Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Review
Reviewed Work(s): Critique, Norm and Utopia. A Study of the Foundations of Critical
Theory by Seyla Benhabib
Review by: Elliot L. Jurist
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 86, No. 4 (Apr., 1989), pp. 203-208
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026962
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BOOK

REVIEWS

203

BOOK REVIEWS

Critique, Norm and Utopia. A Study of the Foundations of Critical

Theory. SEYLA BENHABIB. New York: Columbia University Press,

1986. xiii, 455 p. Cloth $35.00, paper $15.00.

Seyla Benhabib's Critique, Norm and Utopia is a manifold achievement. The work presents a number of communitarian perspectives,
eloquently demonstrating that communitarianism is not a univocal
doctrine that simply asserts the primacy of the community over the
individual. As an alternative to social contract theory, it forms a
tradition in its own right in which the issue of (individual) autonomy
is shown to be a persistent concern. The perspectives of the work can

be characterized as historical reconstructions or narratives of (1) the

idea of critique; (2) the background and development of Critical

Theory; and (3) Jiirgen Habermas's work as the culmination of (1)

and (2).' Benhabib concurs with Habermas in criticizing "the philosophy of the subject" and the interrelated "work" model of action
(10). Ultimately, she goes beyond Habermas, claiming that he does
not adequately free himself from the philosophy of the subject in his
own theory of communicative ethics.
Benhabib rejects the philosophy of the subject, because it entails

several presuppositions, two of which are conspicuously Hegelian:

(1) that history can be viewed as the work of a collective, singular
subject that comes into being through externalizing itself in the
historical process; and (2) that emancipation entails reappropriating

the heritage of this subject (393). These aspects of the philosophy of

the subject are manifest in the original programmatic statements of

Critical Theory, and they are implicit in Habermas. It should be

noted that Benhabib is not sympathetic to poststructuralist attacks

on the philosophy of the subject. It is not the idea of subjectivity

itself which needs to be abandoned, rather subjectivity conceived of

as exclusively monological. Although Benhabib is prepared to de-

fend "the dignity and autonomy of the rational subject" (15), she
wants to argue that the rational subject is intersubjectively constituted and also that one should not presume that, by virtue of sharing
rationality, all subjects have the same histories or interests.

She examines the idea of critique in order to establish the original

'Benhabib distinguishes her approach as "systematic" as opposed to straightforwardly historical. She also cautions against regarding Habermas's work in Hegelian
terms as "last in line," and hence automatically "the most fully developed and the
most adequate" (224).

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204 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

connection between critique and crisis, i.e., "a subjective evaluation

or decision concerning a conflictual and controversial process"

(19).2 Hegel's rejection of the "mere criticism" of Kant and the

Enlightenment aims to restore the aspect of crisis. This is necessary

in Hegel's view, given the absence of unified ethical life in modern

society. Benhabib describes two kinds of critique in the first two
chapters, respectively, (1) immanent- "a non-criteriological inquiry,
which allows its practitioners to criticize the opponents' arguments
by showing their internal inconsistencies and contradictoriness" (9);
and (2) defetishizing-"a procedure of showing that what appears as
a given is in fact not a natural fact but a historically and socially
formed reality" (21). Benhabib seems to regard these two kinds of
critique as functioning in conjunction with each other, although not
much is said about this. The main claim is that critique is crisis
diagnosis, and that crisis diagnosis leads in two directions-to
"norms" (the goal of "fulfillment") and to "utopia" (the goal of
"transfiguration"). Following Habermas, she emphasizes a related
distinction: that critique ideally includes an "explanatory-diagnostic" component as well as an "anticipatory-utopian" one. The
former pertains to the perspective of the observer, while the latter
pertains to the lived needs and experiences of social agents (142).
The subtitle of the work, "A Study of the Foundations of Critical
Theory," indicates that Benhabib is concerned with tracing the
emergence of Critical Theory, as formulated by the Frankfurt
School, out of its background in Hegel and Marx. The "transformation" of the idea of critique, the title of part II, amends the Marxist
idea of critique of political economy to the "critique of instrumental
reason." The latter has the advantage of not excluding consideration

of cultural and psychological relations that individuals actually experience. Benhabib goes on to claim that the development of Critical
Theory resulted in the abandonment of the explanatory-diagnostic
component of critique. This occurred as it allied itself more and
more with aesthetics as the (utopian) alternative to instrumental reason, beginning with Dialectic of Enlightenment.3 While Critical
Theory attempted to break free from the model of action inherited
from Hegel and Marx, it still held onto the presuppositions of the
philosophy of the subject (213).4
2 The discussion of critique and crisis stems from Reinhart Kosseleck's Kritik und
Krise (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976). Also see: Habermas's Legitimation Crisis,
Thomas A. McCarthy, trans. (Boston: Beacon, 1975), pt. I.
3Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (New York: Seabury, 1972).
4Benhabib argues that the model of action in Hegel and Marx is the work model
in which a subject externalizes and produces itself through labor. It also shows the

