Maquilan vs Maquilan June 8, 2007

Facts:
1.) Spouses Maquilan were happily married until Virgilio discovered that Dita was having an
affair.
2.) He filed a complaint for adultery in which Dita and her paramour were found guilty.
3.) June 15 2001: Private respondent filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages. During pre-trial of
case, spouses created a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
4.) This is with regard to some particular properties that they either decided to divide between
them or give to their common child, Neil.
5.) Compromise agreement was given judicial imprimatur by respondent RTC Judge.
6.) Jan. 15, 2002: Petitioner files an Omnibus Motion saying that his lawyer did not
intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Agreement.
Respondent Judge denied Motion.
7.) Aug. 30, 2002: CA also dismissed petition for lack of merit.
8.) The conviction of the crime of adultery of Dita does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing
in the conjugal property.
9.) She was only sentenced with the penalty of prision correccional, without civil interdiction,
which would have deprived her of the right to manage her property.
10.) Since petition for declaration of nullity was not yet decided, it would be premature to apply
Art. 43 and 63 of FC (re: effects of nullified marriage or LS)
The spouses also VOLUNTARILY agreed to a separation of their property which was approved
of by law, in accordance with FC 134. It is the petitioner and his lawyers fault for not checking
nor objecting to this right away before it was approved of.
Main Issue: Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
HELD: YES. The court fully concurs with the CA
Ratio: Art. 134 of the FC says that separation of property may be effected and is subject to
judicial approval. In the case at bar, this was clearly allowed by the RTC so it holds.
Obiter: voluntary separation of property is subject to rights of all creditors of CPG and other
persons with pecuniary interest (Art 136 FC)
Re: Dita being a guilty spouse: the contention that the Compromise Agreement is
tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the
conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.

Conviction of adultery does NOT carry the accessory of civil interdiction, rendering the
agreement still valid, as opposed to what the petitioner believes. (Look at ratio of CA)
Again, the petitioner cannot use the excuse that he was misinformed by his previous counsel.
Negligence of the counsel binds the client. (Salonga vs. CA)
FC 135 cf. FC 55 (10)
FC 136,
FC 74-75, FC 134 L
Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914
Facts:
ATTY. LUNA,

a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the law firm Sycip Law Offices

at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he married in a civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the
Peace of Paraaque and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral
in San Miguel, Bulacan.

they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna,
Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna,
Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna.

After almost 2 decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed
to live apart from each other and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they
entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT", whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of
Dominican Republic.
o

on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with
SOLEDAD.

Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived
together as husband and wife until 1987.

ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named LUPSICON where ATTY. LUNA was the
managing partner.

LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma

Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Makati City. Said condominium unit was to be
used as law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed which was registered bearing the following names:

Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan
in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No.
21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
o

The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit
would be 25/100 share.

ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato
G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The
said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks,
office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY.
LUNAs son of the first marriage.
Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law
firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law
books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by
SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC.
o

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E.

ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON,
married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"

LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the
same was still registered in common.

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E.

ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R.
PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ
SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"

The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence
of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that
since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon
the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of pro-indiviso share consisting of her
share in the said properties plus her share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which
was bequeathed to her in the latters last will and testament; and that the heirs of
ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the
subject properties.

The RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts ruling that the 24/100
pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas
Luna through his sole industry; that Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces

Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

Both parties appealed to the CA.

The CA promulgated decision, holding and ruling EUGENIA, the first wife, was the
legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latters death on July 12, 1997. The absolute
divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his
prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction.

Issue:
whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the
latter to any rights in property.
Held:
The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court approval

Ratio:
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that
the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce
proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to
their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in
force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event
that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage.
Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of
termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court
was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial
order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be
decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply.
The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the
late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as
an incident of the action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the
action for divorce. With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law
for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was
not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.

Ugalde vs. Ysasi G.R. No. 13062, Feb. 29, 2008

Facts:
On February 15, 1951, Jon de Ysasi and Lorea de Ugalde married in civil law and on March 1,
1951, married in church law. They had a child but they separated in April 1957. On June 2, 1961,
they agreed to have their conjugal partnership dissolved as of April 15, 1957. The CFI approved
this Amicable Settlement on June 6, 1961. However, on May 26, 1964, Jon married Victoria
Eleanor Smith. Hence, on December 12, 1984, Lorea petitioned for the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership. Pending appeal in CA, a petition for Judicial Declaration of Nullity of their
Marriage was filed and granted on May 31, 1995 for lack of a marriage license. The Certification
of Nullity was issued on November 20, 1995. CA then decided affirmed RTC decision that no
conjugal partnership exists and that the Amicable Settlement was valid; it added that their
marriage was void, deciding without knowing about the earlier judgment on the nullity of their
marriage.
Issue as stated in the case: WON CA did not err in affirming RTC ruling that there is conjugal
partnership and that the Amicable Settlement is valid and in adding that their marriage is void
Held: CA and RTC did not err in ruling the nonexistence of a conjugal partnership because it has
already been dissolved by the Amicable Settlement which had been judicially approved, and it
also resulted from the subsequent declaration of nullity of their marriage. CA erred in adding the
decision that their marriage is void because such nullity had already been decided in a separate
case.
Issue concerning illegitimacy but not explicit in the case: WON their child is legitimate
Presumptive Held: No. As a consequence of the declaration of nullity of their marriage, their
child is illegitimate because the child was born outside of a valid marriage
Laperal v. Republic 116 Phil 672
Facts: Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria. They are now legally separated. Elisea wants
to resume the use of her maiden name. Petition was opposed by the City Attorney on the ground
that it violates Art. 372 of the CC and that is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The lower
court originally dismissed the petition but changed its mind and granted it on the ground that it
was merely for a change of name. It also reasoned that the use of the married name would give
rise to confusion in the womans finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Issue: WON a wife can use her maiden name after a decree of legal separation has been granted.
Held/Ratio: No. Legal Separation alone is not a ground for wifes change of name. Art 372
specifically mandates the wife to continue using name and surname employed before the legal
separation. Her marriage status is unaffected by the separation. Rule 103 (provision for a change
of name in general) does not prevail over the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
FC 63(4)
Solo Parents Act
FC 65-67
Valdes v. QC-RTC G.R. No. 122749 (July 31, 1996)
Facts: 1) Petition for review bewails on a question of law an alleged error committed by RTC
failed to apply correct law that should govern the disposition of family dwelling in a situation

