Republic

SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989
ZAIDA
G.
RARO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
and
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of
Mines and Geo-Sciences), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late
become a source of confusion among the claimants and the
government agencies enforcing the employees' compensation law.
The strongly lingering influence of the principles of 94 presumption
of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the defunct
Workmen's Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the
present compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency
in employees' compensation decisions.
The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the
new principle of "proof of increased risk." There are two
approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that
the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational
disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions. The
one espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot
prove the necessary work connection because the causes of the
disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the
other hand, the respondents state that if there is no proof of the
required work connection, the disease is not compensable because
the law says so.

The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when

employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at
its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17, 1975. About
four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent
headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick
leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in
Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.
The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be
suffering from brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of
time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost.
A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A
motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the
Employees'
Compensation
Commission
resulted
in
the
Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.
The following issues are raised in this petition:
1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown
but contracted during employment is compensable
under the present compensation laws.
2. Whether the presumption of compensability is
absolutely
inapplicable
under
the
present
compensation laws when a disease is not listed as
occupational disease. (p. 17, Rollo)
The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that
medical science cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of
various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes people in
general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no
relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid
executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of
the earth. It makes the difference whether the victim is employed
or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a
housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.

It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable.
The list of occupational diseases prepared by the Commission
includes some cancers as compensable, namely
Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment
xxx xxx xxx xxx
16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers,
wood products lymphatic and blood forming
vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity and
sinuses and employees in pulp and paper mills and
plywood mills.
17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride
workers, and brain plastic workers.
(Annex A, Amended
Compensation)

Rules

on

Employees

The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness

in the Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic
workers to be compensated for brain cancer. There are certain
cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by
specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR,
cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain
chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others,
are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting
specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.
The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law
itself.
Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the
Philippines defines "sickness" as follows:
ART. 167. Definition of Terms. As used in this
Title unless the context indicates otherwise:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted
as an occupational disease listed by the
Commission, or any illness caused by employment
subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is by working conditions. For
this purpose, the Co on is empowered to determine
and approve occupational and work- related
illnesses that may be considered compensable
sable based on hazards of employment. (PD 1368,
May 1, 1978).
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation clearly defines who are entitled. It provides:
SECTION 1.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease under Annex A of
these rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the
risk of contracting the disease is increase by the
working conditions. (Emphasis supplied)
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive
thing the illness was caused by employment and the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To
say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund
has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that
proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent
proof cannot be presumed .
In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No.
46684, April 27, 1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is
a disease of still unknown origin which strikes; people in all walks

of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a

particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions
(e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we
cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the
risk of contracting the disease .
To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together
with the host of decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in the
course of employment" provision of the defunct law has been
stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions
between the old workmen's compensation law and the present
scheme.
On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was
replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor Code. The new
law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of
compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based
on social security principles. The present system is also
administered by social insurance agencies the Government
Service Insurance System and Social Security System under the
Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a
sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay
workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive
reparation for work- connected death or disability. (Sulit v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980];
Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851
[1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA
192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission,
142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, et al., GR No. 65680, May 11, 1988).
Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family
against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme
where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and
claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove
entitlement.
In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we
affirmed the validity of the new law by explaining the present
system as follows:

We cannot give serious consideration to the

petitioner's attack against the constitutionality of
the new law on employee's compensation. It must
be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under
the provisions of this same law. It was only when
his claim was rejected that he now questions the
constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari.
The Court has recognized the validity of the
present law and has granted and rejected claims
according to its provisions. We find in it no
infringement of the worker's constitutional rights.
xxx xxx xxx
The new law establishes a state insurance fund
built up by the contributions of employers based on
the salaries of their employees. The injured worker
does not have to litigate his right to compensation.
No employer opposes his claim There is no notice
of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick
worker simply files a claim with a new neutral
Employees' Compensation Commission which then
determines on the basis of the employee's
supporting papers and medical evidence whether
or not compensation may be paid. The payment of
benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration
is low. The amount of death benefits has also been
doubled.
On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to
pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme.
It does not look for insurance companies to meet
sudden demands for compensation payments or
set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It
does not have to defend itself from spuriously
documented or long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in
the handling of workmen's compensation. The

Commission administers and settles claims from a

fired under its exclusive control. The employer
does not intervene in the compensation process
and it has no control, as in the past, over payment
of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational
Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered
claimant suffering from an occupational disease is
automatically paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a
claim for compensation, the rules on presumption
of compensability and controversion cease to have
importance. The lopsided situation of an employer
versus one employee, which called for equalization
through the various rules and concepts favoring
the claimant, is now absent.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner's challenge is really against the
desirability of the new law. There is no serious
attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.
The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's
compensation is a matter that should be addressed
to the President and Congress, not to this Court.
Whether
or
not
the
former
workmen's
compensation program with its presumptions,
controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels
of payment is preferable to the present scheme
must be decided by the political departments. The
present law was enacted in the belief that it better
complies with the mandate on social justice and is
more advantageous to the greater number of
working men and women. Until Congress and the
President decide to improve or amend the law, our
duty is to apply it. (at pp. 4, 5, and 6)
The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation
proceedings is crucial to an understanding of the present scheme.