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BOOK

REVIEWS

205

Habermas rejuvenates Critical Theory by positing communicative

reason as an alternative to instrumental reason. Rather than merely
reject the work model of action, he replaces it by the model of
communicative interaction which is guided by ideal speech conditions. Critical Theory's original aim of social transformation is insured, for both components of critique are included: the explanatory-diagnostic (which reestablishes a bridge between philosophy and
the social sciences) and the anticipatory-utopian (which distinguishes
Critical Theory from functionalist theories, since it preserves an
interest in the emancipation of those who actually suffer).
Benhabib makes no secret that her projects reiterate stories Habermas has told. Part I on the "origins" of critique, which traces
Hegel's critique of Kant's critique(s) and Marx's critique of Hegel,
reads like the first part of Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests,5 rewritten with his later self-criticisms in mind.6 I want to dwell
upon two examples that reveal that Benhabib relies rather too
heavily upon Habermas.

The first example concerns the interpretation of Hegel's development. Benhabib follows Habermas in beginning the story with Natural Law (written before 1802), which both she and Habermas see as
being burdened by the model of the polis and the example of Greek
tragedy. Hegel does not formulate a realistic alternative to address
the modern dilemma of the individual's relation to society. The story
moves on to the Jena Realphilosophie (1805/6), which highlights
labor and interaction, and promisingly turns away from the philosophy of the monological subject. In the Phenomenology of Spirit

(1807), the promise of transcending monological subjectivity

founders, owing to the priority given to transsubjectivity, the vantage
point of Spirit. Benhabib's Habermasian version fails to account for

influence of expressivism, a model which she borrows from Charles Taylor. Unfortunately, Benhabib does not explore contradictions between the work and expressivist models. Taylor emphasizes that the latter is an aesthetic concept (it includes an
element of play) and contains demands for unity, freedom, and communion with
man and nature. See Taylor, Hegel (New York: Cambridge, 1975), pp. 24-29; 38.
5Jeremy J. Shapiro, trans. (Boston: Beacon, 1971).

6 For Habermas's self-criticisms, see (1) "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human
Interests," in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, iii (1973): 157-189; and (2) "A
Reply to my Critics," in Habermas: Critical Debates, John Thompson and David
Held, eds. (Cambridge: MIT, 1982), pp. 219-283. For his criticism of the philosophy of the subject, see (1) The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I: Reason
and the Rationalization of Society, Thomas A. McCarthy, trans. (Boston: Beacon,

1984), pp. 387f.; and (2) The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve

Lectures, Frederick Lawrence, trans. (Cambridge: MIT, 1987), pp. 294-326. Also
see Richard Bernstein's useful introduction in Habermas and Modernity, Bernstein, ed. (Cambridge: MIT, 1985).

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206 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

several matters: (1) that the emphasis upon Greek tragedy in Natural
Law can itself be regarded as an interest in intersubjectivity; (2) that

Hegel certainly dwells upon intersubjectivity already in System of

Ethical Life (1802/3) and also in First Philosophy of Spirit (1803/
4); and (3) that it is possible to argue that the Phenomenology retains

an interest in intersubjectivity, following the example of Greek tragedy, through the relation of the reader/spectator reacting to the
"performance" of the text/drama.

The second example of Benhabib's over reliance upon Habermas

concerns the interpretation of Horkheimer and Adorno's concept of

mimesis. Benhabib follows Habermas in criticizing it as an aesthetic

concept. In turning the work model upside down, mimesis is a kind
of narcissistic mirror which ignores the crucial role that linguistic

communication plays and which fails to formulate a viable alternative

model. Benhabib is misled by Habermas's assessment of mimesis as

part of the overall pessimism of Horkheimer and Adorno (both acknowledge that their pessimism was affected by the historical moment in 1944). Both Benhabib and Habermas ignore that mimesis

can be construed as providing a positive model of human interaction.

It provides a contrast to "false projection," where an individual fails

to be able to acknowledge the other as other and regards the other as
like herself. False projection is a pathological form of relation which

Horkheimer and Adorno invoke in order to understand anti-

Semitism and fascism (op. cit., p. 187).

Mimesis includes Aristotelian connotations of being: an imitation
of action, a natural extension from childhood pleasure, and potentially a learning experience (Poetics, 1448a-b). It also includes a

psychoanalytic premise: that one must move beyond the child's intense identification with the parents to a new kind of bond, which, in

not obscuring or denying difference, fosters autonomy. Mimesis

provides a healthy alternative-at worst, a glimmer of hope in the
darkness and, at best, an astute concrete analysis of a social phenomenon that was of crisis proportions.