where a marriage is declared ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or
both of the parties of the contract
2) January 5, 1971: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez married
3) 5 children
4) June 22, 1992: valdez sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Art 36 of
the FC
5) RTC declared marriage null and void
6) Consuelo Gomez sought for a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance
with Arts 50, 51 and 52 of the FC; she asserted that the FC contained no provisions on the
procedure for liquidation of common property in unions without marriage
RTC: clarification: considering that Art 147 of the FC explicitly provides that property acquired
by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have
been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares,
plaintiff and defendant will own their family home and all their other properties for that matter
in equal sharesprovisions on co-ownership will apply
7) Petitioner moved fore reconsideration of the order (issue regarding family dwelling) petition
denied
8) Appealed
DECISION OF SC: Trial court correctly applied the law; Questioned orders, dated May 5, 1995
and October 30, 1995 of the trial court are AFFIRMED.
REASONS:
1) in void marriages, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during
the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of art 147 or 148 such as the case may
be, of the Family Code Art 147 is the remake of Art 144 of the CC
2) this peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively lives together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage
3) under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly of said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family housedhold.
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couples separate property are not
included in the co-ownership
4) the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately a court which had jurisdiction to
declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve the
incidental and consequential matters

it did not commit error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the family home
and all their common property in equal shares as in concluding that in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them the provisions on coownership under the CC
not Arts 50, 51 and 52 in relation to arts 102 and 129 of the FC should aptly prevail--- these are
only for valid and voidable marriages (community and conjugal partnerships)
FC 50-53, FC 51 in rel to NCC 886, 888;
FC176
NCC 908, 1061
Sec. 21, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003 FC 4 cf. 45
San Luis vs. San Luis G.R. 133743 (February 2, 2007)
Facts: 1) Gov. contracted three marriages: a) Virginia Sulit (March 17, 1942) out of which were
born 6 children (Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita, and Manuel) in 1963 Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo
2) May 1, 1968: felicisimo married Merry Lee Cowin (American citizen) with whom he had a son
TobiasMerrly Lee filed complaint for divorce before the family court of the Court of First
Circuit of Hawaii which issued decree Granting absolute divorce and awarding child custody (dec
14, 1973)
3) June 20, 1974: felicisimo married felicidad San Luis (respondent) in Los Angeles, CA no
childrenlived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on dec 18,
1992
4) Respondent sought dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and settlement of
felicisimos estatefiled petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati
5) Respondent alleged that she is the widow of felicisimo that the decedents surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage and son by second marriage
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be
issued to her
6) Feb 4, 1994: petitioner Rodolfo San Luis child of felicisimo in the first marriage filed motion
to dismissgrounds: improper venue to state a cause of actionshould have been filed in the
province of laguna because this was the place f residence of felicisimo prior to his death; claimed
further that respondent has no legal personality to file petition since she was only a mistress of
felicisimo since the latter during the time of his death was still legally married to Merry Lee
7) Feb 15, 1994: Linda invoked the same grounds
8) Feb 28, 1994: RTC issued an order denying the motions
9) Unaware of the denial of motions to dismiss: respondent filed (Mar 5, 1994) opposition
submitted documentary evidence that felicisimo regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang, villahe, Alabang MM; presented absolute divorce decree issued by court n Hawaii to
prove that second marriage was dissolvedclaims felicisimo has legal capacity to marry her

10) Petitioners asserted that par 2 art 26 of FC cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondents bigamous marriage with felicisimo since this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Art 256 of the FC
11) Oct 24, 1994: motion for reconsideration was dismissedrespondent, as widow of decedent
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that the venue was properly laid
TC: dismissed the petition for letters of administration;
1) Felicisimo was duly elected gov of laguna petition must have been filed in sta cruz laguna 2)
Because marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous thus void ab initio (divorce obtained by merry
lee not valid in the Phils)
3) Art 26 par 2 cannot be retroactively applied for it would impair the vested rights of felicisimos
legitimate children
CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE orders of the trial court
- Said that term residence refers to actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicilesince he actually resided in Alabang Muntinlupa even though
he is discharging his functions in lagunathus the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati
- Held that felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of Art 26 par 2 of the FC
(Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr) and Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera)
- Found that marriage between Merry Lee and felicisimo was validly dissolved by virtue of
decree of absolute divorce (not a bigamous marriagecourts cannot deny what the law grants)
ISSUES:
1) Whether venue was properly laid
2) Whether respondent has the legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration
DECISION OF SC: Petition lacks Merit.; Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA reinstating
and affirming the RTC which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its order which dismissed
petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIMRED. Case REMANDED to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and felicisimo - Found that respondents legal capacity to file subject petition for
letter of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of felicisimo or as his coowner under Art 144 of the CC or Art 148 of the FC
REASONS: 1) Section1 Rule 73 of rules of courtpetition for letters of administration should
be filed in the RTC of the province in which he resides at the time of his deathrule for
determining residence (Garcia Fule vs CA) contradistinguised from domicile
2) Residence or residespopular sense, meaning, the personal actual or physical habitation of a
person, signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereatmeans simply residence,
personal residence not legal residence or domicile no particular length of time required,
however, residence must be more than temporary
3) Incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence is the same as domicile for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of the estate of felicisimothis is often used in election laws

