QHSE

1. Planning
Guidelines for developing HSE Policy and
procedures
This article presents some guidelines for setting up HSE policy and procedures for
exploration projects.

1. General
1.1 Policy
"Health, Safety and Environment" are the aspects of activities which relate to how
work is carried out rather than to what is done. They must be given equal priority
with the technical aspects of any operation. This is a primary responsibility of the
Management to ensure that all the contractors involved, as well as all staff
members, are aware and adhere to this policy.

1.2 Implementation
A specific HSE policy document must be prepared and communicated, based on the
Company Guidelines. It should demonstrate commitment, understanding of HSEcritical areas, and control mechanisms. It should be signed by the Country Manager,
displayed in premises and sites, and distributed.
Key features of an HSE policy:
1. Clearly identifies the company and the business areas to which it refers.
2. Should be produced in a bold, easy to read format.
3. Should be consistent in appearance with other company policies.
4. Should be restricted to one A4 page display of concise, action-oriented
statements.
5. For an HSE policy to work it must have the following characteristics:
High HSE awareness, understanding and commitment.
Supervisory capabilities and skills appropriate to the job.
Consistency, clarity, and realism in standards and procedures.
Pragmatic HSE management structures for each business area.
In addition to the general HSE policy, a new Company will need to establish specific
policies for drugs and alcohol abuse, smoking, road safety and others.

2. Health
2.1 Medical care requirements

For general medical services, consider a staff doctor or a contract with a local
doctor.
For specialized medical services, a contract with local hospitals/clinics and an
evacuation plan must be in place. Generally, organizations like embassies have
private clinics and it might be possible to get an arrangement for their use by
Company staff.
In the field the medical support to be provided depends on the operation. For an
onshore operation, depending on the situation (seismic or drilling), activities can be
concentrated in one site, or spread out during road construction or mobilization. The
type of medical support required for each worksite will depend on specific health
risks, risk of injury, communications and access.
In some areas the provision of doctors on offshore drilling units is covered by local
regulations.
As a rule, each working group must contain someone who has had first aid training.
This can be met by means of training courses given on site by the Company doctor
or paramedic.
As a guideline, first aid should be available to all staff within four minutes, advanced
first aid within one hour, and there should be access to a fully qualified doctor or
hospital within four hours.
There must be a fully reliable telecommunications system, 24 hours/day availability
of ambulance transport and doctor. If this cannot be guaranteed a qualified doctor
must be on site with facilities to stabilize a badly injured patient to enable a medical
evacuation even under difficult circumstances. The doctor should have at least five
years relevant experience.
Replacement of the doctor(s) should be addressed.
Requirement for paramedics in addition to the doctor depends on the spread of the
operation and the ease of movement between sites. If it is decided not to have a
doctor on site, then there should certainly be one on call from the office.
Remember that "part-time" doctors have different priorities except for obvious lifeor-death situations.

2.2 Preventive measures

Preventive measures should be discussed and a guide for staff, contractors and
visitors should be prepared. Copy of the guide should be issued to contractors and
visitors, highlighting the period for which prophylactic drugs and vaccinations
should be taken before arrival and continued after leaving.
Staff should be requested to visit a medical center for a briefing and check-up. Note
that acceptable dental care may not be easily available in isolated areas and any
necessary work should be done before departure.

2.3 General preventive health

An assessment of health risks associated with work and the work environment
should be made.
There are a few additional practical points which may be mentioned:
Advice may be given that domestic servants are medically examined before being
taken on, with emphasis on the prevention of infectious diseases.
The spraying or fogging of gardens may be considered.
Drinking water quality should be assessed.

A water filter of the type which filters the water through earthenware candles is
commonly used. If this is done the water should be boiled after filtering rather than
before.
Water condensing out of air-conditioners gives a useful supply of safe water, as long
as the container is covered, and it has the advantage of being free of color and
sediment.
Avoid salads, peel fruit and eat well cooked meat.
The quality of local restaurants can only be judged by experience, and the advice of
other expatriates and senior local staff should be sought in the first instance.

2.4 Health in field locations

It is the responsibility of the Company to ensure that the relevant contractor
maintains proper standards of hygiene, drinking water quality, etc. This must be
done by audits conducted by the line supervisor and the doctor.

3. Safety
3.1 Safety management
The HSE Case, in addition to documenting SMS, provides a description of the
hazards associated with the particular installation or operation and the means by
which they have been assessed and are controlled. It details emergency
preparedness and contingency planning measures aimed at safeguarding life, the
environment and the asset as well as recovering from any emergency situation.
The HSE Case concludes with a Statement of Fitness which explains that the
hazards associated with the installation or operation have been evaluated and
measures have been, or will be taken, to reduce the risks to the lowest level that is
reasonably practicable. The Statement of Fitness must affirm that conditions are
satisfactory to carry out the operation.
The Safety Management System should be in place, and the HSE Case documented,
before any operation can commence.

3.2 Implementation
Visible consistent management commitment is essential. Weekly meetings must be
held between the Country Manager, the Department Heads and the major
contractors (drilling, transport, engineering, etc.). These meetings should inculcate
a team approach to operations and ensure that procedures involving more than one
company are jointly discussed and agreed. Weekly site safety meetings should be
reviewed and action agreed.
Some tenderers know that they wont be able to comply with all the conditions of
contract but, to improve their chance of being awarded the contract, says that they
will comply. Regular inspections may not work as the contract will pretend that he
has everything in order will be ready on the required date. To counter this, consider
including a provision in the contract award notification that the award is subject to
orders for equipment being placed or delivered by a certain date, and key personnel
to be in place by a given time. Penalty for missing items should also be considered.
In practice even if the Company has the option to terminate the contract, there is
never enough time to re-tender and re-award - and the contractor knows this. He

has to be persuaded that compliance with the standards is in his best interest,
which in the short term is not always the case. The best method is good
communication from the beginning, using the assurance that non-compliance with
contractual standards will reduce profits.
The translation of safety procedures and guidelines into practice is the greatest
challenge to the Management Team.
In the context of an operation in a remote area it has to be remembered that the
objective of safety management is the reduction/elimination of accidents.
A policy which creates a major problem in every land-drilling operation in bush
areas is that of wearing protective footwear. Laborers may be tripping all the time,
which is counter-productive. The solution is to identify the risk and use the locally
accepted method of small scale bush clearance. The most common injuries among
bush clearers are likely to be cuts on the lower leg caused by their machetes being
deflected. They may also be at risk from snake bites or scorpion stings. Some
foot/lower leg protection is thus required, but not necessarily safety boots. The
optimum "protective footwear" is thus jungle boots with the lightest possible sole
and foot, and canvas upper sections. If possible, a representative of the laborers
should be involved in the discussion. If the wearing of special footwear can be
associated with the status of the wearer there will be much less resistance to
wearing them.
Note that laborers may "lose" the boots every night. Positive steps should be taken
to prevent this.
It is likely that a transport contractor will not have seat belts in his trucks, or
reversing alarms, or roll-over bars on his personnel carriers. This must be checked
early so that these items can be imported and their fitting supervised. Alternatively,
vehicles should be imported on a temporary basis.

3.3 Hazard identification

As part of the HSE Case a Hazard Register should be prepared to address all
identified hazards associated with the location and operation planned.
An effort should be made to develop an atmosphere in which all staff and
contractors can bring unsafe acts and situations to the attention of the responsible
supervisor without creating ill-feeling. Also everyone (including supervisors) should
be permanently on the look-out for any such act or situation and that if one exists it
should be corrected immediately.

3.4 Reporting
All incidents, including environmental incidents and occupational illnesses must be
reported through the "line", in exactly the same way as for technical operational
data. The Company site representative must generate an atmosphere in which he is
informed about even first aid incidents from the contractor supervisors, rather than
hearing about them from the site doctor or medic.
Minor accidents should be included in the morning report; significant medical
treatment cases, and lost time accidents, should be reported immediately to the
Department Head concerned.

There is a natural reluctance among staff to report accidents. It must be

emphasized that future accidents are avoided by learning from experience and this
is the purpose of the reporting procedure and not to produce statistics. Note that
supervisors/managers should not discuss in public the categorization of specific
accidents.

3.5 Incentives
The question of safety bonuses is a difficult subject. People do not deliberately have
accidents so payment for avoiding accidents will not affect their behavior - it is only
training which can do that. However, the publicity attached to the bonuses will raise
general safety awareness.
If the bonus is not earned individually but by groups, it should encourage laborers to
watch over each other, but if one has an accident, the others may be upset for
losing their bonus. There could also be incentive not to report accidents.
If only one of the contractors have a bonus scheme, the others will be unhappy and
so will company workers.
Disputes may also arise that the accident is caused by factors outside the control of
the contractor.
In general, no accident bonus payments are not recommended. A better approach
may be to give out prizes (preferably in kind) for safety-related suggestions,
mutually agreed training targets, etc. The management of this process will take a
lot of administrative effort as all suggestions must be followed through and
discussed with their originator. In any case, the system adopted must be simple and
visible.

3.6 Audits
External Audit
Technical HSE Audit of the Company operations (transport, seismic, drilling, etc.)
should be carried out by a combined team of external auditors, a Company
representative and a representative of the relevant Contractor. Not only the
hardware and the procedures should be audited, but also the supervisory and
management control.
Pre-start-up audit
A pre-start-up audit of each aspect of the operation (drilling, transport, finance, etc.)
must be conducted to enable the General Manager to sign a "Statement of Fitness".
This audit will be carried out by the Country Manager and Department Heads, with
equivalent levels of the relevant contractors. This audit should cover hardware and
procedures.
Weekly Audit
The second type of internal audit is a weekly audit of a specific aspect of the
operation. This is carried out during the weekly inspection visit from the head office
by whoever makes the visit. Normally there is a team of three - the Company visitor,
the contractor visitor, and the contractors site safety adviser. The objective is to
confirm continued compliance with procedures and practices. It is not just a walk

around to check cleanliness of the site, although it must also check that controls in
place to ensure that hardware and housekeeping standards are maintained.
Follow up is essential and every audit should be reported in a document that
describes what was done, when, by whom and include a list of deficiencies. The
findings will be presented at the weekly safety meeting to decide on the action
parties and deadlines. Progress should be reviewed in the subsequent weekly
meetings.

3.7 HSE meetings

The safety culture within an operation as part of HSE MS has to be reinforced by:
Emphasizing to everyone that the Organization/Contractor is not some
impersonal organization but that it is a group of individuals each of whom has
responsibility for his own safety and for that of his colleagues.
Involving everyone in that operation in the management of safety.
Ensuring that everyone knows why decisions are being taken, and has the
opportunity to discuss these at an appropriate level, i.e. to feel part of the
decision making process.
The method which has evolved is to have a series of cascading safety meetings at
each of which there is always a representative of the next higher level and the next
lower level.

4. Environment
It must be addressed during the preliminary and preparation phases e.g.
road network selection
whether the rig move/ mobilization will be by road, river, rail, or helirig.,
location of the operations base/ office.
choice of drilling prospects
There is a requirement to make an Environmental Assessment in the very early
stages of preparation. It is necessary to estimate what the effects of the operation
might be and, afterwards, evaluate exactly what they were.
There should also be consultation at an early stage with local authorities and or
government. Consultation with the local community may also be appropriate.
Always consider reducing the hole and casing diameters in exploration wells - i.e.
towards slim hole drilling.

4.1 Land location

Generally, it is a requirement to prevent contamination of the soil and this will be
addressed by the Environmental Assessment. In some cases, the only solution will
be to remove the topsoil and cover the whole site with an impermeable membrane
plus fill from elsewhere. At the end of the operation the fill and the membrane are
disposed of elsewhere, and the topsoil is returned. The vegetation cover should be
reinstated, or encouraged to restore itself.
Note that this approach is in fact a transfer of pollution to a different location. The
Environmental Assessment should include not only the requirement for protection of
the local environment but also guidance on acceptable fill material and disposal
location.
The mud pit dug to receive waste mud and cuttings will have to be made
impermeable, either naturally with clay or by using plastic sheets, particularly if
there is a risk of contaminating ground water. The waste mud, cuttings, and the
impermeable barrier itself will have to be removed and disposed of elsewhere in a
pit dug in a more suitable area. The Environmental Assessment will cover this point.

4.2 Waste material

4.2.1 Drilling
If oil based mud is used, ensure that the offshore drilling unit is fitted with a total
containment system.
It is preferable to have a dual drain system, one for rain water which can be
discarded without treatment, and one for mud and wash down water which can be
collected and recycled.
If a significant amount of free oil reaches the collecting tank it can be mixed with
diesel fuel and burnt through the production test burner. If there is only a small
quantity it can be pumped back down the well before abandonment.
On a land location it may be necessary to construct a dual drain system, one for
rain water and one for mud and wash water.
A balance sheet of mud chemicals should be kept, to account for: what goes into the
mud system, what is in circulation, what has been lost down hole/ over the shakers
or discarded to the waste pit, what has been discarded to the environment and
method of disposal.
The balance sheet is not an operational requirement, but will be required when
queries concerning types and volumes of waste are raised by the authorities.
4.2.2 Cuttings
4.2.2.1 General
The best method of disposal is slurrification and re-injection, which is particularly
adapted to a multiple well scenario. Injection must be at a level deep enough
neither to break through to the sea bed offshore nor to contaminate any potential
water sources onshore. Therefore, the well must be drilled to at least the surface
casing depth and at this point the majority of cuttings will already have been

produced. In an exploration environment, limited information will be available about

fracture gradient and infectivity of the formations so it is prudent to prepare a land
location large enough to accommodate the full volume of cuttings expected.
If slurrification and re-injection is not feasible wet cuttings have to be disposed of in
large quantities. To minimize the wastes, use should be made of solids removal
equipment like centrifugal cuttings dryer, so that fluids can be recycled into the
mud system and solids to be disposed of are as dry as possible.
4.2.2.2 Using water-based mud
Offshore generally drilling fluids should not contain chrome-based lignosulphonates.
In sensitive area (reefs, mud flats, areas with sea grass, active fisheries, presence of
mammals or other protected species) cuttings must not be discharged overboard,
but saved and disposed of elsewhere. If the water is naturally turbid it should be
possible to discharge cuttings contaminated with water-based mud overboard. This
should be addressed in the Environmental Assessment.
If the cuttings cant be discharged overboard, it is necessary to discuss with the
local authorities onshore to identify a suitable disposal site. Drying plus burial
method requires a suitable climate.
Another possibility is to have the cuttings collected from the drilling unit in dump
barges and discharged at sea in a non-sensitive area.
Both options will require the mobilization of construction equipment or dump barges
and tugs. Budget provision will have to be made at an early stage of the
preparation.
From an onshore well, cuttings will be collected in the waste pit and dealt with at
the end of the operation.
4.2.2.3. Using oil-based mud
The use of oil-based mud is in general discouraged. In some countries it is not
allowed or total containment is required. This must be decided early in the project.
One alternative for oily cuttings is to wash them before discharge from the rig. This
can be an economic solution if the equipment is already on the rig, so it is a factor
to take into account at the tender evaluation stage. A second alternative is to use
pseudo-oil based mud or incineration, if such facilities are available.
Note that cuttings from an oil reservoir drilled with a water based mud are not
classed as "oily". The amount of oil will be close to residual levels when the cuttings
go over the shakers.
If the cuttings cannot be dealt with offshore, they will have to be transported and
dealt with in the manner described above for water based mud.
4.2.2.4 Packaging material
For consumables the ideal is to have the largest practical packages, which are
returnable if unused. In a typical remote exploration operation there wont be any
bulk supply plant in the area so the largest packages are likely to be palletized 1.5

ton expendable bags. The use of small bulk tanks should be investigated for
consumables which would otherwise be provided in 25-kg sacks.
Offshore, pallets and empty sacks should be stored in neat bundles and sent ashore
regularly. The most hazardous chemical is usually caustic soda. This should always
be purchased in drums and empty drums should be rinsed out, punctured, and sent
ashore.
On land the packaging of mud chemicals, must be disposed of in such a way that
the local residents cannot be harmed and in agreement with local regulations.
Caustic drums should be flattened by a bulldozer and disposed of in a deep pit, so
that they cant be used for roofing material, cooking, etc.
Sacks and pallets should be burnt daily, along with kitchen waste.
4.2.2.5. Sump oil and similar products
It is recommended to investigate the possibility of sale to local industries or
workshops for re-use. Otherwise construct a small cement lined burning pit and
burn the waste oil, along with the kitchen rubbish.
4.2.2.6 Metallic waste
Waste such as thread protectors, used bits, scraps produced by the welder, should
preferably be taken to town and sold for re-cycling. If that is impractical because of
the remoteness of the location, the best is to dump them in the cellar after
abandonment and fill with cement.

4.3 Rehabilitation
The aim of rehabilitation is to leave the environment in such a state that it can
recover to a situation similar to what it was prior to the operation. These should
have been addressed in the Environmental Assessment.
Offshore there is normally little to be done other than cutting the casing below the
mud-line level and leaving the sea-bed clear of large objects in order to prevent
damage to fishing nets.
Onshore, the liquid contents of the waste pit have to be disposed of. The most
convenient method is to pump it down the hole but this can only be done if it is
certain that there will be no contamination of water sources. If this is not feasible
the alternative is to fence the pit and leave until the liquid has evaporated. The
cuttings can then be covered or treated further. Additional costs for mobilization and
demobilization should not be ignored when budgeting for the operation.
Onshore, drilling locations should be cleaned up, debris should be buried into the
mud pit or transported to a recycling site. The wellhead should be removed and a
plate welded over the conductor. A vertical beam should be welded, extending
above ground level, with the company name, well name and date. The cellar should
be filled with cement and other metallic waste products. Pictures of the area must
be taken and the local authorities must be informed of the position for inclusion on
maps.

Any natural drainage which has been disturbed should be restored to the original
channels, and any dams removed.
Generally, roads constructed should be removed, however the national or local
authorities should be consulted as people may want it left to assist in development
of the area.
Roads may also give access for poachers and settlers to previously inaccessible or
protected areas. If an area has an international protection status, consultation at
local level may not be sufficient

Summary of deficiencies in rig

operations
1. Safety management
1.1 Safety meetings
Rig site meetings held on a weekly basis with short 'toolbox' meetings subject to
operational requirement. 5-10 minute safety briefing before each shift or between
each job phase (e.g. tripping and logging or casing running and cementing).
Office meetings involving management and senior operational staff, held on a
weekly or monthly basis.
Deficiencies
Minutes of meeting are not made and distributed.
Action items are not reviewed to final close-out.
No evidence of involvement by management in the site meetings and
inclusion of site supervisors in the management meetings.
Service companies and sub-contractors are left out or forgotten.

1.2. Permit to work

The most commonly used permit to work used is the hot work permit. In most cases
the company drilling supervisor is the ultimate signatory for the permit to become
effective. The system is intended to provide proper control of work under hazardous
conditions and to ensure adequate supervision of such work after necessary
precautions have been taken and to establish that the correct procedures are
followed.
Deficiencies
The permit to work system is used only for hot work. Operations which
involve vessel entry, working at height, unusual operations/tasks, diving
operations are not included in the system.
Many personnel employed on site remain ignorant of the purpose, use and
application of the permit to work system
Only the principal signatories of work permits are aware of the need for the
permit; the work force is ill-informed as to the permit system.
Permits (hot work) are being written for time spans exceeding one shift.

Permits in force are not kept in a visible place such that all work being
performed under the permit system can be seen together in one location
(e.g. toolpusher's office).

1.3. Induction
A system of induction for new arrivals of personnel should cover:
Site rules.
Emergency alarms and response required.
Who is in charge, who to report to?
Safety requirements, e.g. hard hats, ear defenders, boots, goggles, etc.
Information concerning specific hazards, e.g. H2S, chemicals, heat hazards.
Deficiencies
System for recording arrival and departure of personnel on site (POB) is often
unreliable.
No information for new arrivals who to report to or who is in charge.
Alarm signals and muster station locations are often left to the imagination of
the new-comer.
Site-specific hazards are not highlighted during induction briefings.

1.4. Communications
Good communication between rig supervisors and crew is essential. In areas where
English is not commonly used, front-line supervisors should know sufficient of the
local language to be of practical value. Where this is not possible a bilingual
foreman should be appointed to each crew.
Deficiencies
Crews have to be employed with no language in common with their
supervisors.
Crews are unaware of the basic site rules, the meaning of many notices and
do not understand information supplied to them in writing. Often because of
the language problem there is no information supplied at all (particularly subcontractors).
Warning signs with written messages used with illiterate crews.

1.5. Drills
Drills are used to train and optimize response to emergency situations. To be
effective, there must be a concise report logged down on the type of drill, the
response achieved and any shortcomings. Copies of such reports are sent to the
drilling office where the quality of response as well as the significance of any
shortcomings should be discussed at scheduled safety meetings. Unsatisfactory
drills should be repeated at the earliest opportunity and rehearsed until successful.
Drills should be planned to include different scenarios at different times of the day.
It is good practice to 'take out' a key supervisor to test fallback plans. Above all,
drills should be as realistic as possible.
Deficiencies
Most drills held are reported, but there is rarely any comment on the quality
of response or shortcomings

1.6.

Performance and shortcomings of drills are not reviewed by management

safety meetings
Drills held are found to be of poor realism and do not follow stated
procedures.
The head count on location does not tally with the reported personnel on site.
The duties of the person responsible for the head count conflict with other
duties during an emergency. E.g. often the medic is responsible for the head
count, with no deputy in case of an injury.
Drills are held at the same time each week to the same scenario.

Accident reporting

All companies have an accident reporting system. The need for a parallel system of
near-miss reporting and unsafe act auditing is becoming increasingly evident. The
key product of accident investigation procedures is to take appropriate action to
prevent recurrence.
Deficiencies
Identification of accident causes is often lacking in reports.
Results/minutes of accident investigation meetings are not passed down the
line to front-line supervisors.
Many near-miss events are not recorded at all - a key element in accident
prevention.
Contractor/subcontractor accident reporting, investigation, and follow-up
procedures are often of poor standard, if they exist at all.
After many cases of accident reports, much time (and money) is invested in
the invested in the investigation but nothing changes as a result.

1.7.

Contracts

The majority of work carried out in a drilling operation is by contract. Some of the
work or services are done under sub-contract. It is therefore most probable that in
addition to the main drilling contractor are several service contractors and a
number of sub-contractors (e.g. catering staff, transports, drilling crew, general
laborers, male nurse, radio operator, etc.). The content and quality of contracts
entered into by the Company remains the responsibility of Company management,
however, the sub-contracts entered into by contractors vary in quality and content
considerably.
Deficiencies
Contract supervisors and contractor representatives do not have copies of
the relevant parts of their respective contracts.
Sub-contractors do not have copies of their contracts, neither do the
contractor site supervisors or the Company drilling supervisor. In most cases
a copy of the sub-contract is not available in the Company office.
Work schedules, relief schemes and required levels of skills and language
ability are frequently omitted in the text of the sub-contract.
Relevant safety clauses and compliance with Company/contractor safety
standards is often not mentioned. This is particularly evident in relation to
personal protective equipment such as helmets, overalls, and safety boots.

1.8.

Similarly, the requirements for able swimmers offshore is frequently not

mentioned.
Contractors do not include or enforce safety clauses in their subcontracts.

Contingency plans

Comprehensive contingency plans are often prepared well ahead of drilling

operations. Routine matters such as weekend duty rosters, emergency contact
numbers, local emergency contact numbers are normally all contained in the
contingency manual. In some cases, plans are tested with a dry run to check
procedures, communications and to iron out any bugs in the procedures. A dry run
exercise often takes considerable time to review as there are many personnel
involved (medivac).
Deficiencies
Contingency plans are in the hands of the key line supervisory staff but are
not available to other staff (e.g. radio operator, medic, chief pilot, duty pilot,
stand-by boat captain, etc.).
Contingency plans prepared in advance describe contradictory duties, e.g.
camp boss to man both the radio-room and conduct a head count at the
upwind muster area.
Company and contractor have conflicting plans.

2.
2.1.

