1. TAN VS.

BALLENA
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Antonio Tan, Danilo Domingo and Robert Lim were officers of Footjoy Industrial Corporation (Footjoy), a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing shoes and other kinds of footwear, prior to the cessation of its operations
sometime in February 2001. On 19 March 2001, respondent Amelito Ballena, 6 and one hundred thirty-nine (139) other employees
of Footjoy, filed a Joint Complaint-Affidavit7 before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan against the company and
petitioners Tan and Domingo in their capacities as owner/president and administrative officer, respectively. 8
The Complaint-Affidavit alleged that the company did not regularly report the respondent employees for membership at the
Social Security System (SSS) and that it likewise failed to remit their SSS contributions and payment for their SSS loans, which
were already deducted from their wages. In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, 10 petitioners Tan and Domingo blamed the economic
distress that beset their company for their failure to timely pay and update the monthly SSS contributions of the employees. They
alleged that the company's dire situation became even more aggravated when the buildings and equipment of Footjoy were
destroyed by fire on 4 February 2001.11 This incident eventually led to the cessation of the company's operations. Because of this,
some of the company's employees tried to avail themselves of their SSS benefits but failed to do so. It was then that the
employees filed their complaint. Petitioners Tan and Domingo thereafter underlined their good faith and lack of criminal
culpability when they acknowledged their fault and demonstrated their willingness to pay their obligations by executing a
memorandum of agreement with the SSS.
DOJ favored herein Petitioners, thus, Respondents claimed that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in finding that no probable cause existed to charge petitioners Tan, Domingo and Lim with violations of
the SSS Law; that the allegation of petitioners' failure to report respondents to the SSS for coverage is not supported by evidence;
and that charges [for the violation] of a special law such as the Social Security Act can be overcome by a show of good faith and
lack of intent to commit the same.
CA reversed the contention of DOJ. In reversing the DOJ resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that the agency acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it committed a palpable mistake in dismissing the charges against petitioners. The appellate court found
that petitioners were indeed remiss in their duty to remit the respondents' SSS contributions in violation of Section 28(h) of the
Social Security Law. The petitioners' claim of good faith and the absence of criminal intent should not have been considered, as
these were evidentiary in nature and should thus be more properly proved in a trial. Furthermore, the appellate court declared that
said defenses are unavailing in crimes punishable by a special law, which are characterized as mala prohibita. In these crimes, it
is enough that they were done freely and consciously and that the intent to commit the same need not be proved.
RULING:
This Court finds no fault in the assailed actions of the Court of Appeals.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals' findings that there was indeed probable
cause to indict petitioners for the offenses charged.
In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but only such as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 58 Certainly, it
does not involve the determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the
person. Only prima facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient.59 Therefore, matters of evidence are more appropriately presented and heard during the trial. 60
In the present case, petitioners were charged with violations of the SSS Law for their failure to either promptly report some of the
respondents for compulsory coverage/membership with the SSS or remit their SSS contributions and loan amortizations. In
support of their claims, respondents have attached unto their Joint Complaint-Affidavit a summary of their unreported and
unremitted SSS contributions,61 as gathered from the SSS Online Inquiry System, and a computation of their unreported and
unremitted SSS contributions.62
On the part of the petitioners, they have not denied their fault in not remitting the SSS contributions and loan payments of the
respondents in violation of Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the SSS Law. Instead, petitioners interposed the defenses of
lack of criminal intent and good faith, as their failure to remit was brought about by alleged economic difficulties, and they have
already agreed to settle their obligations with the SSS through a memorandum of agreement to pay in installments. As held by the
Court of Appeals, the claims of good faith and absence of criminal intent for the petitioners' acknowledged non-remittance of the
respondents' contributions deserve scant consideration. The violations charged in this case pertain to the SSS Law, which is a
special law. As such, it belongs to a class of offenses known as mala prohibita.
The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law
been violated?63 When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. 64 Thus, the petitioners' admission in the instant
case of their violations of the provisions of the SSS Law is more than enough to establish the existence of probable cause to
prosecute them for the same.

