India Review, vol. 6, no. 1, JanuaryMarch, 2007, pp.

124
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN 1473-6489 print; 1557-3036 online
DOI:10.1080/14736480601172667

The Geostrategic Implications of the

Indo-American Strategic Partnership
1557-3036
1473-6489
FIND
India
Review,
Review Vol. 6, No. 1, January 2007: pp. 112

STEPHEN BLANK
Geostrategic
India
ReviewImplications of the Indo-American Partnership

Introduction
In July 2005 President Bush signed an agreement with India recognizing India as a nuclear power and providing for both some measure of
international regulation of its nuclear capabilities and resources and
for US civilian nuclear exports to India. This deal was reconfirmed in
March 2006 during President Bushs visit to India. Although this deal
aroused much controversy in Washington, Congress has approved it.
However, its nuclear provisions may actually be ultimately less
important than its geopolitical significance. This accords geopolitical
importance lies in the fact that it represents Americas open acceptance and acknowledgement of Indias rising capabilities, ambitions to
be a great power in Asia, and the consequences thereof.1 Thus this
agreement demonstrates that Washington has accepted the legitimacy
of Indias quest for independent great power status.2
Second, it highlights Indias achievement of strategic autonomy
where it is strong enough to pick its own partners without undue fear
of the consequences.3 Consequently Washingtons acceptance of this
achievement not only marks a milestone in the two states bilateral
relations, it also reflects that India has become, for every key international actor, a most desirable strategic partner if not ally. Third, by
virtue of its capabilities and geostrategic setting, India is now a desirable partner that is sought after by both the great powers and middle
powers alike. So there is a reciprocal process taking place wherein
India can choose its partners freely and duly becomes more desirable
as a partner to ever more governments.
Because India is now intrinsically desirable as a partner, it has
greater flexibility than ever before and therefore its assets add to the
Stephen Blank is a Professor of National Security Studies in the Strategic Studies Institute at
the US Army War College in Pennsylvania.

India Review

strategic capability of its partners. Consequently American interests

could suffer if Washington does not move quickly to embrace that reality. Accordingly this partnership is not founded merely or exclusively
on common values of democracy however important they may be.
After all, for much of the last half-century democracy did not prevent
mutual estrangement.4 Rather the basis for this partnership is mutual
needs and interests, possibly an even stronger foundation for genuine
partnership than is the invocation of abstract values.

Geopolitical Consequences and Benefits for India:

Global Partnership and Defense Sales
Both American and foreign observers recognize the significance of
this fact, acknowledged by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice when
she stated in March 2005 that it was US policy to help make India
become a major world power in the twenty-first century. Moreover,
in this selfsame statement, senior officials underscored that they fully
understood what such a commitment meant because they also talked
about American support for Indian requests for transformative systems in such areas as command and control, early warning, and missile
defenses.5 Some Russian sources charged that the July 2005 deal also
contained a secret, non-nuclear double whereby each side signed
letters of intent concerning the participation of US firms in a major
tender for Indias upcoming purchase of 126 medium/light fighters.6
While a major aspect of the partnership undoubtedly is invigorated
bilateral defense cooperation and US analysts want Washington to
take part in this tender, that charge cannot be verified.7
Nevertheless the two sides enhanced defense cooperation is noteworthy. The bilateral Defense Framework of 2005 signed by both
countries defense ministers calls for expansion of joint military exercises and exchanges, defense trade, and the establishment of a bilateral
defense procurement and production group from both countries.
More prosaically, it also identified issues for building Indo-American
defense collaboration and achieving greater inter-operability of their
forces across the spectrum of security and defense. Specifically this
agreement looks to cooperation in multinational operations, counterterrorism, the promotion of regional peace and security, fight the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, calls for expanded cooperation on missile defense, disaster response, combined operations,
and peacekeeping operations, and increased exchanges of intelligence.8

Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Partnership

Similarly, in response to both the deal with Washington and the latters
sale of up to 36 F-16C/Ds to Pakistan, the Indian Air Force is calling
for an acceleration of its own upgrades, especially as the legislative
wheels are in motion for the US to approve formally the initial delivery of 18 Block 52 Pratt & Whitney PW 100-229 powered F-16/C/Ds
with an option for 18 more.9 And since US firms only sold $100 million
worth of goods to Indias defense sector, whose procurement was $12
billion in 2005, the opportunities for closer defense ties are very great.10
At the same time it is clear that Indo-American discussions now regularly include a review of all the outstanding security issues in South
and Central Asia, if not Southeast Asia, China, and the Gulf.11 Indeed,
Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill told Indian audiences in 2001
that President Bush seeks to intensify collaboration with India across
the range of issues on the global agenda and concluded that, In short,
President Bush has a global approach to USIndian relations, consistent
with the rise of India as a world power.12 The revelation of such discussions has already led Pakistani analysts to claim that the United States
has recognized Indias sphere of influence in Asia.13 Other analysts
claim that this agreement represents a threat to Pakistans economy and
security. Allegedly this agreement presages the qualitative improvement
of Indian armaments as India will allegedly move from reliance upon
Russian weapons and technologies to integration with NATO on the
basis of its standards, reform of Indias defense industries, and forthcoming arms purchases from the West.14 Therefore it is hardly surprising that on April 12, 2006 Pakistans President Pervez Musharraf
convened a meeting of military and political officials to discuss the
implications of the Indo-American nuclear agreement and that the
Pakistani National Command Authority (NCA) then stated that, In
view of the fact that the agreement would enable India to produce
significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from
unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that
our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met.15
But although the Indo-Pakistani arms race and political rivalry will
continue throughout South and Central Asia that does not alter the
significance of the Indian deal with America. Whether or not the new
partnership goes as far as Pakistani pundits fear, it certainly does
accept the self-evident fact that India is and will be the primary power
on the subcontinent and that therefore this requires intimate bilateral
strategic-military, political, and economic coordination across a range

India Review

of issues with India. Neither is this agreement confined to South Asia

for, as Blackwill stated above, Washington wants to make New Delhi
not just a regional ally, but a global partner.16
Today we see the fruits of such collaboration in joint discussions
and approaches to seeking an end to civil strife in Nepal and, possibly
more importantly, in Central Asia.17 Indeed, although this cooperation hardly stops at Central Asia, new trends in this region express the
new partnership and its implications with particular force. For example, in 2006 the US government launched a major diplomatic effort
with India to tie together South Asia with Central Asia in order to
give the states of Central Asia alternatives to Russian energy domination over them.18 This initiative encompasses a reorganization of the
State Department to place the Central Asian states in a newly restructured Department of South Asian and Central Asian Affairs with its
own Assistant Secretary of State, giving this area a much needed injection of power in the bureaucracy. But beyond this and a stepped-up
program of high-level visits to South and Central Asia, starting with
President Bushs visit in March 2006, there is also a major US initiative
to stimulate infrastructural and electrical power connection and investments throughout Central Asia that would allow India to play more
effectively in this region as a source of and market for trade, investment, and energy. One benefit for India of this initiative is that it
would also substantially help India satisfy its enormous energy needs.