There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still

arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate
employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable
presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the
employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are
not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees in
trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the
problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not
caused by employment. It is a government institution which
protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund
against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee,
this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove
a positive proposition,
that
the
risk
of
contracting
the
is increased by working conditions.
The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other
important feature which distinguishes it from the old and familiar
system.
Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All
covered employers throughout the country are required by law to
contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust
fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At
the time the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial
studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of
workers who would probably file claims within any given year is
important in insuring the stability of the said fund and making
certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are
entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law.
We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not
intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or
recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is
endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered
by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust
fund to winch the tens of millions of workers and their families look
for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths
occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or premiums
must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now
excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper

actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on

such a complex subject with such far reaching implications.
We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security
System are continually evaluating the actuarial soundness of the
trust funds they administer. In this way, more types of cancers and
other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered
occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to
Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers,
increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to prove
entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this
Court to accomplish.
For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising
lawyers concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the
decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission [128
SCRA 473 (1984)];Mercado v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and
other cases with conclusions different from those stated above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned
decision of the public respondents is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26341

November 27, 1968

ILOILO
DOCK
&
ENGINEERING
CO., petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M.
PABLO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children
EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed PABLO, respondents.
Luisito
C.
Hofilena
for
petitioner.
Villavieja and Villanueva for respondent Workmen's Compensation
Commission.
Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor
children.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company
(hereinafter referred to as the IDECO) from the decision dated
February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission
(hereinafter referred to as the Commission) affirming the decision

of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to
pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo
and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the
sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for
burial expenses and P300 as attorney's fees, and to pay to the
Commission the amount of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.
At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo,
who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on
his way home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters
away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly
called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard
to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime
was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he
could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's
companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like
Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going
home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was
killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and
two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The
entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record.
According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that
Pablo's death occurred in the course of employment and in
presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applying the
"proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was
an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation
Act.
The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the
meaning and intendment of that "deceptively simple and litigiously
prolific",1 phrase The two components of the coverage formula
"arising out of" and "in the course of employment." 2 The two
components of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the
course of employment" are said to be separate tests which must
be independently satisfied;3 however, it should not be forgotten
that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not
dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection,"
because an uncompromising insistence on an independent
application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain
cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries.4 The words "arising
out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are

descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer
to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident
takes place.5
As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to
arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the
period of the employment, at a place where the employee
reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is
engaged in doing something incidental thereto.6
The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the
"going & coming rule," simply stated, is that "in the absence of
special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming
from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's
compensation acts."7 This rule, however, admits of four wellrecognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is
proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer; (2)
where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the
premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary
means of ingress and egress; (3) where the employee is charged,
while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his
home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand
connected with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as
an incident of the employment, provides the means of
transportation to and from the place of employment.8
We address ourselves particularly to an examination and
consideration of the second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off
the premises of the employer, but while using a customary means
of ingress and egress.
This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied
in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9There, the
employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of
work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch
fronting the main gate of the employer's factory, as a result of
which he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not
the accident which caused the employee's death arose out of and
in the course of his employment. This Court ruled in favor of the
claimant thus:

The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co.

invoked by the petitioner intimated that "we do not of
course mean to imply that an employee can never recover
for injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That
depends on the nature of his employment." Considering
the facts found by the Commission, namely, that the
deceased Angel Ariar was not under any shift routine; that
his assignment covered the entire working hours of the
factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in
the morning; that it takes at least thirty minutes before the
machine operates at full speed or load; that the spot where
he fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its
premises), is immediately proximate to his place of work,
the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred
within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out
of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular Lumber
Co., G.R. No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the
Comments on the Workmen's Compensation Commission
Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was
allowed for injury received by a laborer from an accident in
going to his place of work, along a path or way owned by
his employer and commonly used by the latter's laborers.
In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs.
Quiroz,10 which concerned injuries sustained by a centrifugal
operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958)
and was dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon "after he
stepped out of the company gate, and while standing about 2-
meters from it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad
that came from inside the compound and intersected the highway,
waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as a result
of which he sustained" injuries. In holding that these injuries were
"not produced by an accident "arising out of and in the course of
employment," " this Court reasoned thus:
The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee
proceeding to or coming from his work depends upon
whether or not it is "work-connected." As Chief Justice
Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the
employee is travelling to or from work on a public highway
does not necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau vs.
Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is not
enough to say that the employee would not have been on

the public highway had it not been for his job, since the
same can usually be said of the general public (Payne &
Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in
effect, insures the employee against losses arising from
the perils of his work. In other words, the Workmen's
Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as
such, must have a causative connection with something,
not merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the
employment. In order to warrant recovery for off-thepremises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a
very special danger, some particular risk which the
employer could have caused or allowed to exist. Hence,
It is significant that practically all successful offthe-premises cases have involved normal route of
access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to
the premises and therefore identified with the
premises in the sense that the employer should
have removed the ice. (Emphasis ours.)
It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil,
G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30, 1956), we held the employer
liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he
was running to his place of work to avoid the rain,
slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main
gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself
an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the
gate, the employer should have taken measures to
remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a
special way, to the occurrence of the accident.
In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to
exist. There is no particular causative connection between
the injury sustained by the employee and either his work or
his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed
from, the record does not show that the company "had
taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the
employees," neither does the record show either that the
accident occurred at the usual waiting place of the
employees, or that said place was particularlyunsafe.
Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in
origin and text, it is not amiss to pay deference to pertinent

American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law here involved,

we can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and State
precedents.
From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's
Compensation Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following
observations:
Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to
work or on the way home from work. Injuries going to or
from work have caused many judicial upheavals.
The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in
the course of" and not "out of" the employment. How the
injury occurred is not in point. Street risks, whether the
employee was walking or driving, and all other similar
questions deal with the risk of injury or "out of" the
employment. "In the course of" deals mainly with the
element of time and space, or "time, place and
circumstances."
Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working
hours and within one hundred feet of the employer's
premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the question of "in
the course of" the employment is flatly raised.
Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in
the course of" to include these injuries. Most of the states
will protect the employee from the moment his foot or
person reaches the employer's premises, whether he
arrives early or late. These states find something sacred
about the employment premises and define "premises"
very broadly, not only to include premises owned by the
employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or used
by him, even private alleyways merely used by the
employer. Adjacent private premises are protected by
many states, and a few protect the employee even on
adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any
employer owns or controls an island, all its streets are
protected premises.

