G.R. No.

183345

September 17, 2014

MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by
Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA)
decision dated February 28, 2006 and resolution dated June 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289.
These CA rulings affirmed the February 26, 2004 and July 26, 2004 orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, which respectively denied the petitioners' motion to defer arraignment and
motion to lift warrant of arrest.
1

Factual Antecedents
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy) filed a criminal complaint against the
petitioners and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689.
7

Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo was the
manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngos advice to deposit his money in
an investment house that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia
Hao (Gracia), also known as Mina Tan Hao, who presented herself as an officer of various reputable
companies and an incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation (State Resources), the
recommended company that can give Dy his higher investment return.
8

Relying on Ngo and Gracias assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the approximate
amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned the promised interests,
leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, toincrease his investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through several checks he issued in the name of
State Resources. In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his earnings for
his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One Hundred Fourteen Million, Two
Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (P114,286,086.14). All
these checks were subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them.
9

10

Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks. Ngo
promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned from Asiatrust
Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored
checks. He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the construction and realty
business of Gracias husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners
never returned Dys money.
On July 17, 2003, Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in the criminal complaint Chester De
Joya, Allan Roxas, Samantha Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas all incorporators and/or
directors of State Resources.
11

On the basis of Dys complaint and supplemental affidavit, the public prosecutor filed an
information for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-219952 and was raffled to respondent RTC of Manila, Branch 40.
12

13

14

Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other accused.
Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant
of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of probable cause against them and the
pendency of their petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
15

In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the petitioners twin motions. The petitioners
moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied this in its July 26, 2004 order. Consequently,
the petitioners filed a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
16

The CAs Ruling

The CA affirmed the denial ofthe petitioners motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of
arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is mandated to
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. The CA noted that
Judge Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest after his personal examination of the facts and
circumstances of the case. Since the judge complied with the Rules, the CA concluded that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to him.
17

18

In its decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on record and the assertions in Dys
affidavits only show probable cause for the crime of simple estafa,not syndicated estafa. Under PD
No. 1689, in order for syndicated estafato exist, the swindling must have been committed by five or
more persons, and the fraud must be against the general public or at least a group of persons. In his
complaint-affidavit, Dy merely stated that he relied on the petitioners false representations and was
defrauded into parting with his money, causing him damage. Since there was no evidence that
State Resources was formed to defraud the public in general or that it was used to solicit money
from other persons aside from Dy, then the offense charged should only be for simple estafa.
19

20

Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners as there was still probable cause to believe that the
petitioners committed the crime of simple estafa.
21

The Petition
The petitioners submit that an examination of Dys affidavits shows inconsistencies in his cited
factual circumstances. These inconsistencies, according to the petitioners, negate the existence of
probable cause against themfor the crime charged.
The petitioners also contend thatit was only Ngo who enticed Dy to invest his money. As early as
August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved, thus negating the assertion that Dy
advanced funds for this corporation. They question the fact that it took Dy almost five years to file
his complaint despitehis allegation that he lost almost P100,000,000.00.
22

23

Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued against them were null and void.
Contrary to the trial courts findings, the CA noted in the body of its decision, that PD 1689 was
inapplicable to their case. There was no evidence to show that State Resources was formed to solicit
funds not only from Dy but also from the general public. Since simple estafaand syndicated
estafaare two distinct offenses, then the warrants of arrest issued to petitioners were erroneous
because these warrants pertained to two different crimes.
24

The Courts Ruling

We resolve to DENYthe petition.
Procedural Consideration
We note that the present petition questions the CAs decision and resolution on the petition for
certiorarithe petitioners filed with that court. At the CA, the petitioners imputed grave abuse of
discretion against the trial court for the denialof their twin motions to defer arraignment and to lift
warrant of arrest.
This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in the case of Montoya v. Transmed
Manila Corporation where we faced the question of how to review a Rule 45 petition before us, a
CA decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this cited case the kind of review that this Court
should undertake given the distinctionsbetween the two remedies. In Rule 45, we consider the
correctness of the decision made by an inferior court. In contrast, a Rule 65 review focuses on
jurisdictional errors.
25

As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same context that the petition for
certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA decision from the prism
of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court and not on the basis of whether the trial courts denial of petitioners motions was
strictly legally correct. In question form, the question to ask is: did the CA correctly determine
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motions to defer
arraignment and lift warrant of arrest?
Probable Cause for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
Under the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge is mandated to
personally determine the existence of probable cause after hispersonal evaluation of the
prosecutors resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged. These provisions
command the judge to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutors findings and
to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties.
26

27

Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grantsthe trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal complaint
orinformation. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause.
28

In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and their coaccused.To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance with the requirement

that probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked
to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused.In doing so, he need not
conduct a de novohearing; he only needs to personally review the prosecutor's initial determination
and see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
29

The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not present any
evidence to controvert this. As the trial court ruled in its February 26, 2004 order:
The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender practically resulted in the suspension
of arraignment exceeding the sixty (60) days counted from the filing of co-accused De Joyas
motions, which may be considered a petition for review, and that of co-accused Spouses Haos own
petition for review. This is not to mention the delay in the resolutionby the Department of Justice. On
the other hand, co-accused DeJoyas motion to determine probable cause and co-accused Spouses
Haos motion to lift warrant of arrest have been rendered moot and academic with the issuance of
warrants of arrest by this presiding judge after his personal examination of the facts and
circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of the crime that
in fact happened. [Emphasis ours]
30

Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issuedafter his personal evaluation
of the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was probable cause to apprehend the
petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense.
Distinction between Executive and Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at the executive
level, where determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation, before the
filing of the criminal information. The second is at the judicial level, undertaken by the judge before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of probable cause. In
order to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial courts issuance of the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa, whether committed as a
simple offense or through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. In these provisions, the
different modes by which estafa may be committed, as well as the corresponding penalties for each
are outlined. One of these modes is estafaby means of deceit. Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC defines
how this particular crime is perpetrated:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior toor
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business orimaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or

fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the reliance by the
offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which induced him to part
withhis money or property; and 4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage.
31

As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with State Resources
and promised him a higher rate of return. Because of his good business relationship with Ngo and
relying on Gracias attractive financial representations, Dy initially invested the approximate amount
of P10,000,000.00.
32

This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more so that he
eventually advanced almost P100,000,000.00 with State Resources. Gracias succeeding checks
representing the earnings of his investments, however, were all dishonored upon deposit. He
subsequently learned that the petitioners used his money for Dannys construction and realty
business. Despite repeated demands and the petitioners constant assurances to pay, they never
returned Dys invested money and its supposed earnings.
33

34

35

36

These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafaby means of deceit. The petitioners
inducedDy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown to Dy, what occurred
was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in Dannys construction and realty business. The
petitioners deceit became more blatant when they admitted in their petition that as early as August
1995, State Resources had already been dissolved. This admission strengthens the conclusion that
the petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State Resources in order to persuade
Dy to part with his money for investment with an inexistent corporation.
37

These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners deceit. "Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or
by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is intended to deceive
another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury."
38

Thus, had it not been for the petitioners false representations and promises, Dy would not have
placed his money in State Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead us to the
conclusion that probable cause existed as basis to arrest the petitioners for the crime of estafa by
means of deceit.
We now address the issue of whether estafain this case was committed through a syndicate.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, there is syndicated estafaif the following elements are present: 1)
estafaor other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was committed; 2)
the estafaor swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and 3) the fraud
resulted inthe misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
39

40

The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements of syndicated
estafaare present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC against the
petitioners. Moreover, in Dys supplemental complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the fraud perpetrated
against him was committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but also by the other officers and
directors of State Resources. The number of the accused who allegedly participated in defrauding
Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the existence of a syndicate.

However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently solicited by the
corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no evidence was presented to
show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State Resources, also sought investments from
other people. Dy had no co-complainants alleging that they were also deceived to entrust their
money to State Resources. The general public element was not complied with. Thus, no syndicated
estafaallegedly took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial courts denial ofthe
petitioners motion to lift warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and
circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance ofa warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believethat an offense
was committed by the person sought to be arrested. This must be distinguished from the
prosecutors finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal information.
Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
41

42

In People v. Castillo and Mejia, we explained the distinction between the two kinds of probable
cause determination:
43

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that
function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge
cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. [Emphasis ours]
44

With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and that the
petitioners have probably committed it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest against
the petitioners remains to be valid and proper. To allow them to go scot-free would defeat rather than
promote the purpose of a warrant of arrest, which is to put the accused in the courts custodyto avoid
his flight from the clutches of justice.
Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely different crimes.
Simple estafais a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is necessarily included
in another offense when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.
45

Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court is necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners should
not be nullified since probable cause exists for simple estafa.
46

Suspension of Arraignment
Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there is a
petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the Office of the
President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003. Since
this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be suspended
indefinitely.
We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an unqualified
right. In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang, we explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a
ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment to a
period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused
or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
47

1wphi1

48

As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the petitioners'
petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the petitioners'
arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the petitioners' motion to suspend
completely lacks any legal basis.
As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because of the
petitioners' refusal to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of the
Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners' commission of a crime, their arrest
and arraignment should now ensue so that this case may properly proceed to trial, where the merits
of both the parties' evidence and allegations may be weighed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATION the February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao
be charged for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and be
arraigned for this charge. The warrants of arrest issued stand.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171020

March 14, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO PANGILINAN y TRINIDAD, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01414 dated 16
November 2005 which affirmed with modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in Criminal Cases Nos. DH 586-97 and 587-97, finding appellant
Alfredo Trinidad Pangilinan guilty of two counts of rape. The Court of Appeals upheld the two death
sentences imposed on appellant but modified the award of damages.
1vvphi1.nt

Two informations were filed charging appellant with raping AAA,3 his daughter. The informations
read:
Crim. Case No. DH-586-97
That in or about the month of September 1995 at Brgy. Pita, Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, thru force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to have sexual intercourse with the
offended party, AAA, an eleven (11) year old minor girl, who is his daughter against the will and
consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.4
Crim. Case No. DH-587-97
That in or about the month of January 1997 at Brgy. Pita, Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, thru force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to have sexual intercourse with the
offended party, AAA, an eleven (11) year old minor girl, who is his daughter against the will and
consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.5
On 5 May 1997, appellant, who was arrested and detained with no bail recommended, filed a
petition for bail.6
In the hearings for the petition for bail, the prosecution presented the private complainant-victim,
BBB, and Dr. Melinda Layug.
From the evidence presented, the prosecutions version of what transpired, as summarized by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is quoted by the Court of Appeals:
BBB is the wife of appellant Alfredo Pangilinan. On May 9, 1985, BBB gave birth to AAA. Their family
lived in Barangay Pita, Bayan-bayanan, Bataan.
On September 9, 1995, around 9 oclock in the evening, AAA, her brother and two (2) sisters were
asleep. Suddenly, she felt her father, herein appellant, approach their bed, remove her shorts and
lay on top of her. She could not move. Appellant proceeded to remove the rest of her clothes. AAA
struggled with all her strength even though her hands were pinned down by appellant above her
head. AAA cried and shouted for help, but appellant quickly covered her mouth. When appellant
attempted to insert his penis into her vagina, AAA unceasingly resisted until appellant finally stopped
his attack and left her.

Around 11 oclock the following night, appellant once again crawled beside AAA while she was
asleep beside her siblings. He removed all her clothes. When AAA woke up, she resisted appellant
with all her strength and shouted for her grandmothers help, but he quickly covered her mouth, thus
stifling her cries. Appellant, who was naked, mounted AAA and kissed her on different parts of her
body. After a while, AAAs energy waned. AAA felt excruciating pain when appellant forcibly inserted
his penis in her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her. The following morning, AAA was
feverish. She saw blood oozing out of her vagina. Scared and confused, AAA confided to her eight
(8) year-old brother CCC that appellant raped her the previous night.
The following week, appellant repeated his dastardly act. While his children were playing in the
creek behind their house, appellant pulled AAA, who was busy washing dishes, inside their house.
Appellant brought her upstairs and pushed her down to the floor. As before, AAA tried to push
appellant away and scream for help but he covered her mouth and easily overcame her resistance.
Appellant removed AAAs clothes, mounted her and had sexual intercourse with her. After a few
minutes, appellant stood up, put on his clothes and ordered AAA to take a bath.
1awphi1.nt

That same evening, appellant raped AAA again. After doing so, he threatened to kill her and her
siblings should she report him to the authorities. During the month of September in 1995, appellant
repeatedly raped AAA. AAA lost count of the number of times appellant had raped her. Fearing for
her safety and that of her siblings, AAA kept her silence.
For a while, AAA thought that appellant would no longer abuse her. She was wrong. Around 11
oclock in the evening of January 5, 1997, AAA felt her father grope for her while she was sleeping in
their room. Like in the past, appellant removed her clothes. AAA resisted and struggled to free
herself in vain. Appellant was too heavy. Appellant mounted her, inserted his penis into her vagina
and had sexual intercourse with her.
AAAs fear of her father intensified. His stares stopped her from confiding her ordeal to her mother,
who had just arrived from Singapore.
On March 16, 1997, BBB informed her children that she was leaving for Singapore again. DDD,
AAAs grandmother, advised BBB not to leave her children. She told BBB that appellant had been
molesting AAA. Shocked by the revelation, BBB confronted AAA. AAA tearfully confessed everything
to her mother. BBB could only embrace her daughter tightly after hearing the sordid details.
That same day, BBB confronted appellant. As expected, appellant denied any wrongdoing and
hastily left their house.
After the confrontation, BBB decided to leave appellant.
On March 17, 1997, BBB brought AAA to the Dinalupihan District Hospital where she was examined
by Dra. Melinda Layug. The examination revealed that the victim had a non-parous introitus with an
old healed hymenal laceration at the 4 oclock position. Thus the instant case was filed. 7
On 30 October 1997, the prosecution formally offered its evidence consisting of Exhibits "A" to "E,"
with sub-markings, and the testimonies of its witnesses, praying that they be admitted and
considered in the resolution of the petition for bail, and that the same be considered as part of its
evidence in chief.8 On 15 December 1997, appellant filed his comment and/or opposition to the
prosecutions offer of evidence.9

In an Order dated 23 April 1998, the trial court, finding that the evidence against the accused is
strong, denied appellants petition for bail.10 Thereafter, the defense presented its evidence with
appellant as the sole witness. Appellant testified as follows:
Appellant narrated that he left for Saudi Arabia on 27 May 1990 and returned on 22 September
1992. Upon his return, a lot of people informed him that his wife was having an affair. Complainant
even told him he is not the father of his youngest daughter. As a result, he lost interest in going back
to Saudi Arabia, merely stayed at home and did not look for work. He revealed that before he left for
Saudi Arabia, his daughter AAA was sweet to him, that is, she hugged and kissed him. When he
returned from Saudi Arabia, he said AAA became sweeter.
In September 1995, his wife was in Singapore working as an overseas contract worker. He kept in
touch with her through phone and letters. Once, while he was writing a letter to his wife, he said he
became drunk and was not able to finish the letter. He felt dizzy, lay down and slept. He was
awakened by the embraces and kisses of a person who turned out to be his daughter, AAA. He said
there was malice in the way his daughter embraced and kissed him. He wondered why his daughter
was kissing him the way she did. He embraced her but he did not allow anything to happen, she
being his daughter.
Appellant further testified that the same incident happened again, but this time, he was not drunk. He
said AAA approached him wanting to have sex with him by pointing her finger on her palm. He
advised her that sex is only done by married couples. He claimed he did not have any sexual
relationship with her although she seduced him. He added he did not know of any reason why she is
mad at him and why she filed the rape cases against him.
On 9 June 1999, the trial court, having discovered that appellant had not yet been arraigned,
scheduled his arraignment. On 17 June 1999, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.11 Since the prosecution adopted all the evidence it
adduced during the hearing for the petition for bail as part of its evidence-in-chief, which evidence
the trial court admitted, the trial court deemed the cases submitted for decision.
In its Decision dated 9 September 1999, the trial court convicted appellant of two counts of rape and
imposed on him the capital punishment for each count. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Alfredo Pangilinan Y Trinidad GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of RAPE in both cases, Criminal Cases Nos. DH-586-97 and 587-97, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each case and to indemnify the victim, AAA, with
the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.12
The trial court was convinced that private complainant was raped several times by her father during
the month of September 1995, and once on 5 January 1997. It accorded credence to the testimony
of private complainant who, at 12 years old testified in a spontaneous and direct manner. It found
private complainant to be immature, innocent, nave, unfamiliar with sex and incapable of inventing
or fabricating charges against her own father when the sexual assaults were committed in
September 1995 and January 1997 when she was only 10 or 11 years old.
The trial court brushed aside appellants defense of denial. It said it is simply unbelievable for a tenyear old girl to be as malicious as appellant described his daughter. It explained that the minor
inconsistencies in private complainants testimony did not in any way affect her credibility.

In conclusion, the trial court said:

In this society, at a time when incestuous acts are not uncommon, and with the situation where the
accused and offended party were in, when the wife of the accused was away working in Singapore,
it is easy to believe that his loneliness urged him to sexually abuse his daughter. The offended party
had no ill motive in filing the case against him. It was even the paternal grandmother who initially
informed her mother that the accused was raping his daughter while she was gone. For fear that the
accused might do it again, the paternal grandmother was trying to prevail over the mother who was
again planning to leave for abroad. The one responsible for bringing the matter to the attention of the
mother who later reported to the police was no less tha(n) the mother of the accused. A mother
would not allow herself to be used to make her son suffer, (e)specially if the charges are fabricated.
She heard the cries/shouts from the offended party while the accused was sexually assaulting her.
What she did was to tell the truth. Is accused blaming her own mother for simply telling the truth? 13
Inasmuch as the penalty it imposed was the death penalty, the trial court forwarded the records of
the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant to Section 10, Rule 122 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure.14However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,15 the case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. 16
On 16 November 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the death penalties imposed by the trial court
but modified the amounts of damages awarded. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 9, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch V, Dinalupihan, Bataan in Criminal Case Nos. 586-97 and 1257 (sic), finding appellant
Alfredo Pangilinan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape in both cases and sentencing him to
suffer the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED with the modification that he is ordered to pay the
victim AAA, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity andP50,000.00 as moral damages in each case. Appellant
is further ordered to pay an additional amount ofP25,000.00 as exemplary damages, also in each
case.17
On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals elevated the records of the case to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.18 Thereafter, in our resolution dated 28 February 2006, the parties were required to
submit supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within thirty (30) days from notice. The parties opted
not to file supplemental brief on the ground they had fully argued their positions in their respective
briefs.
Appellant makes the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT PROPERLY ARRAIGNED,
AND WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
BEFORE THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION WAS PRESENTED.
II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION.
On the first assigned error, appellant assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned.
Since he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is
a procedural error which is prejudicial to the appellant and is tantamount to denial of his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. He claims that his subsequent
arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time the petition for bail
was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Appellant is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had
already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 19 In the case at bar, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997. His
arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.20 The purpose of arraignment is,
thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of
the State is mobilized against him.21
Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. The question is: Were
appellants rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the
proceedings?
We do not think so. Appellants belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect
was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had
yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His
counsels active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the
charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this
blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties
did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and
sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated.
It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.
In People v. Cabale22 and People v. Atienza23 where the same issue was raised under similar
circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had
been submitted for decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellants
rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not
violated.
With the procedural issue resolved, we now go to the substantial issues raised by appellant.
Appellant tries to discredit private complainant by citing several circumstances that tend to create
doubt as to his guilt, to wit: (1) the alleged molestations could not have been perpetrated within the
confines of the small room in the "upstairs" portion of their house in the presence and within the

hearing distance of the victims brother and two sisters in September 1995, and of her mother in
January 1997; (2) the failure of private complainant to immediately report the sexual attacks to her
maternal relatives and to her mother upon her arrival from abroad, and the delay of more than one
(1) year from the alleged offense in September 1995 and more than two (2) months from the alleged
felony in January 1997 before they were reported to the police or to any barangay official, before
private complainant reported the incidents, render doubtful her charges of rape; (3) private
complainants declaration in her sworn statement contradicted her testimony in court as to how she
reported the incidents; (4) the alleged material inconsistencies in the testimony of private
complainant; and (5) the result of the medical examination that there was no sign of violence on the
person of private complainant is an indication that she was not a victim of rape.
To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three
well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of
rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.24
After examining the testimony of the private complainant, we find no compelling reason to deviate
from the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When it comes to credibility,
the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly
testimonial evidence.25 In the case at bar, there being overwhelming evidence showing that in
September 1995 and in January 2000 appellant had carnal knowledge of private complainant by
means of force and intimidation, we have no reason not to apply the rule and to apply the exception.
In a clear and straightforward manner, private complainant recounted her ordeal as follows:
Prosec. Tanciongco:
Now, in this month of September 1995, while you were there at your house together with your
brother and sisters, and with your father, do you recall of any unusual incident that happened to you?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
What was that unusual incident that you remember that happened to you?
a. I was molested by my father, sir.
Atty. Danan:

Ginamit?
Court:
What do you mean be "ginamit".
a. I was raped, sir.
Atty. Danan:
Ginamit, ginahasa, rape.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
I was raped by my father.
q. When you said you were raped by your father, you are referring to the accused in this case,
Alfredo Pangilinan?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
How were you raped by your father?
a. It was night time, sir, my brother and sisters, sir, including me, sir, were already sleeping, I just felt
that my father was removing my short.
q. Where were you then at the time when you felt that your father was removing your short?
a. I was in my bed, sir.
q. You said a while ago that night time, what time more or less of the night?
a. Between the hours of 9 and 10 oclock in the evening, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
We would like to make on record that the witness is crying at the time she is testifying.
Court:
Take note of that. The Court has observed that the witness is crying.
Prosec. Tanciongco:

And where were your brother and sisters at that time that your father was molesting you?
a. They were already sleeping, sir.
q. Were were your brother and sisters sleeping at that time?
a. Upstairs, sir.
q. Where were you sleeping?
a. Upstairs also, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
How about your father, where was he sleeping?
a. Also upstairs, sir.
q. In relation to your father, where were you sleeping? In what part of the house were you sleeping?
Court:
Sama-sama ba kayo?
a. We were in the same room, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
Now, according to you your father was removing your shorts, was he able to remove your shorts?
a. Yes, sir.
q. What else did your father do aside from removing your shorts if he did anything?
Witness:
He raised my clothes, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
How about you, what were you doing at that time that he raised your clothes and removing your
shorts, what were you doing then?
a. I was preventing him from doing so, but he was so strong I cannot control him.
q. After the accused, your father raised your shirt, what happened next?
a. I was fighting back sir, but both of my hands were pinned by him.

q. You mean both of your hands were pinned by your father?

a. Yes, sir.
q. And then what happened to you?
Witness:
Sumigaw po ako. "Inang, inang tulungan po ninyo ako inaasawa po ako ng papa ko." (I was
shouting. "Inang, inang tulungan po ninyo ako, inaasawa po ako ng Papa ko.")
xxxx
Witness:
Hindi pa rin niya po ako tinitigilan, tapos po sumisikad na po ako, hindi pa rin po siya umaalis. Tapos
po hinahalikan niya ang suso ko.
Court:
You translate it first.
Court Interpreter:
He still continued with what he was doing, I am kicking him, but he is (sic) continue to kiss my
breast, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
What else did the accused do if any, aside from kissing your breast?
a. He followed my vagina, sir.
Court:
What do you mean by that?
Prosec. Tanciongco:
What do you mean by that when you said, "he followed your vagina?
Witness:
He placed himself on top of me, sir.
q. What happened when he was on top of you?
a. Tapos po kumikinyud po siya sa akin. (He was pumping, sir.)

q. How long was he pumping if you know?

a. Less than five (5) minutes, sir.
q. Now, after he was pumping, what happened next?
a. Hindi niya makuha ang gusto niya. Umalis na po siya. (He was not able to succeed of what he
wanted to do, so he left)
Court:
What do you mean?
Prosec. Tanciongco?
Why?
Witness:
Because I was fighting back, sir.
q. Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
a. He was forcing to insert it, sir.
q. But he was not able to completely insert his penis?
xxxx
Court:
Yes, that is the question. And the answer is, Yes, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
Now, after that, what happened?
a. The following evening, sir, the same thing was also repeated by my father. He repeated what he
had done to me.
q. When you said the same thing was repeated what do you mean?
Witness:
He repeated what he had done on the first night.
Prosec. Tanciongco:

Can you tell this Honorable Court, what was that same thing that was done to you again by your
father?
a. He removed my pants and panty and raised my clothes, sir.
q. What were you doing then at the time your father was doing that?
a. I was shouting and struggling, sir, because my father was very heavy.
q. What time more or less of the night was that done by your father?
a. Between ten (10) to eleven (11), sir.
q. Where were your brother and sisters at that time while your father was doing that to you?
a. There were sleeping during that time, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
And your father was the only person awake at that time?
a. Yes, sir.
q. Now, after that he raised your skirt and removed your shorts and panty, what happened next?
a. I was shouting sir, but he was covering my mouth, sir.
q. Covering your mouth?
a. Yes, sir.
q. After that what happened next?
a. He was kissing my breast, sir, then he placed himself on top of me, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
How about you, when he placed himself on top of you, what were you doing?
a. I was kicking my feet, sir.
q. After he was on top of you, can you tell us what was he doing when he was on top of you?
a. He was pumping, sir.
q. While he was pumping, what happened?
a. He was able to take my virginity, sir.

Court:
What do you mean by, he was able to take your virginity?
a. He was able to completely penetrate his penis inside my vagina, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
How about you when you feel that he was able to completely penetrate his penis inside your vagina,
what is your reaction? How do you feel?
Witness:
Its painful, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
What did you do?
a. After his penetration a thick fluid came out from his penis.26
question:
Now, while you were there at your house in the month of January 1997, by the way in the first week
of January to be specific, Your Honor, do you recall of any incident that happened to you?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
question:
Will you please tell that before this Honorable Court?
answer:
I was raped by my father, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
You are referring to the accused Alfredo Pangilinan, in this case?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
question:

Where were you raped by your father?

answer:
In our house, sir.
question:
In what portion of your house were you raped by your father?
answer:
Upstairs, sir.
question:
What time more or less were you raped by your father?
answer:
Between the hours of ten (10) to eleven (11) oclock in the evening, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
In the evening or in the morning?
answer:
In the evening, sir.
question:
Can you tell this Honorable Court, how were you [raped] by your father?
answer:
I was sleeping then and suddenly I felt my father was removing my clothes including my short and
panty and he was raising my shirt, sir. And then, I felt he was on top of me.
question:
By the way, what was your father wearing at that time?
answer:
He was wearing shorts, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:

At that time that he was on top of you, was he wearing anything?

answer:
No more, sir.
question:
Now, at the time he was removing your panty, raised your shirt, what did you do?
answer:
I was fighting back, sir. I was kicking and pushing him, but he was so heavy so I cant push him, sir.
question:
When you stated that he was on top of you, what happened when he was on top of you?
Witness:
He was pumping, sir.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
While he was pumping, what were you doing at that time?
answer:
I was pushing him sir, but he was so heavy, I was not able to push him.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
I would like to make of record that the witness is crying while testifying.
Court:
Make that on record.
Prosec. Tanciongco:
Now, while he was pumping and you were trying to push him and failed to do so, what happened
next?
Witness:
Something sticky came out from him, sir. And then, he stopped. 27

This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature
deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being
subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong
committed against her.28 Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. 29 It is highly improbable
that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a
crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. 30 A rape victims testimony against her parent
is entitled to great weight since Filipino children have a natural reverence and respect for their
elders. These values are so deeply ingrained in Filipino families and it is unthinkable for a daughter
to brazenly concoct a story of rape against her, if such were not true. 31 Her credibility was bolstered
beyond reproach by her spontaneous emotional breakdown during trial. 32
In this case, considering that the victim was of tender age, has undergone a harrowing experience,
and has exposed herself to the rigors of public trial, we find it very unlikely that she would impute so
grave a crime to her father.
Appellants contention that it is impossible for him to have consummated the rapes in the "upstairs
room" without her brother and two sisters becoming aware thereof is untenable.
It has been oft said that lust is no respecter of time or place. Neither the crampness of the room, nor
the presence of other people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held sufficient and
effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape.33 There have been too many instances when rape
was committed under circumstances as indiscreet and audacious as a room full of family members
sleeping side by side.34 There is no rule that a woman can only be raped in seclusion. 35 As testified to
by the private complainant, her brother and two sisters were sleeping soundly and were not
awakened by the commotion36 She further said that when the rape was perpetrated on 5 January
1997, her mother was in the sala downstairs sleeping while her father proceeded upstairs to commit
the dastardly act on her.37 With her brother and sisters sleeping soundly, and her mother sleeping
downstairs (during the rape committed on 5 January 1997), appellant had all the opportunity to carry
out, which he did, his dissolute plan.
Appellants argument that the delay of more than one (1) year from September 1995 and more than
two (2) months from January 1997 before reporting the sexual attacks to her maternal relatives,
mother or to the authorities is a clear indication that the claimed sexual assaults never happened
does not persuade.
The delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is neither
unknown nor uncommon. Particularly in incestuous rape, this Court has consistently held that delay
in reporting the offense is not indicative of a fabricated charge.38 It has been repeatedly held that the
delay in reporting a rape incident due to death threats cannot be taken against the victim. 39 The fact
of delay does not necessarily lead to an acquittal. In several cases we have decided, 40 the delay
lasted for two years or more; nevertheless, the victims were found to be credible. The charge of rape
is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained.
Private complainant was only 10 years old when she was sexually molested by her father in
September 1995 and 11 years old when her father satisfied his bestial desire in January 1997.
Private complainant explained to the satisfaction of the Court why she did not immediately report the
matter to anybody. She disclosed that she is afraid of her father and that the latter threatened to kill
her and her siblings if she would report the matter. Though she told her eight-year old brother of her

ordeal, her brother likewise did not report to the authorities because he was also afraid of his
father. 41 She added that she really wanted to tell her mother after she arrived from abroad but every
time she went near her mother, her father kept staring at her. Exercising moral ascendancy and
influence over his children, appellant clearly instilled fear in them, causing them not to go to the
authorities. Her unwillingness to report which caused the delay does not diminish her credibility or
weaken the charge of rape.
Appellant further attacks private complainants credibility because the latters declaration in her
sworn statement as to how she reported the incidents contradicted her testimony in court. In her
sworn statement,42 it was stated that she reported the rapes to her mother in January 1997, but in
her testimony in court, she said that she reported the matter on 16 March 1997.
Settled is the rule that affidavits, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer or due to partial suggestions,
and are thus generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. 43 In the instant
case, the said contradiction between private complainants sworn statement and her statement in
court was fully explained by her. She made it clear in court that this portion of her sworn statement
was wrong and what was correct was her declaration in court. She explained in court that she
informed the investigator about the mistake in her sworn statement but the latter told her to just sign
it and that he will change this portion. However, the investigator never corrected the same. 44Having
fully explained the discrepancy, her credibility has not been impaired.
Appellant ascribes to private complainant several alleged material inconsistencies that affect the
veracity of private complainants testimony. These are: (1) whether the rapes were committed inside
or outside the room in the "upstairs" portion of their house; (2) whether private complainant was able
to shout or utter the words "Inang, inang tulungan po ninyo ako inaasawa po ako ng papa ko"; (3)
whether the sticky fluid coming out of her fathers penis was ejected inside or outside her vagina;
and (4) whether it was private complainant or her grandmother who told Dr. Melinda Layug that she
was abused.
These inconsistencies refer to minor and collateral matters. Inconsistencies in the testimony of the
witness with regard to minor or collateral matters do not diminish the value of his testimony in terms
of truthfulness or weight. The gravamen of the felony is the carnal knowledge by the appellant of the
private complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. Where the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime, such
inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to. 45 In fact,
these inconsistencies bolster the credibility of the witnesss testimony as they erase the suspicion of
the witness having been coached or rehearsed.46 It is when the testimony appears totally flawless
that a court might have some misgiving on its veracity. This is especially true in rape cases where
victims are not expected to have a total recall of the incident.47
Appellant tries to utilize the first and second inconsistencies in order to show that the rapes could not
have happened in a room in the presence and within hearing distance of other people. As discussed
above, a rape can be committed inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the
same room where there are other members of the family who are sleeping. More importantly, what is
clear from the evidence adduced is the fact that, regardless of whether private complainant was able
to shout or not, appellant was shown to have carnal knowledge of private complainant in the room
located in the "upstairs" portion of their house.