4) Since respondent proved that deceased also maintained a residence in Alabang Muntinlupa
from 1982 up to the time of his deathsubject petition was validly filed before the RTC of
Makati
5) LEGAL PERSONALITY: issue: whether the fil was divorced by his alien spouse abroad and
may validly remarry under the CC marriage solemnized before the FC took effectno need to
retroactively apply art 26 but use the sufficient jurisprudential basis affirmativePilapil vs.
Ibay-Somera; Quita vs CA, Van Dorn vs. Romillo JR.
6) Historical background and legislative intent behind art 26 par 2
7) Van dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of Art 26 par 2 of the FC thereof our lawmakers
codified the already established through judicial precedent--8) the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice
are to be served
9) The law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within
the legislative intent. An indispensable part of the intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature is to RENDER JUSTICE
10) Proof of authenticity and due execution of documents must be presented --- public document
requirements: a) an official publication; b) copy attested thereof by the officer having legal
custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Phils copy must be: a) accompanied by certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Phil foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and b) authenticated by the seal of his office
11) Present; validity of divorce
12) Even if felicisimo is not capacitated to remarry, respondent still has legal capacity she may
be considered the co-owner of felicisimo as regards properties that were acquired through their
joint efforts during their cohabitation
NOTE: IF she proves validity of divorce and capacity to remarry bu felicisimo but fails to prove
that their marriage was validly performed according to law of the USconsidered co-owner in
Art 144 of the CCparties living together without benefit of marriage or void from the beginning
co-ownership If fails to prove the validity of both divorce and marriageapplicable art would be
Art 148 of FC regulating property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but
are incapacitated to remarryregime of limited co-ownership
Gonzales vs Gonzales 478 SCRA 327
Facts: Before they started living together on March 1977, Francisco Gonzales offered Erminda
Gonzales to be his partner in Fiesta Pizza, his pizza business, and to take over its operations. She
accepted the offer and took care of the business daily operations, personnel management, outlets
supervision, and met people during inspections.
Despite their marriage on Feb. 4, 1979, the same was declared void under FC 36 on Feb.
12, 1997. Erminda then sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and claimed

the pizza business to be conjugal property where she contributed to 80% of the total
management. Francisco, however, claimed that it was exclusive.
Issue: WON properties should be divided equally between husband and wife
Held: YES because the marriage was declared void, the property regime that applies is coownership under FC 147. Under the rules of coownership, properties acquired by both parties
during their union (under a void marriage) are presumed to have been obtained through joint
efforts and will be owned by them in equal shares absent proof of the contrary. Francisco
admitted in a handwritten letter dated Sept. 6, 1989 that Erminda had helped in the management
of the business and was not a mere housewife. Hence, the business is coowned and both
Francisco and Erminda are presumed to have contributed jointly.
Art 147 applies when 1) when man and woman capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other without benefit of marriage (2) when man and woman live
together under void marriage
o Presumption is anything acquired during both instances are obtained through
joint efforts and shall be divided equally.
Party who didnt participate in acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in acquisition if formers efforts consisted of care and maintenance of family
and household.
FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 49(2) and FC 50
Bienvenido vs. Court of Appeals 237 SCRA 676 (October 24, 1994)
Facts:
Deceased Aurelio Camacho married Luisita Camacho while still married to Consejo
Velasco. He then had another relationship with Nenita Bienvenido with whom he bought
a house on Delgado St where they have been leaving for the past 14 years

Upon death of Aurelio Camacho, Luisita is contending that house belongs to her since it
is conjugal property.
ISSUE: WON Luisita has rights to property
HELD: NO
Art 83 of Civil Code provides that if person has been absent for seven years the absent
spouse is presumed to be dead
o However cannot be invoked in this case since it was Aurelio who actually left
Luisita.
First exception refers to subsequent marriage of abandoned spouse and
not remarriage of deserting spouse
o Art. 739(1) of the Civil Code declares donations made between persons who are
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation to be void
can only be brought by the innocent spouse, perhaps in this case by the
first wife, but certainly not by Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio is itself
void. The last paragraph of Art. 739 clearly provides:
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of
nullify may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and

the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by

preponderance of evidence in the same action.
until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be
presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced by a deed of absolute sale 7 . It
was error for the Court of Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one
whose marriage to the seller is void.

