Problems and prospects of Democratisation in Pakistan

Parminder S. Bhogal*

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, while reflecting upon the further political outlook of the proposed Pakistan state should be, remarked very enthusiastically, Democracy was in our blood, Democracy was in our marrow.1 That was in 1943. With a shot span in four years thereafter, the state of Pakistan made its hurried entry into the comity of the free countries of the world. Jinnah disapprovingly had called his Pakistan a moth eaten. And the political events that soon followed in Pakistan do show that probability the moth had also eaten into the democracy of Pakistan. Jinnah who himself became the first Governor General of Pakistan, introduced a highly centralized executive to run the newly founded county. Though structures of the new Government had an outward appearance of a parliamentary democracy, however the underlying power structure was made increasingly centralized. There were multifarious factors which led to the emergence of such a situation in Pakistan. The foremost among them was the flawed legacy of the Muslim League. The League emerged as a small group of persons who were antagonised to, and so continuously opposed, the congress, never adopting any positive programme and venturing out to build a mass base among the Muslim populace of India. Another factor was the premature birth of Pakistan. The ideological formation of Pakistan had not yet taken place in the minds of people, who were to become its major populace. Then there was the oligarchic nature of Leagues leadership. Decision making in Muslim League always revolved around Jinnah and to an extent Liaquat Ali Khan. Thus soon after there passing away, the league virtually became leaderless after 1951. The communal foundation of Pakistan, as, the mobilisation of Muslims was carried out under the slogan of Muslim Nationalism and the primacy of Islam, also had its role to play, as soon the communalists and liberalists were crossing the swords in a battle of supremacy in an independent Pakistan. The ethnic dominance of League leadership further created problems. The league leadership was heavily Mohajir dominated, and in an independent Pakistan, they were not sure of wider public support. Hence, they attempted to survive through a centralized military-bureaucratic set up. However, the local regional elites contested this, and this led to strains, which ultimately derailed the political process in Pakistan. The oligarchic league leadership delayed the formation of the constitution, and remained over dependent upon the colonial set up, which again had it ethnic outlook with Mohajirs and Punjabis having an upper hand. This Punjabi-Mohajir combined further did not like the idea of Bengali dominated Pakistan, as there were structural imbalances between, and the west Pakistanis as the Bengalis were the single largest, culturally stronger community in Pakistan, comprising around 56 percent of the total population. Another significant factor was emerging international environment, especially the strong cold war pulls. The US in their attempts to rein in Pakistan into their security alliances targeted at the containment policy, soon started hobnobbing with the military- bureaucratic elites of Pakistan, such an arrangement had its own immediate reasons in Pakistan s well because it was to be extended both financial and military aid. However, such development proved detrimental in the long run to emergence of any representative democratic system in Pakistan; as such an alliance strengthened the position of military- bureaucratic nexus, which was the arch enemy of liberal democracy. I In this way, Pakistan began with strongly centralized policy making apparatus *UGC teacher fellow, Department of Gandhian & Peace studies, Punjab University Chandigarh

In a country full of ethnic diversities, this soon began to show strains on the nascent political system. Centrifugal tendencies soon began to emerge and challenged the centralized system. Firstly, during the constitution making process, the central and provincial leadership could not build a consensus as to how the power was to be shared at both levels. Another strain was authored by the clergy emboldened by the strong communal card played by Leaguites leading to the partition of India and the mobilization of Muslim masses thereof. They opposed the liberal westernized attitude of the Leagues central Mohajir leadership, and instead pressed hard for constitutional Islamisation in the in the new state. They rejected outright any special provisions for the minorities contained in the report pf the Basic Principles Committee submitted to the constituent assembly on March 7, 1949. This report promised democracy and spoke provision and safe guard for minorities so that they could practice their religion and develop their cultures. However, by November 1950 this report