On the third inconsistency, appellant makes a big fuss as to where appellants sperm was ejected.
Whether the sperm was ejected inside or outside the vagina of private complainant is of no moment.
It is clear from the testimony of private complainant that appellant already consummated the crime of
rape when the latter tried to insert his sexual organ into her vagina during the first time that he
molested her because his penis already touched her hymen. 48 It is a settled rule that for rape to be
consummated, the hymen of the private complainant need not be penetrated or ruptured. It is
enough that the penis reaches the pudendum, or at the very least, the labia. The briefest of contacts
under circumstances of force, intimidation or unconsciousness, even without laceration of the
hymen, is deemed to be rape in our jurisprudence. The mere introduction of the penis into the
aperture of the female organ, thereby touching the labia of the pudendum, already consummates the
crime of rape.49
As to the last inconsistency regarding the person who informed Dr. Melinda Layug that private
complainant had been abused, we find this to be very trivial as to affect her credibility.
To support his claim that private complainant was not a victim of rape, appellant uses the answer
elicited from Dr. Layug that she had not observed any physical violence or force perpetrated on the
body of private complainant, specifically on the area surrounding the private organ.
This is not sufficient to exonerate him. The trial court addressed this issue in this wise:
As to the absence of violence, accused pointed out that the physical examination revealed that there
were no signs of violence. This is understandable since the offense took place in September 1995
and January 5, 1997 while the physical examination was conducted on March 17, 1997 or almost
two (2) years and two (2) months, respectively. Whatever signs of physical violence or
wounds/injuries there may be at the time of the commission of the offense the same had healed in
time.50
Though there were no longer physical manifestations of violence outside the sexual organ of private
complainant, there was, however, an indication that the vagina had been injured. 51 The medical
certificate issued52 by Dr. Layug contains, among other things, a finding that reads "Internal
Examination revealed non-parous introitus with old healed hymenal laceration at 4 oclock position."
The finding that the victim had a healed laceration at 4 oclock position on her hymen substantiates
her claim that appellant had sexual intercourse with her. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or
fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. 53] And when the consistent and forthright
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a
conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established. 54]
Against a deluge of damning evidence from the prosecution, appellant merely raises the defense of
denial. He denies sexually molesting her daughter. He even claimed that private complainant
seduced him and wanted to have sex with him, but he refused.
His defense, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Mere denial, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
value than the positive testimony of a rape victim. 55 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a negative and
self-serving assertion.56 The trial court had this to say:
It is unbelievable for a ten (10)-year old girl to be as malicious as accused described the offended
party. At age ten (10), girls still play games that children normally play, but definitely not sex. If

indeed accused had good relationship with the offended party, he would not destroy the reputation or
character of his daughter just to save himself from punishment of his immoral and bestial act.
Following his line of defense, offended party would not file charges against the accused had the
latter treated her well, respected her as a child and cared for her like a precious jewel. Had the
offended party enjoyed this treatment and did not suffer in his hands, the former would not have any
reason nor have a heart to file charges against the (latter). x x x.57
Moreover, appellants statement that he does not know of any reason why his daughter filed the rape
charges58further bolstered the credibility of private complainant. When there is no evidence to show
any improper motive on the part of the rape victim to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely
implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of
full faith and credence.59
Since the felonies were committed in September 1995 and in January 1997, the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7659,60 which was the law in effect on the day when the rapes were committed,
shall apply.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without consent.
If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force is not an element of statutory rape, but the
absence of a free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is
proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse
must be proven and also that it was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat. 61
As provided for in the Revised Penal Code,62 sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is
statutory rape. The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of
a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12
years old is always rape.63
In the present case, appellant was charged with two counts of statutory rape. The first element was
proved by the testimony of the victim herself, while the second element was established by
appellants admission and the presentation of private complainants Certificate of Live Birth 64 showing
that she was born on 9 May 1985. When the crimes were committed in September 1995 and in
January 1997, private complainant was not yet 12 years old.
For one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one of the attendant circumstances mentioned in
Article 33565must be alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial.66 In the instant case,
since the attendant circumstances of the victims minority and her relationship with the offender have
been properly alleged in the informations and established during trial, the trial courts imposition of
the penalty of death on appellant is justified.
With the effectivity,67 however, of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been
prohibited. Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the penalty to be meted on appellant shall be reclusion
perpetua. Said section reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature
of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant, he is not eligible for parole
following Section 3 of said law which provides:
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
As regards the award of damages, the same must be modified. The P50,000.00 awarded by the trial
court as civil indemnity was correctly increased by the Court of Appeals to P75,000.00 which is the
amount awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death
penalty.68 With respect to the award of moral damages, the P50,000.00 awarded by the Court of
Appeals should be increased to P75,000.00 without need of pleading or proof of basis thereof.69 In
addition, the amount of P25,000.00 awarded by the Court of Appeals as exemplary damages was
proper due to the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. 70
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16
November 2005 finding appellant Alfredo Pangilinan y Trinidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two counts of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that each penalty of death
imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346. He is also ordered to pay private complainant AAA, for each count of rape,
the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 163972-77

March 28, 2008

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170,
24195-24196,1questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as
follows:
Said accused,2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three
counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00,
respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given
period making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall

building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they
did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this
Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the
same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and
voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not
acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the
lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of
"guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of
the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private
individual. The prosecution explained:
"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by a private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused,
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts."
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer
of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts because:
"x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per
official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the
damage caused to the government has already been restituted x x x. 3
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,4 dated March 25, 2004, denied petitioners
Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground
that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval.5
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated
May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea
bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely
affixed his signature on the payrolls on a "routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the
amount involved is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.6
The petition is meritorious.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. 7
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2,
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pretrial conference,8 viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a
shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of
the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they
cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of
this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished
presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution
already presented several witnesses.9

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining
may be made,i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,10 and
that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an
exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. 11 Trial
courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience
of the accused.12
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,13 the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead
guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court, 14 viz:
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor
with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v.
Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only
when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In
his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373,
377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court
could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty
to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the
record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a
plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for
compromise, much less bargaining.15 (Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise
of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical
exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.16
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner
and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the
public. TheSandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the
seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public
office that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would
have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far
outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the
laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government."17
1avvphi1

Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer.
However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea

offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity
jurisdiction Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts
of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by
different courts.18
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, 19 in order to afford
equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,20 the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated March 14, 2007,
approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of the accused,
Charlie "Atong" Ang. The agreement provided that the accused undertakes to assist in the
prosecution of the case and promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea
Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea
bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of
"not guilty"; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser
offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in
the offense charged, which is Plunder.21
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not
be applied to the present case. Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its
Memorandum dated August 16, 2002, the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the
total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated
February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by
the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover,
the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused, the
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After
all, the movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed
as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. 22
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account
by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents
and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following elements must

concur: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with
the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.23
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (b) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document. 24
As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties
of his office; (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or
property.25 Article 217 also provides that the failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such
public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, "shall be prima facieevidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use." In this regard, it has been ruled that
once such presumption is rebutted, then it is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never
deemed to have existed at all.26
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render Account by an
Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following
elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender must be an accountable
officer for public funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render
accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a
period of two months after such accounts should be rendered. 27
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is included in the other,
to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And
vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.28
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner
liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner
may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not
appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and
payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation

of Public Funds, while the Informations contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation
against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still
be held liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to
render account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting
within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his
duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local government
funds,29 not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in
this case. Unlike Estradawhich involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,30 and a
whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in
comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a
discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the
imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31, 2004
are SETASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea
Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195956

March 11, 2015

ABS-CBN CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
FELIPE GOZON, GILBERTO R. DUAVIT, JR., MARISSA L. FLORES, JESSICA A. SORO, GRACE
DELA PENA-REYES, JOHN OLIVER T. MANALASTAS, JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The main issue in this case is whether there is probable cause to charge respondents with
infringement under Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code. The
resolution of this issue requires clarification of the concept of "copyrightable material" in relation to
material that is rebroadcast live as a news story. We are also asked to rule on whether criminal
prosecution for infringement of copyrightable material, such as live rebroadcast, can be negated by
good faith.
ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN) filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari to assail the November
9, 2010 Decision and the March 3, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
reinstated the Department of Justice Resolution dated August 1, 2005 that ordered the withdrawal of
1

the Information finding probable cause for respondents violation of Sections 177 and 211 of the
Intellectual Property Code. Respondents are officers and employees of GMA Network, Inc. (GMA-7).
They are: Felipe Gozon (Gozon), GMA-7 President; Gilberto R. Duavit, Jr. (Duavit, Jr.), Executive
Vice-President; Marissa L. Flores (Flores), Vice-President for New and Public Affairs; Jessica A.
Soho (Soho), Director for News; Grace Dela Pea-Reyes (Dela Pea-Reyes), Head of News and
Public Affairs; John Oliver Manalastas (Manalastas), Program Manager; and others.
4

The controversy arose from GMA-7s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino overseas
worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz on July 22, 2004. As summarized by the Court of
Appeals:
Overseas Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition for
his release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he
was released by his captors and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July
2004. Occasioned by said homecoming and the public interest it generated, both . . . GMA Network,
Inc. . . . and [petitioner] made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event.
7

ABS-CBN "conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz
at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and the subsequent press conference." ABS-CBN
allowed Reuters Television Service (Reuters) to air the footages it had taken earlier under a special
embargo agreement.
8

ABS-CBN alleged that under the special embargo agreement, any of the footages it took would be
for the "use of Reuters international subscribers only, and shall be considered and treated by
Reuters under embargo against use by other subscribers in the Philippines. . . . [N]o other
Philippine subscriber of Reuters would be allowed to use ABS-CBN footage without the latters
consent."
10

GMA-7, to which Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, Soho, Dela Pea-Reyes, and Manalastas are
connected, "assigned and stationed news reporters and technical men at the NAIA for its live
broadcast and non-live news coverage of the arrival of dela Cruz." GMA-7 subscribes to both
Reuters and Cable News Network (CNN). It received a live video feed of the coverage of Angelo
dela Cruzs arrival from Reuters.
11

12

GMA-7 immediately carried the live news feed in its program "Flash Report," together with its live
broadcast. Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing
footages of ABS-CBN. GMA-7s news control room staff saw neither the "No Access Philippines"
notice nor a notice that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS-CBN.
13

14

15

On August 13, 2004, ABS-CBN filed the Complaint for copyright infringement under Sections
177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code.
16

17

18

On December 3, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanza issued the Resolution finding
probable cause to indict Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas. Consequently, the Information for
violation of the Intellectual Property Code was filed on December 17, 2004. It reads:
19

20

21

That on or about the 22nd of July 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, being the Head of News
Operations and the Program Manager, respectively, for the News and Public Affairs Department of
GMA Network, Inc., did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use and broadcast the
footage of the arrival of Angelo [d]ela Cruz at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport of which ABSCBN holds the exclusive ownership and copyright by then and there using, airing, and broadcasting

the said footage in its news program "FLASH REPORT" without first obtaining the consent or
authority of said copyright owner, to their damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.

22

On January 4, 2005, respondents filed the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. In
the Resolution (Gonzalez Resolution) dated August 1, 2005, Department of Justice Secretary Raul
M. Gonzalez (Secretary Gonzalez) ruled in favor of respondents and held that good faith may be
raised as a defense in the case. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
23

24

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY GMA-7 in I.S. No. 04-10458 is considered
meritorious and is hereby GRANTED. This case is hereby Dismissed, the resolution of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby reversed and the same is ordered to withdraw the information if
any and report action taken to this office within ten (10) days. (Emphasis in the original)
25

Both parties moved for reconsideration of the Gonzalez Resolution.

26

Meanwhile, on January 19, 2005, the trial court granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed
earlier by Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas. The trial court Order reads:
27

Perusing the motion, the court finds that a petition for review was filed with the Department of Justice
on January 5, 2005 as confirmed by the public prosecutor. Under Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, once a petition for review is filed with the Department of Justice, a
suspension of the criminal proceedings may be allowed by the court.
Accordingly, to allow the Department of Justice the opportunity to act on said petition for review, let
the proceedings on this case be suspended for a period of sixty (60) days counted from January 5,
2005, the date the petition was filed with the Department of Justice. The arraignment of the accused
on February 1, 2005 is accordingly cancelled. Let the arraignment be rescheduled to March 8, 2005
at 8:30 a.m. The accused through counsel are notified in open court.
SO ORDERED.

28

On June 29, 2010, Department of Justice Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra (Secretary Agra) issued
the Resolution (Agra Resolution) that reversed the Gonzalez Resolution and found probable cause
to charge Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas for violation of the Intellectual Property
Code. Secretary Agra also found probable cause to indict Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho for
the same violation. He ruled that:
29

30

[w]hile good faith may be a defense in copyright infringement, the same is a disputable presumption
that must be proven in a full-blown trial. Disputable presumptions may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence. Thus, a full-blown trial is the proper venue where facts, issues and
laws are evaluated and considered. The very purpose of trial is to allow a party to present evidence
to overcome the disputable presumptions involved.
31

The dispositive portion of the Agra Resolution provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered:
(a) The Motion for Reconsideration filed by appellees ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
(ABS-CBN) of our Resolution promulgated on August 1, 2005 (Resolution No. 364, Series of

2005) and the Petition for Review filed by complainant-appellant ABS-CBN in I.S. No. 0410458 on April10, 2006, are GRANTED and the City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby
ordered to file the necessary Information for violation of Section 177 and 211 of Republic Act
No. 8293 against GMA-7. Felipe L. Gozon, Gilberto R. Duavit, Jr., Marissa L.Flores, Jessica
A. Soho, Grace Dela Pena-Reyes, John Oliver T. Manalastas[.]
....
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
32

Respondents assailed the Agra Resolution through the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction on September 2, 2010 before
the Court of Appeals. In the Resolution dated September 13, 2010, the Court of Appeals granted the
temporary restraining order preventing the Department of Justice from enforcing the Agra
Resolution.
33

On November 9, 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision granting the Petition and
reversing and setting aside the Agra Resolution. The Court of Appeals held that Secretary Agra
committed errors of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolution. Resolving the issue of copyright
infringement, the Court of Appeals said:
34

Surely, private respondent has a copyright of its news coverage. Seemingly, for airing said video
feed, petitioner GMA is liable under the provisions of the Intellectual Property Code, which was
enacted purposely to protect copyright owners from infringement. However, it is an admitted fact that
petitioner GMA had only aired a five (5) second footage of the disputed live video feed that it had
received from Reuters and CNN as a subscriber. Indeed, petitioners had no notice of the right of
ownership of private respondent over the same. Without notice of the "No Access Philippines"
restriction of the live video feed, petitioner cannot be faulted for airing a live video feed from Reuters
and CNN.
Verily, as aptly opined by Secretary Gonzalez in his earlier Resolution, the act of petitioners in airing
the five (5) second footage was undeniably attended by good faith and it thus serves to exculpate
them from criminal liability under the Code. While the Intellectual Property Code is a special law, and
thus generally categorized as malum prohibitum, it bears to stress that the provisions of the Code
itself do not ipso facto penalize a person or entity for copyright infringement by the mere fact that
one had used a copyrighted work or material.
Certainly so, in the exercise of ones moral and economic or copyrights, the very provisions of Part
IV of the Intellectual Property Code provide for the scope and limitations on copyright protection
under Section 184 and in fact permit fair use of copyrighted work under Section 185. With the
aforesaid statutory limitations on ones economic and copyrights and the allowable instances where
the other persons can legally use a copyrighted work, criminal culpability clearly attaches only when
the infringement had been knowingly and intentionally committed. (Emphasis supplied)
35

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
Resolution dated 29 June 2010 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the earlier Resolution
dated 1 August 2005, which ordered the withdrawal of the Information filed, if any, against the
petitioners for violation of Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code, is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

36

ABS-CBNs Motion for Reconsideration was denied. It then filed its Petition for Review before this
court assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
37

38

The issues for this courts consideration are:

First, whether Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction in the Resolution dated June 29, 2010
and, therefore, whether a petition for certiorari was the proper remedy in assailing that Resolution;
Second, whether news footage is copyrightable under the law;
Third, whether there was fair use of the broadcast material;
Fourth, whether lack of knowledge that a material is copyrighted is a defense against copyright
infringement;
Fifth, whether good faith is a defense in a criminal prosecution for violation of the Intellectual
Property Code; and
Lastly, whether the Court of Appeals was correct in overturning Secretary Agras finding of probable
cause.
I
The trial court granted respondents Motion to Suspend Proceedings and deferred respondents Dela
Pea-Reyes and Manalastas arraignment for 60 days in view of the Petition for Review filed before
the Department of Justice.
Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows
the suspension of the accuseds arraignment in certain circumstances only:
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension
shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. (12a) (Emphasis supplied)

In Samson v. Daway, this court acknowledged the applicability of Rule 116, Section (c) in a criminal
prosecution for infringement under the Intellectual Property Code. However, this court emphasized
the limits of the order of deferment under the Rule:
39

While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the . . .
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the
trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
40

We clarify that the suspension of the arraignment should always be within the limits allowed by law.
In Crespo v. Judge Mogul, this court outlined the effects of filing an information before the trial court,
which includes initiating a criminal action and giving this court "authority to hear and determine the
case":
41

42

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion
the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been
brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, the only qualification is that the action of the
Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process
of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the
Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the
trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon
the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state
prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does
not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the
prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice. The answer is
simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his
opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether
the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of
appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he
abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire
proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the
prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but
still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution
of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial

court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination
of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
43

The doctrine in Crespo was reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of Appeals, where this court
reminded the Department of Justice Secretary to refrain from entertaining petitions for review when
the case is already pending with this court:
44

[I]n order to avoid a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action
of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal,
when the complaint or information has already been filed in the Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.
45

The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas
arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the Department
of Justice on March 8, 2005. It was only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order
was issued by the Court of Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case
during the interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned in
denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the arraignment "disregards the
requirements of due process [and] erodes the Courts independence and integrity."
46

II
According to ABS-CBN, the Court of Appeals erred in finding that: a motion for reconsideration was
not necessary before a petition for certiorari could be filed; the Department of Justice Secretary
committed errors of jurisdiction since the Agra Resolution was issued within its authority and in
accordance with settled laws and jurisprudence; and respondents were not liable for copyright
infringement.
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals found that respondents committed a procedural error
when they failed to file a motion for reconsideration before filing the Petition for Certiorari. However,
the Court of Appeals held that a motion for reconsideration was unnecessary since the Agra
Resolution was a patent nullity and it would have been useless under the circumstances: Given that
a reading of the assailed Resolution and the instant records readily reveals errors of jurisdiction on
the part of respondent Secretary, direct judicial recourse is warranted under the circumstances.
Aside from the fact that said Resolution is a patent nullity having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is
evidently useless on account of the fact that the issues and arguments before this Court have
already been duly raised and accordingly delved into by respondent Secretary in his disposition of
the petition a quo. (Emphasis in the original)
47

In Elma v. Jacobi, this court ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
proper when assailing adverse resolutions of the Department of Justice stemming from the
determination of probable cause. However, grave abuse of discretion must be alleged.
48

49

50

In Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, this court stressed the prosecutors role in determining probable
cause. Judicial review will only lie when it is shown that the prosecutor acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction:
51

A prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause
justifying the filing of a criminal information against the respondent. By way of exception, however,
judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed
grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise stated, such review is appropriate only when the prosecutor
has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. (Citations omitted)
52

Grave abuse of discretion refers to:

such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
53

Resorting to certiorari requires that there be there be "no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law[,]" such as a motion for reconsideration. Generally, "a motion
for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose
being to grant an opportunity for the [tribunal or officer] to correct any error attributed to it by a reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case." However, exceptions to the rule
exist:
54

55

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the Court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests
of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial Court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)
56

As argued by respondents, "[a] second motion for reconsideration would have been useless and
futile since the D[epartment] [of] J[ustice] had already passed upon the same issues twice." Equally
pressing under the circumstances was the need to resolve the matter, as the Informations filing
would lead to respondents imminent arrest.
57

58

Moreover, Department of Justice Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, or the 2000 NPS
Rules on Appeal, provides that no second motion for reconsideration of the Department of Justice
Secretarys resolution shall be entertained:
SECTION 13. Motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on appeal, furnishing
the adverse party and the Prosecution Office concerned with copies thereof and submitting proof of
such service. No second or further motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
The Agra Resolution was the result of respondents Motion for Reconsideration assailing the
Gonzalez Resolution. To file a motion for reconsideration of the Agra Resolution would be

superfluous. Respondents were, therefore, correct in filing the Petition for Certiorari of the Agra
Resolution before the Court of Appeals.
III
The Court of Appeals ruled that Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction, which then required
the grant of the writ of certiorari:
So viewed, by ordering the filing of information without proof that probable cause exists to charge
petitioners with a crime, respondent Secretary clearly committed an error of jurisdiction thus
warranting the issuance of the writ of certiorari. Surely, probable cause cannot be had when the very
provisions of the statute exculpates criminal liability in cases classified as fair use of copyrighted
materials. The fact that they admittedly used the Reuters live video feed is not, as a matter of
course, tantamount to copyright infringement that would justify the filing of an information against the
petitioners.
59

Error of jurisdiction must be distinguished from error of judgment:

A line must be drawn between errors of judgment and errors of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is
one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders an
order or judgment void or voidable. Errors of jurisdiction are reviewable on certiorari; errors of
judgment, only by appeal.
60

In People v. Hon. Sandiganbayan :

61

An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdictionis one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued
to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. (Emphasis supplied)
62

This court has adopted a deferential attitude towards review of the executives finding of probable
cause. This is based "not only upon the respect for the investigatory and [prosecutorial] powers
granted by the Constitution to the executive department but upon practicality as well." Review of the
Department of Justice Secretarys decision or resolution will be allowed only when grave abuse of
discretion is alleged:
63

64

The full discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to

ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of information rests with the executive branch. Hence, judicial
review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination whether there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Courts cannot
substitute the executive branchs judgment.
....
It is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the
case in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of
Appeals decision may then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on
certiorari. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
65

In this case, it must be shown that Secretary Agra exceeded his authority when he reversed the
findings of Secretary Gonzalez. This court must determine whether there is probable cause to file an
information for copyright infringement under the Intellectual Property Code.
IV
Probable cause pertains to "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof." Preliminary investigation
is the inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is probable cause.
66

67

In Webb v. De Leon, this court ruled that determination of probable cause during preliminary
investigation does not require trial-like evaluation of evidence since existence of probable cause
does not equate to guilt:
68

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his
knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men
have an abundance.
....
. . . A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
69

In Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., finding probable cause is not equivalent to finding with moral
certainty that the accused committed the crime:
70

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense.
71

During preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor does not adjudicate on the parties rights,
obligations, or liabilities.
72

In the recent case of Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., we reiterated Webb on the
determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation and traced the history of probable
cause as borrowed from American jurisprudence:
73

The purpose in determining probable cause is to make sure that the courts are not clogged with
weak cases that will only be dismissed, as well as to spare a person from the travails of a needless
prosecution.
....
. . . In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing
definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These
are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly
correlative to what must be proved.
"The substance of all the definitions" of probable cause "is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt."
McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. St. 63, 69, quoted with approval in the Carroll opinion. 267 U. S. at
161. And this "means less than evidence which would justify condemnation" or conviction, as
Marshall, C. J., said for the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339,
348. Since Marshalls time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable
cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the officers] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132, 162.
These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway
for enforcing the law in the communitys protection. Because many situations which confront officers
in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some
mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading
sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, non technical
conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often
opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to
leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers whim or caprice.
In the Philippines, there are four instances in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure where
probable cause is needed to be established:
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer, to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation
is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to the fine;
(2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge, to determine whether a warrant of arrest or
a commitment order, if the accused has already been arrested, shall be issued and that there
is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice;
(3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113:By a peace officer or a private person making a warrantless
arrest when an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge, to determine whether a search warrant shall be
issued, and only upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In all these instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is based only on the
likelihood, or probability, of guilt.
74

Estrada also highlighted that a "[p]reliminary investigation is not part of the criminal action. It is
merely preparatory and may even be disposed of in certain situations."
75

To determine whether there is probable cause that respondents committed copyright infringement, a
review of the elements of the crime, including the existing facts, is required.
V
ABS-CBN claims that news footage is subject to copyright and prohibited use of copyrighted material
is punishable under the Intellectual Property Code. It argues that the new footage is not a
"newsworthy event" but "merely an account of the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz in the Philippines
the latter being the newsworthy event":
76

To be clear, it is the event itself or the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz which is not copyrightable because
that is the newsworthy event. However, any footage created from the event itself, in this case the
arrival of Angelo dela Cruz, are intellectual creations which are copyrightable. Thus, the footage
created by ABS-CBN during the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz, which includes the statements of Dindo
Amparo, are copyrightable and protected by the laws on copyright.
77

On the other hand, respondents argue that ABS-CBNs news footage of Angelo dela Cruzs arrival is
not copyrightable or subject to protection:
Certainly, the arrival of Angelo [d]ela Cruz, which aroused public attention and the consciousness of
the Filipino people with regard to their countrymen, OFWs working in foreign countries and how the
Philippine government responds to the issues concerning them, is "news". There is no ingenuity or
inventiveness added in the said news footage. The video footage of this "news" is not copyrightable
by any legal standard as facts of everyday life depicted in the news and items of press information is
part of the public domain. (Emphasis in the original)
78

The news footage is copyrightable.

The Intellectual Property Code is clear about the rights afforded to authors of various kinds of work.
Under the Code, "works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or
form of expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose." These include "[a]udiovisual
works and cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography
or any process for making audiovisual recordings."
79

80

Contrary to the old copyright law, the Intellectual Property Code does not require registration of the
work to fully recover in an infringement suit. Nevertheless, both copyright laws provide that copyright
for a work is acquired by an intellectual creator from the moment of creation.
81

82

It is true that under Section 175 of the Intellectual Property Code, "news of the day and other
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information" are considered
unprotected subject matter. However, the Code does not state that expression of the news of the
day, particularly when it underwent a creative process, is not entitled to protection.
83

An idea or event must be distinguished from the expression of that idea or event. An idea has been
likened to a ghost in that it "must be spoken to a little before it will explain itself." It is a concept that
has eluded exact legal definition. To get a better grasp of the idea/expression dichotomy, the
etymology of the term "idea" is traced:
84

85

The word "idea" is derived from a Greek term, meaning "a form, the look or appearance of a thing as
opposed to its reality, from idein, to see." In the Timaeus, Plato saw ideas as eternal paradigms,
independent objects to which the divine demiurge looks as patterns in forming the world. This was
later modified to the religious conception of ideas as the thoughts of God. "It is not a very long step
to extend the term idea to cover patterns, blueprints, or plans in anyone's mind, not only in Gods."
The word entered the French and English vernacular in the 1600s and possessed two meanings.
The first was the Platonic meaning of a perfect exemplar or paradigm. The second, which probably
has its origin with Descartes, is of a mental concept or image or, more broadly, any object of the
mind when it is active. Objects of thought may exist independently. The sun exists (probably) before
and after you think of it. But it is also possible to think of things that have never existed, such as a
unicorn or Pegasus. John Locke defined ideas very comprehensively, to include: all objects of the
mind. Language was a way of translating the invisible, hidden ideas that make up a persons
thoughts into the external, perceptible world of articulate sounds and visible written symbols that
others can understand. (Citations omitted) There is no one legal definition of "idea" in this
jurisdiction. The term "idea" is mentioned only once in the Intellectual Property Code. In Joaquin, Jr.
v. Drilon, a television format (i.e., a dating show format) is not copyrightable under Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 49; it is a mere concept:
86

87

88

89

P.D. No. 49, 2, in enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to finished works and not to
concepts. The copyright does not extend to an idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work. Thus, the new INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES provides:
SEC. 175. Unprotected Subject Matter.Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 172 and 173, no
protection shall extend, under this law, to any idea, procedure, system, method or operation,
concept, principle, discovery or mere data as such, even if they are expressed, explained, illustrated
or embodied in a work; news of the day and other miscellaneous facts having the character of mere
items of press information; or any official text of a legislative, administrative or legal nature, as well
as any official translation thereof.
What then is the subject matter of petitioners copyright? This Court is of the opinion that petitioner
BJPIs copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling within
the class of works mentioned in P.D. 49, 2(M),to wit:
Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any
process for making audio-visual recordings;
The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of its dating game show. Accordingly,
by the very nature of the subject of petitioner BJPIs copyright, the investigating prosecutor should
have the opportunity to compare the videotapes of the two shows.
Mere description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is insufficient; the
presentation of the master videotape in evidence was indispensable to the determination of the
existence of probable cause. As aptly observed by respondent Secretary of Justice:
A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a whole
spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or dissimilarity may be found
by merely describing the general copyright/format of both dating game shows. (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
90

Ideas can be either abstract or concrete. It is the concrete ideas that are generally referred to as
expression:
91

The words "abstract" and "concrete" arise in many cases dealing with the idea/expression
distinction. The Nichols court, for example, found that the defendants film did not infringe the
plaintiffs play because it was "too generalized an abstraction from what plaintiff wrote . . . only a part
of her ideas." In Eichel v. Marcin, the court said that authors may exploit facts, experiences, field of
thought, and general ideas found in anothers work, "provided they do not substantially copy a
concrete form, in which the circumstances and ideas have been developed, arranged, and put into
shape." Judge Hand, in National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc. said that "no
one infringes, unless he descends so far into what is concrete as to invade. . . expression."
These cases seem to be distinguishing "abstract" ideas from "concrete" tangible embodiments of
these abstractions that may be termed expression. However, if the concrete form of a work means
more than the literal expression contained within it, it is difficult to determine what is meant by
"concrete." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language provides several
meanings for the word concrete. These include: "having a material, perceptible existence; of,
belonging to, or characterized by things or events that can be perceived by the senses; real; actual;"
and "referring to a particular; specific, not general or abstract."
92

In Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart, Incorporated, this court, citing the American case
of Baker v. Selden, distinguished copyright from patents and illustrated how an idea or concept is
different from the expression of that idea:
93

In the oft-cited case of Baker vs. Selden, the United States Supreme Court held that only the
expression of an idea is protected by copyright, not the idea itself. In that case, the plaintiff held the
copyright of a book which expounded on a new accounting system he had developed. The
publication illustrated blank forms of ledgers utilized in such a system. The defendant reproduced
forms similar to those illustrated in the plaintiffs copyrighted book. The US Supreme Court ruled that:
"There is no doubt that a work on the subject of book-keeping, though only explanatory of well
known systems, may be the subject of a copyright; but, then, it is claimed only as a book. x x x But
there is a clear distinction between the books, as such, and the art, which it is, intended to illustrate.
The mere statement of the proposition is so evident that it requires hardly any argument to support it.
The same distinction may be predicated of every other art as well as that of bookkeeping.
A treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be they old or new; on the construction and use
of ploughs or watches or churns; or on the mixture and application of colors for painting or dyeing; or
on the mode of drawing lines to produce the effect of perspective, would be the subject of copyright;
but no one would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give the exclusive right to the art or
manufacture described therein. The copyright of the book, if not pirated from other works, would be
valid without regard to the novelty or want of novelty of its subject matter. The novelty of the art or
thing described or explained has nothing to do with the validity of the copyright. To give to the author
of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has
ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of
letters patent, not of copyright. The claim to an invention of discovery of an art or manufacture must
be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office before an exclusive right therein can be
obtained; and a patent from the government can only secure it.
The difference between the two things, letters patent and copyright, may be illustrated by reference
to the subjects just enumerated. Take the case of medicines. Certain mixtures are found to be of
great value in the healing art. If the discoverer writes and publishes a book on the subject (as regular

physicians generally do), he gains no exclusive right to the manufacture and sale of the medicine; he
gives that to the public. If he desires to acquire such exclusive right, he must obtain a patent for the
mixture as a new art, manufacture or composition of matter. He may copyright his book, if he
pleases; but that only secures to him the exclusive right of printing and publishing his book. So of all
other inventions or discoveries.
The copyright of a book on perspective, no matter how many drawings and illustrations it may
contain, gives no exclusive right to the modes of drawing described, though they may never have
been known or used before. By publishing the book without getting a patent for the art, the latter is
given to the public.
....
Now, whilst no one has a right to print or publish his book, or any material part thereof, as a book
intended to convey instruction in the art, any person may practice and use the art itself which he has
described and illustrated therein. The use of the art is a totally different thing from a publication of the
book explaining it. The copyright of a book on bookkeeping cannot secure the exclusive right to
make, sell and use account books prepared upon the plan set forth in such book. Whether the art
might or might not have been patented, is a question, which is not before us. It was not patented,
and is open and free to the use of the public. And, of course, in using the art, the ruled lines and
headings of accounts must necessarily be used as incident to it.
The plausibility of the claim put forward by the complainant in this case arises from a confusion of
ideas produced by the peculiar nature of the art described in the books, which have been made the
subject of copyright. In describing the art, the illustrations and diagrams employed happened to
correspond more closely than usual with the actual work performed by the operator who uses the
art. x x x The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no
foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of
the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can be
secured at all, by letters patent." (Emphasis supplied)
94

News or the event itself is not copyrightable. However, an event can be captured and presented in a
specific medium. As recognized by this court in Joaquin, television "involves a whole spectrum of
visuals and effects, video and audio." News coverage in television involves framing shots, using
images, graphics, and sound effects. It involves creative process and originality. Television news
footage is an expression of the news.
95

96

In the United States, a line of cases dwelt on the possibility of television newscasts to be
copyrighted. Most of these cases focused on private individuals sale or resale of tapes of news
broadcasts. Conflicting decisions were rendered by its courts. Noteworthy, however, is the District
Courts pronouncement in Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, which involves a News Monitoring
Services videotaping and sale of WXIA-TVs news broadcasts:
97

98

It is axiomatic that copyright protection does not extend to news "events" or the facts or ideas which
are the subject of news reports. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir.
1981); Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014, 98 S.Ct. 730, 54 L.Ed.2d 759 (1978). But it is equally well-settled that
copyright protection does extend to the reports themselves, as distinguished from the substance of
the information contained in the reports. Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 95; International News Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211 (1918); see Chicago Record-Herald Co.
v. Tribune Assn., 275 F. 797 (7th Cir.1921); 1 Nimmer on Copyright 2.11[B] (1983). Copyright
protects the manner of expression of news reports, "the particular form or collocation of words in

which the writer has communicated it." International News Service, 248 U.S. at 234, 39 S.Ct. at 70.
Such protection extends to electronic news reports as well as written reports. See17 U.S.C. 102(a)
(5), (6), and (7); see also Iowa State University Research Foundations, Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980). (Emphasis supplied)
99

The idea/expression dichotomy has long been subject to debate in the field of copyright law.
Abolishing the dichotomy has been proposed, in that non-protectibility of ideas should be reexamined, if not stricken, from decisions and the law:
If the underlying purpose of the copyright law is the dual one expressed by Lord Mansfield, the only
excuse for the continuance of the idea-expression test as a judicial standard for determining
protectibility would be that it was or could be a truly useful method of determining the proper balance
between the creators right to profit from his work and the public's right that the "progress of the arts
not be retarded."
. . . [A]s used in the present-day context[,] the dichotomy has little or no relationship to the policy
which it should effectuate. Indeed, all too often the sweeping language of the courts regarding the
non-protectibility of ideas gives the impression that this is of itself a policy of the law, instead of
merely a clumsy and outdated tool to achieve a much more basic end.
100

The idea/expression dichotomy is a complex matter if one is trying to determine whether a certain
material is a copy of another. This dichotomy would be more relevant in determining, for instance,
whether a stage play was an infringement of an authors book involving the same characters and
setting. In this case, however, respondents admitted that the material under review which is the
subject of the controversy is an exact copy of the original. Respondents did not subject ABSCBNs footage to any editing of their own. The news footage did not undergo any transformation
where there is a need to track elements of the original.
101

Having established the protectible nature of news footage, we now discuss the concomitant rights
accorded to authors. The authors of a work are granted several rights in relation to it, including
copyright or economic rights:
SECTION 177. Copyright or Economic Rights. Subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII, copyright
or economic rights shall consist of the exclusive right to carry out, authorize or prevent the following
acts:
177.1. Reproduction of the work or substantial portion of the work;
177.2. Dramatization, translation, adaptation, abridgment, arrangement or other
transformation of the work;
177.3. The first public distribution of the original and each copy of the work by sale or other
forms of transfer of ownership;
177.4. Rental of the original or a copy of an audiovisual or cinematographic work, a work
embodied in a sound recording, a computer program, a compilation of data and other
materials or a musical work in graphic form, irrespective of the ownership of the original or
the copy which is the subject of the rental; (n)
177.5. Public display of the original or a copy of the work;

177.6. Public performance of the work; and

177.7. Other communication to the public of the work.(Sec. 5, P. D. No. 49a) (Emphasis
supplied)
Under Section 211 of the Intellectual Property Code, broadcasting organizations are granted a more
specific set of rights called related or neighboring rights:
SECTION 211. Scope of Right. Subject to the provisions of Section 212, broadcasting
organizations shall enjoy the exclusive right to carry out, authorize or prevent any of the following
acts:
211.1. The rebroadcasting of their broadcasts;
211.2. The recording in any manner, including the making of films or the use of video tape, of
their broadcasts for the purpose of communication to the public of television broadcasts of
the same; and
211.3. The use of such records for fresh transmissions or for fresh recording. (Sec. 52, P.D.
No. 49) (Emphasis supplied)
Section 212 of the Code provides:
CHAPTER XV
LIMITATIONS ON PROTECTION
Section 212. Limitations on Rights. - Sections 203, 208 and 209 shall not apply where the acts
referred to in those Sections are related to:
212.1. The use by a natural person exclusively for his own personal purposes;
212.2. Using short excerpts for reporting current events;
212.3. Use solely for the purpose of teaching or for scientific research; and
212.4. Fair use of the broadcast subject to the conditions under Section 185. (Sec. 44, P.D.
No. 49a)
The Code defines what broadcasting is and who broadcasting organizations include:
202.7. "Broadcasting" means the transmission by wireless means for the public reception of
sounds or of images or of representations thereof; such transmission by satellite is also
"broadcasting" where the means for decrypting are provided to the public by the
broadcasting organization or with its consent;
202.8. "Broadcasting organization" shall include a natural person or a juridical entity duly
authorized to engage in broadcasting[.]
Developments in technology, including the process of preserving once ephemeral works and
disseminating them, resulted in the need to provide a new kind of protection as distinguished from

copyright. The designation "neighboring rights" was abbreviated from the phrase "rights
neighboring to copyright." Neighboring or related rights are of equal importance with copyright as
established in the different conventions covering both kinds of rights.
102

103

104

Several treaties deal with neighboring or related rights of copyright. The most prominent of these is
the "International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations" (Rome Convention).
105

106

The Rome Convention protects the rights of broadcasting organizations in relation to their
broadcasts. Article XIII of the Rome Convention enumerates the minimum rights accorded to
broadcasting organizations:
Article 13
Minimum Rights for Broadcasting Organizations
Broadcasting organisations shall enjoy the right to authorize or prohibit:
(a) the rebroadcasting of their broadcasts;
(b) the fixation of their broadcasts;
(c) the reproduction:
(i) of fixations, made without their consent, of their broadcasts;
(ii) of fixations, made in accordance with the provisions of Article 15, of their
broadcasts, if the reproduction is made for purposes different from those referred to
in those provisions;
(d) the communication to the public of their television broadcasts if such communication is
made in places accessible to the public against payment of an entrance fee; it shall be a
matter for the domestic law of the State where protection of this right is claimed to determine
the conditions under which it may be exercised.
With regard to the neighboring rights of a broadcasting organization in this jurisdiction, this court has
discussed the difference between broadcasting and rebroadcasting:
Section 202.7 of the IP Code defines broadcasting as "the transmission by wireless means for the
public reception of sounds or of images or of representations thereof; such transmission by satellite
is also broadcasting where the means for decrypting are provided to the public by the broadcasting
organization or with its consent."
On the other hand, rebroadcasting as defined in Article 3(g) of the International Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, otherwise
known as the 1961 Rome Convention, of which the Republic of the Philippines is a signatory, is "the
simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another
broadcasting organization."
....