RESULT: Property belongs to Nenita Bienvenido who properly showed she paid for house with
Aurelio. Armas vs Cali
Agapay vs Agapay 276 SCRA 340
Facts:
Miguel Palang married Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol on July 16, 1949

October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii

as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii

July 15, 1973 Miguel married with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay

May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, jointly purchased a parcel of rice land. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 101736 issued in their names

September 23, 1975 Erlinda allegedly purchased a house and lot and title was issued in
her name

October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein
agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only
child, Herminia Palang
1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two
years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died

July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein
private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages of the house and lot together with the riceland
Issue: Who is the owner of the two pieces of property
Held: Carlina, the first wife:
Under FC Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by this provision since it for relationships that have legal
impediments
o Art 147 is the law that recognizes relationships without legal impediment and
proof of care and maintenance of family and household equates to joint effort.
Erlinda failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to buy the subject
Riceland hence the riceland reverts to the first marriage
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on
September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years oldhowever the notary testified that the
property was purchased by Miguel but put in the name of Erlinda- the transaction was
essentially a void donation
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations
between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage

Compromise agreement entered into by Carliana and late Miguel is not a separation of property
and should not be inferred as such. NO LIQUIDATION WAS MADE.
Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez G.R. No. 137650, Apr 12, 2000
Facts:
Spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building and that they
had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the
last seven (7) years, since 1989 without the payment of any rent. They agreed that after a
few months guillerma tumlos would start paying rent but she failed to pay after repeated
demands. They prayed that defendants be ejected
Guillerma Tumlos averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action
against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to
Sell wherein it was stated that she is a covendee of the property in question together with
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez
Defendants alleged Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and
that they acquired the property in question as their love nest
Guillerma administered the property, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to
the annulment of his marriage. It was also during the early part of 1996 when Mario
accused her of being unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless jealousy
Petitioners central theory and main defense against respondents action for ejectment is
her claim of coownership over the property with Respondent Mario Fernandez. At the
first instance before the MTC, she presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his
spouse
CA rejected petitioners claim that she and Respondent Mario Fernandez were co-owners
of the disputed property
Issue:
A. Is the petitioner a co-owner of the property?
B. Can the claim for support bar this ejectment suit?
Held:
the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family
Code which provides
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman
who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the
parties is void from the beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to
adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a coownership where there
exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his
lawful wife
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by petitioner
herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry
petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as
readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage.
Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, [21] only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and

corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
o "If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
coownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article." The foregoing rules on forfeiture
shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith
Petitioners argument -- that the Family Code is inapplicable because the cohabitation
and the acquisition of the property occurred before its effectivity -- deserves scant
consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself states that it can be applied retroactively
if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. In this case, petitioner failed to show
any vested right over the property in question. Moreover, to resolve similar issues, we
have applied Article 148 of the Family Code retroactively Petitioner failed to present any
evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. She
anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario
Fernandez

Malilin vs Castillo 333 SCRA 628

Facts:
Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership
Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo
petitioner and respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their
respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their
respective marriages still subsisted.
during their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs brokerage corporation and also
acquired properties which were registered solely in Elviras name.
In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded
from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that
said properties had been registered solely in her name.
She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the fact was that
they were still legally married to their respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive
owner of all real and personal properties involved in petitioners action for partition on
the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in
her name.
RTC dismissed case. It also ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties actually lived
together as husband and wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code can not be made to
apply to them as they were both incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, it was
impossible for a coownership to exist between them.
CA granted respondents motion. It said in its decision that the desired declaration of coownership and eventual partition will utterly be an indirect or collateral attack on the
subject titles in this suit. Verily, plaintiff-appellant should have first pursued such remedy
or any other relief directly attacking the subject titles before instituting the present
partition suit. Apropos, the case at bench appears to have been prematurely filed.

ISSUE: Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or payment of co-ownership share,
accounting and damages, considering that plaintiff and defendant are admittedly both
married to their respective spouses under still valid and subsisting marriages, even
assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that they lived together as husband and wife without

benefit of marriage? In other words, can the parties be considered as co-owners of the
properties, under the law, considering the present status of the parties as both married and
incapable of marrying each other, even assuming that they lived together as husband and
wife (?)

HELD: Yes
Article 148 shall apply in this case. If the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership
even though the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
Petitioner sought partition of real properties and a substantial amount of personal
properties consisting of motor vehicles and several pieces of jewelry. By dismissing
petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, the appellate
court unwittingly denied petitioner his right to prove ownership over the claimed real and
personal properties. The amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 7, 1998, is
REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Makati City for further proceedings on the merits.

Villanueva vs CA 427 SCRA 439

FACTS:
Oct 7, 1926 - Plaintiff Eusebia is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas 5 children During
their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandue
City and Consolacion (22 properties)
Nicolas is co-owner of a parcel of land in Mandaue which he inherited from his parents
as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately 8 parcels of land in
Mandaue City > earns income (Nicolas only one to receive)
1945: Nicolas no longer lived with legitimate family and cohabited with Pacita (1
illegitimate son)
Pacita has no occupation, no properties of her own
1985: Nicolas suffered a stroke
1985-present: Illegitimate child Procopio has been receiving the income of said
properties
Defendants asked for settlement but no such thing was reached
RTC judgment in favor of respondents (legit family)
Art. 116 (presumption) > Eusebia presented solid evidence, petitioners failed to meet
standard proof required to maintain their claim that the subject properties are paraphernal
properties of Nicolas
Appeal was made
Eusebia died on 1996 > heirs substituted
1996: Pacita and Nicolas married
CA affirmed RTC decision
ISSUES: WON subject properties are conjugal
HELD: YES
Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between
Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of FC (Art. 105)

Under FC, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they
are conjugal
Burden of proof > party claiming that they are not conjugal
Subject properties were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia
Tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Art. 116
Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of one of
the spouses
No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of conjugal property
(intent of Nicolas in misrepresenting himself as single in deeds of sale was to exclude
Eusebia)
Cohabitation of a spouse with another person does not sever the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage
Petition Denied