had to be withdrawn, because the radical Islamists did not allow it. [2] All these factors resulted in the breaking upon of the fragile unity created over Muslim nationalism and badly fractured newly founded policy of Pakistan. The greatest advantage of such chaotic situation accrued to the army-- bureaucracy combine, who being comparatively better organized were able to dominance and displacing the nascent political started by Muslim League leadership. After the assassination of the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951[3] the militarybureaucratic combine almost got a free hand as they encouraged factionalism among already loosely held into league cadres and it soon withered away into many groups. The combine changed governor generals and prime ministers at will, did not enforce the constitution of 1956, as the predominant position of the prime minister vis--vis the President in that constitution would not suit this nexus, and finally imposed martial law on October 7, 1958, making it easy for Gen. Ayub Khan the C-in-C Pakistan Armed Forces to finally dismantle whatever was left of the civilian Government., and instead install himself as head of the first praetorian regime in Pakistan. Thus we see that there were half- hearted attempts by the Muslims League leadership to institutionalize democracy in Pakistan. However due to their weak position they failed to involve any viable political system and institutions. Pakistan, thus to quote Phillipe Schmitter, presented a classic case of the wide spread desire of fledgeling neo-democracies, to imitate the basic norms and institutions of established liberal democracies, which is by no means a guarantee of successespecially when the (democratic) transition is initiated and imposed from above, the previous rulers attempt to protect their interest by embedding authoritarian practices within the emergent regime. [4] II It will be quite paradoxical to note that the first significant movement for democracy in Pakistan germinated and surged ahead under the praetorian regime of Gen. Ayub Khan who took over on October 27, 1958. The seeds of this democratic movement are to be found in the fall-out of the legitimacy facade adopted by Ayub regime, which he called Basic Democracy. The basic democracy was a scheme containing the establishment of institutions whereby Ayub had planned to involve the vast rural elites along with the strong beauracratic set up with the twin purpose of initiating reforms and development in the countryside and of developing some kind of civilian constituency for his regime. Apart from the rural landlord elites, Ayub was also supported by the minuscule industrial bourgeoisie of Pakistan, who were keen to derive economic benefits by being the part of the regime. Both the categories of elites were powerful and well organized people from Punjab and Eastern N.W.F.P and some areas of rural Sind. They had not been properly accommodated in the pre-p1958 period as they had remained alienated from the then Muslim League leadership before and after the partition. [5]

The Basic Democracy system primarily involved the election of 80,000 basic democrats on the adult suffrage at the rate of 1 basic democrat per village/ward or in other words approximately 1000 voters were to elect 1 basic democrat. These 80,000 basic democrats were to become the base of four-staged pyramid, at apex of which Gen. Ayub himself as the president was to be elected by them, the undoubtedly voted for the constitution of Ayub with more than 95 percent yes vote. They were also to elect the National Assembly and the state assemblies and the local unions. They were to work in close association with the bureaucracy and were to be guided by them. Outwardly the system appeared attractive to them. However its implementation and working was altogether illusive. To begin with, the candidates for election were chosen by district bureaucracy and it was made sure that only influential persons and industrialists, who properly disposed to towards the Ayub regime contested the elections. The political parties had already been banned by them. And the operational field they became a link between local people and bureaucracy. [6] With special class interest those people became pets of bureaucracy in the same way as were to local stooges or safaidposh during the British viceregal system in India. [7] However as it happened, the basic democracy system involved a few, but alienated many as those who were left out, along the urban intellectual and small but significant classes, and did not support the scheme, even if they did not come out in a protest at the outset. The common man in the courtyard, the provinces other than Punjab, and N. W. F. P to an extent remained cold in this scheme. In fact the regime made error of confusing the establishment of the institution with the process of political institutionalization. The latter implies legitimacy of foreign structures of public authority; such approval integrates political system, playing a critical role in the process of nation building. The establishment of a public institution without consent (as was done by Ayub in this case) is counter-productive. Instead of neutralizing political tensions, these institutions became symbols of mass alienation.