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G.R. No.

95851
March 1, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
MANOLO VILLANUEVA alias "BOY" VILLANUEVA, accused.
It was the town fiesta of San Pablo, Laguna. But what could have augured an otherwise festive
atmosphere was preempted by the discovery of the lifeless body of a barrio lass sprawled on the
cold cement floor of their conjugal home. Blood was oozing out of her mouth. She was six months
pregnant. The suspected assailant was her husband who allegedly beat her to death after she
slapped him earlier in front of his friends.
Charged with and convicted of parricide with unintentional abortion MANOLO VILLANUEVA also
known as "Boy" Villanueva is now before us still professing innocence. He claims that he was
watching a live concert when his wife, Nora Magpantay, 19, committed suicide by taking sodium
cyanide. She was supposedly burdened with family problems and wanted to follow the footsteps of
her sister who had earlier taken her life.
But the evidence shows otherwise. Isidro Magpantay, father of Nora, testified that on 14 January
1989, at around five or six o'clock in the afternoon, he went to the house of his daughter where she
and Manolo were engaged in a heated argument. Manolo was drunk. After seeing his son-in-law
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slap his daughter, Isidro felt bad and left.


The following morning, at around five o'clock, Isidro was informed by Manolo's parents that Nora had
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poisoned herself. Forthwith, Isidro went to the hospital to look into the-medical records of his daughter.
But failing to find any, he proceeded to the funeral parlor where he saw his lifeless daughter with
contusions on the right cheek, breast, abdomen and at the back of her left ear. Her mouth was swollen.
Her forearms were raised; he straightened them.

To augment the testimony of Isidro and to refute altogether the alibi of the accused, 15-year old
Abigail Bandoy narrated that on 14 January 1989, at around seven-thirty in the evening, while in the
house of Manolo and Nora, she witnessed the accused mauling Nora for about fifteen (15) minutes,
striking Nora several times in the stomach below her left breast and in different parts of her body
over Nora's incessant pleas "[t]ama na Boy." But Manolo would not stop until Nora fell unconscious
on the cement floor. Then Manolo left. After making sure he had already gone Abigail went home
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leaving Nora behind.


Dr. Nida Glorioso, City Medical Officer, recounted that on 15 January 1989, at around nine-fifteen in
the morning, she examined the cadaver of Nora and found a "contusion on the left cheek including
the lateral aspect of the eye"

which could have been caused by a clenched fist, a kick, a piece of

wood, a broken bottle or any hard object.

She also noticed a "bloody mucoid discharge com(ing) out

from her mouth." She then proceeded to open her abdomen to determine the presence of poison as it
was alleged by the victim's husband that his wife had poisoned herself. The abdomen of the victim
however failed to emit the characteristic odor of a chemical poison, negating the allegation that the victim
had poisoned herself.

Nevertheless, to completely rule out poisoning as the cause of death the victim's stomach and
intestines were sent to the PC Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, for a "chemical
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analysis."
Capt. Luena E. Layador of he PC Crime Laboratory disclosed that "[t]oxicological
examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave NEGATIVE result to the tests for
common metallic, non-metallic, volatile and non-volatile poisons, cyanides, organic phosphates, organic
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chlorides."
Thus, Dr. Glorioso concluded that "[i]n view of the negative result of the toxicological
examination from the P.C. Crime Lab., Camp Crame, Q.C., . . . and considering the contusio-ecchymosis,
cheek, lateral aspect of eye, left, the CAUSE OF DEATH is SHOCK DUE TO CEREBRAL CONCUSSION
secondary to a severe blow on the head.

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Manolo Villanueva however has a different tale. He averred that on 14 January 1989, at around sixthirty in the evening, he went home to change his clothes since he was going to watch the concert of
singer Randy Santiago at Canossa College in San Pablo City later that evening. As he was about to
leave their house, his wife tried to stop him. His mother who saw them even reprimanded him.

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Nevertheless, at around seven-thirty, he left the house.


He returned at around two-thirty the following
morning. After knocking at the door, calling out to his wife but failing to get a response for about thirty
minutes, he forcibly opened the door only to find his wife lying prostrate on the floor of their living room.
He then noticed the bottle of sodium cyanide, which he was using for poisoning rats, already empty.

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On cross-examination, Manolo admitted that on 14 January 1989 he was slapped by his wife in front
of his friends which resulted in a little misunderstanding ("tampuhan"). Although embarrassed,
according to him, he nonetheless did not get angry. He merely ushered his wife back to their house
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and then left again.


Sherwin Isleta, 17, took the witness stand for the defense. His house is adjacent to the conjugal
home of Manolo and Nora with only a party wall separating the two houses. He said that on 14
January 1989 at around eight o'clock in the evening, he saw Nora sitting near the gate in front of
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their house, apparently waiting for someone.


That was the last time he saw her. At around three
o'clock the following morning he was awakened by the loud knock on the neighbor's door and repeated
calls for Nora. A little later he heard Manolo screaming, "Nora, Nora, why did you do this?

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In its Decision of 27 April 1990 the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Br. 31, ruled
A close scrutiny of the evidence discloses that: on January 14, 1989, between 5:00 P.M. and 6:00
P.M. at their house, accused and his wife, Nora, quarreled with the former slapping the latter in the
presence of Isidro Magpantay who, after half an hour stay thereat, left them; accused also left and
went to his hangout; at 6:30 P.M.; accused returned and in the presence of his friends, was slapped
by his wife; between 7:30 P.M. and 8:00 P.M., accused mauled his wife by giving her several fist
blows, thereby causing her to fall and hit her head on the cemented floor; also between the same
period of time, accused left their house and attended a concert with his friend, Nick Dalisay, from
9:00 P.M. up to 2:00 A.M. of the following day; at 3:00 A.M. of January 15, 1989, accused found the
lifeless body of his wife on the cemented floor in the bedroom of their house; at 9:15 A.M., Dr.
Glorioso conducted an autopsy on the cadaver and found contusions on the different parts of the
body notably, on the left cheek and eye; and, deceased could have died between 9:00 P.M. of
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January 14, 1989 and 12:00 A.M. of January 15, 1989 (citations omitted).
and held that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused is guilty
of parricide with unintentional abortion. The accused was initially sentenced to suffer the death
penalty which is the penalty for parricide, the more serious crime, applied in its maximum period. But
since the death penalty could not at that time be imposed under the 1987 Constitution, the penalty
for parricide under Art. 246, The Revised Penal Code, was reclusion perpetua, the penalty next
lower to death. However, instead of imposing reclusion perpetua the trial court sentenced the
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accused to suffer life imprisonment.