Atienza vs.de Castro G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006

Facts:
Lupo Atienza hired De Castro as accountant for his two corporations (Enrico Shipping
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation) in 1983
Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo being a married man! They lived
together in the later part of 1983. They had 2 children, after the second child they parted
ways.
Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for a judicial partition of a land between
them in the Bel-Air subdivision
Lupo said Yolanda bought the said property with his own funds.
Yolanda on the otherhand said she bought it with her own funds.
Trial Court said that the contested property is owned common by him and Yolanda and
ordered the partition into two equal parts.
CA reversed the TC! Saying that it was the exclusive property of Yolanda.
Issues: WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda
Held: Yes
Ratio: Since they are not capacitated to marry each other in their cohabitation, FC 148 applies.
Under this regime only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their contributions. Absent of proof of
contribution, it shall be presumed to be equal. He did not show any evidence that he contributed
in the parcel of land while the accountant showed bank accounts which apparently shows that she
was capacitated to buy the said land.
evidence of De Castro: job as accountant and businesswoman engaged in foreign
currency trading, money lending, and jewelry retail, promisorry notes of dealings with
clients, bank account statements, and business transactions = had financial capacity
On the other hand Atienza merely provided evidence that Yolanda had no such sufficient funds
and didnt provide for evidence regarding his own capacity to pay for such property
Borromeo vs Descallar GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009
Facts:

1) Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983. In 1984, he met respondent
Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St.
Moritz Hotel. Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together.
2) In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 19851 and March 10, 19862 and A Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 covering the properties in Agro-Macro Subdivision,
Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers.
3) However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of
Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. Thus they erased Jambrichs name from the document only
retaining his signature in certain areas.
4) Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons.
5) April 1991, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another
woman in Danao City.
6) Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. In 1989, Jambrich purchased
an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the
latter for about P150,000.00. To pay the debt he sold his rights to the Agro-Macro properties to
the petitioner.
7) On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that
titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject
property has already been mortgaged.
8) On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real
property before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that the deed of sale issued for the property in
favor of the respondent do not reflect the true agreement of the parties, the latter having paid
nothing for the said properties.
9) Respondent denies the allegation citing that she had paid for the property solely and
exclusively using the money from her copra business.
10) RTC rules for the petitioner (Borromeo) citing the proofs presented on the earning capacity of
Jambrich at the time the property was purchased over the supposed earnings of the respondent
from her Copra business (which were markedly fictional since the respondent was still working
as a waitress for P1000 a month at the time of the purchase of the properties.
11) April 10, 2002 Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA sides w/ respondent citing:
In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name
of defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title
thereto. Ministries v. Sebastian.
Issues: WON Respondent has a right over the said property.
Held: NO, it was proven in the RTC trial that the properties in question were in fact purchased
from the exclusive funds of Wilhelm Jambrich who at the time of acquisition had sufficient
income compared to the waitress wages of the respondent. As such the purchase of the property
could clearly be attributed Janbrich and subsequently to the petitioner. Furthermore the vice of
alienage plaguing the sale of the property to Jambrich was in fact cured by the transfer of the
property to the petitioner who is a Filipino citizen citing the case United Church Board for World
Heirs of Maramag v. De Guzman G.R. 181132
FACTS:
Petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag, while, the
defendants were the illegitimate family of Loreto

Petitioner alleged that Eva de Guzman Maramag, concubine of Loreto, and the
illegitimate children, Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie, are disqualified to receive
the proceeds from Loretos insurance policies, both from Insular Life Assurance
Company (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife)
In answer, Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and
Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children
Insular already disqualified Eva as beneficiary and divided the proceeds among the
illegitimate children
Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the
illegitimate children as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of Insurance Code
Grepalife, on the other hand, alleged that Eva was not designated as beneficiary in the
insurance policy and that the claims filed by the illegitimate children were denied due to
Loretos misrepresentation in his application form
The Court declared the illegitimate family in default after failing to submit their answer
In a comment, petitioner alleged that the designation of a beneficiary is an act of
liberality or a donation, which is subject to the provisions of Arts 752 [8] and 772 [9] of
the Civil Code
In reply, both the insurance companies countered that the insurance proceeds belong
exclusively to the designated beneficiaries in the policies, not to the estate or to the heirs
of the insured
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss incorporated in the answer of the insurance
companies with respect to the illegitimate children, but the action shall proceed with
respect to Eva and the insurance companies
According to the trial court, principal law on insurance is the Insurance Code and in case
of deficiency in the Insurance Code, the Civil Code may be resorted to
Regarding to whom the insurance proceeds shall be paid, Section 53 of the Insurance
Code states that the insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest
of the person in whose name of for whose benefit is made, unless specified in the policy.
No evidence was shown that the plaintiffs were included as beneficiaries. This is because
the beneficiary has a vested right to the indemnity, unless the insured reserves the right to
change the beneficiary
The law on donations cannot also be invoked because the beneficiary in the contract of
insurance is not the donee under the law of donation.
With regard to Eva, any person is forbidden from receiving any donation under art 739
cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot make
any donation to him, as stated in art 2012 of the Civil code
Since the designation of Eva as one of the beneficiaries is void under art 739 of the Civil
Code, the insurance proceeds should go to the legal heirs of the deceased
Insular and Grepalife filed their respective motions for reconsideration, while the
petitioners reiterated their earlier arguments
The Court granted the motions of Insular and Grepalife
The Court ruled that the entire proceeds would be paid to the illegitimate children
pursuant to Sec 53 of the Inurance Code and only in cases where there are no
beneficiaries designated, or when the only designated beneficiary is disqualified, that the
proceeds should be paid to the estate of the insured
As to the claim that the proceeds to be paid to the illegitimate children should be reduced
based on the rules on legitime, the trial court held that the distribution of the insurance
proceeds is governed primarily by the Insurance Code
The trial court, with respect to Grepalife, dismissed the case as to the illegitimate
children