Under the Rome Convention, rebroadcasting is "the simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting
organization of the broadcast of another broadcasting organization." The Working Paper prepared by
the Secretariat of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights defines broadcasting
organizations as "entities that take the financial and editorial responsibility for the selection and
arrangement of, and investment in, the transmitted content." (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
107

Broadcasting organizations are entitled to several rights and to the protection of these rights under
the Intellectual Property Code. Respondents argument that the subject news footage is not
copyrightable is erroneous. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, correctly recognized the
existence of ABS-CBNs copyright over the news footage:
Surely, private respondent has a copyright of its news coverage. Seemingly, for airing said video
feed, petitioner GMA is liable under the provisions of the Intellectual Property Code, which was
enacted purposely to protect copyright owners from infringement.
108

News as expressed in a video footage is entitled to copyright protection. Broadcasting organizations

have not only copyright on but also neighboring rights over their broadcasts. Copyrightability of a
work is different from fair use of a work for purposes of news reporting.
VI
ABS-CBN assails the Court of Appeals ruling that the footage shown by GMA-7 falls under the
scope of Section 212.2 and 212.4 of the Intellectual Property Code:
The evidence on record, as well as the discussions above, show that the footage used
by[respondents] could hardlybe characterized as a short excerpt, as it was aired over one and a half
minutes.
Furthermore, the footage used does not fall under the contemplation of Section 212.2 of the
Intellectual Property Code. A plain reading of the provision would reveal that copyrighted material
referred to in Section 212 are short portions of an artists performance under Section 203, or a
producers sound recordings under Sections 208 and 209. Section 212 does not refer to actual use
of video footage of another as its own.
The Angelo dela Cruz footage does not fall under the rule on Section 212.4 of the Intellectual
Property Code on fair use of the broadcast.
....
In determining fair use, several factors are considered, including the nature of the copyrighted work,
and the amount and substantiality of the person used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.
In the business of television news reporting, the nature of the copyrighted work or the video
footages, are such that, footage created, must be a novelty to be a good report. Thus, when the . . .
Angelo dela Cruz footage was used by [respondents], the novelty of the footage was clearly
affected.
Moreover, given that a substantial portion of the Angelo dela Cruz footage was utilized by GMA-7 for
its own, its use can hardly be classified as fair use.

Hence, [respondents] could not be considered as having used the Angelo dela Cruz [footage]
following the provisions on fair use.
It is also worthy to note that the Honorable Court of Appeals seem to contradict itself when it relied
on the provisions of fair use in its assailed rulings considering that it found that the Angelo dela Cruz
footage is not copyrightable, given that the fair use presupposes an existing copyright. Thus, it is
apparent that the findings of the Honorable Court of Appeals are erroneous and based on wrong
assumptions. (Underscoring in the original)
109

On the other hand, respondents counter that GMA-7s use of ABS-CBNs news footage falls under
fair use as defined in the Intellectual Property Code. Respondents, citing the Court of Appeals
Decision, argue that a strong statutory defense negates any finding of probable cause under the
same statute. The Intellectual Property Code provides that fair use negates infringement.
110

Respondents point out that upon seeing ABS-CBNs reporter Dindo Amparo on the footage, GMA-7
immediately shut off the broadcast. Only five (5) seconds passed before the footage was cut. They
argue that this shows that GMA-7 had no prior knowledge of ABS-CBNs ownership of the footage or
was notified of it. They claim that the Angelo dela Cruz footage is considered a short excerpt of an
events "news" footage and is covered by fair use.
111

Copyright protection is not absolute. The Intellectual Property Code provides the limitations on
copyright:
112

CHAPTER VIII
LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT
Section 184. Limitations on Copyright. - 184.1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter V, the
following acts shall not constitute infringement of copyright:
....
184.2. The provisions of this section shall be interpreted in such a way as to allow the work to be
used in a manner which does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and does not
unreasonably prejudice the right holder's legitimate interests.
....
CHAPTER XV
LIMITATIONS ON PROTECTION
Section 212. Limitations on Rights. - Sections 203, 208 and 209 shall not apply where the acts
referred to in those Sections are related to:
....
212.2. Using short excerpts for reporting current events;
....
212.4. Fair use of the broadcast subject to the conditions under Section 185.(Sec. 44, P.D. No. 49a)
(Emphasis supplied)

The determination of what constitutes fair use depends on several factors. Section 185 of the
Intellectual Property Code states:
SECTION 185. Fair Use of a Copyrighted Work.
185.1. The fair use of a copyrighted work for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching including
multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, research, and similar purposes is not an infringement
of copyright. . . . In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair use, the
factors to be considered shall include:
a. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
b. The nature of the copyrighted work;
c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
d. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Respondents allege that the news footage was only five (5) seconds long, thus falling under
fair use. ABS-CBN belies this contention and argues that the footage aired for two (2)
minutes and 40 seconds. According to the Court of Appeals, the parties admitted that only
five (5) seconds of the news footage was broadcasted by GMA-7.
113

114

This court defined fair use as "aprivilege to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without the consent of the copyright owner or as copying the theme or ideas rather than their
expression." Fair use is an exception to the copyright owners monopoly of the use of the work to
avoid stifling "the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."
115

116

Determining fair use requires application of the four-factor test. Section 185 of the Intellectual
Property Code lists four (4) factors to determine if there was fair use of a copyrighted work:
a. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
b. The nature of the copyrighted work;
c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
d. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
First, the purpose and character of the use of the copyrighted material must fall under those listed in
Section 185, thus: "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching including multiple copies for
classroom use, scholarship, research, and similar purposes." The purpose and character
requirement is important in view of copyrights goal to promote creativity and encourage creation of
works. Hence, commercial use of the copyrighted work can be weighed against fair use.
117

The "transformative test" is generally used in reviewing the purpose and character of the usage of
the copyrighted work. This court must look into whether the copy of the work adds "new
118

expression, meaning or message" to transform it into something else. "Meta-use" can also occur
without necessarily transforming the copyrighted work used.
119

120

Second, the nature of the copyrighted work is significant in deciding whether its use was fair. If the
nature of the work is more factual than creative, then fair use will be weighed in favor of the user.
Third, the amount and substantiality of the portion used is important to determine whether usage
falls under fair use. An exact reproduction of a copyrighted work, compared to a small portion of it,
can result in the conclusion that its use is not fair. There may also be cases where, though the
entirety of the copyrighted work is used without consent, its purpose determines that the usage is
still fair. For example, a parody using a substantial amount of copyrighted work may be permissible
as fair use as opposed to a copy of a work produced purely for economic gain. Lastly, the effect of
the use on the copyrighted works market is also weighed for or against the user. If this court finds
that the use had or will have a negative impact on the copyrighted works market, then the use is
deemed unfair.
121

The structure and nature of broadcasting as a business requires assigned values for each second of
broadcast or airtime. In most cases, broadcasting organizations generate revenue through sale of
time or timeslots to advertisers, which, in turn, is based on market share: Once a news broadcast
has been transmitted, the broadcast becomes relatively worthless to the station. In the case of the
aerial broadcasters, advertising sales generate most of the profits derived from news reports.
Advertising rates are, in turn, governed by market share. Market share is determined by the number
of people watching a show at any particular time, relative to total viewers at that time. News is by
nature time-limited, and so re-broadcasts are generally of little worth because they draw few
viewers. Newscasts compete for market share by presenting their news in an appealing format that
will capture a loyal audience. Hence, the primary reason for copyrighting newscasts by broadcasters
would seem to be to prevent competing stations from rebroadcasting current news from the station
with the best coverage of a particular news item, thus misappropriating a portion of the market
share.
122

Of course, in the real world there are exceptions to this perfect economic view. However, there are
also many caveats with these exceptions. A common exception is that some stations rebroadcast the
news of others. The caveat is that generally, the two stations are not competing for market share.
CNN, for example, often makes news stories available to local broadcasters. First, the local
broadcaster is often not affiliated with a network (hence its need for more comprehensive
programming), confining any possible competition to a small geographical area. Second, the local
broadcaster is not in competition with CNN. Individuals who do not have cable TV (or a satellite dish
with decoder) cannot receive CNN; therefore there is no competition. . . . Third, CNN sells the right
of rebroadcast to the local stations. Ted Turner, owner of CNN, does not have First Amendment
freedom of access argument foremost on his mind. (Else he would give everyone free cable TV so
everyone could get CNN.) He is in the business for a profit. Giving away resources does not a profit
make. (Emphasis supplied)
123

The high value afforded to limited time periods is also seen in other media. In social media site
Instagram, users are allowed to post up to only 15 seconds of video. In short-video sharing website
Vine, users are allowed a shorter period of six (6) seconds per post. The mobile application 1
Second Everyday takes it further by capturing and stitching one (1) second of video footage taken
daily over a span of a certain period.
124

125

126

Whether the alleged five-second footage may be considered fair use is a matter of defense. We
emphasize that the case involves determination of probable cause at the preliminary investigation
stage. Raising the defense of fair use does not automatically mean that no infringement was

committed. The investigating prosecutor has full discretion to evaluate the facts, allegations, and
evidence during preliminary investigation. Defenses raised during preliminary investigation are
subject to further proof and evaluation before the trial court. Given the insufficiency of available
evidence, determination of whether the Angelo dela Cruz footage is subject to fair use is better left to
the trial court where the proceedings are currently pending. GMA-7s rebroadcast of ABS-CBNs
news footage without the latters consent is not an issue. The mere act of rebroadcasting without
authority from the owner of the broadcast gives rise to the probability that a crime was committed
under the Intellectual Property Code.
VII
Respondents cannot invoke the defense of good faith to argue that no probable cause exists.
Respondents argue that copyright infringement is malum in se, in that "[c]opying alone is not what is
being prohibited, but its injurious effect which consists in the lifting from the copyright owners film or
materials, that were the result of the latters creativity, work and productions and without authority,
reproduced, sold and circulated for commercial use to the detriment of the latter."
127

Infringement under the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum. The Intellectual Property
Code is a special law. Copyright is a statutory creation:
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or independent right
granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by the statute. Being a statutory
grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with
respect to the subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute.
128

The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum prohibitum. "An act which is
declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial."
129

130

In contrast, crimes mala in seconcern inherently immoral acts:

Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime
involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine". In resolving the foregoing question,
the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while
crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:
It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by
law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The
doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does
not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their
being positively prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
[These] guidelines nonetheless proved short of providing a clear cut solution, for in International Rice
Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral
turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and
there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis,
whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statue. (Emphasis in the original)
131

"Implicit in the concept of mala in se is that of mens rea." Mens reais defined as "the nonphysical
element which, combined with the act of the accused, makes up the crime charged. Most frequently
it is the criminal intent, or the guilty mind[.]"
132

133

Crimes mala in sepre suppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to do so,
while crimes mala prohibita do not require knowledge or criminal intent:
In the case of mala in se it is necessary, to constitute a punishable offense, for the person doing the
act to have knowledge of the nature of his act and to have a criminal intent; in the case of mala
prohibita, unless such words as "knowingly" and "willfully" are contained in the statute, neither
knowledge nor criminal intent is necessary. In other words, a person morally quite innocent and with
every intention of being a law abiding citizen becomes a criminal, and liable to criminal penaltes, if
he does an act prohibited by these statutes. (Emphasis supplied) Hence, "[i]ntent to commit the
crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously
intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of
things, the crime itself[.]" When an act is prohibited by a special law, it is considered injurious to
public welfare, and the performance of the prohibited act is the crime itself.
134

135

136

Volition, or intent to commit the act, is different from criminal intent. Volition or voluntariness refers to
knowledge of the act being done. On the other hand, criminal intent which is different from motive,
or the moving power for the commission of the crime refers to the state of mind beyond
voluntariness. It is this intent that is being punished by crimes mala in se.
137

Unlike other jurisdictions that require intent for a criminal prosecution of copyright infringement, the
Philippines does not statutorily support good faith as a defense. Other jurisdictions provide in their
intellectual property codes or relevant laws that mens rea, whether express or implied, is an element
of criminal copyright infringement.
138

In Canada, criminal offenses are categorized under three (3) kinds: "the full mens rea offence,
meaning the accuseds actual or subjective state of mind has to be proved; strict liability offences
where no mens rea has to be proved but the accused can avoid liability if he can prove he took all
reasonable steps to avoid the particular event; [and] absolute liability offences where Parliament has
made it clear that guilt follows proof of the prescribed act only." Because of the use of the word
"knowingly" in Canadas Copyright Act, it has been held that copyright infringement is a full mens rea
offense.
139

140

In the United States, willful intent is required for criminal copyright infringement. Before the
passage of the No Electronic Theft Act, "civil copyright infringements were violations of criminal
copyright laws only if a defendant willfully infringed a copyright for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain." However, the No Electronic Theft Act now allows criminal
copyright infringement without the requirement of commercial gain. The infringing act may or may
not be for profit.
141

142

143

There is a difference, however, between the required liability in civil copyright infringement and that
in criminal copyright infringement in the United States. Civil copyright infringement does not require
culpability and employs a strict liability regime where "lack of intention to infringe is not a defense to
an action for infringement."
144

145

In the Philippines, the Intellectual Property Code, as amended, provides for the prosecution of
criminal actions for the following violations of intellectual property rights: Repetition of Infringement of
Patent (Section 84); Utility Model (Section 108); Industrial Design (Section 119); Trademark
Infringement (Section 155 in relation to Section 170); Unfair Competition (Section 168 in relation to

Section 170); False Designations of Origin, False Description or Representation (Section 169.1 in
relation to Section 170); infringement of copyright, moral rights, performers rights, producers rights,
and broadcasting rights (Section 177, 193, 203, 208 and 211 in relation to Section 217); and other
violations of intellectual property rights as may be defined by law.
The Intellectual Property Code requires strict liability for copyright infringement whether for a civil
action or a criminal prosecution; it does not require mens rea or culpa:
146

SECTION 216. Remedies for Infringement.

216.1. Any person infringing a right protected under this law shall be liable:
a. To an injunction restraining such infringement. The court may also order the
defendant to desist from an infringement, among others, to prevent the entry into the
channels of commerce of imported goods that involve an infringement, immediately
after customs clearance of such goods.
b. Pay to the copyright proprietor or his assigns or heirs such actual damages,
including legal costs and other expenses, as he may have incurred due to the
infringement as well as the profits the infringer may have made due to such
infringement, and in proving profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove sales only
and the defendant shall be required to prove every element of cost which he claims,
or, in lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages which to the court shall
appear to be just and shall not be regarded as penalty.
c. Deliver under oath, for impounding during the pendency of the action, upon such
terms and conditions as the court may prescribe, sales invoices and other
documents evidencing sales, all articles and their packaging alleged to infringe a
copyright and implements for making them.
d. Deliver under oath for destruction without any compensation all infringing copies or
devices, as well as all plates, molds, or other means for making such infringing
copies as the court may order.
e. Such other terms and conditions, including the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, which the court may deem proper, wise and equitable and the destruction
of infringing copies of the work even in the event of acquittal in a criminal case.
216.2. In an infringement action, the court shall also have the power to order the seizure and
impounding of any article which may serve as evidence in the court proceedings. (Sec. 28,
P.D. No. 49a)
SECTION 217. Criminal Penalties. 217.1. Any person infringing any right secured by provisions of
Part IV of this Actor aiding or abetting such infringement shall be guilty of a crime punishable by:
a. Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years plus a fine ranging from Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000) to One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) for the
first offense.

b. Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to six (6) years plus a fine ranging
from One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000) for the second offense.
c. Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years plus a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) to One million five hundred thousand
pesos (P1,500,000) for the third and subsequent offenses.
d. In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency.
217.2. In determining the number of years of imprisonment and the amount of fine, the court
shall consider the value of the infringing materials that the defendant has produced or
manufactured and the damage that the copyright owner has suffered by reason of the
infringement.
217.3. Any person who at the time when copyright subsists in a work has in his possession
an article which he knows, or ought to know, to be an infringing copy of the work for the
purpose of: a. Selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade offering or exposing for sale, or hire,
the article;
b. Distributing the article for purpose of trade, or for any other purpose to an extent
that will prejudice the rights of the copyright owner in the work; or
c. Trade exhibit of the article in public, shall be guilty of an offense and shall be liable
on conviction to imprisonment and fine as above mentioned. (Sec. 29, P.D. No. 49a)
(Emphasis supplied)
The law is clear. Inasmuch as there is wisdom in prioritizing the flow and exchange of ideas as
opposed to rewarding the creator, it is the plain reading of the law in conjunction with the actions of
the legislature to which we defer. We have continuously "recognized the power of the legislature . . .
to forbid certain acts in a limited class of cases and to make their commission criminal without regard
to the intent of the doer. Such legislative enactments are based on the experience that repressive
measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealers knowledge or of his intent are
of little use and rarely accomplish their purposes."
147

Respondents argue that live broadcast of news requires a different treatment in terms of good faith,
intent, and knowledge to commit infringement. To argue this point, they rely on the differences of the
media used in Habana et al. v. Robles, Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals, and this case:
Petitioner ABS-CBN argues that lack of notice that the Angelo dela Cruz was under embargo is not a
defense in copyright infringement and cites the case of Columbia Pictures vs. Court of Appeals and
Habana et al. vs. Robles(310 SCRA 511). However, these cases refer to film and literary work where
obviously there is "copying" from an existing material so that the copier knew that he is copying from
an existing material not owned by him. But, how could respondents know that what they are "copying
was not [theirs]" when they were not copying but merely receiving live video feed from Reuters and
CNN which they aired? What they knew and what they aired was the Reuters live video feed and the
CNN feed which GMA-7 is authorized to carry in its news broadcast, it being a subscriber of these
companies[.]
It is apt to stress that the subject of the alleged copyright infringement is not a film or literary work
but live broadcast of news footage. In a film or literary work, the infringer is confronted face to face

with the material he is allegedly copying and therefore knows, or is presumed to know, that what he
is copying is owned by another. Upon the other hand, in live broadcast, the alleged infringer is not
confronted with the fact that the material he airs or re-broadcasts is owned by another, and
therefore, he cannot be charged of knowledge of ownership of the material by another. This specially
obtains in the Angelo dela Cruz news footage which GMA-7 received from Reuters and CNN.
Reuters and CNN were beaming live videos from the coverage which GMA-7 received as a
subscriber and, in the exercise of its rights as a subscriber, GMA-7 picked up the live video and
simultaneously re-broadcast it. In simultaneously broadcasting the live video footage of Reuters,
GMA-7 did not copy the video footage of petitioner ABS-CBN[.] (Emphasis in the original)
148

Respondents arguments must fail.

Respondents are involved and experienced in the broadcasting business. They knew that there
would be consequences in carrying ABS-CBNs footage in their broadcast. That is why GMA-7
allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon seeing ABS-CBNs ogo and reporter. To admit a different
treatment for broadcasts would mean abandonment of a broadcasting organizations minimum
rights, including copyright on the broadcast material and the right against unauthorized rebroadcast
of copyrighted material. The nature of broadcast technology is precisely why related or neighboring
rights were created and developed. Carving out an exception for live broadcasts would go against
our commitments under relevant international treaties and agreements, which provide for the same
minimum rights.
149

Contrary to respondents assertion, this court in Habana, reiterating the ruling in Columbia
Pictures, ruled that lack of knowledge of infringement is not a valid defense. Habana and Columbia
Pictures may have different factual scenarios from this case, but their rulings on copyright
infringement are analogous. In Habana, petitioners were the authors and copyright owners of
English textbooks and workbooks. The case was anchored on the protection of literary and artistic
creations such as books. In Columbia Pictures, video tapes of copyrighted films were the subject of
the copyright infringement suit.
150

151

In Habana, knowledge of the infringement is presumed when the infringer commits the prohibited
act:
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to underscore its
gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a
private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law,
and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in
the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right
to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright.
....
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the pirate, in such
cases, did not know whether or not he was infringing any copyright; he at least knew that what he
was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril.
....
In cases of infringement, copying alone is not what is prohibited. The copying must produce an
"injurious effect". Here, the injury consists in that respondent Robles lifted from petitioners book
materials that were the result of the latters research work and compilation and misrepresented them

as her own. She circulated the book DEP for commercial use and did not acknowledge petitioners as
her source. (Emphasis supplied)
152

Habana and Columbia Pictures did not require knowledge of the infringement to constitute a
violation of the copyright. One does not need to know that he or she is copying a work without
consent to violate copyright law. Notice of fact of the embargo from Reuters or CNN is not material to
find probable cause that respondents committed infringement. Knowledge of infringement is only
material when the person is charged of aiding and abetting a copyright infringement under Section
217 of the Intellectual Property Code.
153

We look at the purpose of copyright in relation to criminal prosecutions requiring willfulness: Most
importantly, in defining the contours of what it means to willfully infringe copyright for purposes of
criminal liability, the courts should remember the ultimate aim of copyright. Copyright is not primarily
about providing the strongest possible protection for copyright owners so that they have the highest
possible incentive to create more works. The control given to copyright owners is only a means to an
end: the promotion of knowledge and learning. Achieving that underlying goal of copyright law also
requires access to copyrighted works and it requires permitting certain kinds of uses of copyrighted
works without the permission of the copyright owner. While a particular defendant may appear to be
deserving of criminal sanctions, the standard for determining willfulness should be set with reference
to the larger goals of copyright embodied in the Constitution and the history of copyright in this
country.
154

In addition, "[t]he essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to
underscore its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a copyright is a
trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore,
protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this
connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of
anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright."
155

Intellectual property rights, such as copyright and the neighboring right against rebroadcasting,
establish an artificial and limited monopoly to reward creativity. Without these legally enforceable
rights, creators will have extreme difficulty recovering their costs and capturing the surplus or profit of
their works as reflected in their markets. This, in turn, is based on the theory that the possibility of
gain due to creative work creates an incentive which may improve efficiency or simply enhance
consumer welfare or utility. More creativity redounds to the public good.
These, however, depend on the certainty of enforcement. Creativity, by its very nature, is vulnerable
to the free rider problem. It is easily replicated despite the costs to and efforts of the original creator.
The more useful the creation is in the market, the greater the propensity that it will be copied. The
most creative and inventive individuals are usually those who are unable to recover on their
creations.
Arguments against strict liability presuppose that the Philippines has a social, historical, and
economic climate similar to those of Western jurisdictions. As it stands, there is a current need to
strengthen intellectual property protection.
Thus, unless clearly provided in the law, offenses involving infringement of copyright protections
should be considered malum prohibitum. It is the act of infringement, not the intent, which causes
the damage. To require or assume the need to prove intent defeats the purpose of intellectual
property protection.

Nevertheless, proof beyond reasonable doubt is still the standard for criminal prosecutions under the
Intellectual Property Code.
VIII
Respondents argue that GMA-7s officers and employees cannot be held liable for infringement
under the Intellectual Property Code since it does not expressly provide direct liability of the
corporate officers. They explain that "(i) a corporation may be charged and prosecuted for a crime
where the penalty is fine or both imprisonment and fine, and if found guilty, may be fined; or (ii) a
corporation may commit a crime but if the statute prescribes the penalty therefore to be suffered by
the corporate officers, directors or employees or other persons, the latter shall be responsible for the
offense."
156

Section 217 of the Intellectual Property Code states that "any person" may be found guilty of
infringement. It also imposes the penalty of both imprisonment and fine:
Section 217. Criminal Penalties. - 217.1. Any person infringing any right secured by provisions of
Part IV of this Act or aiding or abetting such infringement shall be guilty of a crime punishable by:
(a) Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years plus a fine ranging from Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000) to One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) for the first offense.
(b) Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to six (6) years plus a fine ranging from
One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000)
for the second offense.
(c) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years plus a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) to One million five hundred thousand pesos
(P1,500,000) for the third and subsequent offenses.
(d) In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency. (Emphasis supplied)
Corporations have separate and distinct personalities from their officers or directors. This
court has ruled that corporate officers and/or agents may be held individually liable for a
crime committed under the Intellectual Property Code:
157

158

Petitioners, being corporate officers and/or directors, through whose act, default or omission the
corporation commits a crime, may themselves be individually held answerable for the crime. . . . The
existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who
knowingly and intentionally caused the corporation to commit a crime. Thus, petitioners cannot hide
behind the cloak of the separate corporate personality of the corporation to escape criminal liability.
A corporate officer cannot protect himself behind a corporation where he is the actual, present and
efficient actor.
159

However, the criminal liability of a corporations officers or employees stems from their active
participation in the commission of the wrongful act:
The principle applies whether or not the crime requires the consciousness of wrongdoing. It applies
to those corporate agents who themselves commit the crime and to those, who, by virtue of their
managerial positions or other similar relation to the corporation, could be deemed responsible for its
commission, if by virtue of their relationship to the corporation, they had the power to prevent the act.
Moreover, all parties active in promoting a crime, whether agents or not, are principals. Whether

such officers or employees are benefited by their delictual acts is not a touchstone of their criminal
liability. Benefit is not an operative fact. (Emphasis supplied) An accuseds participation in criminal
acts involving violations of intellectual property rights is the subject of allegation and proof. The
showing that the accused did the acts or contributed in a meaningful way in the commission of the
infringements is certainly different from the argument of lack of intent or good faith. Active
participation requires a showing of overt physical acts or intention to commit such acts. Intent or
good faith, on the other hand, are inferences from acts proven to have been or not been committed.
160

We find that the Department of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when it resolved to file
the Information against respondents despite lack of proof of their actual participation in the alleged
crime.
Ordering the inclusion of respondents Gozon, GMA-7 President; Duavit, Jr., Executive VicePresident; Flores, Vice-President for News and Public Affairs; and Soho, Director for News, as
respondents, Secretary Agra overturned the City Prosecutors finding that only respondents Dela
Pea-Reyes and Manalastas are responsible for the crime charged due to their duties. The Agra
Resolution reads:
161

Thus, from the very nature of the offense and the penalty involved, it is necessary that GMA-7s
directors, officers, employees or other officers thereof responsible for the offense shall be charged
and penalized for violation of the Sections 177 and 211 of Republic Act No. 8293. In their complaint
for libel, respondents Felipe L Gozon, Gilberto R. Duavit, Jr., Marissa L. Flores, Jessica A.Soho,
Grace Dela Pena-Reyes, John Oliver T. Manalastas felt they were aggrieved because they were "in
charge of the management, operations and production of news and public affairs programs of the
network" (GMA-7). This is clearly an admission on respondents part. Of course, respondents may
argue they have no intention to infringe the copyright of ABS-CBN; that they acted in good faith; and
that they did not directly cause the airing of the subject footage, but again this is preliminary
investigation and what is required is simply probable cause. Besides, these contentions can best be
addressed in the course of trial. (Citation omitted)
162

In contrast, the Office of the City Prosecutor, in the Resolution dated December 3, 2004, found that
respondents Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho did not have active participation in the commission
of the crime charged:
This Office, however, does not subscribe to the view that respondents Atty. Felipe Gozon, Gilberto
Duavit, Marissa Flores and Jessica Soho should be held liable for the said offense. Complainant
failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the said respondents conspired with Reyes and
Manalastas. No evidence was adduced to prove that these respondents had an active participation
in the actual commission of the copyright infringement or they exercised their moral ascendancy
over Reyes and Manalastas in airing the said footage. It must be stressed that, conspiracy must be
established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
163

The City Prosecutor found respondents Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas liable due to the nature of
their work and responsibilities. He found that:
[t]his Office however finds respondents Grace Dela Pea-Reyes and John Oliver T. Manalastas
liable for copyright infringement penalized under Republic Act No. 8293. It is undisputed that
complainant ABSCBN holds the exclusive ownership and copyright over the "Angelo [d]ela Cruz
news footage". Hence, any airing and re-broadcast of the said footage without any consent and
authority from ABS-CBN will be held as an infringement and violation of the intellectual property
rights of the latter. Respondents Grace Dela Pea-Reyes as the Head of the News Operation and

John Oliver T. Manalastas as the Program Manager cannot escape liability since the news control
room was under their direct control and supervision. Clearly, they must have been aware that the
said footage coming from Reuters or CNN has a "No Access Philippines" advisory or embargo thus
cannot be re-broadcast. We find no merit to the defense of ignorance interposed by the respondents.
It is simply contrary to human experience and logic that experienced employees of an established
broadcasting network would be remiss in their duty in ascertaining if the said footage has an
embargo. (Emphasis supplied)
164

We agree with the findings as to respondents Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas. Both respondents
committed acts that promoted infringement of ABS-CBNs footage. We note that embargoes are
common occurrences in and between news agencies and/or broadcast organizations. Under its
Operations Guide, Reuters has two (2) types of embargoes: transmission embargo and publication
embargo. Under ABS-CBNs service contract with Reuters, Reuters will embargo any content
contributed by ABS-CBN from other broadcast subscribers within the same geographical location:
165

166

4a. Contributed Content

You agree to supply us at our request with news and sports news stories broadcast on the Client
Service of up to three (3) minutes each for use in our Services on a non-exclusive basis and at a
cost of US$300.00 (Three Hundred United States Dollars) per story. In respect of such items we
agree to embargo them against use by other broadcast subscribers in the Territory and confirm we
will observe all other conditions of usage regarding Contributed Content, as specified in Section 2.5
of the Reuters Business Principles for Television Services. For the purposes of clarification, any
geographical restriction imposed by you on your use of Contributed Content will not prevent us or
our clients from including such Contributed Content in online transmission services including the
internet. We acknowledge Contributed Content is your copyright and we will not acquire any
intellectual property rights in the Contributed Content. (Emphasis supplied)
167

Respondents Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas merely denied receiving the advisory sent by
Reuters to its clients, including GMA-7. As in the records, the advisory reads:
ADVISORY - - +++LIVE COVER PLANS+++
PHILIPPINES: HOSTAGE RETURN
**ATTENTION ALL CLIENTS**
PLEASE BE ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING LIVE COVER
PLANNED FOR THURSDAY, JULY 22:
....
SOURCE: ABS-CBN
TV AND WEB RESTRICTIONS: NO ACCESS PHILIPPINES.