There is no reason in principle why states should not

protect employees for a reasonable period of time prior to
or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before
reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The
Supreme Court of the United States has declared that it will
not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the scope
of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad
tracks adjacent to his employer's brick-making premises
(but shown by his superintendent the specific short
crossing over the track), and killed by a train, was held to
be in the course of his employment when hit by an
oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day would have
begun. So long as causal relation to the employment is
discernible, no federal question arises.
The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his
employment until he crosses the employment threshold is
itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to
or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are
compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from
work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer,
whether in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or
private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at
all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is
travelling for the employer, i.e., travelling workers; (4) if
the employer pays for the employee's time from the
moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the
employee is on his way to do further work at home, even
though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is
required to bring his automobile to his place of business for
use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally
justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances.
Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:
The proximity rule exception to the general going and
coming rule is that an employee is generally considered to
be in the course of his employment while coming to or
going from his work, when, though off the actual premises
of his employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is
proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by
reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary,
convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress either

on land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent

property with the express or implied consent of the
employer.
On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition:
The compensation acts have been very generally held not
to authorize an award in case of an injury or death from a
peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the
public at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they do not
as a general rule cover injuries received while going to or
from work on public streets, where the employee has not
reached, or has left the employer's premises. The question
whether an injury arises out of and in the course of the
employment, however, is one dependent upon the facts of
each case, and in some cases, where an injury occured
while the employee was going to or from work, but was in
the street in front of the employer's premises, it has been
held compensable.
Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria
Co., ante, 85) the injury was held to have arisen out of and
in the course of the employment, where the employee
slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately in front of the
employer's place of business, while on her way to report
for duty, and just before entering by the only entrance to
her place of employment. The court here recognized the
general rule that, if an employee is injured while going to
or from his work to his house, or to or from some point not
visited for the discharge of a duty arising out of the
employment, or while in the use of a public highway, he
does not come within the protection of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, but stated that there is an exception to
this rule and that the employment is not limited by the
actual time when the workman reaches the scene of his
labor and begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a
reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he
is at or near his place of employment. The court reasoned
that in the case at bar, although the employee had not
entered the employer's place of business, and the sidewalk
was a public highway so much therefore as was in front of
the employer's place of business was a necessary adjunct,
used in connection with the business, and that the

sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a part of the

employer's premises.
In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373,
159 NE 363, the injury was held to have arisen in the
course of the employment where an employee, about five
minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty, was
struck by an automobile owned and driven by another
employee, within a short distance from the employer's
plant, which was located at the dead end of a street
maintained by the employer from its plant to the
intersection with another street, and, although the street
was a public one, it led nowhere except to the employer's
plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it in
going to and from their work. The court stated that where
the conditions under the control of an industrial plant are
such that the employee has no option but to pursue a
given course with reference to such conditions and
environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied
obligation of the employer in his contract with such
employee, and that when he, for the purpose of entering
his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone
controlled by his employer and is pursuing a course with
reference to which he has no option, he is then not only
within the conditions and environments of the plant of his
employer, but is then in the course of his employment; and
that, when he receives an injury attributable to such
conditions and environments, there is a direct causal
connection between his employment and his injury, and
the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for
which compensation has been provided by the Workmen's
Compensation Law.
99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:
It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and
coming" rule, that, in the absence of special
circumstances,
and
except
in
certain
unusual
circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or
injury sustained by an employee while going to or from his
work is not compensable. Such injury, or accident, is
regarded by the weight of authority of many courts as not

arising out of his employment, and as not being, or not

occurring, in the course thereof.

Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises

rule exceptions:

However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable

application, and is subject to qualifications, and to
exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances,
and conditions of the particular employment, the
circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the
injury.

We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to

the premises rule: it is not nearness, or reasonable
distance, or even the identifying or surrounding areas with
the premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied
itself that there is a distinct "arising out of" or causal
connection between the conditions under which claimant
must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence
of the injury, it may hold that the course of employment
extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's
Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210211)

Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with enlightening clarity the

rationale for extending the scope of "course of employment" to
certain "off-premises" injuries:
We are urged here to again recognize and apply the
distinction between off-premises injuries which occur on
private property and those which occur on public streets
and highways. The extension of the course of employment
to off-premises injuries is not based upon the principle
which would justify a distinction upon the narrow ground of
private and public property; it is not sound to say that
while an employee is on public highway he is always there
as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of
any right conferred by his contract to employment; nor is it
a complete answer to say that while he is on his
employer's premises his presence there is by contract
right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of
whether or not one is a covered employee should not be
resolved by the application of the law relating to rights to
enter upon lands, or by law of trespass, licensee, invitee or
otherwise.
A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the
course of employment beyond the premises of the
employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks and
hazards associated with the employment. These risks may
or may not be on the premises of the employer and for this
reason there is no justification to distinguish between
extended risks on public highways and private pathways.
In fact it is at most a distinction without a difference. Under
the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or
private is obviously of no moment or in any event in and of
itself is not conclusive.