[8] Along with such mechanizations of basic democracy was the ideological control attempted by Ayub through his rigorous media control, law reforms, and containing the academics in the universities. [9] Ayubs industrialization also generated social cleavages. The outwardly buoyant industrial development was in fact resulting in the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few traditionally wealthy families. This lead to increasing unrest among the urban working classes who were being adversely affected by inadequate distributive mechanisms that involved in the result of apathy by the Government. All these forces, disgruntled the regime, started nursing the idea of democratization. They soon got the opportunity after the debacle of the Pakistani army at the hands of India in the 1945 Indo-Pak war. The myth of army superiority shattered and all the anti-regime elements surged ahead under the leadership of Z.A Bhutto who had broken away the regime and was combining his tremendous demagoguery along with the national unrest and was going to build a strong Anti-Ayub movement, shouting the slogans of democracy. The Sindi nationalists, the Baluchis, the N.W.F.P people already alienated by Ayub because of one of his unit [10] scheme and ideological assault and the ethnic cultural outlook, supported Bhutto. However the major supported Bhutto. However the major support came from Sind and Punjab in the end. East Pakistan was already simmering in discontent as the Bengalis were never reconciled to Punjab-Mohajir in the pre-1958 period. The sabotaging of the1956 constitution further alienated them and their national Awami League Party under Sheikh Mujibir Rehman was demanding a loose confederation of the East and West Pakistan, with very nominal power to federal Government. This was being perceived as secessionist by the regime. In West Pakistan, as the anti-Ayub movement surged ahead under Bhutto who had formed a new political party called Pakistani people Party (PPP) in December 1967, the military Government let loose a wave of repression. However, the movement momentum and Ayub was forced to step down on March 1969, handling over the power Gen. Yahya Khan, his chief of army staff. Yahya Khan, in order to tide over the crises announced elections of the National

Assembly under a Legal Frame work Order (LFO) which hinted at a conditional transfer of power to the civilian authority after the election, thereby hoping to retain some control with armed forces. This was a turning point in the history of democratic process in Pakistan. The elections, held in December 1970, left PPP of Zulfiqar Bhutto as the majority party in the West Pakistan with 81 seats out of total 145 for the National Assembly, and the majority of seats in the Sind and Punjab Provincial Assemblies. The National Awami Party won the Baluchistan and N.W.F.P assembly elections. The significance of these elections in Pakistans democratic process is, firstly, that these were the first ever, fair elections to be held in Pakistan. Secondly, for the first time, the masses of Pakistan came in contact with the political system to express themselves. Thirdly, elections projected very boldly the issue of development, equitable distribution, regional aspirations, and of course representative democracy along with accountability. III Power was transferred to Bhutto in 1972 after the Pakistan army was mauled in 1971 Indo-Pak war, and after the East Pakistan has succeeded in forming a new sovereign country called Bangladesh. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Army quietly and unconditionally handed over power to the democratically elected Government. This time thus was the opportune to carry out the consolidation of democratic process in Pakistan to an extent. However, soon after Bhutto assumed power, his highly ambitious and personalised politic hampered any such development. Though he established representative, democratic political institutions through a constitution of 1973, and carried out economic reforms including land reforms, however he soon went astray and was carried away by immense power and popularity he enjoyed in the beginning. Soon he was undoing whatever he had accomplished till then. However the significance of Bhutto regarding the democratization process in Pakistan should not go unnoticed. It was he who at a very crucial time provided leadership to a nascent movement for democracy and shaped and steered it into a strong movement in West Pakistan, as has been mentioned above. Through his appeal to the Western