which, under R.A. No. 6977, would qual_______________
21 Id., at pp. 18-19.
22 Id., at pp. 19-20.
23 Id., at p. 22.
24 Id., at p. 24.
683
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683
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
ify it as a cottage industry. Further, petitioner argues that, even with the enactment of R.A. No. 8502, the Jewelry Industry Development Act of 1998, jewelry-making
remains a cottage industry.25
Finally, petitioner puts in question the factual basis for the issuance of the CDO by the LLDA.
By way of comment, intervenors Maceda, Logarta, and Planas allege that petitioner has been operating illegally, violating ordinances and laws, operating
without the required permits and clearances, and continuing its operations despite LLDAs issuance of a CDO. 26 They further allege that petitioners business is
located in an area classified as R-1 or low density residential zone under Quezon City Ordinance SP-918, Series of 2000, and preceding zoning ordinances.
Despite having only an Office Only permit, petitioner deliberately uses the premises to manufacture jewelry. 27
Intervenors also refute petitioners claim that it is exempted from obtaining the required LLDA clearance because it is a cottage industry. First, intervenors allege
that petitioner is not registered with the National Cottage Industries Development Authority (NACIDA). Next, intervenors point out that, as admitted by petitioner
itself, it employs at least 229 employees who are strangers to the family, and its operations yield annual sales of at least P25 million. 28
Intervenors also aver that, in R.A. No. 8502, there is no provision categorizing jewelry-making as a cottage industry. Going by the classification of jewelrymaking companies in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 8502 29
_______________
25 Id., at p. 30.
26 Id., at p. 145.
27 Id., at p. 146.

68

28 Id., at p. 152.
29 Rule II Definition of Terms
Section1.x x x.
684
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
and petitioners financial statements filed with the SEC, which state that petitioner had assets amounting to P2,454,459.01 in 1999 and P4,628,900.80 in 1998, 30 it
cannot be characterized as a micro jewelry enterprise.
Next, intervenors insist that the LLDA has jurisdiction over petitioner. They argue that LLDA Resolution No. 41, Series of 1997, does not in any manner waive
the LLDA jurisdiction even over those exempted in the list of activities, projects, and installations. Jurisdiction is provided for by law and cannot be diminished by an
act of the agency concerned. In fact, there is no provision of waiver of jurisdiction contained in the said regulation. Exemption from securing prior clearance before
implementing an activity does not carry with it a waiver of jurisdiction. 31
Intevernors also point out that cottage industry, as contemplated under LLDA Resolution No. 41, Series of 1997, includes only the activities enumerated therein,
namely, stuffed toys manufacturing, handicrafts, and rattan/furniture manufacturing. Further, intervenors aver that, under existing laws, the term cottage industry no
longer exists and has been deleted. Jewelry-making is now classified as an independent and separate industry under R.A. No. 8502, apart from the general
term cottage industry. Therefore, petitioners activity cannot be included as among those exempted from obtaining a
_______________
(z) Micro, Small, Medium and Large Scale Jewelry Enterprise means an enterprise as defined under letter (e), whether single proprietorship, cooperative,
partnership or corporation whose total assets, inclusive of those arising from loans but exclusive of the land on which the particular business entitys office, plant
and equipment are situate, must have value falling under the following categories
a)micro jewelry enterprise
less than P1,500,001
b)small scale jewelry enterprise P1,500,001 P15,000,000
c)medium jewelry enterprise
P15,000,001 P60,000,000
d)large scale jewelry enterprise more than P60,000,00.
30 Rollo, p. 153.
31 Id., at p. 155.
685
VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011
685
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
clearance from the LLDA because jewelry-making is not at all mentioned as an exception to the general rule, intervenors claim. 32
On the other hand, the LLDA and its former General Manager Joaquin G. Mendoza (respondents) also filed their Comment. Respondents narrated that in 1998,
petitioner was found to be operating its business without clearance and permit from the LLDA. Accordingly, a Notice of Violation was issued against petitioner.
Subsequently, the LLDA conducted a public hearing, which was attended by petitioner, its company physician, and legal counsels. During the hearing, petitioner

69

committed to relocate its facilities. Meanwhile, the same would remain padlocked to erase all doubts of its continued operation despite the Closure Order from the
Quezon City Mayors Office.33 After the public hearing, the LLDA issued the assailed CDO against petitioner. Thereafter, proceedings before the RTC, then the CA,
ensued, resulting in the now-assailed decision and resolution.
In their Comment, respondents posit that petitioner is not a cottage industry within the contemplation of the law. They argue that to qualify as such, the
conditions in the laws must be complied with. Thus, while metalcraft activities are considered as cottage industry, asset requirements and NACIDA registration
requirements must also be complied with.34
Respondents contend that petitioner cannot be considered a cottage industry considering that it has assets way above the threshold fixed in the law.
Respondents aver that what petitioner claims as its assets amounting to P312,500.00 refer only to the minimum paid-up capital stock required by law for purposes
of incorporation and registration with the SEC. Respondents argue that petitioner would have other properties contributed and owned for purposes of starting the
enter_______________
32 Id., at p. 156.
33 Id., at p. 181.
34 Id., at p. 190.
686
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
prise, such as furniture, fixtures, machinery, and equipment. Likewise, respondents point out that petitioner actually has a capitalization of P5 million, of which
P1.25 million had been subscribed. The amount subscribed minus the paid-up capital is a subscription receivable from the incorporators and is an asset. 35
Next, respondents argue that the CA did not err in ruling that petitioner is not exempted from securing a clearance from the LLDA. The respondents posit that,
under LLDA Resolution No. 41, Series of 1997, the cottage industries exempted are those of the same nature and category as those enumerated therein, following
the principle of ejusdem generis.36 The activities enumerated, respondents claim, are those whose operations are basically dry and whose environmental impact is
not so significant.37Likewise, respondents argue that, following the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of the three activities
excluded all other cottage industries. If the LLDA had intended to exempt all types of cottage industries, it would not have made an enumeration of those exempt
activities, respondents posit.38
In its Reply, petitioner claims that intervenors are illegally suppressing petitioners legitimate business because it is competing with the jewelry business of
intervenor Logartas cousin.39 Petitioner claims that Logartas cousin also operates his business within the same area as its facilities. It further claims that there is a
total of 34 other businesses, including a manufacturer of garments, a wholesaler of cement, and a manufacturer of leather bags, operating in the same supposedlyresidential zone where its office is located.40 Petitioner
_______________
35 Id., at pp. 193-194.
36 Id., at p. 198.
37 Id., at p. 197.

70

38 Id.
39 Id., at p. 209.
40 Id., at p. 212.
687
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Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
also accuses intervenors Maceda and Planas of going to court with unclean hands, considering that they also run businesses in the same area. 41
Petitioner also denies that Mrs. Faustmann, then operating Unson, Faustmann and Company, Inc., reneged on a promise, made in 1992, to relocate the
companys operations. Petitioner claims that Mrs. Faustmann was pressured into signing the Agreement before the Lupon, through threats and intimidation. As to
the later complaint, petitioner claims that intervenors succeeded in pressing residents to sign the complaint, but those who signed were in fact from other streets,
further away from its office.42
Petitioner also claims that there was no public hearing conducted before the Quezon City Mayors Office issued and enforced the CDO.
Petitioner likewise insists that its business qualifies as a cottage industry.43 It maintains that pertinent laws have identified jewelry-making as a cottage industry.
The Cottage Industry Technology Center (CITC) designates jewelry-making as one of the industries it actively assists. Petitioner also maintains that its paid-up
capital qualifies its business as a cottage industry.44
The petition is unmeritorious; hence, the same is denied.
The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner is exempted from complying with the requirement to obtain a clearance from the LLDA to operate its
business.
Petitioner insists that it is exempted from complying with the clearance requirements because it is a cottage industry. In order to resolve this issue, a review of
the laws pertinent to cottage industries is in order.
_______________
41 Id., at pp. 212-213.
42 Id., at p. 217.
43 Id., at p. 233.
44 Id., at p. 237.
688
688
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
Section 11 of R.A. No. 3470, approved on June 16, 1962, defined cottage industry as an economic activity in a small scale which is carried on mainly in the
homes or in other places for profit and which is mainly done with the help of the members of the family. Among the activities considered as a cottage industry is
metalcraft such as making of jewelries, knives, boloes (sic), scissors, razors, silverwares and brassworks (sic).45
The same law required persons, corporations, partnerships, or associations that wished to avail of the benefits of the law to register with the NACIDA. 46
In 1968, R.A. No. 5326 amended certain sections of R.A. No. 3470. In particular, Section 11 was amended to read:

71

SEC.11.Definition.The term cottage industry as used in this Act shall mean an economic activity in a small scale carried on mainly in the homes or in
other places for profit and mainly done with the help of the members of the family with capitalization not exceeding fifteen thousand pesos. The term shall also
include economic activities carried on by students of public and private schools, within school premises, as a cooperative effort, under supervision of a teacher or
other person approved by and acting under the supervision and control of school authorities, either as part of or in addition to ordinary vocational training, provided
all profits shall accrue to the students working therein. it shall include the following: x x x (5) metal craft such as making of jewelries, knives, boloes ( sic), scissors,
razors, silverwares and brassworks (sic); x x x All cottage industries shall be owned and operated by Filipino citizens, or by a corporation, partnership or
cooperative, at least seventy-five per cent of the capital or investment of which is owned by Filipino citizens. All members of its Board of Directors shall be Filipino
citizens.
The word capitalization as used in this section shall mean the total current assets and fixed assets, excluding the value of the land and building leased, rented
and/or used at least six months of each year. For purpose of this Act, any and all branches, agencies, outlets
_______________
45 R.A. No. 3470, Sec. 11(5).
46 Sec. 12.
698
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
or divisions of a licensed cottage industry shall be collated to determine the capitalization thereof.
R.A. No. 3470 was further amended on October 22, 1975, by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 817. The first sentence of Section 11 was amended, to read:
The term cottage industry as used in this Act shall mean an economic activity carried on in the homes or in other places for profit, with a capitalization of not
exceeding P100,000 at the time of registration.
In 1981, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. No. 1788, the Cottage Industries Development Decree of 1981, amending and consolidating R.A. Nos.
3470 and 5326, P.D. No. 817, and other related Laws, Decrees, Executive Orders, Letters of Instructions, and Acts concerning the NACIDA. Section 10 of P.D. No.
1788 states:
Section10.Cottage Industry.The term cottage industry shall mean a modest economic activity for profit using primarily indigenous raw materials in the
production of various articles of the country. Provided, however, that all cottage industries shall be owned and operated by Filipino citizens, or by corporations,
partnerships, or cooperatives at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the capital investment of which shall be owned by Filipino citizens. Provided, further, that the
total assets of which shall not exceed one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) at the time of registration with the NACIDA. Provided, finally, that the maximum
total assets allowable for cottage industries for purposes of registration may be modified and/or increased accordingly by the NACIDA Board subject to the approval
of the President of the Republic of the Philippines.
For facility of implementation, coordination and statistical gathering, cottage industries shall be classified as follows:
xxxx
a)Metalcraft Industry That sector using metals or its alloys as principal raw material component in producing articles such as brasswares, cutlery items,
fabricated tools, implements and equipment and other items requir690

72

690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
ing a certain degree of craftsmanship in the making thereof including the making of jewelry items involving the use metals and/or its alloys in combination with
semiprecious or artificial stones.
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 917, issued on October 15, 1983, amended the definition of cottage industry by increasing the capitalization requirement to a
maximum of P250,000.00, which amount may be modified or increased accordingly, subject to the approval of the President. 47
In 1986, the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) redefined cottage, small and medium scale industries. Considered as cottage industries were
enterprises, excluding agriculture, with total assets after financing of over P500,000.00 but less than P5 million. 48
When Corazon Aquino became President, she issued E.O. No. 133, reorganizing the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Section 18 thereof provided that
the NACIDA was reorganized into the CITC, and its functions, other than technology development and training, were transferred to the Bureau of Small and
Medium Business Development and relevant line operating units of the DTI.
In 1990, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6977, the Magna Carta for Small Enterprises. The capitalization for a cottage enterprise was changed, viz.:
SEC.3.Small and Medium Enterprises as Beneficiaries.Small and medium enterprise shall be defined as any business activity or enterprise engaged in
industry, agribusiness and/or services, whether single proprietorship, cooperative, partnership or corporation whose total assets, inclusive of those arising from
loans but exclusive of the land on which the particular business entitys office, plant, and equipment are situated, must have value falling under the following
categories:
_______________
47 Executive Order No. 917, Sec. 1.
48 NEDA Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986.
691
VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011
691
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
micro:less than P50,000
cottage:P50,001 P500,000
small:P500,001 P5,000,000
medium:P5,000,001 P20,000,000
In a generic sense, all enterprises with total assets of Five million pesos (P5,000,000) and below shall be called small enterprises.
R.A. No. 6977 was amended by R.A. No. 8289 in 1998. Amending Section 1 of R.A. No. 6977, the term cottage industry or cottage enterprise was completely
eliminated:
SEC.3.Small and Medium Enterprise as Beneficiaries.Small and Medium Enterprise shall be defined as any business activity or enterprise engaged
in industry, agribusiness and/or services, whether single proprietorship, cooperative, partnership or corporation whose total assets, inclusive of those arising from
loans but exclusive of the land on which the particular business entitys office, plant, and equipment are situated, must have value falling under the following
categories:

73

micro:less than P1,500,001


small:P1,500,001 P15,000,000
medium:P15,000,001 P60,000,00
The above definitions shall be subject to review and adjustment by the said Council motu proprio or upon recommendation of sectoral organization(s) taking
into account inflation and other economic indicators. The Council may use as variables the number of employees, equity capital and asset size.
Finally, in 1998, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8502, the Jewelry Industry Development Act of 1998, a law to support, promote, and encourage the growth and
development of the predominantly small and medium scale jewelry industries. R.A. No. 8502 did not use the term cottage industry; instead, it characterized
businesses engaged in jewelry-making as:
a)micro jewelry enterprise
less than P1,500,001
b)small scale jewelry enterprise P1,500,001 P15,000,000
c)medium jewelry enterprise P15,000,001 P60,000,000692
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
d)large scale jewelry enterprise more than P60,000,000.49
On the other hand, the LLDA was created by R.A. No. 4850 to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate provisions
for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration, and pollution.50
The LLDA was granted the power to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by the local government offices/agencies
within their regions, by public corporations, and by private persons or enterprises, where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the Authority
for the development of the region, as well as to issue the necessary clearance for the approved plans, programs and/or projects. 51
Thus, in LLDA Resolution No. 41, Series of 1997, the LLDA specified the development activities, projects, and installations required to secure a clearance from
the LLDA before these can be constructed, operated, maintained, expanded, modified, or implemented by any government office/agency or government
corporation or private person or enterprise. 52 Section 2 of the LLDA Resolution then set out the activities exempted from complying with the clearance requirement,
to wit:
Section2.Exemptions.The following activities, projects, [or] installations are exempted from the above subject requirements:
xxxx
30.Cottage industries including
- stuffed toys manufacturing
- handicrafts and
_______________
49 Supra note 29.
50 R.A. No. 4850, Sec. 1.
51 R.A. No. 4850, Sec. 4.
52 5th paragraph.