Indias Self-Perceived Asian Role

But the benefits for both sides in this deal are not restricted to that
part of Asia, or to coordinated discussion of policies with Washington,
and greater access to nuclear technologies and arms sales. Indian
leaders statements about their vision for Central Asia explicitly
include the rest of the continent in that vision. Most importantly,
Indias legitimate, substantial, and growing interests and capabilities in
regard to Central Asia and Asia more generally are fully accepted as
normal by all the major powers that are active there. Indeed, they are
all competing with each other for influence with New Delhi whose
strategic leverage is enhanced by its ability to engage in non-binding
partnerships with America, Russia, Japan, and China.19
In Central Asia, both the United States and India want India to
become and be seen as a magnet for Central Asian states development. It is important for Washington and New Delhi that Central

Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Partnership

Asia does not fall under exclusive Russian and/or Chinese influence.
Since the thrust of the new US policy is to give local governments
other alternatives in energy cooperation and foreign investment, the
growth of Indias presence in Central Asia and ability to influence key
economic and political decisions there is decidedly in the US interest.
Obviously the same strategic reasoning of providing alternatives to
Moscow and Beijing holds true for India, perhaps with more emphasis
on China. Indeed, already in 1997 Russias press reported that in private Indo-Russian diplomatic conversations, Russian and Indian diplomats willingly open the cards: both Moscow and New Delhi see a
threat in the excessive strengthening of China and the Islamic extremists.20 Indian experts similarly saw Russian weakness in Central Asia
in the 1990s as opening the way to a Chinese-orchestrated encirclement of its interests there and regarded such a trend negatively.21 Consequently India began to expand its interest and presence in Central
Asia soon afterwards.22
Since then it has become clear that India sees itself as a major independent economic player with a leading role throughout all of Asia
including Central Asia. M. K. Naranayan, Indias National Security
Advisor, told the annual Wehrkunde conference in Munich in 2006 that,
In South Asia, for example, those of our neighbors who were farseeing enough to understand the benefits of linking their economies to the Indian economic motor have been rewarded
handsomely. --- It is with this optimism of new opportunities and
broader horizons that India now approaches its neighbors and the
rest of Asia. --- Indias location, straddling as it does all the major
sub-regions of Asia, provides it with a unique vantage point. --- If
the basis for a stable and prosperous Asia lies in both political and
economic integrationcutting across cultures, historical divisions,
ideologies and barriers (both physical and ideological)then India
is eminently suited to play a leading role.23
This is very clearly not an individual view but the considered view
of the government in New Delhi. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran told
a Shanghai audience in January 2006 that,
We regard the concept of neighborhood as one of widening
concentric circles, around a central axis of historical and cultural

India Review

commonalities. In this, we see Indias destiny interlinked with

that of Asia. From this point of view, developing relations with
Asian countries is one of our priorities, while pursuing a cooperative architecture of pan-Asian regionalism is a key area of focus in
our foreign policy. Geography imparts a unique position to India
in the geopolitics of the Asian continent, with our footprint
extending well beyond South Asia and our interests straddling
across different sub-categories of Asiabe it East Asia, West
Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, or Southeast Asia. --- It is this
geopolitical reality and our conviction that enhanced regional
cooperation is mutually advantageous, which sustain our enthusiasm to participate in endeavors for regional integration, ranging from [the] South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
to [the] East Asia Summit, and [the] Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.24
Clearly Saran here laid down a marker to both his audience and to all
other observers who watch Indian activities in Central Asia, if not
throughout the Asian landmass.
Similarly Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee linked together economics and security with Indias expansive vision of itself as a potential stabilizer in Central Asia in a 2005 speech at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in Washington. Mukherhjee
linked the revival of trade with Central Asia to the security advantages
of tolerance and democracy as practiced in India but simultaneously
emphasized that India does not practice the export of democracies, an
idea that has aroused much anti-American suspicion there.25

Indias Strategic Autonomy and Enhanced Capabilities

Thus Indias achievements now have forced the great powers, Russia,
China, and the United States, to acknowledge the legitimacy of its
security and energy interests in Central Asia and to seek Indian support either for their goals or at least to parallel them in Central Asia if
not beyond. In other words, they need Indian friendship as much if
not more than India needs their friendship.
The American seal of good housekeeping has also stimulated
Australia, France, Japan, and Russia to support the transfer of civilian
nuclear technologies to India and for Great Britain to enter into discussions with India about such transfers.26 Evidently China and India

Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Partnership

are also on the verge of an agreement that would enable the buying
and exchange of nuclear technology.27 Indeed, one analysis of the
Russian deal called this agreement with Washington an enabling
agreement for (inter alia) the resumption of Indo-Russian civil nuclear
cooperation even though it raised some concerns in Washington.28
And obviously this is also true insofar as other states are concerned.
Thus India has already begun to reap the many tangible military, economic, technological, and political benefits of this deal. In the wake of
the bilateral agreement Indian analysts also concurred that one of its
many dividends would be the enhanced attractiveness of India as a
partner and an equal enhancement of its status as a great power and
the reach of its influence in Asia if not beyond.29
Similarly Australia signed its first Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with India on cooperation in joint training, maritime security
with a significant cooperative clause on maritime security in the sea
lanes of communication (SLOC) in the Indian Oceanand defense
R&D on March 6, 2006.30 Likewise, Singapore told Mukherjee in June
2006 that it was keen to deepen defense ties with India, including joint
exercises, training, naval, maritime, and counter-terrorist cooperation
and formalize them in its own MOU.31
Indias desirability as a strategic partner for major players in Asia
as well as the European Union is also increasingly visible. Japan is significantly upgrading energy and security cooperation with India,
clearly to ensure its own energy security and due to shared apprehensions about China.32 For over a decade Russia has made strenuous
efforts to consolidate and advance its political and military ties to
India. Arms sales to India constitute between 30 and 40 percent of the
annual revenues coming to Russia from arms sales, without which it
could not finance either the re-equipping of its forces or of defense
industry.
Former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakovs and then President
Vladimir Putins policies toward India calling for a strategic triangle
with Russia and China were based on many factors, not least an
appreciation both of Indias and Chinas rising power, and the fact
that these two great powers could eventually come into conflict in
Asia, forcing upon Russia a most undesirable choice between Indian
or Chinese friendship. Or else an Indo-Pakistani crisis could have
repercussions throughout Asia, including China that could again force
Russia to make the aforementioned choice between major Asian