A careful review of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that save for minor inconsistencies in
the statements of prosecution witnesses which even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any
suspicion of being rehearsed, their testimonies were consistent, in accord with one another, and
were given in simple, straightforward manner, mentioning details of the incident that could not have
been merely concocted. Thus, their averments among others included the fact that accused was
slapped by the victim in front of his friends which caused him extreme embarrassment, leading to a
heated argument and escalating into the mauling of the victim. Matter-of-factly, the manner in which
the witnesses for the state testified and their narration of events bear the hallmarks of candidness
and sincerity.
And neither do we find material discrepancies or substantial inconsistencies in their testimonies
which may engender serious doubt on their reliability and veracity. Except for witness Isidro
Magpantay to whom bias is imputed by reason of his being the father of the victim who allegedly
despised accused as his son-in-law, there appears to be no motive on the part of Abigail and Dr.
Glorioso to testify falsely. The absence of evidence as to improper motives actuating the principal
witnesses for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motives
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existed, and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.
There was no reason at all for
Abigail and Dr. Glorioso to lie and incriminate the accused. More so with Abigail who was then only fifteen
(15) years old when she took the witness stand. It has been held that the testimony of a minor of sound
mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of an older person, so that once established that the

former has fully understood the character and nature of an oath, his testimony should be accorded full
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credence.
What is more, the eyewitness account of Abigail conforms with the autopsy findings, making
her testimony even more reliable and faithworthy.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to which the lower court has given full faith lead to a
fair and reasonable inference that the accused was indeed responsible for the death of the victim.
Isidro Magpantay narrated that he witnessed the misunderstanding between his daughter and her
husband who was then reeking with liquor, which the latter even admitted on cross-examination.
Abigail Bandoy was an eyewitness to the altercation between the spouses which led to the fatal
mauling of the victim. And Dr. Nida Glorioso, after examining the deceased and taking into
consideration the result of the tests, concluded that the cause of death was "shock due to cerebral
concussion secondary to a severe blow on the head," contrary to the submission of the accused that
his wife had poisoned herself. Certainly, the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
leading to a logical conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, perpetrated the crime.
In brief, as this Court has repeatedly ruled, the alibi and denial of the accused cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses and their clear identification of him as the perpetrator
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of the crime.
Thus, against the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, the arguments of the
defense have proved to be unavailing.
The submission of the accused that the trial court erred in lending credence to the testimony of the
father of the deceased who has shown his dislike and bias against the former even before the death
of Nora is unsustainable. Isidro Magpantay merely narrated that, the last time he saw his daughter
alive was in the afternoon before she died when she and her husband were quarreling. While he
may have previously manifested his enmity towards the accused, Isidro only testified that he saw his
daughter and the accused in a heated altercation, which per se is not incriminatory, and which the
accused himself even admitted, downplaying it as a mere "tampuhan." It has long been settled that
relationship of the prosecution witness to the victim does not necessarily categorize him as biased
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and interested and thus tarnish his testimony.


In fact, it is highly doubtful that Isidro would aid in the
prosecution of the accused simply because he disliked the latter. For sure, he would like to send the real
killer of his daughter to jail, and not just anyone whom he despised. Hence, there is no reason why
Isidro's testimony should not be believed.
The contention of the accused that the deceased should have suffered more contusions, and not
merely on the "left cheek including the lateral aspect of the eye," considering the numerous blows
she supposedly received from him as narrated by witness Abigail, is ungrounded. We have
repeatedly said that absence of external injuries does not rule out the possibility that a blow had in
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fact been administered by the offender.


The proposition of counsel of the accused that the toxicological examination performed by Dr.
Glorioso was very limited,"

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and that her conclusions were merely based on her opinion and not on
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medical findings is likewise untenable. In fact, we find this amusing coming as it does from counsel who
has neither presented his qualifications nor cited any medical authority in forming such self-serving
conclusions. We thus sustain the opinion of Dr. Glorioso who certainly appears to be more competent in
the field of medicine than counsel who simply proffered speculations that have remained unsubstantiated.

Thus, even the assertion of the accused that his wife took sodium cyanide is very doubtful, not only
because her toxicological examination yielded negative result for the presence of poison, but also
because the pieces of broken bottle which supposedly contained the poison were also found
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negative for "volatile, non-volatile and metallic poisons."


The defense, contending that "the prosecution should not have been allowed to spring a surprise,"
then seeks to nullify the account of rebuttal witness Abigail Bandoy that the accused mauled the
victim, and binds the prosecution to its earlier statements that the rebuttal witness will testify only for
the purpose of rebutting the alibi of the accused that he attended the concert of Randy Santiago.
We are not persuaded. The Court finds it difficult to believe that the defense was surprised by the
testimony of witness Abigail considering that it was able to subject her to a grueling and rigorous
cross-examination, ceaselessly trying to elicit contradictory statements from her. If indeed the
defense was caught flat-footed, as it now makes it appear, then it could not have extensively crossexamined the 15-year old witness. Suffice it to state that what Abigail said she saw and where she
was at the time of the incident are the natural and logical allegations to show that "the accused was

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not in the Randy Santiago show,"


which is the essence of the testimony of the rebuttal witness, as
stated by the prosecutor, to refute the denial of the accused.
The accused also takes to task the testimony of Abigail because of her delay in reporting the
incident. She witnessed the mauling of the victim on 14 January 1989. Yet, she executed an affidavit
only on 23 January 1990, or after more than one year. Abigail however explains that she was not
aware that the victim had died as a result of the mauling and that a case was filed against the
accused since after the mauling she left for Manila to continue her schooling. Hence, it was only
sometime in November 1989 when she learned that Nora was dead, and only on 23 January 1990
that a case was filed against the accused. We thus accept the elucidation of Abigail. She has
satisfactorily shown that she was indeed in Manila to continue her studies, and was not well-posted
on developments in the province. It was only some ten (10) months later when she returned to San
Pablo that she learned of Nora's death.
It has been repeatedly held that delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of a crime, if
sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness and his testimony nor destroy its
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probative value.
And, the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed cannot be taken against him for it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some
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reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case.