74

693
VOL. 646, MARCH 30, 2011
693
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
- rattan/furniture manufacturing.
Contrary to the CAs pronouncement and to respondents claim, the provision did not restrict the exemption to the three activities therein mentioned.
The word include means to take in or comprise as a part of a whole.53
Thus, this Court has previously held that it necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. 54 The principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration is by way of
example only.55 The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example. 56 Said legal maxim should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest. 57
In another case, the Court said:
[T]he word involving, when understood in the sense of including, as in including technical or financial assistance, necessarily implies that there are activities
other than those that are being included. In other words, if an agreement includestechnical or financial assistance, there is [] apart from such assistance
something else already in[,] and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement. 58
_______________
53 Websters All-In-One Dictionary and Thesaurus, 2008 ed. (Emphasis supplied.)
54 Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 374 Phil. 413, 440; 316 SCRA 65, 86 (1999).
55 Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Hon. Torres, 503 Phil. 42, 56; 465 SCRA 47, 65 (2005), citing Gomez v. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners,
54 Phil. 726 (1930); id.
56 Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Hon. Torres, supra, at 56; 65.
57 Id.
58 La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 486 Phil. 754, 796; 445 SCRA 1, 104 (2004).
694
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sterling Selections Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA)
As the regulation stands, therefore, all cottage industriesincluding, but not limited to, those enumerated therein are exempted from securing prior clearance from
the LLDA. Hence, the CA erred in ruling that only the three activities enumerated therein are exempted.
Next, the Court must determine if petitioner is in fact a cottage industry entitled to claim the exemption under LLDA Resolution No. 41, Series of 1997.
That jewelry-making is one of the activities considered as a cottage industry is undeniable. The laws bear this out. However, based on these same laws, the
nature of the activity is only one of several factors to be considered in determining whether the same is a cottage industry.
In view of the emphasis in law after law on the capitalization or asset requirements, it is crystal clear that the same is a defining element in determining if an
enterprise is a cottage industry.

75

Petitioner argues that its assets amount to only P312,500.00, representing its paid-up capital at the time of its SEC registration. The law then in force was R.A.
No. 6977, which, to recapitulate, states:

76

77

[No. L-5387. April 29, 1954]


In the matter of the Adoption of the minors MARIA LUALHATI MAGPAYO and AMADA MAGPAYO. CLYDE E. McGEE, petitioner and appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellant.
1. 1.ADOPTION; PURPOSE OF.The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation where non existed before. Where therefore
the relationship of parent and child already exists whether by blood or by affinity as in the case of illegitimates and step-children, it would be unnecessary
and superfluous to establish and superimpose another relationship of parent and child through adoption.
1. 2.ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; NEGATIVE WORDS PREVAIL OVER AFFIRMATIVE WORDS.Under the rule of statutory construction, negative
words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory.
1. 3.ID.; PERSONS WHO CANNOT ADOPT.Pursuant to the provisions of article 335, paragraph 1 of the new Civil Code, a step-father who already has a
child may not adopt a step-child regardless of the provisions of article 338, paragraph 3 of the same Code, the latter provisions being confined and
applicable to those step-fathers and step-mothers who hav6 no children of their own.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Jose, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Quijano, Alidio and Azores for appellee.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Estrella Abad Santos for appellant
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Appellee Clyde E. McGee, an American citizen is married to Leonarda S. Crisostomo by whom he has one child. The minors Maria and Amada, both surnamed
Magpayo are Leonarda's children by her first husband Ernesto Magpayo who was killed by the Japanese during the oc821
VOL. 94, APRIL 29, 1954
821
McGee vs. Republic
cupation McGee filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to adopt his two minor step-children Maria and Amada.
At the hearing, the Government filed its opposition to the petition on the ground that petitioner has a legitimate child and consequently, is disqualified to adopt
under article 335, paragraph 1, of the new Civil Code which provides:
"ART. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction;'
The trial court overruled the opposition and granted the petition, applying the provisions of article 338 of the same Civil Code, particularly paragraph 3 thereof,
which reads:

78

"ART. 338, The following may be adopted.


* * * * * * *
(2) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother."
The Government is appealing from that decision. Only recently (December 21, 1953), and during the pendency of the present appeal, we have had occasion to
decide a similar case wherein the same question was involved, 1namely, whether a husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child. Applying the
provisions of article 335, we held that it cannot be done for the reason that although article 338 of the new Civil Code permits the adoption of a step-child by the
step-father or the step-mother, nevertheless, because of the negative provisions of article 335, said permission is confined to those step-fathers and step-mothers
who have no children of their own.
With the doctrine laid down in the Ball vs. Republiccase, we could stop right here and sustain the appeal of
_______________
In re application of Norman H. Ball to adopt the minor George William York, Jr., Norman H. Ball vs. Republic of the Philippines, supra,p. 106.
822
822
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
McGee vs. Republic
1

the Government in the present case. However, it may not be unprofitable to further elaborate on the relation between the two articles335 and 338, new Civil
Code. The strongest argument of the trial court and of the appellee in support of the decision granting the adoption is that to hold that a step-father having a
legitimate child may not adopt a step-child would be to render article 338, paragraph 3, meaningless and a surplusage inasmuch as without said article 338, a
husband without a legitimate child may adopt a step-child anyway; or worse, article 338 contradicts article 335. At first blush, that is a f ormidable argument
because the Legislature in enacting a law is supposed and presumed not to insert any section or provision which is unnecessary and a mere surplusage; that all
provisions contained in a law should be given effect, and that contradictions are to be avoided. Furthermore, it is contended by appellee that article 335 prohibiting
adoption by a parent who already has a child of his own should not be considered exclusively but rather in relation with article 338 so as to regard the latter as an
exception to an exception. To meet and dispose of this argument we have to go into the philosophy of adoption.
The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation where none existed before. Where therefore the relationship of parent and child
already exists whether by blood or by affinity as in the case of illegitimate and step-children, it would be unnecessary and superfluous to establish and superimpose
another relationship of parent and child through adoption. Consequently, an express authorization of law like article 338 is necessary, if not to render it proper and
legal, at least, to remove any and all doubt on the subject-matter. Under this view, article 338 may not be regarded as a surplusage. That may have been the
reason why in the old Code of Civil Procedure, particularly its provisions regarding adoption authority to adopt a step-child by a step-father was provided in section
766 notwithstanding the general au823
VOL. 94, APRIL 29, 1954
823
McGee vs. Republic
thorization in section 765 extended to any inhabitant of the Philippines to adopt a minor child. The same argument of surplusage could plausibly have been
advanced as regards section 766, that is to say, section 766 was unnecessary and superfluous because without it a step-father could adopt a minor step-child

79

anyway. However, the insertion of section 766 was not entirely without reason, The Code of Civil Procedure was of common law origin. It seems to be an
established principle in American jurisprudence that a person may not adopt his own relative, the reason being that it is unnecessary to establish a relationship
where such already exists (the same philosophy underlying our codal provisions on adoption). So, some states have special laws authorizing the adoption of
relatives such as a grandfather adopting a grandchild and a father adopting his illegitimate or natural child.
Another possible reason for the insertion of section 766 in the Code of Civil Procedure and article 338, paragraph 3, in the new Civil Code, authorizing the
adoption of a step-child by the step-father or step-mother is that without said express legal sanction, there might be some doubt as to the propriety and advisability
of said adoption due to the possibility, if not probability, of pressure brought to bear upon the adopting step-father or mother by the legitimate and natural parent.
One additional reason for holding that article 338 of the new Civil Code should be subordinated and made subject to the provisions of article 335 so as to limit
the permission to adopt granted in article 338, to parents who have no children of their own, is that the terms of article 335 are phrased in a negative mannerthe
following cannot be adopted, while the phraseology of article 338 is only affirmativethe following may be adopted. Under the rule of statutory construction,
negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory.
824
824
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
McGee vs. Republic
". . . negative( prohibitory and exclusive words or terms are indicative of the legislative intent that the statute is to be mandatory, . . ." (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, sec. 263, p. 523.)
"Ordinarily . . . the word 'may' is directory, . . . (Crawford, op. cit., sec. 262, p. 519.)
"Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, or, as it has been aptly stated, there is but one way to obey the command 'thou shalt not', and that
is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act. And this is so, even though the statute provides no penalty for disobedience." (Crawford, op. cit., sec. 263. p.
523.)
The principal reason behind article 335, paragraph 1 denying adoption to those who already have children is that adoption would not only create conflicts within the
family but it would also materially affect or diminish the successional rights of the child already had. This objection may not appear as formidable and real when the
child had by the adopting parent is by the very spouse whose child is to be adopted, because in that case, the legitimate child and the adopted one would be halfbrother or half-sisters, would not be total strangers to each other, and the blood relationship though half may soften and absorb the loss of successional rights and
the possible diminution of the attention and affection previously enjoyed. But as not infrequently happens, the step-father or step-mother adopting a child of his or
her second wife or husband already may have a child of his or her own by a previous marriage, in which case, said child and the adopted one would be complete
strangers to each other, with no family ties whatsoever to bind them, in which event, there would be nothing to soften and reconcile the objection and resentment,
natural to the legitimate child.
In conclusion, we hold that pursuant to the provisions of article 335, paragraph 1, a step-father who already has a child may not adopt a step-child regardless of
the provisions of article 338, paragraph 3 of the same Code, the latter provisions being confined and appHcable to those step-fathers and step-mothers who have
no children of their
825
VOL. 94, APRIL 29, 1954
825
People vs. Jistiado, et al.
own. The decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the petition for adoption is denied. No pronouncement as to costs.
Pars, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