educational intelligentsia and students as an intellectual, and staunch nationalist, and through this excellent rabble- rousing rhetoric a populist socialistic socio-economic manifesto, punctuated by Islam, he stirred the masses in almost every nook and corner of Pakistan. The greatest success was of course in Sind, his own province, and Punjab. To more affluent middle class, he had appeal too, as he was also speaking out for the injured national pride of Pakistan, both by denouncing Ayub and Yahya along with the army as well as carrying out his famous hysteric anti-Indian diatribes. [11] In other words, Bhutto was giving every one his dream in Pakistan. All this not only raised the political consciousness and aspirations of the people in Pakistan but also unleash a strong democratic force, which he himself was not able to control later on. Once in a powerful position as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, he went on to consolidate his personal power at the cost of democratic institutions and culture. For a very short time, Bhutto did implement some parts of his socialist economic thinking, and nationalized the banks and industries, and started land reforms. However, soon, around 1974, he began to abandon such populist policies and instead laid more emphasis on roping in the support of large landlord elites in Punjab and Sind. Of course this was not liked by the earlier allies, the urban middleclass and the small and marginal farmers and labourers. Soon a personalized and centralized regime came into being instead of the democratic one that Bhutto had promised. Opposition began to be muffled. A new force, the Federal Security Force (FSF) that was created by him ostensibly to act as a paramilitary force to counter riots and insurgencies, rather than calling in whenever required, however soon began to be used by him according to whims and fancies. It was extensively used to disrupt the opposition political rallies and to liquidate his opponents both within and outside

the PPP. In one of many such incident, Bhuttos close friend and PPP member, Minister J.R Rahim, who was known for his leftist leaning, was assaulted and hounded out of Pakistan at the instance of Bhutto because he disagreed with the changed economic and political priorities of Bhutto.[12] And in an other incident the FSF forcibly evicted the opposition members of National Assembly from the assembly premises as they were protesting against PPP-proposed amendment aimed at limiting the dissent in the country. [13] Bhutto soon started undoing the constitution of 1973 that he himself made, by amending it to curb democratic activity. In April 1974, he amended Art.17 of constitution which limited the right of freedom of associations, political parties and organizations. In 1975, he severely curtailed the civil liberties guaranteed by the constitution and introduced draconian preventive detention laws, thus bypassing the judiciary. These provisions were then extensively used to detain his political opponents. The high courts were banned from granting bail to the individuals detained under preventive detention. Similarly, the Press was shifted and censored through bodies like National Press Trust. [14] All this was clear volte-face from his earlier pro-democracy and civil liberties drama that he enacted to depose Ayub. Bhutto dismissed the democratically elected NAP Government in Baluchistan on the pretext of unrest and sent the army to Gen. Tikka Khan to mercilessly quell the guerilla resistance autonomy. The army perpetrated so many atrocities and mercilessly killed thousands of people that commander Gen. Tikka Khan earned the infamous title Butcher of Baluchistan After coming to power, Bhutto can be credited with only two major steps that can be deemed to have favoured the democratic process, the first being the making of the 1973 constitution, and the second being radically curtail the powers and privileges of the civil war bureaucracy of Pakistan. New recruitment and promotion policies were introduced, thus taking away the vast immunities and unaccountabilities that the bureaucrats enjoyed earlier. To an extent he can also be credited with his populist economic measures which were deserted half way, as was the democratic process. To conclude the Bhutto period, it can safely be concurred, that Bhutto the demagogue and feudal authoritarian character that he was, talked democracy as and when it suited him, and snubbed it when it did not. The undesirable cocktail of democracy and authoritarianism exploded in the end and finished him. The masses were stirred but the middle class and higher elites were alienated. On the whole this volatile Bhutto era in Pakistan failed in bringing about any consolidation of democracy. The democratic forces, however, kept their momentum, albeit on a low profile. IV The democratic movement did not die Pakistan even as the Army moved in after deposing