It has become judicial knowledge that prosecution
witnesses are, more often than not, afraid to testify. This was manifested by the prosecutor in the instant
case. Hence, in one case,
prosecution witnesses.

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we said that fear of reprisal is a valid excuse for the momentary silence of

Thus the testimony of defense witness Sherwin Isleta that he saw Nora at around eight o'clock in the
evening before she was found dead has lost its relevance as it has not shown that the accused was
precluded from having mauled the victim and causing her eventual death. In fine, we uphold the
pronouncement of the trial court that "[t]he defense of alibi raised by the accused showing that he
was at the Canossa College in San Pablo City (watching the concert of singer Randy Santiago) with
a friend, Nick Dalisay, who was not even presented in Court, at the time when his wife could have
allegedly died even if true is still of no moment as his act (mauling) committed prior thereto is the
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one in issue."
Consequently, we affirm the conclusion of the trial court that accused Manolo Villanueva is guilty of
parricide with unintentional abortion, for a husband who with violence kills his pregnant wife,
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occasioning the death of the fetus, is guilty of parricide with unintentional abortion.
Applying Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which in part provides that "[w]hen a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies . . . the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period," accused should be sentenced to death,
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the maximum period of the penalty for parricide which is the more serious crime.
However, in view
of Sec. 19, par. (1), Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, which proscribes the imposition of the death penalty,
and the inapplicability of R.A. 7659 which restores the death penalty, considering that the act charged
was committed prior to the effectivity of said statute, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, which is
the proper penalty as prescribed by The Revised Penal Code, and not life imprisonment as erroneously
imposed by the trial court. Time and again this Court has said that reclusion perpetua is not the same as
life imprisonment. The former entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict
becomes eligible for parole, and carries with it accessory penalties.

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WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused MANOLO VILLANUEVA also known as
"BOY" VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of life imprisonment
should instead be reclusion perpetua, and consistent with existing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity
for the death of the victim and the award for moral damages should be as they are increased to
P50,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively, while the actual damages and costs of P3,000.00 remain.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. Nos. 93932-33. June 5, 1991.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VIVENCIO SABELLANO and WESLY
SAPELLANO, Accused-Appellants.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.


Cruz B. Carbon, for Defendants-Appellants.
DECISION
This is an appeal purportedly interposed by two of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 65155 (for frustrated
homicide) and 67688 (for murder) which were jointly tried and then decided by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro-Manila, Branch 156 on June 6, 1990. The dispositive portion of the assailed judgment of
conviction reads:
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"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:

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"The court finds accused VIVENCIO SABELLANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 65155 and hereby sentences said accused VIVENCIO SABELLANO to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor and to pay the costs.
Let alias warrant be issued for the arrest of VIVENCIO and MAYOLING SABELLANO the same to be served by
the NBI and other national police agencies.
Accused WESLY and JAIME SABELLANO on the other hand are hereby acquitted of the offense changed in
said Criminal Case No. 65155 with costs de oficio.
In Criminal Case No. 67688, the Court finds accused WESLY SABELLANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences said accused WESLY SABELLANO to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of victim Benito Abrogar, in the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
In the service of his sentence, Accused WESLY SABELLANO shall be credited in full with the period of his
preventive imprisonment.
Let alias warrant be issued for the arrest of accused VIVENCIO and JIMMY SABELLANO the same to be
served by the NBI and other national police agencies." (RTC Decision, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 34-35)
The accused-appellants whose surnames had occasionally been misspelled in the records were both charged
with the crimes of frustrated homicide and murder in two separate informations. In Criminal Case No.
65155, the accused-appellants together with Jaime and Mayoling, also surnamed Sabellano were indicted of
the crime of frustrated homicide committed as follows:
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"That on or about the 6th day of February, 1985, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Benito Abrogar, hitting the latter on the
different parts of his body, thereby causing him stab wounds which would ordinarily cause his death, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide, but nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is due to the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to said Benito Abrogar, which prevented his death." (RTC Decision, p. 1; Rollo, p. 22)
In Criminal Case No. 67688, the accused-appellants with one Jimmy Sabellano were charged with the crime
of murder committed as follows:
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"That on or about the 9th day of March, 1986, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with one John Doe whose true identity and present whereabout are still unknown and mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Benito Abrogar with a bladed weapon on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which directly caused his death."
(RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 236)