Operations
Lifting equipment

All equipment used for lifting must have the safe working load clearly marked on it.
This essential detail is valid even for consumable items such as slings and shackles.
Additionally, lifting equipment should be carefully inspected monthly and thoroughly
NDT tested every 12 months.
It is also necessary to keep a register of all slings and shackles with latest inspection
dates on the rig. So that individual slings can be easily identified, each sling should
be tagged/marked with its unique identity code. (Similar to a movable number).
Deficiencies
No register of slings and shackles kept on the rig.
Newly purchased slings and shackles are uncertified and are not proof tested.
The SWL is not marked on lifting equipment, e.g. BOP lifting trolleys, air
winches.
Pre-slung cargoes are manifested without including the slings - e.g. 'l lot'
slings is not adequate.
Damaged and potentially dangerous slings are mixed up with good slings.

2.2. Weight control

Consignments of materials to and from the rig are commonly loaded onto and from
transport vehicles by crane. It is essential that crane drivers, supervisors and rig
stability staff know the weight of each lift. Unusually heavy lifts should be done
under the permit to work system using certified lifting slings.

Deficiencies
Materials are loaded and consigned with the wrong weight on consignment
notes. In some cases, the weight is not mentioned at all.
Most material yards have scales for verifying loads. However, this equipment
is often not used and load weighs are overestimated instead.
Crane drivers offshore are obliged to pick up loads 'blind' if there is no weight
given on the consignment note.
Rig stability calculations are incorrect due to overestimated weighs quoted on
consignment notes.

2.3. Fork-lift trucks

Most palletized materials are handled with fork-lift trucks. The truck used should be
suitable for working in hazardous Zone 2 areas or the permit system is required for
work in a classified area. There are many instances of accidents associated with
fork-lift trucks and they are usually caused by one or more of the deficiencies listed
below.
Drivers of fork-lift trucks should always be experienced and verified competent. To
avoid unauthorized drivers 'having a go', there must be a visible list of authorized
drivers on the notice board with published rules stating clearly that persons not on
the authorized list may not use the vehicle for any purpose.
A reversing alarm should be fitted to the vehicle though care should be taken to
select equipment suitable for hazardous Zone 2 area classification.
Deficiencies
The fork-lift truck is unsuitable for hazardous area Zone 2 use (e.g. electric
starter motor with battery).
Reversing alarm not fitted.
Unauthorized persons driving the vehicle (e.g. the contract mud technician).
List of authorized drivers not published and visible.
The fork-lift is used for lifting personnel.

2.4. Chemicals
At any time on a rig there are a large variety of chemicals which are used for:
drilling muds;
completion fluids;
formation stimulation;
cement slurry additives;
maintenance solvents and cleaning fluids;
water treatment agents.
As many chemicals are harmful if used incorrectly, it is clearly a requirement that
data sheets are available for all chemicals on site. Such data sheets should also be
available at the material/transport yard, to any contractor handling the chemicals,
and to any driver or supply vessel captain transporting chemical to and from the rig.

Chemical data sheets should include all relevant properties of each substance, the
known hazards, e.g. harmful vapors, inflammability First aid and subsequent
medical attention recommended in the event of contact with the chemical should
also be stated on the data sheet. Personnel handling and transporting hazardous
chemicals should be fully informed and should be aware of first aid treatment
necessary in case of an accident.
The use of protective equipment when handling and mixing chemicals should be
mandatory with provision of deluge shower and eye wash facilities easily accessible.
High corrosive, toxic and flammable chemicals must be kept separate and identified
with suitable warning signs. Oxidizing agents (e.g. potassium dichromate) must be
kept away from any form of combustible material (e.g. grease). In areas where local
labor may be of particularly low educational standards and with no industrial
background, it is often better to prohibit local labor from handling particularly
dangerous chemicals (e.g. caustic soda). It is almost impossible to explain to an
uneducated person what a caustic or corrosive chemical is.
Deficiencies
Data sheets on all chemicals stored or in use are not available.
The rig medic does not have a copy of chemical data sheets.
Eye wash and douche facilities are not available in the mud mixing area.
Mud mixing crews are not warned of the hazards of particularly dangerous
chemicals, e.g. caustic soda, soda ash.
The use of protective equipment is not enforced.
Little is done about significant residues of chemicals left in 'empty' sacks and
drums.
Information concerning chemical hazards is almost always lacking during
transport.

2.5. Hazardous area classification

The control of sources of ignition in areas around sources of hydrocarbon emission is
vital for the purpose of protection against fire or explosion. Close control of hot work
within hazardous area is also mandatory. There are a number of hazardous area
classification systems, the one most applicable being the I.P Model Code of Safe
Practice (Drilling and Production) and the minimum standard which should be
adhered to.
Deficiencies
Hazardous area drawings are generally not available.
The local rules and standards applicable to hazardous area classification are
not known to supervisory personnel on site.
Trucks unsuitable for operating in a hazardous zone enter the location without
the permission of the Company drilling supervisor. The permit system is not
used.

2.6.

Mud-gas separators

The minimum recommended dimensions for a mud-gas separator is given in

Pressure control manual for drilling and workover operations. The most significant

hazard with this equipment is the possibility of gas venting via the mud line to the
rig mud tank and shale shaker area - there being usually no provision in the design
of the mud gas separator to prevent this.
It is essential therefore that details of the design of the separator are scrutinized to
verify that there is a mechanism to prevent gas escape via the mud line. In the past,
serious injury has resulted from hydrocarbon gases entering the shale shaker area a problem even more lethal if H 2S is involved.
Deficiencies
Inadequately designed mud-gas separator.
Drawings and specifications for the separator are not available.
Overall separator dimensions are below the sizes recommended in Pressure
control manual for drilling and workover operations.

2.7.

Gas cylinders

Gas cylinders are used and stored on all drilling locations. In the industrialized world
the rules for handling and using gas cylinders are well known. In some remote
areas, codes of practice and standards applied to the use of gas cylinders may be
inadequate and it is under such conditions that special attention must be paid to
the standards of local welders and local suppliers of compressed gases and gas
cylinders.
Deficiencies
Oxygen cylinders are stored together with acetylene cylinders.
Cylinders are not kept upright in a shaded area.
Caps of bottles are missing
Full and empty bottles are mixed.
Bottles are wrongly color coded.

2.8.

ESD systems

Emergency shut-down systems are generally used to isolate all power from
hazardous areas including the drill floor, mud pits and slush pumps. The system is
normally function-tested once per well or per rig-up.
Toolpusher, drillers and assistant drillers must all know the location and function of
the ESD actuator situated in the immediate vicinity of the drawworks.
Deficiencies
Most supervisory staff on the rig, including drillers do not know exactly what
happens when the ESD function is actuated.
There are rarely any documents anywhere describing ESD procedures.
ESD systems should include isolation of AC power to the rig floor and derrick
area.

2.9.

Alarm systems

The same can be observed with alarm systems as with ESD systems. Although the
major fire and muster alarms are generally known through drills, the many other

alarms such as gas, H2S, Halon release, etc.) are not always known or understood.
It is essential that new-comes and visitors are initially trained to recognize alarms
and know the required response. It is especially important that all staff on a drilling
installation are fully aware of the functioning of all types of alarm.
Deficiencies
Key staff do not know all the different alarms or what they mean.
Crews, contractors and sub-contractors do not know sound of all alarms or
the response required.
Alarm systems often conflict, e.g. PA system used for alarm signal but must
be used to give directions at the same time.
Visitors and new staff are not briefed on the alar signals used on site.

2.10. Radioactive sources

For wireline logging operations radioactive source have to be used. Radioactive
materials are therefore often stored on or close to the drilling location. Levels of
radioactivity around the storage area should be carefully monitored and verified to
be within acceptable levels, and warning signs used to control access.
It is also necessary that a register available of radioactive substances is kept on the
rig and updated when there are any changes to the radioactive source inventory.
Updated copies of the register should be forwarded to the senior operations
engineer.
Deficiencies
There is no register available giving a description of radioactive sources on
the location.
The level of radioactivity around the storage box is not known, either above
or below SSC acceptable limits.
No signs warning of radioactivity.
No boundary fence to indicate a no-go area.

2.11. Radio silence

The procedure for radio silence whilst connecting and handling armed explosive
devices is fully described and documented in EP 55000. The need for radio silence is
well-known and all radios must be accounted for including portable radios.
In addition, DC power should be isolated along with any welding sets or
transformers. Such equipment must be electrically disabled and a clearly visible
notice attached to prohibit use. It is important to eliminate all potential sources of
stray current around the rig floor area; this includes electrically driven cathodic
protection systems.
Other sources of radio transmission must be warned in adequate time before
operations with electrically detonated explosives commence, e.g. helicopters,
police, militia, etc.
Deficiencies

There is no register of portable radio transmitters on the location.

Notices to indicate isolated equipment not in use.
DC power isolation sometimes omitted.

2.12. Electrical earthing

Proper earthing of electrical equipment and drilling equipment throughout the mud
system is important. Without an effective earth, dangerous potentials could build up
and result in electrical discharge in areas classified as hazardous. Such a potential
source of ignition can be eliminated by interconnecting all tanks and mud mixing
systems and ensuring that resistance to earth is low (< 1 ohm). Sensitive
equipment such as computer, instrument logic boards and digital recorders can also
be adversely affected by poor earthing. Concern on these problems is usually
restricted to dry desert environments.
Deficiencies
Mud tanks and mixing skids are not interconnected or earthed.
The quality of earth is not checked with a Mega insulation tester.

3.

Questionnaire

The following questions are produced under headings to fit with parts of the
standard audit check list. Common audit findings listed in sections A and B of this
paper are addressed by the questions in this section.

3.1.

3.2.

Communication and motivation

Are identified action items reviewed and formally closed out?
Do field supervisors attend the office-based meeting?
Do management attend the rig site meeting?
Are all contractor representatives invited to attend?
Do supervisors and crew have a common language?
Are translators with work experience available in the crews?
Are any of the supervisors proficient in the local language?
Are signs and information available in the local language?
Is there a requirement for bilingual foremen in the contracts?
How is the quality of communication on the rig site verified?

Work permit
Does the work permit system cover all aspects of hazardous work?
Are the requirements known to all the work force & supervisors?
Are permits in force on display in a central location?
Is the location reserved for this purpose?
Is there any system of review of the use of the permit system?
Who in the organization sees copies of permits issued?

3.3.

3.4.

3.5.

3.6.

Safety training and induction

Are there notices instructing all arrivals to report in/out?
Is there a system of induction - is this recorded?
Who is identified as the focal point for induction?
How is the emergency signal demonstrated?
How is the use of emergency safety equipment demonstrated?
Are there printed cards giving muster locations and site rules?
Are these handed out to every new arrival?
Are they printed in the local language as well as in English?
Are there clear hazard signs in appropriate place on location?
Are escape routes clearly visible?

Contingency plans
Are reports of drills prepared and distributed after each drill?
Is the drill performance reviewed?
Is there a system of shortcoming correction?
Do the drills follow published procedures - how is this checked?
Is the quality of drills discussed by management?
What are the instructions in the event of an unsatisfactory drill?
Are the contingency plans available to all key staff?
Including those involved in the plan?
Has there been feedback from all personnel involved?
Have the plans been changed and the changes distributed?
Do the contractors have their own contingency plans?
Any conflict?
Are there dry runs of contingency plans?
Is so, how is the exercise reviewed?
Who is focal point for amendments, to contingency plans?
Does the head count check with meal sheets?
How are short-term visitors including in POB at all times?
Is the POB list available to the person responsible for the head count?
What other duties/responsibilities does he have?

Accident investigation
Is accident reporting and investigation procedures fully described?
Are they distributed to all supervisory staff?
Does contract oblige participation in accident investigation?
How are contractors informed of others near miss accidents?
Are procedures, rules or specifications changed as a result of accident
investigations?

Contractor safety
Are copies of all contracts with site supervisors?
With contractor representatives?

3.7.

3.8.

Is the content of sub-contract terms vetted by the Company?

How is agreement to the sub-contract by the Company specified?
Are the work schedules of the sub-contractor compatible with safe practice?
Is there a relief schedule?
How is the skill and experience level of sub-contract staff checked?
Are medical requirements met by sub-contract staff?
Can the sub-contractor communicate with the contractor supervisor?
How is a language problem identified?
Are personnel required to work over or near water?
Is there a system for verifying swimming capability?

Maintenance procedures
Is a register kept on the rig of all slings and shackles in use?
Is lifting equipment marked with the SWL?
Are slings marked with an ID number?
Is there a system for regular inspection of lifting equipment?
Is there certification of inspection of lifting equipment?
Is responsibility for sling selection clearly understood?
Are the rules pertaining to lifting procedures known to all crews at all levels?

Weight control

Is there a system used for checking loads?

3.9.

Is there an instruction how often loads are to be checked?

Are rig stability calculations required?
Is there a deck-load limitation?
Is there a system for checking the actual loads on the rig?

Fork-lift trucks

Is there a system for authorization of fork-lift drivers?

Is a list of authorized drivers available?

Does the fork-lift work in Zone 2 area?
Is there a work permit system to cover this?
Is the vehicle suitable for Zone 2 work?
Is a reversing alarm fitted and working?
Do the rules forbid lifting of personnel with the fork-lift?
Are these known to the supervisors and crews?

3.10. Industrial hygiene

Are chemical data sheets for all chemicals available?

Are they distributed to transport and rig supervisors?

Are hazardous chemicals identified and isolated?
Are personnel working with these chemicals aware of the hazards?
Do they know what to do in the event of a spillage or accident?
Are shower and eye wash available in mud mixing/handling areas?

How are 'empty' drums and sacks dealt with?

What happens to excess chemicals on site?
Are 'removal' or waste disposal personnel aware of the dangers?

3.11. Hazardous area classification

Is the hazardous area classification according to the IP code?

Is the IP code applied on the drilling location?
Is a hazardous area diagram available on the rig?
Is it clearly visible where current work permits are on display?
Do key personnel on the rig know the hazardous area boundaries?
Are cars allowed to be parked on the location?

3.12. Flares and vents

Is the rig fitted with a mud-gas separator?

Does it conform to Company's Policy?
Are drawings available?
Is there a mechanism to prevent gas venting through the mud-line?
What are the operating instructions to the drillers?
Can a gaseous influx be circulated out safely through the separator?

3.13. Gas cylinders

Are local gas supplies to a recognized standard or code of practice?

Are gas cylinders stored upright in a shaded area?
Is oxygen separated from fuels?
Are cylinders properly color coded and fitted with caps?
Are there records kept of the location of each bottle used?

3.14. ESD systems

Do all supervisory staff know how to actuate the ESD function?

Do they know what equipment is actually shut down?

Is there written description of the ESD system available?

3.15. Radioactive sources

Are there regulations governing use of radioactive materials?

If so, who is identified as legally responsible?

What is the limit of radiation around the source storage container?
Is radiation verified below the maximum permissible level?
How is this verified?
Is there a register of radioactive sources kept on the rig?
Who is responsible for updating the register?
Is copy held by the senior operations engineer?

3.16. Telecommunications

How is the use of portable radio-transmitters controlled?

Is a register of all portable radios available on the rig site?

Are isolation notices available?
Is there a procedure for informing others of radio silence?

3.17. Electrical earthing

How is rig equipment earthing tested?

Are all individual tanks and skids properly earthed?
Is equipment of service companies included?

3.18. Service contractors

Do all service contractors receive a site safety induction?

Are Company transport standards complied with?
Do service staff have copies of relevant Company standards?
Are they all included in safety meetings?
Do all personnel know their emergency response duties?
Is participation in emergency drills routine?

HSE Compliance and Code of Conduct Consequence Matrix

2. Quality
Deficiencies in Safety Management
Systems

Main deficiencies encountered in the safety management system of drilling

operations

1 Safety meetings
Rig site meetings held on a weekly basis with short 'toolbox' meetings subject to
operational requirement. 5-10-minute safety briefing before each shift or between
each job phase (e.g. tripping and logging or casing running and cementing).

Office meetings involving management and senior operational staff, held on a

weekly or monthly basis.
Deficiencies
Minutes of meeting are not made and distributed.
Action items are not reviewed to final close-out.
No evidence of involvement by management in the site meetings and
inclusion of site supervisors in the management meetings.
Service companies and sub-contractors are left out or forgotten.

2 Permit to work
The most commonly used is the hot work permit. The company drilling supervisor is
the ultimate signatory for the permit to become effective. The system is intended to
provide proper control of work under hazardous conditions and to ensure adequate
supervision of such work after necessary precautions have been taken and to
establish that the correct procedures are followed.
Deficiencies
The permit to work system is used only for hot work. Operations which
involve vessel entry, working at height, unusual operations/tasks, diving
operations are not included in the system.
Many personnel employed on site remain ignorant of the purpose, use and
application of the permit to work system
Only the principal signatories of work permits are aware of the need for the
permit; the work force is ill-informed as to the permit system.
Permits (hot work) are being written for time spans exceeding one shift.
Permits in force are not kept in a visible place such that all work being
performed under the permit system can be seen together in one location
(e.g. toolpusher's office).

3 Induction
A system of induction for new arrivals of personnel should cover:
1. Site rules
2. Emergency alarms and response required
3. Who is in charge, who to report to?
4. Safety requirements, e.g. hard hats, ear defenders, boots, goggles, etc.
5. Information concerning specific hazards, e.g. H2S, chemicals, heat hazards.
Deficiencies
System for recording arrival and departure of personnel on site (POB) is often
unreliable.
No information for new arrivals who to report to or who is in charge.
Alarm signals and muster station locations are often left to the imagination of
the new-comer.
Site-specific hazards are not highlighted during induction briefings.

4 Communications
Good communication between rig supervisors and crew is essential. In areas where
English is not commonly used, front-line supervisors should know sufficient of the
local language to be of practical value. Where this is not possible a bilingual
foreman should be appointed to each crew.
Deficiencies
Crews have to be employed with no language in common with their
supervisors.
Crews are unaware of the basic site rules, the meaning of many notices and
do not understand information supplied to them in writing. Often because of
the language problem there is no information supplied at all (particularly subcontractors).
Warning signs with written messages used with illiterate crews.

5 Drills
Drills are used to train and optimize response to emergency situations. There must
be a concise report logged down on the type of drill, the response achieved and any
shortcomings. Copies of such reports are sent to the drilling office where the quality
of response as well as the significance of any shortcomings should be discussed at
scheduled safety meetings. Unsatisfactory drills should be repeated at the earliest
opportunity and rehearsed until successful. Drills should be planned to include
different scenarios at different times of the day. It is good practice to 'take out' a key
supervisor to test fallback plans. Drills should be as realistic as possible.
Deficiencies
Most drills held are reported, but there is rarely any comment on the quality
of response or shortcomings
Performance and shortcomings of drills are not reviewed by management
safety meetings
Drills held are found to be of poor realism and do not follow stated
procedures.
The head count on location does not tally with the reported personnel on site.
The duties of the person responsible for the head count conflict with other
duties during an emergency. E.g. often the medic is responsible for the head
count, with no deputy in case of an injury.
Drills are held at the same time each week to the same scenario.

6 Accident reporting
All companies have an accident reporting system. The need for a parallel system of
near-miss reporting and unsafe act auditing is becoming increasingly evident. The
key product of accident investigation procedures is to take appropriate action to
prevent recurrence.
Deficiencies
Identification of accident causes is often lacking in reports.

Results/minutes of accident investigation meetings are not passed down the

line to front-line supervisors.
Many near-miss events are not recorded at all - a key element in accident
prevention.
Contractor/subcontractor accident reporting, investigation, and follow-up
procedures are often of poor standard, if they exist at all.
After many cases of accident reports, much time (and money) is invested in
the invested in the investigation but nothing changes as a result.

7 Contracts
Some of the work or services are done under sub-contract. It is therefore most
probable that in addition to the main drilling contractor are several service
contractors and a number of sub-contractors (e.g. catering staff, transports, drilling
crew, general laborers, male nurse, radio operator, etc.). The content and quality of
contracts entered into by the Company remains the responsibility of Company
management, however, the sub-contracts entered into by contractors vary in
quality and content considerably.
Deficiencies
Contract supervisors and contractor representatives do not have copies of
the relevant parts of their respective contracts.
Sub-contractors do not have copies of their contracts, neither do the
contractor site supervisors or the Company drilling supervisor. In most cases
a copy of the sub-contract is not available in the Company office.
Work schedules, relief schemes and required levels of skills and language
ability are frequently omitted in the text of the sub-contract.
Relevant safety clauses and compliance with Company/contractor safety
standards is often not mentioned. This is particularly evident in relation to
personal protective equipment such as helmets, overalls, and safety boots.
Similarly, the requirements for able swimmers offshore is frequently not
mentioned.
Contractors do not include or enforce safety clauses in their subcontracts.

8 Contingency plans
Comprehensive contingency plans are often prepared well ahead of drilling
operations. Routine matters such as weekend duty rosters, emergency contact
numbers, local emergency contact numbers are normally all contained in the
contingency manual. In some cases, plans are tested with a dry run to check
procedures, communications and to iron out any bugs in the procedures. A dry run
exercise often takes considerable time to review as there are many personnel
involved (medivac).
Deficiencies
Contingency plans are in the hands of the key line supervisory staff but are
not available to other staff (e.g. radio operator, medic, chief pilot, duty pilot,
stand-by boat captain, etc.).

Contingency plans prepared in advance describe contradictory duties, e.g.

camp boss to man both the radio-room and conduct a head count at the
upwind muster area.
Company and contractor have conflicting plans.

Inspections requirements for drilling

operations

Inspections should be undertaken by the Department Head who will be responsible

for managing the relevant contract. An inspection should check that the item
complies with relevant regulations or code of practice, but also the state of
maintenance of the equipment and the condition of the personnel operating it. Third
partys inspections should be arranged for any equipment which the company is
responsible for damage to.

1 Drilling rigs inspection

Check-lists for both land and offshore rigs are available for checking on the
completeness and state of the equipment and maintenance/ inspection procedures.

2 Marine vessels inspection

All water transport vessels taken on under a charter party or other contract should
be "classed". If the contractor has a current certificate by an acceptable
Classification Society (ABS; Bureau Veritas; DNV; Lloyds), it can be assumed that the
vessel meets legal requirements. An inspection by a company representative is still
required.

3 Aircraft inspection
Company invited to tender must have been audited, and be approved. In some case
the legislation requires obligatory use of military aircraft or national air carriers
where auditing may not be possible. In such circumstances, ensure all possible
steps are taken in planning and arranging procedures to control these situations.

4 Handling equipment inspection

All lifting equipment (cranes and slings) should be certified by a "competent
society". Special attention should be paid to the condition of slings and to their
markings.

5 Vehicles inspection
Special attention should be paid to roadworthiness and safety equipment (in
particular to compliance with Group recommendations with respect to seat belts,
reversing alarms and roll-over bars), together with the proposed scheduled
maintenance programme.

6 Consumables inspection

If possible material such as mud chemicals/cement should be inspected at the point

of delivery. A check should be made that the packing is as specified in the order.
Photographs are always useful either in case of a claim against the supplier or, in
case of subsequent damage during transport by a third party, to show that it was in
good condition when handed to the carrier.

7 Casing inspection
New casing is inspected as part of the purchase formalities. Second hand casing
(pre-owned but unused) is normally sold on an as-is, where-is basis. Unless the staff
of the current venture are personally familiar with the up-to-date history of the
casing it should be properly inspected by one of the specialist service companies
prior to finalizing the purchase.
Note that the number of times the casing will have to be handled, and the
skill/experience of the transporters, may be more relevant than its initial condition.
Used and recovered casing should only be considered in very exceptional
circumstances.

8 Wellheads inspection
In general wellheads should be assembled and tested prior to delivery. If the
wellhead supply is the responsibility of the company rather than the drilling
contractor the test should preferably be witnessed by one of the future well-site
staff

Typical deficiencies encountered in

drilling operations

This article presents a summary of the main deficiencies encountered in drilling

operations

1 Lifting equipment
All equipment used for lifting must have the safe working load clearly marked on it.
This essential detail is valid even for consumable items such as slings and shackles.
Additionally, lifting equipment should be carefully inspected monthly and thoroughly
NDT tested every 12 months (see EP-5500 Section 3433).
It is also necessary to keep a register of all slings and shackles with latest inspection
dates on the rig. So that individual slings can be easily identified, each sling should
be tagged/marked with its unique identity code. (Similar to a movable number).
Deficiencies
No register of slings and shackles kept on the rig.
Newly purchased slings and shackles are uncertified and are not proof
tested.
The SWL is not marked on lifting equipment, e.g. BOP lifting trolleys, air
winches.
Pre-slung cargoes are manifested without including the slings - e.g. 'l lot'
slings is not adequate.
Damaged and potentially dangerous slings are mixed up with good slings.