168

There is probable cause that respondents Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas directly committed
copyright infringement of ABS-CBNs news footage to warrant piercing of the corporate veil. They
are responsible in airing the embargoed Angelo dela Cruz footage. They could have prevented the
act of infringement had they been diligent in their functions as Head of News Operations and
Program Manager.

Secretary Agra, however, committed grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the filing of the
Information against all respondents despite the erroneous piercing of the corporate veil.
Respondents Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho cannot be held liable for the criminal liability of
the corporation.
Mere membership in the Board or being President per se does not mean knowledge, approval, and
participation in the act alleged as criminal. There must be a showing of active participation, not
simply a constructive one.
Under principles of criminal law, the principals of a crime are those "who take a direct part in the
execution of the act; [t]hose who directly force or induce others to commit it; [or] [t]hose who
cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished." There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it":
169

170

Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by
direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show
the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a
conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the
cohorts.
1wphi1

It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over
the other co-conspirators[.] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
171

In sum, the trial court erred in failing to resume the proceedings after the designated period. The
Court of Appeals erred when it held that Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction despite its
own pronouncement that ABS-CBN is the owner of the copyright on the news footage. News should
be differentiated from expression of the news, particularly when the issue involves rebroadcast of
news footage. The Court of Appeals also erroneously held that good faith, as. well as lack of
knowledge of infringement, is a defense against criminal prosecution for copyright and neighboring
rights infringement. In its current form, the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum and
prescribes a strict liability for copyright infringement. Good faith, lack of knowledge of the copyright,
or lack of intent to infringe is not a defense against copyright infringement. Copyright, however, is
subject to the rules of fair. use and will be judged on a case-to-case basis. Finding probable cause
includes a determination of the defendant's active participation, particularly when the corporate veil
is pierced in cases involving a corporation's criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The Department of Justice Resolution dated June
29, 2010 ordering the filing of the Information is hereby REINSTATED as to respondents Grace Dela
Pena-Reyes and John Oliver T. Manalastas. Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is
directed to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-04-131533.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 175195 : September 15, 2010]

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE
OF PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the conviction of the accused unless such testimony is
supported by other evidence. As an exception, however, the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if
uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and contains details which
could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. [1]
This petition for review on certiorari[2] assails the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 25,
2006 which upheld the Judgment[4] dated September 20, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28,
Mandaue City finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
For the death of Pastor Papauran (victim) on April 15, 1993, Norman Maramara (Maramara) was indicted for
murder.[5] After pleading not guilty but before his trial, Maramara moved and was allowed by the trial court
to enter into a plea bargaining with the prosecution and the victim's next of kin. Accordingly, Maramara,
upon re-arraignment, pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of homicide, a crime necessarily included in the
charge of murder.[6] It would appear, however, that before he was indicted or thereabout, Maramara
executed an extrajudicial confession[7] wherein he admitted shooting the victim to death and implicated as
his co-conspirators herein petitioners Gregorio Manatad (Manatad), Virgilio Bug-atan (Bug-atari) and Bernie
Labandero (Labandero).
Based on the account of Maramara, petitioners were accordingly charged with murder in an Information
dated August 25, 1993, the accusatory portion of which reads:
The State accuses GREGORIO MANATAD, VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN and BERNIE LABANDERO of MURDER,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April 1993, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused in conspiracy with NORMAN MARAMARA whose information
for murder was filed on June 9,1993, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-3721 who was convicted on July 19,
1993, and with others who shall be prosecuted separately once sufficient and/or corroborative evidence are
gathered and secured, and proper preliminary investigation is conducted thereon, with deliberate intent to
kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
conspire, confederate and help one another in inducing and causing die said NORMAN MARAMARA to attack,
assault and shoot Pastor Papauran with a handgun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound at his
vital portion which caused his death soon thereafter,
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Petitioners, when arraigned, pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Factual Antecedents
The CA, in its assailed Decision, chronicled the facts in this sequence:
On April 14, 1993, at around 12:00 o'clock noon, accused-appellants Manatad and Bug-atan arrived at La
Paloma, Labangon, Cebu City to meet with Maramara [whom] they instructed x x x to go to Mandaue City
and kill Pastor Papauran. Accused-appellants Bug-atan and Manatad gave Maramara a .38 caliber revolver
with three reserve[d] bullets and P500.00 for transportation money. The sum of P30,000.00 was also
offered to Maramara as part of the considerations for his killing Pastor Papauran, together with a promise
that accused-appellant Bug-atan would move for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. CBU-24099, a case for
murder filed against Maramara which was pending before the sala of then Judge Portia Hormachuelos.
Sometime in the morning of April 15, 1993, Maramara met with accused- appellants Bug-atan and
Labandero at Labangon, Cebu City. Thereafter, Maramara and accused-appellant Labandero boarded a
passenger jeepney and proceeded to Mandaue City to carry out the task of killing Pastor Papauran.

Accused-appellant Bug-atan, on the other hand, road [sic] Ms motorcycle to Labogon, Mandaue City and
waited in the comer outside Pastor Papauran's house to act as back-up. Maramara and accused-appellant
Labandero arrived at Labogon and proceeded to the house of Pastor Papauran. Maramara shot Pastor
Papauran once in the head and then he and accused-appellant Labandero walked away and ran towards the
highway. They boarded a passenger jeepney towards Consolacion. Three days later, accused-appellant
Bug-atan and Maramara went to Labogon on a motorcycle to confirm if Pastor Papauran was really dead.
When they saw that Pastor Papauran was already dead, accused-appellant Bug-atan told Maramara to keep
silent about the killing and that he would pay the latter on April 21, 1999. [9] However, Maramara was
already arrested by the police on April 21,1999.[10]
Petitioners denied the accusation against them. They respectively interposed the defense of denial and alibi
and ascribed ill-motive on prosecution principal witness Maramara. Thus:
xxx. In denying criminal liability, accused-appellant Manatad interposed the defense of alibi. He testified
that, on April 11 to 15, 1993 he was allegedly in Luyag, San Remegio and Tigbawan, Labuelan, all places
located in the province of Cebu. The accused-appellant Labandero declared that he was an eye-witness for
the State in the case of "People v. Nicolas Yolen and Norman Maramara, Criminal Case No. CBU-24099," and
accordingly, after testifying against Maramara, he immediately left for Manila since he had received death
threats that he would be the next to be killed. Thus, accused-appellant Labandero claims that he was in
Manila at the time of the killing of Pastor Papauran and that the extrajudicial confession and testimony of
Maramara is false, fabricated and was concocted by the latter as a means of revenge. Accused-appellant
Bug-atan, on the other hand, simply denied having participated in the commission of the offense charged. [11]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses particularly
that of Maramara and found the existence of conspiracy among the petitioners in the commission of the
crime. It rejected their alibi holding that the same is self-serving and uncorroborated. Thus, on September
20,1994, judgment was rendered against the petitioners:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, Gregorio
Manatad, Virgilio Bug-atan and Bernie Labandero guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Homicide,
the said accused are hereby [each sentenced] to undergo an indeterminate penalty [of] imprisonment of
Eight (8) Years, One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as minimum to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One
(1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum with the accessories of the law and to indemnify jointly and
severally the legal heirs of Pastor Papauran in the amount of P50.000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay their proportionate share of the cost.
All accused being detention prisoners shall be credited in the service of their respective sentences full time
during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's Decision. Like the trial court, the appellate court found the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and sustained the trial court's finding of conspiracy. It
noted that petitioners' identities were duly established by Maramara's positive identification and, thus,
disregarded petitioners' denial and alibi. On May 25, 2006, the appellate court disposed the appeal:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal
filed in this case and AFFIRMING the Decision dated September 20, 1994 of the RTC in Mandaue City in
Criminal CaseNo.DU-3938.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The appellate court, in the challenged October 4, 2006 Resolution [14] denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration prompting the latter to institute before this Court the instant Petition for Review
onCertiorari. We note that petitioners did not enumerate any specific assignment of errors but instead
presented arguments on procedural and substantive matters.

Issues
As we gleaned from the arguments of the petitioners, the main issues formulated thereon for resolution are:
(1) whether Maramara is a credible witness; (2) whether conspiracy was proven;"and, (3) whether the guilt
of petitioners was proven beyond reasonable doubt. But before dwelling on these matters, we opted to
tackle an issue brought beforehand by petitioners concerning a procedural point. Though it is our opinion
that the discussion on this point is not relevant in the resolution of the guilt or innocence of petitioners, we
still find it necessary to determine what crime was actually committed and its corresponding penalty.
Our Ruling
Preliminarily, petitioners are challenging, on procedural standpoint, the manner in which the proceeding in
Criminal Case No. DU-3721 entitled People v. Norman Maramara was conducted. They point out that after
Maramara was arraigned in the morning of July 19, 1993, the trial court hastily heard and approved a plea
bargain motion in the afternoon leading to his immediate conviction on the same day. They also fault the
trial court in concluding that there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances to appreciate despite
Maramara's confession to the murder of the victim. They likewise question why the filing of Criminal Case
Nos. DU-3721 and DU-3938[15] was done separately and not simultaneously. According to petitioners, the
conviction of Maramara in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 was precipitately done following a skewed procedure.
We disagree. We find no legal flaw in the assailed actions of the trial court in Criminal Case No. DU-3721.
At the outset, it is easily discemable that petitioners failed to point out any rule of procedure or provision of
law that was transgressed by the trial court. On the contrary, the plea bargain was validly acted upon
despite the fact that all the proceedings, i.e. arraignment, plea bargaining and conviction, occurred on a
single day. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes plea bargain for a lesser offense in a
criminal case, is explicit on how and when a plea bargain may be allowed. The rule pertinently provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to
plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint
or information is necessary.
As clearly worded, there is nothing in the law which expressly or impliedly prohibits the trial court from
allowing an accused to change his plea, on a plea bargain, immediately after a previous plea of not guilty.
In approving the plea bargaining agreement, the trial court undoubtedly took into consideration the
timeliness of the plea bargaining and its compliance with the requirements of the law.
Neither do we see any error in the trial court's holding that there were no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances to appreciate even with Maramara's confession of murder for the obvious reason that
introduction of evidence became no longer necessary after entering a plea of guilty.
Respecting the non-simultaneous filing of Criminal Case Nos. DU-3721 and DU-3938, suffice it to say that at
the time Maramara pleaded guilty, the present charge against petitioners was still in the initial stage of
preliminary investigation.
We now proceed to the substantive arguments raised in the petition.
Evaluation of the witnesses' credibility
is a matter best left to the trial court.
Indubitably, the credibility of the testimony of prosecution's prime witness Maramara is the meat of the
instant controversy. Petitioners postulate that he is not a credible witness. They point out that there were
inconsistencies in his testimonies vis-a-vis his confession, and that his declarations should be totally rejected
considering his questionable reputation and personal background as evidenced by his previous conviction.
Being a confessed conspirator, his testimony was procured from a polluted source. Moreover, he had the illmotive of revenge against Labandero and Bug-atan considering that Labandero was a witness against
Maramara in the killing of Lanogan while Bug-atan was responsible for his arrest on April 21, 1993.
We are not convinced.

Petitioners try to discredit Maramara by highlighting his alleged inconsistent statements in his extrajudicial
confession and his testimony in court, i.e., he allegedly averred in his confession that Manatad and Bug-atan
went to see him on April 9, 1993 whereas in his direct examination, he merely stated that there was only
one person who went to him. Petitioners also invite our attention to the variance regarding the place where
the meeting was held, whether it was at the house of Maramara's aunt or at the pier.
These perceived inconsistencies provide no persuasive reason for us to distrust the credibility of Maramara.
They refer to minor details and not to the central fact of the crime. They are too trivial to affect his
straightforward account of the killing of the victim and the complicity of the petitioners. It is settled that
inconsistencies relating to minor details do not affect the creditworthiness of the witness testifying and that
minor inconsistencies tend to show that the witnesses were not coached or rehearsed. This is a well- settled
doctrine which need not require much documentation. The testimony of a witness must be considered in its
entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its
isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. [16] At any rate, Maramara had adequately
explained and properly corrected himself regarding these alleged inconsistencies during his examination in
court.[17]
Maramara's previous conviction neither detracts his competency as a witness nor necessarily renders his
testimony totally untrustworthy and inadmissible. While Maramara admitted to having been previously
convicted in Criminal Case No. DU-3721, this circumstance does not necessarily make him or his
testimony ipso facto incredible. The determination of the character of a witness is not a prerequisite to
belief in his testimony.[18] His alleged bad reputation, even if true, should not sway the court in the
evaluation of the veracity of his testimony. Other important factors should be considered in determining the
inherent probability of his statements for a convicted person is not necessarily a liar. After all, conviction of
a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification of witnesses. [19] More
importantly, the testimony of Maramara who undeniably pleaded guilty in killing the victim should definitely
be given more weight inasmuch as his testimony pertains in not insignificant points to the specific incident.
It is to be noted that Dr. Crisostomo Abbu, the medical officer who conducted the post- mortem examination
on the body of the victim, provided collaborating testimony regarding the location of the inflicted wound,
thereby rendering more credible the testimonial account of Maramara. In fine, we defer to the trial court's
finding, sustained by the appellate court, giving full weight and credit to Maramara's testimony. The trial
court's findings regarding the witness's credibility are accorded the highest degree of respect. [20]
The Court finds the supposed enmity of Maramara not sufficient reason to impel him to implicate petitioners
in the killing of the victim. While it may be conceded that Labandero was a witness against Maramara in a
murder case while Bug-atan was instrumental in Maramara's arrest, still, the defense was unable to
conclusively establish that Maramara was ill-motivated in denouncing petitioners as his co-conspirators in
the commission of the crime. There is no proof that Maramara had the intention to pervert the truth and
prevaricate just to implicate petitioners in so serious a crime as murder. In fact, the trial court did not
perceive such improper motivation on his part. All that petitioners had are pure speculation and
afterthought. The absence of evidence of improper motive tends to indicate that a witness's testimony is
worthy of full faith and credence.[21]
We see no reason to deviate from the trial court's keen observation that the credibility of Maramara as
witness has remained intact notwithstanding the attempts of the defense to demolish it. Hence, his
testimony should be given full weight and credit. We likewise agree with the appellate court in holding that
the trial court did not err in appreciating the testimony of Maramara since it was corroborated by the
testimonies of other witnesses and was given unhesitatingly in a straightforward manner and full of details
which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. His testimony is too rich in details brought
out during his examination in court which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrication. The
declarations of the other prosecution witnesses, individually considered, may have been circumstantial and
lacking in full details. But their combined testimonies somehow supplement in no small measure the
testimonial account of Maramara. As we and the courts below cautiously determined, they strengthen the
prosecution's evidence not only with respect to the fact of killing but also on the conspiracy angle of the
case.
Conspiracy was duly proven.
Like the courts below, we are equally convinced that there is sufficient evidence of conspiracy as convincing
as the evidence of the participation of each of the petitioners. The records teem with circumstances
correctly outlined by the trial court clearly indicating the collective and individual acts of the petitioners

which reveal their common purpose to assault and liquidate the victim. For emphasis, we need to quote a
portion of the ratiocination of the appellate court in this regard:
In the case at bench, as categorically attested to by witness Maramara. accused-appellants asked him to kill
Pastor Papauran in exchange for money and dropping an earlier case, Criminal Case No. 24099, filed against
him. They also accompanied him on the day of the shooting to see to it that the job was done. The
concerted acts of accused-appellants reveal a consciously adopted plan and clearly demonstrate their joint
design to exterminate Pastor Papauran. Conspiracy having been established, the act of one is the act of all.
[22]

Needless to stress, these circumstances are clear enough to show that petitioners acted in concert in the
implementation of a common objective - to kill the victim. In conspiracy, proof of the agreement need not
rest on direct evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of
action and community of interest.[23] To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution nor talce part in every act and may not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in
the execution of the conspiracy.[24] But once conspiracy is shown, as in this case, the act of one is the act of
all.
Defense of alibi and denial
was correctly rejected.
For alibi to prevail, the established doctrine is that the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the locus criminis or within its immediate vicinity.[25] Physical impossibility means that the accused was
at such other place for such a length of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene
either before or after the time he was at such other place. [26]
Manatad's alibi is that from April 11 to 15, 1993, he was in Cuyang, San Remigio and Tigbawan, Tabuelan,
doing faith healing. His alibi, assuming it to be true, cannot be given merit. He could have easily been at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission considering that San Remigio and Tabuelan are
municipalities located in the province of Cebu. His presence therein did not, therefore, render impossible his
being at the scene of the killing at Labogon, Mandaue City, a place also located in the province of Cebu.
To corroborate his exculpatory tale, Manatad presented, among others, Patrocino Vaflor and Rafaela Maglinte
to support his alleged alibi. However, these witnesses were shown to be biased since they have the
tendency to falsely testify in Manatad's favor for they admittedly owed him a great debt of gratitude. [27]
For his part, Labandero posits that he was in Manila at the time of the incident because of a previous death
threat on him after giving his testimony in Criminal Case No. 24099 such that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus criminis. Considering that his alibi and supposed death threat were
uncorroborated and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, the Court finds the same self-serving
and deserving of no weight in law. Moreover, the fact that he has no derogatory record will not affect the
outcome of his case since it does not disprove his complicity in the commission of the offense.
Respecting the denial of Bug-atan, suffice it to state that a mere denial constitutes negative evidence and
warrants the least credibility or none at all. Absent any strong evidence of non-culpability, a denial crumbles
in the face of positive declarations.[28]
In fine, petitioners failed to rebut the prosecution's evidence and their defense of alibi and denial must be
rejected.
The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court has perused the lengthy discussion of the trial court and the
assailed Decision of the appellate court.
Prosecution's evidence sufficiently
established the presence of treachery
and evident premeditation.
Treachery qualifies the crime to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, method or forms which tend directly and especially to ensure its

execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party might make. [29] The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to
himself.[30]
In the present case, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery was indubitably established.
The attack on the unarmed victim was so sudden, unexpected, without preliminaries and provocation. The
victim was totally unprepared and oblivious of the attack since he was peacefully resting inside his house.
The single shot found its mark at the back portion of his head indicating that he was shot from behind with
his back turned to the assailant. This position was disadvantageous to the victim since he was not in a
position to defend himself or to retaliate. Moreover, the location of the wound obviously indicates that the
assailant deliberately and consciously aimed for the vital part of the victim's body to ensure the commission
of the crime. The attack from the rear is treacherous. As has been held many times, treachery exists since
the defenseless victim was shot from behind. The fact that Bug-atan furnished the deadly weapon used in
the shooting eloquently shows that they made a deliberate and conscious adoption of the means to kill the
victim. These facts, established by evidence on record, clearly constitute treachery as defined in Article
14(16) of the Revised Penal Code.
Before evident premeditation may be appreciated, the following elements must be proved: a) the time when
the accused determined to commit the crime; b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to
his determination; and, c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.
The foregoing requisites were fulfilled. First, it was on April 14, 1993 when Manatad and Bug-atan gave
Maramara a .38 caliber revolver and P500.00 as expenses for transportation, instructing the latter to
proceed to Mandaue City and kill the victim. Undisputedly, these presuppose planning. Second, the
execution of the crime was done the following morning of April 15, 1993 where Bug-atan and Labandero
accompanied Maramara to the house of the victim. Third, the more than one day period, at the very least,
was substantial interval of time clearly sufficient to afford a full opportunity for meditation and reflection
upon the consequences of their nefarious acts. These proved their premeditated design to end the life of the
victim which was accomplished.
Crime committed and proper penalty
While the Decision of the trial court recognized the guilt of the petitioners for the offense as charged to have
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court went on to hold them guilty to a lesser offense of
homicide citing the Court's ruling in People v. Tapalla.[31] In said case, this Court declared that if the
prosecution accepts from any of the defendants charged with conspiracy in the commission of a crime, a
plea of guilty to a lesser offense included in the one alleged in the information, such acceptance will benefit
his co-defendants. In arriving at this conclusion, the trial court was of the impression that Maramara's plea
of guilty to a lesser offense of homicide in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 should benefit the petitioners in this
case.
The case of Tapalla,[32] invoked by the trial court as authority in arriving at such conclusion, is not applicable
in the present case. The information in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 indicting Maramara alone of murder is
distinct and separate from the information charging petitioners for the same offense in the instant case.
Moreover, Maramara was neither charged as co-accused of petitioners nor of conspiring to commit a crime in
either case. As correctly observed by the trial court, Maramara was only a principal witness in this
case[33] though admittedly a conspirator in the commission of the crime. These circumstances provide a
distinction from the Tapalla case where the accused Tingzon, who pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide, was a co- accused in the same information charging him along with others of conspiring to commit
murder. We therefore cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion drawn from the principle laid down in
the Tapalla case and neither can we give imprimatur on the appellate court's affirmation thereof. The basis
thus used is, in our opinion, wrong.
As the evidence stands, the crime committed by petitioners is murder in view of the attending circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation. Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is
the unlawful lolling of a person which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery or evident
premeditation, inter alia, attended the lulling. The presence of any one of the enumerated circumstances
under Article 248 is enough to qualify a killing as murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. When
more than one qualifying circumstance is proven, as in this case, the rule is that the other must be
considered as generic aggravating.[34] In the present case, the qualifying circumstance of evident

premeditation will be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance warranting the imposition of the
penalty of death in the absence of any mitigating circumstance. [35] Since the imposition of the death penalty
has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346,[36] a law favorable to petitioners which took effect on June 24,
2006, the penalty that should be imposed on petitioners is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole. Sections 2 and 3 of the Act provide:
Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties,
of the Revised Penal Code;
xxxx
Section 3. Person convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Civil Liability
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and, (6) interest, in proper cases. [37]
The Decision of the trial couit as affirmed by the appellate court only awarded P50,000.00 to the legal heirs
of the victim without stating the nature of this grant. As held in People v. Zamorqga, [38] civil indemnity and
moral damages, being based on differen jural foundations are separate and distinct from each other. Thus,
it becomes imperative for this Court to rectify the error and award additional damages following precedents.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, we award the fixed amount of P75,000.00 for the death of the
victim[39] as civil indemnity ex delicto without any need of proof other than the commission of the crime. An
award of moral damages is also in order even though the prosecution did not present any proof of the heirs'
emotional suffering apart from the fact of death of the victim, since the emotional wounds from the vicious
killing of the victim cannot be denied.[40] The award of P75,000.00 is proper pursuant to established
jurisprudence.
Although the prosecution presented evidence that the heirs had incurred actual expenses, no receipts were
presented in the trial court. An award of temperate damages in lieu of actual damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is warranted because it is reasonable to presume that when death
occurs, the family of the victim suffered pecuniary loss for the wake and funeral of the victim although the
exact amount was not proved.[41]
In addition, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should be awarded considering the attendance
of the aggravating circumstance of treachery that qualified the killing to murder and evident premeditation
which served as generic aggravating circumstance. Exemplary damages are awarded when treachery
attended the commission of the crime.[42]
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioners Gregorio
Manatad, Virgilio Bug-atan and Bernie Labandero are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
not homicide, qualified by treachery, and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Petitioners are ORDERED to pay the heirs of victim Pastor Papauran the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 99287 June 23, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME MANUEL, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the decision and the order of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region at Pasig, Metro Manila dated February 25 and March 13, 1991, respectively
in Criminal Case No. 1345-D entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jaime Manuel y Ohide" for
violation of Section 16, Article 111, RA 6425, as amended.
Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging from six
years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos.
The information against him reads:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 0.08
grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu) wrapped with an aluminum foil,
which is a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Rollo)
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On
November 21, 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private
respondent verbally manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to change his
former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No.
6425, as amended. The said section provides a penalty ofimprisonment ranging from six months
and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who
violates or fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of the Act; if the violation or failure
involves a regulated drug. That same day, the respondent Judge issued an order (Annex "B," p.
17, Rollo) directing private respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea,
and set the promulgation of decision on January 30, 1991. On January 30, 1991, respondent Judge
postponed the promulgation of the decision to February 18, 1991 to give private respondent another
opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. Also, on the said date, the private respondent
filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On February 18, 1991, respondent Judge
issued another order (Annex "D," p. 19, Rollo) postponing the promulgation of decision to February
25, 1991 to give private respondent further opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. On
February 20, 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense (annex "E," p. 20, Rollo) on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on
November 21, 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally
charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time
which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On February 21, 1991,
private respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense (annex F, p. 21, Rollo), alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal
Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a

lesser offense. Subsequently, on February 25, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision granting
the accused's motion, to wit:
It may well be appropriate at this time to state that the accused is not availing of the
"voluntary plea of guilt" as a mitigating circumstance envisioned under Article 13,
paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused simply wants to avail of
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules. As pointed out by Atty. Fernando Fernandez of the
PAO, there is nothing in the said provision which requires that the same be availed of
prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It is conceded though,
as pointed out by the prosecution, that such is a waste of time on the part of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and of the Court, nonetheless, this Court, having
in mind Section 2 of Rule 1 which provides that the rules shall be liberally construed
in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding and also for humanitarian
considerations, hereby APPROVES and GRANTS the Motion at bar.
Moreover, such an admission of guilt by the accused indicates his submission to the
law and a moral disposition on his part to reform. (Vide: People vs. Coronel, G.R. No.
L-19091, June 30, 1966)
Let it be made of record however that the Court is not putting a premium on the
change of heart of the accused in mid-stream.
WHEREFORE, finding the accused JAIME MANUEL Y CHIDE @ Manny guilty
beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Article III, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, he is hereby sentenced to a straight prison term of two
(2) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, to pay a fine of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of
his preventive imprisonment.
Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, let the 0.08
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) subject matter of this case be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and be turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be disposed of according to law.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 24-25)
Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforestated decision but the same
was denied in the order of March 13, 1991, which states:
It is the considered view of this Court that Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules should
not be interpreted to the letter in "victimless crimes" such as this case, possession of
regulated drugs, which is more of a "social disease" case so to speak and in the light
of (the) provision itself that "with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal." Is
the fiscal the offended party?

Moreover as the records show, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal has not been very
consistent on this "lesser offense plea" thing. It would perhaps be in consonance with
justice that a guideline be laid down by the said Office, if only to apprise the public,
the Court and the accused on when said consent is to be given by the fiscal as a
matter of course and when it will be withheld. For to leave the same undefined is in
the mind of this Court, not conducive to a "just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 41-42)
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A LESSER OFFENSE
BECAUSE THE REQUEST WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THE CONSENT
THERETO OF THE PROSECUTOR AND THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT
OBTAINED.
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN CONVICTING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT OF THE LESSER OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 17,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, AS AMENDED, INSTEAD OF THE OFFENSE
ORIGINALLY CHARGED OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 16 OF THE SAME LAW, IN
VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF A VALID CHANGE OF PLEA. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)
In the resolution of January 20, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
respondent Judge from enforcing the questioned judgment in the aforesaid criminal case (Rollo, p.
86).
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th
Ed., 1979, p. 1037). It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only
one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the
graver charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal
proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea
thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime
charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense
charged for purposes of double jeopardy.
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is
not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the

sound discretion of the trial court (Manuel v. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 94732, February 26, 1991, En
Banc Resolution).
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after
the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial
court and the Office of the Prosecutor with yardstick within which their discretion may be properly
exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that
the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish
guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion inPeople v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462,
February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely
the rationale of the law:
. . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and
the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to charge his former plea of not
guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more
nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that
Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser
offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for
compromise, much less bargaining.
As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the
Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has
submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to
assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the
accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served. A reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of
the prosecution's evidence. Apparently, the judgment under review dwelt solely on only one of the
three objections (i.e. waste of valuable time already spent by the court and prosecution) interposed
by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive. It must be recalled that the other two grounds of
objection were that the prosecution had already rested its case and that the possibility of conviction
of the private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of
the prosecution. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in hand, the respondent judge's
acceptance of the private respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.
The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes
involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because there is no offended party to speak Of and that
even the latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before the trial court could allow the
accused to change his plea.
We do not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and
the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense (see Manuel v.
Velasco, et al., supra, p. 6). The reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full control of the
prosecution of criminal actions (Cinco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October
15, 1991). Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or
graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former (seePeople v.
Parohinog, supra, concurring opinion of then Justice Barredo, p. 377; also Vda. de Bagatua, et al. v.
Revilla, et al., 104 Phil. 393, 395-396).