On April 18, 1986, all the accused in Criminal Case No. 65155 except Mayoling Sabellano who had remained
at large up to the present time, entered a plea of "not guilty" with the assistance of counsel. Subsequently,
Accused Vivencio and Jaime jumped bail, hence, they were tried in absentia.
On December 8, 1987, the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 67688.
Initially, the case for frustrated homicide was dismissed for the repeated failure of prosecution witnesses to
appear in court. However, the case was revived and consolidated with the murder case after a motion for
reconsideration and/or to revise case filed by the private respondent, Walderita Abrogar, wife of the
deceased Benito Abrogar, was granted by the trial court in an Order dated January 12, 1988.
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The antecedent facts in Criminal Case No. 65155 as summarized by the trial court from the lone testimony
of the prosecution witness Walderita Abrogar are as follows:
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". . . [O]n February 6, 1985, she was in her house at 536 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong watching a wake
across the street. A game had then been in progress for about two (2) hours between one Julio Catayong
and Wesly. A few people were watching said game among them, the son of the deceased, Almar Abrogar.
Due to both players zealousness, a misunderstanding ensued. Julio cursed putang ina mo and delivered a
fist blow to the rightside jaw of Wesly. Seeing the trouble erupt, Salvador, brother of Julio, pulled out a knife
and advanced towards Wesly. Vivencio Sabellano, at the same time, had also approached and held up
Salvador preventing the latter from attacking Wesly. As this occurred, Wesly went home and after getting
hold of a knife, rushed back and stabbed Salvador twice. In the process, Wesly had held Salvadors right
arm and stabbed him with the knife on his right hand. Salvador was released and ran to his Aunts house.
Almar, who was then a mere three (3) arm-lengths (sic) away watching, followed to see if Salvadors wounds
were serious. Salvador asked Almar to fetch a taxi to which the latter obliged. When the taxi arrived
however, its path was blocked by Wesly, Vivencio and Paulino Sabellano. Wesly confronted Almar and said
putang ina mo huwag kang makialam bayaan mo siyang mamatay while pulling out the knife. Almar ran to
the house and hid. The deceased, Benito Abrogar, was at that time fixing the toilet. Hearing the commotion,
he went out holding a bolo. He was met by Vivencio, Mayoling, Wesly and Jaime who struck him with a
bareta. Mayoling and Wesly mauled Benito while Vivencio delivered a stab to the back with a 29" knife.
Benito fell to the ground wounded. He was then picked-up by his wife who, along with other relatives, took
him to Nayan where a doctor advised that he be taken to the Rizal Provincial Hospital and confined for ten
(10) days." (RTC Decision, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 24-25).
In Criminal Case No. 67688, the pertinent facts that led to the conviction of the accused-appellant Wesly
Sabellano are stated by the trial court, to wit:
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"On March 9, 1986, Benito and Walderita with Gertrudes Basilides were walking along Cordillera Street near
Sierra Madre Street on their way to Divisoria to buy merchandise to be resold later in the day. It was 3:45
a.m. as they chanced upon the group of Vivencio, Wesly, Jimmy and John Doe at a grocery store. The
Abrogars ignored them. Further down the street however, Gertrudes noticed that two (2) joggers, were
coming up behind them. One of the joggers, Wesly, grabbed Walderita with his left arm around her neck and
warned her "huwag kang sisigaw, papatayin kita kapag sumigaw ka." The other jogger, Vivencio, embraced
Benito and stabbed the latter on the right breast. Two (2) persons, Jaime and John Doe came from
Cordillera and Sierra Madre Streets and stabbed Benito in the abdomen. Wesly released Walderita and
stabbed Benito in the back. As Benito dropped to the ground, his assailants ran in different directions to
escape and Walderita tried to help Benito for home but he died shortly thereafter. Gertrudes was only an
arm-length away when the attack occurred. With light coming from a nearby house, she was able to
recognize the assailants. She also remembered the clothes that the attackers had worn. Wesly was wearing
a white sando and maong pants; Jaime had an orange T-shirt and maong and Vivencio was in a black jacket
and maong pants. Seeing Benito fall to the ground, Gertrudes looked at him before going back to Calbayog
Street to get help from their relatives. Walderita stayed with Benito until help arrived. She then called for
the police to bring the deceased to the Municipal Hall and later to Camp Crame for autopsy. A request for
autopsy (Exhibit "H") was made and a Certificate of Death (Exhibit "I") was issued. Medico Legal Report M0-418-86 (Exhibit D) was issued on the findings as testified to by Dr. Moraleda. Walderita executed a
statement (Exhibit "E") and so did Gertrudes. (Exhibit "G")" (RTC Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 25-26)
After a joint trial on the merits, the trial court promulgated the questioned decision from which the present
appeal was filed assigning as errors:
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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT (SIC) ACCUSED-APPELLANT VIVENCIO SABILLANO GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 65155.
II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MUCH CREDENCE TO THE CLEARLY BIASED, HIGHLY IMPROBABLE,
CONTRADICTORY AND CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF WALDERITA ABROGAR (WIFE OF THE DECEASED
BENITO ABROGAR) AND GERTRUDES BASELIDES (NIECE OF THE SAID DECEASED).
III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SABILLANOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT WESLY SABILLANO
BEING ONE THEM, (SIC) WERE THE PERSONS WHO HELD UP AND KILLED THE DECEASED BENITO
ABROGAR IN THE MORNING OF MARCH 9, 1986 IN THE CORNER OF CORDILLERA AND SIERRA MADRE
STREETS, MANDALUYONG, METRO MANILA.
IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD ESTABLISHED OR PROVED THE
GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WESLY SABILLANO BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
67688 FOR MURDER." (Rollo, p. 52)
At the outset, we are constrained to review the trial courts decision only insofar as the accused-appellant
Wesly Sabellanos conviction for the murder of Benito Abrogar is concerned considering that with respect to
the other accused-appellant Vivencio Sabellano, an order dated June 8, 1990 was issued by the trial court
which states:
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"He who wants to avail of the processes of the Court must be within the reach of the Court. Having escaped
from detention, Accused Vivencio Sabellanos Notice of Appeal through counsel must perforce be DENIED
DUE COURSE and it is hereby SO ORDERED." (Records, p. 487)
Either by deliberate omission or on account of ignorance of the rules of procedure specifically Section 18,
Rule 114 and Section 8, Rule 124, the counsel for the accused Vivencio Sabellano failed to seasonably
question the above order which by this time has become final and executory. Well-settled is the rule that the
right to appeal is a statutory right, not a natural or inherent one, so that the party who seeks to avail of the
said right must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost. (Ozaete v.
Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 800 [1989]). Hence, as regards Criminal Case No. 65155 accused Vivencio
Sabellano, who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide, lost his right
to appeal from the trial courts judgment of conviction.
Anent Criminal Case No. 67688, the issue is whether or not the evidence for the prosecution establishes the
guilt of the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano beyond reasonable doubt.
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In support of his prayer for a reversal of the trial courts verdict, the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano
makes the following contentions in his brief, namely: (a) that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
contained material inconsistencies and contradictions, so that the trial court erred in giving much credence
thereto; (b) that the complaining witness, Walderita Abrogar, failed to immediately report to the police
officer who conducted the "on-the-spot investigation" on the day of the incident in question that the
Sabellanos were the persons responsible for the death of her husband, Benito Abrogar; and (c) that the trial
court injustly failed to appreciate the defense of alibi despite the fact that the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses who allegedly identified Benitos assailants is highly questionable.
The alleged contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses alluded to by the accusedappellant Wesly Sabellano are that while Walderita Abrogar stated in her testimony in court that it was only
on March 9, 1986, the day of the fatal incident that the other prosecution witnesses, Gertrudes Baselides,
accompanied the former and her husband, Benito Abrogar to Divisoria to buy some merchandise, Gertrudes
testified that she went with her uncle and aunt, Benito and Walderita, to Divisoria everyday (Appellants
Brief, pp. 22-23); that Walderita testified that when she and her deceased husband were held up by the
accused-appellants Wesly and Vivencio Sabellano, respective]y, Gertrudes ran back to her house
immediately, while Gertrudes claimed that she remained at the scene of the fatal incident while her uncle