80

Judgment reversed, and petition for adoption denied.


________________
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81

82

176

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Bersabal vs. Salvador

No. L-35910. July 21, 1978.*


PURITA BERSABAL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, Branch XIV, TAN THAT
and ONG PIN TEE, respondents.
Appeal; Action; In an appeal from a decision of a city or municipal court to the CFI under RA. 6031, the submission of memorandum is optional and failure of
appellant to submit the same is not a ground for the dismissal of the appeal for failure to prosecute.The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt.
It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter
may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the
party waiving the submission of said memorandum. If the appellant so
_________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
177
VOL. 84, JULY 21, 1978
Bersabal vs. Salvador

177

chooses not to submit the memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the evidence and records
transmitted from the city or municipal courts. In other words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit
his memorandum, but rather it is the Courts mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and records transmitted to it.
Same; Same; Statutory construction; Use of word may in the statute generally connotes a permissible thing.As a general rule, the word may when used
in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word shall is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (dizon vs.
Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the
basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on
request.
Same; Same; Courts should proceed with caution so as not deprive a party of the right to appeal. In the case of Republic vs. Rodriguez (L-26056, May 29,
1969, 28 SCRA 378) this Court underscored the need of proceeding with caution so that a party may not be deprived of its right to appeal except for weighty
reasons.

83

MAKASIAR, J.:
On March 23, 1972, petitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge of August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971 and March 15, 1972 and to
compel said respondent Judge to dicide petitioners perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City Court of Caloocan
City plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and respondents.
Since only questions of law were raised therein, the Court of Appeals, on October 13, 1972, issued a resolution certifying said case to this Court pursuant to
Section 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of this case are as follows:
178
178
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bersabal vs. Salvador
It appears that private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee filed an ejectment suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 6926 in the City Court of Caloocan City, against
the petitioner. A decision was rendered by said Court on November 25, 1970, which decision was appealed by the petitioner to the respondent Court and docketed
therein as Civil Case No. C-2038.
During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent court issued on March 23, 1971 an order which reads:
Pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6031, the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City, is hereby directed to transmit to this Court within fifteen (16) days from
receipt hereof the transcripts of stenographic notes taken down during the hearing of this case before the City Court of Caloocan City, and likewise, counsels for
both parties are given thirty (30) days from receipt of this order within which to file their respective memoranda, and thereafter, this case shall be deemed submitted
for decision by this Court.
which order was apparently received by petitioner on April 17, 1971.
The transcript of stenographic notes not having yet been forwarded to the respondent court, petitioner filed on May 5, 1971 a MOTION EX-PARTE TO
SUBMIT MEMORANDUM WITHIN 30 DAYS PROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OP SUBMISSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT OP STENOGRAPHIC NOTES TAKEN DUR.
ING THE HEARING OF THE CASE BEFORE THE CITY COURT OP CALOOCAN CITY which was granted by respondent court on May 7, 1971. However, before
the petitioner could receive any such notice from the respondent court, the respondent Judge issued an order on August 4, 1971 which says:
For failure of the defendant-appellant to prosecute her appeal, the same is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against her.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on September 28, 1971, citing as a ground the granting of his ex-parte motion to submit memorandum
within 30 days form notice of the subsmission of the stenographic notes taken before the City Court. Private respondents filed their opposition to the motion on
September 30, 1971. In the meantime, on October 30, 1971 filed her memorandum dated October 18, 1971, on October 30, 1971 the respondents Court denied
the motion for reconsideration. Then on January 25, 1972, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by
the respondent court on March 15, 1972. Hence this petition.
179
VOL. 84, JULY 21, 1978
179
Bersabal vs. Salvador
The sole inquiry in the case at bar can be stated thus: Whether, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 46 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on time the memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would empower the Court of

84

First Instance, to dismiss, the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute; or, whether it is mandatory upon said Court to proceed to decide the appealed case on
the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, the failure of the appellant to submit a memorandum on time notwithstanding.
The second paragraph of Section 45 of R. A. No. 296, otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part,
as follows:
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That
the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested. x x x. (Italics Ours).
The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the part of
the parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice
given to the parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the submission of said memorandum. If the appellant so chooses not to submit the
memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or
municipal courts. In other words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but
rather it is the Courts mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and records transmitted to it.
As a general rule, the word may when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the
180
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bersabal vs. Salvador
word shall is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The
implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis
of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on request.
Moreover, memoranda, briefs and oral arguments are not essential requirements. They may be submitted and/or made only if so requested
Finally, a contrary interpretation would be unjust and dangerous as it may defeat the litigants right to appeal granted to him by law. In the case of Republic vs.
Rodriguez (L-26056, May 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 378) this Court underscored the need of proceeding with caution so that a party may not be deprived of its right to
appeal except for weighty reasons. Courts should heed the rule in Municipality of Tiwi, Albay vs. Cirujales (L-37520, Dec 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 390, 395), thus:
The appellate courts summary dismissal of the appeal even before receipt of the records of the appealed case as ordered by it in a prior mandamus case must be
set aside as having been issued precipitously and without an opportunity to consider and appreciate unavoidable circumstances of record not attributable to
petitioners that caused the delay in the elevation of the records of the case on appeal.
In the instant case, no notice was received by petitioner about the submission of the transcript of the stenographic notes, so that his 30-day period to submit his
memorandum would commence to run. Only after the expiration of such period can the respondent Judge act on the case by deciding it on the merits, not by
dismissing the appeal of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, THE CHALLENGED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED AUGUST 4, 1971, OCTOBER 30, 1971 AND MARCH 15, 1971 ARE
HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO DECIDE
181
VOL. 84, JULY 21, 1978
181
Bersabal vs. Salvador
CIVIL CASE NO. C-2036 ON THE MERITS. NO COSTS.
Muoz Palma, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

85

Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.