We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death:

assault.
An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer,
is considered an "accident" within the meaning of sec. 2 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, since the word "accident" is
intended to indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be casual
or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally
responsible."12
In the cases where the assault was proven to have been workconnected, compensation was awarded. InNava, supra, the
helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the ship's cable and in
coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the
passengers. This passenger, upon being asked, declared his
ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing it
out of the way and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the
passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a piece
of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this point, the
passenger's brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The
death was adjudged compensable.
In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck
which Mandaguit was driving collided with a cyclist going in the
opposite direction. The latter turned around and immediately
pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes later when it
stopped to take on passengers. The driver then disembarked from

the bus to wash his hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist

followed him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant
of compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and
in the course of employment.
In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to
work in lieu of another employee who had been suspended from
work upon request of his labor union; while Carla was working, the
suspended employee asked him to intercede for him, but Carla
refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended
employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was held
compensable because "the injury sustained by the deceased was
caused by an accident arising out of his employment since the
evidence is clear that the fight which resulted in the killing of the
deceased had its origin or cause in the fact that he was placed in
the job previously occupied by the assailant."
In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the
motive of the assailant.
In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver
who, while driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger,
was held compensable by the Commission. However, the question
of whether the assault arose out of the employment, was not
raised on appeal to this Court.
In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that
question was raised. While the employee-driver was driving a bus,
a passenger boarded it and sat directly behind the driver. After
about thirty minutes, during which the passenger and the driver
never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger shot the driver
to death and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the
cause of the assault, although there were intimations that the
incident arose from a personal grudge. The majority
decision17 ruled the death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is
proved that the employee died in the course of the employment,
the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence to
the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the
compensation law" (sec. 43), in other words, that the
incident arose out of the workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to
rights to compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and
his dependents. (3) The Commissioner's declaration on the workconnection might be binding on the Court. (4) There are

employments which increase the risk of assault on the person of

the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm
sustained by the assaulted worker arises out of the employment,
because the increased risk to assault supplies the link or
connection between the injury and the employment. Among the
jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs
having to do with keeping the peace or guarding property; (b) jobs
having to do with keeping or carrying of money which subject to
the employee to the risk of assault because of the increased
temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the employee to
direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the
community, like that of a bartender; and (d) work as bus driver,
taxi driver or street car conductor.
It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of
assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute
leading to the assault. The first kind of employment, the so-called
"increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving dangerous
duties, such as that of guarding the employer's property, that of
carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to
lawless or irresponsible members of the public, or that which
subjects him to increased or indiscriminate contact with the public,
such as the job of a street car conductor or taxi-driver; 18 (2) jobs
where the employee is placed in a dangerous environment; 19 and
(3) jobs of employees whose work takes them on the highway. On
the other hand, the employment itself may be the subject-matter
of a dispute leading to the assault as where a supervisor is
assaulted by workmen he has fired, or where the argument was
over the performance of work or possession of tools or the like, or
where the violence was due to labor disputes.20
In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was
considered to have arisen out of the employment because it
occurred in the course of employment. This Court relied on the
presumption of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a
claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the
Act.21 According to this Court, "this statutory presumption was
copied from New York." Concerning the corresponding New York
provision of law, Larson has this to say:
In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts,
a statutory presumption in favor of coverage has figured in

unexplained-accident cases. The Massachusetts statute

provides:

We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New

York in Daus vs. Gunderman & Sons:22

In any claim for compensation, where the

employee has been killed, or is physically or
mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in
the absence of substantial evidence to the
contrary, that the claim comes within the
provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of
the injury has been given, and that the injury or
death was not occasioned by the wilful intention of
the employee to injure or kill himself or another.

The statute is not intended to relieve completely an

employee from the burden of showing that accidental
injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the
course of his employment. "It is not the law that mere
proof of an accident, without other evidence, creates the
presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's
Compensation Law (Consol. Law, c. 67) that the accident
arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the
contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and
indirectly, that there must be some evidence from which
the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out
of and in the course of the employment." Proof of the
accident will give rise to the statutory presumption only
where some connection appears between the accident and
the employment.

This provision was largely copied from the New York section
on presumptions, except that the New York act creates the
presumption in all cases, not merely those involving an
employee's death or inability to testify.
The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at
first glance to mean that the mere making of a claim is also
the making of a prima facie case, as long as death or injury
is shown to have occurred. The New York and
Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted these
statutes, however. It seems to be necessary to establish
some kind of preliminary link with the employment before
the presumption can attach. Otherwise, the claimant
widow would have merely to say, "My husband, who was
one of your employee, has died, and I therefore claim
death benefits," whereupon the affirmative burden would
devolve upon the employer to prove that there was no
connection between the death and the environment.
It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of
employment-connection will give the presumption a
foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which
claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in the
course of employment nor that it arose out of it, as where
he contracted a disease but has no evidence to show
where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury occurred
in the course of employment, the presumption will usually
supply the "arising-out-of-employment" factor." Larson's
Workmen Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124.

Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:

The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and
in the course of employment," was opened with the
suggestion that, while "course" and "arising" were put
under separate headings for convenience, some interplay
between the two factors should be observed in the various
categories discussed.
A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two
tests, in practice, have not been kept in air-tight
compartments, but have to some extent merged into a
single concept of work-connection. One is almost tempted
to formulate a sort of quantum theory of work-connection:
that a certain minimum quantum of work-connection must
be shown, and if the "course" quantity is very small, but
the "arising" quantity is large, the quantum will add up to
the necessary minimum, as it will also when the "arising"
quantity is very small but the "course" quantity is relatively
large.
But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small,
the minimum quantum will not be met.

