Professional Documents
Culture Documents
As the world and regional security environments call increasingly for action under coalition
and intergovernmental auspices, an emerging advisory role is forming for the Army special-
operations community. In these roles, perhaps more than in any others, ARSOF Soldiers will
be called on to put all of their skills to the test. In these advisory roles, Soldiers will operate in
isolation, with few or no support personnel. They will have to work side by side with coalition
soldiers who do not speak their language and have no experience with their technology.
Often times, they will be called on not only to keep the peace, but to broker it.
In August 2004, the author found to strike a balance between those two Initially, there were 12 AU MILOBS
himself in just such a role when he de- missions while staying positioned be- teams, of five or six officers each,
ployed to the Darfur region of Sudan as tween the warring parties as advisers spread out among the six largest pop-
part of a small joint-special-operations without getting killed in the process. ulation centers in western and south-
advisory team dispatched there by the The mission originated when the ern Darfur. Because of the warring
commander of the Joint Special Opera- United States partnered with the parties enduring distrust of both the
tions Task Force Horn of Africa. The European Union, or EU, in an effort to Arab League and the African Union,
team, deployed from Camp Lemonier, avoid a full-scale civil war in Sudan. the teams were mandated to have ei-
Djibouti, consisted of a Navy SEAL The coalition focus is on funding and ther an EU or a U.S. adviser to ensure
lieutenant commander, a Marine recon supporting the newly formed African impartiality and improve the reliability
major, and the author, an Army Spe- Union, or AU, in a role designed to of the observing and reporting.
cial Forces major. The team was tasked mediate between the Government of The other members of the MILOBS
to work as advisers to the African Sudan, or GoS (which is primarily in teams consisted of EU officers from
Unions 12 military-observer teams, the control of the Northern Arab Su- Italy, Hungary, Ireland, France, Eng-
or MILOBS, which were attempting danese), and the armed rebel groups land, Denmark and Norway. The Afri-
to negotiate a cease-fire with multiple in the Darfur region. The government- can Union officers hailed from South
parties in the Sudans civil war. supported militias were created when Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Congo,
fantry Officer Basic at Fort Benning, officers to convince them to use the training offered, but they did place
Ga. Within the AU team, he spoke the U.N./AU templates have been unsuc- U.S. officers under a microscope,
best English, understood U.N. and cessful. watching everything we did and said,
NATO doctrine and was often called on The lack of technology and coali- looking for inconsistencies. The EU
to translate between English and Ara- tion partners inability to use it is also officers did not face the same sort of
bic. Most of the other officers required a drawback in these types of mis- fascinated scrutiny that U.S. officers
constant encouragement to read their sions. The author deployed with the faced, and they would normally defer
U.N. military handbooks to learn how most advanced support in terms of to their U.S. officer peer.
to format reports, plan missions and electronics, staff training and op- Once a MILOB team is trained up
communicate effectively. One ongo- erational capabilities. Most U.S. first and well advised, they tend to yield
ing split was the insistence by officers lieutenants and captains have more significant relevant data and action-
from Islamic countries upon using a command and staff training and ex- able intelligence for both regional
religious header line that proclaimed perience than many other countries combatant commanders and national
the glory of Allah for all reports and majors and lieutenant colonels. For platforms. The authors two teams
plans. All attempts by other instance, the Mozambique produced significant results with
AU major had never had to more than 40 intelligence information
Department personnel at the the U.S. equipment on every mission and was forces, the teams also faced the
base in Djibouti had to craft a support always prepared to enter into the es- uncertainty of the cease-fire and the
plan. This was difficult, as the U.S. cape-and-evade mode, which basically daily risk of crossfire. The cease-fire
Embassy in Khartoum was flanked by meant running for the Chad border. was tenuous, as there was steady
a local Hamas headquarters and an Illustrating the requirement for fighting around Al Fashir, Kebka-
office of the Survivors of the Martyrs solid mission planning was the inci- bia and Nyala, and sporadic fighting
reimbursement office that provides dent in which the AU received intel- around El Geniena, Ambarou and Bir
money to families of suicide bombers ligence that a non-Sudanese third Furniwayah.