2 Weight control
Consignments of materials to and from the rig are commonly loaded onto and from
transport vehicles by crane. It is essential that crane drivers, supervisors and rig
stability staff know the weight of each lift. Unusually heavy lifts should be done
under the permit to work system using certified lifting slings.
Deficiencies
Materials are loaded and consigned with the wrong weight on consignment
notes. In some cases, the weight is not mentioned at all.
Most material yards have scales for verifying loads. However, this equipment
is often not used and load weighs are overestimated instead.
Crane drivers offshore are obliged to pick up loads 'blind' if there is no weight
given on the consignment note.
Rig stability calculations are incorrect due to overestimated weighs quoted
on consignment notes.

3 Fork-lift trucks
Most palletized materials are handled with fork-lift trucks. The truck used should be
suitable for working in hazardous Zone 2 areas or the permit system is required for
work in a classified area. There are many instances of accidents associated with
fork-lift trucks and they are usually caused by one or more of the deficiencies listed
below.
Drivers of fork-lift trucks should always be experienced and verified competent. To
avoid unauthorized drivers 'having a go', there must be a visible list of authorized
drivers on the notice board with published rules stating clearly that persons not on
the authorized list may not use the vehicle for any purpose.
A reversing alarm should be fitted to the vehicle though care should be taken to
select equipment suitable for hazardous Zone 2 area classification.
Deficiencies
The fork-lift truck is unsuitable for hazardous area Zone 2 use (e.g. electric
starter motor with battery).
Reversing alarm not fitted.
Unauthorized persons driving the vehicle (e.g. the contract mud technician).
List of authorized drivers not published and visible.
The fork-lift is used for lifting personnel.

4 Chemicals
At any time on a rig there are a large variety of chemicals which are used for:
drilling muds;
completion fluids;
formation stimulation;
cement slurry additives;
maintenance solvents and cleaning fluids;

water treatment agents.

As many chemicals are harmful if used incorrectly, it is clearly a requirement that

data sheets are available for all chemicals on site. Such data sheets should also be
available at the material/transport yard, to any contractor handling the chemicals,
and to any driver or supply vessel captain transporting chemical to and from the rig.
Chemical data sheets should include all relevant properties of each substance, the
known hazards, e.g. harmful vapors, inflammability First aid and subsequent
medical attention recommended in the event of contact with the chemical should
also be stated on the data sheet. Personnel handling and transporting hazardous
chemicals should be fully informed and should be aware of first aid treatment
necessary in case of an accident.
The use of protective equipment when handling and mixing chemicals should be
mandatory with provision of deluge shower and eye wash facilities easily accessible.
High corrosive, toxic and flammable chemicals must be kept separate and identified
with suitable warning signs. Oxidizing agents (e.g. potassium dichromate) must be
kept away from any form of combustible material (e.g. grease). In areas where local
labor may be of particularly low educational standards and with no industrial
background, it is often better to prohibit local labor from handling particularly
dangerous chemicals (e.g. caustic soda). It is almost impossible to explain to an
uneducated person what a caustic or corrosive chemical is.
Deficiencies
Data sheets on all chemicals stored or in use are not available.
The rig medic does not have a copy of chemical data sheets.
Eye wash and douche facilities are not available in the mud mixing area.
Mud mixing crews are not warned of the hazards of particularly dangerous
chemicals, e.g. caustic soda, soda ash.
The use of protective equipment is not enforced.
Little is done about significant residues of chemicals left in 'empty' sacks and
drums.
Information concerning chemical hazards is almost always lacking during
transport.

5 Hazardous area classification

The control of sources of ignition in areas around sources of hydrocarbon emission is
vital for the purpose of protection against fire or explosion. Close control of hot work
within hazardous area is also mandatory. There are a number of hazardous area
classification systems, the one most applicable being the I.P Model Code of Safe
Practice (Drilling and Production) and the minimum standard which should be
adhered to.
Deficiencies
Hazardous area drawings are generally not available.
The local rules and standards applicable to hazardous area classification are
not known to supervisory personnel on site.

Trucks unsuitable for operating in a hazardous zone enter the location

without the permission of the Company drilling supervisor. The permit system
is not used.

6 Mud-gas separators
The minimum recommended dimensions for a mud-gas separator is given in
Pressure control manual for drilling and workover operations. The most significant
hazard with this equipment is the possibility of gas venting via the mud line to the
rig mud tank and shale shaker area - there being usually no provision in the design
of the mud gas separator to prevent this.
It is essential therefore that details of the design of the separator are scrutinized to
verify that there is a mechanism to prevent gas escape via the mud line. In the past,
serious injury has resulted from hydrocarbon gases entering the shale shaker area a problem even more lethal if H 2S is involved.
Deficiencies
Inadequately designed mud-gas separator.
Drawings and specifications for the separator are not available.
Overall separator dimensions are below the sizes recommended in Pressure
control manual for drilling and workover operations.

7 Gas cylinders
Gas cylinders are used and stored on all drilling locations. In the industrialized world
the rules for handling and using gas cylinders are well known. In some remote
areas, codes of practice and standards applied to the use of gas cylinders may be
inadequate and it is under such conditions that special attention must be paid to
the standards of local welders and local suppliers of compressed gases and gas
cylinders.
Deficiencies
Oxygen cylinders are stored together with acetylene cylinders.
Cylinders are not kept upright in a shaded area.
Caps of bottles are missing
Full and empty bottles are mixed.
Bottles are wrongly color coded.

8 ESD systems
Emergency shut-down systems are generally used to isolate all power from
hazardous areas including the drill floor, mud pits and slush pumps. The system is
normally function-tested once per well or per rig-up.
Toolpusher, drillers and assistant drillers must all know the location and function of
the ESD actuator situated in the immediate vicinity of the drawworks.

Deficiencies
Most supervisory staff on the rig, including drillers do not know exactly what
happens when the ESD function is actuated.
There are rarely any documents anywhere describing ESD procedures.
ESD systems should include isolation of AC power to the rig floor and derrick
area.

9 Alarm systems
The same can be observed with alarm systems as with ESD systems. Although the
major fire and muster alarms are generally known through drills, the many other
alarms such as gas, H2S, Halon release, etc.) are not always known or understood.
It is essential that new-comes and visitors are initially trained to recognize alarms
and know the required response. It is especially important that all staff on a drilling
installation are fully aware of the functioning of all types of alarm.
Deficiencies
Key staff do not know all the different alarms or what they mean.
Crews, contractors and sub-contractors do not know sound of all alarms or
the response required.
Alarm systems often conflict, e.g. PA system used for alarm signal but must
be used to give directions at the same time.
Visitors and new staff are not briefed on the alar signals used on site.

10 Radioactive sources
For wireline logging operations radioactive source have to be used. Radioactive
materials are therefore often stored on or close to the drilling location. Levels of
radioactivity around the storage area should be carefully monitored and verified to
be within acceptable levels (see EP 55000 Section 3441), and warning signs used to
control access.
It is also necessary that a register available of radioactive substances is kept on the
rig and updated when there are any changes to the radioactive source inventory.
Updated copies of the register should be forwarded to the senior operations
engineer.
Deficiencies
There is no register available giving a description of radioactive sources on
the location.
The level of radioactivity around the storage box is not known, either above
or below SSC acceptable limits.
No signs warning of radioactivity.
No boundary fence to indicate a no-go area.

11 Radio silence

The procedure for radio silence whilst connecting and handling armed explosive
devices is fully described and documented in EP 55000. The need for radio silence is
well-known and all radios must be accounted for including portable radios.
In addition, DC power should be isolated along with any welding sets or
transformers. Such equipment must be electrically disabled and a clearly visible
notice attached to prohibit use. It is important to eliminate all potential sources of
stray current around the rig floor area; this includes electrically driven cathode
protection systems.
Other sources of radio transmission must be warned in adequate time before
operations with electrically detonated explosives commence, e.g. helicopters,
police, militia, etc.
Deficiencies
There is no register of portable radio transmitters on the location.
Notices to indicate isolated equipment not in use.
DC power isolation sometimes omitted.

12 Electrical earthing
Proper earthing of electrical equipment and drilling equipment throughout the mud
system is important. Without an effective earth, dangerous potentials could build up
and result in electrical discharge in areas classified as hazardous. Such a potential
source of ignition can be eliminated by interconnecting all tanks and mud mixing
systems and ensuring that resistance to earth is low (< 1 ohm). Sensitive
equipment such as computer, instrument logic boards and digital recorders can also
be adversely affected by poor earthing. Concern on these problems is usually
restricted to dry desert environments.
Deficiencies
Mud tanks and mixing skids are not interconnected or earthed.
The quality of earth is not checked with a Mega insulation tester

Audit questionnaire
1 Communication and motivation

Are rig site and office based safety meetings minute?

Distributed to all involved/concerned parties?
Are identified action items reviewed and formally closed out?
Do field supervisors attend the office-based meeting?
Do management attend the rig site meeting?
Are all contractor representatives invited to attend?
Do supervisors and crew have a common language?
Are translators with work experience available in the crews?
Are any of the supervisors proficient in the local language?
Are signs and information available in the local language?
Is there a requirement for bilingual foremen in the contracts?
How is the quality of communication on the rig site verified?

2 Work permit

Does the work permit system cover all aspects of hazardous work?
Are the requirements known to all the work force & supervisors?
Are permits in force on display in a central location?
Is the location reserved for this purpose?
Is there any system of review of the use of the permit system?
Who in the organization sees copies of permits issued?

3 Safety training and induction

Are there notices instructing all arrivals to report in/out?

Is there a system of induction - is this recorded?
Who is identified as the focal point for induction?
How is the emergency signal demonstrated?
How is the use of emergency safety equipment demonstrated?
Are there printed cards giving muster locations and site rules?
Are these handed out to every new arrival?
Are they printed in the local language as well as in English?
Are there clear hazard signs in appropriate place on location?
Are escape routes clearly visible?

4 Contingency plans

Are reports of drills prepared and distributed after each drill?

Is the drill performance reviewed?
Is there a system of shortcoming correction?
Do the drills follow published procedures - how is this checked?
Is the quality of drills discussed by management?
What are the instructions in the event of an unsatisfactory drill?
Are the contingency plans available to all key staff?
Including those involved in the plan?
Has there been feedback from all personnel involved?
Have the plans been changed and the changes distributed?
Do the contractors have their own contingency plans?
Any conflict?
Are there dry runs of contingency plans?
Is so, how is the exercise reviewed?
Who is focal point for amendments, to contingency plans?
Does the head count check with meal sheets?
How are short-term visitors including in POB at all times?
Is the POB list available to the person responsible for the head count?
What other duties/responsibilities does he have?

5 Accident investigation

Is accident reporting and investigation procedures fully described?

Are they distributed to all supervisory staff?

Does contract oblige participation in accident investigation?
How are contractors informed of others near miss accidents?
Are procedures, rules or specifications changed as a result of accident
investigations?

6 Contractor safety

Are copies of all contracts with site supervisors?

With contractor representatives?
Is the content of sub-contract terms vetted by the Company?
How is agreement to the sub-contract by the Company specified?
Are the work schedules of the sub-contractor compatible with safe practice?
Is there a relief schedule?
How is the skill and experience level of sub-contract staff checked?
Are medical requirements met by sub-contract staff?
Can the sub-contractor communicate with the contractor supervisor?
How is a language problem identified?
Are personnel required to work over or near water?
Is there a system for verifying swimming capability?

7 Maintenance procedures

Is a register kept on the rig of all slings and shackles in use?

Is lifting equipment marked with the SWL?
Are slings marked with an ID number?
Is there a system for regular inspection of lifting equipment?
Is there certification of inspection of lifting equipment?
Is responsibility for sling selection clearly understood?
Are the rules pertaining to lifting procedures known to all crews at all levels?

8 Weight control

Is there a system used for checking loads?

Is there an instruction how often loads are to be checked?
Are rig stability calculations required?
Is there a deck-load limitation?
Is there a system for checking the actual loads on the rig?

9 Fork-lift trucks

Is there a system for authorization of fork-lift drivers?

Is a list of authorized drivers available?
Does the fork-lift work in Zone 2 area?
Is there a work permit system to cover this?
Is the vehicle suitable for Zone 2 work?

Is a reversing alarm fitted and working?

Do the rules forbid lifting of personnel with the fork-lift?
Are these known to the supervisors and crews?

10 Industrial hygiene

Are chemical data sheets for all chemicals available?

Are they distributed to transport and rig supervisors?
Are hazardous chemicals identified and isolated?
Are personnel working with these chemicals aware of the hazards?
Do they know what to do in the event of a spillage or accident?
Are shower and eye wash available in mud mixing/handling areas?
How are 'empty' drums and sacks dealt with?
What happens to excess chemicals on site?
Are 'removal' or waste disposal personnel aware of the dangers?

11 Hazardous area classification

Is the hazardous area classification according to the IP code?

Is the IP code applied on the drilling location?
Is a hazardous area diagram available on the rig?
Is it clearly visible where current work permits are on display?
Do key personnel on the rig know the hazardous area boundaries?
Are cars allowed to be parked on the location?

12 Flares and vents

Is the rig fitted with a mud-gas separator?

Are drawings available?
Is there a mechanism to prevent gas venting through the mud-line?
What are the operating instructions to the drillers?
Can a gaseous influx be circulated out safely through the separator?

13 Gas cylinders

Are local gas supplies to a recognized standard or code of practice?

Are gas cylinders stored upright in a shaded area?
Is oxygen separated from fuels?
Are cylinders properly color coded and fitted with caps?
Are there records kept of the location of each bottle used?

14 ESD systems

Do all supervisory staff know how to actuate the ESD function?

Do they know what equipment is actually shut down?
Is there written description of the ESD system available?

15 Radioactive sources

Are there regulations governing use of radioactive materials?

If so, who is identified as legally responsible?
What is the limit of radiation around the source storage container?
Is radiation verified below the maximum permissible level?
How is this verified?
Is there a register of radioactive sources kept on the rig?
Who is responsible for updating the register?
Is copy held by the senior operations engineer?

16 Telecommunications

How is the use of portable radio-transmitters controlled?

Is a register of all portable radios available on the rig site?
Are isolation notices available?
Is there a procedure for informing others of radio silence?

17 Electrical earthing

How is rig equipment earthing tested?

Are all individual tanks and skids properly earthed?
Is equipment of service companies included?

18 Service contractors

Do all service contractors receive a site safety induction?

Are Company transport standards complied with?
Do service staff have copies of relevant Company standards?
Are they all included in safety meetings?
Do all personnel know their emergency response duties?
Is participation in emergency drills routine?

Implementation, Supervision,
Verification and Control
Responsibilities for the implementation, supervision, verification and control of
drilling operations are listed in the following table:
Action
Execution
Quality Control
Provide input to the
Drilling Supervisor
Operations Engineer
preparation of the Drilling
Programme
Prepare the drilling /
Operations Engineer
Senior Operations
completion / workover
Engineer Head of
programme
Onshore/Offshore

Prepare amendments to
Drilling Programme

Operations Engineer

Equipment selection

Operations Engineer

Call-Out Company supplied

equipment/personnel

Operations Engineer
Drilling Supervisor
Logistics Supervisor
Drilling Contractor
Logistics Supervisor
Drilling Contractor
Drilling Contractor
Drilling Contractor
Operations Engineer
Drilling Supervisor

Call-Out Contractor supplied

equipment/personnel
Conduct drills
Inspect tubulars (not casing)
Inspect and test BOP
Monitor well trajectory

Monitor drilling parameters

Monitor drilling costs versus
plan
BHA design, bit selection and
hydraulics

Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Supervisor

Measure and tally tubulars

Cement operations

Drilling Contractor
Cement Contractor

Drilling Supervisor
Directional Drilling
Contractor / Operations
Engineer

Safe and proper operation of Drilling Contractor

rig equipment
Leak-off/ liner lap/ casing tests Drilling Supervisor
Well control
Drilling Supervisor Mud
logger Drilling
Contractor
Decide when to conduct check Drilling
trips
Drilling

Carry out flow checks

Maintain Trip Sheets in and

Drilling
Drilling

Operations
Approval : Drilling
Manager
Senior Operations
Engineer Head of Onshore/
Offshore Operations
Senior Operations
Engineer Head of Onshore/
Offshore Operations
Head of Onshore/ Offshore
Operations
Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Supervisor
Operations Engineer
Senior Operations
Engineer
Operations Engineer
Operations Engineer
Operations Engineer
Senior Operations
Engineer
Head of onshore/offshore
operations
Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Supervisor
Operations Engineer
Drilling Supervisor

Operations Engineer
Drilling Supervisor
Operations Engineer
Head of Onshore/Offshore
Operations
Supervisor/
Operations Engineer
Contractor
Senior Operations
Engineer
Head of Onshore/ Offshore
Operations
Contractor
Drilling Supervisor
Contractor & Mud Drilling Supervisor

out of the hole

Final Well Report

Loggers
Operations Engineer

Formation evaluation

Petroleum Engineer
Logging Contractor
Geologists/ Petro
physicists
Drilling Contractor / Mud
Contractor / Mud Logger
Drilling Contractor

Monitor formation being

drilled
Monitor mud weight
Report drilling problems
Maintain adequate mud,
chemical, LCM & cement
stocks
Equipment/Tools/Water
Ordering

Hand over well

Final well reports, sketches

with well head

Senior Operations
Engineer
Head of Onshore/Offshore
Operations
Petroleum Engineering
Petroleum Engineering

Drilling Supervisor
Contractor Tool Pusher
Drilling Supervisor
Operations Engineer
Drilling Supervisor / Mud Drilling Supervisor
& Cementing
Operations Engineer
Contractor/Logistics
Drilling Supervisor
Senior Operations
Logistics Supervisor
Engineer Head of
Onshore/Offshore
Operations
Drilling Supervisor/
Operations Engineer
Drilling Contractor
Senior Operations
Engineer
Operations Engineer
Senior Operations
Engineer Head of
Onshore/Offshore
Operations

3. Safety
Safety of Drilling Operations/Key Safety
Standard in Drilling Operations
1 Personnel
Work shall be restricted in all areas below other work being carried out at higher
levels.
Work vests shall be worn by all personnel working over or near water, and where
there are no guard rails in elevated positions. A safety belt and lifeline shall be worn
by all personnel working above the first girt of the mast. The lifeline shall be
secured to both the belt and the structure.
Personnel shall not be raised or lowered by the catlines, nor shall they "ride the
elevator".
All tools and materials shall be raised to work platforms by a hand line, toolbar, or
other means. Both hands shall be free when climbing ladders.
All safety belts, lifelines, stop chutes, and the Derrickman's emergency breathing
apparatus shall be tested at regular intervals. The tests shall be included in the
fortnightly inspection report.
Eye protection shall be worn at all times.

2 Floors and Work Platforms

Guard rails and toe boards shall be fitted round the work platforms wherever
possible.
Walkways, staircases and platforms shall have non-slip surfaces. All openings shall
be properly guarded and sign posted in English and Norwegian, or suitably covered.
Work platforms shall be erected on the mast for all personnel to stand on while
working with equipment in or on the mast.
Work platforms shall be inspected before and after work for loose tools and
materials, and a high standard of housekeeping shall be maintained at all times.

3 Safety of Drilling Equipment

3.1 General
All the Drilling Contractors drilling equipment shall be included in the Contractor's
maintenance system.
The equipment shall be inspected in the fortnightly inspection report. Company
drilling equipment shall also be maintained by the Drilling Contractor.
All certificates or copies thereof shall be available on board, and no equipment shall
be used after the expiry date of such certificates.
Guards over moving parts of machinery shall not be removed while the machinery
remains connected to a power source. Machinery with remote controls shall be
isolated locally, the means of isolation shall be locked, and a warning notice posted.
All newly repaired or maintained equipment shall be commissioned by an
authorized person.
All downhole equipment and other equipment (as necessary) shall be rated for the
test pressures to be applied.

3.2 Iron Roughneck, Power Tongs, Tongs

In cases where the iron roughneck cannot be utilized, two rig tongs shall be used for
making-up/breaking-out connections.
The rotary clutch shall not be engaged while the drillpipe tongs are latched round
any piece of equipment or drillpipe in the rotary.
Floormen shall always:
- Keep their hands clear of the tong latch, the tong jaws, and the gap between the
tongs and pipe.
- Observe swinging tongs to prevent being pushed into a hazardous position.
- Wear eye protection when changing tong dies.
Power tongs shall have a working safety device to prevent them operating whilst
the gates or guards are open.
Spinning chain is not allowed in any circumstances.
When replacing and repairing snublines, it shall be verified that the length of the
snubline remains correct.

3.3 Hoists
All hoists shall be marked with their Safe Working Load (SWL), and this shall be
visible at all times.
The Weight Indicator shall be visible to the Driller at all times.

Wirelines shall be checked in the fortnightly inspection report. After the maximum
allowed ton mileage the lines shall be slipped or slipped and cut.
Lines shall always have sufficient wrap on the drum to prevent the load being
applied directly to the fastening clamps.
When greasing the crown and block, the Driller shall stay at the brake throughout
the operation.
Use of the catline is prohibited.

3.4 Stop Chutes

Stop Chutes are a safety block with auto stopping device. They shall be available to
provide a safe escape from masts and other places where work has to be carried
out at heights.
The landing point of the Stop Chute shall be kept clear of obstructions.
Various types are available, and an appropriate model shall be used and adjusted
for each situation.

3.5 Elevators and Slips

The use of power slips is recommended.
The elevator shall be removed when the drillstring is stuck, and the Kelly or topdrive
used to loosen the pipe. Jarring with the elevator can be dangerous. If this is done,
tie the latch of the elevator.
Single joint elevators shall be used for picking up casing and tubing.
The elevator shall be used for picking up drillpipe from the Catwalk machine.
Operators shall:
- Ensure the elevator latch closes all the way when picking up pipe.
- Never catch the elevator bails. The back handle shall be used to pull the elevator
away from the pipe.
- Keep their feet clear of the handles of the slips.

3.6 Stabbing Board

A log of the checks and maintenance of the stabbing board shall be kept as part of
the drilling unit maintenance system. All ropes shall be checked regularly, and
routine lubrication shall be carried out.
Whenever the stabbing board has not been used for 14 days or more, the ropes and
lubrication system shall be completely checked, the stabbing board examined and
all its motions tested.

The designated Stabbing Board Operator shall be trained in the operation of the
equipment, and shall check it independently as soon as possible after coming on
board.

3.7 Pipe Handling

Mechanical handling of drill pipe and tubulars (i.e. "Iron rough neck" and remote
operated pipe racking) is a compulsory requirement for operations on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS).

3.8 Drawworks
The drawworks "crown-o-matic" (crown block protection device), shall be tested
(and recorded on the IADC report) each shift, and each time the drill line has been
slipped or cut.
The Driller shall be at the controls whenever work is being carried out on the
drawworks. A wok permit is also necessary for this work.
The rat-hole and mouse-hole shall be covered when not in use, unless the protective
casing extends above the level of the rig floor.
The guards over the drum and rotary table gears shall always be in place when the
machinery is in use.

3.9 High Pressure Equipment

Detailed information on Safety requirements for pressure testing is given in the
"Safety Procedure Manual".
All equipment shall be pressure tested after repairs and maintenance in addition to
routine tests.
All pressure lines shall be secured. All temporary pressure hoses shall be protected
from damage.
All hoses and lines shall be vented to atmosphere before they are disconnected.
Rotary hoses shall be properly secured at both ends, with the standpipe end
secured to the mast and the goose neck end to swivel.
It is a basic safety requirement that all equipment (e.g. wellhead equipment and
choke manifolds etc.) shall be designed, operated and maintained to eliminate the
possibility of discharges, and the potential of creating an explosive atmosphere
during normal operations.
In this context, production test equipment shall conform to operational
requirements and also meet the criteria governing its use in hazardous zones.
Personnel should not be in the vicinity of the pumps in the drilling unit and the fluid
ends of pumps and hoses when high circulating/test pressures are being used.