and aunt were embraced by the accused-appellants until she saw her uncle being stabbed after which she
ran home (Appellants Brief, pp. 23-24) that while Walderita said in open court that after the stabbing of her
husband, she saw four (4) persons run to different directions, some towards Libertad Street and the others
towards Sierra Madre Street, Gertrudes asserted that all the assailants ran towards only one direction,
towards the Producers Market (Appellants Brief, pp. 24-26); and that while Walderita claimed that there
were police officers at the scene of the fatal incident since she was the one who summoned them on March
9, 1986, Gertrudes categorically stated that no policeman arrived at the scene of the crime. (Appellants
Brief, pp. 26-28)
The discrepancies pointed out by the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano are not only on minor details but
they do not alter the fact that the deceased Benito Abrogar was fatally stabbed on March 9, 1986 and that
one of the assailants was the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano. The autopsy report (Exh. "D" ; Records, p.
356) indicated that Benito suffered from cardio respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result
of stab wounds of the trunk and upper extremity.
Prosecution witness Desiderio Moraleda, the medico-legal examiner who conducted the autopsy on the
deceased Benito Abrogar described in court the nature of the six (6) stab wounds inflicted on the victims
body and made a conclusion that the mortal wound caused by a single-bladed knife was that located on the
right side of the chest and indicated as Stab Wound No. 1 in the report. (TSN, June 6, 1989, pp. 6-7)
The straight-forward and detailed testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, Walderita Abrogar and
Gertrudes Baselides relating to the fatal stabbing of Benito Abrogar clearly pinpointed the authors of the
crime under consideration. (TSN, April 12, 1988, pp. 10-14; TSN, August 25, 1988, pp. 3-5). The
inconsistencies and contradictions specified by the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano merely pertain to
minor details which cannot affect the credibility of Walderitas and Gertrudes testimonies. Our ruling in the
case of People v. Tomas Gadiana (G.R. No. 92509, March 13, 1991) bears reiterating. We stated:
chanroble s.com.ph : virtual law library

"As this Court had remarked in People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 76742, August 7, 1990:

jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"The truth need not be narrated with perfect symmetry. Several persons remembering the same incident
may vary in their recollections of some of the details but these differences do not necessarily make liars of
them all. What is important is that they agree on essential facts and that their respective versions,
corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole." (at pp. 45)
The accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano further presents the argument that since the complaining witness,
Walderita Abrogar, reported to the police authorities the matter of her husbands death and identified the
Sabellanos as the culprits only after the lapse of two (2) days and not immediately when she had the very
first opportunity to do so, i.e., at the time the police conducted an "on-the-spot" investigation on March 9,
1986, then, there is ground to believe that the credibility of Walderitas entire testimony is greatly
weakened.
In the light of the circumstances in the case at bar, the delay in relating to the police authorities the
attendant facts of the crime for which the Sabellanos had been charged is consistent with normal behavior
considering that after a tragic incident, the last thing that the bereaved would want to happen is to provoke
further reprisals from the perpetrators of the felonious act. Although there is a natural tendency to seek the
ends of justice for the treacherous killing of a dearly departed, mourning and rites for the dead take priority
as dictated by our culture. As we have held in the case of People v. John Gabriel Gamboa (G.R. No. 91374,
February 25, 1991):
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"It is quite understandable when the witnesses do not immediately report the identity of the offender after a
startling occurrence more especially when they are related to the victim as they just had a traumatic
experience. . . . Nevertheless, a delay of about a few hours before the identification of the offender by the
prosecution witnesses does not thereby affect their credibility." (at p. 9)
Moreover, in the case of People v. Ponciano Mandapat, (G.R. No. 76953, April 22, 1991), we distinctly stated
that:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

As a general rule, the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he had
witnessed cannot be taken against him (People v. Demate, 113 SCRA 353 [1982])for it is not uncommon for
a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case. The natural
reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice (People v. Pacabes, 137 SCRA
158 [1985]; People v. Coronado, 145 SCRA 250 [1986]) and the fear of eyewitness when townmates are
involved in the commission of the crime is understandable for they may provoke reprisals from the accused