Applicable SSS Provisions:

SEC. 9. Coverage. - (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory upon all employees not over sixty (60) years of age
and their employers: x x x Provided, finally, That nothing in this Act shall be construed as a limitation on the right of
employers and employees to agree on and adopt benefits which are over and above those provided under this Act.
SEC. 10. Effective Date of Coverage. - Compulsory coverage of the employer shall take effect on the first day of his
operation and that of the employee on the day of his employment: x x x.
SEC. 22. Remittance of Contributions. -- (a) The contribution imposed in the preceding section shall be remitted to the
SSS within the first ten (10) days of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within
such time as the Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contributions shall
be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the
contribution a penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid. If
deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the collection and remittance of contributions shall be made
quarterly or semi-annually in advance, the contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective
employers: Provided, That upon separation of an employee, any contribution so paid in advance but not due shall be
credited or refunded to his employer.
(b) The contributions payable under this Act in cases where an employer refuses or neglects to pay the same shall be
collected by the SSS in the same manner as taxes are made collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended. Failure or refusal of the employer to pay or remit the contributions herein prescribed shall not prejudice the
right of the covered employee to the benefits of the coverage.
The right to institute the necessary action against the employer may be commenced within twenty (20) years from the
time the delinquency is known or the assessment is made by the SSS, or from the time the benefit accrues, as the case
may be.
(c) Should any person, natural or juridical, defaults in any payment of contributions, the Commission may also collect
the same in either of the following ways:
1. By an action in court, which shall hear and dispose of the case in preference to any other civil action; x x x.
SEC. 24. Employment Records and Reports. (b) Should the employer misrepresent the true date of employment of the employee member or remit to the
SSS contributions which are less than those required in this Act or fail to remit any contribution due prior to
the date of contingency, resulting in a reduction of benefits, the employer shall pay to the SSS damages
equivalent to the difference between the amount of benefit to which the employee member or his beneficiary
is entitled had the proper contributions been remitted to the SSS and the amount payable on the basis of the
contributions actually remitted:
SEC. 28. Penal Clause. (e) Whoever fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of this Act or with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission, shall be punished by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), or imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one
(1) day nor more than twelve (12) years, or both, at the discretion of the court: Provided, That, where the
violation consists in failure or refusal to register employees or himself, in case of the covered self-employed,
or to deduct contributions from the employees' compensation and remit the same to the SSS, the penalty shall
be a fine of not less Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and
imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor more than twelve (12) years.
(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership, corporation or
any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this
Act for the offense.
(h) Any employer who after deducting the monthly contributions or loan amortizations from his employee's
compensation, fails to remit the said deductions to the SSS within thirty (30) days from the date they became
due shall be presumed to have misappropriated such contributions or loan amortizations and shall suffer the
penalties provided in Article Three hundred fifteen of the Revised Penal Code.

2. Garcia vs. SSS

Facts: Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, et.al. were directors of Impact Corporation.

Impact Corporation started encountering financial problems. Impact Corporation
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Petition for Suspension
of Payments. The company is directed to pay all the entitled workers unpaid wages,
unpaid 13th month pay and to remit to the Social Security System loan
amortizations and SSS premiums previously deducted from the wages of the
workers. The Social Security System (SSS), through its Legal and Collection Division
(LCD), filed a case before the SSC for the collection of unremitted SSS premium
contributions withheld by Impact Corporation from its employees. Petitioner avers
that under the aforesaid provision, the liability does not include liability for the
unremitted SSS premium contributions.

Issue: WON petitioner can be made solely liable for the corporate obligations of
Impact Corporation pertaining to unremitted SSS premium contributions and
penalties therefore.

Held: Clearly, a simplistic interpretation of the law is untenable. It is a rule in

statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.[23] The liability imposed as contemplated under the foregoing
Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law does not preclude the liability for the
unremitted amount. Relevant to Section 28(f) is Section 22 of the same law
Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, as sole surviving director of Impact Corporation is
hereby ORDERED to pay for the collected and unremitted SSS contributions of
Impact Corporation. The case is REMANDED to the SSS for computation of the exact
amount and collection thereof.