It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as
amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by
law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human
dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No. 70998,
October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts
themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic
unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended party
in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the criminal action in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to
defend the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person
directly injured by the offense (see United States v. Samio, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the
consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in
behalf of the government.
Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change of plea
and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no
longer open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.
Such supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent
to the private respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private
respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that
found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for
an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
information under any of the following instances:
(a) . . . ;
(b) . . . ;
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal
and of the offended party;
xxx xxx xxx
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation
of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also
represents the offended party,i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change
of plea was irregular and improper.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156 dated February 25 and March 13, 1991,

respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D (People v. Manuel y Ohide) are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said criminal case is hereby remanded to the trial court for continuation of trial on the
original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140406

April 17, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO DESUYO alias "TONY," accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MARICEL PERU DESUYO was sleeping beside her younger sister Aisalyn one late night in
September 1996 when she was awakened by someone caressing her breasts. She opened her eyes
and saw her father, accused Antonio Desuyo, crouching before her. He was naked except for his
underpants to cover his private parts. Instinctively, she begged her father not to touch her, reminding
him that she was his daughter. But he paid no heed; instead, he removed her underwear while
threatening to kill her should she make any noise. He mounted her, forced his penis into her vagina
and gyrated his hips against hers. She wept as she continued to beg him to desist from his fiendish
assault on her virtue. Meanwhile, Maricel did not tell her mother about the incident; instead, she kept
the ignominy and pain to herself.
Maricel's mother worked as a housekeeper in a faraway town and she did not want to give her any
trouble. Neither did she inform her relatives who lived nearby. She feared for her life as her father
had threatened to kill her should she speak to anyone about what he had done to her.
The accused would repeat his sexual molestation of Maricel almost everyday from September 1996
to August 1997. His assaults on her virtue were always followed by threats on her that she would be
killed should she report these to her mother. The sexual abuses of her father were so often that
Maricel lost count.
On 14 August 1997, early dawn, as Maricel had been already accustomed to, she would be roused
from her sleep by her father fondling her private parts. Again, he undressed her and unleashed his
lechery on her. It was meant to be the last. In her young and impressionable mind, Maricel vowed
that it would not happen to her again.
On 18 August 1997 Maricel summoned enough courage to relate her ordeal to a police officer who
lived nearby. She bravely narrated to Police Officer Tito Ganggalang and his wife Riza her sordid tale
which was actually a confirmation of what was already circulating around their neighborhood. She
admitted that her father had been sexually abusing her for close to a year already. Emboldened by
the encouragement she received from sympathetic neighbors, she next confided to Luisa Galit,
Maricel's maternal aunt, who could only commiserate with her.
1wphi1.nt

Forthwith, Luisa Galit accompanied Maricel to a doctor who upon examination found Maricel to have
several old hymenal lacerations in her vaginal area. Thereafter, they repaired to the municipal hall

where Maricel instituted a complaint against her father, accused Antonio Desuyo, for having
repeatedly raped her.
In the course of the preliminary examination conducted by the municipal trial court judge, accused
Antonio Desuyo asked forgiveness from his daughter and promised to leave her alone should she
withdraw the charge she filed against him. Maricel vehemently refused as her father grovelled for
forgiveness.1 As a consequence, anInformation was filed against the accused Antonio
Desuyo alias "Tony" for raping his fifteen (15)-year old daughter Maricel.
Maricel attested in court to the truth of her accusations. According to her, ever since her mother
worked in a faraway town, her father was dauntless and unrelenting in sexually abusing her night
after night within the confines of their home. She felt pain and cried everytime her father would
forcibly insert his penis into her vagina; however she kept her ordeal to herself as she was afraid of
him.
After having her first menstruation she became apprehensive that she might get pregnant. Her father
however was unperturbed and simply dismissed her fears by telling her not to worry. A year after the
first forced coition, Maricel decided to end her tribulation by unburdening her grief to neighbors who
readily sympathized with her. She felt relieved after seeing her father locked up behind bars. 2
The accused denied having raped Maricel. He affirmed however that he raised singlehandedly his
two (2) daughters Maricel and Aisalyn as his wife was serving another household in a distant town.
According to him, despite his guidance, Maricel turned out to be a wayward daughter who
entertained suitors at an early age. Once, his daughter Aisalyn confided to him that Maricel was
corresponding with a boy from another barrio. He immediately searched through her bag and found
a letter intended for a certain Jerry. Incensed by his daughter's behavior he mauled her expecting
that she would atone for her mistakes. However, instead of mending her ways, Maricel ran away
from home and instituted this unfounded charge for rape against him. He presented in evidence
Maricel's supposed letter to Jerry as well as a letter from his wife pledging her love and support. He
averred that Maricel was being inveigled by his sister-in-law Luisa and the latter's boyfriend Boy into
tormenting him for reasons which he could not fathom.3
The trial court did not give credence to the bare denials of the accused. Solely on account of
Maricel's testimony, the court a quo found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of "multiple incestuous rape" and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, and to
indemnify the offended party P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.4
Accused Antonio Desuyo assails in his brief his conviction for "multiple rape" essentially on two (2)
grounds, namely, that the Information is defective and that the court a quo erred in imposing upon
him the penalty of death despite the failure of the prosecution to establish the age of Maricel with
certainty.5
Accused avers that the Information for "multiple rape" filed against him is deficient since by merely
stating that the sexual assaults were repeated "within the month of September 1996 up to August 18,
1997,"6 it failed to state the exact dates when the alleged rapes were committed. Quoting heavily
from the early case of US v. Diacho,7accused asserts that unless he is informed of the precise "day,
or about the day, he may be, to an extent deprived of the opportunity to defend himself." 8

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the
time of commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of particulars. The
records show that the accused never asked for a bill of particulars in accordance with the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.9
The failure of the accused to move for the specification of the date when the alleged crime was
committed or for the quashal of the Information on the ground that it does not conform substantially
to the prescribed form10deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could lawfully be
introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently
charges the accused with a definite crime.11 It is indeed too late in the day for the accused to raise
this issue because objections to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for
the first time on appeal. At any rate, it is settled that the exact date of the commission of rape is not
an essential element thereof and need not be stated in the information. 12 The Court has sustained
the following dates alleged in an information for rape as sufficient for purposes of complying with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, to wit: "from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994," 13 "sometime in
November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto," 14 "on or about and sometime
in the year 1988,"15"sometime in the year 1987"16 and "before and until October 15, 1994."17 In any
event, a review of the evidence presented by the prosecution more than establishes the guilt of the
accused for the rape of his daughter.
1wphi1.nt

For one, it is highly inconceivable, if not completely preposterous, that Maricel, a

guileless barrio lass, would concoct a story of rape against her very own father, taking into mind the
societal humiliation and personal devastation which such a charge entails. More so, no serious
motive, apart from the beatings which she supposedly suffered in the hands of the accused, was
offered to satisfactorily explain why Maricel would come out and undergo legal scrutiny of the
unfortunate encounters with her father. Thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
An analysis of the records reveals that Maricel testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and
consistent manner. Although Maricel expounded only on the first and last instances of rape, failing
thus to give an accurate account of the other sexual violations, her testimony in its entirety was
forthright, clear and free from any contradictions.
Maricel's failure to immediately inform her mother as well as her relatives about her ordeal is
consistent with reason. It must be remembered that Maricel depended on the accused for existence
and protection as her mother lived far. As to her total obedience to her father and the stoic silence
she kept about her sufferings, these were all brought about by her genuine fear of a man who on
account of his moral ascendancy needed no weapon to instill such terror in her.18 Maricel was
convinced of a potential yet real danger posed by a beast masquerading as the family's paladin.
Finally, we take into consideration Antonio's admission before the trial court that he wrote his
parents-in-law sometime in March 1998 to ask for their forgiveness. Antonio likewise acknowledged
when cross-examined that he begged for Maricel's mercy before the municipal trial judge in the
course of the preliminary examination. No compelling reason was offered by the defense to explain
Antonio's incriminating declarations. Verily, these are judicial admissions which no man in his right
mind would make unless they were true.
The court a quo convicted the accused of "multiple rape" without stating the counts of rape involved.
The records however show that the prosecution established beyond doubt that accused was guilty of

two (2) counts of rape. Although Maricel insists that she had been raped almost everyday from
September 1996 to August 1997 she was only able to relate with clarity two (2) of the rapes, the first
forced coition sometime in September 1996, and the last on 14 August 1997. She positively narrated
in detail the surrounding circumstances of the sexual assaults committed against her on those two
(2) occasions. Indeed, her recollection of these two (2) rapes was very vivid, leaving no doubt about
its credibility and truthfulness.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the guilt of the accused for two (2) counts of rape has been
conclusively established; however, the death penalty was erroneously imposed. Under Sec. 11 of RA
7659, death shall be imposed if "the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent x x x of the victim."
In the instant case, the Information charging the accused with rape alleges that Maricel is the
fourteen (14)-year old daughter of the accused. However, it is significant to note that other than the
testimony of Maricel, no independent proof was presented to show that she was a minor and that
she was the daughter of the accused. Although Maricel's relationship with the accused was not
contested, nor her age refuted, proof of age and relationship is critical considering the gravity of the
penalty to be imposed upon the accused.19
It bears emphasis that the minority of the victim and her filiation to the accused when properly
alleged in the information and proved beyond reasonable doubt during trial elevate the crime of
simple rape to qualified rape and warrant the imposition of the extreme penalty of death. As such,
nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which the accused is charged must be established by the prosecution in order for the penalty of
death to be upheld. In fine, the minority of the victim as well as her relationship with the accused
must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself; contrarily, the failure of the
prosecution to sufficiently establish the victim's age and relationship with the accused is fatal and
consequently bars conviction for qualified rape. 20
Perforce, in the present case, the death penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced
to reclusion perpetua. Likewise, the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity should be modified and
adjusted to P50,000.00 since the penalty is likewise lowered to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence, accused Antonio Desuyo should also be ordered to pay Maricel
Desuyo P50,000.00 as moral damages even if there was no proof presented as basis therefor since
the anguish and pain that complaining witness endured are plainly evident. 21
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 26, San Jose, Southern Leyte, finding
accused Antonio Desuyo alias "Tony" guilty of "multiple rape" in its qualified form and ordering him to
pay complaining witness Maricel Peru Desuyo P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, is MODIFIED. The
accused is instead found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape and, accordingly, sentences him
to reclusion perpetua for each count. In addition to paying Maricel Peru Desuyo civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00, instead of P75,000.00, for each count of rape, accused is further ordered to
pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 also for each count. Costsde oficio.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399
November 19, 2014
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 13-4013-RTJ]

GASPAR BANDOY, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 45, and ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 46, both at REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE, OCCIDENT AL
MINDORO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For review before the Court is this administrative case against respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr.
(Judge Jacinto, Jr.) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 45 and 46, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, filed by Gaspar Bandoy (Bandoy) for Grave Abuse of Authority in relation to Criminal Case
No. 2-1928, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Caspar Bandoy, Peter Alfaro and Randolph
Ignacio" and Criminal Case No. Z-1910, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Romulo De Jesus, Jr."
1

Complainant Bandoy alleged, inhis verified complaint, that he was one of the accused in Criminal
Case No. 2-1928, for Serious Illegal Detention filed by Romulo De Jesus, Jr. (De Jesus, Jr.),which
was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro (RTC-Br. 44), with Judge
Jacinto, Jr. as the Assisting Presiding Judge. Bandoy claimed that the case was initiated by De
Jesus, Jr. to get back at him for being instrumental in the filing of an earlier criminal complaint
against him for Violation of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph 7, number 14 of the Omnibus
Election Code (Ballot Switching). The said case was likewise raffled to RTC-Br. 44.
4

Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former Mayor Joel Panaligan during the
2007 local elections, while De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their municipalitys public elementary school,
was one of the chairpersons of the Board of Election Inspectors; thatthey were both assigned in
Precinct 3-A of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was rumored to be closely
associated with the rival mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa (Voltaire), son of House
representative Amelita C. Villarosa (Cong. Villarosa)and Mayor Jose Tapales Villarosa (Mayor
Villarosa) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that in the said local elections, De Jesus, Jr. was caught
in the act of ballot switching, which was captured on video by a member of the media, a certain
Randy Bool; that by virtue of a search warrant from the Commission of Elections (COMELEC), De
Jesus, Jr. was caught in possession of some ballots insidehis backpack; and that as a result of this
incident, De Jesus, Jr. was criminally charged with the offense of ballot switching. Accordingly, on
August 17, 2007, a warrant of arrest was issued against De Jesus, Jr.
5

According to Bandoy, on August 20, 2007, De Jesus, Jr. personally appeared before Provincial
Prosecutor Levitico Salcedo to file a criminal case for Serious Illegal Detention against him, Peter
Alfaro, Randolph Ignacio, and then Election Supervisor, Atty. Judy Lorenzo (Atty. Lorenzo).
Apparently, De Jesus, Jr. did this while there was a standing warrant of arrest against him. Worse,
De Jesus, Jr. remained at-large until he was able to post bail on March 7, 2008 before then Las
Pinas RTC Judge Raul B. Villanueva. Because complainant Bandoy was charged with Serious
Illegal Detention, the provincial prosecutor recommended "no bail" leaving them incarcerated for
morethan two years.
6

Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave abuse of his authority by displaying
manifest bias and partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he granted several postponements of De
Jesus, Jr.s arraignment, originally scheduled on April 23, 2008, but was reset for seven times until
8

De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty supposedly inside Judge Jacinto, Jr.s chambers on July 6,
2011.
9

Bandoy emphasized that many of the said resettings were mostly due to De Jesus, Jr.s nonappearance for failure to locate him at his given address. Despite these supposed obvious court
defiance, Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient and seemingly tolerated his continuous nonappearance in the courts subsequent scheduled hearings. Another example of Judge Jacinto, Jr.s
supposed unreasonable bias towards Bandoy was his lack of interest to dispose of the case of
serious illegal detention despite De Jesus, Jr.s obvious dilatory tactics and unjustified absences
when his appearance was necessary.
Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration and filed a petition for review before
the Department of Justice (DOJ)to have the serious illegal detention case against them dismissed.
Meanwhile, coaccused Atty. Lorenzo filed a separate petition with the Court of Appeals (CA)and won
the case. The Court later affirmed the dismissal of the case against her. At first, the DOJ denied their
petition. Upon reconsideration, however, the DOJ, under the helm of Justice Secretary Leila De
Lima, directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Occidental Mindoro, to cause the withdrawal of
the case against Bandoy and his co-accused. Accordingly, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
filed its Motion to Withdraw Information.
10

Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order, dated July 5, 2011, denied the motion to withdraw information. In the
end, Bandoy was only able to regain temporary freedom when Judge Jacinto, Jr. finally resolved to
allow him to post a bail bond of P100,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00. Bandoy added that
Voltaire was a principal sponsor in the wedding of Judge Jacinto, Jr.s child.
11

12

13

Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor
(Judge Mayor) became the assisting presiding judge of Branch 44. It was during this time that the
case for serious illegal detention was temporarily dismissed, but upon reconsideration, Judge Mayor
decided to reinstate and continue the case against Bandoy. Meanwhile, the case of ballot switching
against De Jesus, Jr. was dismissed on October 25, 2012, while their bail for the serious illegal
detention case was cancelled.
14

15

According to complainant Bandoy, the compelling force that made him initiate this present
administrative case was because Judge Jacinto, Jr. would take over Judge Mayors assignments on
account of the latters compulsory retirement from service on December 1, 2012, which would
include their pending serious illegal detention case. He claimed that Judge Jacinto, Jr. ordered the
police and the CIDG to re-arrest him and his coaccused even though there was no warrant of arrest
against them. He begged the Court not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. handle their case of serious illegal
detention for fear that they would have to endure another bout of extreme bias and partiality from
him.
16

In his Comment, Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the Villarosa clan. He also denied
having a hand in the order to arrest Bandoy and his co-accused as the Chief of PNP and the CIDG
Chief, both of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, merely consulted him on how to go about the order of
cancellation of bail that Judge Mayor issued. He explained "wala po akong alam sa Kautusan kaya
binasa po sa akin ang nilalaman nito sa cellphone at pagkatapos ay nagwika po akong parang may
kulang sa Kautusan at kapag nakansela ang piyansa ay babalik sila sa selda dahil wala na po silang
piyansa (as a consequence thereof)." Judge Jacinto, Jr. even refused to issue a warrant of arrest
when he was asked because he was not handling the case anymore.
17

18

19

20

Bandoy, in his Reply, brought to the attention of the Court that Judge Jacinto, Jr., in order to
thwartthe enemies of his supposed master, Mayor Villarosa, issued warrants of arrest against ten
individuals. He also divulged that the audit team from the Court was personally assisted by Judge
Jacinto, Jr. and given accommodations in "Aroma Center," one of the properties of Mayor
Villarosa. Bandoy was thankful that Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not deny the fact that the police officials
wanted to arrest them even without a warrant of arrest. Bandoy showed a timeline of events
supposedly depicting how De Jesus, Jr., through the tolerance and partiality of Judge Jacinto, Jr.,
evaded arraignment on numerous occasions effectively delaying the progress of the case for ballot
switching and even actually conducting the arraignment in his chambers. He further reiterated his
plea not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. preside over the affairs of Branch 44.
21

22

23

24

25

In his Rejoinder, Judge Jacinto, Jr. stated that he was again assigned as Assisting Presiding Judge
of Branch 44. He clarified that he indeed issued warrants of arrest against ten individuals in
connection with a serious illegal detention case against them, but only after a finding of probable
cause by the public prosecutor handling it. Judge Jacinto, Jr. reiterated that he merely affirmed the
finding of probable cause, which justified the issuance of the warrants of arrest as the charge was a
non-bailable offense. He likewise denied seeking any favor from Mayor Villarosa to accommodate
the audit team in their property, the Aroma Family Hotel. He explained that the audit team paid him a
"courtesy call" where he assured the team of his cooperation. He again restated that the police
officials merely coordinated with him as was customary because he was the Executive Judge of the
municipality. Judge Jacinto, Jr. believes that Bandoys accusations against him were designed to
oust him as Presiding Judge of Branches 45 and 46 of San Jose and even as Assisting Presiding
Judge of Branch 44, Mamburao, both in the province of Occidental Mindoro.
26

27

28

29

30

31

In its Report, dated June 03, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) did not give
credence to Bandoys allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an order for his arrest without a
warrant and to the insinuation that the Courts audit team was conveniently housed in Aroma Family
Hotel of the Villarosas for failure to present proof. The OCA observed, however, that Judge Jacinto,
Jr. never refuted the allegations of leniency over the several resettings of the arraignment of De
Jesus, Jr. and that the arraignment was held in his chambers. As such, the OCA equated his silence
to admission.
32

33

34

Thus, the OCA recommended that:

1. The administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr., Branch 45,
Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, be RE-DOCKETED as regular
administrative matter; and
2. Respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be found GUILTY of Bias and Partiality and Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and, accordingly, be FINEDin the amount of Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
35

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code ofJudicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites to the
due performance of judicial office.
36

Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One who accepts the exalted position of
a judge owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain professional competence at all times.
37

In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he arraigned De Jesus,
Jr. inside his chambers. He was given the opportunity to answer, but he chose not to delve into it.
Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues being imputed against him, which was
quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a member of the bench, that was being
challenged. As aptly observed by the OCA, "the natural instinct of man impels him to resist an
unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It isagainst human nature to just remain reticent
and say nothing in the face of false accusations." His silence introduces doubt in the minds of the
public, which is not acceptable.
1wphi1

38

Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and procedure, the
Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Court, specifically Section 1(a) thereof requiring arraignment of an accused to be made in
open court, to wit:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court
where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in
open courtby the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he
pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other then those named in
the complaint or information.
(Emphasis supplied)
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a judge can
take nonchalantly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal litigation
"where the issues are joined x x x and without which the proceedings cannot advance further."
39

Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1(a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. There is gross ignorance of the law when the error committed by the judge was "gross or
patent, deliberate or malicious." It may also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails
to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Gross
ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.
40

41

42

43

The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the legal profession to know
the very law that they are supposed to apply in a given controversy. They are called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant with the
basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence. When a judge displays an utter
lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes
the public and the Court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws
and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice.
44

45

46

Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise emphasize that judges,
as officers of the court, have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed with evenly and fairly. Not
only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to be honest and impartial in the
dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are circumspect and do not arouse
suspicion in the minds of the public. When they fail to do so, such acts may cast doubt upon their
integrity and ultimately the judiciary in general. As held in Joselito Rallos, et al., vs. Judge Ireneo
Lee Gako Jr., Branch 5 RTC, Cebu City:
47

48

49

50

51

Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would
become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must
not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges
like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the
litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of
the peoples sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach.
Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed from 2007 to
2011 without appropriate action coming from the court. Judge Jacinto, Jr. should have availed of
known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally appear for his arraignment, but he did
not. The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an impression of
bias and partiality that should be addressed and corrected.
1wphi1

Consequently, under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Section 11 (A) of the
same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious
charge is either a fine of more thanP20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00, suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.
The Court is aware of the other pending administrative cases against Judge Jacinto, Jr., but they
cannot be fully considered in the imposition of the penalty in this case as they are still under review
and evaluation. Thus, a fine of P40,000.00 is deemed appropriate under the circumstances.
52

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of
the Law and Procedure and of Bias and Partiality. Accordingly, he is FINED in the amount of Forty
Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192818

November 17, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PRINCE FRANCISCO y ZAFE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated March 29, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03041, which affirmed with modification the Judgment 2 dated October 5, 2007 in
Criminal Case No. 3007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 in Virac, Catanduanes. The
RTC found accused-appellant Prince Francisco y Zafe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder.
The Facts
In an Information3 filed on January 23, 2002, appellant was indicted for murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of October 2001 at around 8:50 oclock in the evening, in barangay
San Juan, municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident premeditation, treachery and deliberate
intent to take the life of Ramil Tablate did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
criminally, attack, assault and stab the latter, with the use of a bladed instrument (kitchen knife)
wounding mortally his chest, abdomen and different parts of his body which wounds were
necessarily mortal causing the direct and immediate death of said Ramil Tablate, to the damage and
prejudice of his surviving heirs.
During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, during the pre-trial
on March 4, 2003, he withdrew his former plea. Consequently, on the same hearing, he was rearraigned and he pleaded guilty4 to the crime charged.
Through the March 4, 2003 Order from the pre-trial proceeding, it was shown that the RTC
conducted searching questions to determine that appellant voluntarily entered his guilty plea and
that he understood its consequences. The RTC further ordered the setting of the case for the
prosecution to adduce evidence proving the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt and to
determine the degree of his culpability. The March 4, 2003 RTC Order states:
When this case was called for pre-trial this morning, the accused thru counsel manifested his desire
to withdraw his former plea and to enter a plea of guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, the
accused was rearraigned and he entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged. He agreed to pay
the amount of P131,313.50 as actual damages and another P50,000.00 for the life of Ramil Tablate.
The Court proceeded to ask the accused searching questions to determine the voluntariness
of his plea and as to whether he understood the consequences of the same. Satisfied that the
accused willingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty with full knowledge of the consequence of

the same and, in addition that he was given proper [advice] by his counsel prior to entering
said plea, the Court sets the hearing of this case to April 22, 2003 at 8:30 a.m. to determine the
degree of culpability of the accused as required under the Rules in cases of capital offenses.
Let a subpoena duces tecum be issued to Dr. Elmer Tatad and Dr. Lalaine A. Bernardo, all of IPHO,
Virac, Catanduanes, to testify and bring with them the medical record of Ramil Tablate on the said
date of hearing. As requested by the prosecution.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied.)
In its November 12, 2003 Order,6 the RTC stated that during the hearing conducted on the same
date, the defense admitted the fact of death of Ramil Tablate due to stab wounds and that it was
appellant who stabbed Ramil.
To prove appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Dr.
Lilian Olfindo, Joseph Romero, Christopher Tablate, and Napoleon Mandac, and established the
following facts:
On October 24, 2001, at around 8:50 p.m., Joseph, Christopher, and Napoleon were at the wake of
one Sulpicio Go in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes. While they were watching a game of pai-cue, the
victim, Ramil, was sitting nearby on a parked motorcycle talking to someone. Appellant then
appeared from behind and started stabbing Ramil using a knife. Ramil pleaded with appellant to
stop, saying: "Tama na PRINCE magadan na ako." ("That is enough PRINCE, I will die.") When
Christopher heard the commotion and saw his brother Ramil being assaulted, he went to Ramil and
told appellant: "Tama na PRINCE magadan na ang tugang ko." ("That is enough PRINCE, my
brother will die.") Efren Francisco, father of appellant, told appellant to stop the assault and
embraced Ramil, but appellant relentlessly continued stabbing Ramil. Fearing for his brothers life,
Christopher grabbed a plastic chair and hit the back of appellant, who got more enraged and turned
upon Christopher, stabbing him five times in the arm.7 Christopher ran away with appellant chasing
him until he was able to ride a tricycle which rushed him to the hospital. In the emergency room,
Christopher was given medical attention and was stunned to eventually see the lifeless body of
Ramil on a stretcher.8
Dr. Olfindo made the post-mortem examination on the victim. 9 The result showed that Ramil suffered
a total of 16 wounds in various parts of the body, 13 of which were stab wounds. 10 Ramil died of
cardiac arrest secondary to cardiac tamponade, secondary to multiple stab wounds in the chest and
abdomen.11
The prosecution rested its case and made its formal offer of exhibits without any objection from the
defense.
After admitting the death of Ramil resulting from appellants assault, the defense, however, did not
present any witnesses, but simply argued that the offense of appellant is only homicide and not
murder. Contending that no treachery attended the assault, the defense asserted that appellant did
not attack Ramil from behind.
The Ruling of the RTC

The trial court rendered its decision on October 5, 2007, convicting appellant of the crime of Murder,
the dispositive portion reading:
WHEREFORE, this Court, after determining the degree of culpability of PRINCE, who pleaded guilty
to the crime of Murder, hereby, sentences Prince Francisco to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify the family of the victim the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED THIRTEEN AND 50/100 (Php131,313.50) PESOS as actual damages and
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for taking the life of Ramil Tablate, as previously agreed
upon.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant committed the crime charged qualified by treachery. But it opined that appellant
acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation,
considering an altercation appellant had with Ramil earlier at a billiard hall. 13
Unperturbed, appellant appealed to the CA, raising the lone issue of whether the RTC erred in
convicting him of murder.
The Ruling of the CA
In its Decision dated March 29, 2010, the appellate court affirmed with modification the ruling of the
RTC. Thefallo reads:
Wherefore, the Decision dated 5 October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region,
Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, in Criminal Case No. 3007, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS in that appellant PRINCE FRANCISCO y ZAFE is ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Ramil Tablate the additional sums of P50,000.00 and P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
respectively.
SO ORDERED.14
The appellate court likewise found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
It held that, while there were no transcripts of stenographic notes in the records pertaining to the
searching inquiry conducted by the RTC on March 4, 2003, still the prosecution was able to establish
the culpability of appellant by means of evidence independent of his admission of guilt. The
prosecution witnesses testified in detail how the stabbing incident transpired that caused the death
of Ramil.
The CA found the killing of Ramil qualified by alevosia or treachery based on the prosecution
witnesses testimony that Ramil was stabbed from behind by appellant, without any provocation from
Ramil nor affording Ramil any opportunity to defend himself.
The appellate court did not consider passion and obfuscation to mitigate appellants culpability. The
CA pointed out that Christophers testimony on the altercation between appellant and Ramil in the
billiard hall was hearsay, for Christopher had no personal knowledge of the supposed altercation
since he only learned about it from another person.

Anent damages, the appellate court awarded to the heirs of the victim moral damages of PhP 50,000
and exemplary damages of PhP 25,000.
Thus, we have this appeal.
The Issues
Both appellant and the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG), representing the People of the
Philippines, opted not to file any supplemental brief, since neither new issues were raised nor
supervening events transpired. Considering that both appellant and the OSG did not file a
supplemental brief, the sole issue for our consideration, therefore, is the same one appellant raised
before the CAwhether the RTC erred, and consequently the CA for its affirmance of the former, in
convicting appellant of the crime of murder.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Conviction based on evidence of prosecution and not on plea of guilt by appellant
First, appellant assails the March 4, 2003 Order of the trial court as being precipitate considering that
the trial judge failed to ascertain the voluntariness of his plea of guilt when he did not fully
understand its consequences and significance, for the records show neither proof nor a transcript of
the proceedings on March 4, 2003 that appellant indeed voluntarily made a guilty plea and that he
fully understood its import.
We are not persuaded.
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently provides:
Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.When the accused pleads guilty
to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
The indispensable requirement of searching inquiry was elucidated in People v. Mangila:
To breathe life into this rule, we made it mandatory for trial courts to do the following:
(1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the accuseds plea;
(2) require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and
(3) inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow
him to do so if he so desires.15 (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, the trial court must be satisfied that:

the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats or
physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters, and this it can do either by eliciting
from the accused himself the manner in which he has been brought into the custody of the law and
whether he had the assistance of competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations or by ascertaining from him the conditions of his detention and interrogation during the
investigation.16
It is also imperative that "a series of questions directed at defense counsel on whether or not
counsel has conferred with the accused and has completely explained to him the meaning of a plea
of guilt are well-taken steps along those lines."17
In People v. Bello, the Court explained that: "A searching inquiry, under the Rules, means more than
informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term but so also, the exact length of imprisonment
under the law and the certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal
colony."18
Lastly, it has been mandated that the accused or his or her counsel be furnished with a copy of the
complaint and the list of witnesses against the accused.
It has to be made clear that the purpose of the searching inquiry is "not only to satisfy the trial judge
himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly
understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea." 19
We reproduce the March 4, 2003 RTC Order:
When this case was called for pre-trial this morning, the accused thru counsel, manifested his desire
to withdraw his former plea and to enter a plea of guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, the
accused was rearraigned and he entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged. He agreed to pay
the amount of P131,313.50 as actual damages and another P50,000.00 for the life of Ramil Tablate.
The Court then proceeded to ask the accused searching questions to determine the voluntariness of
his plea and as to whether he understood the consequences of the same. Satisfied that the accused
willingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty with full knowledge of the consequence of the same and, in
addition that he was given proper [advice] by his counsel prior to entering said plea, the Court sets
the hearing of this case to April 22, 2003 at 8:30 a.m. to determine the degree of culpability of the
accused as required under the Rules in cases of capital offenses.
Let a subpoena duces tecum be issued to Dr. Elmer Tatad and Dr. Lalaine A. Bernardo, all of IPHO,
Virac, Catanduanes, to testify and bring with them the medical record of Ramil Tablate on the said
date of hearing, as requested by the prosecution.
SO ORDERED.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the records do not include any transcript of stenographic notes pertaining to the
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of
guilty made by appellant on March 4, 2003 during the pre-trial. The March 4, 2003 Order of the RTC

unequivocally demonstrates that the trial court conducted a searching inquiry ascertaining the
voluntariness and full comprehension of appellant. The unavailability of the transcript of stenographic
notes does not necessarily connote that no searching inquiry was made by the trial court. The trial
court is entitled to the presumption of regularity of performance of duty under Sec. 2(m), 21 Rule 131
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, absent any factual or legal basis to disregard this
presumption.22
Lastly, the March 4, 2003 Order should have been challenged within the reglementary period to
prevent its finality, if the contents were false or inaccurate, which appellant failed to do. The Order
became final, which buttresses the validity of the directive.
Even assuming arguendo that there was no searching inquiry made, still the ascribed error will not
grant relief to appellant for belatedly raising the issue for the first time on appeal. 23 And most
importantly, the conviction of appellant was not made solely on his guilty pleaimprovident or not
but on the evidence adduced by the prosecution proving beyond reasonable doubt appellants
culpability and liability for murder. Consequently, even if his plea of guilt during the pre-trial on March
4, 2003 be viewed as improvident, still appellants conviction for murder stands as duly proved by
the prosecution. Thus, the Court emphatically ruled in People v. Baun:
Where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred
in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) loses
legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based on the evidence proving
the commission by the accused of the offense charged.24 (Emphasis supplied.)
This is so, as the rule now stands, "even in cases in which the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the prosecution is still required to present evidence to prove his guilt and the precise degree
of his culpability."25 In other words, notwithstanding the plea of guilt, evidence must be adduced to
determine the precise participation of the accused in the perpetuation of the capital offense
whether as principal, accomplice, or accessoryas well as the presence or absence of modifying
circumstances. And "the accused may also present evidence in his behalf"26 either to rebut the
prosecutions evidence or to show the presence of mitigating circumstances.
1avvphi1

Appellant waived his right to present evidence

Second, appellant maintains that he was not given opportunity to present evidence and that the case
was submitted for decision immediately after the prosecution filed its offer of evidence.
We do not agree.
The Minutes of the hearing conducted on August 7, 2007 shows otherwise:
Defense has no more witness to present. Prosecution is given 15 days to file formal offer of exhibits.
15 days for the defense for comments/objections. Case submitted for decision. 27
The defense chose not to present any witnesses which amounts to a waiver to present evidence.
This was not objected to by appellant. Thus, there was an implied acquiescence on the part of
appellant not to present himself or other witnesses even though he was entitled to present evidence
to prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances under Sec. 3 of Rule 116. Appellant is, consequently,
estopped from questioning the rendition of the trial courts disposition of the case without the

presentation of any evidence by the defense, unless there are exceptional reasons justifying the
additional reception of evidence for the defense. Appellant has not shown any cogent justification to
set aside the defenses waiver of right to present evidence. Moreover, the records show that
appellant filed neither comment nor objection to the prosecutions Formal Offer of Exhibits. We also
take note that under Sec. 3, Rule 116, the accused may present evidence in his behalfit is,
therefore, not mandatory for the defense to present evidence but is only accorded an opportunity to
do so, which, in the instant case, was waived by the defense.
Besides, we further note that in the proceedings before the trial court, the defense neither assailed
the non-presentation of its witnesses nor asserted its right to adduce evidence. Thus, issues raised
for the first time on appeal are barred by estoppelarguments not raised in the original proceedings
cannot be considered on review.28
Treachery proved in qualifying the killing
Third, appellant argues, assuming his valid plea of guilt, that the trial court gravely erred in convicting
him of murder by appreciating the presence of treachery. According to him, there were certain flaws
in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that cast doubt as to the existence of treachery in
order to deprive Ramil of the chance to defend himself since it was uncertain on how appellants
attack on Ramil commenced.
The argument is bereft of merit.
Art. 248 of the RPC provides in part that:
Art. 248. Murder.Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246, shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
To be liable for murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused
killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248;
and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. 29
The prosecution competently proved the guilt of appellant and his precise degree of culpability. First,
it was established that Ramil was killed. Second, appellant was the one who stabbed Ramil resulting
in the latters death. Third, the killing was attended by treachery. And fourth, the killing is neither
parricide nor infanticide. Aside from the testimonies of Joseph, Christopher, and Napoleon, who
positively identified appellant as the one who stabbed Ramil, Dr. Olfindo corroborates the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses that the death of Ramil was caused by the stab
wounds he suffered.
The prosecution presented the Certificate of Death of Ramil G. Tablate,30 signed by Dr. Lilian L.
Olfindo, Municipal Health Officer of Virac, Catanduanes, and the Post-Mortem Examination
Report,31 which states that Ramil Tablate died of Cardiac Arrest Secondary to Cardiac Tamponade,
Secondary to Multiple Stab Wounds on the Chest and Abdomen. 32

The third element of the crime of murder is being questioned by appellant who argues that treachery
was not present. One with the courts a quo, we see no doubt that appellant committed murder
qualified withtreachery. Joseph Romero testified:
THE COURT
Q. What was the position of Ramil when he was stabbed?
A. He was sitting on the motorcycle, your Honor.
Q. And from where did the accused come from when he approached Ramil Tablate?
A. From San Pablo, your Honor.
Q. Immediately prior to the incident when the accused stabbed the victim where did the accused
come, did he come from the front or did the accused approach him from the back?
A. At the back, your Honor.
Q. In other words, Ramil did not notice that the accused was approaching him in order to stab him?
A. Yes, your Honor.
xxxx
Q. If that is now the kind of statement which you relayed to the court, how were you able to tell the
court that the accused approached Ramil from behind?
A. There were some vacant spaces wherein my view was not obstructed.
xxxx
Q. When the accused [sic] was stabbed, what did the accused do?
A. He ran away going to the police station, your Honor.
Q. What about the victim?
A. He was brought to the hospital, your Honor.
Q. At the time when the victim was stabbed, did he fight back?
A. No, your Honor.33
On cross-examination, Joseph34 further testified:
THE COURT

Q. So what was the position of the accused in stabbing Christopher, the brother of Ramil?
A. Christopher was stabbed behind by Prince.
Q. How about Ramil, because it was Ramil who died and Christopher is alive. So how about Ramil,
what was the position of the accused in stabbing Ramil?
A. Ramil was stabbed from behind by the accused your Honor.35 (Emphasis supplied.)
Christopher Tablate, brother of Ramil, corroborated Josephs testimony, as follows:
COURT
Just one or two questions from the Court.
Q. You said that you saw Prince Francisco stab your brother and you came to rescue your brother by
getting hold of the plastic chair and hitting Prince at his back. My question is, what was the position
of your brother when you hit Prince at his back?
A. My brother was sitting on a motorcycle when he was stabbed by Prince several times and Prince
came from the dark place and he suddenly stabbed Ramil.36
On cross-examination, Christopher37 reiterated how his brother was treacherously murdered by
appellant, thus:
COURT
Q. Why did you not inform your brother about the fact that you saw Prince Francisco pass you by
carrying a knife knowing that there was an incident at the billiard hall? Can you please explain the
sequence of the incident from the time you saw Prince Francisco up to the time you saw you [sic]
your brother being stabbed by him?
A. When Prince Francisco passed by going to the dark portion, he suddenly attacked my brother and
continuously stabbed my brother.
COURT
Q. When Prince Francisco passed by you and you saw him carrying a weapon, did you follow his
move with your eyes until he went to the dark place and turned around and stabbed your brother?
A. Yes, maam.
COURT
Continue.
ATTY. SAMONTE

Q. You saw Prince Francisco coming from the dark?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. You saw Prince Francisco from the dark going to your brother?
A. Yes, sir.38
Moreover, prosecution witness Napoleon corroborated the testimonies of Joseph and Christopher
that appellant was the assailant of Ramil by testifying that, at first, he thought Ramil and appellant
were simply engaged in a fistfight, but later on, he saw appellant holding a knife and stabbing Ramil
who was lying on the ground.39
The witnesses of the prosecution positively testified that appellant came from behind Ramil and
started stabbing Ramil at the back with a stainless knife. Appellant continued the relentless stabbing
of the unarmed Ramil, who was unable to defend himself or repel the attack of appellant. Thus, the
presence of treachery as aptly found by the courts a quo.
In a catena of cases, treachery is found obtaining "when the offender commits the crime employing
means, methods or forms in its execution which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make." 40
Settled jurisprudence prescribes two (2) essential elements in order to support the finding of alevosia
as an aggravating circumstance:
(1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offenders
safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus, no opportunity for
self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate and conscious choice of means, methods or manner of
execution.41
In this factual setting, the selection of the knife as the weapon to kill Ramil was arrived at so as not
to create any noise that can alert the victim. Appellant planned to attack Ramil when Ramils back is
turned from appellant to preclude any window for self-defense or retaliation on the part of Ramil. The
attack was swift and unexpected. Appellant rained numerous stabbing blows on the body of Ramil to
ensure the success of his assault. Ramil was unarmed at the time of the attack depriving him of any
opportunity to defend himself. Indeed, there was a deliberate, premeditated choice of the means,
method, or manner of executing the crime that would shield appellant from any counterattack from
Ramil. Ergo, the two elements of treachery were unquestionably met.
While appellant may claim that the attack is frontal and Ramil had the opportunity to defend himself,
the Court explained in People v. Segobre that "treachery exists even if the attack is frontal if it is
sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself, for what is
decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate."42 This is the unfortunate case of Ramil who was unable to repel the attack
except only to plead for his life. As the CA aptly pointed out, even if Ramil was attacked frontally
which is definitely not the casehe was bereft of any opportunity to defend himself due to the
swiftness and suddenness of the attack.