(People v. Rosario, 134 SCRA 496 [1985]). The delay, when adequately explained, does not impair the
credibility of the witness, as in the case at bar (People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94 [1985]; People v. Millora,
119 SCRA 417 [1984]); neither will it render his testimony biased (People v. Itura, 129 SCRA 127 [1984]);
nor will it destroy its probative value (People v. Millora, supra) . . ." (at pp. 5-6)
Lastly, the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano tries to buttress his claim that he is innocent of the crime
imputed to him by adducing evidence in support of the defense of alibi. Hence, he testified that at the time
of the incident in question, he was asleep in his house and was awakened only by Walderita shouting about
her being held-up together with her husband (TSN, March 13, 1990, pp. 9-12). Corroborative evidence on
the defense of alibi was also given by Erlinda Sabellano, Accused-appellant Weslys mother, who stated in
her testimony that on March 6, 1986, between 3:00 oclock and 4:00 oclock in the morning, she was
preparing food for her children which included accused-appellant Wesly who were all asleep at that time.
(TSN, January 24, 1990, pp. 6-8)
We affirm the trial courts rejection of the defense of alibi in line with the doctrinal rule that the defense of
alibi being inherently weak cannot prevail against the prosecutions positive identification of the accused and
in the absence of any convincing evidence showing physical impossibility of the accuseds being at the time
and place of the crime. (See People v. Roberto Soriano y Bruan alias "Ruben", Et Al., G.R. No. 74783, April
22, 1991, citing People v. Garcellano, 23 SCRA 595 [1968]; People v. Naba-unag, 79 SCRA 32 [1977]; see
also People v. Magno Gupo y Gayeta, Et Al., G.R. No. 75814, September 24, 1990 citing People v. Reunir,
157 SCRA 686 [1988]) As the trial court stated:
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"Also, as clearly shown in Exhibit "3" for the defense, the house of accused Wesly is not far enough from the
scene of the crime for him to have been physically impossible to have participated in the crime and be at his
house shortly thereafter. Established is the rule that the accused must be able to show that he was at
another place at the time the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the particular moment it was perpetrated.
"Lastly, Mrs. Abrogar and Gertrudes Baselides gave such a vivid account of the attack, clearly identifying the
attackers and the clothes worn that the defense of alibi must necessarily fail. Alibi is not credible where the
prosecution witnesses directly testify as to how the assault was committed and positively identified the
accused as the offenders." (Rollo, pp. 33-34)
Moreover, the trial court correctly ruled that alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is mainly
established by the accused himself and his immediate relatives who would naturally be expected to make
statements in his favor, as in this case it was the mother of accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano who
supported the accuseds alibi. (People v. Dennis de Guzman y de Leon, G.R. No. 95685, March 4, 1991,
citing People v. Somera, 173 SCRA 684 [1989]).
We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial courts finding that conspiracy exists among the assailants of
the deceased Benito Abrogar. In the case at bar, although the records do not show any direct proof showing
that the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano together with his three other companions agreed to inflict fatal
wounds on the person of the deceased, there is overwhelming evidence from the elaborate testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses that Benitos attackers were at the time and place of the stabbing incident that led
to the death of the said victim, Benito Abrogar, and that all of them acted in consonance with a common
design so that the guilt of one becomes the guilt of all. (People v. Martin Cagadas, Jr., Et Al., G.R. No. 88044,
January 23,1991 citing People v. Maralit, 165 SCRA 427; People v. Newman, 163 SCRA 496; People v.
Salvador, 163 SCRA 574) Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but can be inferred from the
acts of the accused tending to show community of criminal purpose. (People v. Valeriano Pacris, Et Al., G.R.
No. 69986, March 5,1991 citing People v. Balane, 123 SCRA 614; People v. Baltazar Alan Alitao, Et Al., G.R.
No. 74736, February 19, 1991 citing People v. Pineda, 157 SCRA 71; People v. Palino, 183 SCRA 680)
After a careful review of the instant case, we find that the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano is guilty of the
crime of murder qualified by treachery considering that he and his other companions adopted a mode of
attack that insured the killing of the deceased Benito Abrogar without risk to themselves inasmuch as their
attack was swiftly and methodically done as observed by the trial court and their victim and his party were
unarmed and taken by surprise. (see People v. Luis Mision y Salipot, G.R. No. 63480, February 26, 1991
citing Bernabe v. Bolinas, Jr., 18 SCRA 812; see also People v. Mabubay, 185 SCRA 675 [1990] citing People
v. Lopez, 80 SCRA 18; People v. Alegria, 84 SCRA 614).
chanroble s virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the trial courts decision dated June 6, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the amount of indemnity be increased to FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) in
accordance with the Courts recent pronouncements.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182356 December 4, 2013


DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading, Respondent.
DECISION
Very case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions of fact and questions of law. Questions
of fact are the parties and their counsel to respond to, based on what supporting facts the legal
questions require; the court can only draw conclusion from the facts or evidence adduced. When the
facts are lacking because of the deficiency of presented evidence, then the court can only draw one
conclusion: that the cause must fail for lack of evidentiary support.
The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A dela Llanas(petitioner) petition for review on

certorari challenging the February 11, 2008 Decision

and the March 31, 2008 resolution

of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89163.


The Factual Antecedents
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car

along North Avenue, Quezon City.

His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at
the backseat.

Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few
seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the cars
rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the cars rear end collapsed and its
rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these
minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical
injuries.

The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It
stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.

Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the
name and style of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.

In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of
her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more
severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9,
2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her
condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the
compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical
therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llanas condition did not improve despite three months

of extensive physical therapy.

She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in
search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine
surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her
spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.

10

The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the

11

practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.

Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but

12

Rebecca refused to pay.

Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular
accident and claimed P150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and
an average monthly income of P30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral,
and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.

13

In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no
reasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llanas injury. She pointed
out that Dra. dela Llanas illness became manifest one month and one week from the date of the
vehicular accident. As a counterclaim, she demanded the payment of attorneys fees and costs of
the suit.

14

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness


witness.

15

and Joel as a hostile

16

Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To
prove her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000
issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash
injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations.

17

Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the trucks brakes got stuck.

18

In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met
several days after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed out that she required
Joel to submit a certification of good moral character as well as barangay, police, and NBI
clearances prior to his employment. She also stressed that she only hired Primero after he
successfully passed the driving skills test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a licensed drivermechanic.

19

Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he checked the truck in the morning of March
30, 2000. He affirmed that the truck was in good condition prior to the vehicular accident. He opined
that the cause of the vehicular accident was a damaged compressor. According to him, the absence

20

of air inside the tank damaged the compressor.

RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas
whiplash injury to be Joels reckless driving.

21

It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area.
It pointed out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was overspeeding. It maintained that Joel should have driven at a slower pace because road visibility
diminishes at night. He should have blown his horn and warned the car that his brake was stuck and
could have prevented the collision by swerving the truck off the road. It also concluded that Joel was
probably sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been driving for fifteen hours on that

fateful day. The RTC further declared that Joels negligence gave rise to the presumption that
Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in Joel's selection and
supervision of Joel. Rebecca was vicariously liable because she was the employer and she
personally chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the collision, she ordered him to deliver gravel
and sand to Muoz Market, Quezon City. The Court concluded that the three elements necessary to
establish Rebeccas liability were present: (1) that the employee was chosen by the employer,
personally or through another; (2) that the services were to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer had the authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of the employee
was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. The RTC thus awarded Dra.
dela Llana the amounts of P570,000.00 as actual damages, P250,000.00 as moral damages, and
the cost of the suit.

22

CA Ruling
In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana
failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury
by preponderance of evidence. Citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of Appeals,

23

it declared that

courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too
slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact in issue. It noted that the interval between the
date of the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness
was lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised doubts on whether Joels reckless driving and the
resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela Llanas injury. It also declared that courts cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It observed that Dra. dela Llana did
not immediately visit a hospital to check if she sustained internal injuries after the accident.
Moreover, her failure to present expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to the
medical certificate. The medical certificate did not explain how and why the vehicular accident

24

caused the injury.