Benhabib's discussion of Habermas is complex and enormously

informative. I shall not be able to do itjustice here. She is skeptical of
Habermas's Kantian tendencies, discernable in his attention to tran-

scendental argument (267), proceduralism (288), and universalist

egalitarian commitments (306). She also worries that Habermas does
not successfully carry forth an anticipatory-utopian component. In

allying himself with "a democratic public ethos," he is opting for the
goal of fulfillment over transformation (254;283). She lauds Ha-

bermas for his interest in rights and entitlements, while she criticizes
him for neglecting issues of needs and solidarity (339).

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BOOK REVIEWS 207

At the heart of Benhabib's criticism

he ignores natural, social, and cultu

possibility of a generalized other, w
Mead and which bears the mark o
Benhabib offers instead the notion
takes from Carol Gilligan. The conc
every rational being as an individual
and affective-emotional constitution" (341). The concrete other is
identified with a feminist perspective, although its relevance is not
limited to gender issues (409). Benhabib's notion of the concrete
other bases itself upon a norm of "complementary reciprocity." She
emphasizes that the context for human interaction is often private
and noninstitutional, and thus there is the need for norms of solidarity, friendship, love, and care.7

One might well link Benhabib's notion of the concrete other to

Horkheimer and Adorno's concept of mimesis, since they portray
the Jews as concrete others. [Horkheimer and Adorno also mention
a connection in their analysis between Jews and women (op. cit., p.
112; see also p. 248).] It is not easy to reconcile the notion of the
concrete other with Habermas's views. For example, Benhabib does
not deal with the way in which love and care are not bound by
linguistic communication. It is also unclear why Benhabib would
want to endorse Habermas's exclusivist bridging of philosophy and
the social sciences, since it is predicated upon the Kantian separation
of the theoretical, the practical, and the aesthetic (and the implicit
devaluing of the latter). Is not aesthetic discourse precisely the arena
where we find the concrete other represented and taken seriously?
Certainly aesthetic discourse is likely to be more articulate about and
attentive to our "affective-emotional" selves.

Benhabib proposes that Critical Theory constitutes a third alternative in contemporary philosophy, situated between neo-Kantianism and contextualism. Like neo-Kantians, she is not prepared to do
away with standards of validity (or the model of the rational subject).

Like the contextualists, she accepts "the inevitable cultural, historical hermeneutical and ontological presuppositions which form the
horizon of our standpoint" (15). In reaction to the neo-Kantian
7 For a view that is more bluntly critical of Habermas's failure to take account of
such norms, see Nancy Fraser, "What's Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of
Habermas and Gender," in Feminism as Critique, Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell,

eds. (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1987). Benhabib's article in the same volume,

"The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and
Feminist Theory," offers important clarifications concerning the notion of the

concrete other.

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208 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

elements of Habermas's version of Critical Theory, Benhabib introduces her own version, which seems to lean more toward contextual-

ism. Perhaps we might consider this as the basis of a fourth, rather

than an extension of a third, alternative.
ELLIOT L. JURIST

University of California/Santa Barbara

Ought, Reasons, and Morality. W. D. FALK. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. 291 p. $29.95.
W. D. Falk is a hedgehog, to use Isaiah Berlin's term. Over the past
forty years he has written a series of papers which grapple with the
most fundamental problems of moral philosophy. What is value, and

how is it known? How is moral obligation possible? How, that is, can
rational agents be bound by morality in a way which is inescapable
and which gives them rationally conclusive motives? How can reason

be practical? How can conduct be guided by reason, not just in the

sense that it proceeds in the knowledge of reasons, but shaped by an
awareness that they are reasons? And how is that awareness itself
possible? How can practical thinking go validly from iss to oughts,
even though no practical judgment follows deductively from the
premises on which it is based?

Given the breathtaking range of these questions, it may seem odd

to characterize Falk as a hedgehog. Only the nimble fox could hope

to engage them all, and, even then, only in his relatively superficial,

foxlike way. It is not too much of an exaggeration to say, however,

that, for Falk, all these questions are but different aspects of the
same underlying problematic, different formulations of a single-root
issue. Whether he is concerned with the nature of value and its
epistemology, or with the relation between moral obligation and the
autonomy of the moral subject, Falk takes himself to be exercised
with a question that is, at bottom, much the same, even though it may
appear in different dress, with different emphases and stress. And it
has been almost always to expose, engage, and, finally, to solve this
single-root issue of moral philosophy that Falk has been burrowing.
The present book is a very welcome collection of Falk's essays.

Most have been previously published, and many of these with great
impact, but five of the essays are new. The collection is welcome, of
course, partly because of this new material; "Fact, Value, and Nonnatural Predication" is an important piece, for example. But the
0022-362X/89/8604/208-214 ? 1989 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

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