India Review

powers that it does not wish to make. Since Primakovs original initiative Russia has pursued this idea assiduously, giving rise to its fear of
losing India as a partner, or even ally, and being left alone in Asia with
a resurgent China. All three powers also share a common interest in
squelching threats from Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism within
their boundaries and in Central Asia, a zone that essentially abuts each
of them.
Today India can meet with Russia and China in support of
Primakovs concept of a strategic triangle, as it did in 2005 at a Foreign
Ministers Conference in Vladivostok, and yet suffer no repercussions
from Washington.33 Indeed, the Indo-American agreement was signed
six weeks after this conference. These events show that India will be
nobodys ally or subordinate but will continue to pursue its own independent orientation, although today that orientation gravitates more
strongly toward Washington than ever before. So it is impossible to
say, as do Russian commentators, that there is a general agreement
among the three powers that a multipolar world is more desirable than
is American unipolarity, and to suggest that they share a latent antiUS orientation for such an inclination to Moscow and Beijing contradicts the entire essence and spirit of the USIndia agreement.34

India and China

Moreover, it is the fact of Indo-American rapprochement that has
probably most driven China to reduce tensions with India, as Russia
has advocated, and embrace this triangle, albeit in altered form, i.e. the
tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting in 2005, despite its earlier skepticism about the idea. This suggests that Thomas Christensen was on
the right track when he argued that the balance between US integrationist policies vis--vis China and the maintenance of tough defense
of strategic interests through coercive or military means has helped
produce pacific effects in modifying Chinese aversion to multilateralism and to improved relations with many of its neighbors, not least
India.35 Indeed, both Christensen and Chinese observers like Li Yihu of
Peking University have argued that the response to the Indo-American
rapprochement must be forthcoming on Beijings part.36
Similarly, as Indias partnership with America grew, the status
accruing to India, as well as its visible growth in power, has obliged
China to effectuate a highly public rapprochement with India and
become a major Indian trading partner.37 Indias nuclear tests, ascension

Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Partnership

to the role of bona fide nuclear power, rising economic and conventional military capabilities, and especially its visible rapprochement
with America arguably discomfited Beijing considerably, obliging it
to make this rapprochement and acknowledge Indias increased
attractiveness as a strategic partner.38 Thus even as Beijing hints at
upgrading its nuclear relationship with Pakistan as a riposte to the
Indo-American agreement and seeks to minimize Indias involvement
with ASEAN and its associated organizations, it has nevertheless been
forced to make and continue a detente with India.39 Consequently
Indias rapprochement with America not only obliged China to take
more account of India than it has hitherto been willing to do, it also
reflected the power of this partnership, even before the Bush Administration offer of July 2005, to moderate Chinese policy and to
enhance Indias standing throughout Asia.
This fact also points to two other conclusions. Indias desirability
as a partner has already forced major interlocutors like China and
Russia to assent to its observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), thereby recognizing its status. Furthermore,
despite its habitual policy of trying to reduce Indias status and confine it to South Asia, the Sino-Indian rivalry for influence in states like
Myanmar, Chinas support for Pakistan, hints of Chinese nuclear
assistance to it in the light of the Indo-American agreement, and
Chinas presence in its port city of Gwadar where it is building a
major naval infrastructure for Pakistan and possibly for itself, China
has been forced to come to terms with Indias enhanced role, status,
and capabilities.40 Thus Chinas diplomatic initiatives to South and
Southeast Asia reflect, albeit in varying degrees, the altered strategic
conditions in these parts of Asia generated not only by its own rise to
power but by Indias ensuing rise in economic and military capabilities and the Indo-American rapprochement and partnership. In other
words, thanks to this Indo-American rapprochement, Chinas margin
for conducting a tough Realpolitik against India has diminished
considerably.

Indias Capabilities as a Factor in its Rise to Great Power Status

The American offer of strategic partnership as well as Indias overall
desirability as a partner to other great powers like China and Russia
reflects Indias continuing rate of economic growth which now
approaches 8 percent per annum and the fact, as recognized by US

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India Review

commanders, that India has a world class, superb, professional military force with which it is highly desirable for the US to engage on a
permanent basis.41 Indias rising economic and military capabilities
not only ensure that it is and will remain the pre-eminent partner in
the South Asian subcontinent, they also facilitate its ability to project
power and influence abroad.
India now has an apparently operational air base in Tajikistan collocated with a Russian base at Farkhor (or Ayni) in Tajikistan.42 Central Asia is equally, if not more important to it as a venue for new
energy sources. And India therefore eagerly competes for access to
Central Asian oil and gas. It is expanding defense collaboration and
economic penetration, often much of it connected also with the quest
for energy in Africa and Southeast Asia.43 And in many cases local
governments are seeking defense cooperation with India in Southeast
and even Northeast Asia, probably as a balance to China.44 It also is
helping to protect the Straits of Malacca against international piracy
and/or terrorism. And it participates in the Asian Regional Forum and
ASEANs 7+1 forum.45 In the Middle East it has managed to combine
a flourishing defense partnership with Israel with good relations with
Iran, for whose energy it is a major customer.46 And at the same time it
also serves as a major refiner of Irans crude oil.

Indo-Russian Collaboration in Central Asia

These trends in Asias international relations illustrate the benefits
that accrue to India merely from the prospect of partnership with
America, not to mention its actuality. Indeed, Russias and Chinas
fears about what this partnership might mean have galvanized them
both to offer inducements to India to support each of them, e.g.
increased trading opportunities with China, observer status in the
SCO, better terms on Russian weapons sales to India, thereby enhancing Indias status and capabilities in world affairs.47
For example, Russia supports Indias full membership in the SCO.48
Likewise it is clear that Russian analysts, if not officials, are very concerned about losing the Indian arms market to America. There are also
more telling examples of the mutual advantage both sides derive from
Indo-Russian collaboration, e.g. in Central Asia. Russian and Indian
diplomats began discussions in February 2006 on the possibility of
enlarging the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russias
military alliance in Central Asia, and on whether India might participate

Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Partnership

11

in its forums.49 The reasons for these consultations appear to ratify

Russias and Indias appreciation of potential challenges there and the
contribution that India could make to overcoming them. Specifically,
two reasons for this initiative have been cited.
Firstly, because of the unstable situation created by the possibility
of a military crisis over Iran, India is forced into seeking to secure,
as quickly as possible, access to energy sources in post-Soviet Central Asia, sources whose availability would be guaranteed by some
political and military mechanism; in an emergency, the CSTO
institutions could be mobilized to ensure the security of gas and oil
production in the region. Second, a war against Iran could destabilize Indias neighbor Pakistan where radical Islamists are influential; this could amount to a serious threat to the whole region.50
Indian participation in the CSTO would sidestep Chinese objections to its full membership in the SCO, buttress Russias position
there against Chinas interest in acquiring bases in Central Asia, and at
the same time obviously enhance Indias position and capabilities in
Central Asia. It is a sign of Russian partiality to India that it sees nothing wrong with India maintaining an air base in Tajikistan at Farkhor
(Ayni) as long as it is collocated with its own base there, but vocally
and staunchly opposes any other foreign military presence in the area.
Russia may have pressured India into locating the two bases together
as has recently been charged, but it has steadfastly opposed any foreign
bases in Central Asia except this Indian base.51 So this potential
enhancement of the already existing Indo-Russian strategic partnership
has an implicit value in also restraining Chinas capacity for power
projection (and not just military power either) into Central Asia.

Indo-American Cooperation
Thus Indias rapprochement with the great powers not only encompasses enhanced political ties but also sensitive military planning with
them. Neither is this confined to Central Asia. For example, one
American consultant, writing about the prospects for Indo-American
cooperation in space, forthrightly stated that,
The new strategic partnership between the United States and
India has the potential to be the turning point around which a new

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India Review

geopolitical balance of power will form. A key element in this

partnershipUSIndia space cooperationwill most likely become
the defining relationship for space cooperation around which
other space-faring nations will posture their international space
cooperation strategies.52
These discussions about the transfer of nuclear technologies to
India also go far to ratify Indias long-standing claim that it is not a
proliferation threat but rather a responsible steward of nuclear power
(whether or not that claim is actually true) and also testifies to its
increased political standing and overall commercial attractiveness as a
partner to other major economic actors. At the same time, in historical
terms, this relationship builds on previous Indian policies and strategies while also leaning forward to an unprecedented strategic partnership with the United States. On the one hand, this new strategic
partnership conforms to Indias history since independence where it
has sought the leverage offered by cooperation with a great power,
most prominently the Soviet Union during 196485, to realize its strategic ambitions in South Asia if not beyond. As a Japanese analyst,
Horimoto Takenori observes,
Reviewing the past half-century of Indian diplomacy, therefore,
we can see that it has consistently sought strategic partnerships to
serve its national interests; it has been a diplomacy of what one
might call geopolitical partnerships. Since the 1990s, in the interests of promoting economic liberalization and improving its security strength, it has come to need closer relationships with the
superpower United States.53
But, on the other hand, Washingtons acceptance of the legitimacy of
Indian ambitions and the reality of its present and future economic
strategic capabilities amounts to a wholly unprecedented US recognition that India is already reaching or about to reach that status and
level of capability on its own. Although psychologically it may be
appealing to Indians to have this status conferred upon India by
America, in fact Indias indigenous capabilities make such a move
both timely and necessary for all major international actors, not just
the United States, in spite of the continuing legacy of poverty and
backwardness that still inhibits Indian development.54 Therefore this

Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Partnership

13

acknowledgement also represents US acceptance of the fact that

Indias rise to power comports with US strategic interests and requires
a commensurate US adjustment to the implications of that rise. For
example, Anupam Srivastava reports that,
Since 2002, the Pentagon has conducted a series of assessments
reviewing its defense co-production options with NATO and
Asia-Pacific partners and contrasted them with newer options
such as partnering with India. The net assessment is that given
Indias comparative advantage in select segments of high-technology,
if technology safeguards in India were to be beefed up to prevent
unauthorized diversion of US technologies, then the two sides can
profitably partner to produce weapons systems and component
that could be absorbed by their respective armed forces and also
exported to select destinations. To an extent, this assessment has
complemented bilateral efforts to deepen defense cooperation and
improve firewalls between and within Indias defense and civilian sectors, most notably through the High Technology Cooperation Group (2003) and the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
(2004).55
The success of both those programs paved the way for the agreements in 2005 on civilian nuclear technology and on defense cooperation and shows how economic and security issues come together in
this relationship. Indeed, the 2005 agreement cannot be divorced from
strategic considerations.
Reaching out to India and assisting it with nuclear cooperation at
a time when it is a relatively weak state geopolitically bequeaths
the United States with greater dividends than would be the case if
such assistance were offered after India had already become a true
great power and a repository of sophisticated nuclear technologies
when New Delhi presumably would have lesser need for such
cooperation.56

India as a Great Power

And this growing partnership also takes place with both states
increasingly mindful of Chinas growing capabilities throughout Asia.
Takenori states that,

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India Review

India, in terms of the structure of international relations, is seen as

a counter balancer to China. Most countries that feel wary or
threatened by China do not have such apprehensions toward
India. Indeed, because India is not yet considered a major
power in the true sense, it can be said that any country can use
India as a valued card to be played in the game with China.57
Similarly, Srivastava argues that rapprochement with Washington
enhances Indias position in what he calls a tripolar relationship
between it, Beijing and Washington.
And while Indias interests are not perfectly aligned with those of
the United States, this tripolar dynamic certainly affords it the
opportunity to improve its position vis--vis both China and the
United States. That is why, as noted earlier, an unspoken element
of this cooperation is for India to develop the capability for joint
operations with the United States and provide it military basing
and logistical assistance to curb any Chinese activism that might
undermine Asian security and prosperity in the future.58
At the same time, the Indian achievement of becoming a major
power in its own right and worthy of alignment with major powers
(bundnisfahig in German) has long been anticipated by outside
observers as well as devoutly wished for by Indian elites.59 In 1988
Henry Kissinger observed that India was becoming the dominant military country in its region and that it had not hesitated to use that
power to advance its national interests. He therefore concluded that,
I expect Indian influence to radiate in the Indian Ocean and down to
Singapore, and Southeast Asia will become sort of a four-power contest among China, India, the Soviet Union, and Japan.60 American
military analysts then also expected a substantial growth in Indian defense
and power projection capabilities leading into the present.61 A contemporary geopolitical assessment of Indias place in Asia would have
to admit that much of this forecast has come to pass or is about to.62
Certainly Indias own strategic guidelines, developed by the
Vajpayee government in 2003 and carried over into the present government of Manmohan Singh who was elected in 2004 reflect a fundamental Indian consensus about Indian interests and ambitions to
project power throughout the Indian Ocean, its littoral, and even into

Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Partnership

15

Central Asia.63 And this outlook is certainly shared by the Indian

Army and Navy if not the Air Force.64 Indeed, the military program
of present and past Indian governments clearly envisions a major augmentation of Indias power projection capabilities into Asia as a whole
not just Central Asia.
In late 2003, to signify its sense of itself as a rising Asian power,
Prime Minister Atal Behar Vajpayees government opted for a 20 year
program to become a world power whose influence is felt across the
Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, and all of Asia.65 Vajpayee directed
planners to craft defense strategies that extend beyond South Asia and
transcend past sub-regional mindsets. He claimed that Indias
expanded security perspectives require fresh thinking about projecting power and influence, as well as security in all these directions.
Therefore India will seek more defense cooperation with states in the
Gulf, Southeast, and Central Asia, presumably going beyond intelligence sharing about terrorist activities. This cooperation will proceed
to more bilateral exchanges and exercises and greater sharing of
defense advice with friendly nations. In this context strategic partnership with Washington is essential because Russias ties with India are
tempered by Moscows dependence on the West, particularly America.
In the absence of partnership with Washington, this situation would
severely constrain Indian options since it could no longer hide behind
Russia if it clashed with America.66
While India formally eschews offensive military projections to
intervene unilaterally in other countries, it announced that its air base
in Ayni, Tajikistan had been operational since 2002 and hopes to
undertake the following military programs through 2013:

Improve military logistics in Iran, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, and

Uzbekistan.

Increase military interaction with Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore,

Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.

Increase naval interaction with South Africa, other African

states, Iran, Oman, the UAE and other Gulf nations.

Extend infrastructure, logistic, and material support to Myanmar

to contain Chinese activities there.67

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India Review

Beyond those policies all the Indian military services are undertaking a major buildup of conventional weapons, ways of delivering
nuclear weapons, and defenses against nuclear missiles by improving
communication and surveillance systems. This ongoing buildup obviously intends to project Indian power and influence not just to Central
Asia, but also throughout Asia, and represents what analysts are calling strategic assertion.68 More recently it has become clear that India
is reshaping its procurement and training plans to enhance its capacity
for power projection and insertion of forces behind enemy lines.69
This program embraces all sections of the Indian armed forces.70 For
example, the Indian Air Force wants to evolve into an expeditionary
force with a strategic reach beyond its borders because it believes that
in the future, as Air Marshal Tyagi, Commander in Chief of the Indian
Air Force suggested, it may well have to project power anywhere from
the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca, including Central Asia, and
to be ready for an enormous range of potential contingencies.71
From Beijings point of view, such contingencies might even
include joint Indo-American naval action to block its navy from
entering the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait. Chinese strategists are not only increasingly nervous about Americas capability
to block Chinese naval and energy supplies from crossing or entering
the Indian Ocean, they discern that Indias rising naval ambitions
and capabilities could lead it to undertake similar actions alone or
with America. Thus they cite Washingtons so-called regional maritime security initiative in the Malacca Strait as a first step by the US
military to garrison the Strait under the guise of counter-terrorist
measures.72 And, looking at Indo-American joint anti-terrorist
patrols along the Malacca Strait, straddling Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Singapore, they fear that Washington would use New Delhis naval
strength to block its fleets from entering into those waters.73
Thus Indias growing capabilities for power projection throughout
Asia accompany the growth of its desirability as a partner for major
global actors in reciprocal fashion. Chinas concerns about Indias
overall presence in and around Southeast Asia are well merited. And
there is good reason to suspect that China also carefully monitors the
growth of Indias power projection capabilities into Central Asia as
well.74 Since 2002, if not before, India has been projecting military
power and influence into both Central and Southeast Asia. Retired
Brigadier General V. K. Nair, a leading strategist, spoke for the entire

Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Partnership

17

Indian establishment when he told the US National Defense University in 2001 that,
India needs to evolve a broad based strategy that would not only
ensure the security of its vital interests but also provide policy
options for effectively responding to developing situations in the
area. Indias geostrategic location dictates that the primary focus
of its security policies must be its relationship with the neighboring countries and the countries that form part of its extended
security horizon which in one official publication is defined as
regions with economic, social, cultural, and environmental linkages [that] result in overlapping security interests.75
But India has even broader objectives. Because it competes with
China in the small arms market and also seeks to penetrate into Southeast Asia and Central Asia where China is expanding its influence,
India must compete with China on price and quality in the same categories of weapons. India sells small arms, ammunition, patrol ships,
light field guns, trucks, and aircraft parts to Southeast Asia at reduced
price and with better equipment.76 Furthermore,
Over the next decade, India intends to produce weapons system
China cannot, including an indigenously designed air defense ship
basically a small aircraft carrier. Through subsidies, loans, and
higher technology, New Delhi hopes to supplant China as a major
regional arms supplier. It also can take advantage of underlying
concerns about China within Southeast Asia, touting Indian
weapons systems as free from the risks of being swallowed by an
aggressive China in the future.77

Conclusions: The Nature of the Strategic Partnership

This partnership is not an accident of history. Rapprochement with
India began under President William J. Clinton and continued
thereafter. It certainly conforms to President Bushs vision from at
least the start of his first term, if not beforehand.78 And it is also
driven by the immense geostrategic transformations of the last
decade, the rise of China, the rise of India, and the attacks of
September 11. Despite rhetoric about shared values because India
and the United States are democracies, those shared values, if anything,

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India Review

obstructed cooperation. Today, although democracy is important in

ways that were not previously the case, what drives this partnership
are common interests and shared threats. Indian elites know full
well that if India is to play the role which they all wish for it, it must
embrace economic globalization and break through the accumulated institutional and cognitive structures that hold much of its
population in thrall and in poverty. Moreover, it must keep pace
with China if it does not want to be eclipsed even in South Asia, not
to mention elsewhere. Lastly, it must find a way to overcome the
constant and probably growing threat of terrorism aiming at
Kashmir and its Northeastern frontier.
This determination is visible in the competition between India and
China for access to energy and also in Indias determination to project
its power in tandem with Southeast and Northeast Asian states, but
alone if necessary throughout the Indian Ocean. India not only shares
with Washington a concern as to what the rise of China might portend, it also obviously is similarly threatened by Islamic terrorism in
Central and South Asia. The economic potentials of an unshackled
India, as well as the more prosaic possibilities of major US arms sales,
energy investments, and technology transfer to India also buttress a
common or complementary relationship and it is therefore hardly surprising that much of the current emphasis in these relations as well as
much of the public justification for the Indo-American deal on
nuclear energy is in stimulating Indo-American commercial relationships and Indian domestic reform, along with the benefits of strategic
partnership.79
Finally, even though New Delhi and Washington share common concerns about Chinas rise and its potential implications for
them, this is not a containment strategy in name or in reality. India
will not engage in a containment policy or let itself be used for
such purposes and this has long been a cardinal point in Indian
official statements.80 But, as we have shown here, Indias rising
power and its improved relationships with all the major powers
creates a situation whereby China and Russia must reckon with
India thus limiting Chinas interest and ability in challenging its or
Washingtons vital interests too directly. This phenomenon has
been noticed abroad as well. For example, already in 2003, when
the trends were pointing in the direction of Indo-American
partnership,

Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Partnership

19

A source at the Russian Foreign Ministry told Nezavisimaya

Gazeta that since 11 September 2001 Beijing has substantially
reviewed its position in South Asia. Much more attention has
begun to be devoted to India, and China has realized that Delhi
must be brought more actively into the sphere of Chinese geopolitical and foreign economic interests. The Chinese leadership
has also begun to regard the Kashmir issue in a new light, finding
out for itself that terrorist groupings of radical Islamists from
Xinqiang (Xinjiang) have entrenched themselves in the territory
of that former Indian principality. And though Pakistan remains
the stronghold of Chinese influence in South Asia, nonetheless
there is clear evidence of a desire on Beijings part to balance its
policy in this area.81
Thus it is clear that an India which is developing rapidlyand with
American help that development is more likely than everrepresents
what might be called an existential deterrent to or check upon Chinese
expansionism or desire to stir up trouble in Asia. Although we have
stressed the implications of this partnership deal in Central Asia, they
apply with no less force to Southeast Asia, as the rise in Indian interest
and capability in that region indicate.82 And Indias enhanced capacities are similarly now regarded as a positive factor in Moscow, which
supports the Indo-American nuclear deal. Russian Ambassador to
India, Vyacheslav Trubnikov admitted that Russia supports the IndoAmerican nuclear deal and that Russia does not fear the upcoming
competition to provide India with nuclear energy because the Indian
market is a huge one. Moreover, he and Russian analysts view India as
a thriving democratic country with a strong set of controls over the
export of its nuclear technology and have promoted the view that the
status quo with regard to India in the non-proliferation treaty regime
ought to be changed.83
In other words, the Indo-American deal has enabled Washington
and Delhi to board a moving train and accelerate its journey to a common destination, forcing other interested bystanders to seek to catch
up with it as well lest their vital interests be significantly harmed.
Indeed, other powers awareness of this partnership is obliging them
to compensate India handsomely even as they complain about it.84
Therefore this agreement is strategic in the highest sense, i.e. it transforms the playing field and introduces a new dynamic that everyone

20

India Review

must reckon with. But that reckoning and the widening ramifications
of this partnership are inestimably of benefit to both Washingtons
and Delhis, if not to the larger security of Asia as whole.
NOTES
The views expressed here do not represent those of the US Army, the Defense Department
or the US Government.
1. US Department of State, Background Briefing by Administration Officials on US
South Asia Relations, March 25, 2005. Accessible via www.state.gov.
2. Mushahid Hussain, Pakistans Quest for Security and the Indo-US Nuclear Deal,
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 2006), p. 129.
3. European Union General Affairs and External Relations Council, October 11, 2004:
EUIndia Strategic Partnership Council Conclusions. Accessible via www.eu.int/
comm/external_relations.
4. Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 19411991 (Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994).
5. Background Briefing by Administration Officials on USSouth Asia Relations, US
Department of State, March 25, 2005. Accessible via www.state.gov.
6. Artur Blinov and Andrei Terekhov, Cold War With Trade Subtext, Nezavisimaya
Gazeta (Moscow), April 7, 2006. Trans., Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Accessible via www.ng.ru/english.
7. Conversations with United States Pacific Command officials in Honolulu, November
2004.
8. Hussain, Pakistans Quest for Security and the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, p. 169; New
Framework for the USIndia Defense Relationship, Government of India, Embassy of
India Press Release, June 28, 2006. Accessible via www.indianembassy.org.
9. Neelam Matthews, Filling Gaps: Indias Long-Delayed Acquisition Reforms May Be
Pushed by Pakistans F-16 Deal, Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 16,
2006, p. 40.
10. Horimoto Takenori, The World As India Sees It, Gaiko Forum (Tokyo) (Fall 2006),
pp. 45.
11. Background Briefing by Administration Officials on USSouth Asia Relations.
12. Robert D. Blackwill, The India Imperative, The National Interest Online, June 1,
2005. Accessible via www.nationalinterest.org (emphasis added).
13. K. P. Nayar, The US Recognizes South Asia as Indias Sphere of Influence, The Telegraph (Calcutta), April 5, 2006. Cited in Hussain, Pakistans Quest for Security and the
Indo-US Nuclear Deal, pp. 12831.
14. Marya Mufti, Boosting War Machinery, The Nation (Islamabad), March 27, 2006.
15. Pakistan Shows Concern Over USIndian Nuke Deal, NTI Global Security Newswire, April 13, 2006. Accessible via www.nti.org.
16. Sharif Shuja, Americas Security Relations with India and Pakistan, Taiwan Defense
Affairs Vol. 3, No. 4 (Summer 2003), p. 128.
17. India Instrumental in Nepal Uprising, Rebel Says, ABC News Online, June 23, 2006.
Accessible via www.abc.net.au; B. P. Khamma and Lalit Sethi, Different Hemispheres,
Common Foe, Armed Forces Journal (December 2004), p. 37.
18. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard A. Boucher, The US
India Friendship: Where We Were and Where Were Going, Remarks at the Confederation of Indian Industries, New Delhi, April 7, 2006. Accessible via www.state.gov;
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard A. Boucher, Remarks
at Electricity Beyond Borders: A Central Asia Power Sector Forum, Istanbul, Turkey,
June 13, 2006. Accessible via www.state.gov; Electricity Relights Washingtons Central
Asian Policy, Janes Foreign Report, June 29, 2006. Accessible via www4.janes.com;

Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Partnership

19.

20.