5. Chua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125837, October 6, 2004.

Facts:
On August 20, 1985, private respondents Andres Paguio, Pablo Canale, Ruel Pangan,
Aurelio Paguio, Rolando Trinidad, Romeo Tapang and Carlos Maliwat filed a petition
with the SSC for SSS coverage and contributions against petitioner Reynaldo Chua,
owner of Prime Mover Construction Development, claiming that they were all
regular employees of the petitioner in his construction business.
Private respondents alleged that petitioner dismissed all of them without justifiable
grounds, and without notice to them and to the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment. They further alleged that petitioner did not report them to the SSS for
compulsory coverage in flagrant violation of the Social Security Act.
Petitioner claimed that private respondents were not regular employees, but project
employees whose work had been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion of which was determined at the time of their engagement. This being
the case, he concluded that said employees were not entitled to coverage under the
Social Security Act. Petitioner also claimed that the case has prescribed. The Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of the private respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to compulsory SSS coverage.
Held:
Yes. Well-settled is the rule that the mandatory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended, is premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
the essential elements of which are: (a) selection and engagement of the employee;
(b) payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power of control with
regard to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, with
the power of control being the most determinative factor. The existence of an
employer-employee relationship between the parties can easily be determined by
the application of the control test.
It is clear that private respondents are employees of petitioner, the latter having
control over the results of the work done, as well as the means and methods by
which the same were accomplished. Suffice it to say that regardless of the nature of
their employment, whether it is regular or project, private respondents are subject
of the compulsory coverage under the SSS Law, their employment not falling under
the exceptions provided under Section 8(j) of the Social Security Act. In addition,
private respondents right to file their claim had not yet prescribed at the time of
the filing of their petition. Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, prescribes a period of
twenty (20) years, from the time the delinquency is known or assessment is made
by the SSS, within which to file a claim for non-remittance against employers.

7. Elena Dycaico Vs SSS

Facts:
Elena Dycaico seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the
decision of Social Security Commission denying her claim for survivors pension which
accrues from the death of her husband, Bonifacio Dycaico.
Bonifacio Dycaico became a member of SSS and designated Elena Dycaico and their eight
children as beneficiaries therein. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Nine years after, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension
from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away. A few
months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner
Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for
survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that they were not
living under the benefit of marriage when Bonifacio became a member of SSS. The basis
was Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 which reads:
Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension.

An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals but it was, likewise, denied. The same Court
ruled that that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the
time of his retirement, his designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries is void.

The petitioner claims that there is no merit to the decision of Court of Appeals as the SSS
law does is silent denying the beneficiarys claim for survivor pension.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation to equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the positive. There is a violation of due process and equal
protection.
The Court holds that the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep.
Act No. 8282, which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, is unconstitutional for it
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
If the said provision will be sustained, there will be an outright confiscation of benefits due
to the surviving spouse without giving her opportunity to be heard. There is, therefore, a
violation of due process.
There is also a violation of equal protection of the Constitution.
A statute, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements: must satisfy
the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivors pension
based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other
spouse bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law
Indeed, the SC does not find substantial distinction between spouses whose assignment as a
beneficiary was made after the marriage and spouses whose assignment as a beneficiary

was made before the marriage. The statute violates equal protection clause when it grants
surviving pensions only to the spouses belonging to the former case and not to than the
latter.