As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but

weak "course" factor, one may cite the cases in which
recoveries have been allowed off the employment
premises, outside business hours, when an employee going
to or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly
traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam
overflowing from the employment premises, or a rock
flying through the air from a blast on the premises. Here,
by normal course of employment standards, there would
be no award, since the employee was not on the premises
while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of
the causal relation of the injury to the employment has
been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the
"course" factor. Another example of the same kind of
balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with
injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels
or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases
that, although the "course" factor is on the borderline when
the employee is sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong
causal relation of the injury to the conditions of
employment as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a
straw falls into the bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the
mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a burning
hotel will boost the case over the line to success; while a
weak causal connection, as where the salesman merely
slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak "course" factor
due to the absence of any direct service performed for the
employer at the time, will under present decisions add up
to a quantum of work-connection too small to support an
award. It was also shown that when the "course" element
is strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all
times on call, the range of compensable sources of injury is
broader than when the employee, although living on the
premises is not on call.
A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the
holding that a borderline course-of-employment activity
like seeking personal comfort or going to and from work
falls short of compensability if the method adopted is
unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no such
restriction applies to the direct performance of the work.

As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course"

element and a weak "arising" element; one may recall the
"positional" cases discussed in section 10, as well as the
unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases. Here the
course of employment test is satisfied beyond the slightest
doubt: the employee is in the midst of performing the
active duties of his job. But the causal connection is very
weak, since the source of the injury whether a stray
bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or death,
or a mistaken assault by a stranger is not distinctly
associated with employment conditions as such, and is tied
to the employment only by the argument that the injury
would not have occurred to this employee but for the
obligation of the employment which placed him in the
position to be hurt. Yet, since the "course" element is so
strong, awards are becoming increasingly common on
these facts.
Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea
forms a useful yardstick for measuring just how generous a
court has become in expanding compensation coverage;
for if a court makes an award when a case, by the above
standards, is weak both on course of employment and on
causal connection, one can conclude that the court is
capable of giving the act a broad construction. Thus, an
award was made in Puffin v. General Electric, where the
course element was weak (rest period) and the causal
element was weak (setting fire to own sweater while
smoking). Both factors were likewise very weak in O'Leary
v. Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of
employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted
by a rescue of a stranger, and the arising factor consisted
of drowning in a channel where decedent was prohibited
from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of
employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in the
morning) and the causal factor was also weak (an
unexplained fall); yet an award was made in New York.
But another New York case shows that the simultaneous
weakness of course and arising factors may reach the point
where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz v.
Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an
employee who while combing her hair preparatory to going

to lunch negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here we

see thinness on all fronts: as to course of employment time
factor, we have a lunch period; as to the course of
employment activity factor, we have care of personal
appearance; and as to the causal factor, we have
negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing
alone lunch period, care of appearance, negligence
would not be fatal; there are many awards in which one or
another of these is present. But when all are present, while
an award is not impossible and could be defended on a
point by point basis, it cannot be relied upon in most
jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer. Larson's Workmen's
Compensation Law 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to 452.100.
In resume:
1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result
from an accident which arise out of and in the course of
employment.
2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be
present. If one factor is weak and the other is strong, the
injury is compensable, but not where both factors are
weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is
work-connected.
3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same
is presumed to come within the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must
first be shown to exist between the injury and the
employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of
employment, it is presumed to havearisen out of the
employment.
4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and
circumstances. This factor is present if the injury takes
place within the period of employment, at a place where
the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or
is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee

goes to or comes from his place of work, is not of the
employment.
6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the
employee's premises, but while in close proximity thereto
and while using a customary means of ingress and egress.
The reason for extending the scope of "course of
employment" to off-premises injuries is that there is a
causal connection between the work and the hazard.
7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The
employment may either increase risk of assault because of
its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to
the assault.
From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the
case at bar, having in mind always that no cover-all formula can be
spelled out with specificity, that the particular facts and
circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and that in any
perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the line should be
drawn beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue
has been held to be usually one of fact.
We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road
where Pablo was killed. In granting compensation, the Commission
said that "the road where the deceased was shot was of private
ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led straight to the main
IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it
belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even
if the ownership of the road were open to question, there was no
doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the
respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an extent
as to make it to all intents and purposes an extension of its
premises," so that the "shooting of the deceased may be
considered to have taken place on the premises, and therefore
within the employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its
name to be used in connection with the private road for the ingress
and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the
necessary precaution to make it safe for its employees by
employing security guards."