Bhutto in July 1977. Soon afterwards when in August 1977 Bhutto freed temporarily he extensively toured the areas of Sind and Punjab. Wherever he went, he was given a tumultuous welcome. This was quite in contrast to Anti-Bhutto sentiment led by PNA in the wake of rigged March 1977 elections. The strong anti-Bhutto movement led by PNA in fact had bent him to come down to compromise with the opposition, and signing of an accord was few hours away when the army took over on July 5, 1977. The rousing welcome given to Bhutto was not so much out of love for Bhutto, as for the love of democracy. [15] This strong manifestation of democratic forces made Zia shudder, and he gave second thoughts to his plans. Bhutto was executed and all political activity came to stand still. However, after Zias Islamic legitimacy endeavours he was feeling more and more isolated. The compulsions of legitimacy forced him to seek a military dominated semi-representative arrangement. However Zia proved to be much shrewder than Ayub. He first went in for local body elections in 1979 and then tried out with nominated National Assembly called Majlis-e-

Shoura. However, there was not much success. He then thought of having party less elections and forms a buffer set-up between the Army and the civilian population. The opposition sensed his game and protest in the form of a Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in 1983. This was primarily led by PPP and was not much success except in Sind where it generated widespread anarchy, and a lot of violence took place. This was however quelled by the armed forces successfully. But this drove home the message to Zia. Zia held a partyless and campaignless election in 1985. These elections provided on opportunity of major land-owning families and large industrialists to gain direct access to the Government and thus reap the success in such a contest would provide.[16] Zia was in way moving on to the game plan of Ayub, only he was being much more manipulative and cautious. However, as later events shall prove, he was to meet a similar fate. The sheer magnitude of the turnout (52%) was a surprise to all groups: the military, the candidates and the boycotting opposition.[17] Obviously, the latent democratic forces were at work, trying to fight back. Zia chose to obscure figure, Mohammed Khan Junejo, to be the Prime Minister and soon withdraw martial law. However strains began to appear soon between Zia and Junejo. A contradiction was inherited in the institutional structure created in 1985. The powers that the military were willing to grant to the legislature made its position untenable. The large turnout was seen as a mandate to terminate military rule, albeit in stages. The phased nature of process imposed constant pressure in legislature to be seen to be acting with a degree of independence from the military and to take steps towards the gradual transfer of power to civilians. From the armys point of view, it was a structure which required a sensitive handling if it was to deliver benefits.[18] In the beginning the army was successful, as a part form other things the international environment provided by Afghan issue was not conductive enough for the democratic forces to strike immediately. However the environment showed signs of change towards end of 1987, things also began to change. Martial law had already been withdrawn, the press was given relatively more freedom, the political parties were allowed to function more freely and even Banezir Bhutto was allowed to return by then. The army began to feel pressure as it started coming under increasing public apathy and pressure to the point of persistant demand for accountability and cuts in defense expenditure. Last year (1987) the entire annual budget had to be hastily withdrawn under intense public agitation against the defense tax.[19] And the Prime Minister spoke about cutting down armys expenditure. Prime Minister Junejo, compelled by the democratic forces has begun to assert his independence. He differed with Zia on several issues including Islamisation, the Afghan policy and liberalized political activity in Pakistan. Another latent but significant development which was becoming a headache for Zia, was ethnic upsurge. In fact the democratic movement of late 60s and volatile democratic exposure during the Bhutto era had stirred the similar nationalities. Probably the greatest single development within Pakistan in last ten years has been the heightened awareness of the rights of smaller nationalities. Even in highly environment, they are not deterred to demand for the recognisation and redressal of their rights. In making such demands they are all united. The open militant conflicts in Sind in 1983 and 1986, the consistent only increase in the unity among the Pakhtuns and their escalating conflict with the Centre and the wait-and-see-and-prepare strategy of the Baluchs were some of the significant developments in this regard.[20] Thus the pressure for democratization was building up strongly in Pakistan. However Zia under pressure from the army dismissed the Junejo Governments. It is here that the situation is comparable to Ayub, as like him, Zia after dismissing the Government came face to face with the masses. This did more damage than any good to Armys interest, because the democratic sentiment was again stirred up in the wake of dismissal of the Government. Zia tried to contain the building pressure by promising elections in August. The global environment too had changed after Geneva accord and the subsequent Soviet withdrawal form Afghanistan. So Zias Afghanistan legitimacy was