Consequently, we cannot agree with appellant that he only committed homicide on account of the
absence of treachery. As a matter of course, "a qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the
nature of the crime and increases the imposable penalties for the offense." 43 The CA is correct in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the plea of guilt.
Anent the proper damages, we find proper the grant by the RTC of PhP 131,313.50 as actual
damages as duly proved during trial. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, 44 we find it proper to
increase the award of civil indemnity and moral damages to PhP 75,000 each. We likewise increase
the award of exemplary damages to PhP 30,000 in line with recent jurisprudence. 45
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03041 finding
accused-appellant Prince Francisco y Zafe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION in that he is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Ramil Tablate,
the amounts of PhP 131,313.50 as actual damages, PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 75,000 as
moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188314

January 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu
Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman,
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES, Accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476
and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants
namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder,
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence
to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death
Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus
terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to
7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus

stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the
bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men,
because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each other one sat two seats
behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15
passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he
approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers,
the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and
gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid for
both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that the two were up to no
good, and that there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the
bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared
to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from
view as if he was tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would
glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the
police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men
insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them
off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus
stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two
immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion.
He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a
while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground
or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station
narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that
shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman
announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentines Day "gift" for former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb
attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview
some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentines Day bombing incident. In
another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the
bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied
the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused
Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus
on the evening of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo
Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and
other "John" and "Jane Does" were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain
at-large.

On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad,
and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated
murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan
pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties
stipulated the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted knowing one
another before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the RRCG bus
while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of the
Makati Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he claims taught
him how to make explosive devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14 bombing
incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb explosion
inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more or less forty persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March 20-24 each
gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network admitting their participation in the
commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these crimes, because
they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus that they had
entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a television
news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the explosive devices which resulted in
this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in the filing of these charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are members of the Abu
Sayyaf.1
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad
were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder,
considering that they pled "guilty" to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and
explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the
inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to
them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.2

After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the Abu
Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how to make
bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against the
government in the city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway
Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership,
specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum
powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then
recalled that sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of
TNT that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that
Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly placed in
two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got
another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call from Abu
Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by
Baharan and Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called
Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call from
accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the mission. 3 According to Asali, Abu
Zaky specifically said, "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
Assignment of Errors
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea of guilt despite insufficiency of
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said
plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for the crimes charged
had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.4
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching
inquiry after they had changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." The transcript of stenographic
notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced
below:
Court : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that were agreed
upon during the last hearing, is to address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the frustrated
murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they
entered pleas of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not guilty for the
frustrated multiple murder charges remain [I]s that not inconsistent considering the stipulations
that were entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they admitted to have
caused the bomb explosion that led to the death of at least four people and injury of about forty other
persons and so under the circumstances, Atty Pea, have you discussed this matter with your
clients?


Atty. Pea : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I havent conferred with them
about this with regard to the multiple murder case.

Court : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea, can you assist the two accused because if they are
interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.
Atty. Pea : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence of their pleas, your
Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated multiple
murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.
Court : With matters that they stipulated upon?
Atty. Pea : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the murder case,
then they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are now
ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.

INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in Filipino in a clearer
way and asked both accused what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have withdrawn their
pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank you.
Are there any matters you need to address at pretrial now? If there are none, then I will terminate
pretrial and accommodate5
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges must refrain
from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy
administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused
pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction."6 Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to
a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
(Emphasis supplied)

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In

People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's original plea was "not guilty," the
trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to
"guilty."7 According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the
death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility
that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the
plea.8
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in
which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused,
as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident
plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained
the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the
accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not
been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.9
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of
judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been
under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects,
and consequences of their guilty plea.10This requirement is stringent and mandatory.11
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or
of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that
accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on
the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior
to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of
guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both
accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the
foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry"
in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accuseds plea of
guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration. 12
Second Assignment of Error
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry
was not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made loses much of great
significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission by
the person accused of the offense charged."13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of
the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the
accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. 14 (Emphasis supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor was merely circumstantial,
while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.

Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the
prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily consisted
of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness,
Asali. Andales positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted
suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati
ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the
other hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the
bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently
established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions
(pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they both
stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentines Day
bombing.15 Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of accusedturned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the transcript of stenographic notes on the
state prosecutors direct examination of state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances did he train
you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and Trinidad?
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo Trinidad and
myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.
Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?
A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and two weeks.

Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training at Mr. Cararao,
is there any mission that you undertook, if any, with respect to that mission?

A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila,
sir.16
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and Trinidad.
Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to the 2 kilos of
bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in November 2004?
A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.
Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?
A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.


Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to you by
Trinidad?
A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.

Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that date, December
29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?

A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could detonate a
bomb

Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with respect to
the taking of the explosives from you?
A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
A : He told me that "this is your first mission."
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring to?
A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the Christians.

Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if the bomb
explode?
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad from me until
after I was caught, because I was told by the policeman that interviewed me after I was
arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not explode.
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo Trinidad and
Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?

A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.

Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?

A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.

Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?
A : No, sir.
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives, which were
taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?

A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.

Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?
A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me not to
leave the house because the explosive that were taken by Tapay and Angelo Trinidad
exploded.

Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?

A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive that he took
exploded already, sir.
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb exploded at Makati,
beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with the bombing
in General Santos.

A : He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it was sometime in
February 2005.

Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the bombing exploded
in Makati, any other call?

A : There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.

A : He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."

Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu Zaky called
you up the following day, that was February 15, and congratulating you for the success of the
mission. My question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the relation of that mission,
wherein you were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which have been indoctrinated
to you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A : They are connected, sir.
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu Sayyaf should not
wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the city.
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A : The government, sir.17
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was determined to sow
terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their "anger towards the Christians." 18 It can also be
seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentines
Day bombing incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make
bombs and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their mission was to plant
bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to Asali, Rohmat called him on
29 December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were
"about to commence" their "first mission."19 They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in
Metro Manila, but to no avail. The day before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad got another two
kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentines Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced that they had a gift for
the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right
after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would be more bombings in the
future. Asali then received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung
tinuro ko sayo."20

In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article
17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on "principal
by inducement." The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make bombs coupled
with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and
Rohmats confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission prove
the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the
crime.21 Such "command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the crime would not have
materialized."22
lawphi1

Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act would
not have been performed."23 In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the
fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of
the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal
and co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered
liable for all the resulting crimes.24 The same finding must be applied to the case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused Baharan,
Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the "collective acts of the accusedappellants before, during and after the commission of the crime." As correctly declared by the trial
court in its Omnibus Decision:
Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major points, coupled with
the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other accused, are sufficient to prove
the existence of a conspiracy hatched between and among the four accused, all members of the
terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately killing
and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly admitted by accused
Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latters participation in
the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue of the aforementioned
evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the indispensable participation
of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators criminal design would be realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, which clearly
manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v. Lenantud,
352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,

conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353
SCRA 643).25
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in concluding that the
defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy "when the defendants by their acts aimed at the
same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part so as to complete it,
with a view to the attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments."26
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a coconspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the
Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial
confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.27 Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial
confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they
are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the
declarants co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to
testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Mercenes admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is
admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried
together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is
competent evidence against the latter.28
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, as
affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 153714-20

August 15, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIO K. ESPINOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must be clear, categorical, knowing and
intelligent. Corollary to this rule, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be
unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be
simple and unconditional.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the April
10, 2002 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (SBN) in Criminal Case Nos. 26422-26428. The antigraft court dismissed the criminal cases against Respondent Mario K. Espinosa on the ground of
double jeopardy as follows:
"That being the case, the Court is constrained to concur with the accused that jeopardy has set in
and that he is now at peril of punishment twice for the same offense in violation of the protection
afforded by Sec. 21, Art. III of the Constitution.
"WHEREFORE, these cases are DISMISSED as against accused Mario K. Espinosa alone." 3
The Antecedents
On February 4, 1998, separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption of public officers were filed
before the SBN by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against (1) Respondent Espinosa, then
provincial administrator of Masbate; (2) Emma Vasquez; and (3) Romeo Sanano. The cases were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24438 and 24439.
Prior to his arraignment, Espinosa filed a Motion for Reinvestigation of the cases. The SBN Fourth
Division granted the Motion in an Order4 dated March 23, 1988, and directed the Office of the
Special Prosecutor to evaluate the evidence against the accused.
While the cases were being reevaluated, Espinosa filed with the SBN a Motion for Leave to Travel
Abroad for the period May 2-13, 1999.
On the date set for the hearing of the Motion, the SBN (Fourth Division) issued an Order resetting
the hearing to April 22, 1999. It required private respondent to be "conditionally arraigned on that
date"5 before it would act on his Motion to Travel.
As ordered, private respondent was arraigned, and thereafter granted his Motion to Travel. The
Order of Arraignment dated April 22, 2000, stated that "upon being duly arraigned, [he] entered a
plea of Not Guilty to both Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 24438 and 24439." 6 The Court also
ordered the deferment of the pretrial of the cases, pending the reinvestigation then being conducted
by the Ombudsman.
On December 28, 2000, the OMB -- through the Office of the Special Prosecutor -- moved to
withdraw ex parte the two cases against private respondent. The SBN granted the Motion in a
Resolution dated January 9, 2001.
Thereafter, the OMB filed in the same court seven Informations for Malversation of Public Funds
against Espinosa and several others. These Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
24622 to 24628 and raffled to the SBN First Division.
On January 22, 2001, Espinosa filed a Motion to Quash the Informations. He argued that double
jeopardy had already attached, because (1) he had been arraigned in the previous estafa cases; and
(2) the Motion to Withdraw the two earlier ones had been granted without his express consent.

Petitioner countered that the arraignment for the two previous cases was "conditional," because it
was made solely for the purpose of accommodating private respondents request to travel abroad
while the matters were pending reinvestigation.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In its assailed Resolution, the SBN First Division ruled that jeopardy had attached in the first
instance when Criminal Case Nos. 24438-24439 were dismissed upon the prosecutions "ex parte
motion to withdraw the information." It noted that the dismissal had been sought and obtained
without respondents knowledge, much less express consent.
It likewise held private respondents actual arraignment to be straightforward and unqualified. The
records did not disclose any circumstance showing that the accused knew that his arraignment was
subject to certain conditions.
Hence this recourse.7
Issue
Petitioner submits the following issue for the Courts consideration:
"Whether or not [the SBN] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or x x x excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 34622 to 24628 as against Respondent Espinosa." 8
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Procedural Lapses
Before tackling the main issue raised by petitioner, the Court will point out some procedural lapses.
First, prior to submitting the instant Petition to this Court, petitioner should have filed a motion for
reconsideration before the SBN. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari will lie only if there is "no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 9
Here, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy expressly provided by law10 is a motion for
reconsideration to be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or
judgment.11 The purpose of the motion12 is "x x x to afford public respondent an opportunity to correct
any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects
of the case."
Explaining further, the Court said:
"x x x. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under the circumstances is tantamount to a deprivation of
the right and opportunity of the respondent commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly

committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. An improvident resort to certiorari cannot
be used as a tool to circumvent the right of public respondent to review and purge its decision of an
oversight, if any. x x x."13 (Italics supplied)
Second, the proper remedy is appeal under Rule 45, not certiorari under Rule 65. Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, provides that "[d]ecisions and
final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by [a] petition for review
on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." Section
1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, likewise provides that a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Sandiganbayan may be appealed to the Supreme Court via a verified petition for review on
certiorari.
Clearly then, the remedy of appeal was available to petitioner. For unexplained reasons, it chose not
to pursue this recourse. Neither has it cited grounds to exempt the Petition from the stringent rule
forbidding a substitution of remedies. Verily, its cavalier disregard of procedural requirements,
especially its erroneous choice of remedy, is indeed enough reason to throw out this Petition
summarily.
Main Issue:
Attachment of Legal Jeopardy
Even if we are to gloss over these procedural infirmities, the Petition should nonetheless be
dismissed for its lack of substantive merit.
Petitioner argues that the dismissal of the later Informations against private respondent on the
ground of double jeopardy had no factual or legal basis,14 because his arraignment in the earlier
cases was only "conditional."
We are unconvinced.
Previous cases15 have mentioned the SBNs practice of "conditionally" arraigning the accused
pending the Ombudsmans reinvestigation of the case.16 This practice is not mentioned or provided
for in the regular rules of procedure.
Section 9 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975,17 provides:
"Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to
all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of
cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and other matters relating to the
internal operations of the court which shall be enforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme
Court."
The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan,18 promulgated by this Court, do not mention any
"conditional arraignment." Neither do the regular Rules of Court.

Arraignment is an indispensable requirement of due process. It consists of the judges or the clerk of
courts reading of the criminal complaint or information to the defendant. At this stage, the accused is
granted, for the first time, the opportunity to be officially informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation.19 Thus, arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily.
Espinosa pleaded simply and unconditionally on April 22, 1999. No unusual ceremony punctuated
his arraignment. The SBN itself found this simple process inconsistent with its studied manner of
"conditionally" arraigning the accused pending reinvestigation in other cases. We quote from its
assailed Resolution as follows:
"Since it is the accused who wishes to travel even while his case is pending review, and in order that
the Court might not lose jurisdiction over him while he is abroad, the accused and counsel are
advised as part of the arraignment process, that the arraignment is conditional, i.e., that
arraignment is without prejudice to the results of the reinvestigation or review; that if the prosecution
should recommend the filing of new charges, in lieu of the present charge, which would necessarily
include or be included in the present accusation, the accused would now be understood as having
waived his right against double jeopardy; and that if the prosecution sought to withdraw the
information, the arraignment would be deemed to have been of no effect. If the accused accepts
these conditions for arraignment, then he is arraigned and allowed to travel. In other words, in this
instance, the accused is clearly aware of what is going on; at the time of his arraignment, there is an
explicit waiver against the protection against double jeopardy as a condition for his travel." 20 (Italics
supplied)
Under Section 11(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the arraignment shall be suspended for a
period not exceeding 60 days when a reinvestigation or review is being conducted at either the
Department of Justice or the Office of the President. However, we should stress that the court does
not lose control of the proceedings by reason of such review. Once it had assumed jurisdiction, it is
not handcuffed by any resolution of the reviewing prosecuting authority.21 Neither is it deprived of its
jurisdiction by such resolution.22 The principles established in Crespo v. Mogul23 still stands, as
follows:
"Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the
Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the
trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution
of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination
of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court which has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation."24 (Italics supplied)

In any event, petitioner insists that private respondent has waived his right to invoke double jeopardy
in the light of his allegedly "conditional" arraignment.
Again, the Court is not persuaded.
The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution, which
reads:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act."
This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.25 To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following
must be demonstrated:
"x x x (1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
"And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused." 26
It has been the unwavering position of this Court that substantial rights cannot be trifled with or cast
aside on the basis of mere suppositions and conjectures. The relinquishment of a constitutional right
has to be laid out convincingly. Such waiver must be clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. 27
As can be gleaned from the Memorandum of petitioner, the alleged waiver falls short of the above
requirement:
"Unfortunately, the records reveal that a lawyer for respondent Espinosa was present when the April
19,1999 Order of the Fourth Division was issued in open court. Thus, said lawyer must have heard
that the hearing of the motion to travel was reset to April 22, 1999 so that the movant could be
conditionally arraigned."28
xxx

xxx

xxx

"x x x. As stressed in the petition, the arraignment was conditional for if it was not so, respondent
Espinosa would have been deemed to have abandoned his recourse for the reevaluation of his
cases before the Office of the Ombudsman."29 (Italics supplied)
As correctly pointed out in the challenged Resolution, the dismissal of the estafa and the corruption
cases was made upon petitioners ex parte Motion for the withdrawal of the Informations. Petitioner
does not dispute the fact that private respondent was not notified of this Motion. Neither was a
hearing held thereon.

On the other hand, private respondent has amply shown that he learned of the Motion only after the
cases had been dismissed. It is clear that the dismissal, having been secured by petitioner without
the express consent of the accused, does not amount to a waiver of the right against double
jeopardy. But it does unequivocally show the fourth requisite for the proper invocation of such right.
In a nutshell, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable, express,
informed and enlightened. They must be expressly stated in the Order disposing of the arraignment.
Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple and unconditional.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164015

February 26, 2009

RAMON A. ALBERT, Petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari1 of the Resolutions dated 10 February 20042 and 3 May 20043 of the
Sandiganbayan. The 10 February 2004 Resolution granted the prosecutions Motion to Admit the
Amended Information. The 3 May 2004 Resolution denied the Motion For Reconsideration of
petitioner Ramon A. Albert (petitioner).
The Facts
On 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao charged petitioner and his co-accused, Favio D. Sayson and Arturo S. Asumbrado, before
the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 25231. The Information alleged:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao hereby
accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation
of Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public
officer, being then the President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation,
occupying the said position with a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official
function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position,
conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE
Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin

Residents and Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality and or gross neglect of duty, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
cause undue injury to the government and public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax
Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly described
in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which Tax Declarations
accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the two pieces of
real property covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are agricultural land, and
by reason of accuseds misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount ofP4,535,400.00 which
is higher than the loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus causing undue
injury to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On 26 March 1999, a Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against petitioner
and his co-accused.
On 25 May 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 25231 on the following
grounds: (1) the accused (petitioner) was denied due process of law; (2) the Office of the
Ombudsman did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (3) the constitutional rights
of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases and to a speedy trial were violated; and (4) the
resolution dated 26 February 1999 finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
is not supported by evidence.5
On 18 December 2000, pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a Motion to
Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The prosecution did not object to the latter
motion on the condition that petitioner would be "provisionally" arraigned. 6 On 12 March 2001,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to
Travel. The following day, or on 13 March 2001, the Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner who
entered a plea of "not guilty." In the Resolution dated 16 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan granted
petitioners Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel.
On 26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and ordered the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioner. In a Memorandum
dated 6 January 2003, the SPO who conducted the reinvestigation recommended to the
Ombudsman that the indictment against petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause. However,
the Ombudsman, in an Order dated 10 March 2003, disapproved the Memorandum and directed the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of the criminal case. Petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman.
In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of
petitioner on 24 July 2003. However, in view of the pending motion for reconsideration of the order of
the Ombudsman, the arraignment was reset to 2 October 2003.
In a Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the SPO informed the Sandiganbayan of the
Ombudsmans denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration. On even date, the prosecution filed
an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information. During the 2 October 2003 hearing, this ex-parte
motion was withdrawn by the prosecution with the intention of filing a Motion for Leave to Admit
Amended Information. The scheduled arraignment of petitioner was reset to 1 December 2003. 7

On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The
Amended Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I of the Office of Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of
Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public
officer, being then the President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation,
occupying the said position with a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official
function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position,
conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE
Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin
Residents and Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally cause undue injury to the government and public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax
Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly described
in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which Tax Declarations
accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the two pieces of
real property covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are agricultural land, and
by reason of accuseds misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount ofP4,535,400.00 which
is higher than the loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus causing undue
injury to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the information is substantial
and, therefore, not allowed after arraignment.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In its Resolution of 10 February 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecutions Motion to Admit
Amended Information. At the outset, the Sandiganbayan explained that "gross neglect of duty" which
falls under Section 3(f) of RA 3019 is different from "gross inexcusable negligence" under Section
3(e), and held thus:
In an information alleging gross neglect of duty, it is not a requirement that such neglect or refusal
causes undue injury compared to an information alleging gross inexcusable negligence where undue
injury is a constitutive element. A change to this effect constitutes substantial amendment
considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally intended.
It may be considered however, that there are three modes by which the offense for Violation of
Section 3(e) may be committed in any of the following:
1. Through evident bad faith;
2. Through manifest partiality;

3. Through gross inexcusable negligence.

Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under said
section of the law should suffice to warrant conviction. 10
However, the Sandiganbayan also held that even granting that the amendment of the information be
formal or substantial, the prosecution could still effect the same in the event that the accused had
not yet undergone a permanent arraignment. And since the arraignment of petitioner on 13 March
2001 was merely "provisional," then the prosecution may still amend the information either in form or
in substance.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution of 3 May 2004. Hence this petition.
The Issues
The issues raised in this petition are:
1. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED INFORMATION; AND
2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FURTHER PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE
THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On Whether the Sandiganbayan
Should Admit the Amended Information
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution.-- A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx
Petitioner contends that under the above section, only a formal amendment of the information may
be made after a plea. The rule does not distinguish between a plea made during a "provisional" or a
"permanent" arraignment. Since petitioner already entered a plea of "not guilty" during the 13 March
2001 arraignment, then the information may be amended only in form.
An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required by the rules, an accused, for
the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. 11 The accused

is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. As an
indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed
aside peremptorily.12
The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or "conditional" arraignments is not
sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of
Court.13 However, in People v. Espinosa,14 this Court tangentially recognized such practice, provided
that the alleged conditions attached thereto should be "unmistakable, express, informed and
enlightened." Moreover, the conditions must be expressly stated in the Order disposing of the
arraignment; otherwise, the arraignment should be deemed simple and unconditional. 15
In the present case, the arraignment of petitioner is reflected in the Minutes of the Sandiganbayan
Proceedings dated 13 March 2001 which merely states that the "[a]ccused when arraigned entered a
plea of not guilty. The Motion to Travel is granted subject to the usual terms and conditions imposed
on accused persons travelling (sic) abroad."16 In the Resolution of 16 April 2001,17 the
Sandiganbayan mentioned the arraignment of petitioner and granted his Urgent Motion to Amend
Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel, setting forth the conditions
attendant thereto which, however, were limited only to petitioners itinerary abroad; the setting up of
additional bailbond; the required appearance before the clerk of court; and written advice to the court
upon return to the Philippines. Nothing on record is indicative of the provisional or conditional nature
of the arraignment. Hence, following the doctrine laid down in Espinosa, the arraignment of petitioner
should be deemed simple and unconditional.
The rules mandate that after a plea is entered, only a formal amendment of the Information may be
made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.
Petitioner contends that replacing "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence" is a
substantial amendment of the Information which is prejudicial to his rights. He asserts that under the
amended information, he has to present evidence that he did not act with "gross inexcusable
negligence," evidence he was not required to present under the original information. To bolster his
argument, petitioner refers to the 10 February 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which ruled
that the change "constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the
accused may divert from the one originally intended." 18
lawphil.net

We are not convinced.

Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

This crime has the following essential elements:19

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is,
through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence." 20 In Uriarte v.
People,21 this Court explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as
when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the
accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a
clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another.22 "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will.23 "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. 24 "Gross inexcusable
negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.25
The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted with "evident bad faith and
manifest partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of duty." The amended information, on the other hand,
alleges that petitioner acted with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable
negligence." Simply, the amendment seeks to replace "gross neglect of duty" with "gross
inexcusable negligence." Given that these two phrases fall under different paragraphs of RA 3019
specifically, "gross neglect of duty" is under Section 3(f) while "gross inexcusable negligence" is
under Section 3(e) of the statutethe question remains whether or not the amendment is substantial
and prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have,
would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended.26 On the other hand, an
amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in
the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime. 27
lavvphil

In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase "gross neglect of duty" from the
Information. Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is allowable even
after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused. 28 As a replacement, "gross inexcusable
negligence" would be included in the Information as a modality in the commission of the offense.
This Court believes that the same constitutes an amendment only in form. In Sistoza v.

Desierto,29 the Information charged the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, but
specified only "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as the modalities in the commission of the
offense charged. "Gross inexcusable negligence" was not mentioned in the Information.
Nonetheless, this Court held that the said section is committed by dolo or culpa, and although the
Information may have alleged only one of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is
deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof. 30 In so ruling, this Court applied by analogy
the pronouncement in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan31 where an accused charged with willful
malversation was validly convicted of the same felony of malversation through negligence when the
evidence merely sustained the latter mode of perpetrating the offense. The Court held that a
conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. Thus, we
hold that the inclusion of "gross inexcusable negligence" in the Information, which merely alleges
"manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as modalities in the commission of the crime under
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an amendment in form.
On Whether Petitioners
Right to a Speedy Trial was Violated
Petitioner contends that the complaint-affidavit against him was filed on 15 June 1992, but it was
resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao only on 26 February 1999, or after a period of
almost seven (7) years. Four (4) years thereafter, the SPO, upon reinvestigation of the case,
recommended that the case against petitioner be dismissed for lack of probable cause, but this
recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman. A Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information
was later filed by the prosecution and granted by the Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution of
10 February 2004. Thus, petitioner maintains that it took the Office of the Ombudsman twelve (12)
years since the initial filing of the complaint-affidavit in 1992 to charge accused with the offense
under the Amended Information, in violation of petitioners right to a speedy trial.
Petitioners contentions are futile.
The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the Philippine
Constitution which provides: "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This right, however, is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 32 A simple
mathematical computation of the period involved is not sufficient. We concede that judicial
proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life. 33
After reviewing the records of the case, we believe that the right of petitioner to a speedy trial was
not infringed upon. The issue on the inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint-affidavit filed
against petitioner and his co-accused and the filing of the original Information against petitioner was
raised in petitioners Motion to Dismiss, and was duly addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution denying the said motion. It appears that the said delays were caused by the numerous
motions for extension of time to file various pleadings and to reproduce documents filed by
petitioners co-accused, and that no actual preliminary investigation was conducted on petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan properly held that a reinvestigation of the case as to petitioner was in order.
Although the reinvestigation inadvertently resulted to further delay in the proceedings, this process
could not have been dispensed with as it was done for the protection of the rights of petitioner

himself. It is well-settled that although the conduct of an investigation may hold back the progress of
a case, it is necessary so that the accused's right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.34 The succeeding events appear to be parts of a valid and regular course of judicial
proceedings not attended by delays which can be considered vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or
unjustified. Hence, petitioners contention of violation of his right to a speedy trial must fail.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions dated 10 February 2004 and
3 May 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25231.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-58678-80 July 20, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE IRINEO V. MENDOZA of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Mauban Branch V and
ANDY DE LOS SANTOS, JR., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Romeo M. Devera and Dante Diamante for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the setting aside of a judgment of conviction based on a plea of guilty and
allowing the accused to substitute it with a plea of not guilty and have a trial on the merits.
Andy de los Santos, Jr. was charged on July 29, 1981 with estafa in three informations all dated May
28, 1981 for having issued in Mauban, Quezon in November, 1980 postdated checks drawn against
the Quezon City branch of the Pacific Banking Corporation as payment for lumber purchased from
Rafael Ayuste in the amounts of P33,785.80, P 30,877.40 and P31,920.60. The checks were
dishonored for lack of funds (Criminal Cases Nos. 749, 753 and 754).
The investigating fiscal certified that he furnished accused De los Santos with copies of
complainant's affidavit and that the accused did not present any counter-affidavit.
In the three cases, De los Santos pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on August 12, 1981. Then, at
the hearing on September 7, 1981, his counsel de oficio manifested that the accused was
withdrawing his plea of not guilty and substituting it with a plea of guilty. De los Santos was
rearraigned. Upon interrogation by respondent judge, De los Santos declared that he understood the
consequences of his plea of guilty, that he knew that he would receive imprisonment sentences, that
he conferred with his lawyer regarding the plea of guilty and that he changed his plea voluntarily.
His counsel de oficio asked the trial court to take into account the mitigating circumstances of plea of
guilty and voluntary surrender to the authorities. The fiscal interposed no objection to that request.
The trial court on that same date, September 7, 1981, rendered three separate decisions, imposing

upon De los Santos in each of the three cases an indeterminate penalty of four months and twentyone days of arresto mayor as minimum to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional as maximum and to pay the corresponding indemnity. He was given the benefit of the
two extenuating circumstances. The court directed that the accused be given credit for his preventive
imprisonment.
Presumably, the said decisions were promulgated on the said date. The record does not disclose
whether De los Santos started serving sentence after the promulgation of the said decisions.
Three days later, or on September 10, 1981, his counsel filed a "petition" (motion) to set aside the
judgments of conviction. It contains the following brief allegations:
1. That the accused has entered a plea of guilty to all these criminal cases captioned
above;
2. That the accused intends to substitute the same with a plea of not guilty in
accordance with Sec. 6, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, undersigned counsel most respectfully prays that judgment in all
these cases be set aside and allow accused to enter a plea of not guilty and
henceforth set these cases for trial. (p. 41, Rollo.)
The fiscal was furnished with a copy of that motion. It was not set for hearing. It was submitted for
resolution on the date that it was filed. The trial court in its order of September 14, 1981, after noting
that the judgments of conviction had not yet become final, set them aside, granted the prayer of the
accused that a plea of not guilty be entered for him and set the three cases for trial on September
21, 1981. A copy of the order was received by the fiscal on September 15 (p. 54, Rollo).
The fiscal in a motion dated September 17 asked for the reconsideration of the order and for
modification of judgment (due to the alleged error in the computation of the penalties). The motion
was set for hearing on September 21, the date that the three cases were scheduled for trial.
The trial court in its order of September 21, 1981 reiterated its view that De los Santos should be
allowed to substitute a plea of not guilty for his plea of guilty. It did not categorically deny the motion
for reconsideration. As the fiscal did not present his evidence, the case was rescheduled for hearing
on the following day, September 22, in spite of the fiscal's manifestation that the complainant was in
Manila having a medical checkup for hypertension and that there was no time to contact the
prosecution witnesses.
On September 22 no trial was held. The fiscal's witnesses were not available. He asked that the
case be reset on October 5. He filed a second motion for reconsideration dated September 23. He
stressed that De los Santos' motion of September 10, 1981 to set aside the judgments of
conviction was not based on any ground and was not set for hearing.
The trial court at the hearing on October 5 denied that second motion for reconsideration. When the
fiscal did not present his witnesses after the defense counsel invoked the right of the accused to a
speedy trial, the court dismissed the cases and ordered the release of De los Santos.

That order of dismissal and the order setting aside the judgments of conviction are assailed in this
appeal under Republic Act No. 5440.
The issue is whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in setting aside the judgments of
conviction and later dismissing the three estafa cases when the prosecution did not present its
evidence.
Section 6, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court empowers the trial court, if the judgment has not become
final, to allow a plea of guilty to be withdrawn, to set aside a judgment of conviction and to allow a
plea of not guilty.
The exercise of that power should be justified by some compelling reason such as error, fraud,
illegality or manifest injustice. The trial court is not invested with unbridled discretion to set aside a
judgment of conviction based on a plea of guilty just because it has not yet become final.
It is not the ministerial or routinary duty of the trial court, on a mere request or petition of the
accused, to allow him to substitute a plea of not guilty for his prior plea of guilty and to set aside the
judgment of conviction already rendered in the case.
In such a situation, the setting aside of the judgment is tantamount to reopening the case and
granting a new trial (Fiscal of Manila vs. Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 20, 24). While the motion of the
accused for the withdrawal of his plea of guilty need not be verified (Paredes vs. Borja and Catalan,
113 Phil. 482, 489), it should at least have some rational basis. The accused should state that he
has meritorious defenses to the charge. The motion should be set for hearing.
The prosecution should be heard on that motion. The trial court should state the reasons for setting
aside the judgment of conviction and for permitting the accused to substitute a plea of not guilty for
his plea of guilty.
The trial court should not act in a perfunctory manner in setting aside the judgment of conviction and
in allowing the substitution of pleas because the accused should not trifle with the court by gambling
on the result of his change of pleas. See People vs. Nazario, 79 Phil. 297, where the accused
wanted to withdraw his plea of guilty after the principal prosecution witnesses had gone abroad.
In California, "the remedy of vacating the judgment and withdrawal of the plea of guilty may be
resorted to and utilized only when, because of fraud, duress or other force overreaching the free will
and judgment of the accused, he has been deprived of the right to a trial on the merits, and only on a
strong and convincing showing of the deprivation of legal rights by extrinsic causes" (22 C.J.S.
1158).
Evidence should be introduced to show duress, fraud or misrepresentation when the plea of guilty
was made (People vs. Lamb, 148 Pac 2nd 873). In Kentucky, the withdrawal of a plea of guilty may
be made after judgment if it is shown that such a plea was made due to fear, deceit or coercion (Kidd
vs. Commonwealth, 74 SW 2nd 944; Clift vs. Commonwealth, 105 SW 2nd 557).
In the Del Rosario case, supra, ten persons, who were charged with a violation of the Opium Law,
were permitted by the trial court to change their plea of not guilty to guilty. The trial court forthwith
rendered the corresponding judgment of conviction.