TEEHANKEE, J., Concurring:
I concur with the setting aside of the questioned dismissal of petitioners appeal on the ground that the record shows quite clearly that there was no failure on part
of petitioner-appellant to prosecute her appeal in respondent judges court. Petitioner had been grafted in respondent judges Order of May 7, 1971, 30 days from
notice of submission of the transcripts within which to file her memorandum on appeal, yet her appeal was dismissed per his Order of August 4, 1971 for alleged
failure to prosecute (by failure to file the memorandum) even before she had received any such notice. Upon receipt of the dismissal order, petitioner had promptly
moved for reconsideration and filed her memorandum on appeal.
I am not prepared at this stage to concur with the ratio decidendi of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Makasiar that the Court is not empowered by law to
dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Courts mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the
available evidence and records transmitted to it. I entertain serious doubts about such pronouncement, since when the court of first instance requests the partyappellant to submit a memorandum or brief on appeal under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6031 amending section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, such request
is tantamount to a requirement for the proper prosecution of the appeal; thus, when the appellant willfuly fails to file such memorandum or brief, the judge should
be empowered to dismiss the appeal, applying suppletorily the analogous provisions of Rule 50, section 1 for dismissal of appeal by the higher appellate courts
and taking into account that Rule 40, section 9 of the Rules of Court now expressly authorizes the court of first instance to dismiss an appeal before it for failure to
prosecute.
182
182
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bersabal vs. Salvador
Notes.Where an order granting a new trial is reversed by the Court of Appeals, the period of appeal from the decision of the trial court is 30 days counted
from the entry of final judgment of the decision of the Court of Appeals rather than from the date of receipt of the decision of the trial court. ( Pineda vs. Court of
Appeals, 65 SCRA 258).
The order of the trial court approving the record on appeal and stating that the appeal is made on time dispenses with the requirement that the record should
show timeliness of the appeal (Pimentel vs. Court of Appeals, 64 SCRA 475).
Where the verification to the notice of appeal contains the date when the decision appealed from was received, the same complies with the requirements on
appeal. (Lacificar vs. Court of Appeals, 64 SCRA 361).
On an appeal to the CFI from the municipal court, no new trial is required. (Bernabe vs. Geraldez, 65 SCRA 96).
Section 45 of the Judiciary Act as amended by R.A. 6031 does not allow ah appeal by record on appeal from the decision of the CFI in an appealed case falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal or city court. (Gutierrez vs. Magat, 67 SCRA 262).
An appellee may be allowed to file her brief beyond the reglementary period where no substantial prejudice may be caused to the appellant ( Espiritu vs.
Valerio, 3 SCRA 103.)
An extension of time for the filing of brief may be allowed for good and sufficient cause, if the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the time
sought to be extended. (Allan vs. Acosta, 10 SCRA 230.)
The right to appeal to a higher court being merely statutory may only be taken when the law so provides and hence the parties cannot confer such right by
mutual agreement. (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 465.)

86

Right to appeal not a natural right nor part of due process but it is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of the law. (Bello vs. Fernando, 4 SCRA 135; Ker & Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 4 SCRA 160.)
183
VOL. 84, JULY 21, 1978
183
Caluza vs. Workmens Compensation Commission
Supreme Court can review matters not assigned as errors in the appeal (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines,64 SCRA 610.) Supreme Court will entertain
new matters not raised in the Court of Appeals where the respondents did not pose any answer to said new matters and in order to do justice to the case. ( Vda. de
Catingdig, 74 SCRA 83.) The liberal doctrine has been followed by the Supreme Court whenever the material data rule is invoked to dismiss an appeal ( Garcia vs.
Court of Appeals, 77 SCRA 148.) An appeal may be reinstated, even after the remand of the record to the trial court, where it appears that dismissal of the appeal
was made under the erroneous impression that the appellants had abandoned their appeal (Balajadia vs. Pineda, 81 SCRA 464.)
o0o
Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

[No. L-4712. July 11, 1952]


RAMON DIOKNO, plaintiff and appellant vs.REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION, defendant and appellee.
1. 1.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; "SHALL" MAY BE CONSTRUED AS "MAY".In its ordinary signification the word "shall" is imperative or mandatory.
However, this signification is not always followed; it may be construed as "may," when so required by the context or by the intention of the statute.
1. 2.ID.; BACKPAY LAW; REPUBLIC ACT No. 304, SECTION 2 CONSTRUED AS DIRECTORY.Section 2 of Republic Act No. 304, in so far as the discount
and acceptance of backpay certificates are concerned, should be interpreted to be directory merely, not mandatory, the same to be construed as a
directive for the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to invest a reasonable portion of its funds for the discount of backpay certificates, from time to time in
its sound discretion, as circumstances and its resources may warrant.
1. 3.OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; ACTIONS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE DOES NOT LlE IF OBLIGATION IS NOT CONTRACTUAL.If an
action is not based on any contractual relation between plaintiff and defendant, it may not be one for specific performance.

87

1. 4.PLEADING AND PRACTICE; MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL ACCEPTANCE OF BACKPAY CERTIFICATE IN PAYMENT OF OBLIGATION
CONTRACTED AFTER 1948.Mandamus does not lie to compel the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to accept backpay certificates in payment of
outstanding loans. Although there is no provision expressly authorizing such acceptance, nor is there one prohibiting it, yet the duty imposed by the
Backpay Law upon said Corporation as to the acceptance or discount of backpay certificates is neither clear nor ministerial, but discretionary merely, and
such special civil action does not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Abaya, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The appellant in his own behalf.
Sixto de la, Costa for appellee.
609
VOL, 91, JULY 11, 1968
609
Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp,
LABRADOR, J.:
Plaintiff is the holder of a backpay certificate of Indebtedness issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304 of a face
value of P75,857.14 dated August 30, 1948. On or about November 10, 1950, when this action was brought, he had an outstanding loan with the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, contracted therewith on January 27, 1950, in the total sum of P50,000, covered by a mortgage 011 his property situated at 44 Alhambra,
Ermita, Manila, with interest at 4 per cent per annum, of which P47,355.28 was still unpaid. In this action he seeks to compel the defendant corporation to accept
payment of the balance of his indebtedness with his backpay certificate. The defendant resists the suit on the ground that plaintiff's demand is not only not
authorized by section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 but contrary to the provisions thereof, and furthermore because plaintiff's loan was obtained on January 27, 1950,
much after the passage of Republic Act No. 304, and because the law permits only "acceptance or discount of backpay certificates," not the repayment of loans.
The court a quoheld that section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 is permissive merely, and that even if it were mandatory, plaintiff's case can not fall thereunder because
he is not acquiring property for a home or constructing a residential house, but compelling the acceptance of his backpay certificate to pay a debt he contracted
after the enactment of Republic Act No. 304. It, therefore, dismissed the complaint with costs.
The appeal involves the interpretation of section 2. of Republic Act No. 304, which provides:
* * * And provided, also, That investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to availability of
loanable funds, and any provision of their charters, articles of incorporations, by-laws, or rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, accept or discount
at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate for the following purposes only: (1) the acquisition
610
610
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
of real property for use as the applicant's home, or (2) the building or construction or reconstruction of the residential house of the payee of said certificate: * * *