in Palestine and Iraq. party was operating in Darfur with the The GoS reinforced its military
The U.S. Embassy is actually a intent of abducting U.S. or EU officers and police battalions daily, but the
mission that has only recently opened, to sell to al-Qaeda operatives. It is governments intent was not always
and it operates on minimal staffing common knowledge among the AU and clear. The rebel groups claimed that
without an accredited ambassador. rebel forces that al-Qaeda has robust the GoS was preparing for an offensive
The mission staff continually works on networks in Darfur. Al-Qaeda has that would shatter the cease-fire and
developing an aggressive evacuation been very active there, and the team could cause the MILOBS team mem-
plan to be used if the country defaults received a continuous flow of informa- bers to execute their escape-and-eva-
to the harder line Islamic radicals who tion on its activities. sion plans.
advocate increased fundamentalist Abductions, threats and hostile ac- The JEM and SLA representatives
involvement in the government. tion toward AU, U.S. and EU person- on the MILOBS teams constantly
Just as the embassy staff planned nel were not limited to al-Qaeda. The pulled the U.S. and EU representa-
for evacuation, so, too, did the military authors initial assignment in Darfur tives aside to show them documents
advisers. The advisers to the MILOBS was in Tine, Sudan, in the southern that they claimed were taken from
operated as isolated personnel in a Libyan Desert. Shortly after the author government offices. The documents
region crawling with armed factions, left that first team, it was abducted by outlined the GoSs final solution to
as is often the case in advisory assign- one of the warring parties. the Darfur problem: the employment
ments. The team carried all its survival Besides the threat from outside of chemical weapons.
March-April 2006 13
BROKERING PEACE IN SUDAN
14 Special Warfare
The pligh
t of the civ 30 Se
and each ilians here
day is a st r e mains pe
suering, ruggle of rilous,
starvation denial ab
cultures. In , and the d o u t is sues of
Ambarou eaths of fa
found 15-2 , 1 20 kilome m il ie s and
0 families ters east o
between living on f Tine, we
a governm the edge
battalion ent milita of existen
that we th r y brigade a ce
members ink is hea nd a polic
of the Jan vily stae e
routinely jaweed M d with for
attacked ilitia. The m e r
loot at wil by govern families a
l, adding m ent forces re
of loss an to the alre that rape
d destruc ady overw and
families fo tion. The helming s
r not leav r ebels con e n se
worst alte ing for SL demn the
rnative, th A or JEM te
AM Nabo e Chadian rritory, or
k or Baha refugee c the
and we p y. The fam amps of Ir
ass their p ilies beg fo ib a,
for Refug leas to th r assistan
ees or to e UN High C c e ,
this passin any NGO ommissio
g of inform w e come acr n
we began ation has oss. But e
passing in its conseq ven
Ambarou formation uences. A
families to on the pli fter
aid truck NGOs, a B ght of the
attempte ritish Save
was blow d to enter the Childr
n up by a th e Ambaro en
military-o deliberate u area an
bserver te ly placed d
explosion am arrive mine. Wh
, we foun d at the sce en our
aid worke d the veh ne of the
in September 2004. rs killed a icle ippe
body, a sa nd one bu d over, wit
vage repa rned over h two
least able y m ent for try 3 0 % o f
with warring factions in areas normal- Divisions 41st to help th ing to help his
parties ob emselves t h ose
ly denied or restricted to U.S. forces. Enhanced Infan- jected to . Evidently
a ssisting th , o n e
In preparation for more of these types try Brigade, the
conicted
with one ese familie of the
play in th o f the many s , as it
of advisory assignments, a class on 1st Corps and is despera political a
This was t te and vio gendas in
that type of advisory role should be the U.S. Army he second lent part o
the past t attack on f t he world.
included in the officer portion of the Cadet Com- hree mon an NGO in
occurred t h s. On July A mbarou in
Special Forces Qualification Course. mand before on an aid 19, a simil
vehicle, a a
being as- the shake
n NGO co nd with th r attack
mmunity is new attac
Major Patrick J. Christian is the signed to the will not so k,
ground operations officer in the Com- Joint Special
on try aga
in to
bined Joint Special Operations Task Opera-
Force-Arabian Peninsula. Commis- tions Task
sioned in Infantry in 1986, he served Force-Horn
three years as an Infantry platoon of Africa. Major Christian is a
leader before completing the Spe- graduate of the Command and Gen-
cial Forces Qualification Course and eral Staff Officer Course and holds a
rebranching to SF. As an SF officer, he bachelors degree from the University
served as detachment commander, bat- of South Florida.
talion S1 and battalion S3 in the 20th
SF Group. He later served with the U.S.
Southern Command, the 7th Infantry
March-April 2006 15