3.10 Mud Pumping/ Mixing

Detailed information on use and handling of mud chemicals is given in the "Safety
Procedure Manual".
The emergency stop switch in the pump room shall be locked shut and a warning
notice posted while work is in progress on the mud pump.
Reset type relief valves are preferred. If shear pin type relief valves are fitted,
guards shall be fitted to prevent sections of the sheared pin flying off if the valve(s)
relieves.
Guards shall be in place over all moving parts of the equipment.

4 Safety of Specific Drilling Operations

4.1 General
The following general precautions shall be observed at all times:
- No smoking outside the accommodation.
- Always use safety glasses outside the accommodation
- Never break off a drilling stand with the pump on.
- Never stand on the rotary table during drilling.
- Never place a hand on top of a pipe when adding pipe.
- Always keep hand tools in good working condition.
- Always keep the workplace tidy and clean.
- Always use Permits to Work as required for non-routine operations.
- Check for H2S and petroleum vapors whenever gas is suspected.
- Wear the appropriate protective clothing for the operations being carried out.

4.2 Well Logging

Detailed safety procedures for electric wireline logging are given in the
Drilling Manual.

4.3 Cementing
Detailed information on use and handling of cementing chemicals is given in the
"Safety Procedure Manual".
All equipment shall be designed for the operation and test pressure it will be
subjected to in the operations.
All personnel working on cement mixing shall wear the appropriate protective
clothing, as detailed on the toxicological data sheets and in the Chemical Product
Index. The cement room should be well ventilated.
The pipelines from the cement pump to the wellhead shall be tested before cement
mixing commences.

4.4 Blow-out Prevention

Detailed information on blow-out prevention is given in the "Pressure Control

Manual".

4.5 Production Testing

Refer to the "Production Testing Safety Manual" prior to commencing
production testing operations.

4.6 Well Servicing

Well swabbing is prohibited.
The following precautions shall be observed when well acidizing:
- Have the minimum personnel on the drill floor, wearing the appropriate
protective clothing.
- Ensure fresh water is available for washing down protective equipment and
personnel.
- Pressure test all piping and connections before use.
- Wash all equipment thoroughly with fresh water on completion of acidizing.

4.7 Concurrent Operations

Detailed safety procedures for concurrent operations are given the "Concurrent
Operations Safety Manual".

5 Hazardous Zones
Discharges give rise to Hazardous Zones depending on the frequency of discharge
and the ventilation available. Wherever there is a risk of explosion, all potential
sources of ignition, principally electrical equipment, shall be adequately protected,
isolated, or removed.
Hazardous zones are also established when explosives operations are in progress.
The Senior Drilling Supervisor is responsible for ensuring that the requirements to
Zone Classification within the drilling unit are being implemented. The Offshore
Installation Manager shall ensure that all precautions are taken, and warning notices
are posted for work in Hazardous Zones.
The Zones are classified as follows:
Zone 0 - Area with an explosive atmosphere continuously or for long periods.
Zone 1 - Area where an explosive atmosphere must be expected occasionally
during normal operations.
Zone 2 - Area where an explosive atmosphere occurs only exceptionally and
for short periods of time.
The types of discharge giving rise to explosion risk are:

Continual Discharge - taking place either continuously, or for short periods at

a high frequency.
Primary Discharge - Expected to take place intermittently or occasionally
during normal operations.
Secondary Discharge - Not expected to take place during normal operations.
If discharges take place, they will be both infrequent and of short duration.

The Hazardous zones that shall be implemented are determined by the ventilation
available, and can be determined from the following table:
Continual Discharge ==== With all types of ventilation, zones 0, 1 and 2
required
Primary Discharge ==== With natural or mechanical ventilation, zones 1 and
2 required.
With no ventilation, zones 0, 1 and 2 required.
Secondary Discharge ==== With natural or mechanical ventilation, zone 2
required.
With no ventilation, zones 1 and 2 required.

Storage of Dangerous Goods (Explosives

and R.A. Sources)
The following procedure for storage of explosives and radioactive materials shall
apply to the well operations and shall be used to control the access to the locked
storage magazines for both the explosives and radioactive material.
1. The keys to both the explosive magazine and the radioactive source storage
bunker will be kept by the Offshore Installation Manager in a secure place for use by
the LWD/ Electric Wireline Logging Personnel in the course of their duties or by
himself in the case of an NPD/ Safety Officer inspection. This also applies to any
Emergency situation that may arise. The Offshore Installation Manager can delegate
this responsibility to the Senior Drilling Supervisor.
2. A control book must be kept to track the usage and whereabouts of the various
key sets. The book should indicate in particular, the date, person and reason for
entering the storage bunkers.
3. The Electric Wireline Logging Engineer shall, when arriving on the platform,
leaving the platform and when stock changes, fill out an Explosives Inventory List.
The list shall be distributed in the following way:
1 Copy to the OIM
1 Copy to the Senior Drilling Supervisor
1 Copy to be kept in the magazine
1 Copy to be kept by the Electric Wireline Engineer for inclusion into the Rig
Book
1 Copy to be kept by the Offshore Co-coordinator - as a record only.
1 Copy to be brought back onshore to update the Contractor's inventory
listing.

4. The MWD/ Electric Wireline Logging Engineer shall, when arriving on the
platform, leaving the platform and when stock changes, fill out a Radioactive
Inventory List. The list shall be distributed in the same way as above.
5. The Offshore Co-coordinator/ Well Site Drilling Engineer shall ensure that these
essential tasks are completed accurately.
6. The Materials Man will be notified of the arrival of any Dangerous Goods on
board by the manifest and warning fax from the dispatching Company. The
Materials Man shall upon notification inform the Senior Drilling Supervisor and the
Offshore Co-coordinator.

Drilling safety guidelines

The drilling safety guidelines identify basic elements of a safety programme

applicable for exploration, development, or workover operations.

1 Responsibilities
Safety is the responsibility of everyone associated with the drilling operation. In
order to conduct safe operations, Contractor and Company personnel must clearly
understand and effectively discharge their respective responsibilities.

1.1 Contractor responsibilities

The drilling Contractor is responsible for:
Implementation of a management policy directed at providing a safe work
site.
Implementing an on-site safety programme
Safety of Contractor and Subcontractor personnel
Control of work and health conditions on the rig site
Training Contractor personnel to ensure safe operations
Providing personnel with necessary protective/ safety equipment and training
in the use of such equipment
Ensuring that all Contractor equipment is properly maintained to ensure safe
operation.
Emergency contingency plans for major scenarios such as fire/explosion, toxic
material release, man-overboard, stability control, and heavy weather that do
not require third party personnel or equipment.
Compliance with operator safety guidelines, policies, procedures.

Compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.

1.2 Company responsibilities

The Company is responsible for:
Ensuring that Contractor's safety policies, standards, and procedures are
acceptable to the Company and conform with applicable laws and
regulations.
Ensuring that Contractor's safety programme is accomplishing the desired
safety objectives.
Reporting any hazards to appropriate Contractor supervisors when situations
exists where safety has been compromised; following up to ensure that
appropriate action has been taken to correct the situation.
Instructing Company subcontractor personnel to observe the rig Contractor's
safety programme and coordinating activities between rig contractor and
company sub-contractor personnel to avoid conflicts.
Identifying responsibility for third party equipment maintenance and
operability.
Emergency contingency plans requiring coordination of outside third party
groups such as oil spill response, rig evacuation, etc.
Monitoring contractor and company personnel safety performance (lost time
accidents, accident frequency rate).

2 Safety management programme

Each Contractor is expected to:
Have a documented safety programme containing written policies and
procedures designed to protect the safety and health of its employees.
Effectively implement this safety programme in day-to-day operations, and
Have a procedure for periodically updating the programme, as required.
Ensure that all personnel are familiar with the content of these documents
and have ready access to them at the worksite for day-to-day reference.
This programme should include the following topics:

2.1 Policy statement

Contractor should have a safety policy statement which clearly conveys
management support for safe operations and defines responsibility and
accountability for Contractor personnel to achieve this goal. This policy statement
should be signed by a senior executive and fully disseminated to all employees. In
addition, it should be posted in visible locations at the work site.
On locations where English is not the local language, the policy statement should
also be posted in the local national language.

2.2 Employee orientation programme

Every contractor should have an employee orientation programme which includes
indoctrination of each new rig employee, regardless or prior experience. The new
employee should be instructed on work procedures, safe practices, the station bill

and any emergency responsibility associated with his/her position on the station bill,
and the use and maintenance of personal protective equipment.
Guidelines should be in place for key contractor personnel to observe the new
employees work performance until he/she is satisfied that the employee can fill the
position in a safe and effective manner.
The employee orientation programme should also be designed to instruct Company,
visitor and third party personnel new to the rig on procedures and safe practices,
the station bill and any emergency responsibility associated with his/her position on
the station bill, and the use and maintenance of personal protective equipment.
The use of training aids (videos, posters, viewgraphs, etc.) is encouraged.

2.3 Personnel safety training

All contractor personnel at the work site should be fully trained and currently
qualified for his/her job in accordance with the following minimum standards:
2.3.1 Well control and blowout prevention
The toolpusher, driller, assistant driller, and subsea engineer should possess a
current certificate in well control and blowout prevention issued by an industry
recognized training institution.
2.3.2 Fire fighting
All supervisory personnel should receive training in basic firefighting. In addition,
those personnel assigned as members of a fire team should receive formalized fire
team training, including instruction on fire team leadership.
2.3.3 Survival at sea
All personnel working on an offshore rig operating in a hostile environment should
receive survival at sea training.
2.3.4 First aid
All supervisory personnel should possess a valid first aid certificate.
When drilling operations are to take place in an area where H2S is present or
potentially a hazard, all rig personnel should undergo training in the use of
breathing apparatus and escape sets. The training should be reinforced by regular
drills.
Where local regulatory requirements specify more stringent standard than those
outlined above, the drilling contractor will be expected comply with those higher
standards.

3 Hazard control system

A system should be in place to identify and quickly correct hazards found at the rig
site. This system should address such topics as:
Hazard warning signs.
Chemicals, data storage and handling procedure.

Unsafe work practices.

Use of personal protective equipment.
Machinery guarding.
Lifting equipment and procedures.

4 Safety meeting and documentation requirements

Regularly scheduled safety meetings are required. They should be led by
appropriate line supervisors and/or the safety adviser and should be conducted in
the language of personnel in attendance. They should encourage worker input and
free communication. Safety meetings should include a review of any recent accident
and safety procedures implemented to prevent its reoccurrence. Every individual
should attend a safety meeting at least once per hitch (work cycle).
Each meeting should be documented, and the minutes should include a listing of
those in attendance. topics covered, and any safety concerns raised and follow-up
action to be taken. Minutes of each meeting should be copied to the senior
Company representative.
In addition, pre-job, or "toolbox" meeting, are recommended for the purpose of
discussing safety concerns specific to a particular job. Company personnel should
coordinate and ensure third party personnel attendance, particularly for job specific
meetings.
Local Contractor management should periodically review the material covered in
these meetings and follow-up on safety related issues raised during the meetings.

5 Safety inspection programme

A periodic safety inspection programme should be in place. This programme should

consist of:
a. Routine inspections made by experienced and qualified supervisors on site
(usually on a weekly or monthly basis). This inspection should be conducted by both
Contractor and Company personnel.
Critical equipment to be examined should include:
Personnel protective equipment
BOP equipment and controls
Lifting equipment and hoisting gear
Walkways, handrails, guards and ladders
Warnings signs and notices
First aid and medical facilities
Communications equipment and capabilities
Emergency response equipment.
Each inspection report should be reviewed by a senior manager so that appropriate
resources can be made available and given the priority required.
b. Periodic visits by Contractor and Company management and Contractor safety
specialists. As a minimum, one safety system or drill should be reviewed per visit
with any noted deficiencies corrected at the earliest opportunity.

c. Full safety audit (annual inspection) conducted by a team typically consisting of a

contractor manager, senior drilling technician, safety specialist, and a Company
representative has been found to be effective and should be considered by
individual contractors as part of their safety programme.
Topics covered during these audits generally include:
safety management systems;
conformity with standards and procedures;
work permit and other safety systems;
emergency preparedness;
training material, manuals, and safety literature;
training effectiveness.
Copies of previous inspection records should be kept on the rig to document
findings noted during earlier inspections and follow-up action taken to correct the
problem.

6 Accident reporting and investigating system

An accident reporting procedure should be in place.

The completed accident reporting form should include the date of the accident,
number of fatalities resulting from the accident, job title of injured personnel, type
of accident, medical cause of death (if applicable), a brief narrative of the accident,
and recommended corrective action.
Responsibility for follow-up action should be identified. Any changes in procedures,
rules, equipment replacement, etc. as a result of the accident should be identified in
the follow-up report and should be discussed during appropriate safety meetings.
A list of personnel/offices to receive copies of the accident reports should be
included.
In addition, the Contractor must report all lost time accidents sustained by
Contractor's or subcontractor's personnel to the Company on the day such accident
occurs. and the Contractor must provide the Company with a full written report of
the investigation of each such accident within seven days after the occurrence of
the accident.

In the first work day of each month, the Contractor must provide the
Company with a monthly safety report which includes the following
information:
No. of personnel (both rig site and support staff) assigned full time to provide
the Contract Services.
Number of man-hours worked by personnel (both rig site and support staff)
assigned full time to provide the Contract Services.
No. of fatalities.
No. of lost time accidents (LTA).

No.
No.
No.
No.

of
of
of
of

days away from work resulting from LTA's.

restricted lost time accidents (RLTA's).
non-lost time accidents.
near-misses.

The following definitions shall apply:

Reportable accidents
A reportable accident is any injury such as a cut, fracture, sprain, amputation,
death, etc., which results from a work related accident or from an exposure
involving a single incident in the work environment. Note that the term reportable
accident and incident are identical.
Lost time accident (LTA)
Any reportable accident that results in "lost" work days subsequent to the day of
injury (i.e. next shift, tour or hitch).
Restricted lost time accident (RLTA)
If the employee is able to return to work on "light duty status" on his/her next
regularly scheduled shift following a reportable accident, the accident will be
considered a RLTA.
Non-lost time accident (NLTA)
Any act, situation or occurrence which, although it did not cause a serious injury,
could have under certain circumstances.
Accident frequency rate (AFR)
Number of lost time accidents including. Fatalities/man-hours worked 1,000,000.
Man-hours
Man-hours for rig site personnel should be based on hours actually worked during a
normal tour. Man-hours for shore based personnel should be based on hours
actually worked.
Fatalities
The total number of Contractor employees who died as a result of a particular
accident should be reported. "Delayed" deaths that occur after the accident are to
be included in the year of the accident if the deaths were a direct result of the
incident.

7 Rig site safety coordinator

The individual responsible for coordinating safety activities at the drill site should be
the senior Contractor (i.e. rig superintendent, senior toolpusher). The senior
Contractor representative may assign another individual as the Rig Site Safety
Coordinator and delegate responsibility for specific on-site safety activities such as:
arranging and conducting drills;
checking safety equipment (firefighting, lifesaving, etc.);
checking alarms (H2S, smoke);
site inspection;
documenting safety meetings and any follow-up action;

 assisting in evaluating hazards;

induction training for new employees.
The senior Contractor representative should have the authority to suspend any work
until unsafe or hazardous conditions are corrected.

8 Safety adviser
A shore based safety adviser (employed by the drilling contractor) should maintain
regular contact with the rig site Safety Coordinator. The role and responsibilities of
the safety adviser should be clearly defined and known to personnel on the rig site.
Duties of a safety adviser typically include:
Formal safety training (scheduling personnel into firefighting schools, first aid
classes, H2S training, survival at sea, etc.).
Rig site drill evaluation.
Follow-up on safety inspection and drill deficiencies (Verification of
satisfactory close-out of safety inspection and drill deficiencies).
Addressing relevant issues involving environment, health and industrial
hygiene.
The Contractor will be expected to designate a senior executive with responsibilities
for safety management and loss prevention. Safety advisers should report directly
to the executive.

9 Emergency response procedures

Emergency procedures for major scenarios such as fire/explosion, toxic material
release (H2S) release), man-overboard, well control, medical emergency, stability
control, heavy weather, helicopter crash and rig evacuation should be documented
and readily accessible at the rig site. The procedures should describe each scenario,
response team organization, response team action, and personnel to be contacted
in the event of an emergency.
Any contingency plans adopted from Company, third party contractors, or subcontractors must be checked for overall compatibility. For each contingency, there
should only be one plan.
Each plan should be site-specific and must clearly indicate individual and group
roles with details of action to be taken. It is also essential to identify alternative
individuals to assume key duties so that redundancy is built into a plan.
Key contact facilities and personnel must be specified with a published roster of all
personnel on call in case of an emergency.
Communications priorities are to be clearly specified for each plan and must include
the information necessary to communicate. Local emergency contact numbers
(police, fire, hospital) must also be known to personnel responsible for initiating the
emergency plan.
Periodic drills should be conducted to train all personnel on their duties during
emergencies. The frequency of drills, which should at least conform to local

regulations or statutory requirements, should be clearly stated, and the date of

each drill should be documented.
The emergency response procedures should be readily accessible and known to all
supervisors on the rig location.

10 Permit to work system

A permit to work procedures for critical operations such as hot work, lock-out/tagout, confined space entry, and handling of radioactive materials must be in place.
Contractor's procedures should define the individual responsible for the permits,
who reviews permits, and who monitors the permit system. The permit should
include space for the hazard(s) to be identified and precautions to taken. When a
permit is issued, all personnel need to be informed when the work has started and
when it is completed.

11 Safety manual
Every Contractor should have a manual which addresses safety procedures and
practices. This manual should include:

11.1 Policy statement

The Contractor Safety Policy should be included in the Safety Manual.

11.2 Contractor safety organization and individual

responsibilities
The Contractor safety organization and individual responsibilities should be clearly
identified.

11.3 Basic safety rules

Basic safety rules should be site/rig specific and produced in languages understood
by all personnel at the work site. It is also suggested that the basic safety rules and
safety practices be readily available to all personnel in handbook form and
presented to all employees and visitors new to the rig during the employee
orientation programme.
It is essential that the Contractor's policy regarding smoking, horseplay, and the use
of drugs, alcohol, and firearms be clearly stated.

11.4 Safe work practices

The section on safe work practices should include:
Use of personal protective equipment.
Identification of hazardous areas, use of hazard signs.
Identification, handling and control of hazardous material.
Reporting procedures for defective equipment, unsafe acts and injuries.

12 Responsibilities of company rig personnel

12.1 The drilling supervisor
The Drilling Supervisor is the Company Representative on site. It is his duty to
ensure compliance of all contractors with the provisions of their contracts, in
particular the scope of work, and to act on behalf of the Company in day-to-day
contractual matters. He must keep himself fully informed of the progress of the
operations at all times, and ensure that his line supervisors are also kept informed
by means of regular reports.
Specifically, his responsibilities are to:
ensure that Company policies and instructions are properly given and to
make sure that they are properly understood and implemented;
acquaint himself with the locality in which he is drilling;
review the drilling programme in detail;
advise his supervisors of any aspects of the prognosis or well plan which
might cause the loss of well control;
ensure that a system of well control data sheets is maintained, ready for
immediate use if required;
see to it that units are used consistently throughout the drilling rig and are
consistent with the drilling programme;
check on the adequacy of BOP training of the relevant personnel on the rig
floor and supervisory staff on the drilling rig;
ensure that all operations conducted with equipment associated with
pressure control are carried out in a safe and efficient manner;
be acquainted with the contingency plans relating to fire, blowout, pollution
and spillage on or around the drilling unit;
have a full knowledge of H2S procedures and verify that all contractors on
site are suitably equipped and trained.
The responsibilities of the company drilling representative in no way reduce those of
the contractor with regard to well control.

12.2 The rig drilling engineer

The rig drilling engineer reports through the Drilling Supervisor, who is the company
representative on site, and should assist him, as requested, in the discharge of his
duties.
His specific responsibilities include:
Supervision of the wireline logging contractor in so far as compliance with the
logging programme and quality control is concerned. He should also ensure
that radio-active sources and explosives are properly handled and stored.
Liaison with the mud logging contractor to ensure that the company's
interests are properly addressed with regard to geological sampling and
formation description. He should also assure himself that the interface
between the mud loggers and the drillers is managed such that any
anomalies in the drilling parameters are promptly reported and that hole
volume monitoring during tripping is properly addressed.

Liaison with the company drilling supervisor, the contractor site manager and
the sub-contractor cementer to ensure that cement formulations and volumes
are adequate for the job.
Liaison with the mud engineer to ensure that mud properties are adequate
for well control, cuttings removal and formation stability.

Simultaneous/ Concurrent Operations

Producing or conducting well intervention operations in adjacent wells during drilling
operations is a potentially hazardous situation. In simultaneous drilling/production
operations a risk management approach is accepted as being the best way to
address the problem.
The following table addresses the most critical activities during drilling operations
and identifies the risks, mitigating actions and responsible paths
Operation
Drilling
26in hole
Setting 20
in casing
Drilling
16in hole
Setting
13.3/8in
casing

Hazard
Dropped
object

Consequences
Damage to
process
equipment,
Intersection release of
with
hydrocarbons,
adjacent
H2S exposure,
wells,
injury to
shallow gas personnel
working in the
vicinity.
Possible fire or
explosion
Heavy lift Dropped
Damage to
Operations object
process
over
equipment,
wellbay
release of
e.g., risers,
Hydrocarbons,
BOPs,
Fire /
H2S exposure,
wellheads Explosion
injury to
and Xmas
personnel
tree
working in the
Welding
vicinity
Torch
cutting
Perforating Premature
Stuck Pipe detonation
Fishing
of explosive
charge

Serious
explosion,
personnel
injury

Conditions and Controls

Adjacent wells will
remain secured with
downhole plug SCSSV,
BPV
Flowline will remain depressurized within the
collision risk zone (100
ft. radius)
Area access restriction

References
COMPANY Drilling
Manual
H2S Contingency
plan
Well Control
Manual
Contingency
Plan and
Emergency Well
Control Manual

Closure and deWell Control

pressurization of
Manual
adjacent wells until
COMPANY
lifting operations are
Contingency Plan
complete. (Deand Emergency
pressurization in this
Procedure
case includes tubing
H2S Contingency
above SCSSV, Xmas tree Plan
and flowlines)
Permit to work system
Area access restricted
Pre-job safety meeting
P.A. announcement
Suspension of hot work COMPANY
Area access restriction Contingency Plan
Radio silence. Local
and Emergency
Rules
Procedure
P.A. announcement
Radio Silence
Stray Current Control
Standing

Instructions
Acidizing
Loss of well Release of
No hot work on WHJ or Completion
Nitrogen
control
hydrocarbons, cantilever
Programme
lifting
Splash/spill H2S, exposure, superstructure
COMPANY
release
fire or
Closure of adjacent wells Contingency Plan
explosion
Safety clothing
and Emergency
Injury to
Emergency wash
Procedure
personnel
stations
H2S Contingency
Area access restriction Plan
Wellbay area to be
marked area to be
marked with Hazard
tape.
Well testing Relief valve Release of
This operation only
COMPANY
on separator hydrocarbons permitted with written Contingency
pops out
from
approval from Drilling
Plans and
extinguishin atmospheric
Department
Emergency
g flare from vent boom H2S
Procedure
burner
exposure, fire
or explosion
Pressure
Failure of
Liquid jet
P.A. announcement.
Drilling Manual
testing and mechanical impact,
Area defined by
COMPANY
BOP testing component projectiles,
components under test Contingency Plan
except
injury to
to be restricted by use and Emergency
testing
personnel
of Hazard tape.
Manual
equipment
Utilization of certified fit
lines
for purpose
components
Drilling
Loss of well Release of
Not hot work on WHJ or Drilling Manual
12.1/4in
control
Hydrocarbons cantilever substructure. COMPANY
hole
H2S Exposure, Should the BOPs be
Contingency Plan
Setting
possible fire or activated in the event of and Emergency
9.5/8in
explosion
an emergency then the Procedure
casing
producing wells should H2S Contingency
Drilling
be closed immediately Plan
8.1/2in
by activating the ESO.
hole
beyond
100ft
radius of
collision
Running
tubing
Operations Release or Injury of illness Area access restriction, COMPANY
with
exposure to to personnel
monitor area
Contingency Plan
Radioactive radiation
exposed to
Pre-job safety meeting and Emergency
Sources
hazard
P.A. announcement
Procedure
Open hole

logging

Rig team responsibility during

emergency response

Responsibilities of the rig team in case of emergency and provide definition for the
different Emergency levels.