The Petition
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court that Nutrimix is inapplicable in the present
case. She stresses that Nutrimix involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code,
provisions governing hidden defects. Furthermore, there was absolutely no evidence in Nutrimix that
showed that poisonous animal feeds were sold to the respondents in that case. As opposed to the
respondents in Nutrimix, Dra. dela Llana asserts that she has established by preponderance of
evidence that Joels egligent act was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury. First, pictures of
her damaged car show that the collision was strong. She posits that it can be reasonably inferred
from these pictures that the massive impact resulted in her whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla
categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from whiplash injury.
Third, her testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is credible because she was a
surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has probative value. Citing several cases,
she posits that an uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if uncontroverted.

25

She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely relates to matters of common
knowledge. She maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine the causation between
Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Trial judges are aware of the fact that whiplash
injuries are common in vehicular collisions.
The Respondents Position
In her Comment,

26

Rebecca points out that Dra. dela Llana raises a factual issue which is beyond

the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She maintains
that the CAs findings of fact are final and conclusive. Moreover, she stresses that Dra. dela Llanas
arguments are not substantial to merit this Courts consideration.
The Issue
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether Joels reckless driving is the proximate
cause of Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury.
Our Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious.

The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari when the
findings of fact by the lower courts are conflicting
The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule,
the CAs findings of fact are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. It is
not the function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We can only review the presented evidence, by way of
exception, when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the CA.

27

We see this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly examine the relevant evidence
presented before the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this
provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant
must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.

28

These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of
mutual duties that civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from non-contractual
relations of certain members of society to others.

29

Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the
three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebeccas liability as Joels employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.

30

Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then
proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.

31

Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an action
predicated on an employees act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held
liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee."

32

The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent
act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.

33

In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater
weight of credible evidence.

34

The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.

35

In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joels negligence and
Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of
evidence that Joels negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not
have occurred.

36

Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,

(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and


(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation
between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words,
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the
factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below.

37

A.
The pictures of the damaged
car only demonstrate the
impact of the collision
Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show that the massive impact of the
collision caused her whiplash injury. We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence that
these pictures show the causation grossly belies common logic. These pictures indeed demonstrate
the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that the whiplash injury can also
be inferred from these pictures.
B.
The medical certificate cannot be
considered because it was
not admitted in evidence
Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit "H" during trial, should not be considered in
resolving this case for the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC in an order dated
September 23, 2004.

38

Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution of the case. It is a
basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in
arriving at their judgments.
However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical
certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness
but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.

39

Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence

40

except in very unusual

circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not
be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.

41

During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified:


"Q: Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was the reason why you were feeling that pain in
your left arm?
A: Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate, she stated that my condition was due to a
compression of the nerve, which supplied my left arm and my left hand.
Court: By the way, what is the name of this physician, Dra.?
Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist. Atty.
Yusingco: You mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued a medical certificate. What
relation does this medical certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to do with that certificate, you said
was made by Dra. Milla?
Witness: This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made out for me.
Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit H.
Atty. Yusingco: What other medical services were done on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a result of that
feeling, that pain that you felt in your left arm?
Witness: Well, aside from the medications and physical therapy, a re-evaluation of my condition after
three months indicated that I needed surgery.
Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this surgery?
Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck, on my spine.

Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result of that surgical operation?
Witness: Well, the operation was to relieve the compression on my nerve, which did not resolve by
the extensive and prolonged physical therapy that I underwent for more than three
months."

42

(emphasis ours)

Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate.
However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify and affirm the
contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of the opportunity to crossexamine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings. We also point out in this respect that
the medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in fact between Joels
reckless driving and Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash
injury was a result of the vehicular accident. A perusal of the medical certificate shows that it only
attested to her medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering from whiplash injury. However, the
medical certificate failed to substantially relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llanas whiplash
injury. Rather, the medical certificate only chronicled
her medical history and physical examinations.
C.
Dra. dela Llanas opinion that
Joels negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as the plaintiff in this
quasi-delict case, was the lone physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified as an
ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in her testimony that Joels
reckless driving caused her whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and
even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to her opinion that Joels
reckless driving caused her whiplash injury without violating the rules on evidence. Under the Rules
of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and an expert witness. The
opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding:
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the witness
may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.

43

On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.

44

However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much
less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the
probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert's opinion.
Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by
demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic of
his conclusions is founded.

45

In the present case, Dra. dela Llanas medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the
reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not
competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we
emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on
the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.
The Supreme Court cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries.
Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial court shows that
Dra. Dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows
the causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela Llanas injury. Her claim that
Joels negligence causes her whiplash injury was not established because of the deficiency of the
presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice
that vehicular ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public knowledge, or is capable

of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial


functions.

46

We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges are only tasked to

apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties pieces of evidence and their corresponding
legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of evidence. While
we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the
case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llanas favor. Her claim, unsupported by prepondernace of
evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Admissibility of evidence
Kinds of Admissibility
A. Multiple Admissibility: when a material is asked by a party to be admitted as evidence, the
party presenting must inform the court of the purpose which the material is intended to serve
and the court then admits the material as evidence. Multiple admissibility may mean either (i)
the evidence is admissible for several purposes or (ii) an evidence is not admissible for one
purpose but may be admitted for a different purpose if it satisfies all the requirements of the
other purpose
1. Examples of the first concept: (a) a knife may be admitted to prove the accused was armed
with a deadly weapon; to prove the weapon is far deadlier than the weapon of the victim; to
prove it was the weapon of the accused which cause the wounds and not some other
instrument; to corroborate the statement of a witness who claims he saw the accused holding a
bladed instrument.
2. Example of the second concept: (a). the extra judicial confession of one of several accused
may not be admitted to prove there was conspiracy among them or to prove the guilt of the
other co-accused but it maybe admitted to prove the guilt of the confessant (b) the statement of
the victim may not be admitted as a dying declaration but as part of the res gestae.

B. Curative admissibility or fighting fire with fire or Opening the Door


1. This applies to a situation when improper evidence was allowed to be presented by one party,
then the other party may be allowed to introduce or present similar improper evidence but only
to cure or to counter the prejudicial effect of the opponents inadmissible evidence.
2. The party presenting must have raised an objection to the improper evidence, for if he did
not, then it is discretionary for the court to allow him to present curative evidence
3. The evidence sought to be countered should not refer to those which are incompetent due to
an exclusionary rule
4. Example: P vs. D for sum of money. P was allowed to introduce evidence that D did not pay
his debt as shown by his refusal to pay his indebtedness to X, Y and Z. Defendant may
introduce evidence that he paid his debts to A, B and C.