 Petitioners appealed to the CA but dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction

Petitioners elevated the matter to the SC
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the legitimate family are entitled to the proceeds of the
insurance for the concubine
HELD: The legitimate family are not entitle to the proceeds
According to the court, although they are the legitimate heirs, they were not named as
beneficiaries in the insurance policies
Petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Art 2011 of the Civil Code
which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by specials laws
According to Sec 53 of the Insurance Code, the only people entitled to claim the
insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is
already deceased
The exception to the rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to
benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations
or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from he insurer
The revocation of Eva as beneficiary in one policy, and her disqualification in the other
are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as
beneficiaries remains valid
No legal prescription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships
by the insured, the shares of Eva, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition
on donations under art 739 of the CC or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on
the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated
beneficiaries
It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance
policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan
Facts:
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre was
outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sallys father
was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a purported
marriage contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against
Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as
non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage license
allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally was not
authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the alleged
marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with the essential
requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak of.
Tambuyat v. Tambuyat G.R. No. 202805, 23 March 2015
Facts:
Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom Tambuyat were married on
September 16, 1965.
During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700 sq. m.
parcel of land located at Brgy. Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which was bought
on November 17, 1991. The Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano alone as vendee.
One of the signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario Banguis Tambuyat, who signed
therein as Rosario Tambuyat. All this time petitioner Banguis remained married to
Eduardo Nolasco.
When TCT covering the subject property was issued, it was made under the name of
Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.
When Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation
of the subject TCT. She alleged that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano. That the
TCT was erroneously registered and made in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married
to Rosario E. Banguis. That per annexed marriage contract, Banguis was still married to
Nolasco. Wenifreda prayed that the TCT be cancelled. That a new certificate of title be
made out in Adrianos name, with her as the spouse indicated, and that Banguis be
ordered to surrender her copy of TCT.
On her defense, Banguis claimed that she and Adriano were married on Sept. 2, 1988,
and thereafter lived together as married couple; that their union produced a son; and that
the trial court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation, which is merely a
summary proceeding considering that a thorough determination will have to be made as
to whether the property is conjugal or exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have
a child whose rights will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case.
The RTC decided in favor of Wenifreda and directed the RD of Meycauayan to cancel the
TCT of Banguis and in lieu thereof to issue a new certificate of title in the name of
Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Wenifreda Winnie Balcom Tambuyat. RTC justified
its decision by using Sec. 108 of PD 1529 which states: court authorization is required
for any alteration or amendment of a certificate of title when any error, omission or
mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any
duplicate certificate, or when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration
of the title.
The CA sustained the trial courts decision, noting that Banguis name was included in
the TCT by error or mistake. It held that the evidence adduced proved that Wenifreda
and not Banguis is the lawful wife of Adriano; that there is a valid and subsisting
marriage between Nolasco and Banguis, and the latter admitted to such fact during the
course of the proceedings in the trial court; and that Banguiss opposition to Wenifredas
petition for cancellation of TCT is not real and genuine as to place the latters title to the
subject property in doubt.
Issue: Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be granted by the court.
Held: YES

Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment
of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances, included are (1) when any
error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum
thereon or on any duplicate certificate and (2) when there is reasonable ground for the
amendment or alteration of title. The present case falls under the two instances because
the RD of Bulacan committed and error in issuing the disputed TCT, in the name of
Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis when, in truth and in fact,
respondent Wenifreda and not Banguis is Adrianos lawful spouse. As correctly ruled
by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is
the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were
husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common law
relationship at all.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to
the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it is true that our laws do not just brush
aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a
community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case
law to the effect that such form of co ownership requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. that the provisions of
the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when
referring to a spouse contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.

Fullido vs. Grilli

Facts:
Ginno Grilli, an Italian national, met Rebecca in Bohol and courted her. To build a residential
house where he can stay during his visits in the Philippines, Gino helped Rebecca buy for her
parents a lot located in Dauis, Bohol; the lot was eventually registered in her name under TCT
No. 30626, and a house was constructed thereon where Gino and Rebecca maintained their
common-law relationship. In 1998, Gino and Rebecca executed a contract of lease, a
memorandum of agreement, and a special power of attorney to define their respective rights over
the property. Under their agreements, Gino as lessee, would rent the lot for a period of 50 years,
to be automatically renewed fro another 50 years upon its expiration, for the amount of
P10,000.00 for the whole term of the lease, and Rebecca as the lessor is prohibited from selling,
donating, or encumbering the lot without the consent of Gino. The MOA on the other hand stated
that Gino owned the house and lot, and that should their common-law relationship be terminated,
Rebecca could only sell the lot to whomever Gino so desired. The SPA on the other hand allowed
Gino to administer, manage and transfer the lot in favour of Rebecca.
At first, their relationship were harmonious; however, it soon turned sour, both charging each
other with infidelity. They could not agree on who should manage the property. Gino thus sent
Rebecca notice to vacate. Gino later filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rebecca
before the MCTC. In his complaint, Gino alleged that their relationship turned sour when she
gave birth to a child which she alleged was Ginos child. Gino doubted it as the childs features