1. Company drilling supervisor

Responsible to take immediate responsive action to control the emergency

situation on the rig.
Receive notification of an incident or the likelihood of such a development
from the OIM or other member of Rig crew and inform the Company drilling
superintendent
Discuss the action to be taken and contribute as a member to the emergency
response team
In consultation with the emergency response team agree on the need for
support services, supply to chemical/equipment, search and rescue or
evacuation.
Keep the Company Drilling Superintendent informed of developments of the
incident and maintain a log of events as they occur
Ensure that an incident Report form is completed and that corrective action is
carried out within his authority.

2. OIM

Ensure that drilling contractors requirement are followed, provided that they
do not conflict with those of the Company drilling supervisor, national
legislation or any other instructions issued by a government or superior
authority
Responsible for the direct supervision of the drilling crew, work in close
cooperation with Company drilling supervisor
Notify the Company drilling supervisor the occurrence of emergency/incidents
immediately, and give all available information regarding the situation
including whatever action is being taken by the drilling crew. Assist Company
drilling supervisor in evaluating the situation and shall give all possible
Advice aid and assist in bringing the abnormal situation under control.
Has the right to perform trouble shooting and take all precautions to avoid
total disaster including the loss of human life during the Emergency, even
without Company approval such approval shall be obtained soonest possible

3. Drilling Contractor Tool Pusher

responsible for all drilling related operations on the rig.

responsible for directing the drilling crew in performance of its members
specific and emergency response duties.

4. Emergency Level classification

Degree of
Definitions
Emergency
Level-1(Abnormal No immediate danger of life, environment or properties
situation)
Can be dealt with totally by Company normal operating
procedures
Level-2
Where it may cause limited danger to life, environment and or
(Emergency
equipment
situation)
Requires implementation of special emergency response
procedure of Company
Level-3 (Major
Where it may develop into and cause danger to life, environment
disaster Situation) or equipment
Requires mobilization of emergency resources from external
sources such a Government bodies and associated emergency
services

Slickline Safety Instructions

Have a good pre-job meeting with the whole crew, inform the crane driver
and check with him the correct signs for crane movements. Run together
through the program, shortly explain the purpose.
Make sure all necessary surface equipment is available, check the last
pressure certificates of BOPs, lubricator and other pressure vessels (not older
than one year).
As long as safety valve is closed and before opening a well to the lubricator
visually inspect the Xmas tree, pay attention to the control line system,
including outlet, lines and pump. Inform the crew for emergency access.
Set up good access to the Xmas tree and pressure control equipment. Check
and secure installation of ladders and scaffolds.
Check availability of communication means and devices. Show and explain
the use of the system.
Check pressure setting of the safety valve pump.
All thermal engines (i.e. diesels) must to be installed in non-hazardous areas
(10 meters from the well center-line) around the wellhead), unless fitted with
the following safety equipment, in which case they may be located within 3 to
7 meters from the well center-line:
- exhaust with anti-spark device and cooling
- automatic shutdown by over speed detector system
- auto-closing of air intake and auto-shut-down in the event gas
is detected
- conspicuous and easily accessible shut-down control
Ensure that effective firefighting capabilities are in place throughout the
wireline operations and that all personnel are aware of the procedures.
Locate portable foam extinguishers near the wellhead and ensure that they
are full and operational.
Ensure that all personnel are familiar with the operation of firefighting
equipment; ensure that everybody in your crew knows what his duties are
going to be.
Ensure that your working stations are clean and tidy.

Should night work be expected, take appropriate steps to ensure proper

lighting.
Remember that a tired operator is a potential danger to rest of the crew.
Before lifting a piece of equipment with slings, make sure the cables are in
good shape and the clamps and shackles well tightened and secured.
Always open a well slowly using the swab valve.
Each crew working on isolated locations should take along a first aid kit.
When designing a wireline set-up make sure the equipment planned can
safely withstand and handle the maximum wellhead pressure.
Every member of the wireline crew must know how to shut in a well in case of
emergency.
Always make sure that the pressure has been bled down to zero before
attempting to unscrew a quick union.
Never run-in a well with the winch engine stopped.
Do not climb or let somebody climb the lubricator whenever it is under
pressure.
Never attempt to pull a plug before the pressure across it has been equalized.
When rigging up or down a lubricator, never stay below it.
Blow out preventers should always be tested before each job.
When running in for the first time, check the weight frequently.
Perform torsion test on the wire prior to each job.
It is recommended to run a gauge cutter (or sinker bars only) prior to running
anything else in the hole.
When working in H2S wells, inhibit the wire.
When coming out of hole, use the winch relief valve.
Always write down the length, ODs and size of fishing necks of the different
components you are running in the hole.
When cutting wire at surface (rig down) make sure that neither end can fly.
Always work in sight of each other.
Use demarcation cones on route of the wire.
When running a wireline job, always have a clear view of the stuffing box.
Keep track of the number of hours the wire has worked. Change it before it is
too late. Check frequently for defects or corrosion. Between each job, cut and
remove at least 10 of wire.

Guidelines for developing road safety

procedures

Transport related accidents are responsible for the larger percentage of lost time
accidents and fatalities. To ensure a safe operation it is essential to prepare
procedures and guidelines for staff, contractors and visitors in the field.
Safety must be assigned a line responsibility. The following guide-lines provide a
basis for the development of transport safety procedures:
Emergency procedures inclusive of Medevac are required, which should be
tested through table-top exercises in order that lines of communication,

responsibilities and action parties are already defined and understood. Such
procedures should identify medical resources and hospitals which have been
nominated in the event of an emergency.
All passenger vehicles are to be fitted with inertia type seat belts for all
passengers and driver. All passenger seats are to be forward facing. Bench
seats fitted longitudinally are not permitted.
Seat belts are to be worn at all times by driver and passengers. Drivers to
ensure that passengers are "belted up" prior to starting journey.
No night driving to be permitted. Restricted departure times calculated from
given location to given destination must ensure that the vehicle arrives at the
destination prior to darkness with a margin of thirty minutes.
Field vehicles are to be equipped with safety equipment. In the event of a
vehicle breakdown it is imperative that the driver and passengers remain
with the vehicle until a secondary or search vehicle arrives.
A search and rescue procedure is to be prepared for vehicles that have failed
to report at their nominated destination.
All company drivers are to undergo a medical and eyesight examination prior
to engagement.
All transport (haulage) vehicles, cranes and civil engineering equipment/
vehicles are to be fitted with reversing alarms.
All cargo handling equipment required for the safe handling and
transportation of a large assortment of items of all shapes sizes and weight
must have valid certification. Such equipment is to be regularly checked and
maintained. Adequate replacement back-up should be available for items
which are used frequently.
In view of the remoteness of drilling locations, the drilling contractor should
provide a 4WD ambulance.

Road Safety Plan

Driving remains one of the highest risk activities carried out within the oil and gas
exploration industry on a daily basis (according to OGP). Driving risk increases in
countries where driving habits and road conditions are not consistent with
international accepted road and driver safety standards (which lower the risk of
motor vehicle accident (MVA)). Road safety has been identified as a high risk event
from the commencement of Company operations in country. A recent MVA during
the drilling operations at Topkhana 1 has again highlighted this risk and identified
the requirement to put in to place a Road Safety Plan (RSP) to ensure, as far as
reasonably practicable, adequate road safety for all Company workplace vehicles.
Some vehicle risk mitigation measures included in this RSP are already functional,
such as the Journey Management Plan and No Night Driving Policy.
A high volume of vehicle journeys is required for any Company project, ranging from
seismic operations to drilling operations. Vehicles are required to transport people
and equipment to the workplace, distances as short as a few hundred meters, to
distances in excess of a thousand kilometers. Moving drilling rigs could exceed 180
heavy loads in single trucks or multi-vehicle convoys in short time periods. Seismic
operations have included up to 140 vehicles in use daily. Travel routes vary from
multi-lane paved highways to newly constructed gravel roads or potentially off road

4x4 driving. Hazards include both poor drivers and challenging road conditions
(steep grades, sharp corners, uneven roads, poor road visibility, etc.). Travel routes
in remote areas are frequently on poor public gravel roads which pass through small
villages which are occupied by unwary children and seniors. To reduce the risk of
motor vehicle and pedestrian accidents, vehicles must be sound and be driven
carefully at appropriate speeds by competent, unimpaired and alert drivers.

Purpose
The purpose of the RSP is to reduce the risk associated with motor vehicle travel
and to define practical actions which can be put in effect to mitigate road safety
risk. This document does not include detailed procedures, but specifically highlights
the methods which will be employed by Company to mitigate the risk of MVAs. All
Company personnel must accept full responsibility for managing our own road
safety and that of our contractors and subcontractors.
Company has identified high risk activities and subsequently developed a strategy
to highlight these activities (The 10 Golden Rules) with the goal of reducing future
incident frequency. The Golden Rule which highlights vehicle safety is:

Golden Rule # 9 Operate Vehicles Safely.

We never operate vehicles without:
Conducting a pre-trip vehicle inspection, assessing the risks and planning
accordingly.
Ensuring the driver is properly licensed for the class of vehicle and free from
fatigue, drug or alcohol impairment.
Driving with care at appropriate speeds for road conditions, and ensuring all
occupants fasten seatbelts.
Avoiding the use of all mobile communication devices and other driver
distractions, while using any company-leased vehicle on company time.
Designating safe areas while working around moving vehicles.
This Golden Rule and associated requirements will be reviewed regularly with
Company personnel and Company Contractors (and Subcontractors) in various
forums such as:
Contract kick-off meetings
Pre-spud meetings
Pre-job safety meetings for operations requiring vehicle movements
Daily Security meetings (Company Security manages most personnel vehicle
movements)
Worksite weekly safety meetings
Monthly contractor HSE meetings
Service quality meetings
It is the responsibility of every Company Site Supervisor to ensure that the
mandatory requirements of this Golden Rule are followed for every journey. All

Company personnel have a right and a duty to intervene (i.e. Stop the Job) if these
requirements are not being met.
All Company vehicle operators and Contractors must be informed of the
requirements of the Road Safety Plan prior to their commencement of work. Such
orientation must be documented and concluded with the agreement that the
requirements of the RSP are understood and will be followed.
Responsible: Company contract owner.
All Company's operations are required to follow a Journey Management Plan (JMP).
The JMP is a requirement for all personnel, equipment and supplies movements. The
purpose of the JMP is to regulate motor vehicle journeys, to assist vehicles if
incidents occur while travelling, to ensure that all vehicles arrive safely and
according to schedule at the work site, to enforce the no night driving policy and for
security control purposes.
Responsible: Company Logistics Coordinator, in cooperation with the onsite
logistics and security team and with Company Security Office.

Vehicle Inspections
All vehicle operators (drivers) will be required to conduct a documented pre-trip
vehicle inspection prior to commencement of any journey or start of shift. The pretrip walk around will inspect for any deficiencies such as fuel, oil, tires, water, lights
(headlights, brake lights, signal lights), brakes, seatbelts, etc.
All vehicles must be mechanically sound and fit for purpose. Vehicles that arrive on
site in poor mechanical condition are to be refused entry and will not be used under
any circumstances.
Vehicles are to be maintained and inspected according to the requirements
stipulated in the Contract, in the Project HSE Plan, or as a minimum, all vehicles
must be inspected on a monthly basis by a qualified inspector.
Company and all Contractors are required to use a documented vehicle inspection
process. Company will review/audit Contractors inspection procedures and
inspection records.
Responsible: Vehicle operators.

Road Safety Equipment

Company will provide recommended minimum equipment checklists for Company
and contractor operated vehicles to allow for response to mechanical problems, a
MVA and potential injuries to people in the event of a MVA or onboard medical
emergency. The checklists will cover items such as first aid equipment, tire jacks,
spare tires, tool kits, warning triangles, drinking water, mobile telephone, satellite
phones, Track 24, etc.
Responsible: Vehicle operators.

Local Benefits Hired Vehicles

All vehicles and drivers hired from local communities which are designated local
benefits according to the Company Local Benefits Requirements shall be required to

meet or exceed all requirements herein defined. Any inspections or audits shall
comply with this RSP in every respect. Minimum vehicle inspection standards or
operator competency standards will not be lowered because the vehicles or
operators are from the local community.
Responsible: Company supervisory, HSE & community relations (CR) personnel.

Required Documentation
All vehicles must have valid vehicle registration and all drivers must have valid
drivers licenses to meet minimum Iraqi requirements. All inspections or
assessments must be recorded on paper and the information filed for future
reference.
Any vehicles carry hazardous goods are required to carry a copy of the Material
Safety Data Sheet(s).
Responsible: Vehicle operators.

Control of Approved Vehicles and Operators

There is a requirement to ensure all vehicles and operators working on Company
work sites are approved. The control procedures put in place (to be defined) will
confirm (by visual means) that vehicles and vehicle operators meet the minimum
requirements of this RSP.
Responsible: Company Site Supervisor.

Road Safety Assessments

A road hazard assessment is an inventory of road hazards that exist along a
documented route. It is used to identify high-risk roads, to communicate road
hazards to employees and contractors, and to identify any additional driver training
which may be appropriate for the road conditions. This will ensure that hazards are
identified in advance and mitigation measures (warning signs, guard rails, etc.) are
put in place prior to the road being authorized for use in Company operations.
Potential road safety hazards could include:
In vehicle use of hand held communication devices.
Driver fatigue.
Areas of habitation. For example, small towns, villages and other smaller
habitation areas, where the rise in the amount of vehicular traffic creates an
increase in risk to the population (consider by-passing these areas).
Pedestrians.
Bridges (width, capacity and approaches).
Adverse road conditions (e.g., gravel, lease roads and poor weather
conditions).
Narrow road sections, blind corners and hilltops.
Areas with reduced speed.
Sloped and cambered surfaces.
Wildlife and livestock.

Control measures may include:

Road signs depicting speed limits, manmade or topographical hazards, and
advisories such as steep grades, overhead power cables, hidden
intersections, etc.
Ongoing road maintenance, including repair.
Watering of gravel roads when dust becomes a safety hazard.
Requirement for vehicles to operate with headlights and taillights on at all
times for improved visibility.
Adequate controls will put in place to mitigate any identified hazards. The road
hazard assessment will be provided to relevant road users to assist with trip
planning.
Responsible: Company HSE.

Training
Company contracts include the requirement for Contractors to ensure equipment
operators (drivers) are trained in off road driving, highway driving, defensive driving
and vehicle recovery. Company may also conduct additional Defensive Driving
training for contracted vehicle operators.

Assessments
All vehicle operators (drivers) are required to pass a driver assessment prior to
commencing work. A designated Company or third party assessor will perform
driver assessments as required. The format of the assessment will be as follows:
Pre-departure vehicle checks.
Driver competence (road test).
Minimum vision requirements.
Duty time exceeded?
Identification of future training requirements.
Confirmation of valid driver`s license for vehicle type.
All operator (driver) assessments will be documented. All tested operators will
receive a final competency rating according to the following scale:
Distinction
Credit
Pass
Weak pass
Fail
A written report for each operator will summarize the assessment, and will include
individualized assessment information such as strengths, weaknesses and
requirements for additional training. The minimum requirement to pass the operator
assessment is Weak Pass. Operators achieving a Fail assessment will not be allowed
to operate vehicles on Company work sites until a minimum passing grade is
obtained.

Enforcement
All vehicle operators (drivers) are required to meet the minimum competency
assessment. Failure to meet the requirements herein contained will result in
immediate dismissal.
Responsible: Company vehicle contract owner.
Vehicles will make use of either benzene or diesel fuel in their vehicles. All vehicle
operators (drivers) or designated re-fueling personnel shall be familiar with safe refueling procedures and hazards, including flammability hazards, and environmental
spill hazards.
Responsible: Company vehicle contract owner.
In the event of a spill of environmentally sensitive products, there are limited
resources available for cleanup. If the spilled products are deemed hazardous, the
Company Emergency Response Plan will be activated and followed accordingly. All
vehicles transporting hazardous substances are required to have in the same
vehicle the relevant MSDS.
Responsible:
To maintain clear communication and to provide contractors with the minimum
requirements necessary to mitigate the risk of road traffic incidents the following
information, which forms the Road Safety Plan, will be provided to contractors
operating vehicles on Company work sites.
Companys 10 Golden Rules with specific reference to Golden Rule #9
Operate Vehicles Safely.
Orientation
Journey Management Plan.
Vehicle Inspection
Road Safety Hazards & Risk Assessment.
Driver Assessment and Training.
Fuel Management and Hazards.
Environmental Hazards.
All contractor vehicle operators should be qualified and trained to carry out their
duties in a safe and effective manner.
The compliance to the RSP will be audited every 6 months to ensure the
requirements are being followed by Company and its contractors. The verification
process is required to ensure compliance to this RSP and most importantly to reduce
the risk of motor vehicle accidents.
Responsible: Company HSE Team Lead.
This Road Safety Plan is to be reviewed and revised on an annual basis.
Responsible: Company HSE Manager.

Adverse Weather Conditions

Basic types of adverse weather conditions (extreme temperature, freezing and

wind) and the precautions to be taken.

1 Extreme Temperatures
Extreme temperatures affect the safety of personnel through loss of concentration.

1.1 Heat Stress:

This can be alleviated by protection from the heat source, and a plentiful supply of
drinking water.

1.2 Cold Stress:

This can be fought against by:
keeping clothing dry, clean and in loose layers,
avoiding overheating and sweating,
adequate meals,
liquid intake (preferably warm).
On entering heated spaces, moisture and snow should be brushed off clothing.
Openings in clothing should be adjusted to avoid overheating and sweating.

2 Icing and Freezing Conditions

2.1 General
When working in the Northern Seas, icing and freezing conditions, possibly
connected with the occurrence of polar lows, can be expected during the winter
season. Precautions are necessary to prevent systems from freezing and these
include heat tracing, insulation, circulation, anti-freeze additives, steam heating and
drainage.

2.2 Deicing
In addition to the above precautions if ice does form then several methods for
deicing are available:
Steam. The use of steam for de-icing should be carefully evaluated in case
too low a temperature causes the steam condensate to freeze and quickly
form solid ice. All steam hoses shall be drained properly after use and stored
in heated areas.
Compressed air. The use of compressed air is a clean method of removing ice
but it may be necessary to mechanically break the ice before applying the
compressed air. Alternatively, compressed air may be used with steam deicing to remove the water and condensate after defrosting with steam. All air
hoses should be stored in heated areas after use.
Seawater. Flushing with seawater is in most circumstances the best method
although it is less efficient than steam. Its advantages are that seawater has
a lower freezing point than steam condensate, does not freeze as fast, and
also the ice crystals are smaller. The effect of wind causing additional water
spray over the surrounding area should be considered.
Vibration. Ice may be removed by mechanical vibration by hammering with
pneumatic percussion tools etc. on all types of structure including the derrick

and crane booms. If large amounts of ice are formed on the derrick, (e.g.:
during logging runs, then between runs) the travelling block may be used if
necessary to cause shocks or vibrations through the derrick to remove the
ice; having first cleared the area of personnel.

2.3 Precautions
Further precautions may be necessary for particular systems or areas likely to be
affected by icing or freezing, and are as follows:
2.3.1 Emergency Exits and External Escape Routes
All emergency exits leading to the open and external escape routes shall be
continuously accessible and have non-slip surfaces during any weather conditions. If
necessary emergency exits
and escape routes should be de-iced.
2.3.2 Fire and Wash-down Systems
The fire and wash-down systems shall be continuously operable and all exposed
parts shall be protected by heat tracing, insulation, water circulation or drainage as
applicable.
2.3.3. Seawater Systems
All exposed parts of seawater systems shall be heat traced and insulated.
2.3.4. High Pressure Mud and Cement Systems
The mud system standpipe and Kelly hose shall contain anti-freeze treatment liquid,
or be properly drained when not in use.
The choke manifold, the kill and choke lines from the choke manifold to the BOP and
the cementing lines shall be similarly treated.
2.3.5. Closed Circuit Cooling Systems
All cooling systems shall have anti-freeze added to accept temperatures down to
-20C.
All exposed seawater-cooled equipment shall be equipped with drainage facilities
and should be drained when not in use.
2.3.6. Lubrication and Hydraulic Oil
Lubrication and hydraulic oils shall be changed before the winter season to types
suitable for arctic conditions. To prevent increased viscosity problems, a low
temperature tolerant oil should be used.
2.3.7. Engines
All engines not in daily use shall be operated at least once a day during the coldest
periods. The diesel fuel should be kept free of water contamination and at above
0oC.

3 High Wind
High winds can cause the following hazards:

3.1 Wind speeds higher than 20 knots:

Movement of unsecured items.

Dislodging of materials.
Damage to cladding, light equipment and structures.

3.2 Wind speeds 40-60 knots:

Damage to crane.

3.3 Wind speeds higher than 60 knots:

Operational limits reached.
Therefore, under these wind conditions the following shall be taken:

3.4 Wind speeds higher than 20 knots:

Secure loose items.

Use nets on skips etc.

3.5 Wind speeds 40-60 knots:

Limit external movements of personnel to Leeward areas (For wind speed

higher than 50 knots.).
Suspend crane operations.

3.6 Wind speeds higher than 60 knots:

Restrict work access in all high risk areas.

Secure operations in progress, indoor working only (For wind speed higher
than 80 knots.)

Note: There are no restrictions to skidding of the drilling mast with maximum set
back load with regards to wind speed

Emergency Preparedness Program

The purpose is to ensure operational follow-up of the performed risk analyses,
emergency preparedness analyses, and any other recommendations from the
Health, Safety and Environmental cases prepared for the drilling and well
operations.
The main tool for the detailed implementation of risk reduction and emergency
preparedness improvement measures is the Emergency Preparedness Program,
prepared for each major operational activity.
In this document, the reporting requirements for the implementation and
verification activities are specified, as well as the connection between this reporting
and the hazard registers and the emergency preparedness registers established for
the activity.
By contract all contractors must have their own Company independent safety
management system in operation. Contractors will also have participated in the
Companys performed risk and emergency preparedness analyses.

1 Implementation process
Introduction
As required by HSE standards; hazard identifications, risk analyses, emergency
preparedness analyses and HSE-cases are performed and prepared for each drilling
and well operation.
The results from these activities are cascaded into an Emergency Preparedness
Program. This programme will be either a free standing (controlling) document, or
form part of the Drilling or Well Operations Programme for the activity in question,
dependent on timing and practicalities.
The complete HSE-Case on the activity may be studied for clarification on the
background and assumptions for the measures to be implemented. The HSE-Case
shall be available on the installation.

Procedure
The measures specified in this programme are in addition to the regular and routine
safety related activities specified in other sections of this manual.
Action by
Ste Activity
p
Senior
1
Receives / requests the Emergency Preparedness Program
Drilling
before operations start.
Supervisor
Prepares the detailed scheduling and distribution of
responsibility for the implementation and verification of the
tasks specified in the programme, in co-operation with the OIM,
Drilling Section Leader, and other potential relevant parties
(executors) on the installation. The required actions shall be
discussed with the executors in order to reach a mutual
understanding and agreement on how and why to perform the
activity.
Executor
2
Performs the implementation, including checking the efficiency
of the measure. Performs verification of existing and
implemented measures. Documents the results and reports to
the Senior Drilling Supervisor.
Senior
3
Compiles the results, and reports to shore according to the
Drilling
reporting schedule specified in the Emergency Preparedness
Supervisor
Program.
Rig Supt.
4
Reviews and approves report. Distributes as per Companys
procedure.

