Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PRUDENTIALBANK,petitioner,vs.THECOURTOFAPPEALS,
AURORACRUZ,respondents.
Commercial Law Banks or Banking Institutions A banking
corporation is liable to innocent third persons where the representation is
made in the course of its business by an agent acting within the general
scopeofhisauthorityeventhoughtheagentissecretlyabusinghisauthority
and attempting to perpetrate a fraud upon his principal or some other
person for his own ultimate benefit.Conformably, we have declared in
countless decisions that the principal is liable for obligations contracted by
the agent. The agents apparent representation yields to the principals true
representationandthecontractisconsid
________________
*FIRSTDIVISION.
351
VOL.223,JUNE14,1993
351
PrudentialBankvs.CourtofAppeals
ered as entered into between the principal and the third person. A bank is
liableforwrongfulactsofitsofficersdoneintheinterestsofthebankorin
thecourseofdealingsoftheofficersintheirrepresentativecapacitybutnot
foractsoutsidethescopeoftheirauthority.(9c.q.s.p.417)Abankholding
out its officers and agent as worthy of confidence will not be permitted to
profit by the frauds they may thus be enabled to perpetrate in the apparent
scopeoftheiremploymentnorwillitbepermittedtoshirkitsresponsibility
for such frauds, even though no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom
(10 Am Jur 2d, p. 114). Accordingly, a banking corporation is liable to
innocent third persons where the representation is made in the course of its
business by an agent acting within the general scope of his authority even
though,intheparticularcase,theagentissecretlyabusinghisauthorityand
attemptingtoperpetrateafrauduponhisprincipalorsomeotherperson,for
his own ultimate benefit (McIntosh v. Dakota Trust Co., 52 ND 752, 204
NW818,40ALR1021.)
PETITIONforreviewofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
MoniqueQ.Ignacioforpetitioner.
EduardoC.Tutaanforprivaterespondent.
CRUZ,J.:
We deal here with another controversy involving the integrity of a
bank.
Thecomplaintinthiscasearosewhenprivaterespondent
352
352
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PrudentialBankvs.CourtofAppeals
**
353
VOL.223,JUNE14,1993
353
PrudentialBankvs.CourtofAppeals
wasnocopyonfileoftheConfirmationofSaleandtheDebitMemo
allegedly issued to her by Quimbo. Quimbo herself was not
availableforquestioningasshehadnotbeenreportingforthepast
week. Shocked by this information, Cruz became hysterical and
burst into tears. The branch manager,
Roman Santos, assured her
9
thathewouldlookintothematter.
Everydaythereafter,Cruzwenttothebanktoinquireabouther
requesttowithdrawherinvestment.Shereceivednodefiniteanswer,
not even to the10 letter she wrote the bank which was received by
Santoshimself. Finally, Cruz sent the bank a demand letter dated
11
November12,1986fortheamountofP200,000.00plusinterest. In
areplydatedNovember20,1986,thebanksVicePresidentLauroJ.
JocsonsaidthatthereappearedtobeananomalyandrequestedCruz12
to defer court action as they hoped to settle the matter amicably.
Increasingly
worried, Cruz sent another letter reiterating her
13
demand. This time the reply of the bank was unequivocal and
negative.Shewastoldthatherrequesthadtobedeniedbecauseshe
14
hadalreadywithdrawntheamountshewasclaiming.
Cruzs reaction was to file a complaint for breach of contract
againstPrudentialBankintheRegionalTrialCourtofQuezonCity.
Shedemandedthereturnofhermoneywithinterest,plusdamages
andattorneysfees.Initsanswer,thebankdeniedliability,insisting
thatCruzhadwithdrawnherinvestment.Thebankalsoinstituteda
thirdparty complaint against Quimbo, who did not file an answer
15
and was declared in default. The bank, however, did not present
15
and was declared in default. The bank, however, did not present
anyevidenceagainsther.
Aftertrial,JudgeRodolfoA.Ortizrenderedjudgmentinfavorof
theplaintiffsanddisposedasfollows:
ACCORDINGLY,judgmentisherebyrenderedorderingthedefendant/third
partyplaintifftopaytotheplaintiffsthefollowing
________________
9Rollo,p.30.
