1.

PP vs LAUGA 615 SCRA 2010

Facts:
Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old
daughter. One of the witnesses for the prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a
bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting testified that after his assistance was
sought, he proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing only his
underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the
police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he raped his daughter AAA because he
was unable to control himself. Lauga contests the admissibility in evidence of his
alleged confession with Banting. He argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to
Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan, the confession was inadmissible in evidence
because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such
requirement.

Decision:
The Supreme Court held that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature
of watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local
government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and
order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken
by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided
for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken
without counsel was inadmissible in evidence.

2. MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SSANGYONG

CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 170633; October 17, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel
products. One of its suppliers is the responded, an international trading company
with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City,
Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and
facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Respondent would send the pro forma invoices
containing the details of the steel product order to petitioner; if the latter conforms
thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back
to the respondent, again by fax.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent
alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the
letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel
under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging
that respondent failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on
which the civil action was based. Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro
forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their
supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the
ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the
original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of
the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of
the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document
and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further
claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1
and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.

Issue:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic
evidence and admissible as such?

Held:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document
under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight
or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in
evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must
foremost be an electronic data message or an electronic document.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the
Electronic Data Message refers to information generated, sent, received or stored
by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.
The phrase but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy in the IRRs definition of electronic data message is
copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which majority of the
provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted this phrase in the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion
by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal.
Moreover, when Congress formulated the term electronic data message, it
intended the same meaning as the term electronic record in the Canada law. This
construction of the term electronic data message, which excludes telexes or
faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic
Commerce Laws focus on paperless communications and the functional
equivalent approach that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this
sense, paperless, but verily are paper-based.
[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based
information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the
receiving end. [I]n a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no
original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in
all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the laws definition of
electronic data message, which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with electronic
document, could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original
paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two
copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress
anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when
it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex
and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as
compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it
defined the term electronic data message.

[T]he terms electronic data message and electronic document, as defined under
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.
Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence.
It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is
not admissible as electronic evidence.

4. JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS

G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011]

FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse
alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent,
Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioners
certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with
a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting
that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served
on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which
the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed
a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of
a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.
Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held
that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a
paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie
case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A
new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied
upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a fullblown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that
the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held
that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a
prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order

HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis--vis the
motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.

RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial
stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed.
The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is
herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are
aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any
person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such
order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The
biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a
DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This
does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right
if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a
show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause
for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various

jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but
those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must
be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court
may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in
which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo
a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing The same condition precedent should be
applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits.
Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present
prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.