2 Documentation of results
Documentation of the activities should be according to a standardized / tabulated
format:
Measure
Relevant
Verification
Dat Results
implemented or Standard
method
e

verified
Rescue man
a) MOB-boat in Actual launching of
overboard within water within 5 MOB-boat, timing
15 minutes
minutes.
the action. Pull
b) Man inside
man into boat,
MOB-boat within timing the action.
another 10
minutes.
Potential H2S
victims must be
evacuated from
the drill floor
within 5 minutes

H2S Rescue
Actual H2S alarm
Team 1 must be and team
able to evacuate mobilization
two persons to a practice with
Safe Breathing breathing
Area within 5
apparatus and
minutes
stretchers, timing
the action.

Weather conditions: Low

winds, wave height 1 - 2
m.
a) Boat in water in 4:35
minutes.
b) Man inside MOB-boat
in an additional 3:45
minutes.
From the time the alarm
was sounded at 1500
hours until the two
drillfloor victims were on
the helideck (Safe
Breathing Area 3) took
9:30 minutes.
Discussion: Main problem
was proper donning of
the breathing equipment
by the rescue team.
Repeated exercises will
be performed to check
improvement potential.
Same exercise, this time
it only took 6 minutes for
the total activity.
Acceptability to be
evaluated onshore.

3 Hazard Register
The activity related Hazard Register (HR) is established and maintained according to
the description in the Hazard Identification and Risk Analyses procedures.
The activity related Hazard Register contains all details of the hazards identified to
be the target of risk reduction efforts. If specified assumptions are incorrect, or if
risk reduction measures as specified in the Emergency Preparedness Program are
not possible to implement in practice, such information must be included in the
Emergency Preparedness Program Report, for updating of the hazard registers, and
a non-conformity report must be filled out for further investigations for future
projects of similar nature.

4 Emergency Preparedness Register

The activity related Emergency Preparedness Register (EPR) is established and
maintained according to the Companys procedure.
The activity related Emergency Preparedness Register contains all details of the
emergency preparedness measures in place i.e. the hazards identified to be the
target of risk reduction efforts. If these specifications / details are incorrect, or if

emergency preparedness measures specified in the Emergency Preparedness

Program are not possible to implement in practice, such information shall be
included in the Emergency Preparedness Program Report, for updating of the
emergency preparedness registers, and a non-conformity report must be filled out
for further investigations for future projects of similar nature.
Note: The HRs and EPRs are maintained according to Companys procedures.

Safety Organization and Responsibilities

The Company is responsible for the implementation of safe operating procedures for
both Company and Contractors' operations. The Contractors are responsible for
developing procedures that apply to their primary work tasks, while ensuring that
these comply with the Company procedures. In case of non-compliance the
Company Representative shall be made aware of the situation, in order that the
discrepancy is resolved.

1 Offshore Installation Manager

During concurrent operations on offshore installations, several activities take place
which involve a number of different functions with interfaces to these activities.
Within the confines of an offshore installation the multiple interactions of the
various functions necessitate a wide degree of co-ordination and defined lines of
responsibilities to ensure operational effectiveness and to safeguard personnel, the
wells, equipment and the installation.
To achieve the safety objective an Offshore Installation Manager is appointed and as
the highest authority on the installation he is responsible for:
The co-ordination and execution of all operations on the installation. This
overall responsibility cannot be delegated under any circumstances.
Organizing all the Safety functions, inspections, on board training, discussions
and meetings
required by the Regulations and as specified in the
Companys Operating Management Manual.
Ensuring that all emergency procedures as specified in the Emergency
Procedures Manual are in place and ready to be effective at short notice in
case of an emergency.
Ensuring that all Safety and Administrative Procedures as specified in the
Safety Procedure Manual and the Administrative Procedure Manual are in
place and followed.

2 Senior Drilling Supervisor

The Senior Drilling Supervisor is responsible for the implementation of the Safety
Policies within the drilling unit, which means to carry the following responsibilities:
Contractors implementation of applicable safety policies.
To ensure that operations are continuously run with full adherence to safe
operating practices, and to stop operations should any breach of safety
procedures and/or Government Safety Regulations exist. (Similarly, in
accordance with Regulations, the Offshore Installation Manager and the
Drilling Manager also have the authority to stop operations. Thus a liaison
between all parties and Base may be necessary).

To liaise and report directly to the OIM with a view to keeping him fully
abreast of current drilling and associated activity and to make him aware of
anything which may require certain operating conditions or priority setting.
The submission of accident / injury / incident reports to the OIM and Base on
both Company and Contractors' personnel within the drilling unit.
Ensuring that procedures proposed by Contractors within the drilling unit
comply with those applicable. The Senior Drilling Supervisor shall obtain
authorization from OIM and Base for all exceptions to this.
Providing one of the approval signatures on Permits to Work within the drilling
unit.
Attending when required and possible, all inspections, discussions and
meetings on the installation as the Drilling Department Representative,
although this responsibility may be delegated to a nominated representative.
Conducting unsafe act audits, at least one per tour of duty.

The Drilling Supervisor will act as the deputy of the Senior Drilling Supervisor on
nightshift, and is consequently responsible for the above mentioned activities
during night hours.

3 Well Site Drilling Engineer

The Well Site Drilling Engineer is responsible for:
The record of stock, movements, and use of explosives within the drilling
unit.
Radio-active sources used in logging.
Chemicals handling procedures and toxicological data sheets for chemicals
used within the drilling unit.
Conducting unsafe act audits, at least one per tour of duty.

4 Production Test Supervisor

The Production Test Supervisor is responsible for all the safety aspects of production
testing equipment, and for all the safety precautions on surface production testing
facilities from wellhead to burner booms.

5 Safety Supervisor
The Safety Supervisor reports to the Offshore Installation Manager and is assisting
the OIM in all safety related matters.

4. Health
Ergonomic principles in the design of
work systems
Technological, economic, organizational and human factors affect the work behavior
and well-being of people as part of the work system. The design of the work
systems shall satisfy human requirements by applying ergonomic knowledge in the
fight of practical experience.

1 Scope
This Standard establishes ergonomic principles as Basic guidelines for the design of
work systems.

2 Field of application
The ergonomic guiding principles specified in this International Standard apply to
the design of optimal working conditions with regard to human well-being, safety
and health, taking into account technological and economic efficiency.
NOTES
1 This international Standard shall be used in conjunction with other pertinent
standards, regulations or agreements.
2 Adaptation of this International Standard may be necessary in order to meet
additional requirements of some categories of individuals, for example. in view of
age or handicap, or in the case of exceptional working situations, or emergencies.
3 While the principles in this International Standard are oriented to industry, they
are applicable to any field of human activity.

3 Definitions
3.1 Work System: The work system comprises a combination of people and
work equipment. Acting together in the work process, to perform the Work &Task, at
the workspace, in the work environment, under the conditions imposed by the work
task.

3.2 Work Task: An intended outcome of the work system.

3.3 Work Equipment: Tools. machines, vehicles, devices, furniture,
installations and other components used in the work system.

3.4 Work Process: The sequence in time and space of the interaction of
people. work equipment, materials, energy and information within a work system.

3.5 Work Space: A volume allocated to one or more persons in the work
system to complete the work task.

3.6 Work Environment: Physical, chemical, biological, social, and cultural

factors surrounding a person in his/her workspace. However, this International
Standard does not cover social and cultural factors.

3.7 Work Stress (or external load):

The sum of those external

conditions and demands in the work system which act to disturb a person's
physiological and/or psychological state.

3.8 Work Strain (or internal reaction): The effect of the work stress
upon a person in relation to his/her. individual characteristics and abilities.

3.9 Work Fatigue: The local or general non-pathological manifestation of

work strain, completely reversible with rest.

4 General guiding principles

4.1 Design of workspace and of work equipment
4.1.1 Design in relation to body dimensions
The design of the workspace and work equipment shall take into account
constraints imposed by body dimensions, with due regard to the work process.
The work space shall be adapted to the operator. In particular:
a) The working height shall be adapted to the body dimensions of the operator and
to the kind of work performed. Seat, work surface, and low desk should be designed
as a unit to achieve the preferred body posture, namely trunk erect, body weight
appropriately supported, elbows at the side of the body, and forearms
approximately horizontal.
b) The seating arrangements shall be adjusted to the anatomic and physiological
features of the individual.
c) Sufficient space shall be provided for body movements. in particular, of the head,
arms, hands, legs, and feet.
d) Controls shall be within functional reach.
e) Grips and handles shall suit the functional anatomy of the hand

4.1.2 Design in relation to body posture. Muscular strength, and body

movements
The design of the work shall be such as to avoid unnecessary or excessive strain in
muscles, joints, ligaments. and in the respiratory and circulatory systems. Strength
requirements shall be within physiologically desirable limits. Body movements
should follow natural rhythms. Body posture, strength exertion and body movement
should be in harmony with each other.
4.1.2.1 Body posture
Attention shall be paid primarily to the following:
a) The operator should be able to alternate between sitting and standing. If one of
these postures must be chosen, sitting is normally preferable to standing; standing
may be. necessitated by the work process.
b) If high muscle strength must be exerted, the chain of force or torque vectors
through the body should be kept short and simple by allowing suitable body posture
and providing appropriate body support.
c) Body postures should not cause work fatigue from prolonged static muscular
tension. Alternations in body postures shall be possible.
4.1.2.2 Muscular strength
Attention shall be paid primarily to the-following:
a) Strength demands shall be compatible with the physical capacities of the
operator.
b) Muscle groups involved must be strong enough to meet the strength demands. If
strength demands are excessive, auxiliary sources of energy shall be introduced
into the work system.
c) Maintenance of prolonged static tension in the same muscle shall be avoided.
4.1.2.3 Body movement
Attention shall be paid primarily to the following:
a) A good balance shall be established among body movements; motion shall be
preferred to prolonged immobility.
b) Amplitude, strength. speed and pace of movements shall be mutually adjustable
c)Movements with great accuracy requirements shall not entail extension of
considerable muscular strength
d) Execution and sequencing of movements shall be facilitated by guiding devices.
as appropriate
4.1.3 Design concerning signals, displays, and controls
4.1.3.1 Signals and displays
Signals and displays shall be selected, designed and laid out in a manner
compatible with the characteristics of human perception. In particular:

a) The nature and number of signals and displays shall be compatible with the
characteristics of the information.
b) In order to achieve clear identification of information where displays are
numerous, they shall be laid out in space in such a way as to furnish reliable
orientation clearly and rapidly. Their arrangement may be a function either of the
technical process or of the importance and frequency of use of particular hems of
information. This may be done by grouping in accordance with the functions of the
process, the type of measurements, etc.
c) The nature and design of signals and displays shall ensure unambiguous
perception. This applies especially to danger signals. Account shall be taken, for
instance, of the intensity, shape, size, contrast, prominence, and the signal to-noise
ratio.
d) Rate and direction of change of display of information shall be compatible with
rate and direction of change of the primary. source of that information.
e) In protracted activities in which observation and monitoring predominate,
overload and underload effects shall be avoided by design and layout of signals and
displays.
4.1.3.2 Controls
Controls shall be selected designed and laid out in such a way as to be compatible
with the characteristics (particularly of movement) of that. pan of the body by which
they are operated. Skill, accuracy', speed and strength requirements shall be taken
into account. In particular:
a) Type. design and layout of controls shall correspond to the control task, taking
into account human characteristics, including learned and innate responses.
b) Travel of controls and control resistance shall be selected on the basis of the
control task and of biomechanical and anthropometric data.
c) Control movement. equipment response. and display information shall be
mutually compatible.
d) Function of the controls shall be easily identifiable to avoid confusion.
e) Where controls are numerous they shall be laid out so as to ensure safe,
unambiguous and quick operation. This may be done similarly as for signals by
grouping them according to their functions in the process, to the order in which they
are used, etc.
f) Critical controls shall be safeguarded against inadvertent operation.

4.2 Design of the work environment

The work environment shall be designed and maintained so that physical, chemical
and biological conditions have no noxious effect on people but serve to ensure their

health, as well as their capacity and readiness to work. Account shall be taken of
objectively measurable phenomena and of subjective assessments.
Depending on the work system it is necessary to pay attention in particular to the
following points:
a) The dimensions of the work premises (general layout, space for work, and space
for work related traffic) shall be adequate.
b) Air
-

renewal shall be adjusted with regard to the following factors, for, example:
number of persons in the room;
intensity of the physical work involved;
dimensions of the premises (taking account of work equipment);
emission of pollutants in the room;
appliances consuming oxygen;
thermal conditions.

c) Thermal conditions at the work place shall be adjusted in accordance with local
climatic conditions, taking into account mainly:
- air temperature;
- air humidity;
- air velocity;
- thermal radiation;
- intensity of the physical work involved
- properties of clothing, work equipment, and special protective
equipment.
d) Lighting shall be such as to provide optimal visual perception for the required
activities. Special attention shall be paid to the following factors:
- luminance,
- color;
- distribution of light;
- absence of glare and undesirable reflections;
- contrast in luminance and color;
- age of operators.
e) In the selection of the colors for the room and for the work equipment, their
effects on the distribution of luminance, on the structure and quality of the field of
vision. and on the perception of safety colors, shall be taken into account.
f) The acoustic work environment shall be such that noxious or annoying effects of
noise are avoided, including those effects due to outside sources. Account shall be
taken in particular of the following factors:
- sound Pressure level;
- frequency spectrum;
- distribution over time;
- perception of acoustic signals;
- speech intelligibility.

g) Vibrations and impacts transmitted to man shall not attain levels causing
physical damage. physio-pathological reactions or sensorimotor disturbances.
h) Exposure of workers to dangerous materials and harmful radiations shall be
avoided.
j) During outdoor work, adequate protection shall be provided against adverse
climatic effects (for example against heat, cold, wind, rain. snow, ice).

4.3 Design of the work process

The design of the work process shall safeguard the workers' health and safety,
promote their well-being, and facilitate task performance, in particular by avoiding
overloading and under loading. Overloading and under loading will result from
transgressing, respectively, the upper or lower limits of the operational range of
physiological and/or psychological-functions. for example:
- Physical or sensory overloading produces fatigue;
- conversely, under loading or work sensed as monotonous diminishes
vigilance.
The physical and psychological stresses exerted depend not only on factors
considered in 4.1 and 4.2 but also on the content and repetitiveness of operations
and on the workers' control over the work process.
Attention shall be directed to implementation of one or more of the following
methods of improving the quality of the work process:
a) Having one operator perform several successive operations belonging to the
same work function, instead of several operators (job enlargement).
b) Having one operator perform successive operations belonging to different work
functions, instead of several operators. For example, assembly operations followed
by quality checks performed by the operator who also removes defects (job
enrichment).
c) Change of activity as, for example, voluntary job rotation among workers on an
assembly fine or in a team working within an autonomous group.
d) Breaks, organized or non-organized. In implementing the above measures,
particular attention
should be paid to the following:
e) Variations in vigilance and work capacity over day and night.
f) Differences in work capacity among operators, and changes with age.
g) Individual development.

5. Environment
Waste management - Transport of
cuttings to shore for disposal
The option of transporting drill cuttings from the rig has a number of
attractions. Unlike the use of WBM or CRI, the skip and ship option can in principle
be applied to any drilling operation from platform or MDU.
Rig upgrades required to allow this containment option are minimal and may be
implemented quickly and cheaply. Since the rig site equipment is simple and
reliable, equipment failure is less likely than for CRI. A number of process
technologies have been developed for treating the cuttings which recover and
recycle base oil from the cuttings leaving an inert material such that the whole
process is environmentally sound. Use of the processed cuttings for projects such as
construction material is possible, representing further scope for a completely
"green" process.
The transport of drill waste to shore has been practiced successfully in numerous
operations worldwide.
The disadvantages of transporting material to shore is that the quantities of cuttings
involved can be very large and the logistics problematical. The process is most
suitable where volumes of cuttings generated are small and the distance they need
to be transported short. For offshore operations weather conditions are also
significant and may have an impact on the ability to move waste material. Because
of the heavy demand on deck space for storage of cuttings, it may not be feasible
to ship cuttings from 16" or more unless drilling rates are restricted.

The process of transport to shore, known as skip and ship, is very simple. Cuttings
are collected from the cuttings ditch and transferred, usually by screw auger, to a
suitable location for loading. As well as collecting cuttings the system should handle
liquid over spill from the shakers and waste from centrifuges. The drill waste is
loaded, normally into specially designed skips of around 8 T capacity, via a
steerable chute. For onshore operations, the skips can be placed directly below the
shale shakers. Empty and full skips are stored on the rig and depending on the
drilling program filled skips may be off loaded either onto a dedicated collection
vessel or to a standard platform supply vessel (PSV).
Once back loaded the drilling waste is disposed of onshore. Land-filling or
incineration of untreated cuttings are acceptable solutions depending on the local
legislation. Another option is to fix the oil to the cuttings using fly ash, leaving a
relatively stable, but still potentially hazardous, product. It is also possible to employ
a technique to clean the cuttings and recover the base oil, leaving a benign solid
waste and re-usable oil. This generally the best option, as the additional costs for
treatment of the cuttings are not prohibitive and the advantages are clear.
The critical considerations in planning the feasibility of a skip and ship operation
relate to the quantity and rate of cuttings generated, the space available on the rig
to store cuttings, the cost and availability of the necessary vessels for transport and
the likely impact of weather on operations.

1. Logistics and shipping

The following steps should be followed:
Estimate the rate and quantities of cuttings generated for each hole section
(a spread sheet has been developed);
Estimate the number of skips required;
Estimate storage facilities / requirements;
Estimate crane utilization requirements for cuttings movements in relation to
availability;
Examine shipping requirements / availability;
Determine the potential impact of seasonal weather effects on transfer
operations;
Identify best option for treatment facility.
The following table gives an indication of typical cuttings volumes.
Hole size (ins)
17 "
12 "
Average section length (ft.)
5000
5000
Total cuttings volume (m3)
264
126
Total cuttings weight (MT)
581
277

8"
2000
25
55

Waste volume Inc. mud (m3)

Waste weight Inc. mud (MT
Total no. skips required
Average ROP (ft./day)

42
77
20
250

446
816
204
500

213
390
98
400

Average days per section

Average skips per day
Maximum ft./day
Maximum skips per day

10
20
2000
80

12
8
2000
20

8
3
500
5

These skips will hold a maximum load of approximately 8 tones but actual loads for
cuttings are often nearer to 4 tones. More efficient loading practice should allow
better utilization and a reduction in the number of skips required.
Wherever possible the 16" or 17.5" should preferably be drilled with WBM and
discharging the cuttings overboard.
To manage the lower hole-sections, in the order of 100 - 150 skips will be required
depending on the well. The number of skips that can be stored on the rig will clearly
be specific to the particular installation. Capacities in the range 20 - 80 skips might
be expected. In many cases the rig's deck capacity will be limited and for the 12 "
hole a dedicated vessel will be required to stand by the rig and handle the cuttings.
Typical PSVs have capacity for 50 - 100 skips, which may be sufficient to handle the
entire hole section. If not, turnaround times must be considered and the possible
requirement for a second vessel to cover the changeover period. For 8 " sections
it is likely that a single visit from a collection vessel at the end of the section or
even the regular supply boat services will suffice.
The number of days sailing / turnaround time between trips to the rig will clearly
depend upon the location of the cuttings treatment plant.
The option of transferring cuttings to another drilling installation with the facility for
cuttings re-injection should be considered. This would have the advantage of
reducing transportation distances but would involve a second offshore handling
operation to transfer cuttings from the transport vessel to the CRI platform.
Demand for vessels can be very high and consequently so are day rates - it would
be very difficult even to find available vessels to match potential demand. It is
therefore important to plan ahead for expansion of the PSV fleet to match
anticipated demand over a suitable time frame.

2. Weather effects
The possibility of bad weather is a major concern for skip and ship operations.
Loading operations will be suspended when either wind speeds and / or wave
heights are excessive. Lifting operations will stop if wind speeds exceed 40 knot, or
possibly 30 for floating installations. Critical wave height is less well defined but for
lifts in the order of 10 tones, such as full cuttings skips, a limit of 3.5m is
recommended as a guideline. Even in conditions less severe than this it should be
recognized that handling operations to move substantial volumes of cuttings will
represent an increased exposure to hazardous operating conditions for deck crews.
Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

55%

44%

44%

19%

7%

3%

1%

3%

20%

33%

42%

53%

For Northern North Seas operations, the annual average time that the 40 knots wind
speed is exceeded is only 2.2% (about 12% for the 30 knots limit), but the wave
height is exceeded more often. The percentage of the time the significant wave
height exceeds 3.5 m varies strongly throughout the year:
The year round average is 27% but if the year is divided between summer, Apr-Sep
inclusive and winter, the averages are 9% and 45% respectively, highlighting the
seasonal variation. Based on these figures an estimation of likely down time may be
made. If the expected drilling time for the 12" section is 12 days, 45%
downtime would correspond to about 5 days. However, if the rig can hold 25
skips loading would only be necessary every third day and the expected downtime
would be reduced by a third to two days. It must be recognized that this calculation
is very approximate - the impact of bad weather depends strongly on the duration
and timing of the bad spells as much as the average percentage of the time. It is
also important to appreciate the sensitivity of this calculation to the rig's capacity
for storage of skips. In order to best estimate likely down time for a specific
operation this capacity and the expected drilling program should be used to repeat
this evaluation.
For the purpose of first look comparisons, an estimated weather down time for
winter operations will be of the order of 3 rig days per well.
The possibility of transporting cuttings in bulk, would have the benefit of reducing or
removing this downtime cost.

3. Cuttings treatment
Although there is currently only one commercial operation in the UK for the
treatment of drill cuttings (the Enaco plant in Lowestoft) there are a number of
solids handling and waste companies very keen to develop this market. As a result,
a number of processing technologies are expected to be available at a range of
locations by the end of 1997. This enthusia-synthetic mud within the service
industry will clearly benefit attempts to extend the application of skip and ship
operations. The willingness within the waste handling companies to invest in this
market is also a clear indication that there is a strong expectation that demand for
such services will be high.
The processes available for cleaning cuttings are based on controlled thermal
treatment to drive off any hydrocarbons, without causing cracking, such that
recovery of the base oil is possible. The Enaco unit uses a process licensed by Soil
Recovery a/s of Denmark. A number of similar process technologies are available,
however, and it is likely that as the number of companies operating in this market
increases a range of these processes will be employed.
In addition to the oil from drilling mud, drill cuttings will typically also have a high
salt content and traces of other contaminants such as barites and heavy metals. In
the Lowestoft operation the de-oiled cuttings can be washed to remove these
contaminants producing a saturated brine which may be re-used offshore.

Dependent upon the final application for the cuttings this washing process should
be repeated in other treatment operations.
Given the level of competition within the service industry, provision of adequate
treatment capacity is likely to keep pace with demand. In the short term cuttings
may be stock piled pending the development of new plant and there is little or no
constraint on the rate at which the skip and ship option might be adopted. Of more
relevance to operational planning is the range of locations likely to become
available.
In addition to the Lowestoft facility, Burgess and Garrick on Shetland own
processing plant which is expected to be operational Q1 1997. Although this plant
may not be the most efficient, its existence offers Lerwick as a possible processing
location. Burgess and Garrick have also expressed an interest in purchasing further
plant as necessary and have the support of the Shetland Council to develop a waste
treatment facility. Further processing facilities will almost certainly be developed in
Peterhead and or Aberdeen, according to discussions with likely suppliers. Currently
waste handling in Aberdeen is limited to land fill, lime fixation and land spreading or
incineration.