C. Conditional Admissibility: An evidence is allowed to be presented for the time being or


temporarily, subject to the condition that its relevancy or connection to other facts will later be
proven, or that the party later submit evidence that it meets certain requirements of the law or
rules. If the conditions are not later met, the evidence will be stricken from the record.
1. Example: A Xerox copy of a document may be allowed to presented subject to the condition
that the original be later presented
2. Example: P vs. D to recover a parcel of land. P presents a document that the land belonged
to X. If D objects to it as being irrelevant, P can state that he will alter show that X sold the land
to Y who in turn sold it to Z and then to P. The Court may admit the document conditionally.

Rule 128 Sec 3


Rule 128
Sec. 3.Admissibility of evidence. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and
is not excluded by the law of these rules. (3a)
Q: What elements should be present for an evidence to be admissible?
A: 1. The evidence is relevant
2. The evidence is not excluded by the rules (competent)
Distinguish admissibility from weight
A. Admissibility- the character or quality which any material must necessarily possess for it to be
accepted and allowed to be presented or introduced as evidence in court. It answers the
question: should the court allow the material to be used as evidence by the party?
B. Weight- the value given or significance or impact, or importance given to the material after it
has been admitted; its tendency to convince or persuade. Hence a particular evidence may be
admissible but it has no weight. Conversely, an evidence may be of great weight or importance
but it is not admissible.
Two Axioms of admissibility per Wigmore
Conditions for admissibility (Axioms of admissibility per Wigmore)
A. RELEVANCY (None but facts having rational probative value are admissible). Per section 4,
Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence.
1. The material presented as evidence must affect the issue or question. It must have a bearing
on the outcome of the case. It requires both:
a). rational or logical relevancy in that it has a connection to the issue and therefore it has a
tendency to establish the fact which it is offered to prove. The evidence must therefore have
probative value
b). legal relevancy in that the evidence is offered to prove a matter which has been properly put
in issue as determined by the pleadings in civil cases, or as fixed by the pre-trial order, or as
determined by substantive law. If so the matter has materiality.
Illustration: (i). Criminal case: the fact that the crime was committed at nighttime is rationally or
logically relevant to a killing at 12 midnight but evidence thereon would be not be legally
relevant if nighttime was not alleged in the Information. It would be immaterial. (ii) Civil Case: In
an action for sum of money based on a promissory note, evidence that the defendant was
misled into signing the note would be rationally relevant but if fraud was never alleged as a
defense, then evidence thereof would be legally irrelevant or immaterial.

The components of relevancy are therefore probative value and materiality.


2. Rule as to collateral matters: Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except
when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the facts
in issue
a). collateral matters-facts or matters which are not in issue. They are not generally allowed to
be proven except when relevant.
b) In criminal cases, the collateral matters allowed to be proven, being relevant include:
(i). Antecedent Circumstances, or those in existing even prior to the commission of the crime.
They include such matters as habit, custom, bad moral character when self defense is invoked;
or plan design, conspiracy, or premeditation, agreement to a price, promise or reward
(ii) Concomitant circumstances or those which accompany the commission of the crime such as
opportunity to do the act or incompatibility
(iii).Subsequent circumstances or those which occur after the commission of the crime, such as
flight, escape, concealment, offer of compromise
c). Example: Motive is generally irrelevant and proof thereof is not allowed except: when the
evidence is purely circumstantial, when there is doubt as to the identity of the accused, or when
it is an element of the crime.
B. COMPETENCY ( All facts having rational probative value are admissible unless some
specific law or rule forbids). In short the evidence is not excluded by law or rules.
When is evidence relevant?
When the evidence has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence.
Rule 128, Sec 4
Sec. 4.Relevancy; collateral matters. Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue. (4a)

Rino vs SSS, GR 132558 May 2000


Material evidence
When is evidence material?
Direct and Circumstantial Evidence
What are the requisites for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence?
People vs Escamilla 2013
People vs Rarugal 2013
People vs Canlas 2001
Espenel vs People 2014
People vs Asis 2002

Flight or Non-flight of the Accused


Non-Flight
Flight
People vs Nogra 2008
People vs Gulmatico 2007
People vs Hashim 201
Cumulative and Corroborative Evidence
Sec 22 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness
Positive and Negative Evidence
Liberal COnstruction of the Rules of Evidence
Waiver of the Rules of Evidence
Rule 130, Sec 34, Similar acts as evidence
Impeachment proceedings in the Philippines being sui generis
fruit of the poisonous tree
Sec2 of Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides
Collateral Matters
When is evidence on collateral matters allowed?
Distinguish admissible evidence from credible evidence?
Competency of a witness distinguish from credibility of witness
Judicial notice
People vs Tundag 2000
Spouses Latip vs CHua 2009
Saludo Jr vs American Express International 2006
Expert Travel vs CA and Korean Airlines 2005
Asian Terminals Inc vs Malayan Insurance 2011
Social Justice Society vs Hon Atienza 2008
processual presumption
How to prove foreign law?
Sec 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court

What are the material requisites on taking judicial notice?


Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co and/or Chemical Bank vs Rafael 2003
ATCI Overseas Corporation vs Ma. Josefa Echin 2010
A court may take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case
No judicial notice on post office practice on registered mail
Judicial Notice of Bank Practices
What are judicial admissions?
Rule 129, Sec 4 Judicial Admissions
Silot Jr vs De La Rosa 2008
Constantino vs COnstantino 2013
Admissions in the Pre-Trial of CIVIL CASE
Rule 18, Sec 7
Admissions in the Pre-Trial of CRIMINAL CASE
Sec 2, Rule 11
How about admission made or entered during the trial, does it require that it has to be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel
before the same can be used as evidence against the accused?
Admissions obtained through depositions, written interrogations or requests for
admission are also considered judicial admissions
Rule 26, Sec 1
Rule 26, Sec 2 - Implied admission
Rule 26, Sec 3 - Effects of admission
Admissions in Amended Pleadings
Admissions in Dismissed Pleadings
Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission
Bon vs People 2004
Hypothetical Admission in a Motion to Dismiss
Admission by Counsel
Consequences of Judicial Admission
Effects of Judicial Admission
Distinctions between Judicial admissions and Extrajudicial admissions

People vs Jorie Wahiman 2015

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