But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum

filed with the Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablo's death did
not originate from his work as to time, place and circumstances.
This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the road. The decision of
the Regional Office does not state that the road belongs to the
IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes
after he was dismissed from work and while walking along the
IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate." In its "motion
for reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that
"the place where the incident happened was a public road, not less
than twenty (20) meters away from the main gate of the
compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate
vicinity of the place of work." Again, the ownership of the road was
implicitly denied. And in its "motion for reconsideration and/or
appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright
that the "road where the incident took place, although of private
ownership, does not belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no
evidence on record that shows IDECO owns the road." If the road
were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no question that
the assault arose "in the course of employment."23 But if it did
indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and
place its main gate at the other end of the road where it meets the
public highway.
But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be
denied that it was using the same as the principal means of ingress
and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate. 24 Its
right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an
easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a
legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should
logically and properly be charged with security control of the road.
The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its premises. In
compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not
only that road was properly paved and did not have holes or
ditches, but should also have instituted measures for the proper
policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo was shot
was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate,
certainly nearer than a stone's throw therefrom. The spot is
immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises. Considering this
fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just finished overtime
work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal
from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say,
as we did in Ampil, that the place where the employee was injured
being "immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in

question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his

employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof."
Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in
the course of employment. We find that it was, and so conclude
that the assault arose out of the employment, even though the
said assault is unexplained.
American jurisprudence supports this view.
In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled:
Employment includes both only the actual doing of the
work, but a reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to and from the place
where the work is to be done. If the employee to be injured
while passing, with the express or implied consent of the
employer, to or from his work by a way over the
employer's premises, or over those of another in such
proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of
the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of
and in the course of employment as much as though it had
happened while the employee was engaged in his work at
the place of its performance. In other words, the
employment may begin in point of time before the work is
entered upon and in point of space before the place where
the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general
rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee
reaches the entrance to the employer's premises where
the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases
the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the
employee as a means of ingress and egress with the
express or implied consent of the employer.
The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from
dismissal and twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in
passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees
used the private road with its consent, express or implied. Twenty
meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the
IDECO's premises. It follows that Pablo's death was in the course of
employment.

In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision

extension of coverage to employees from the time they reach the
employer's premises until they depart therefrom and that hours of
service include a period when this might be accomplished within a
reasonable interval;" and that "under exceptional circumstances, a
continuance of the course of employment may be extended by
allowing the employee a reasonable time not only to enter or leave
the premises but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent
thereto."
The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this
description, it would appear that the road is a dead-end street.
In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales,27 it was held that, where the
employee, while returning to work at the end of the lunch period,
fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the
employer's premises and one other located thereon, and the
general public used the street only in connection with those
premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk,
the sidewalk was within the precincts of employment. In that case
there were even two business establishments on the dead-end
street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO premises which appear to
be at the end of the private road.
We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement
of the obligation of the employer to its employees: "That the
employer owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe passage' to an
employee to the point where he can reach the proper arrival or
departure from his work seems without question."
We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance
Company:29
The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an
injury received by an employee while using the public
streets and highways in going to or returning from the
place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of
the rule being that in most instances such an injury is
suffered as a consequence of risk and hazards to which all
members of the travelling public are subject rather than
risk and hazards having to do with and originating in the
work or business of the employer....

Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in

the so-called "access" cases. In these cases a workman
who has been injured at a plane intended by the employer
for use as a means of ingress or egress to and from the
actual place of the employee's work has been held to be in
the course of his employment. The courts have said that
these access areas are so closely related to the employer's
premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's
premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities dealing
with this exception to the general rule.
The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access"
exception, and one which we think is controlling of this
appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112
Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the
employee was employed by Hartburg Lumber Company,
which company operated and owned a sawmill in Hartburg,
Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the
employer's facilities. A railroad track ran through the town
and a part of the lumber company's facilities was situated
on either side of the right-of-way. A public road ran parallel
to the railroad tracks which led to the various buildings on
the property of the lumber company. This crossing was
used by any member of the public desiring to go to any
part of the lumber company facilities. On the day in
question the decedent quit work at noon, went home for
lunch and while returning to the lumber company plant for
the purpose of resuming his employment, was struck and
killed by a train at the crossing in question. The insurance
company contended (as it does here) that the decedent's
death did not originate in the work or business of his
employer and that at the time of his fatal injuries he was
not in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of
his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion,
reviewed the authorities from other states and especially
Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and
arrived at the conclusion that the injury and death under
such circumstances were compensable under the Texas
Act. The court held that the railroad crossing bore so
intimate a relation to the lumber company's premises that
it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a part of the
premises. The Court pointed out that the lumber company
had rights in and to the crossing which was used in
connection with the lumber company's business, whether

by employees or by members of the public. In announcing

the "access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said:
Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance
of the affairs or business of his employer when he
received the injury causing his death? He was upon
the crossing provided as the means of access to his
work solely because he was an employee. He
encountered the dangers incident to use of the
crossing in order that he might perform the duties
imposed by his contract of service. Without
subjecting himself to such dangers he could not do
what was required of him in the conduct of the
lumber company's business. He had reached a
place provided and used only as an adjunct to that
business, and was injured from a risk created by
the conditions under which the business was
carried on. To hold that he was not acting in
furtherance of the affairs or business of the lumber
company would be to give a strict interpretation to
this remedial statute, which should be liberally
construed with a view to accomplish its purpose
and to promote justice.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App.,