10Rollo,p.30.
11Rollo,p.30.
12Rollo,p.31.
13Rollo,p.31.
14Rollo,p.31.
15Rollo,p.36.
354
354
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PrudentialBankvs.CourtofAppeals
amounts:
1. P200,000.00,plusinterestthereonattherateof13.75%perannum
fromOctober27,1986,untilfullypaid
2. P30,000.00,asmoraldamages
3. P20,000.00,asexemplarydamagesand
4. P25,000.00,asreasonableattorneysfees.
The counterclaim and the thirdparty complaint of the defendant/ third
partyplaintiffaredismissed.
Withcostsagainstthedefendant/thirdpartyplaintiff.
Thedecisionwasaffirmedintotoonappealtotherespondentcourt.
16
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is now faulted in this
petition, mainly on the ground that the bank should not have been
found liable for a quasidelict when it was sued for breach of
contract.
The petition shall fail. The petitioner is quibbling. It appears to
be merely temporizing to delay enforcement of the liability clearly
establishedagainstit.
The basic issues are factual. The private respondent claims she
has not yet collected her investment of P200,000.00 and has
submittedinproofoftheircontentiontheConfirmationofSaleand
theDebitMemoissuedtoherbyQuimboontheofficialformsofthe
bank.ThepetitionerdeniesherclaimandpointstotheWithdrawal
Slip, which it says Cruz has not denied having signed. It also
contendsthattheConfirmationofSaleandtheDebitMemoarefake
andshouldnothavebeengivencredencebythelowercourts.
Thefindingsofthetrialcourtontheseissueshavebeenaffirmed
bytherespondentcourtandweseenoreasontodisturbthem.The
petitionerhasnotshownthattheyhavebeenreachedarbitrarilyorin
disregard of the evidence of record. On the contrary, we find
substantial basis for the conclusion that the private respondents
signedtheWithdrawalSliponlyaspartofthebanksnewprocedure
ofreinvestment.Shedidnotactuallyreceivetheamountindicated
therein,whichshewasmadetounderstandwasbeingreinvestedin
hername.Thebankitselfso
_______________
16Rollo,pp.3946.
355
VOL.223,JUNE14,1993
355
PrudentialBankvs.CourtofAppeals
assured her in the Confirmation of Sale and the Debit Memo later
issuedtoherbyQuimbo.
Especially
persuasive are the following observations of the trial
17
court:
Whatismore,itcouldnotbethatplaintiffAuroraF.Cruzwithdrewonlythe
amountofP196,122.98fromtheirsavingsaccount,ifheronlyintentionwas
tomakesuchawithdrawal.For,if,indeed,itwasthedesireoftheplaintiffs
towithdrawtheirmoneyfromthedefendant/thirdpartyplaintiff,theycould
havewithdrawnanamountinroundfigures.Certainly,itisunbelievablethat
their withdrawal was in the irregular amount of P196,122.98 if they really
received it. On the contrary, this amount, which is the price of the Central
Bankbillsrolledover,indicatesthat,asclaimedbyplaintiffAuroraF.Cruz,
she did not receive this money, but it was left by her with the defendant/
thirdpartyplaintiffinordertobuyCentralBankbillsplacementforanother
sixtythree(63)days,forwhichshesignedawithdrawalslipattheinstance
ofthirdpartydefendantSusanQuimbowhotoldherthatitwasanewbank
requirement for the rollover of a matured placement which she trustingly
believed.
Indeed,thebankhasnotexplainedtheremarkablecoincidencethat
the amount indicated in the withdrawal slip is exactly the same
amountCruzwasreinvestingafterdeductingtherefromtheprepaid
interest.
Thebankhasalsonotsucceededinimpugningtheauthenticityof
theConfirmationofSaleandtheDebitMemowhichweremadeon
its officialforms.These are admittedly not available to the general
publicorevenitsdepositorsandarehandledonlybyitspersonnel.