9. SONIA MACEDA and GEMMA MACEDA-MACATANGAY v.

ENCARNACION DE GUZMAN VDA. DE MACATANGAY
481 SCRA 415 (2006), THIRD DIVISION
Spouses Sonia Maceda and Bonifacio Macatangay, executed a Kasunduan
whereby they agreed to live separately. Bonifacio soon lived with his common
law wife Carmen Jaraza. When Bonifacio died, Sonia claimed for his Social
Security System (SSS) benefit, which was granted to her. However, the Social
Security Commission (SSC) later ordered Sonia to refund the benefits in favor
of Encarnacion De Guzman Macatangay, Bonifacios mother, and his
illegitimate children, on the ground that the Kasunduan is a proof that Sonia is
not dependent upon Bonifacio for support.
Sonia filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA). However,
the same was dismissed due to their failure to explain why they failed to
personally serve copies of the petition to Encarnacion which is required in
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure. In her affidavit, Sonia
explains that they resorted to service by mail due to the distant addresses of
Encarnacions lawyer in Lopez, Quezon and Sonias counsel in Lucena City,
thereby making personal service impracticable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the distant addresses made the personal service impracticable
making the service by mail valid
HELD:
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set
of adjectiverules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of
Rule 13 thengives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as
not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no
written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the
first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itselfbegins with the clause
whenever practicable.
The Court thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general
rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception.
Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of
the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is
mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort
to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin
with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise
consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues
involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11.
In the case at bar, the address of Encarnacions counsel is Lopez, Quezon,
while Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away
from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As in
Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally
might have been superfluous.
Without preempting the findings of the Court of Appeals on the merits of
Sonias petition, if Sonias allegations of fact and of law therein are true and
the outright dismissal of their petition is upheld without giving them the

opportunity to prove their allegations, Sonia would be deprived of her

rightful death benefits just because of the Kasunduan she forged with her
husband Bonifacio which contract is, in the first place, unlawful. The resulting
injustice would not be commensurate to Sonia counsels thoughtlessness in
not explaining why Encarnacion were not personally served copies of the
petition.

G.R. No. 173846

February 2, 2011

10. JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, ERLINDA PANLILIO, NICOLE MORRIS and MARIO T.
CRISTOBAL, Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, CITY OF MANILA, represented by HON. PRESIDING
JUDGE ANTONIO M. ROSALES; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and the SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM, Respondents.
FACTS:
Jose Marcel Panlilio, ErlindaPanlilio, Nicole Morris and Marlo Cristobal (petitioners), as corporate
officers of Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (SIHI), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 24, a petition for Suspension of Payments and Rehabilitation. The RTC of Manila, Branch
24, issued an Order staying all claims against SIHI upon finding the petition sufficient in form and
substance. At the time, however, of the filing of the petition for rehabilitation, there were a number of
criminal charges pending against petitioners in Branch 51 of the RTC of Manila. These criminal
charges were initiated by respondent Social Security System (SSS) and involved charges of Estafa.
Consequently, petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 51, a Manifestation and Motion to
Suspend Proceedings. Petitioners argued that the stay order issued by Branch 24 should also apply

to the criminal charges pending in Branch 51. Petitioners, thus, prayed that Branch 51 suspend its
proceedings until the petition for rehabilitation was finally resolved but Branch 51 issued an
Order denying petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings. It ruled that the stay order issued by
Branch 24 did not cover criminal proceedings. Branch 51 then denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the Order of Branch
51 but the CA issued a Decision denying the petition. Hence petitioners filed before the Supreme
Court a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of "all claims" as an incident to a corporate rehabilitation also
includes the suspension of criminal charges filed against the corporate officers of the distressed
corporation.
RULING:
No, the criminal charges are not included.
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 51, was ORDERED to proceed with the criminal cases filed
against petitioners.
In Rosario v. Co24 (Rosario), a case of recent vintage, the issue resolved by the Court was whether
or not during the pendency of rehabilitation proceedings, criminal charges for violation of Batas
PambansaBilang 22 should be suspended and it was ruled that the filing of the case for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 is not a "claim" that can be enjoined within the purview of P.D. No. 902-A. True,
although conviction of the accused for the alleged crime could result in the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
felonious act of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a criminal
action.
A criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the
offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the
offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused.
The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the
sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance
to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, the action between the private
complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former.
The rehabilitation of SIHI and the settlement of claims against the corporation is not a legal
ground for the extinction of petitioners criminal liabilities. There is no reason why criminal
proceedings should be suspended during corporate rehabilitation, more so, since the prime purpose
of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to
maintain social order. As correctly observed in Rosario, it would be absurd for one who has engaged
in criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere filing of a petition for rehabilitation by the
corporation of which he is an officer.
The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending
rehabilitation of the corporation, especially since they are charged in their individual
capacities. Such being the case, the purpose of the law for the issuance of the stay order is not

compromised, since the appointed rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge his functions as
mandated by law.