clearly did not resemble him. Rebecca later admitted that it was not her child. Because of this,
Gino allowed him to stay in one of the rooms, but did not demand rent. After a year, Rebecca
became more hostile; allowing her relatives to stay in the house, necessitating repairs every time
he comes back to the Philippines; since he could not tolerate anymore Rebeccas hostility, he
decided to file the complaint. Rebecca on the other hand alleged that their common-law
relationship lasted for 18 years when Gino found a younger woman. He then began to harass her
and physically hurt her. When she refused to leave their house, Gino again harassed, intimidated
and threatened to hurt her, forcing her to file a petition for issuance of temporary restraining order
and PPO under RA 9262 against him. The RTC granted her petition and ordered Gino excluded
from the property.
The MCTC ruled in favour of Rebecca, dismissing the case. Ginos appeal to the RTC was
granted. The RTC was of the view that Grilli had the exclusive right to use and possess the house
and lot by virtue of the contract of lease executed by the parties. Since the period of lease had not
yet expired, Fullido, as lessor, had the obligation to respect the peaceful and adequate enjoyment
of the leased premises by Grilli as lessee. The RTC opined that absent a judicial declaration of
nullity of the contract of lease, its terms and conditions were valid and binding. As to the TPO,
the RTC held that the same had no bearing in the present case which merely involved the
possession of the leased property.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling, emphasizing that in an ejectment case, the only issue to be
resolved would be the physical possession of the property. The CA was also of the view that as
Fullido executed both the MOA and the contract of lease, which gave Grilli the possession and
use of the house and lot, the same constituted as a judicial admission that it was Grilli who had
the better right of physical possession. The CA stressed that, if Fullido would insist that the said
documents were voidable as her consent was vitiated, then she must institute a separate action for
annulment of contracts. Lastly, the CA stated that the TPO issued by the RTC-Branch 3 under
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262 was without prejudice to any other action that might be filed by the
parties.
Rebecca elevated her case to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Rebecca may be ejected from the property.
Held: The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully
withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The
only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. 1
In this case, Fullido chiefly asserts that Grilli had no right to institute the action for unlawful
detainer because the lease contract and the MOA, which allegedly gave him the right of
possession over the lot, were null and void for violating the Constitution. Contrary to the findings
of the CA,Fullido was not only asserting that the said contracts were merely voidable, but
she was consistently invoking that the same were completely void.2 Grilli, on the other hand,
contends that Fullido could not question the validity of the said contracts in the present ejectment
suit unless she instituted a separate action for annulment of contracts. Thus, the Court is

confronted with the issue of whether a contract could be declared void in a summary action of
unlawful detainer.
Under the circumstances of the case, the Court answers in the affirmative.
A void contract cannot be
the source of any right; it
cannot be utilized in an
ejectment suit
A void or inexistent contract may be defined as one which lacks, absolutely either in fact or in
law, one or some of the elements which are essential for its validity.3 It is one which has no force
and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into; it produces no effect
whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone. 4 Quod nullum est nullum producit effectum.
Article 1409 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that void contracts also cannot be ratified;
neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. 5 Accordingly, there is no need
for an action to set aside a void or inexistent contract 6.
A review of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that the Court did not hesitate to set aside a void
contract even in an action for unlawful detainer. In Spouses Alcantara v. Nido,7 which involves an
action for unlawful detainer, the petitioners therein raised a defense that the subject land was
already sold to them by the agent of the owner. The Court rejected their defense and held that the
contract of sale was void because the agent did not have the written authority of the owner to sell
the subject land.
Similarly, in Roberts v. Papio,8 a case of unlawful detainer, the Court declared that the defense of
ownership by the respondent therein was untenable. The contract of sale invoked by the latter was
void because the agent did not have the written authority of the owner. A void contract produces
no effect either against or in favor of anyone.
In Ballesteros v. Abion,9 which also involves an action for unlawful detainer, the Court
disallowed the defense of ownership of the respondent therein because the seller in their contract
of sale was not the owner of the subject property. For lacking an object, the said contract of sale
was void ab initio.
Clearly, contracts may be declared void even in a summary action for unlawful detainer because,
precisely, void contracts do not produce legal effect and cannot be the source of any rights. To
emphasize, void contracts may not be invoked as a valid action or defense in any court
proceeding, including an ejectment suit. The next issue that must be resolved by the Court is
whether the assailed lease contract and MOA are null and void

CHEESMAN vs. IAC 193 SCRA 93

FACTS:
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been
separated since February 15, 1981.
On June 4, 1974, a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights was executed by Armando
Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house in favor of Criselda P.
Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman, and residing at Lot No.
1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City .
Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to
his wife.
Thereafter, tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda
Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property,
leasing it to tenants. This happened without any protest from Thomas.

 Criselda sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Cheesman.
The deed described Criselda as being of legal age, married to an American citizen...
Subsequently, Thomas filed a suit in the CFI against Criselda and Estelita Padilla, praying for the
annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his
knowledge and consent.
During the Pre-trial, the sale was declared void ab initio and the the delivery of the property to
Thomas as administrator of the conjugal partnership property was ordered.
However, the judgment was set aside on a petition for relief filed by the Estrellita, grounded on
"fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which had seriously impaired her right to present
her case adequately. Estelita Padilla filed a supplemental pleading as her own answer to the
complaint and a motion for summary judgment.
The Trial Court found that
o The evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption that all property
of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership and that the immovable in question was
in truth Criseldas paraphernal property;
o The legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply because the husband-plaintiff is an
American citizen and therefore disqualified under the Constitution to acquire and own real
properties; and
o The exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge of her husband
had led Estelita to believe that the properties were the exclusive properties of Criselda and
on the faith of such a belief she bought the properties from her and for value and therefore,
Thomas was estopped to impugn the transfer.
Thomas appealed the judgment, as well as the act of the Trial Court of granting Estelitas
petition for relief and its resolution of matters not subject of said petition. IAC affirmed the
Summary Judgment and found no reversible error. Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Thomas correctly availed of the remedy of appeal to SC? NO
[COMMENTO: Were familiar with the Persons related issue The foreigner husband has no
capacity or personality to question the sale of the property because it would be an indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. Aliens are prohibited from acquiring lands of the
public domain.]
RULING: An order of the CFI granting a petition for relief under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is
not appealable.
QUESTION OF FACT vs. QUESTION OF LAW: The conclusions made by the trial court