125 S. W. 2d 674, wr. ref., this court followed the rule
announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the employee
was killed while crossing the railroad track near his place of
employment. In discussing the question of the situs of the
injury Justice Looney said:
Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his
place of work not only conduced his safety and
convenience, but contributed to the promptness
and efficiency with which he was enabled to
discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the
reason and necessity for his presence upon the
railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading
over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our
opinion, had to do with, originated in and grew out
of the work of the employer; and that, the injury

received at the time, place and under the

circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of
the affairs or business of the employer.
Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ.
App. 53 S. W. 2d 327, err. ref., this court had occasion to
follow the "access" doctrine. In that case Chief Justice Jones
quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Bountiful Brisk Company, et al. v. Giles, 276 U.S.
154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as
follows:
An employment includes not only the actual doing
of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and
space necessary to be used in passing to and from
the place where the work is to be done. If the
employee be injured while passing, with the
express or implied consent of the employer, to or
from his work by a way over the employer's
premises, or over those of another in such
proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a
part of the employer's premises, the injury is one
arising out of and in the course of the employment
as much as though it had happened while the
employee was engaged in his work at the place of
its performance. In other words, the employment
may begin in point of time before the work is
entered upon and in point of space before the
place where the work is to be done is reached.
The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That
part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to
the employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related
to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the
employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a
relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of
entering the IDECO premises, either for the public or for its
employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business.
It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of
easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the
road as a means of access to his work solely because he was an
employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep
the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that

the employees might encounter therein, one of these dangers

being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper
security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO
is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.
As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The
murderer was himself killed before he could be brought to trial. It is
true there is authority for the statement that before the "proximity"
rule may be applied it must first be shown that there is a causal
connection between the employment and the hazard which
resulted in the injury.30 The following more modern view was
expressed in Lewis Wood Preserving Company vs. Jones:31
While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the
causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not
common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise out of
and in the course of the employment (see Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121];
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App.
420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been somewhat more
liberal, saying that, "to be compensable, injuries do not
have to arise from something peculiar to the employment."
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260,
262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where the duties of an
employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the
claim for an injury there occurring is not to be barred
because it results from a risk common to all others ...
unless it is also common to the general public without
regard to such conditions, and independently of place,
employment, or pursuit." New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v.
Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe
Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46,
47; McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App.
826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.
But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer
should still be held liable in view of our conclusion that that portion
of the road where Pablo was killed, because of its proximity, should
be considered part of the IDECO's premises. Hence, the injury was
in the course of employment, and there automatically arises the
presumption invoked in Rivera that the injury by assault arose
out of the employment, i. e., there is a causal relation between the
assault and the employment.

We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after

dismissal from overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the
employer's main gate, bring Pablo's death within the scope of
the course factor. But it may logically be asked: Suppose it were
three minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after
and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In
answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision in Jean vs.
Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising
from an ingenious hypothetical question put forth by the defendant
therein:
We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us"
and utilize the old saw, "that which is not before us we do
not decide." Instead, we prefer to utilize the considerably
older law: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof"
(Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this admonition: no
statute is static; it must remain constantly viable to meet
new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case
should not be suppressed because of a conjectural posture
which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided
in the light of then existing law.
Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is
legislation designed to afford relief to workmen,
construed
to
attain
the
purpose
for
enacted.32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the
Pablo's death. The Commission did not
compensation.
ACCORDINGLY, the
petitioner's cost.

decision

appealed

from

basically a social
it must be liberally
which
it
was
Act comprehends
err in granting

is

affirmed,

at

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando

and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., reserves his vote. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME
Manila

COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990

MANUEL
BELARMINO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
and
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death
of a lady school teacher which the public respondents disallowed
on the ground that the cause of death was not work-connected.

Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania

Belarmino, was a classroom teacher of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports assigned at the Buracan Elementary
School in Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had been a
classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for eleven (11) years.
Her husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher.
On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while
performing her duties as a classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who
was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on
the classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal
pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she continued to
suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in
her stomach, but, heedless of the advice of her female co-teachers
to take a leave of absence, she continued to report to the school
because there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven
(11) days after her accident, she went into labor and prematurely
delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo).
Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery,
accompanied by high fever and headache. She was brought to the
Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on February 11, 1982. Dr.
Alfonso Alino found that she was suffering from septicemia post
partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was
discharged from the hospital after five (5) days on February 16,
1982, apparently recovered but she died three (3) days later. The
cause of death was septicemia post partum. She was 33 years old,
survived by her husband and four (4) children, the oldest of whom
was 11 years old and the youngest, her newborn infant (p.
9, Rollo).
On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her
husband. On February 14, 1984, it was denied by the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) which held that 'septicemia post
partum the cause of death, is not an occupational disease, and
neither was there any showing that aforesaid ailment was
contracted by reason of her employment. . . . The alleged accident
mentioned could not have precipitated the death of the wife but
rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds as a
result of her delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo).

On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter

issued Resolution No. 3913 dated July 8, 1988 holding:
We agree with the decision of the system, hence
we dismiss this appeal. Postpartum septicemia is
an acute infectious disease of the puerperium
resulting from the entrance into the blood of
bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins which
cause dissolution of the blood, degenerative
changes in the organs and the symptoms of
intoxication. The cause of this condition in the
instant case was the infected vaginal lacerations
resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child
which took place at home. The alleged accident in
school could not have been the cause of
septicemia, which in this case is clearly caused by
factors not inherent in employment or in the
working conditions of the deceased. (pp. 1415, Rollo.)
Hence, this petition for review.
After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes
thereof, as well as the comments of the public respondents, we are
persuaded that the public respondents' peremptory denial of the
petitioner's claim constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation enumerates the grounds for compensability of injury
resulting in disability or death of an employee, as follows:
Sec. 1. Grounds (a) For the injury and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
injury must be the result of an employment
accident satisfying all of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been
injured at the place where his work
requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been

performing his official functions;
and
(3) If the injury is sustained
elsewhere, the employee must
have been executing an order for
the employer.
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under
Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set
therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown
that the risk of contracting the disease is increased
by the working conditions.
(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after
January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or
death shall be compensable under these Rules.
The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of
Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an occupational
disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher.
However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that
ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the
conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The
condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and
fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of
recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature
termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her
fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery
which caused the development of post partum septicemia which
resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or
responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events,
leading to her demise.
. . . what is termed in American cases the
proximate cause, not implying however, as might
be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in