running out. By the time he died, General Zias system was in shambles. He was on the retreat of defensive yet again. Overnight his Parliament had lost the legitimacy of transitional mandate. It was abundantly clear that a phased sequence towards democratic Government was not an agenda. The general was up his tricks again. The man was pulling the strings has to make personal appearance on the stage again. The audience was not amused [21]. To conclude Zia phase, it can safely be said that 11 years of army rule, though for some time, mainly due to external reasons, blocked the democratic sentiment, but unable to roll it back. The slow albeit steady growth if the democratic movement that continued during the Bhutto period got more strength. The Pakistani economy improved. The entire opposition remained united even though with less success, against Zia. The pressure was always on Zia and he tried to cap it through elections to local bodies in 1979 and 1984 and through the Junejo experiment of 1985. All these in long run proved detrimental to Zia and favorable to democratic forces. This was clearly proved by the post Junejo scene in Pakistan till death of Zia in an air crash on August 17, 1988. V That the case of democracy in Pakistan is ill- served by the elites will be amply displayed even in the post-Zia phase. The elites, as in the dilemma faced by the process of democratization in the entire third world, still play a stronger role, according to power distribution in the societies. Nowadays pluralist democratic systems based on multi party participation and emerging in these countries. The parties revolved around the elites, due to power distribution in these societies. These elites stir democratic movement to bargain for their share power, of and once they have reached that stage, both those who are successful, and the failing contenders, dont mind undermining democratic movements and institutions for their personal consolidation. This is one major reason that the democratic movements, in most countries, after making a good start, were slowed down and to failed to properly institutionalized and consolidate. In Pakistan three general elections have taken away after Zia viz. in 1988, 1993 and 1993 with some apprehensions about the elections of 1990 and 1993 have been fair and free. The influence and control of armed forces has been even more restricted then ever before. This is particularly true after the 1993 elections. In 1988 Benazir and 1990 Mian Niawaz Shariefs elected governments were not only suffered confrontation army and bureaucratic set- up, but got dismissed as the result of confrontation.22. Moreover their own weaknesses and personal choices over the institutional preferences also played a role. Obviously the elites game was at work. Though some positive steps towards the consolidation of democratic movements have taken place, things cannot be said to have stabilized. There are three significant developments regarding this. The first is the emergence of a two-party system in Pakistan. The second significant has been the rejection of small splinter and ultra- Islamist parties thereby showing the clear rejection of religion in politics. The credit of both these developments goes to the people of Pakistan who have time and again proved their total commitment to the democratic process. The third development has been the election of Sardar Farouk Ahmed Khan Legheri as the president of Pakistan in 1993. The President and Prime Minister belong to the same party (PPP) means more freedom for the PM and the stability of the democratic system. Commenting upon the developments, Ziring remarked in 1993, Presidents prospects for a stable political future have seldom been higher, but the times do not call for euphoria. The country confronts domestic and external dilemmas of significant magnitude, and hard realities are bound to demand difficult and not always popular choices.[23] However, as pointed above, the elites continued to play vendetta against each other. Democratization in Pakistan is also suffering from what has been called as exclusionary decision making, in which the insulation of policy makers from the popular pressure and