were derived from evidence adduced by the parties, the facts set out in the pleadings or
otherwise appearing on recordare conclusions or findings of fact. As distinguished from a
QUESTION OF LAWwhich exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts" "there is a QUESTION OF FACT when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when the "query
necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation; to each
other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation."
The RULE is that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the
review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to the Supreme Court.
The appellate jurisdiction of the SC is limited to reviewing errors of law, accepting as conclusive
the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence.

 CA was created precisely to take away from the SC the work of examining the evidence, and

confine its task to the determination of questions which do not call for the reading and study of
transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses.
The rule of conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the CA is subject to certain
exceptions. However, none of which is present in the case at bar.
Both the Trial Court and the IAC reached the same conclusions on the 3 factual matters, after
assessment of the evidence and determination of the probative value thereof and these
determinations will not be disturbed.
o The facts on record adequately proved fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which
Estelita Padilla's rights had been substantially impaired; that the funds used by Criselda
Cheesman was money she had earned and saved prior to her marriage to Thomas Cheesman,
and that Estelita Padilla did believe in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the sole owner
of the property in question.
An order of a CFI granting a petition for relief under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is
NOT appealable. The failure of the party who opposed the petition to appeal from said
order, or his participation in the proceedings subsequently had, cannot be construed as a
waiver of his objection to the petition for relief so as to preclude his raising the same
question on appeal from the judgment on the merits of the main case.
Such a party need not repeat his objections to the petition for relief, or perform any act
thereafter in order to preserve his right to question the same eventually, on appeal, it being
sufficient for this purpose that he has made of record "the action which he desires the court to
take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor."
The prayer in a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is not necessarily the same
prayer in the petitioner's complaint, answer or other basic pleading. Once a petition for relief
is granted and the judgment subject thereof set aside, and further proceedings are thereafter
had, the Court in its judgment on the merits may properly grant the relief sought in the
petitioner's basic pleadings, although different from that stated in his petition for relief.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
Frenzel vs. Catito G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
Facts:
Alfred (Australian, German descent) pilot with New Guinea airlines. Started business in
Philippines in 1974 and married Teresita Santos (Fil). They separated without divorce in
1981.
1983 He met Ederlina Catito (Fil) a masseuse in Australia. Unknown to him she is
married to Klaus Muller (German) and lived in Germany for a while. She is fluent in
German and Alfred enjoyed talking to her.
Alfred offered Ederlina to stay in Phil and engage in business. She put up a beauty parlor.
Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina. They acquired
properties in the name of Ederlina which Alfred consented to since he plans on marrying
Ederlina. Klaus wrote Alfred about his marriage with Ederlina and begged Alfred to
return Ederlina. When Alfred confronted Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were
married but she assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus. He agreed to continue the
amorous relationship and wait for the outcome of Ederlinas petition for divorce. Alfred
hired the lawyer. Alfred acquired more properties in the name of Ederlina. Ederlinas
petition for divorce was denied because Klaus opposed the same. A second petition filed
by her met the same fate. Klaus wanted half of all the properties owned by Ederlina in the

Philippines before he would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a bigamy
case against Ederlina
Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. He demanded the return of all the
properties acquired by him and Ederlina during their coverture.
Alfred filed a Complaint on October 28, 1985 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, for recovery of real and personal properties located in Quezon City and Manila. For
Ederlina transfered funds from their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own
account without his knowledge and consent. Using the said funds, Ederlina was able to
purchase the properties subject of the complaints. He also alleged that the beauty parlor
in Ermita was established with his own funds, and that the Quezon City property was
likewise acquired by him with his personal funds.
Alfred also filed a complaint against Ederlina with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City,
for specific performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal properties, sum of
money, and damages. (RTC Davao in favor of Ederlina, case dismissed)
RTC of QC: the purchaser of land is Ederlina (Alfred as an alien was precluded from
recovering the properties from the respondent)
CA: upheld RTC (the petitioner knowingly violated the Constitution; hence, was barred
from recovering the money used in the purchase of the three parcels of land. It held that
to allow the petitioner to recover the money used for the purchase of the properties would
embolden aliens to violate the Constitution, and defeat, rather than enhance, the public
policy)
Pertinent Issues: whether or not the land belongs to Alfred
Held/Ratio - No. It belongs to Ederlina. The constitution prohibits Alfred from owning lands. He
cannot recover the money used to buy the properties.

MULLER VS. MULLER

G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006
Doctrine:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By
this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used
the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and
the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in
the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.

Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed the
separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties
located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With
regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was
purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo
property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the respondent to
REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the
amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.
Ruling:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put the
property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law
bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
BEUMER V. AMORES
G.R. 195670 December 3, 2012
FACTS:

Petitioner. a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC
Negros Oriental. Petitioner and Filipina respondents marriage was nullified by basis of the
formers psychological incapacity. Petitioner thus filed for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
praying for distribution of the properties acquired during their marriage which include 4 lots of
land acquired through purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled that all parcels of land be
given to the respondent, tools and equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two houses on
Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there
are no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the
two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned by the parties.