88

It is first contended by the appellant that the above provision is mandatory, not only because it employs the word "shall", which in its ordinary signification is
mandatory, not permissive, but also because the provision is applicable to institutions of credit under the control of the Government, and because otherwise the
phrases "subject to availability of loanable funds" and "any provisions of this charter, * * * and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding" would be superfluous.
It is true that in its ordinary signification the word "shall" is imperative.
In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term "shall' is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a
compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation. It has a peremptory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. It has the invariable significance of
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or when addressed to public officials, or where a public
interest is involved, or where the public or persons have rights which ought to be exercised or enforced, unless a contrary intent appears. People vs. O'Rourke, 13
P. 2d. 989, 992, 124 Cal. App. 752. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 90.)
The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is used in an imperative, and not in a directory, sense. If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest
upon something in the character of the legislation or in the context which will justify a different meaning. Haythorn vs. Van Keuren & Son, 74 A. 502, 504, 79 N. J. L.
101; Board of Finance of School City of Aurora vs.People's Nat. Bank of Lawrenceburg, 89 N. E. 904, 905, 44 Ind. App. 578. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent
Ed., p. 93.) However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as "may", when so required by the context or by the intention of the statute.
In its ordinary signification, "shall" is imperative, and not permissive, though it may have the latter meaning when required by the context. Town of
Milton vs. Cook, 138 N. E. 589, 590, 244 Mass. 93. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 89.)
611
VOL. 91, JULY 11, 1952
611
Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
"Must" or "shall' in a statute is not always imperative, but may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. In re O'Hara, 82 N. Y. S. 293, 296, 40 Misc. 355, citing In
re Thurber's Estate, 162 N. Y. 244, 252, 56 N. E. 638, 639. (Ibid. p. 92.)
The word "shall" is generally regarded as imperative, but in some contexts it is given a permissive meaning, the intended meaning being determined by what is
intended by the statute. National Transit Co. vs. Boardman, 197 A. 239, 241, 328 Pa. 450,
The word "shall" is to be construed as merely permissive, where no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an imperative
meaning. Sheldon vs. Sheldon, 134 A. 904, 905, 100 N. J. Ex. 24.
Presumption is that word "shall," in ordinance, is mandatory; but, where it is necessary to give effect to legislative intent, the word will be construed as "may."
City of Colorado Springs vs. Street, 254 p. 440, 441, 81 Colo. 181.
The word "shall" does not necessarily indicate a mandatory behest. Grimsrud vs. Johnson, 202 N. W. 72, 73, 162 Minn. 98.
Words like "may," "must," "shall," etc., are constantly used in statutes without intending that they shall be taken literally, and in their construction the object
evidently designed to be reached limits and controls the literal import of the terms and phrases employed. Fields vs. United States, 27 App. D. C. 433, 440. (39
Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., pp. 89, 92).
In this jurisdiction the tendency has been to interpret the word "shall" as the context or a reasonable construction of the statute in which it is used demands or
requires. Thus the provision of section 11 of Rule 4 of the Rules requiring a municipal judge or a justice of the peace to render judgment at the conclusion of the
trial has been held to be directory. (Alejandro vs. Judge of First Instance1 40 Off. Gaz., 9th Supp., 261). In like manner section 178 of the Election Law, in so far as
it requires that appeals shall be decided in three months, has been held to be directory for the Court of Appeals. (Querubin vs. The Court of Appeals,246 Off. Gaz.,
155).

89

In the provision subject of controversy, it is to be noted that the verb-phrase "shall accept or discount" has two modifiers, namely, "subject to availability of
loanable
________________
70 Phil., 749.
82 Phil., 226.
612
612
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp,
1
2

funds" and "at not more than two per centum per annum f or ten years." As to the second modifier, the interest to be charged, there seems to be no question that
the verbphrase is mandatory, because not only does the law use "at not more" but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the backpay
certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when
the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. The phrase "subject" means "being under the
contingency of" (Webster's Int Dict.) a condition. If the acceptance or discount of the certificates is to be "subject" to the condition of the availability of loanable
funds, it is evident that the Legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are "available loanable funds." In other words,
acceptance or discount is to he permitted only if there are loanable funds.
Let us now consider the meaning of the condition imposed for accepting or discounting certificates, the "availability of loanable funds." On this issue the
appellant contends that the mere fact that P50,000 was loaned to him and that the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation has been granting loans up to the time
plaintiff offered to pay the loan with his certificatethese prove that there are "available loanable funds". As the court a quo did not pass on such availability, he
also contends that this is a question of fact to be determined by the courts. The defendant denies the existence of "available loanable funds." The gist of plaintiffs'
contention is that any and all funds of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation are subject to the provision for the discount or acceptance of the certificates; that of
defendant-appellee is that only funds made available for the purpose of discounting backpay certificates may be used for such purpose and that at the time the
action was filed there were no such f unds
613
VOL. 91, JULY 11, 1952
613
Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
The Rehabilitation Finance Corporation was created by Republic Act No. 85, which was approved on October 29, 1946. The corporation was created "to provide
credit facilities for the rehabilitation and development of agriculture, commerce and industry, the reconstruction of property damaged by war, and the broadening
and diversification of the national economy" (section 1), and to achieve the above aims it was granted the following powers:
SEC. 2. Corporate powers.The Rehabilitation Finance Corporation shall have power:
(a) To grant loans for home building and for the rehabilitation, establishment or development of any agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprise, including
public utilities;
(b) To grant loans to provincial, city and municipal governments Fo the rehabilitation, construction or reconstruction of public markets, waterworks, toll bridges,
slaughterhouses, and other selfliquidating or income-producing services;

90

(c) To grant loans to agencies and corporations owned or controlled by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the production and distribution of
electrical power, for the purchase and subdivision of rural and urban estates, for housing projects, for irrigation and waterworks systems, and for other essential
industrial and agricultural enterprises;
(d) To grant loans to cooperative associations to facilitate pro duction, the marketing of crops, and the acquisition of essential commodities;
(e) To underwrite, purchase, own, sell, mortgage or otherwise dispose of stocks, bonds, debentures, securities and other evidences of indebtedness issued for
or in connection with any project or enterprise referred to in the preceding paragraphs;
(f) To issue bonds, debentures, securities, collaterals, and other obligations with the approval of the President, but in no case to exceed at any one time an
aggregate amount equivalent to one hundred per centum of its subscribed capital and surplus, * * *
If the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation is to carry out the aims and purposes for which it was created, it must evolve a definite plan of the industries or activities
which it should rehabilitate, establish or develop, and apportion its available funds and resources among these, consistent with the policies outlined in its charter.
614
614
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
As of May 31, 1948, immediately prior to the passage of the Backpay Law, it had granted the following classes of loans:
Agricultural
P23,610,350.74
loans .................................................................................................
Industrial
22,717,565.87
loans .....................................................................................................
Real Estate
34,601,258.29
loans ..................................................................................................
Loans for purchase, Subdivision and Resale of
7,271,258.78
Landed
Estates .................................................................................................
Loans to Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities
1,889,763.00
for Self-liquidating
Projects ..............................................................................
Total
P90,090,077.68
Loans ...............................................................................................
(Exhibit 2)
As of February 2, 1951, the corporation had accepted in payment of loans granted before June 18, 1948, the total amount of P8,225,299.96, as required by section
2 of the Backpay Law. (See Exhibit 11, p. 4.)
The third anniversary report of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation dated January 2, 1950 (Exhibit 1), shows that the funds originally available to the
corporation came from the following sources:
Funds made available:
Initial cash capital ...........................................................................................
P50,000,000.00
Cash transferred from Financial Rehabili2,423,079.74

91

tation funds .................................................................................................


Cash received from Surplus Property Com26,350,000.00
mission ........................................................................................................
Cash received from Phil. Shipping Adm. ..........................................................
3,700,000.00
Cash payment of capital ..................................................................................
82,473,079.74
Proceeds of bond
58,909,148.18
issues ....................................................................................
Advances from the Central Bank .....................................................................
10,000,000.00
There was also collectible from loans the total amount of P28,659,442.12, so that the total cash available to the corporation from January 2, 1947, to November 30,
1949, was P180,041,670.04. But the total amount of loans already approved as of the last date was P203,667,403.78 and the total of approved loans pending
release was P25,342,020.78, and the only cash balance available in November, 1949, to meet these approved loans was P1,716,286.71.
615
VOL. 91, JULY 11, 1952
615
Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
It may readily be seen from the above data that were we to follow appellants' theory and contention that the law is mandatory, the loan he had applied for, as well
as that of any holder of a backpay certificate, would have to be paid out of this available cash, pursuant to the alleged mandate of section 2 of the Backpay Law.
The compulsory acceptance and discount of certificates will bring about, as a direct and necessary consequence, the suspension of all, if not of most, of the
activities of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation; and no agricultural or industrial loans, or loans to financial institutions and local governments for their markets,
waterworks, etc., would be granted, until all the backpay certificates (amounting to some hundred millions of pesos) shall have been accepted or discounted. And
as the defendant-appellant forcefully argues, even funds obtained by the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation by the issue of bonds , at rates of interest of more than
2 per cent, the rate fixed for the discount of backpay certificates, will have to be loaned to holders of backpay certificates at a loss, to the prejudice of the
corporation. There would be loans for holders of backpay certificates, but none for rehabilitation or reconstruction, or development of industries, or of the national
economy; there would be funds for amployees' loans, but none for those engaged in agriculture and industry, none for the improvements of public services, etc., as
all Rehabilitation Finance Corporation funds will be necessary to meet the demands of holders of backpay certificates. And if it be remembered that the provision is
intended for all financial institutions controlled by the Government, the consequences would be felt by all industries and activities, and the whole scheme of national
financial organization and development disrupted. It seems evident that the legislature never could have intended such absurd consequences, even with all the
sympathy that it is showing for holders of backpay certificates.
616
616
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
But while we agree with the appellee that it could not have been the intention of Congress to disrupt the whole scheme of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and
development envisioned in the Rehabilitation Act, by its passage of section 2 of the Backpay Law, neither are we prepared to follow appellee's insinuation that the
section is impracticable or impossible of execution by the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation in the situation in which its funds and resources were at the time of
the trial. In our opinion, what the Legislature intended by the provision in dispute is that the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, through its Board of
Directors, should from time to time set aside some reasonable amount f or the discount of backpay certificates, when this can be done without unduly taxing its
resources, or unduly prejudicing the plan of rehabilitation and development that it has mapped out, or that which the corresponding authority has laid down as a