On the following day, the accused, through a new counsel, asked leave to withdraw their plea of
guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty. Counsel simply alleged that the plea of guilty was made due to
ignorance or misunderstanding and that he has a good defense to present in behalf of his clients.
The trial judge granted the motion and set aside the judgment of conviction already promulgated on
the theory that the accused should be given every opportunity to defend themselves freely and
adequately. The City Fiscal of Manila assailed in this Court by means of certiorari the said order
setting aside the judgment of conviction and allowing the change of plea. That order was nullified by
this Court because the motion to set aside the judgment was unverified and unsupported by
affidavits of merits.
In People vs. Pangilinan, 74 Phil. 451, the accused, who was charged with theft, pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment. When the case was called for trial, he, with the assistance of counsel, asked
leave of court to change his plea of not guilty to guilty. The court allowed the change of plea, and
after asking the accused whether he understood the information and whether he knew that on the
basis of his plea he would be convicted, the court imposed the corresponding penalty.
However, as the accused did not agree to the penalty imposed, he took the witness stand. Instead of
testifying on the mitigating circumstances, he denied having committed the theft. The trial court did
not believe his testimony. It maintained the sentence already imposed on him.
Thereafter, counsel for the accused filed a motion to reopen the case on the ground that the plea of
guilty was made on the understanding that the accused would be given only a penalty of four months
and twenty-one days.
The trial court denied the motion to reopen the case. The accused appealed. This Court upheld the
judgment of conviction. It said that the trial court was perfectly justified in not allowing the accused to
trifle with a solemn judicial proceeding by changing his plea from not guilty to guilty, solely because
the penalty meted out by the court, although in accordance with the law, was not satisfactory to him.
In the instant case, we hold that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, in setting aside the three judgments of conviction on the basis of De los Santos'
flimsy and whimsical "petition" which does not contain any reason as to why he wanted to change
his plea of guilty to that of not guilty.
In unceremoniously and summarily setting aside the judgements of conviction and allowing the
change of plea on the ground that the said judgments were not yet final, the trial court assumed that
the change of plea was a matter of right. It did not accord to its own judgments the respect and
importance which they deserved. It allowed itself to be influenced by De los Santos' capricious
conduct.
It disregard the settled rule that "where (as in the instant case) the record conclusively shows that
the accused freely, voluntarily and spontaneously entered the plea of guilty with a full and complete
realization of the meaning and consequences of that plea, after the same had been clearly explained
to him by the court, he shall not be allowed to withdraw that plea and substitute therefor the plea of
not guilty." In such a case, the trial court commits no error in denying the motion of the accused to
withdraw his plea of guilty (People vs. Ubaldo and Tuason, 55 Phil. 94).

The trial court in this case acted with commendable circumspection in interrogating De los Santos
when he withdrew his plea of not guilty and substituted it with a plea of guilty. On the other hand, it
acted with deplorable precipitancy in allowing the withdrawal of De los Santos' plea of guilty, setting
aside the judgments of conviction and entering for him a plea of not guilty without requiring him to
explain why he had changed his mind.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's orders of September 14 and 21 and October 5, 1981, setting aside
the judgments of conviction, allowing the accused to withdraw his plea of guilty and substituting it
with a plea of not guilty, scheduling the cases for trial and later dismissing them because of the
prosecution's failure to present its evidence, are reversed and set aside.
The judgments of conviction against the accused are reinstated and hereby declared final and
executory. Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188706

March 17, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
OSCAR M. DOCUMENTO, Appellant.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 13, 2008, affirming the Regional Trial
Court2(RTC) Decision3 dated June 9, 2003, finding appellant Oscar Documento guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape.
Documento was charged before the RTC with two (2) counts of Rape, as defined and punished
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, in separate Informations, which read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6899
That sometime on April 22, 1996 at Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the use of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his daughter AAA,
a minor, 16 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659).
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6900
That sometime on October 15, 1995 at Barangay Antongalon, Butuan City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the use of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his
daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659). 4
Upon arraignment, Documento pled not guilty. Subsequently, however, he changed his earlier plea to
one of guilt. As such, the RTC ordered a re-arraignment and entered appellants plea of guilt to the
charges.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented evidence consisting of the testimonies of private complainant
herself, AAA, her mother, BBB, and Dr. Johann A. Hugo. Their testimonies established the following:
1. Documento started sexually molesting his daughter, AAA, in 1989 when she was ten (10)
years old. Eventually, AAA became pregnant and gave birth in 1993.
2. Documento raped AAA on a number of occasions in the houses of Barsilisa Morada,
Documentos relative, and Aida Documento, both located in Butuan City. During each
incident, Documento hit and hurt AAA physically. He likewise threatened to kill her if she told
anyone of the rape.
3. AAAs mother, BBB, who was working in Manila from 1994 to 1996, went to Barsilisa and
asked for help in locating Oscar and AAA. BBB testified that she had not seen nor heard
from the two since April 7, 1994, when Documento brought their daughters AAA and CCC to
Tubod, Lanao del Norte, for a vacation. Thereafter, Documento left CCC in Tubod and
brought AAA with him to Santiago, Agusan del Norte.
4. When BBB found out from their relatives that AAA got pregnant and gave birth, she
suspected that Documento was the culprit. Upon learning that Documento and AAA were in
Butuan City, she went to the Butuan Police Station and requested assistance in securing
custody of AAA. As soon as Documento was arrested, AAA informed the police that
Documento raped her.
5. Dr. Hugo testified on the genital examination he conducted on AAA, and affirmed the
medical certificate he issued with the following findings:
Physical exam: HEENT with in normal limits.
C/L with in normal limits.
CVB with in normal limits.
ABD Soft; NABS
GU (-) KPS
Genitalia - Parrous
- Healed vaginal laceration
- Vaginal introitus; admits 2 finger[s]

with ease
- Hymen with pemnants "caruncula
multiforma"
Labs; Vaginal Smear; Negative for Spermatozoa.5
Documento testified as the sole witness for the defense. He asseverated that he pled guilty to the
crime of Rape only because Prosecutor Hector B. Salise convinced him to do so. Documento
contended that he did not rape AAA, and that, to the contrary, they had a consensual, sexual
relationship. He further alleged that the incident did not happen in Butuan City, but in Clarin, Misamis
Occidental. Finally, on cross-examination, Documento disowned the handwritten letters he had
supposedly written to his wife and to AAA, asking for their forgiveness.
The RTC rendered judgment convicting Documento of both counts of Rape, to wit:
WHEREFORE, as a consequence of the foregoing, this Court finds accused Oscar M. Documento
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) counts of rape and correspondingly sentences him:
1. To suffer the penalty of DEATH in each of the two (2) rape cases filed against him Criminal Case No. 6899 and Criminal Case No. 6900;
2. To indemnify the victim, AAA, in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, respectively, for each count of
rape in accordance with recent jurisprudence.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused Oscar M. Documento from Butuan
City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Let the records of these cases be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review.
SO ORDERED.6
Consistent with our ruling in People v. Mateo,7 Documentos appeal was remanded to the CA.
Ruling on the appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs conviction, but changed the penalty imposed on
Documento from death penalty to reclusion perpetua, and increased the award of moral damages
from P50,000.00 toP75,000.00 for each count of Rape. The fallo of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding appellant Oscar Documento guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of the crime of rape and ordering him to indemnify the victim for each count of
rape the amounts ofP75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is increased to P75,000.00
for each count of rape and that in lieu of the death penalty, appellant Oscar Documento is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape without possibility of
parole.

SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this appeal, assigning the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE WITHOUT FIRST RESOLVING
ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED AS THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE WERE PERPETRATED IN
BUTUAN CITY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY INTO
THE VOLUNTARINESS AND FULL COMPREHENSION BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA.9
We find no cogent reason to disturb Documentos conviction. We affirm the CA, but with
modification.
On the issue of the trial courts territorial jurisdiction over the crime, we completely agree with the
appellate courts ruling thereon. Contrary to the insistence of Documento that the prosecution failed
to establish that the two (2) counts of Rape were perpetrated in Butuan City, the CA pointed to
specific parts of the records which show that, although AAA did not specifically mention "Butuan
City" in her testimony, the incidents in the present cases transpired in Barangay Antongalon and on
Ochoa Avenue, both in Butuan City.
First. AAA in her Sworn Statement dated April 24, 1996 answered the prosecutors question in this
wise:
15. Q : Right after you arrived [in] Butuan City, did your father molest you or rape you?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : When was that?
A : From the month of October 15, 1995 when we stayed [in] Barangay Antongalon, Butuan
City, and the last happened in the evening of April 22, 1996 [on] Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City.
Second. The Resolution dated May 3, 1996 of Hector B. Salise, Second Assistant City Prosecutor,
states that:
There were many places they stayed and several sexual intercourse that took place which this office
has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation but only on the incidents of rape that took
place [in] Antongalon, Butuan City on October 15, 1995 and [on] Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City on April
22, 1996.

Third. The two (2) Informations dated May 8, 1996, clearly state that the crimes charged against
appellant were perpetrated in Barangay Antongalon and Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City on October 15,
1995 and April 22, 1996, respectively.
Fourth. The inclusion of the two Barangays in the City of Butuan is a matter of mandatory judicial
notice by the trial court. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms
of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of
the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure
of time, and the geographical divisions.10
Documento avers that his conviction for Rape must be reversed because the trial court did not
properly conduct a searching inquiry on the voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of guilt.
We disagree.
It is true that the appellate court noted the trial courts failure to conduct the prescribed "searching
inquiry" into the matter of whether or not Documentos plea of guilt was improvidently made.
Nonetheless, it still found the conviction of appellant proper. Its disquisition on Documentos plea of
guilt is in point.
Nothing in the records of the case at bench shows that the trial court complied with the guidelines
[set forth by the Supreme Court in a number of cases] after appellants re-arraignment and guilty
plea. The questions propounded to appellant during the direct and cross-examination likewise fall
short of these requirements. x x x.
xxxx
The questions propounded were clearly not compliant with the guidelines set forth by the High Court.
The appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of his guilty plea. In fact, as argued by
appellant, "the trial court should have informed him that his plea of guilt would not affect or reduce
the imposable penalty, which is death as he might have erroneously believed that under Article 63,
the death penalty, being a single indivisible penalty, shall be applied by the court regardless of any
mitigating circumstances that might have attended the commission of the deed." Moreover, the trial
court judge failed to inform appellant of his right to adduce evidence despite the guilty plea.
1avvphi1

With the trial courts failure to comply with the guidelines, appellants guilty plea is deemed
improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious.
This does not mean, however, that the case should be remanded to the trial court. This course of
action is appropriate only when the appellants guilty plea was the sole basis for his conviction. As
held in People v. Mira, Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellants guilty plea, we are not inclined to
remand the case to the trial court as suggested by appellant. Convictions based on an improvident

plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on
sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained,
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence
proving his commission of the offense charged.11
On the whole, we find that the appellate court committed no reversible error in affirming the trial
courts ruling convicting Documento.
Lastly, on the matter of the appellate courts award of exemplary damages, we increase the award
fromP25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 13, 2008 in CAG.R. CRHC No. 00285 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary
damages is hereby increased fromP25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The Decision is affirmed in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE
GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents, LAURO
VIZCONDE, intervenor.
G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995
MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE
GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents.
G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995
ANTONIO L. LEJANO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE

GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274,respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Before the Court are petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamuswith application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to: (1)
annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E.
de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95-404; (2) enjoin the respondents from
conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case
or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. 1
From the records of the case, it appears that on June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons, 2 with the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation 3 of those charged with the
rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; 4 her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, 5 and
her sister Anne Marie Jennifer 6 in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paraaque,
Metro Manila.
During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following: (1) the sworn statement dated
May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission
of the crime; 7 (2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the former housemaids of the Webb family in the
persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S.Gaviola; 8 (3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who
alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound for New York
and who expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip; (4) the sworn
statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated the manner of how
Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar; 9 (5) the sworn statements of Belen
Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and the sworn statements of Normal White, a
security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also
submitted and they showed that Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer
nineteen (19). 10 The genital examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa. 11
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for
Production And Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the following:
(a) Certification issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission to and
stay of Hubert Webb in the United States from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992;
(b) Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan,
M.D.;
(c) Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong (other than his Sworn Statement dated October 7,
1991);

(d) Photographs of fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during the
investigation;
(e) Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al.;
(f) List of names of 135 suspects/persons investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated
September 2, 1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent;
(g) Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro
(other than the May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by the NBI and other police
agencies;
(h) transmittal letter to the NBI, including the report of the investigation conducted by
Superintendent Rodolfo C. Sison, Regional Deputy Director, NCRC;
(i) The names of NBI officials/agents composing the Task Force Jecares, including their
respective positions and duties;
(j) Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.
The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. It
alleged it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro. This compelled petitioner
Webb to file Civil Case No. 951099 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Br. 63, for the
purpose, among others, of obtaining the original of said sworn statement. He succeeded, for in the
course of its proceedings, Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., produced a copy of said original in
compliance with a subpoena duces tecum. The original was then submitted by petitioner Webb to
the DOJ Panel together with his other evidence. It appears, however, that petitioner Webb failed to
obtain from the NBI the copy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report despite his request
for its production.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar
as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27,
1992. 12 His alibi was corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque,
Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela Francisco. 13 To further support his defense, he submitted
documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the United States on said
dates 14 and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No. A8818707 on June 14,
1991. 15 Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal
Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San
Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808.
The other respondents Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio "Tony Boy"
Lejano, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Gerardo Biong submitted sworn statements,
responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the
Vizcondes. 16 Only the respondents Joey Filart and Artemio "Dong" Ventura failed to file their counteraffidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last known address. 17In his sworn statement,
petitioner Gatchalian alleged that from 11 o'clock in the evening of June 29, 1991 until 3 o'clock in the
morning of the following day, he was at the residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syyap, at New
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa watching video tapes. He claimed that his co-petitioner Lejano was with him.

On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold
respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against
petitioners and their co-respondents, 18 On the same date, it filed the corresponding
Information 19 against petitioners and their co-accused with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258 presided by respondent judge
Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, the respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano,
who issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August 11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily
inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment
with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by
Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused.
On August 11, 1995, petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo
Papa Sr., in Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the
authorities after filing their petitions before us.
In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against them: (2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding
that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel
denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4)
the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in
the Information as an accused.
We find the petitions bereft of merit.
I
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the May 22,
1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They
hammer on alleged material inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995
sworn statements. They assail her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair
as semi-blonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn
statements of the witnesses for the NBI.
We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section 1 of Rule
112 provides that a preliminary investigation should determine " . . . whether there is a
sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial." Section 3 of the same Rule outlines the procedure in conducting a
preliminary investigation, thus:
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed
without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following
manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other
supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two

(2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal,
state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and
other supporting documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, the
respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall
have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the
respondent shall also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof
and copies thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit
counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base
his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may
set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses,
during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without
the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit
questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or
witnesses concerned.
(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating
officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus
adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the respondent for trial.
Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He shall
certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe that
a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof . . ."
The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature . . ." 20 An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the
privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State. 21 Probable cause to warrant arrest is not
an opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they are facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 22 Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of
reasonable caution 23 or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man. 24 The terms are legally synonymous and their
reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average
man on the street. 25 It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man

weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of
which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable
men have an abundance.

Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel gravely abused
its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. Petitioners belittle the
truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner
Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2)
sworn statement, thus: 26
xxx xxx xxx

To illustrate, the following are some examples of inconsistencies in the two sworn
statements of Alfaro:
On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident in question
First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before June 29, 1991.
Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party sometime in February, 1991."
On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies
First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead persons on that night.
She just said "on the following day I read in the newspaper that there
were three persons who were killed . . ."
Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first door on the left. I saw
two bodies on top of the bed, bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert
on top of Carmela."
On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde
First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape.
Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with bare buttocks, on top of
Carmela and pumping, her mouth gagged and she was moaning and
I saw tears on her eyes."
On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the Vizconde house
First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which was only a little more
than a meter high."
Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate which was already open."
On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house

First Affidavit: She never entered the house.

Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill gate leading to the dirty
kitchen."
In its Resolution, the DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies
did not erode the credibility of Alfaro. We quote the pertinent ruling, viz.: 27
xxx xxx xxx

As regards the admissibility of Alfaro's statements, granting for purposes of argument

merely that she is a co-conspirator, it is well to note that confessions of a coconspirator may be taken as evidence to show the probability of the co-conspirator's
participation in the commission of the crime (see People vs. Lumahang, 94 Phil.
1084).
Furthermore, it is a well-established doctrine that conspiracy need not be proved by
direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Indeed, "only rarely would
such a prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal
undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in writing. Thus, conspiracy
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that the several accused had acted in concert or in
unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design." (Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, 210 SCRA 402 [1992], citations omitted; People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA
699).
Neither can we discredit Alfaro merely because of the inconsistencies in her two
sworn statements. InAngelo, the Court refused to discredit the testimony of a witness
accusing therein petitioner for the slaying of one Gaviano Samaniego even though
said witness failed to name Angelo in his affidavit which was executed five (5)
months earlier. Granting, the Court continued, that a part of the witness' testimony is
untrue, such circumstance is not sufficient to discredit the entire testimony of the
witness.
On August 7, 1995, another counsel for respondent Webb submitted his
memorandum suggesting that the instant complaint "should not be decided within the
month to give time to the NBI to coordinate with the FBI on the latter's inquiry into the
whereabouts of Hubert Webb . . . and to check on our U.S.-based witnesses."
In said memorandum, counsel for respondent Webb calls for the application of the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus arising from the inconsistencies of Alfaro's
statements, among others. This is untenable. As held in Angelo:
There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from crediting part of
the testimony of a witness as worthy of belief and from
simultaneously rejecting other parts which the court may find
incredible or dubious. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is
not a rule of law, let alone a general rule of law which is universally
applicable. It is not a legal presumption either. It is merely a latinism

describing the conclusion reached by a court in a particular case after

ascribing to the evidence such weight or lack of weight that the court
deemed proper.
In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having
reservations when she first executed the first statement and held back vital
information due to her natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes
that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently
explained especially specially so where there is no showing that the inconsistencies
were deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value of
Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and credit. As it has been often noted, ex
parte statements are generally incomplete because they are usually executed when
the affiant's state of mind does not give her sufficient and fair opportunity to
comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in full the incidents which
transpired (People vs. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31 [1994]; Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been
committed and what is clear before us is that the totality of the evidence submitted by
the complainant indicate a prima faciecase that respondents conspired in the
perpetration of the imputed offense.
We note that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro was given with the assistance of
counsel 28 and consists of six (6) pages, in single space reciting in rich details how the crime was planned
and then executed by the petitioners. In addition, the DOJ Panel evaluated the supporting sworn
statements of Nerissa Rosales and Mila Gaviola, former housemaids of the Webbs, Carlos J. Cristobal, a
passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808 and Lolita Birrer, a paramour of Gerardo Biong. The Panel
assayed their statements as follows: 29
xxx xxx xxx
According to Nerissa E. Rosales, a former housemaid of the Webb family, on June
29, 1991, between 7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Hubert was at home
inside his room with two male visitors. She knew it because she and her cohousemaid, Loany, were instructed by Hubert to bring them three glasses of juice. It
was the last time she saw Hubert and was later told by then Congressman Webb that
Hubert was in the United States.
While Mila S. Gaviola, another former housemaid of the Webb family and who served
as a laundry woman, claims, aside from corroborating the statement of Nerissa
Rosales, that on June 30, 1991, she woke up at around 4:00 in the morning and as
what she used to do, she entered the rooms of the Webbs to get their clothes to be
washed. As a matter of fact, in that early morning, she entered Hubert's room and
saw Hubert, who was only wearing his pants, already awake and smoking while he
was sitting on his bed. She picked up Hubert's scattered clothes and brought them
together with the clothes of the other members of the family to the laundry area. After
taking her breakfast, she began washing the clothes of the Webbs. As she was
washing the clothes of Hubert Webb, she noticed fresh bloodstains in his shirt. After
she finished the laundry, she went to the servant's quarters. But feeling uneasy, she
decided to go up to the stockroom near Hubert's room to see what he was doing. In
the said stockroom, there is a small door going to Hubert's room and in that door

there is a small opening where she used to see Hubert and his friends sniffing on
something. She observed Hubert was quite irritated, uneasy, and walked to and from
inside his room.
On that day, she noticed Hubert left the house at around 1:00 in the afternoon and
came back at around 4:00 in the same afternoon and went inside his room using the
secret door of the house. It was the last time that she saw Hubert until she left the
Webb family.
On the other hand, Carlos J. Cristobal alleged that on March 9, 1991, at about 10:00
in the morning, he was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he was then
scheduled to take the United Airlines Flight No. 808 at 2:00 in the afternoon for New
York. At the airport's lobby, he saw then Congressman Freddie Webb with a male
companion. He greeted him and Webb answered: "Mabuti naman, at ito, ihahatid ko
ang anak ko papuntang Florida." He knew Freddie Webb because he often watched
him then in a television show "Chicks to Chicks." He observed that the man whom
Freddie Webb referred to as his son, was of the same height as Freddie. The son
referred to has fair complexion with no distinguishing marks on his face. He (son of
Webb) was then wearing a striped white jacket. When he and his children were
already inside the plane, he did not see Freddie anymore, but he noticed his son was
seated at the front portion of the economy class. He never noticed Freddie Webb's
son upon their arrival in San Francisco. He claims that, while watching the television
program "DONG PUNO LIVE" lately, he saw the wife of Freddie Webb with her
lawyer being interviewed, and when she described Hubert as "moreno" and small
built, with a height of five feet and seven inches tall, and who was the one who left for
United States on March 9, 1991, he nurtured doubts because such description does
not fit the physical traits of the son of Freddie, who left with him for United States on
the same flight and date.
Lolita Birrer, alleged that she know Gerardo Biong because she had an affair with
him for almost three (3) years and in fact, she had a child with him who is now four
(4) years old. Their relationship started in February, 1991 until she broke up with him
in September 1993. She recalls that on June 29, 1991, at around 6:00 p.m., Biong
invited her to play mahjong at the canteen of a certain Aling Glo located at the back
of the Paraaque Municipal Hall.
At about 2:30, in the early morning of January 30, 1991, the radio operator of the
Paraaque police told Biong that he has a phone call. Before Biong went to the radio
room, she was instructed to take him over and after somebody won the game, she
followed Biong at the radio room where she overheard him uttering,
"Ano?, Saan? Mahirap yan, Paano, o sige, aantayin kita, O ano?, dilaw na taxi, o
sige." When he put the phone down, Biong told her, "Mayroon lang akong
rerespondehan, ikaw muna ang maupo" and then, he went outside the canteen
apparently waiting for somebody. Twenty minutes later, a taxi, colored yellow, arrived
with a male passenger sitting at the backseat and parked near the canteen. After it
made some signals by blinking its headlight, Biong rode thereat at the front seat
beside the driver and then, they left. She was not able to recognize the male
passenger because the window of the taxi was tinted. Biong came back at around
7:00 of the same morning and when he arrived, he immediately washed his hands

and face, and took his handkerchief from his pocket which he threw at the trash can.
She asked him why he threw his handkerchief and he answered, "Hmp . . . amoy
tae." She inquired what happened in BF Homes and he replied, "Putang inang mga
batang iyon, pinahirapan nila ako."
Biong later invited her for breakfast, but they first went to his office where she
observed him doing something in his steel cabinet while he appeared to be uneasy.
Moments later, Galvan, another policeman of Paraaque, arrived and said, "Oy
Biong, may tatlong patay sa BF, imbestigahan mo" to which Biong answered, "Oo
susunod na ako." Biong went to the office of Capt. Don Bartolome who offered to
accompany him and with whom she asked permission to go with them. Before they
proceeded to the place where the killings happened, she asked Biong if he knew the
exact address and the latter immediately responded, "Alam ko na yon." She was
surprised because Galvan never told him the place of the incident.
As soon as they arrived at the Vizconde's residence, Biong instructed the
housemaids to contact the victim's relatives, while the security guard fetched the
barangay chairman and the president of the Homeowners Association. When all
these persons were already in the house, Biong started recording the wounds of the
victim. Inside the master's bedroom, she saw Biong took a watch from the jewelry
box. Because she could not tolerate the foul odor, she and Capt. Bartolome went out
of the room and proceeded to the dining area. On top of the dining table, she saw the
scattered contents of a shoulder bag. Moments later, Biong came out from the room
and proceeded to the front door to remove the chain lock; asked the keys from the
housemaid and it was only then that the main door was opened. Biong noticed a
stone in front of the broken glass of the door and requested Capt. Bartolome to go
inside the servant's quarters as he doubted the housemaids' claim that they heard
nothing unusual. Using the handle of his gun, Biong broke the remaining glass of the
door panel. Bartolome then came out of the room and told Biong that he can hear the
sound of the glass being broken. At the garage, Biong also noticed same marks on
the hood of the car.
On the following day, at around 12:00 noon, Biong arrived in her house together with
the Vizconde housemaids. When Biong was preparing to take a bath, she saw him
remove from his pocket the things she also saw from Vizconde's residence, to wit:
calling cards, driver's license, ATM card, a crossed check worth P80,000.00,
earrings, a ring, bracelet, necklace, and the watch he took from the jewelry box
inside the room of the Vizcondes. These jewelry items were later pawned by Biong
for P20,000.00 at a pawnshop in front of Chow-Chow restaurant in Santos Avenue,
Paraaque. The next day, she saw Biong took from his locker at the Paraaque
Police Station an imported brown leather jacket, which the latter claimed to have
been given to him by the person who called him up in the early morning of June 30,
1991.
Since then, Biong has been wearing said jacket until they broke up sometime in
1993. She observed that Biong seemed not interested in pursuing the investigation of
the Vizconde case. In fact, when Biong and this group picked up Mike Gatchalian
and brought him to the Paraaque Police Station, she was surprised that Biong
halted the investigation when Gatchalian was profusely sweating while being

interrogated. After the father of Gatchalian talked to Colonel Pureza, the latter called
up and instructed Biong to bring Gatchalian to him (Colonel Pureza) and that was the
last thing she remembered regarding this case.
The DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evidence against the exculpatory evidence of
petitioners. It ruled:30
xxx xxx xxx
The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his
defense of denial and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough
evaluation of the records, believes that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted
by the complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by a
prosecution witness. Verily, alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of positive
identification especially so where the claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends and
relatives (People vs. Apolonia, 235 SCRA 124 [1994]; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA
316 and a long line of cases).
Similarly, denial is a self-serving negative which cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters
(People vs. Carizo, 233 SCRA 687 [1994]). Indeed, denial, like alibi, is weak and
becomes even more weaker when arrayed against the positive identification by the
witness for the prosecution (People vs. Onpaid, 233 SCRA 62 [1994]).
Surprisingly, Gatchalian's defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano, whom he
claimed was with him watching video tapes at the Syyap residence. Other than
claiming that he "was not and could not have been at or near the area of the
Vizconde residence at the time of the alleged commission of the crime,"
respondent Lejano proffered no evidence to substantiate his claim of alibi.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent Webb seeks to enhance the acceptability of his alibi
in the form of documents tending to show that he was thousands of miles away when
the incident occurred. We have carefully deliberated and argued on the evidence
submitted by respondent Webb in support of his absence from the country since
March 9, 1991 to October 26, 1992 and found the same wanting to exonerate him of
the offense charged. The material dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991. While
respondent Webb may have submitted proof tending to show that he was issued a
California driver's license on June 14, 1991, there is no showing that he could not
have been in the country on the dates above mentioned. Neither do we find merit in
the allegation that respondent Webb personally bought a bicycle on June 30, 1991 in
California in view of his positive identification by Alfaro and the two (2) househelps of
the Webb family who testified that he was here in the country on said dates.
Additionally, the issuance of receipt evidencing the purchase of a bicycle in California
is no conclusive proof that the name appearing thereon was the actual buyer of the
merchandise.

Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, we hold that the
DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the
petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, 31 while probable cause
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . .
conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of
probable cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely abuse its discretion in
refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses
for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the
investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator
need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part
of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights,
such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In
the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced
to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.
II
We now come to the charge of petitioners that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without
conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners support their stance by
highlighting the following facts: (1) the issuance of warrants of arrest in a matter of few hours;
(2) the failure of said judges to issue orders of arrest; (3) the records submitted to the trial
court were incomplete and insufficient from which to base a finding of probable cause; and
(4) that even Gerardo Biong who was included in the Information as a mere accessory had a
"NO BAIL" recommendation by the DOJ Panel. Petitioners postulate that it was impossible to
conduct a "searching examination of witnesses and evaluation of the documents" on the part
of said judges.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is regulated by no
less than the fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of probable cause both with respect
to issuance of warrants of arrest or search warrants. The similarities and differences of their

requirements ought to be educational. Some of them are pointed out by Professors LaFave
and Israel, thus: 32 "It is generally assumed that the same quantum of evidence is required
whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search. But each
requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances, and thus
one can exist without the other. In search cases, two conclusions must be supported by
substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with
criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched. It is not also
necessary that a particular person be implicated. By comparison, in arrest cases there must be
probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it,
which of course can exist without any showing that evidence of the crime will be found at
premises under that person's control." Worthy to note, our Rules of Court do not provide for a
similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants. With
respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that "upon filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused." In
contrast, the procedure to be followed in issuing search warrants is more defined. Thus, Sections
3, 4 and 5 of Rule 126 provide:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted.
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is thereupon satisfied of
the facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to
believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the
form prescribed by these Rules.
We discussed the difference in the Procedure of issuing warrants of arrest and search
warrants in Soliven vs. Makasiar, 33 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after

examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the

witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of
the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran
that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law 34 repudiate the submission
of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination of
witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject petitioners' contention
that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law
or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2)
sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita
Birrer 35 as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and
analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is
probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we stress that before
issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certaintyof
guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The
sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours. The
fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause
determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the evidence
attached to the records of the case. 36
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs. Diokno 37 is misplaced. Our Allado ruling is
predicated on the utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Not even
the corpus delicti of the crime was established by the evidence of the prosecution in that case.
Given the clear insufficiency of the evidence on record, we stressed the necessity for the trial

judge to make a further personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses to reach a
correct assessment of the existence or non-existence of probable cause before issuing warrants
of arrest against the accused. The case at bar, however, rests on a different factual setting. As
priorly discussed, the various types of evidence extant in the records of the case provide
substantial basis for a finding of probable cause against the petitioner. The corpus delicti of the
crime is a given fact. There is an eyewitness account of the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The
alibi defense of petitioner Webb is also disputed by sworn statements of their former maids. It
was therefore unnecessary for the respondent judges to take the further step of examining ex
parte the complainant and their witnesses with searching questions.

III
Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They decry their alleged hasty and
malicious prosecution by the NBI and the DOJ Panel. They also assail the prejudicial
publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.
We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the
preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove
lack of probable cause against them. The fairness of this opportunity is well stressed in the
Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General, viz.:
Again, there is no merit in this contention. Petitioners were afforded all the
opportunities to be heard. Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary
investigation by appearing in the initial hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the
second hearing on July 14, 1995; and by filing a "Motion for Production and
Examination of Evidence and Documents" on June 27, 1995 (p. 4, Petition), a "Reply
to the compliance and Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and
Examination of Evidence" on July 5, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), a "Comment and
Manifestation" on July 7, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), his "Counter-Affidavit" on July 14,
1995 (pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to Resolve" on August 1, 1995. Numerous
letter-requests were also sent by the petitioner Webb's counsel to the DOJ Panel
requesting the latter to furnish him a copy of the reports prepared by the FBI
concerning the petitioner's whereabouts during the material period (Annexes "L", "L1" and "L-2" of the Supplemental Petition dated August 14, 1995). In fact, not
satisfied with the decision of the DOJ Panel not to issue subpoena duces tecum to
Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., petitioner Webb filed a "Petition for Injunction, Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Makati in
order to compel said Atty. Mercader, Jr. to produce the first sworn statement of Alfaro
for submission to the DOJ Panel. (p. 4, Petition) The said court dismissed the petition
after Mercader produced and submitted to the DOJ Panel the first sworn statement of
Alfaro, without ruling on the admissibility and credence of the two (2) conflicting and
inconsistent sworn statements of the principal witness, Alfaro. (Attached hereto is a
copy of the order of Judge Ruben A. Mendiola, RTC-Makati, Branch 63 dated July
28, 1995) marked as Annex "F."
It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the
preliminary investigation was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14,
1995, the panel continued to conduct further proceedings, e.g. comparison of the

photo-copies of the submitted documents with the originals on July 17, 1995. (p. 7,
Petition) The panel even entertained the "Response" submitted by accused Miguel
Rodriguez on July 18, 1995. (p. 17 Resolution) In addition to these, the panel even
announced that any party may submit additional evidence before the resolution of the
case. (p. 8, Petition) From the time the panel declared the termination of the
preliminary investigation on July 14, 1995, twenty-seven (27) days elapsed before
the resolution was promulgated, and the information eventually filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque on August 10, 1995. This notwithstanding the directive of
Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the investigating officer shall
resolve the case within ten (10) days from the termination of the preliminary
investigation. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence
in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. This
directly disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the resolution was done with
indecent haste in violation of the rights of the petitioners. During the period of twentyseven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and present additional evidence
before the DOJ Panel.
Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the
conduct of the preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated
the adverse resolution and filed the Information in court against them.
Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against them
for rape with homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said Information is in
accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993. We
quote its pertinent sections, viz.:
Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. No appeal may be taken from a
resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City
Prosecutor finding probable causeexcept upon showing of manifest error or grave
abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been
arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said
appeal shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause,
however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.
Sec. 2. When to appeal. The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period
shall be interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten (10)
days from receipt of the resolution and shall continue to run from the time the
resolution denying the motion shall have been received by the movant or his counsel.
(Emphasis supplied)
Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an Information in court
after the consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still exercise
the right to seek a review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.

Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information considering
her alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-inclusion
of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit Program
And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its Section 10,
which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a
crime and desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined
in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the
following circumstances are present:
(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under
the R.P.C. or its equivalent under special laws;
(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed;
(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in
order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he
complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the
discharge of an accused so that he can be used as a Witness under Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her noninclusion in the criminal Complaint or Information, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. The certification
of admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit
by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE
WITNESS IN THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION and if included
therein, to petition the court for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a
State Witness. The court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused
from the information.

Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from
criminal prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or
used and all the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof.
The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner Webb. It is urged that they
constitute ". . . an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the
power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness."
The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119 38which gives the court the prerogative to
approve the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for
it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution
of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power
to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A.
No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a
witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. 39 Section 9 of Rule
119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an
inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given the power to discharge a
state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.
The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an
inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond
change by legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981
is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against crime,
one certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well
put by the Department of Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation,
usually refuse to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases.
Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or
lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to
pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their
appearance in investigative bodies/courts." 40 Petitioner Webb's challenge to the validity of R.A.
No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.
Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings during
their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn
statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report. The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it
urges an expansive reading of the rights of persons under preliminary investigation it
deserves serious consideration. To start with, our Rules on Criminal Procedure do not
expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the preliminary investigation stage of a
criminal proceeding. 41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to move
for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material evidence in possession of the
prosecution.42 But these provisions apply after the filing of the Complaint or Information in court
and the rights are accorded to the accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at
arraignment and to prepare for trial. 43
This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not,
however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his
constitutional right to life, liberty and property. Preliminary investigation is not too early a
stage to guard against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a

potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary investigation is to

determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a
probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or
diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for
they are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary
investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation
conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. 44 As this Court emphasized
in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 45 "the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before
being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of incarceration or
some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right." A preliminary
investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty
of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage. We uphold the legal basis of
the right of petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the April 28,
1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their preliminary investigation
considering their exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable materiality to the issue of
their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional protection of due process which we
rule to be operational even during the preliminary investigation of a potential accused. It is also
implicit in section (3) (a) of Rule 112 which requires during the preliminary investigation the filing
of a sworn complaint, which shall ". . . state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents . . ."
In laying down this rule, the Court is not without enlightened precedents from other
jurisdictions. In the 1963 watershed case of Brady v. Maryland 46 the United States Supreme Court held
that "suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt
or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Its progeny is the 1935 case of Mooney
v. Holohan 47 which laid down the proposition that a prosecutor's intentional use of perjured testimony to procure conviction
violates due process. Thus, evolved jurisprudence firming up the prosecutor's duty to disclose to the defense exculpatory

The rationale is well put by Justice Brennan in Brady 49 "society wins not
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair." Indeed, prosecutors should
not treat litigation like a game of poker where surprises can be sprung and where gain by guile is
not punished.
evidence in its possession. 48

But given the right of petitioners to compel the NBI to disclose exculpatory evidence in their
favor, we are not prepared to rule that the initial non-production of the original sworn
statement of Alfaro dated April 28, 1995 could have resulted in the reasonable likelihood that
the DOJ Panel would not have found probable cause. To be sure, the NBI, on July 4, 1995,
upon request of petitioners, submitted a photocopy of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn
statement. It explained it cannot produce the original as it had been lost. Fortunately,
petitioners, on July 28, 1995, were able to obtain a copy of the original from Atty. Arturo
Mercader in the course of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 951099. 50 As petitioners admit,
the DOJ Panel accepted the original of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn statement as a part of their
evidence. 51 Petitioners thus had the fair chance to explain to the DOJ Panel then still conducting
their preliminary investigation the exculpatory aspects of this sworn statement. Unfortunately for
petitioners, the DOJ Panel still found probable cause to charge them despite the alleged material
discrepancies between the first and second sworn statements of Alfaro. For reasons we have
expounded, this finding of probable cause cannot be struck down as done with grave abuse of
discretion. 52 On the other hand, the FBI Report while corroborative of the alibi of petitioner Webb

cannot by itself reverse the probable cause finding of the DOJ Panel in light of the totality of
evidence presented by the NBI.

Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality due to
the prejudicial publicity waged in the press and broadcast media by the NBI.
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while
undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early
invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary
investigation.
In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of the most problematic areas in
constitutional law where the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the press, the
public's right to information, and an accused's right to a fair and impartial trial collide and
compete for prioritization. The process of pinpointing where the balance should be struck has
divided men of learning as the balance keeps moving either on the side of liberty or on the
side of order as the tumult of the time and the welfare of the people dictate. The dance of
balance is a difficult act to follow.
In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and
oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the
telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high
velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily
diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still
bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even
the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and
their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the
press and the public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 53 it was
wisely held:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American
justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open,
thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned
and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on
secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of
public trials was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of
outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice
serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern,
hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal
process "satisfy the appearance of justice," Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99
L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such
process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid
today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of
justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication
on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such
as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the
right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees;
the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of
trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government
from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at
the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also
relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a
catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which
it was deliberately linked by
the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and
representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees
to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not
expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of
enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of
the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press
could be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus,
in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., 54 we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity
there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that
will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners
fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the
subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is
a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of
publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not
appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the
parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the
generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their
fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the
DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as petitioners
will now have to undergo trial on the merits. We stress that probable cause is not
synonymous with guilt and while the light of publicity may be a good disinfectant of
unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame an accused's right to fair trial. Without
imposing on the trial judge the difficult task of supervising every specie of speech relating to
the case at bar, it behooves her to be reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile
criminal cases to control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. 55 The Court
reminds judges that our ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every

criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the
guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the
promise that justice shall be done and is done and that is the only way for the judiciary to get
an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122770 January 16, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Nine years and four months ago this Court declared:
Rape is a nauseating crime that deserves the condemnation of all decent persons who
recognize that a woman's cherished chastity is hers alone to surrender of her own free will.
Whoever violates that will descends to the level of the odious beast. The act becomes doubly
repulsive where the outrage is perpetrated on one's own flesh and blood for the culprit is
reduced to lower than the lowly animal. The latter yields only to biological impulses and is
unfettered by social inhibitions when it mates with its own kin, but the man who rapes his
own daughter violates not only her purity and her trust but also the mores of his society
which he has scornfully defied. By inflicting his animal greed on her in a disgusting coercion
of incestuous lust, he forfeits all respect as a human being and is justly spurned by all, not
least of all by the fruit of his own loins whose progeny he has forever stained with his
shameful and shameless lechery. 1
At the end of the day, after resolving this case of 14-year-old Eden Agbayani who charged her own
father with rape committed in the sanctity of their rented room on 19 July 1994, this Court finds itself
repeating this declaration. 2
Before this Court on automatic review is the decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 106, in view of the death penalty imposed by it for the crime of rape, defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. 4
On 12 September 1994, the Station Investigation and Intelligence Division of the National Capital
Regional Command, Philippine National Police (PNP), endorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City the complaint of Eden Agbayani (hereafter EDEN) for rape against her father, herein
accused-appellant Eduardo Agbayani y Mendoza. 5
After appropriate preliminary investigation, a complaint 6 for rape signed by EDEN, assisted by her
sister Fedelina Agbayani, and subscribed, and sworn to before Asst. City Prosecutor Charito B. Gonzales,

was filed against appellant with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 27 October 1994. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-94-59149, then set for arraignment, pre-trial and trial on 22
December 1994. 7

At his arraignment on 22 December 1994, appellant, assisted by Attys. Samuel Baldado and Edwin
de la Cruz as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty. 8 Upon agreement of the parties, trial on
the merits immediately followed, with the prosecution presenting the first witness, Dr. Florante Baltazar, a
Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory,9 who was cross-examined by Atty. Baldado. 10 On the
succeeding dates of trial, the prosecution presented EDEN 11 and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje. 12 During
these hearings, however, appellant was represented by Atty. Arturo Temanil of the Public Attorney's
Office. 13
On its part, the defense presented appellant, Adoracion M. Cruz, Fedelina Agbayani, as well as
EDEN who identified her and Fedelina's affidavit of desistance, 14 which was subscribed and sworn to
before notary public Eranio Cedillo on 6 February 1995. Said affidavit reads as follows:
We, Eden Agbayani, 14 years old, complainant and Fedelina Agbayani, 19 years old, sister of Eden
Agbayani, and presently residing at No., Phase 1, United Glorieta, Kaniogan, Pasig, Metro Manila, after having been duly sworn to
in accordance with law do hereby depose and states [sic]:

That we are the complainant [sic] against our father, Eduardo Agbayani pending before this
Honorable Court docketed as Criminal Case No. 59149;
That after evaluating the circumstance that lead [sic] to the filing of the instant case I formally
realize that the incident between us and my father is purely family problem that arise from
the disciplinarian attitude of our father;
That this resulted to family misunderstanding, hence we decided to formally forego this case
and withdraw the same:
That I am executing this affidavit for purpose of finally withdrawing the instant case and
therefrom requesting this Honorable Court to dismiss the case against our father.
That this affidavit was executed freely and voluntarily.
As EDEN declared in open court that what she said in her previous testimony and sworn statement
were not true, the trial court held her in direct contempt of court, reasoning that her "intentional
falsehood" was "offensive to its dignity and a blatant disrespect to the Court, and actually degrading
[to] the administration of justice." Accordingly, the trial court ordered her "committed to incarceration
and imprisonment within the period provided by law," 15which penalty, however, was modified to a fine
of P200.00 upon EDEN's motion for reconsideration. 16
On rebuttal, the prosecution had EDEN back on the witness stand. She retracted her affidavit of
desistance and claimed that she had signed it under coercion by her mother and elder sister.
The trial court's summary of the evidence for the prosecution, with the references to the pages of the
stenographic notes and exhibits deleted, is as follows:

The evidence adduced on record shows that sometime in September of 1993 in Malolos,
Bulacan, the accused was charged by his two daughters, FEDELINA and DODIMA
AGBAYANI, [with] the crime of rape which case was raffled to the sala of Judge Danilo
Manalastas of Branch 7, Regional Trial Court, Bulacan. The case was, however, provisionally
dismissed by said Judge after the complainants desisted from pursuing the same in May
1994. Eduardo Agbayani was thus consequently released from jail on July 13, 1994. Three
(3) days thereafter, he began living with four (4) of his six (6) daughters, Fedelina, Eden,
Diana and Edima, in a rented room at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon City.
The evidence of the prosecution, in part consisting of the testimonies of Complainant Eden
Agbayani, Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Florante Baltazar and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje, shows
that at the above-mentioned address the complainant, Eden Agbayani, on the evening of
July 19, 1994, was sleeping on the floor of the room with her father, the accused Eduardo
Agbayani and her youngest sister, Edima, while her sisters, Fedelina and Diana slept on a
bed. At the time, complainant's mother was outside the country, working in Saudi Arabia. At
about 9:00 p.m. of July 19, Complainant Eden Agbayani was awakened from her sleep by
hands caressing her breasts and vagina. She turned to discover that it was her father who
was then molesting her. Frightened, she asked, "Tay bakit niyo po ginagawa sa akin ito,
gayong kalalabas mo lang sa kulungan?" and threatened to kill her [sic]. The accused then
proceeded to undress her. Thereafter he undressed himself and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with the complainant who could only cry helplessly. The complainant thereafter
felt blood dripping from her vagina and felt pain.
The next day, or on July 20, 1994, the complainant informed her elder sister, Fedelina, of
what had been done to her by her father. She was told not to worry as they would go to
Bulacan to report the incident to Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan, who had, the year before,
handled the rape case filed by Fedelina and Dodima. Several attempts were made by her
sisters, Fedelina and Eden to reach the said fiscal but it was only on September 9, 1994, that
they were able to meet with him. Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan reported the complaint to Judge
Danilo Manalastas who reopened the previously provisionally dismissed case and issued a
warrant of arrest against the herein accused.
With the assistance of police officers from Station 10 of the SIID in Quezon City, the accused
was arrested on the same day at his residence at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon
City and was later brought to Malolos, Bulacan where he is currently detained. After the
accused's arrest, Eden and Fedelina returned to Station 10 where they made individual
statements before SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje narrating the events leading to and occurring
after the incident of July 19, 1994.
The next morning, Eden was examined by Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Dr. Florante Baltazar, a colonel, who, accordingly, prepared the corresponding
Medico-Legal Report. 17
Appellant put up the defense of denial and alibi. According to him, he could not have raped his
daughter EDEN, because on 19 July 1994, he was in Barangay Victoria in Sual, Pangasinan, visiting
his eldest daughter. 18 He declared that EDEN charged him with rape because he had hit her with a belt
after he caught her lying about her whereabouts one night. Then on 24 July 1994, she left their rented
apartment and did not return anymore. 19

Adoracion Cruz corroborated appellant's alibi. She declared that on 17 July 1994, appellant
requested her to take care of his children because he was going to Pangasinan to visit his sick
father, returning home only on 21 July
1994. 20
The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of EDEN, who "appeared, during her entire
testimonies on January 20 and May 4, 1995, coherent, candid and responsive;" further, it
commended her "for her courage and her unwavering strength in the midst of the emotional and
psychological strain and humiliation, not to mention the pressure and lack of moral support of her
family, brought on by the filing of this case." It also ruled that EDEN did not voluntarily execute the
affidavit of desistance, as it was procured "at the behest of her mother and sister for whom the
sanctity of the family and the family's good name were more important than demanding punishment
for whatever injury the complainant might have suffered in the hands of the accused." Besides, even
assumingarguendo that no such pressure was exerted by her mother and sister, the trial court
declared that it understood EDEN's moral predicament, viz., for a child like EDEN, it was difficult to
charge her own father with rape; insist on his punishment; and thereby inflict emotional stress and
financial strain upon the members of her family, particularly her mother.
The trial court likewise gave full faith to the sworn statement (Exhibit "E") of Fedelina Agbayani.
Turning to the defense of appellant, the trial court found his alibi wholly self-serving, and
characterized the testimony of Adoracion Cruz unworthy of belief. As to appellant's claim that EDEN
filed the complaint because of a grudge against him, the trial court found this "incredible, if not totally
absurd," for:
The complainant is an innocent girl of tender years who is unlikely to possess such
vindictiveness and dearth of conscience as to concoct such a malicious and damaging story.
The complainant appeared, during her entire testimonies on January 20 and May 4, 1995,
coherent, candid and responsive. Her retraction on March 16 was sufficiently explained to
this Court (tsn, 5-4-95, testimony of Eden Agbayani, pp. 2-3). She has shown to this Court
the seriousness of the injury upon her person and dignity inflicted upon by the accused. . . .
Even assuming argumenti gratia that the complainant would indeed lodge a complaint
against her father solely on account of an altercation with him, it is highly unlikely that the
complainant would concoct a charge which would damage her and wreck havoc on her
family's reputation, destroy the household peace and subject her father, the accused, to a
grave punishment which by dent of express of law, can obliterate him from the face of this
earth. Indeed, to uphold the defense's proposition would be stretching the imagination too
far, if not to the extreme.
The trial court finally found that appellant employed on EDEN force or intimidation by virtue of his
moral ascendancy over her and his threat that he would kill her if she reported the incident to
anyone.
Accordingly, the trial court, applying Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which imposes the penalty of death
when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim, rendered judgment against appellant, to wit:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused, EDUARDO AGBAYANI, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE
committed against complainant, Eden Agbayani, his minor daughter. This Court, as a
consequence thereof, hereby imposes upon him the supreme penalty of DEATH,
conformably with the provisions of the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. Further, Accused is
hereby ordered to pay the complainant, Eden Agbayani, the sum of P75,000.00 as damages,
with all the necessary penalties provided for by law without subsidiary imprisonment,
however, in the event of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
On 26 May 1995, appellant, through his new counsel de parte Attorneys Froilan V. Siobal and
Domingo Floresta, filed a Motion for New Trial 21 on the ground that serious irregularities prejudicial to
his substantial rights were committed during the trial, viz., the failure of the counsel de oficio to: (a)
present at trial the Barangay Captain of Barangay Obrero, Quezon City, who would have testified, on the
basis of certification attached to the motion, that there was a house bearing No. 30, Makabayan St., in his
barangay, but that there was no such place as 30-A Makabayan St. of said barangay, which was the
address given by EDEN; (b) consider the futility of Adoracion Cruz's testimony; (c) present private
complainant's mother and sister Fedelina on sur-rebuttal to testify as to the circumstances which brought
about the execution of the affidavit of desistance; and (d) cross-examine complainant and the police
investigator exhaustively. He further alleged that his counsel de oficio was never prepared during all the
scheduled hearings, worse, even waived the presence of appellant after the third witness for the
prosecution was presented. He also averred that the trial court used its inherent power of contempt to
intimidate private complainant.
In their Comments/Opposition to the Motion for New Tria1, 22 the public and private prosecutors alleged
that there were no such irregularities; neither was there new and material evidence to be presented that
appellant could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted at trial would probably change the judgment of the court.
In its Order 23 of 31 July 1995, the trial court denied the motion for new trial for being devoid of merit and
for not being within the purview of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.
In his Appellant's Brief filed before this Court, appellant contends that the trial court erred in: (a)
denying his motion for new trial; and (b) holding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that he committed the crime charged.
In support of the first assigned error, appellant reiterates the grounds in his motion for new trial, and
adds two others, namely, (1) the lower court failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel of his
own choice; and (2) the lower court did not give him the opportunity to prepare for trial, despite the
mandated period of two days prescribed in Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
In his second assigned error, appellant contends that EDEN's testimony is not sufficient to convict,
since it is unclear and not free from serious contradictions. Considering their proximity to EDEN, it
was impossible for her sisters or any one of them not to have been awakened when EDEN was
allegedly being abused by him. Strangely, EDEN simply kept quiet and allowed him to abuse her;
neither did she shout for help or put up a fight that would have awakened her sisters. Notably, EDEN

and her sisters allowed him to live and sleep with them again in their rented room even after the
alleged rape.
Finally, appellant asserts that EDEN's testimony is unreliable because her affidavit of desistance
must have necessarily been contradictory thereto. Her "subsequent turn-around . . . that she was
pressured and influenced to execute and sign the affidavit of desistance further confirmed her being
untruthful and, in effect, demolished whatsoever faith left on her charge against the accused."
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) considers the first assigned error as devoid of merit. When
appellant appeared without counsel at the arraignment, the trial court informed him that it would
appoint de oficio counsel for him if he so desired, to which appellant agreed. Moreover, the 2-day
period to prepare for trial provided in Section 9 of Rule 116 is merely directory and does not prohibit
the court from proceeding with trial after arraignment, especially if the defense, as here, consented
thereto. It would have been entirely different if the defense did not agree, in which case the court
would have no other alternative but to grant him the period.
As to appellant's other grievances, the OSG points out that throughout all the hearings, appellant
never questioned the way his defense was being handled by his counsel de oficio. The latter's
request for a continuance because he had not yet conferred with appellant was not evidence of
counsel's lack of sincerity. On the contrary, it showed counsel's awareness of his duty to confer with
appellant to ferret out the relevant facts as regards the second witness for the prosecution. Likewise,
the waiver of appellant's presence during the hearing of 18 March 1995 did not prejudice him,
because on that date, the defense presented EDEN to testify as to her affidavit of desistance, and
Fedelina to corroborate the statements of EDEN which testimonies were in appellant's favor. As to
the manner appellant's counsel de oficio cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, the OSG
stresses that the record shows that said counsel tried his best.
The OSG then characterizes the second assigned error as "barren of merit." EDEN's positive
identification of appellant as the author of the crime rendered appellant's defense of alibi unavailing;
moreover, she demonstrated clearly and vividly what transpired that fateful evening of 19 July 1994.
Thus in view of EDEN's candid and categorical manner of testifying the OSG concluded that she
was a credible witness. 24
As to the commission of rape in a small room and in the presence of other persons, the OSG
maintains that such was not at all improbable. 25 There was, as well, nothing unusual in EDEN's silence;
as she could only attempt to shout because appellant had succeeded in covering her mouth with his
hands and exercised a high level of moral ascendancy over EDEN, his daughter. 26 Hence the OSG
invokes the principle that in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former's moral
ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence intimidation. 27
As regards EDEN's affidavit of desistance, the OSG maintains that courts look with disfavor on
retraction of testimonies previously given in court, for such can easily be secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses usually for a monetary consideration, 28 as well as the probability that it may later be
repudiated.
In his Reply Brief, appellant countered that his consent to the appointment of counsel de oficio at his
arraignment did not relieve the court of its duty under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to
inform him of his right to counsel and that it would be grievous error to deny an accused such right.
Appellant then elaborated on this point as follows:

This is not without judicial precedent. In People vs. Cachero, 73 Phil. 426 and People
vs. Domenden, 73 Phil. 349, cited in RJ Francisco's Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1966, p.
323 it was held, that:
The courts should comply with Rule 116, Sec. 3. It would be a grievous error
to proceed by sentencing the accused without due process of law and this is
not complete, when the accused is denied the right recognized by said rule.
The records must show compliance therewith or that the accused renounced
his right to be assisted by counsel. This is demanded by the interest of justice
and remove all doubts that if the accused had waived said right, he was fully
informed before giving his plea of its consequences. Omission by courts
whether voluntary should not truly be censured but also condemned.
Discussing further the right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, the appellant contends that said
right:
[H]as been held to be mandatory and denial of this right is a reversible error and a ground for
new trial. (R. J. Francisco's Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1986, p. 404, citing People
vs. Mijares, et al., 47 OG 4606;Dumasig v. Morave, 23 SCRA 659). This must be so ". . . to
prevent that any accused be caught unaware and deprived of the means of properly facing
the charges presented against him.
The first assigned error does not persuade this Court. It is true that the transcript of the stenographic
notes of the proceedings of 22 December 1994 and the order issued by the trial court after the
conclusion of said proceedings only state that the court appointed de oficio counsel with the consent
of the said accused. They do not categorically disclose that the trial informed appellant of his right to
counsel of his own choice. However, this does not mean that the trial court failed to inform appellant
of such right. The precise time the two counsel de oficiowere appointed is not disclosed in the record
either. At the recorded portion of the arraignment aspect of the proceedings on 22 December 1994,
the two formally entered their appearance, thus:
COURT: Call the case.
(Interpreter calls the case).
FISCAL ROSARIO BARIAS:
For the prosecution, Your Honor.
ATTY. MARIETA AGUJA:
Respectfully appearing for the prosecution, Your Honor under the control and
direct supervision of the Trial Prosecutor, Your Honor, we are ready to
present our first witness.
ATTY. BALDADO:
For the accused Your Honor, appointed as counsel de oficio.

ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:
For the accused, Your Honor appointed by the court as counsel de oficio. 29
This obviously means that the appointment had taken place earlier. The trial court's order 30 of 22
December 1994 states that said de oficio counsel were "duly appointed by the Court with the consent of
the accused." Since appellant has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to
counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been regularly performed
by the trial court stand. 31 In other words, the trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold
duties under Section 6 32 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely, (1) to inform the accused that he has
the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask accused
whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court
must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ
one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him. 33
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that
the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the
hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative
showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that
it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be
presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right. 34
In U.S. v. Labial, 35 this Court held:
Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question to be determined in this
case is whether the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised
the accused of their right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of
conviction and to send the case back for a new trial. Upon this point we are all agreed that in
the absence of an affirmative showing that the court below did in fact fail to advise the
accused of their rights under the provisions of sections 17 of General Orders No. 58, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere omission from the record brought here upon
appeal of an entry affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is not reversible error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court below must be presumed
in matters of this kind to have complied with the provisions of law prescribing the procedure
to be followed in the trial had before him.
While in People v. Miranda 36 this Court explicitly stated:
However, said counsel calls attention to the fact that the record is silent as to whether or not,
at the time appellant was arraigned, the trial court informed him of his right to be assisted by
an attorney, under section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27 Phil., 87, 88), in the sense
that unless the contrary appears in the records, it will be presumed that the defendant was
informed by the court of his right to counsel. ". . . If we should insist on finding every fact fully
recorded before a citizen can be punished for an offense against the laws, we should destroy
public justice, and give unbridled license to crime. Much must be left to intendment and

presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things correctly than to describe them correctly."
(United States vs. Labial, supra.) The same doctrine was reiterated in People vs.Abuyen (52
Phil. 722) and in United States vs. Custan (28 Phil. 19). We see no reason to modify it now.
In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the appellant at his
arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-examined the first witness for the prosecution, Dr.
Florante Baltazar. 37 Besides, it is only in this appeal that appellant raised the issue of the failure of the
trial court to inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he previously raise it in the trial court despite
ample opportunity to do so. His consent to be assisted by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's
extensive cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to question the
alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his right to counsel. 38
The cases of People v. Domenden 39 and People v. Cachero 40 cited by appellant are inapplicable. In
both cases the trial courts there clearly failed to inform the accused of their right to counsel nor appoint de
oficio counsel during the arraignment. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to admonish trial courts to
ensure that their compliance with their pre-arraignment duties to inform the accused of his right to
counsel, to ask him if he desires to have one, and to inform him that, unless he is allowed to defend
himself in person or he has counsel of his choice, de oficio counsel will be appointed for him, must
appear on record.
Turning to the alleged violation of appellant's right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, Section 9
of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 9. Time to prepare for trial After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2)
days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time.
It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. 41 Only when so demanded does
denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. 42 Further, such right may be waived,
expressly or impliedly. 43 In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he
effectively waived such right.
During the succeeding hearings, appellant was represented by Atty. Temanil of the Public Attorney's
Office in Quezon City, who entered his appearance as de parte, and not as de oficio, counsel. It is to
be presumed that Atty. Temanil's services were obtained pursuant to the law creating the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO), formerly the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO). 44 There is at all no
showing that Atty. Temanil lacked the competence and skill to defend appellant. The latter's contention
that his counsel was not ready at all times because at the hearing on 20 January 1995 he asked for a
continuation as he has "not yet interviewed [his] Client," 45 is misleading. Atty. Temanil made that
statement after he cross-examined EDEN and after the judge realized that it was almost 1:00 o'clock in
the afternoon and both of them were already hungry, thus:
ATTY. TEMANIL:
I just want to make it on record, Your Honor that from the start of trial the
witness appears to be fluent and suffers no difficulty in answering the
questions, even the questions propounded by the Private Prosecutor, Your
Honor.
COURT:

Put that on record.

That is true, Atty. Temanil, it is almost 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon and we
are both hungry now.
ATTY. TEMANIL:
I will just asked [sic] for continuance considering that I have not yet
interviewed my client, Your Honor. 46
Neither is there merit in appellant's claim that his counsel committed irregularities: (1) in not
considering the futility of the testimony of Adoracion Cruz; (2) in not presenting the barangay captain
in the evidence in chief for the defense, and EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina in sur-rebuttal; and
(3) in not cross-examining exhaustively EDEN.
Adoracion Cruz was presented to corroborate appellant's alibi that he was in the province and not in
their rented room from 17 to 21 July 1994. On the other hand, the testimony of the barangay captain
could not alter the fact that rape was committed in a rented room in a house along Makabayan
Street in his barangay. Appellant neither testified that he did not occupy a house numbered 30-A nor
denied that he was living with EDEN and her sisters in that room. Besides, he and his children were
not renting the entire house, but merely a room, which could probably be the unit numbered "30-A"
referred to by EDEN.
As to the presentation of EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina as sur-rebuttal witnesses to disprove
the claim of EDEN that they coerced her into signing the affidavit of desistance, suffice it to state that
there was nothing to show that they were in fact willing to refute EDEN's claim.
Finally, contrary to appellant's allegation, a meticulous examination of the transcripts of the
stenographic notes convinces this Court that Atty. Temanil sufficiently cross-examined EDEN. If he
decided to terminate his cross-examination, it could have been due to the futility of any further crossexamination which might only prove favorable to the prosecution, as it might have opened another
window of opportunity for EDEN to strengthen her testimony.
The second assigned error is equally unpersuasive. It raises the issue of the credibility of EDEN as a
witness. One of the highly revered dicta Philippine jurisprudence has established is that this Court
will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of opposing
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence
which have been overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result. This is founded on practical
and empirical considerations, i.e., the trial judge is in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, since he personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying. 47 He had before him the essential aids to determine whether a witness was telling the truth or
lying. Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked; she often hides in nooks and crannies visible only to
the mind's eye of the judge who tried the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious
shame, the hesitation, the sincere or flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh,
the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and
mien. 48 On the other hand, an appellate court has only the cold record, which generally does not reveal
the thin line between fact and prevarication that is crucial in determining innocence or
guilt. 49

At any rate, in view of the gravity of the offense charged and the extreme penalty of death imposed,
this Court took painstaking effort and meticulous care in reviewing the transcripts of the stenographic
notes of the testimonies of the witnesses.
This Court is fully satisfied that EDEN told the truth that she was raped by her father, herein
appellant, on 19 July 1994, in their rented room in Barangay Obrero, Quezon City. Her story was
made even more credible by the simplicity and candidness of her answers, as well as by the fact that
it came from an innocent girl writhing in emotional and moral shock and anguish. She must have
been torn between the desire to seek justice and the fear that a revelation of her ordeal might mean
the imposition of capital punishment on her father. By testifying in court, she made public a painful
and humiliating secret, which others may have simply kept to themselves for the rest of their lives.
She thereby jeopardized her chances of marriage, as even a compassionate man may be reluctant
to marry her because her traumatic experience may be a psychological and emotional impediment to
a blissful union. Moreover, such a revelation divided her family and brought it shame and humiliation.
If EDEN did testify regardless of these consequences and even allowed the examination of her
private parts, she did so inspired by no other motive than to obtain justice and release from the
psychological and emotional burdens the painful experience had foisted upon her. It was then
improbable that EDEN fabricated a story of defloration and falsely charged her own father with a
heinous crime.
What appellant claims to be improbabilities in the testimony of EDEN are more apparent than real.
The presence of her sisters in the small room did not at all make impossible the commission of rape.
The evil in man has no conscience. The beast in him bears no respect for time and place; it drives
him to commit rape anywhere even in places where people congregate such as in parks, along
the roadside, within school premises, and inside a house where there are other
occupants. 50 In People v. Opena, 51 rape was committed in a room occupied also by other persons. In the
instant case, EDEN''s other companions in the room when she was molested by appellant were young
girls who were all asleep.
That EDEN was unable to resist or shout for help can easily be explained by the fact that appellant
threatened to kill her. Whether or not he was armed was of no moment. That threat alone coming
from her father, a person who wielded such moral ascendancy, was enough render her incapable of
resisting or asking for help.
Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed
to the victim's and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. It is enough that the intimidation produced fear
fear that if the victim did not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something far worse
would happen to her at that moment. Where such intimidation existed and the victim was cowed into
submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be the height of
unreasonableness to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would
nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering none at all does not mean consent to the
assault so as to make the victim's submission to the sexual act voluntary. 52
In any event, in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, as in this case, the former's
moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. 53 Likewise, it
must not be forgotten that at her tender age of 14 years, EDEN could not be expected to act with the
equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel, or to act like a mature and experienced woman who

would know what to do under the circumstances, or to have courage and intelligence to disregard the
threat. 54 Even in cases of rape of mature women, this Court recognized their different and unpredictable
reactions. Some may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility; while others
may openly welcome the intrusion. 55

Neither does the fact that EDEN continued to live with appellant in same rented room disprove the
rape. While she was hurt physically, psychologically and emotionally, yet the thought must have
been irresistible and compelling that her assailant was her own father, who was both a father and
mother to her since her mother was in Saudi Arabia and who provided her with the daily wherewithal
to keep her alive. Besides, a less harsh life outside was uncertain. Instances are not few when
daughters raped by their fathers stayed with the latter and kept in the deepest recesses of their
hearts the evil deed even if the memory thereof haunted them forever.
Nor is there merit in the insistent claim that EDEN's affidavit of desistance "must have necessarily
contradicted her previous testimony." We have earlier quoted in full this affidavit of desistance.
Plainly, nowhere therein did she retract her previous testimony or claim that she was raped by her
father. In any case, EDEN withdrew her affidavit of desistance and solemnly declared that she was
pressured by her mother and sister to sign it. Moreover, affidavits, being taken ex parte, are
generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court; 56 and affidavits of recantation have
been invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice
simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule
would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. 57
This Court has no doubt that appellant is guilty as charged. The penalty therefor is death under the
first circumstance mentioned in Article 335(7) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, which provides, in part, as follows:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
This law may be difficult to accept for those who believe that the verdict of death for a sin or crime is
God's exclusive prerogative. But the fundamental law of the land allows Congress, for compelling
reasons, to impose capital punishment in cases of heinous crimes, 58 hence the passage of R.A. No.
7659. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so
the law is written and the Court is duty-bound to apply it in this case.
To the appellant who inflicted his animal greed on his daughter in a disgusting coercion of incestuous
lust, thereby forsaking that which is highest and noblest in his human nature and reducing himself to
lower than the lowliest animal, the full force of the law must be weighed against him, for he deserves
no place in society. All that we concede to him is a modification of the award of "P75,000.00 as
damages," which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with current case law.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59149 finding accused-appellant EDUARDO
AGBAYANI y MENDOZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape defined
and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and
imposing upon him the penalty of DEATH, subject to the above modification as to the amount of
indemnity.
Two Justices voted to impose upon the accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Upon finality of this Decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of this case, be
forwarded without delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency
pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.