4. Cost analysis
A number of elements must be considered in the cost of ship to shore operation. To
assist in this appraisal a spreadsheet has been developed which reproduces the
calculations below. An indication of typical skip and ship costs is given:
Installation costs (approx.): 10K
Conveyor rental (operational): 160/day
Conveyor rental (stand by): 100/day
Skip weigh frame rental 50/day
Skip rental (per skip per day) 14
Operational personnel 300/man/day
(expect 2-3 crew)
Dock charges 90
(per skip sent out)
A number of the above costs, such as dock charges, are higher than might be
expected and should be considered as a starting point in negotiating terms with any
solids control / waste handling service provider. The largest cost components are
less easy to determine. Firstly, vessel costs for transport will vary according to
demand levels. Current prices are high - of the order of 11K per day, but assuming
long term contracts can be arranged for dedicated cuttings handling vessels a sum
more like 6 - 7K would be expected. The option of transporting cuttings as a bulk
waste using a dedicated vessel would aim to reduce this cost significantly.
The last cost is for the treatment of the oily cuttings. This processing cost is
190/ton. For amounts greater than 5000 tones prices would be negotiable. It is
reasonable to expect that as more companies compete for this business prices will
be driven down. The cost of washing the de-oiled cuttings to remove salt will add to
the total treatment charges.t.

An example of applying these costs for a typical well program for 12" and sections
is given below.
12" hole - 12 days drilling time, including 2 days sailing gives 14 days vessel hire.
400 tones cuttings - 100 skips (reserve 150 for safety margin) for 20 days to include
mobilization time.
Equipment and crew charges 11,500
Skip rental 42,000
Dock fees 9,000
Boat rental 91,000
Cuttings treatment 60,000
Total 213,500
8" hole - 8 days drilling time, 80 tons of cuttings - 20 skips (30 reserved) for 16
days, 4 days vessel hire to deliver skips and collect cuttings.
Equipment and crew 8,000
Skip rental 7,000
Dock fees 3,000
Boat rental 26,000
Cuttings treatment 12,000
Total 56,000
This gives a total cost for the well of approximately 270,000. It should be
appreciated that where such a containment schemes are operated it is possible to
use cheaper OBM rather than the synthetic mud currently most common and that
associated mud bill savings may be substantial. Similarly, the recovered base oil
may offset the above cost by something in the order of 10K.
As described in above, operations carried out during the winter months should
expect a significant cost associated with weather related down time, perhaps in the
order of 250K per well.
Given the scale of the potential demand for cuttings treatment the possibility of
negotiating preferential rates with a preferred supplier might be investigated.

Waste Management - Cuttings reinjection

The process of grinding drill cuttings to form a slurry which is then pumped
downhole, either into a dedicated disposal well or into the annulus of an existing
well, has been used since the early nineties and is now a mature technology.

This process of cuttings re-injection or CRI has some major benefits compared to the
alternative containment option of transporting cuttings to shore for treatment and
disposal. Firstly, the CRI process is able to handle volumes of drill cuttings
compatible with the fastest realistic rates of drilling even in the larger 16" or 17 "
hole-sections (this can be 30 - 40 tones per hour), unlike the ship to shore option.
Furthermore, because there is no requirement to move the cuttings off the rig there
are no demands on crane facilities, deck space or supply vessels and perhaps most
importantly no vulnerability to weather related downtime. The last factor is the
largest uncertain variable in the planning of containment operations, and may
correspond to drilling shut downs where the ship to shore option is used in the
winter months. Finally, the re-injection option has the benefit that where the reinjection facility is available it may be further employed for the disposal of other
problematical waste streams such as low radioactivity LSA scale or even produced
water.
The limitations of CRI are partly cost related - injection units have a fairly high capex
and operating cost which can only be justified for a drilling installation with a
reasonably active drilling schedule. Furthermore, the installation of a CRI unit will
place certain weight and space requirements on the platform, as well as extra crew,
which may pose problems for synthetic modal installations. The reliability of CRI
equipment is also an important factor. Experience has shown that properly designed
and managed re-injection operations may be carried out with little down time, but
wherever problems do occur drilling shutdowns will result. Lastly, in order to carry
out a CRI operation it is necessary to have access to a suitable well head to receive
the waste slurry and this in effect restricts the application to permanent platforms.
The technology for re-injection into a subsea well head has been demonstrated but
is not available for operational use.

1. CRI technical background

The process typically involves the collection of cuttings from discharge lines at the
shale shakers which are then carried to a cuttings processing unit by an auger or
conveyor system. The cuttings are mixed with sea water and fed through a grinding
mill to produce a fine paste. Grinding is controlled such that an ideal particle size of
about 200 microns is achieved. The slurry is usually then passed to a second tank
where further water and / or conditioning chemicals may be added to produce a
fluid suitable for injection. The slurry may then be passed to a holding tank or
injected immediately. Dedicated injection pumps would normally be used although
the standard cement pump is also an option. Unless a dedicated disposal well is
being used the slurry is pumped via a modified well head into a selected annulus,
typically the 20" by 13 3/8". The fluid is then injected into the formation in a similar
manner to standard fracturing principles. On completion of injection activities, the
annulus would then be cemented.
The main technical distinction separating different commercial CRI units is the
method used in grinding the drill cuttings. There are two established methods of
grinding cuttings. The first is generally referred to as the Arco method after the
patent owners. In this treatment the cuttings are passed through what is essentially
a modified centrifugal pump in which the shearing and abrasive actions act to
reduce the cuttings size. The second approach is to use a positive action grinding

mill such as the Statoil wet autogenous mill (WAG). The latter has the advantage
that the positive action can result in faster more effective grinding but has the
disadvantage that wear and maintenance requirements of the mill are typically
higher.
A third approach being pursued is the use of ultrasonic technology to produce a
cuttings slurry. In this application the cuttings are pumped through an ultrasonic
processing chamber in which a fast and efficient particle size reduction may be
achieved. The basic processing unit has been built and tested but its incorporation
in a fully functional unit is still in the development phase. With each of these
systems the processed cuttings are passed through a classification stage with
oversize material being re-circulated through the grinding stage.
A lists of commercial suppliers of CRI equipment including the ultrasonic unit is
presented at the end.

2. Planning and feasibility

The main requirements for application of a CRI unit may effectively be divided
between the surface and the subsurface. The surface considerations that must be
addressed in the planning process are principally those of space and weight. A
typical re-injection unit would consist of a slurrification skid, with the grinding mill
and usually two tanks (- a conditioning tank and a holding tank), and an injection
pump skid. The slurrification unit might be in the order of 20' 10' 10' and 15T and a
skid with a triplex pump and power pack something similar again. Where space or
loading constraints are likely to be problematical a custom unit may be designed
with individual components of the plant separated and located wherever possible
and tanks sized as permitted. Rig electrical power, air and diesel are also required.
A final requirement for additional crew of 2 - 4 men, dependent upon the equipment
and drilling program, must also be given consideration.
The subsurface issues that must be treated at an early stage in the planning
process relate to the availability of suitable wells for injection. This problem will
clearly be field and installation specific but having identified a suitable formation,
consideration should be given to the following factors: wellhead design and
specification (including erosion / corrosion tolerance); casing design and integrity;
cement quality and TOC. It is important to appreciate that whilst a lot of work has
been done in predicting fracture behavior, practice has often deviated a long way
from expectation. In this context the value of the experience gained within
Company from the CRI operations in Brent should not be under estimated and any
project group looking seriously at re-injection would be most strongly recommended
to try and benefit from this firsthand experience.
In operations where CRI has been identified as the most cost effective option the
above issues must clearly be addressed to establish the feasibility of the option. If
these requirements can be met the process of identifying a suitable supplier and
planning system build and installation must then be followed.

3. CRI economics

The economic viability of CRI is heavily dependent upon the drilling sequence and
the level of activity of a given installation and in order consider this properly an
evaluation exercise must be carried out to determine which installations will favor
CRI and of the effective costs.
For this exercise to be successful, however, it will clearly be important to have
accurate input data for the cost of installation and operation of re-injection units on
the platforms considered. Whilst approximate costs are available from the various
companies offering CRI units, accurate figures will depend both on the installation
specific considerations listed above and on the degree of commercial competition at
the tender stage. To realize the best quality input possible for the economics
evaluation a preliminary study is being carried out for a number of candidate
platforms.
As an indication of CRI costs, package prices are likely to be in the 1,000Ks range
depending on whether or not a dedicated injection pump skid is required. The
option of using the cement pump for injection is therefore quite important to the
overall cost as well as space requirements. In addition to this overhead, installation
costs are likely to be in the order of 1,000K depending on platform requirements.
Finally, during drilling operations a CRI crew of 2 - 4 men will be required at a day
rate of approximately 700 each. During top hole drilling 4 men would probably be
required whereas later in the well when cuttings generation rates are lower 2 might
be sufficient. It is possible that the development of increasingly automated and
reliable units will reduce the crew requirements.
Another option for reducing CRI costs would be to exploit the increasing mobility of
CRI units to time share a unit between installations. An alternative to mobile CRI
units would be to transport cuttings from installations without CRI capability for
injection at some central location. This would clearly have the advantage of
reducing CRI overheads but has associated problems. Firstly, there is legislation
restricting the movement of waste material for disposal remote from the site of
origin. This legislation has recently been relaxed to allow transfer of waste
material within a single field for disposal by re-injection and the current climate
seems to be of an increasingly open minded approach to such operations. The
second problem with transporting cuttings for re-injection is that all of the logistical
problems associated with ship to shore are immediately encountered. The economic
implications need to be evaluated, but the expectation is that if cuttings are to be
moved from the rig on which they originate it will be more efficient to return them
to shore than to another platform. An exception might be in the case of a mobile rig
drilling beside a platform where cuttings transfer might be possible without
requiring a vessel.

4. Subsea re-injection
Whilst the process of subsea injection is not an established operation, work has
been done to prove the feasibility of the concept. As part of DEA project 026 a CRI
permanent guide base (PGB) and wellhead for subsea injection have been built and
successfully tested. The DEA project involved an injection test at the end of an MDU
drilling operation. After completion of the well a drill pipe stinger was run and
engaged with a stab connector on the PGB allowing a quantity of stored cuttings to
be injected into the 20" 13 3/8" annulus.

Whilst this trial was a successful proof of concept, a number of areas would need
considerable development before the process could be considered for routine
application offshore. Firstly, the development PGB would need considerable
improvement to meet Company standards. More importantly, a satisfactory method
of pumping the slurry from the CRI unit at surface to the PGB during drilling
operations needs to be found. Furthermore, on single well sites the disposal of
cuttings generated before the 13 3/8" casing has been set represents a serious
problem.
Despite these problems, however, given the requirement to use OBM in many of the
wells drilled from MDU and the difficulties of shipping cuttings off the rig, the value
of a subsea CRI facility could be very high.

Appendix CRI Service suppliers

Apollo Services, Aberdeen Tel. 694098
Burgess and Garrick, Shetland, Tel. 01806 242107
Drexel, Aberdeen, Tel. 899000
Drill-Quip, Aberdeen Tel. 727000
Drilltech Services Ltd, Aberdeen, Tel. 249988
Enaco PLC, Aberdeen Tel. 895511
The Company Group, Aberdeen Tel. 214600
MGA Environmental Services Ltd, Aberdeen, Tel. 210366
Oiltools Ltd, Aberdeen, Tel. 719200
Pac-Land Management, Inc., Lafayette, LA Tel. 001 318 236 8805
Sea Force Engineering, Aberdeen Tel. 622303
Swaco Geolograph Ltd, Aberdeen Tel. 703771
Sweco Oilfield Services, Aberdeen Tel. 715250
Solids Control Services, Aberdeen Tel. 249220
Thule Rigtech, Aberdeen Tel. 595763
Transocean, Aberdeen Tel. 891118

Waste Management Strategy - cuttings

discharge
As part of the continuous drive to improve environmental performance,
drill cuttings discharges must be addressed and recommendations made for
reducing the environmental impact of this waste stream.
The options for avoiding OBM discharges are to increase the use of water based
drilling mud or implement total containment systems to prevent the discharge of
synthetic or oil - based muds (synthetic mud/OBM) to seat.
The methods of total containment (cuttings re-injection - Cuttings Re-Injection), and
transport of cuttings to shore for treatment and disposal) are operations involving
mature technology.

Other technologies to consider are: high performance water based mud; equipment
for sub-sea Cuttings Re-Injection; bulk transport of cuttings to shore; improved onsite cleaning technology and slurrification and discharge.

1. Introduction
In order to reduce the impact of cuttings discharged to sea, a considerable effort
has been made over a number of years to develop drilling muds with an
environmentally acceptable base fluid. Initially diesel base muds were replaced with
low toxicity oil based muds (LTOBM). Although this represented an improvement,
the slow rate of degradation of mineral oil based muds results in cuttings piles on
the sea bed with a very long lifetime. As a result, increasingly stringent legislation
on the discharge of all OBM cuttings has been introduced, leading to the situations
whereby no cuttings may be discharged if the level of OBM relative to the weight of
dry cuttings exceeds 1%.
The principal methods for eliminating OBM discharges are by the containment of
drilling waste for subsequent disposal, the use of water based muds (WBM) and the
development of synthetic or pseudo oil based muds (synthetic mud / POBM) with
similar performance characteristics but faster degrading than OBM.
The high cost of the synthetic base fluid makes pseudo muds considerably more
expensive than mineral oil based muds. This has been justified by the fact that for
many drilling operations the cost of a total containment system for drill cuttings
disposal has been even higher and because the drilling performance of WBM is too
low. However, the environmental performance of the synthetic mud has not
matched expectations. In fact, laboratory tests indicate that the environmental
behavior of the majority of synthetic mud is very similar to that of OBM. With this
evidence the continued use of costly drilling fluids is increasingly becoming
insupportable both on economic and environmental grounds.
It is necessary to assess the environmental impact of all drilling muds in use and to
design a practical solids control schedule for phasing out the discharge of any found
unacceptable. This must be done without compromising the need for drilling fluids
able to drill demanding wells. This involves identifying the current forecast for the
discharge activity in question, and analysis of the reduction drivers impacting that
activity: environmental effects, public perception, asses-synthetic mudent of legal
trends, bench marking (nationally and internationally), best available technology,
cost, etc.
The alternatives to disolids controlharging contaminated cuttings to the sea are: the
use of genuinely low impact drilling fluids; employing an effective cuttings cleaning
technique prior to dumping or containing the drill cuttings and either returning them
to shore for treatment and disposal or re-injecting them in a disposal well offshore.
These options each have technical limitations as well as economic implications
which will differ between specific operations. In order to recognize this a method of
comparing and ranking the possible solutions on a case specific basis should be
found.
It should be recognized that a number of important factors in considering the
handling of drilling waste are changing quite quickly. Such factors include the
legislation in place, the level of understanding of the genuine impact of drilling

fluids currently in use, the technologies available for cleaning or disposing of

cuttings and the development of new drilling fluids.

2. Environmental effects
The environmental effects of disolids controlharging cuttings to sea are well
understood. The practical significance of such effects is determined by the nature
and composition of contaminants in the discharge, which determine the rate at
which organisynthetic muds are able to re-colonise impacted areas. For water based
muds, re colonization typically proceeds rapidly - generally beginning when
discharge has ceased.
OBM discharges have longer term effects, since elevated concentrations of
hydrocarbons associated with cuttings and surrounding sediments have severe
impacts on marine life - either by direct toxicity or by creating anoxic conditions.
The rate at with the oil degrades determines the duration of effects. Degradation is
typically slow under North Sea conditions, and effects can last for decades.
Environmental concerns with synthetic muds (synthetic muds) also focus on their
persistence in the marine environment, and thus on the duration of environmental
effects. The muds were developed in response to increasing restrictions on the
discharge of oil based mud (OBM) to sea, with their use and discharge supported by
claims from mud companies that their products degraded significantly faster in the
marine environment than OBM. These claims are based on limited - and sometimes
questionable - data sets.
Results from sea bed surveys and other environmental studies have provided
increasing evidence that synthetic muds do not degrade rapidly under field
conditions. This has been confirmed by results of laboratory biodegradation tests,
carried out by SOAEFD, which indicate that synthetic mud base oils (other than the
ester, Petrofree) cannot be differentiated from mineral oils on grounds of
persistence.
Following on from this, discharges of OBM and synthetic muds also contribute to
overall levels of contamination of the sediments. The significance of this last points
needs to be considered against a broader background of reducing inputs of
contaminants to the Sea, particularly from land based sources.

3. Public perception/UK Regulations

Issues associated with drilling discharges have received a growing degree of public
attention as reflected by articles in the New solids controlientist. These articles have
not focused specifically on synthetic mud pollution as distinct from mineral oil based
muds but as the environmental data described above becomes more established it
is clear that the distinction between the two is irrelevant. The issue has also been
adopted in the party political arena attracting further recent coverage in local and
national media and public interest in the subject is growing. Criticism is largely
directed at the DTI for endorsing less stringent legislation than other European
countries.

4. Future liability

The question of future liability and the possible requirement to remove the tens of
thousands of tons of contaminated cuttings already on the sea bed is a major issue.
Although this problem is considered as a decommissioning issue, it is important to
recognize that current practices may have longer term implications. Although there
is little or no evidence to suggest that oil free cuttings pose any serious threat to
the sea bed, if clean cuttings are dumped on top of dirty cuttings it would aggravate
any future problems in removing the oily waste. Also, if a commitment is made to
remove cuttings in place it become less critical to avoid adding to existing piles in
the short term. Likewise, whilst cuttings pile removal is a possibility it would be
sensible to make extra efforts to avoid dumping any remaining synthetic mud
cuttings on virgin sites. In this context, of the options disolids controlussed below,
cuttings re-injection and ship to shore disposal have an advantage over cuttings
cleaning techniques or the use of water based mud in that they have no impact on
the sea bed.

5. Available techniques
There are a number of possible options for reducing the effect of waste drill cuttings
on the environment, falling in three main categories.
1. The ideal solution would be to use a drilling fluid which is genuinely non - harmful
to the environment such that cuttings might be discharged with impunity. The
synthetic muds were produced with this aim but are now seen to have fallen short
of their goal. Irrespective of environmental performance, the application of ester
muds is restricted by their temperature limit of 320 F. Mud companies are
continuing to work on new high performance drilling fluids and as long as their
environmental acceptability can be positively demonstrated and is consistent with
new legislation this work should be encouraged. Currently WBM is the only
environmentally acceptable option allowing the discharge of untreated cuttings. The
disadvantage of using WBM is that it has inferior drilling performance to OBM in a
number of respects, principally maintaining formation stability and providing good
lubrication for high deviation or extended reach wells.
2. The second option is to use OBM and to implement a total containment system
allowing disposal of drill cuttings in an environmentally acceptable manner.
Currently available methods are either transportation to shore for treatment and
disposal or the grinding of cuttings to a slurry which is then pumped back into the
ground either in a dedicated disposal well or into the annulus of a standard well. The
main advantage of this approach is that it allows continued use of the highest
performance and relatively low cost OBMs. The disadvantage is that the costs
associated with containment and disposal are substantial.
3. The last option is to continue to use OBM but rather than contain the waste, to
clean drill cuttings prior to discharge overboard. A number of approaches to
cleaning drill cuttings have been pursued and several have demonstrated
technology capable of the required quality of cleaning. None of the existing systems
have yet been developed to a commercial stage for offshore applications, however,
although the availability of shore based facilities is important in option two above.
There is a considerable ongoing effort to develop such technology for offshore use.
The advantage of onsite cleaning is in eliminating the expensive process of

transporting waste to shore and the associated vulnerability to weather related

downtime.
The approach of incinerating rather than cleaning the waste offshore would be
unlikely to receive government approval and would itself be a source of polluting
emissions inconsistent with improved environmental performance. On a practical
level, proper incineration of oily cuttings requires a high temperature furnace and
heavy fuel consumption and such plant would not be desirable for a rig site location.
Although the 1% target is currently unattainable at the rig site, where limited
discharge of contaminated cuttings does continue there will be an increased
emphasis on using the best solids control equipment and effective operational
controls to minimize the quantity of mud discharged with cuttings.
The final option for reducing the impact of any discharges is to reduce cuttings to a
fine particle slurry prior to discharge. This has the benefit that the suspension time
of solid matter before reaching the sea bed is very much greater resulting in a much
wider dispersion area. It is also likely that the increased surface area of the solids,
combined with the greater suspension time, will lead to a much more rapid
breakdown of any associated drilling fluids. Therefore, although the area over which
the cuttings spread is much greater, the thinner layer will have a much reduced
impact on the sea bed.
The application of the above techniques involves consideration of a number of
factors which will vary on a case by case basis as explained below. It is therefore
impossible to attribute simple figures for the cost of widespread application of
discharge reduction projects.
Table 1. Available techniques
Reduction
Advantages
Disadvantage
Cost
Comments
Measure
can handle all
Substantial
drilling waste.
cuttings reinstallation costs
Mature
no weather
1000's $ per day
injection
Restricted to
technology
related down
platform
time.
Logistical
Applicable to all
ship to
problem, weather
ops.
shore
delays, downtime. $500K+ / well
minimum rig
for disposal
High
upgrade
operating costs
Drilling
Dependent upon If suitable for
performance not
Cheap and
hole
drilling
Use WBM
adequate for
simple.
sections. May be WBM should
some hole
cheaper than OBM always be used
sections
weather proof
technology not
suitable for
on site
for
currently
not available
some
cleaning
subsea wells
available
projects

6. Discharge reduction strategy/Disolids

controlharge reduction strategy
The effect of the withdrawal of OBM on drilling operations will require significant rig
upgrades, logistics planning and reappraisal of drilling fluid selection. The costs
associated with these changes will also be significant and the phase out strategy
should be designed in the context of a business case to minimize the impact. Given
the uncertainty in a number of key considerations, it is important to retain a high
degree of flexibility in any planning.
Planning a coordinated approach to phasing out the use of OBM involves
comparison of the costs associated with the various options applicable to each
drilling project on a well section by well section basis. Furthermore, the cost
efficiency of the cuttings re-injection option is heavily dependent upon the level of
drilling activity of each installation over a number of years i.e., the long term drilling
sequence.
There are currently three options for managing the drilling waste from any well
section.
1. The simplest is the use of WBM as this allows the unrestricted discharge of drill
cuttings. Where the performance of WBM is compatible with the demands of the
hole section to be drilled this should be the first choice for environmental and
economic perspectives.
2. The second option is to use an OBM drilling mud in conjunction with a total
containment system (cuttings re-injection or shipment of waste to shore for
treatment and disposal). Where a containment system is planned cheaper mineral
OBM is preferred to the more expensive synthetic mud. A containment system will
have associated cost penalties but allows the use of high performance drilling muds
where required.
3. The third option, rarely available today, is the use of synthetic mud and discharge
of cuttings to the sea. Where this option is selected the use of optimum solids
control equipment to minimize the amount of synthetic mud discharged will be
important. In the short term improved solids control is likely to be an important
consideration as it is possible to reduce the oil on cuttings (oil on cuttings (OOC))
level, and hence the volume of oil discharged, by approximately 50% at relatively
low expense.
Where WBM is not cost effective for a hole section, as a result of performance
penalties compared to OBM, the best alternative must be identified. If the Cuttings
Re-Injection option is economically favorable, this will be the preferred option. It
should be recognized that Cuttings Re-Injection is only mature in the context of
platform drilling. Subsea re-injection is not available as routine technology. At this
stage the only containment option considered for mobile rigs is ship to shore.
Once containment costs have been calculated the adjusted cost of using OBM
should be compared again with the cost of WBM and associated performance
penalties.

The option of cleaning drilling waste at the rig site and then disolids controlharging
to sea is not currently available, although there is a considerable effort being made
within the industry to develop the necessary technology to achieve this. This and a
number of other technologies are reviewed below.

7. Strategy implementation
The process of identifying the preferred containment option for each drilling
operation is to collate drilling sequence, mud performance and containment cost
data. Platforms where Cuttings Re-Injection is the best option are identified and for
remaining operations the skip and ship option has to be compared with the use of
WBM. Where hole sections of 16" or larger require OBM the limitations of skip and
ship will be problematical and the use of ester muds may be considered against the
option of drilling at reduced speeds.
It should also be recognized that having identified the choice of drilling fluid or
containment system for a particular project there will in many cases be a
substantial amount of work required to implement this solution. This is particularly
true in the case of cuttings re-injection where the installation of a unit requires
detailed appraisal of platform facilities, a tender bid to select one of the several
suppliers and in most cases a significant amount of engineering work to install and
commission the unit. Similarly, in the case of shipment of cuttings to shore, if this
policy is to be adopted on a significant solids control ale, as will be required,
detailed attention must be given to considerations such as the capacity of the
company's platform supply vessel resources and the ability of the waste handling
industry to cope with the consequent increase in volume of material to be treated
on shore. The impact on rig contracting strategy should also be considered.