21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

21

Joshua Kuchera, USAID Official Outlines Plan to Build Central-South Asian Electricity Links, Eurasia Insight, May 4, 2006. Accessible via www.eurasianet.org; Atajan
Yazmuradov, The USs Greater South Asia Project: Interests of the Central Asian
Countries and of the Key Non-Regional Actors, Central Asia and the Caucasus Vol.
41, No. 5 (2006), pp. 8194.
Vladimir Skosyrev, India and Pakistan on Verge of Dtente. But Situation Could Be
Complicated by US Arms Deliveries, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), August 10,
2005. Trans., FBIS; Alexei Andreyev and Yevgeny Verlin, Geometry of Asian Security:
Vajpayee Seeks to Improve Relations with Beijing, and Musharraf with Washington,
Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), June 25, 2003. Trans., FBIS; Abanti Bhattacharya,
Chinas Foreign Policy Challenges and Evolving Strategy, Strategic Analysis Vol. 30,
No. 1 (JanuaryMarch 2006), pp. 186, 198200; JapanIndia Partnership in a New
Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of JapanIndia Global Partnership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 2005. Accessible via www.mofa.go/jp.
Jyotsna Bakshi, Russias Post-Pokhran Dilemma, Strategic Analysis Vol. 22, No.5
(August 1998), p. 721, quoted in Jerome M. Conley, Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear
Cooperation: Implications for the United States, INSS Occasional Paper No. 31, Proliferation Series, USAF Institute for National Security Studies (2000), pp. 245.
S. Enders Wimbush, Indias Perspective, Central Intelligence Agency, Russia in the
International System: A Conference Report, June 1, 2001, p. 31. Accessible via
www.cia.gov/nic/pubs. See also Sumit Ganguly, Indias Alliances 2020, in Michael R.
Chambers, ed., South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002), pp. 37076.
Stephen Blank, Indias Rising Profile in Central Asia, Comparative Strategy Vol. 22,
No. 2 (AprilJune 2003), pp. 13957.
M. K. Narayanan, Asias Global Foreign Policy and Security Interests, Hampton
Roads International Security Quarterly No. 2 (2006), p. 51
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, Present Dimensions of the Indian Foreign Policy,
Address at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, New Delhi, January 12, 2006.
Address by Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Indias Strategic Perspectives, Washington, DC, June 27, 2005. Accessible via www.indianembassy.org.
Swapna Kona, Building an Edifice, Securing Partnerships, New Delhi Institute of
Peace and Conflict Studies, April 10, 2006; V. R. Raghavan, Indias Quest for Nuclear
Legitimacy, Asia-Pacific Review Vol. 13, No. 1 (2006), p. 66.
Jehangir S. Pocha, China and India on Verge of Nuclear Deal, Boston Globe, November
20, 2006.
Swapna Kona, Russian Nuclear Fuel for Tarapur, Institute of Peace and Conflict
Studies (New Delhi), March 23, 2006.
Indranil Bannerjee, Assessing the Bush Visit, SAPRA India Bulletin (April 2006), p. 7.
Bannerjee, Assessing the Bush Visit, p. 28.
Geert de Clercq, Singapore Keen to Deepen Defense Links With India: Defense Minister, Reuters, June 5, 2006.
India, Japan To Cooperate in Security, Indo-Asian News Service, May 30, 2006.
Primakovs call was made in 1998. See John Cherian, The Primakov Visit, Frontline,
January 215, 1999. Accessible via www.flonnet.com.
J. F. O. McAllister, Russias New World Order, Time Europe, July 10, 2006. Accessible via www.time.com/europe.
Thomas Christensen, Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?: The Rise of China
and US Policy Toward East Asia, International Security Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006),
pp. 11621.
Christensen, Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? pp. 11621.
Andreyev and Verlin, Geometry of Asian Security; Anupam Srivastava, The Strategic Context of Indias Economic Engagement with China, Indian Journal of Economics
and Business (Fall 2005), p. 9. Made available to the author by Dr. Srivastava.
Bhattacharya, Chinas Foreign Policy Challenges and Evolving Strategy, pp. 186, 198200.

22

India Review

39. Mohan Malik, The East Asian Summit, Australian Journal of International Affairs
Vol. 60, No. 2 (June 2006), pp. 20711.
40. Malik, The East Asian Summit, pp. 20711; Hussain, Pakistans Quest for Security
and the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, p. 129 cites the Peoples Daily from October 26, 2005.
Also see Steven Fidler, Views Differ on US Energy Deal with New Delhi, Financial
Times, March 3, 2006. Accessible via www.ft.com.
41. Mrityunjoy Mazumdar and Rupak Chattopadhyay, Indo-US Naval Exercises Bearing
Fruit, Proceedings (US Naval Institute) Magazine (July 2006), pp. 3841; Remarks to
the Press by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace at Roosevelt
House, New Delhi, June 5, 2006. Accessible via newdelhi.usembassy.gov. Your Navy
Is World Class, Rediff.com, May 31, 2006. Accessible via wwww.specials.rediff.com.
42. Russia, India May Jointly Use Tajik Military Airfield-Russian Defense Minister,
ITAR-TASS, December 5, 2005; India Rebuilding Air Base in Tajikistan: Diplomat,
Agence France-Presse, April 25, 2006.
43. Juli A. MacDonald, Indo-US Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions,
Released from the Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Washington, DC: Booz Allen Hamilton, 2002), pp. 41, 51; Vivek Raghuvanshi, Indias
HAL Eager for Aviation Ventures, Defense News, November 17, 2003, p. 3; Vivek
Radhuvanshi. India Strives for Missile-Building Hub, Defense News, February 24,
2003, p. 34.
44. Remarks to the Press by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace at the
Roosevelt House, New Delhi, US Embassy, New Delhi, June 5, 2006. Accessible via
newdelhi.usembassy.gov; India, Japan to Cooperate in Security, Indo-Asian News
Service, May 30, 2006; India, Malaysia Discuss Malacca Strait Security, Defense News,
June 7, 2006; R. K. Radhakrishnan, Australian Navy Looking for Ties With India,
Global News Wire, World News Connection, June 11, 2003; India, Indonesia Begin
Joint Naval Patrols, Agence France Presse, September 4, 2002.
45. Radhakrishnan, Australian Navy Looking for Ties With India, Global News Wire,
World News Connection, June 11, 2003; India, Indonesia Begin Joint Naval Patrols,
Agence France Presse, September 4, 2002; India, Malaysia Discuss Malacca Strait Security, Defense News, June 7, 2006.
46. Stephen Blank, Arms Sales and Technology Transfer in Indo-Israeli Relations, Journal of East Asian Affairs Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2005), pp. 200224.
47. Russia, USA Compete in India, Janes Intelligence Digest, December 10, 2004. Accessible via www4.janes.com; Jyotna Bakshi, Prime Ministers Moscow Visit, Strategic
Analysis Vol. 29, No. 4 (OctoberDecember 2005), pp. 7328; Bhattacharya, Chinas
Foreign Policy Challenges and Evolving Strategy, pp. 198200.
48. Vinay Shukla, India Pitches for Full Membership of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Press Trust of India, October 26, 2005; Ranesh Ramachandran, Russian Wants
India in Shanghai Pact, The Asian Age, January 3, 2006.
49. Ilyas Sarsembaev, Russia: No Strategic Partnership with China in View, China Perspectives No. 65 (MayJune 2006), p. 30.
50. Sarsembaev, Russia: No Strategic Partnership with China in View, p. 30.
51. Sudha Ramachandran, Indias Foray into Central Asia, Asia Times Online, August 12,
2006. Accessible via www.atimes.com; Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), May 12, 2004. Trans., FBIS;
US Bases Pose Threat to Russia Chief of Post-Soviet Security Pact, mosnews.com,
November 12, 2005; Bush Troop Redeployment Plan: A Threat to Russia? Current
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press Vol. 56, No. 33, September 15, 2004, pp. 15.
52. Randall R. Correll, USIndia Space Partnership: The Jewel in the Crown, Astropolitics
Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2006), p. 159.
53. Takenori, The World as India Sees It, p. 5.
54. Pankaj Mishra, The Myth of the New India, New York Times, July 6, 2006, p. 21.
55. Srivastava, The Strategic Context of Indias Economic Engagement with China, pp. 67.
56. Ashley J. Tellis, Atoms for War? USIndia Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and Indias Nuclear
Arsenal (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 42.

Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Partnership

23

57. Takenori, The World as India Sees It, p. 6.

58. Srivastava, The Strategic Context of Indias Economic Engagement with China, pp. 78.
59. MacDonald gives a comprehensive account of elite Indian views about Indian ambitions
which confirms this aspiration.
60. Kissinger is quoted in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, Soviet Relations with
India and Vietnam (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), p. 1.
61. Thakur and Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, p. 132.
62. For example Donald L. Berlin, India in the Indian Ocean, Naval War College Review
Vol. 59, No. 2 (Spring 2006 ), pp. 5889.
63. Berlin, India in the Indian Ocean, pp. 5889; Vivek Raghuvanshi, India Aims to
Project Power across Asia, Defense News, November 10, 2003, p. 10.
64. Berlin, India in the Indian Ocean, pp. 5889; Vivek Raghuvanshi, India Embraces
New War Doctrine, Defense News, November 8, 2004, p. 14.
65. Raghuvanshi, India Aims to Project Power across Asia, p. 10.
66. Raghuvanshi, India Aims to Project Power across Asia, p. 10.
67. Raghuvanshi, India Aims to Project Power across Asia, p. 10.
68. Rahul Bedi, India-Regional Focus: Power Play, Janes Defense Weekly, July 13, 2005.
Accessible via www4.janes.com.
69. Raghuvanshi, India Aims to Project Power across Asia, p. 10; Vivek Raghuvanshi,
India Plans Weapons, Training to Project Power, Defense News, February 20, 2006;
Pramod Buravalli, Strategic Planning for India, India Defence Consultants, April 15,
2006. Accessible via www.indiadefence.com/index.htm; Vivek Raghuvanshi, Indias
New Navy Chief Pushes for Expeditionary, Net-Centric Capabilities, Defense News,
November 2, 2006.
70. Berlin, India in the Indian Ocean, pp. 5889; Raghuvanshi, India Embraces New
War Doctrine, p. 14; Raghuvanshi, India Aims to Project Power across Asia, p. 10;
Raghuvanshi, India Plans Weapons, Training to Project Power; Buravalli, Strategic
Planning for India; Raghuvanshi, Indias New Navy Chief Pushes for Expeditionary,
Net-Centric Capabilities.
71. Rajat Pandit, IAF May Follow US Air Force, The Times of India, October 28, 2005.
Accessible via timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
72. R. Parmeswaran, US, China, India Flex Muscle Over Energy-Critical Sea Lanes,
Defense News, October 4, 2006.
73. Parmeswaran, US, China, India Flex Muscle Over Energy-Critical Sea Lanes.
74. On Indias policies in Central Asia see Stephen Blank, Natural Allies: Regional Security
in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Collaboration (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2005), pp. 4762.
75. Brigadier Vijai K. Nair VSM, Challenges for the Years Ahead: An Indian Perspective,
Paper presented to the Annual National Defense University Asian-Pacific Symposium,
Honolulu, March 2001. Accessible via www.ndu.edu.
76. Nair, Challenges for the Years Ahead. Also see Atlantic Council of the United States,
Defense Industry Globalization, a compendium of papers presented at the conference
Defense Industry Globalization, Washington, DC, November 16, 2001; India Furthers Strategic Goals by Reaching out to Arms Markets, Stratfor.com, October 19,
2002. Accessible via www.stratfor.com.
77. India Furthers Strategic Goals by Reaching out to Arms Markets.
78. Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (Washington,
DC Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Also see the remarks by Polly Nayak to the
Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Conference, Dwight D. Eishenhower
National Security Compendium 2003, Washington, DC, pp. 188, 203; Alan Sipress, US
Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India, Washington Post, August 12, 2001; Samina Ahmed,
The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia, International Security Vol. 26,
No. 3 (Winter 200102), pp. 8081; Paul Dibb, The Strategic Environment in the AsiaPacific Region, in Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds., Americas Asian Alliances
(Cambridge, MA; The MIT Press, 2000), pp. 4, 10; C. Raja Mohan, We Wont Play the
Triangular Game: US, The Hindu, October 22, 2001.

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India Review

79. Remarks of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the USIndia Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, Wednesday, April 5, 2006.
Accessible via foreign.senate.gov; Statement of Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, US Department of State Committee on
House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, US Department
of State, May 17, 2006. Accessible at www.state.gov.
80. Ashley J. Tellis, The Changing PoliticalMilitary Environment: South Asia, in
Zalmay Khalizad et al., eds., The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy
and Force Posture (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), pp. 21016; Arun
Sahgal, IndiaUS Not Quite in Step Yet, Asia Times Online, August 21, 2003.
Accessible via www.atimes.com.
81. Andreyev and Verlin, Geometry of Asian Security.
82. For Indian policy in Southeast Asia see Blank, Natural Allies: Regional Security in Asia
and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Collaboration, pp. 6380; Arabinda Acharya,
India and Southeast Asia, In the Age of Terror: Building Partnerships for Peace,
Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 28, No. 2 (August 2006), pp. 297321.
83. Shaun Walker, Fueling Indias Growth, Russia Profile Vol. 1, No. 4 (May 2006),
pp. 1314.
84. Skosyrev, India and Pakistan on Verge of Dtente.