Evenassumingthattheywerenotsignedbyitsauthorizedofficials,
as it claims, there was no obligation on the part of Cruz to verify
their authority because she had the right to presume it. The
documentshadbeenissuedintheofficeofthebankitselfandbyits
ownemployeeswithwhomshehadpreviouslydealt.Suchdealings
had not been questioned before, much less invalidated. There was
absolutely no reason why she should not have accepted their
authoritytoactonbehalfoftheiremployer.
_______________
17DecisionofRTCJudgeRodolfoA.Ortiz,pp.78.
356
356
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PrudentialBankvs.CourtofAppeals
Thereisnoquestionthatthepetitionerwasmadeliableforitsfailure
or refusal to deliver to Cruz the amount she had deposited with it
and which she had a right to withdraw upon its maturity. That
investment was acknowledged by its own employees, who had the
apparent authority to do so and so could legally bind it by its acts
visavisCruz.Whatevermighthavehappenedtotheinvestment
whether it was lost or stolen by whoeverwas not the concern of
thedepositor.Itwastheconcernofthebank.
AsfarasCruzwasconcerned,shehadtherighttowithdrawher
P200,000.00placementwhenitmaturedpursuanttothetermsofher
VOL.223,JUNE14,1993
357
PrudentialBankvs.CourtofAppeals
358
358
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PrudentialBankvs.CourtofAppeals
Applicationoftheseprinciplesisespeciallynecessarybecausebanks
have a fiduciary relationship with the public and their stability
depends on the confidence of the people in their honesty and
efficiency. Such faith will be eroded where banks do not exercise
strictcareintheselectionandsupervisionofitsemployees,resulting
inprejudicetotheirdepositors.
It would appear from the facts established in the case before us
thatthepetitionerwaslessthaneagertopresentQuimboatthetrial
oreventoestablishherliabilityalthoughitmadetheinitialeffort
which it did not pursueto hold her answerable in the thirdparty
complaint.Whateverhappenedtoherdoesnotappearintherecord.
Her absence from the proceedings feeds the suspicion of her
possiblemisdeed,whichthebankseemstohavestudiouslyignored
by its insistence that the missing money had been actually
withdrawn by Cruz. By such insistence, the bank is absolving not
only itself but also, in effect and by extension, the disappeared
Quimbowhoapparentlyhasmuchtoexplain.
We agree with the lower courts that the petitioner acted in bad
faith in denying Cruz the obligation she was claiming against it. It
was obviousthatan irregularity had been committed by the banks
personnel,butinsteadofrepairingtheinjurytoCruzbyimmediately
restoringhermoneytoher,itsoughttoglossovertheanomalyinits
ownoperations.
Cruz naturally suffered anxious moments and mental anguish
over the loss of the investment. The amount of P200,000.00 is not
smallevenbypresentstandards.Byunjustlywithholdingitfromher
ontheunproveddefensethatshehadalreadywithdrawnit,thebank
violated the trust she had reposed in it and thus subjected itself to
furtherliabilityformoralandexemplarydamages.
Ifapersondealingwithabankdoesnotreadthefineprintinthe
contract,itisbecause hetrusts the bank and relies on its integrity.
Theordinarycustomerapplyingforaloanorevenmakingadeposit
(andsohimselfextendingtheloantothebank)doesnotbotherwith
the red tape requirements and the finicky conditions in the
documentshesigns.Hisfeelingisthathedoesnothavetobewary
of the bank because it will deal with him fairly and there is no
reason to suspect its motives. This is an attitude the bank must
justify.
Whilethisisnottosaythatbankregulationsaremeaningless
359
VOL.223,JUNE14,1993
359
Domagasvs.Malana
mustalwaysactingoodfaith.Theordinarycustomerdoesnotfeel
the need for a lawyer by his side every time he deals with a bank
becauseheiscertainthatitisnotapredatororapotentialadversary.
The bank should show that there is really no reason for any
apprehensionbecauseittrulydeserveshisfaithinit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
GrioAquino,BellosilloandQuiason,JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied.Appealedjudgmentaffirmed.
o0o
Copyright2016CentralBookSupply,Inc.Allrightsreserved.