successful pursuit of macro-political and economic polices take place. In Pakistan such an attitude has generated problems at micro level. Where there has been rise in inflation, unemployment and continuing recessionary in Pakistan economy, there have been political problems also. The ethnic crisis in Sind has been worsened. In N.W.F.P there has been trouble in Malakand division as local autonomy has sought to be sabotaged by the government. [24] Added to all these are the grave legacies of long exposure to military dictatorship. There has been deliberate erosion of institutions that promote and sustain democracy. Over the years of political culture of conformity and political intolerance has developed. The Zia period will be remembered for its drug and Kalashnikov culture that it introduced in Pakistan culture. Respect for the law and direct result of this has gone down and crime and sabotage has become the trend of the day. Political elites and their groups have lost their civic competence and civic society is in the state of decay. All these are the problems before the toddling democracy of Pakistan. It will take many years befor democracy in Pakistan crosses the threshold of survival of survival and acquires legitimacy. The Pakistani people have clearly voiced their desire for democratic change, but expanding and consolidating democratic gains over the long terms remains a daunting task. The greatest challenge before them is building up of civil society, which will than become terra firma of democracy in future society, in that country. They have come a long way; they still have a longer way to go. The road ahead will be strewn with difficulties and these obstacles must be seen as challenges to be met rather than excuses for abandoning the journey towards more civilized politics.[25] NOTES & References
1. 2. 3. Mohammed Ali Jinnah quoted by Khalid, Mohammed, Welfare State of Pakistan, [Karachi, Royal book co. n.d.]P-26 Mahmood, Safdar, Political roots and development in Pakistan, (New Delhi, Sterling 1990),pp.29-30 The enquiry commissions investigation report, the identity and motive of the assassin has not been made public till date. However it was widely suspected as the clergy was behind the conspiracy as it had started perceiving Liaquat as a hurdle in the way of its having an upper hand through the proposed constitution. For details, please see Akbar, M.J. India: the Siege Within, Chap. 2, (Mullah Power in Pakistan) (N.Y.: Penguin 1985), pp.36-7. Schmitter, Philippe C, dangers and dilemmas of democracy, journal of democracy, vol. 5. No.2, April 1994, pp. 58-59. Jalal, Aysha, democracy and authorization in south Asia (Cambridge: C.P.U. 1995) p.16 Zining, Lawrence, the Ayub khan era: politics in Pakistan 1958-69 (N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1971) p.16 The British in colonial India encouraged influential people in country side to collaborate with them. Those who agreed were given respect by the administration and were given titles like Safaidposh literary means a person in a stark white dress, which is a local symbol of respect. The public in general perceived them as stooges of the colonial power as they were pro-British, and even reported the activities of freedom fighter to them. Noman, Omar, Pakistan: a political and economic history since 1947 ( London Kegan Paul International, 1990), p.28 for more details please see ibid., pp27-8 Under this scheme, the Pakistan leadership, who were prominently West Pakistanis (Mohajirs and Punjabis), in order to offset there structural imbalances against Bengalis, clubbed all the four provinces in west (Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and N.W.F.P) in one unit in 1994. However it was resented by the Sindis, Baluchis, and N.W.F.P people as they feared the Punjabi preeminence and dominance over them. Punjabis in decisive numerical majority in Pakistan, then called, West Pakistan. Wolpart, Stanly, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, (N.Y.: O.U.P., 1993), pp. 115-6. Ibid. p. 240. Sayeed, K.B, the nature and direction of political change in Pakistan, (USA. Praeger, 1980),pp 329-30 Ibid., n. 8, p. 69. Ibid., n. 11,p.311 Noman, Omar, Pakistan: and general Zia, third world Quarterly, vol. 11, No.1, January 1989, pp. 28-54. Ibid., p.38. Ibid., p. 39. Joshi, V.T., Pakistan: Zia to Benazir, (New Delhi: Konark, 1995) p. 81.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. Ali Baber, Pakistans Decade of generals, Economic and political weekly, Vol.XXII, No. 28, July 1897, p.1125. 21. Ibid, n. 16, p. 44. 22. Ziring, Lawrence, The second stage in Pakistani Politics: The 1993 Elections Asian Survey. 23. Ibid, p. 1185. 24. Amin Tahir, Pakistan in 194: the politics of Confrontation, Asian Survey. Vol. XXXV, No.2, February 1995, pp. 143-4 25. Rais Rasul Baksh, Pakistan: Hope Amidst Turmoil, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, Vol. 2, April 1994, p.143.