92

policy. This legislative intention can be inferred from the fact that Congress itself expressly ordered that all financial institutions accept or discount backpay
certificates in payment of those loans, evidently laying down an example to be followed by financial institutions under its control. The loans granted under section 2
of the law by the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation amounted to P8,225,299.96. It is not shown or even pretended that the payment of this considerable amount
has impaired or disrupted the activities of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. It is not claimed, either, that at the time of the filing of appellant's action the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation was in no position to set aside a modest sum, in a manner similar to the creation of a sinking fund, for the discount of backpay
certificates to help the Government comply with its financial commitments. We are convinced that the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation may, without impairment
of its activities, set aside from time to time, say, half a million pesos or a considerable part thereof, for the payment of backpay
617
VOL. 91, JULY 11, 1952.
617
Diokno vs. rehabilitation Finance Corp.,
certificates. But these circumstances notwithstanding, we are of the opinion that the law in question (section 3 of the Backpay Law), in so faras the discount and
acceptance of backpay certificates are concerned, should be interpreted to be directiory merely, not mandatory, as claimed by pliantiff-appellant, the same to be
construed as a directive for the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to invest a reasonable portion of its funds for the discount of backpay certificates, from time to
time and in its sound discretion, as circumstances and its resources may warrant.
Having come to the conclusion that section 2 of the Backpay Law is directory merely, we now address ourselves to the propriety of the action, which the plaintiff
and appellant labels as specific performance. as the action is not based on any contractual relation between the plaintiff and appellant and the defendant and
appellee, it may be one for specific performance; it is in effect predicated on a supposed legal duty imposed by law and is properly designated as a special civil
action of mandamus, because the appellant seeks to compel the appellee to accept his backpay certificate in payment of his outstanding obligation. We are bnot
impressed by the defense, technical in a sense, that the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation is not expressly authorized to accept certificates in payment of
outstanding loans. There is no provision expressly authorizing this procedure or system; but neither is there one prohibiting it. The legislature had once ordered it;
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation has once authorized it. We believe the legislature could not have intended to discriminate against those who have already
built their houses, who have contracted obligations in so doing. We prefer to predicate our ruling that this special action does not lie on the ground that the duty
imposed by the Backpay Law upon the appellee as to the acceptance or discount of backpay certificates is neither clear nor ministerial, but discretionary merely
and that mandamus does not issue to control the exercise
618
618
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
of discretion of a public officer. .E e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora vs. Wright and Segado, 53 Phil., 613, 621; Blanco vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 46 Phil., 190,
192, citing Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456; Gonzales vs. Board of Pharmacy, 20 Phil., 367, etc.) It is, however, argued on behalf of the appellant that inasmuch as
the Board of Directors of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation has seen fit to approve a resolution accepting backpay certificates amounting to P151,000 (Exhibit
H), law and equity demand that the same privilege should be accorded him. The trial court held that the above resolution was illegal and that its unauthorized
enactment (which he called a "wrong") does not justify its repetition for the benefit of appellant. As we have indicated above, we believe that its approval (not any
supposed discrimination on behalf of some special holders) can be defended under the law, but that the passage of a similar resolution can not be enjoined by an
action of mandamus.
We must admit, however, that appellant's case is not entirely without any merit or justification; similar situations have already been favorably acted upon by the
Congress, when it ordered that certificates be accepted in payment of outstanding obligations, and by the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation in its above-

93

mentioned resolution. But we feel we are powerless to enforce his claim, as the acceptance and discount of backpay certificates has been placed within the sound
discretion of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, and subject to the availability of loanable funds, and said discretion may not be reviewed or controlled by us. It
is clear that this remedy must be available in other quarters, not in the courts of justice.
For all the foregoing considerations, we are constrained to dismiss the appeal, with costs against the appellant.
Pars, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason,Montemayor, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Appeal dismissed.
619
VOL. 91, JULY 14, 1952
619
People vs. Bernal, et al.
Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

94

G.R. No. 131082. June 19, 2000.*


ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES, petitioner, vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondent.
Pag-IBIG Fund; Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742, and Home Development Mutual
Fund Circular No. 124-B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under Presidential
Decree No. 1752, as amended by Republic Act No. 7742, are null and void insofar as they require that an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan
and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage. The issue of the validity of the
1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, specifically Section I, Rule VII on Waiver and Suspension, has been squarely
resolved in the relatively recent case of China Banking Corp. v. The Members of the Board of Trustees of the HDMF. We held in that case that Section 1 of Rule VII
of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure
for Filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, are null and void insofar as they require that
an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order to qualify for waiver or
suspension of the Fund coverage.
Statutory Construction; It is ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term and/or is that the word and and the word or are to be used
interchangeably.In arriving at said conclusion, we ruled: The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words and/or. In the instant case, the legal meaning
of the words and/or should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., either and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs. The term
and/or means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive and and the disjunctive or; or that
_______________
FIRST DIVISION.
778
7
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
*

78

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles vs.


Home Development Mutual Fund
one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole
statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive or alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the
use of the conjunctive and will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone. It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the
legislature in using the term and/or is that the word and and the word or are to be used interchangeably.
Administrative Law; It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that
have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is without doubt that the
HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules and
regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and
be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
Same; Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF); The Home Development Mutual Fund cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation
not consistent with the law it seeks to applyadministrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they

95

intend to carry out.In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for
exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996
Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated
power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed,
administrative issuances must not
779
VOL. 333, JUNE 19, 2000
779
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles vs.
Home Development Mutual Fund
override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.
Same; Same; A departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by the statute.While it may be conceded that the requirement of
having both plans to qualify for an exemption, as well as the abolition of the exemption, would enhance the interest of the working group and further strengthen the
Home Development Mutual Fund in its pursuit of promoting public welfare through ample social services as mandated by the Constitution, we are of the opinion
that the basic law should prevail. A department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by the statute.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles for and in its own behalf.
Cristobal A. Paralejas for respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Once again, this Court is confronted with the issue of the validity of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742, which
require the existence of a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits for exemption from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage under Presidential
Decree No. 1752, as amended.
Pursuant to Section 191 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura,
_______________
It reads:
SEC. 19. Existing Provident/Housing PlanAn employer and/or employee-group who, at the time this Decree becomes effective have their own provident
and/or employee-housing
780
780
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles vs. Home
Development Mutual Fund
1