8. WBM and drilling fluid performance

WBM systems have been the traditional drilling fluids since the early days of the oil
industry. Deeper, hotter wells, more deviated and with increasing well path
tortuosity have brought the WBM systems to their limits of economic applicability.
Continued efforts in the development of WBM systems have allowed the industry to
use systems ranging from the classic Water-Bentonite suspension via the highly
dispersive Lignosulphonate drilling fluids to the KCl-Polyglycol drilling fluid presently
known as the most inhibitive WBM to-date.

9. Cuttings re-injection
The process of grinding drill cuttings to form a slurry which is then pumped
downhole, either into a dedicated disposal well or into the annulus of an existing
well, has been used since the early 90's and is a mature technology. This process of
Cuttings Re-Injection has some major benefits compared to the alternative
containment option of transporting cuttings to shore for treatment and disposal.
Firstly, the Cuttings Re-Injection process is able to handle volumes of drill cuttings
compatible with the fastest realistic rates of drilling even in the larger 16" or 17 "
hole sections (this can be 30 - 40 tones per hour), unlike the ship to shore option.
Furthermore, because there is no requirement to move the cuttings off the rig there
are no demands on crane facilities, deck space or supply vessels and perhaps most
importantly no vulnerability to weather related downtime. The last factor is the

largest uncertain variable in the planning of containment operations, and may

correspond to drilling shut downs where the ship to shore option is used in the
winter months. Finally, the re-injection option has the benefit that where the reinjection facility is available it may be further employed for the disposal of other
problematical waste streams such as low radioactivity LSA solids control ale or even
produced water.

10. Transport of cuttings to shore for disposal

The option of transporting drill cuttings from the rig has a number of attractions.
Unlike the use of WBM or Cuttings Re-Injection, the skip and ship option can be
applied to any drilling operation from platform or MDU. The rig upgrades required to
allow this containment option are minimal and can be implemented quickly and
cheaply. Since the rig site equipment is simple and reliable, equipment failure is less
likely than for Cuttings Re-Injection. A number of process technologies have been
developed for treating the cuttings which recover and recycle base oil from the
cuttings leaving an inert material that can be used as building material.

11. Solids control

Good solids control equipment is a requirement for any drilling operation. The level
of oil on cuttings for both OBM and synthetic mud discharges has been the focus of
a great deal of attention in the cuttings discharge debate and the solids control
industry has responded by developing equipment that will greatly reduce the oil on
cuttings (OOC) compared to simple shale shaker processing. Although there is no
mechanical equipment able to reach the 1% oil on cuttings (OOC). It is
recommended that adoption of the highest performance solids control quickly
becomes a requirement for operations planning to use and discharge synthetic
mud.
A standard arrangement of linear shale shakers will typically leave an oil on cuttings
(OOC) level of 10 - 15%. The level is usually lower in top hole sections where
cuttings are large and higher in lower sections where cuttings hold down effects and
greater residence time in the borehole often result in finely ground cuttings.
Improved solids control can reduce this oil on cuttings (OOC) level to 5% or better at
relatively low cost, effectively halving the amount of synthetic mud discharged on
cuttings.
Furthermore, the additional mud recovered may represent a substantial saving per
well section, making it attractive in financial as well as environmental terms.
It is recommended that the use of this kind of solids control technology and other
performance enhancing equipment, such as the active flow divider to replace the
header box, be pursued on a rig specific basis with the solids control companies.
As well as reducing the amount of synthetic mud discharged on cuttings it should be
recognized that significant surface losses of synthetic mud result from other sources
such as shaker overflow, centrifuge waste and disposal of cement contaminated
mud. All of these waste streams should be targeted for reduction.

12. MUD 10 system

The MUD 10 system is effectively a vibrating centrifuge designed to process

cuttings delivered straight from the shakers by screw conveyor. The system has a
high throughput and can handle cuttings at the maximum rates generated in drilling
and has the advantage of also coping with shaker overflow. The fluid recovered by
the unit requires secondary processing with a decanting centrifuge to produce reusable drilling mud. The solids waste leaving the unit will typically have an oil on
cuttings (OOC) level reduced to approximately 2 - 4%. This can equate to the
recovery of 100 - 150 bbl. of drilling mud per 1000 ft. drilled which represents a
significant saving when expensive drilling muds are being used.
Rental for a unit is in the order of 2 to 3000 per day, with the requirement of a
second, decanting centrifuge adding possible additional cost. The unit would
probable also require an additional operator, approximately 1000 per day.
If the system is used in conjunction with a total containment system for a ship to
shore operation there will be a benefit from reducing the total volume of material to
be transported. It should be recognized, however, that the very dry solids produced
may be harder to handle. Further, if the cuttings are to be processed on shore for
base oil recovery the financial advantage of recovering mud on the rig is reduced.
The M.U.D. 10 unit is not efficient for processing hydrated cuttings. When drilling
soft shales and chalks the efficiency of the unit will be reduced unless other,
granular cuttings are added into the feed stock.

13. The High G drier

The High G drier is a high performance shale shaker. The unit has a large screen
with a three dimensional pyramid profile that increases the effective working area
and prevents clogging. The unit also has a high impact vibration motion which
produces a considerable performance improvement over standard linear motion
shakers. The High G drier should produce cuttings with oil on cuttings (OOC) levels
in the order of 5 - 8%. Although the level of oil recovery is not as high as the M.U.D.
10 unit there is no requirement for an additional centrifuge and the processed
cuttings are easier to handle. This unit will again be most effective for mud recovery
from top hole sections.

14. Mud / cuttings separator

This unit works on the principal of a screw press whereby cuttings and associated
mud are transported via an auger type screw through a cylindrical wedge wire
screen fitted with an adjustable pressure plate at the discharge port. The action of
the screw pushing cuttings against the pressure plate generates a squeezing effect
forcing the associated mud through the screen. This mud is collected and returned
to the active system, whilst processed cuttings exit the periphery of the compressed
pressure plate.
Suppliers claim the unit will reduce oil on cuttings (OOC) to approximately 5 - 6%
which may equate to a compaction ratio of 30 - 40%, although this will depend on
the type of cuttings material and the quality of the primary shakers. The unit has
the advantage of being synthetic modal (1.7m 0.5m 0.5m) and is simple in

operation with low maintenance. A dedicated operator is required initially but the
responsibility for unit maintenance should go to the Drilling Contractor.
The unit was developed in Norway where a number of systems are in use and is now
marketed in the UK by two companies, Sea Force Engineering and Apollo Services
UK Ltd.

15. On site cuttings cleaning technology

The ability to clean cuttings at the rig site to a level better than the 1% oil on
cuttings (OOC) limit for unrestricted discharge would increase the range of options
to allow the continued use of synthetic mud or OBM. Where Cuttings Re-Injection is
possible, i.e. for platform operations, on site cleaning is unlikely to be a competitive
option but for MDU drilling subsea wells there are a number of advantages over the
alternative of ship to shore. The requirement to stock pile large volumes of cuttings
on the rig will be avoided as well as vulnerability to weather related down time.
Whilst the technology is available for this type of processing on shore, however,
there are a number of problems associated with transferring it to the rig site. The
first difficulty is that processing units are typically large and producing a facility that
could realistically be installed on a drilling rig is in itself a major challenge.
Secondly, the available technologies all utilize either high temperature processing
or the use of volatile solvents for cleaning. These operations clearly have safety
implications which will need to addressed in detail before any offshore application
could be considered. Finally, the plant in use onshore is highly sophisticated and
may be hard to operate and maintain reliably offshore. In an application where any
downtime is likely to result in an immediate drilling stoppage this is potentially a
major concern. Some concepts are described below:

TORBED
The toroidal bed reactor or TORBED is an established technology with a number of
applications, particularly in the food processing industry.
The basic principal of the process is the use of high temperature steam directly in
contact with the cuttings to produce highly efficient thermal cleaning of the drilling
waste. The process is controlled such that hydrocarbons are recovered without
cracking for re-use. A prototype unit has been built and used in a proof of concept
trial which successfully demonstrated cleaning performance in excess of the 1% oil
on cuttings (OOC) target and a second reliability and versatility trial is in its final
planning stage.
The TORBED project has attracted firm interest within the service industry and if the
current trials are successful it is expected that commercial development of an
onshore facility could be quite rapid. The evolution of the process for offshore
application is still at a conceptual stage.

The Star Tech process

Another cuttings cleaning treatment application is the "Star Tech" process. This is
also a thermal application, designed to allow recovery of hydrocarbons for recycling. The unique feature of this process is that the plant operates under partial

vacuum of 21 inches of mercury. This has the effect of increasing the efficiency of
the hydrocarbon distillation process at lower temperature. The system also
incorporates a condensing and secondary filtration stage to recover and clean
hydrocarbons in the vapor phase exhaust.

Ultrasonic cleaning
The field of ultrasonic is an area in which there is potential for cuttings cleaning
applications.

Solvent extraction techniques

The cuttings are mixed with a solvent in an agitated reaction vessel in which the
oil / water emulsion is broken allowing the oil to dissolve into the solvent. The
solvent / cuttings mix is then fed to a centrifuge for separation and the cleaned
dried cuttings are discharged overboard. As a result of the hydrophilic nature of the
cuttings solids, the water content of the solvent phase is very low. The solvent / oil
mix is then passed through an evaporator and condensation column to separate the
two, with the oil returned to the mud pit and the solvent to a holding tank for re-use.

16. Bulk shipment of cuttings

Tithe biggest barriers to the widespread adoption of the transportation of cuttings to
shore for disposal are the high cost of shipping and the weather down time. Storage
of cuttings on the rig in tanks rather than containers might allow a greater storage
volume and therefore a longer period of drilling before off-loading of cuttings was
required. Furthermore, bulk haulage vessels would also carry a greater tonnage of
waste, allowing a reduction in the number of dedicated vessels required to service a
fleet of drilling rigs. Of even greater potential advantage, however, would be the
ability to pump cuttings from rig to ship via a floating hose if this would allow the
waste to be transferred in weather where normal loading operations would be shut
down.
Reciprocating pumps developed in the mining industry are available which will
pump cuttings in the form they leave the shale shakers over considerable distances.
If a low price vessel were available that could hold its position off the rig even in bad
weather, such a pump might be used to transfer drill cuttings irrespective of the sea
/ wind state. It might be noted that the transfer would be easier if the cuttings were
slurrified prior to being pumped, but the formation of a slurry requires the addition
of significant volumes of water which would add to the volume to be transported
and greatly increase the cost of the final processing of the cuttings to remove the
oil.

17. Slurrification and discharge

This option has considerable potential for a low cost, highly effective solution.
The main concern associated with the discharge of cuttings contaminated with
synthetic muds is that the base fluid can take a long time to degrade, especially
when trapped inside a substantial cuttings pile. Sea bed contaminated with
synthetic mud recovery times can be many tens of years. It is considered entirely
possible that if cuttings are ground to produce a fine particle slurry prior to
discharge the greatly increased suspension time of the particles before settling to
the sea bed might result in significantly increased rates of degradation.

Furthermore, although the area over which the cuttings are dispersed will be much
greater, the resulting in very thin cuttings layers on the sea bed will be likely to
continue to degrade quickly and have a minimal and short lived effect on the sea
bed.
The process of slurrification prior to discharge has already been practiced, primarily
to avoid the production of cuttings piles which can be problematical to subsea well
heads. The ultrasonic slurrification unit is ideal for this application and can easily be
installed between the cuttings ditch and discharge chute.
Very little is known, however, about the impact of slurrification on degradation rates
and the process may be criticized for dispersing the cuttings waste over a wider
area, possibly into foreign waters, and a parallel with the banned process of sewage
discharge has been drawn. It is possible, however, that this process may represent a
cheap solution with very low environmental impact and a study to determine the
actual behavior of slurrified cuttings on the sea bed is strongly recommended.

18. Silicate WBM development

The use of silicate mud is likely to offer a cost effective solution in a wide range of
well sections.

19. Subsea cuttings re-injection

The basic process of injection via a subsea wellhead has been demonstrated, but for
the operation to be carried out in earnest a considerable amount of work needs to
be spent developing the injection guide base and designing a suitable injection
riser.

20. Mud Containment

One of the recommendations of the UKOOA was that all UK operators should ensure
that all installations contracted to or operated by them have oil mud containment
systems in place. The guidelines produced contained an idealized list of mechanical
containment methods which should be considered when designing new rigs and
installations.

Waste Management - WBM and drilling

fluid performance
WBM systems have been the traditional drilling fluids since the early days
of the oil industry. Deeper, hotter wells, more deviated and with increasing well path
tortuosity have brought the WBM systems to their limits of economic applicability.

1 Introduction

WBM systems are ranging from the classic Water-Bentonite suspension via the
highly dispersive Lignosulphonate drilling fluids to the KCl-Polyglycol drilling fluid
probably the most inhibitive WBM. Silicate Mud, may be the ultimate WBM system
with the same inhibitive properties as OBM. Also, it is assumed that no performance
difference exists between OBM and synthetic mud, hence OBM is used as reference
to OBM or synthetic mud.
In this article we present evidence that in the North Sea the usage of conventional
WBM systems in many hole sections is possible without the fear that drilling
performance is adversely effected.
Performance Indicators
Quantifying the success of a drilling fluid is difficult as many factors play a role in
successfully drilling a well section. The time-depth graph is widely used as a
Performance Indicator (PI). The shorter the time to complete a well section the
better, provided the agreed drilling programme is executed effectively. A second PI
may be the Stuck Pipe Frequency and the associated time to free the pipe: Recovery
Time (RCT). Instances of stuck pipe will then require the section to be re-drilled,
effectively doubling the Open Hole Time.

2 Results
Analysis of the historical performance data for WBM and OBM indicates that in 17.5"
sections the following variables effect the drilling performance derived from drilling
fluids: shale reactivity, section length, mud type.
For the analysis, the 17.5" footage planned was used as the base case. Sections
drilled with WBM were then compared with the same sections drilled with OBM. The
results indicate that a section less than 4400ft drilled in unreactive shale with WBM
will have a 90% expectation of having an Open Hole Time (OHT) exceeding the
average Open Hole Time (OHT) for drilling the section in a reactive shale with OBM
by 17%.
From the historical results it becomes apparent that 17.5" sections in unreactive
shales can be drilled with WBM without incurring a performance penalty. The
performance seems to be slightly dependent of section length (4,400ft is proposed
as a critical length) although this is considered as less significant. Hole angle does
not seem to play a major role mainly although that could not be assessed properly
as the data set is synthetic modal.
From the analysis it could also be concluded that the value for the critical Open Hole
Time (OHT) currently in use for 17.5" sections (7 days) is far too conservative and
longer Open Hole Time (OHT) can be allowed, in particular for sections that will be
drilled through medium or non-reactive shales.

3 Silicate Drilling Fluid Performance

The field results shown that for medium reactive shales the Open Hole Time (OHT)
performance of silicate mud is in the range of conventional WBM performance. It is
important to appreciate, however, that the expected benefit of using silicate mud,

rather than conventional WBM, lies in improved hole stability and hence reduced
Stuck Pipe Frequency (SPF) and Recovery Time.
Logging results from these trial sections, however, have shown much improved
shale stabilization, with good in gauge hole. The expectation is, therefore, that the
silicate WBM may show a significant performance improvement for drilling the
highly reactive shales currently incompatible with WBM.

4 Conclusion
From statistical analysis of mud performance data from 17.5" sections it has been
established that:
a split should be made between reactive and non-reactive shales. Reactive shale
areas have been identified as Dunlin, Osprey, Fulmar and Auk (highest Stuck Pipe
Frequency for WBM). Medium or non-reactive shales may be drilled with
conventional WBM systems or with the Silicate mud.
reactive shales need to be drilled with OBM, unless field trials with the silicate mud
system show improved performance when compared to conventional WBM.
Continued silicate mud development and support for field trials is strongly
recommended.
hole angle is not seen to play a major role: this needs to be further assessed.
indications are that in 17.5" sections a critical section length (4400 ft.) plays a role.
This needs to be further investigated.

Waste Management - Mud Containment

Equipment
One of the recommendations of the UKOOA was that all UK operators
should ensure that all installations contracted to or operated by them have oil mud
containment systems in place. The guidelines produced contained an idealized list
of mechanical containment methods which should be considered when designing
new rigs and installations.

Waste Management - UK Regulations

The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) regulates environmental

aspects of the UK offshore E&P industry. The Scottish Office Agriculture,
Environment and Fisheries Department (SOAEFD) and The Centre for Environment,
Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (CERES - formerly part of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) provide the DTI with specialist scientific support.
The UK is a Contracting Party to the Oslo and Paris Commission (OSPAR or PARCOM),
which regulates international aspects of offshore discharges to the North Sea and
North East Atlantic. Regulations applied on the UKCS have to be compatible with
OSPAR Decisions and are thus greatly influenced by pressure from other Contracting
Parties to OSPAR, such as the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Germany.

Current UK regulatory framework

Water Based Muds (WBM): There are no specific controls on the discharge of
WBM to sea, although chemicals added to WBM are regulated under the Offshore
Chemicals Notification Scheme (OCNS). It is considered unlikely that any additional
restrictions will be placed on the discharge of WBM as available evidence suggests
that the impact on the environment is low.
Oil Based Muds (OBM): The discharge of OBM to sea is regulated under
exemptions to the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act (1971). Discharges have been
increasingly restricted, and an Oil on Cuttings (OOC) limit of 10 g/kg now applies to
all wells (effective 01/01/97). This limit is not achievable using proven techniques
and technologies. In practical terms, the imposition of the 10 g/kg OOC limit can be
taken as an effective ban on the discharge of OBM cuttings.
Synthetic muds (synthetic mud): Current UK legislation affecting the discharge
of synthetic drilling muds to sea can be summarized as follows:
synthetic muds are regulated under the Offshore Chemicals Notification Scheme
(OCNS) - their discharge to sea is only permitted when muds are allocated to the
least hazardous category (Group E) of this scheme. Other controls on the discharge
of synthetic muds include:
An upper limit for OOC (as synthetic mud base oil) of 100 g/kg. This used to be
requested "when achievable," but is increasingly being required by the DTI as a
condition of discharge;
No discharges from larger hole sections (>16 ins), other than in exceptional
circumstances (operators to justify such discharges to DTI);
Operators are required to carry out sea bed surveys to investigate the fate and
effects of discharges under field conditions. This is a conditional requirement
depending on the availability of survey results. SOAEFD consider that results from
five surveys provide a reasonable basis for assessing the environmental properties
of each synthetic mud. Requirements for sea bed surveys are increasingly applied
only when using new muds.

UK regulatory developments
The results described above challenge the scientific robustness of the regulatory
framework governing synthetic muds, and the DTI has responded by proposing the
following controls on their discharge to sea:
Discharges of synthetic muds above a 1% oil on cuttings limit to be
phased out over a four-year period.
All classes of synthetic mud base oils will be subject to the same phase
out programme, with the possible exception of esters;
Pending further evidence from seabed surveys the discharge of ester
based muds will continue to be permitted;
Reduction targets will be applied on a company-by-company basis,
with operators free to determine how targets shall be achieved.
DTI have discussed and agreed these controls with other Government Departments,
UKOOA and EOSCA (European Offshore Specialty Chemicals Association), and they
were presented to a PARCOM meeting in February 1997 as the UK strategy for
regulating synthetic mud discharges. These proposals were provisionally accepted
by Parcom pending a workshop on the impact of synthetic muds to be hosted in the
UK in November 1997. Following this workshop, a final position on legislation will be
decided by Parcom in February 1998.
As noted above, a decision about the esters has been deferred until results from sea
bed survey studies are available. Company carried out such a study several years
ago, and results showed little degradation. If other studies on the UKCS confirm this,
then the esters will be subject to the same controls as other synthetic muds. Note in
this context that studies have been carried out in both Norway and the Netherlands
which appear to show that esters degrade relatively rapidly under field conditions.
However, the experimental design of the Norwegian study has been widely
criticized, and the relevance of the Dutch study to conditions in the Central and
Northern North Sea is questionable.
Following on from this, there are indications that the Government will define criteria
to determine the environmental acceptability of new drilling muds, based on
persistence in the environment. This would provide an opportunity for mud
companies to develop new products.

6. Security
Guidelines for developing Security Policy
and Procedures

Guidelines for preparing security policy and procedures for exploration projects.
A Company can be affected by four main types of security problems:
- general political unrest;
- organized political unrest/terrorism;
- "petty" crime in residential areas;
- serious theft of material/equipment.

1. General political unrest

Any action will not be directed specifically at the OPCO. The first approach is merely
to keep a low profile and to stay away from the places where crowds tend to gather
(no photography). Corporate Security (CS) will be keeping themselves informed
about the situation and if it escalates will give advice on further steps, such as
evacuations.
A contingency plan for application in the case of such an escalation should be
prepared in advance, for both field and office staff.
The British and US embassies will probably have prepared their own contingency
plans. The OPCO should maintain contact with these embassies, plus the
appropriate ones for any non US /British staff, and ensure that its plans are
compatible with, and if possible are integrated into, the embassy plan. OPCO staff
should be prepared to participate and assist as and when requested. It may well be
found that one or the other embassy will be prepared to include the whole staff,
irrespective of nationality, in their plan.

2. Organized political unrest/terrorism

This may very well be directed against either Company property or staff in a bid
either to embarrass the Government or to raise money by ransom demands. Before
commencing any operation CS should be invited to visit the area and evaluate the
threat, if any. They will advise the OPCO Management on steps which should be
taken.

3. "Petty" crime in residential areas

This is the most common security problem to be faced by an OPCO. It is not directed
specifically against the Company staff, except as representatives of a richer strata
of society. The three hazards are burglary, car theft and mugging. Again CS should
be invited to visit the area, evaluate the threat and advise on countermeasures.
Against burglary this will basically be to "harden" the target, so that opportunist
thieves will preferentially choose a different, "softer", target. Steps to take are to
have a good wall and gate, install security lights around the house, have bars on the
windows (but think of escape in case of fire) and to employ watchmen, armed or not
according to the local custom. Servants should be chosen with care.
It can also be considered to employ the services of a professional security
organization who will provide a radio link to an alarm center ("panic button") with
mobile patrols to respond to calls. Depending on the evaluation of the level of

personal risk one room in the house can be strengthened into which to retreat while
waiting for assistance to arrive.
Communication between residences and between residences and office should be
ensured. If the telephones are not reliable (or wires are exposed and can be cut)
then it is recommended to use mobile phones or VHF radios.
The risk to cars can be minimized by installing alarms, and by avoiding parking in
areas which are known to be prone to car theft. If the risk is significant then
company drivers should be used, who can stay with the car.
A sense of proportion should be kept about the risk of mugging/rape. It is often no
higher than it is in Europe, and it can be minimized by the use of common sense.
Staff, especially wives and children, should not walk alone in areas known to be
risky, and attacks should not be invited by flaunting jewelry. Important documents
should not be carried in shoulder bags so that there is little inconvenience when
they are snatched.

4. Serious theft of material/equipment

This include the theft of major pieces of equipment, vehicles and/or loads, and may
also include the threat of violence. This is likely to take place during transport.
Waterborne transport is susceptible to piracy (very common in SE Asia) and land
transport is susceptible to hold ups using trees across the road, etc. A feel for the
risk should be obtained from local contacts, along with their advice on how to deal
with the threat.
If theft is an issue, trucks should be dispatched in convoys, with an escort vehicle in
advance to check the road (in radio contact with the trucks). If the threat is not
serious issuing batons to the crews may suffice. If travelling at night (which itself is
only allowable under exceptional circumstances) spotlights should be fitted to the
vehicles. If the bandits are likely to be armed, then military or police escort must be
requested.
Supply vessels are most at risk when at anchor in a harbor or sheltering near the
coast, so crews must be vigilant. Slow moving barges are always at risk. Using
guards on barges both while under tow and at anchor should be considered.
If it is considered necessary to arm the guards, this should be done through the
appropriate authority.