96

Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER), a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995 from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage
by respondent Home Development Mutual Fund (hereafter HDMF) because of a superior retirement plan. 2
On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995,
amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to
a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, 3 it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the
PagIBIG Fund.
On 16 November 1995, PETITIONER filed with the respondent an application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage because of its superior retirement
plan.4 In support of said application, PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a
_______________
plans, may register with the Fund, for any of the following purposes:
1. (a)For annual certification of waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Fund, which shall be granted on the basis of verification that the
waiver or suspension does not contravene any effective collective bargaining agreement and that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the
Fund or continue to be so; or
2. (b)For integration with the Fund, either fully or partially.
The establishment of a separate provident and/or housing plan after the effectivity of this Decree shall not be a ground for waiver of coverage in the Fund; nor
shall such coverage bar any employer and/or employee-group from establishing separate provident and/or housing plans.
2
Rollo, 43.
3
Id., 187.
4
Id., 44.
781
VOL. 333, JUNE 19, 2000
781
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles vs. Home
Development Mutual Fund
letter explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the Rules are invalid. 5
In a letter dated 18 March 1996, the President and Chief Executive Officer of HDMF disapproved PETITIONERS application on the ground that the requirement
that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase and/or, and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742
did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the law. 6
PETITIONERS appeal7 with the HDMF Board of Trustees was denied for having been rendered moot and academic by Board Resolution No. 1208, Series of
1996, removing the availment of waiver of the mandatory coverage of the PagIBIG Fund, except for distressed employers. 8
On 31 March 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition for review 9 before the Court of Appeals. On motion by HDMF, the Court of Appeals dismissed 10 the petition on
the ground that the coverage of employers and employees under the Home Development Mutual Fund is mandatory in character as clearly worded in Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742. There is no allegation that petitioner is a distressed employer to warrant its exemption from the Fund coverage. As to

97

the amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, the same are valid. Under P.D. No. 1752 and R.A. No. 7742 the Board of Trustees of
the HDMF is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations, as well as amendments thereto, concerning the extension, waiver or suspension of coverage under
the Pag-IBIG Fund. And the publication requirement was amply met, since the questioned amendments were published in the 21 October 1995 issue of
_______________
Id., 45-51
Id., 52-54.
7
Id., 55-60.
8
Rollo, 61.
9
Id., 30-42.
10
Id., 86-91. Per Tayao-Jaguros, L. J., with Martinez, A. and Brawner, R. JJ., concurring.
782
782
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles vs. Home
Development Mutual Fund
5
6

the Philippine Star, which is a newspaper of general circulation.


PETITIONERS motion for reconsideration11 was denied.12 Hence, on 6 November 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition before this Court assailing the 1995 and
the 1996 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742 for being contrary to law. In support thereof, PETITIONER contends that
the subject 1995 Amendments issued by HDMF are inconsistent with the enabling law, P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, which merely requires as a
pre-condition for exemption from coverage the existence of either a superior provident/retirement plan or a superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both
plans. Hence, considering that PETITIONER has a provident plan superior to that offered by the HDMF, it is entitled to exemption from the coverage in accordance
with Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. The 1996 Amendment are also void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended.
The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power, which cannot be delegated to HMDF.
PETITIONER also cites Section 9 (1), Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 9. Public Participation(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
Since the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742 involve an imposition of an additional burden, a public hearing should
have first been conducted to give chance to the employers, like PETITIONER, to be heard before the HDMF adopted the said Amendments. Absent such public
hearing, the amendments should be voided.
_______________
Id., 112-126.
Id., 140.
783
VOL. 333, JUNE 19, 2000
783
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles vs. Home
11
12

98

Development Mutual Fund


Finally, PETITIONER contends that HDMF did not comply with Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that [e]very
agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
On the other hand, the HDMF contends that in promulgating the amendments to the rules and regulations which require the existence of a plan providing for
both provident and housing benefits for exemption from the Fund Coverage, the respondent Board was merely exercising its rule-making power under Section 13 of
P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use and only instead of or in the rules on waiver in order to effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing and,
the Board has clarified the confusion brought about by the use of and/or in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.
As to the public hearing, HDMF maintains that as can be clearly deduced from Section 9(1), Chapter 2, book VII of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
public hearing is required only when the law so provides, and if not, only if the same is practicable. It follows that public hearing is only optional or discretionary on
the part of the agency concerned, except when the same is required by law. P.D. No. 1752 does not require that public hearing be first conducted before the rules
and regulations implementing it would become valid and effective. What it requires is the publication of said rules and regulations at least once in a newspaper of
general circulation. Having published said 1995 and 1996 Amendments through the Philippine Star on 21 October 1995 13 and 15 November 1996,14 respectively,
HDMF has complied with the publication requirement.
Finally, HDMF claims that as early as 18 October 1996, it had already filed certified true copies of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations with the
University of the Philippines Law Center. This fact is evidenced by certified true
_______________
Rollo, 187.
Id., 188.
784
784
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles vs. Home
Development Mutual Fund
13
14

copies of the Certification from the Office of the National Administrative Register of the U.P. Law Center. 15
We find for the PETITIONER.
The issue of the validity of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, specifically Section I, Rule VII on Waiver and
Suspension, has been squarely resolved in the relatively recent case of China Banking Corp. v. The Members of the Board of Trustees of the HDMF. 16 We held in
that case that Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the
Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, are null
and void insofar as they require that an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in
order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage. In arriving at said conclusion, we ruled:
The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words and/or.
In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words and/or should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., either and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs means butter
and eggs or butter or eggs.
The term and/or means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive and and the disjunctive or; or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly
as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which

99

by the use of the disjunctive or alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive and will exclude the efficacy of
any one of the alternatives standing alone.
_______________
Id., 189.
G.R. No. 131787, 19 May 1999, 307 SCRA 443.
785
VOL. 333, JUNE 19, 2000
785
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles vs. Home
Development Mutual Fund
15
16

It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term and/or is that the word and and the word or are to be used
interchangeably.
It. . . seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee
housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the employee [ sic] should have both a superior provident
plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and instead of and/or. Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for
annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously contemplates that
the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient.
To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing
the disjunctive word or in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.
It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 5 17 of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 1318 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is wellsettled that rules
_______________
SEC. 5. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations.Within sixty (60) days from the approval of this Act, the Board of Trustees of the Home Development
Mutual Fund shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of this Act.
18
SEC. 13. Rule-Making Power.The Board of Trustees is hereby authorized to make and change needful rules and regulations, which shall be published in
accordance with law or at least once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, to provide for, but not limited to, the following matters:
...
(b) Extension of fund coverage to other working groups, and waiver or suspension of coverage or its enforcement for reasons herein stated;
...
786
786
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles vs. Home
Development Mutual Fund
17

100

and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of
the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. 19 It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law,
and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. 20
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from
the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it
repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the
Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances
must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. 21 Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.
While it may be conceded that the requirement of having both plans to qualify for an exemption, as well as the abolition of the exemption, would enhance the
interest of the working
_______________
(i) Other matters that, by express or implied provisions of this Act, shall require implementation by appropriate policies, rules and regulations.
19
Victorias Milling Co., Inc., v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558 (1962), as cited in the case of China Banking Corp. v. The Members of the
Board of Trustees, supra note 16.
20
The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 243 SCRA 666, 675 (1995).
21
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 368, 372 (1994).
787
VOL. 333, JUNE 19, 2000
787
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles vs. Home
Development Mutual Fund
group and further strengthen the Home Development Mutual Fund in its pursuit of promoting public welfare through ample social services as mandated by the
Constitution, we are of the opinion that the basic law should prevail. A department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by the statute. 22
Considering the foregoing conclusions, it is unnecessary to dwell on the other issues raised.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of 31 July 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-43668 and its Resolution of 15
October 1997 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The disapproval by the Home Development Mutual Fund of the application of the petitioner for waiver or
suspension of Fund coverage is SET ASIDE, and the Home Development Mutual Fund is hereby directed to refund to petitioner all sums of money it collected from
the latter.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., No part. Related to a party.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.If the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for implementing
administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively

101

complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably
demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation con_______________
Radio Communications of the Philippines v. Santiago, 58 SCRA 493, 498 (1974).
788
788
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PGA Brotherhood Association vs. NLRC
22

sisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. ( Rabor vs. Civil Service Commission, 244
SCRA 614 [1995])
It is well settled that the rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. (China Banking Corporation vs. Members of the Board
of Trustees, Home Development Mutual Fund, 307 SCRA 443[1999])
o0o
Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

102

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