point of time or relation, but rather, [is] the

efficient cause, which may be the most remote of
an operative chain. It must be that which sets the
others in motion and is to be distinguished from a
mere preexisting condition upon which the
effective cause operates, and must have been
adequate to produce the resultant damage without
the intervention of an independent cause. (Atlantic
Gulf vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166,171.)
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102
Phil. 181.)
Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled:
. . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to
disability due to disease supervening upon and
proximately and naturally resulting from a
compensable injury (82 Am. Jur. 132). Where the
primary injury is shown to have arisen in the
course of employment, every natural consequence
that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of an
independent intervening cause attributable to
complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I
Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3-279
[1972]).
Simply
stated,
all
the
medical

consequences and sequels that flow from the

primary injury are compensable. (Ibid.)
Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the
course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the
medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal
pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post
partum and death, are compensable.
There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the
cause of the decedent's post partum septicemia "was the infected
vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her
child at home" for the incident in school could not have caused
septicemia post partum, . . . the necessary precautions to avoid
infection during or after labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo).
The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia
post partum is a disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth
would not have occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the
classroom.
It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions
in a hospital operating room instead of in the unsterile
environment of her humble home, and if she had been attended by
specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would not have
suffered lacerations of the vagina and she probably would not have
contracted the fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained
longer than five (5) days in the hospital to complete the treatment
of the infection, she probably would not have died. But who is to
blame for her inability to afford a hospital delivery and the services
of trained doctors and nurses? The court may take judicial notice of
the meager salaries that the Government pays its public school
teachers. Forced to live on the margin of poverty, they are unable
to afford expensive hospital care, nor the services of trained
doctors and nurses when they or members of their families are in.
Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering her baby at
home instead of in a hospital.
The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not
entirely blameless for her poverty. Government has yet to perform

its declared policy "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of
living, and improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973
Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for
the lowly and underpaid public school teachers will only be an
empty shibboleth until Government adopts measures to ameliorate
their economic condition and provides them with adequate medical
care or the means to afford it. "Compassion for the poor is an
imperative of every humane society" (PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC,
164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the petitioner's claim for
benefits arising from the death of his wife, the public respondents
ignored this imperative of Government, and thereby committed a
grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents
Employees Compensation Commission and the Government
Service Insurance System are ordered to pay death benefits to the
petitioner and/or the dependents of the late Oania Belarmino, with
legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid,
plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award,
and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court, assailing the Decision, [1] dated 27 June 2002, rendered by
the
[2]

Court

of

Appeals,

partially

affirming

the

Resolution,

promulgated by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

on 16 August 2000. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision,

sustained

the

award

of

actual

damages

in

the

amount

of P7,742.50, moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00 and

exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in favor of
respondent RichelBandiola (Bandiola),
THIRD DIVISION
U-BIX CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

Sometime in April 1995, Bandiola was employed by U-BIX to install

YNARES-SANTIAGO,furniture for its customers. On 13 April 1997, Bandiola and two

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,other U-BIX employees were involved in a vehicular accident on
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
their way to Baguio, where they were assigned by U-BIX to install
NACHURA, JJ.

RICHEL BANDIOLA,
Re s p o n d e n t .
June 26, 2007
x---------------------------- --------------------x

furniture

for

an

exhibit. As

result

of

the

brought

to

accident, Bandiola sustained a fracture on his left leg.[3]

Bandiola and

his

co-employees

were

initially

the Rosario District Hospital. The next day, 14 April 1997, they
were

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

an injury

petitioner U-BIX Corporation, (U-BIX)

G.R. No. 157168

Promulgated:

DECISION

to

sustained by the latter in the course of his employment with

Present:

- versus -

in relation

transferred

to

the

Philippine

Orthopedic

Hospital

(Orthopedic). After his broken leg was cemented, Bandiola was

advised to go back for further medical treatment. U-BIX paid for
the medical expenses incurred in both hospitals. [4]

Bandiola claims that he asked U-BIX for financial assistance but

On September 1998, Bandiola filed a Complaint before the Labor

that the latter refused. As a consequence, he could no longer

Arbiter, where he alleged underpayment of salary; non-payment of

afford to go back to the Orthopedic in Quezon City, which is of

overtime pay; premium pay for work performed on holidays and

considerable distance from his residence in Paraaque. Instead, he

rest days; separation pay; service incentive leave pay; 13 th month

went to Medical Center Paraaque (MCP) where he had his leg cast

pay; and the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages.

in fiberglass.[5] He attached the receipts, issued by MCP and

[9]

Dr. Celestino Musngi, for medical expenses with a total amount

1998, that[10]:
Accordingly, complainant is entitled to salary
differential, service incentive leave pay and
13th month pay computed as follows:

of P7,742.50.[6] He

also

the Roentgenological Report,

attached

dated 24

copy
April

of
1997,

The Labor Arbiter ordered in its Decision, dated 16 September

of Amado V. Carandang, a Radiologist in MCP. [7] The said report

xxxx

affirmed that Bandiolas left leg was still fractured, even after the

WHEREFORE,
respondent
is
ordered to pay complainant the following:

doctors

at

the

Orthopedic

put

plaster

cast

on

his

Salary Differential P20,424.00

Service incentive leave 825.00
13th Month pay 10,324.15
GRAND TOTAL P31,573.15

leg. Bandiola added that he paid for other medical expenses for
which no receipts were issued.

Bandiola maintains that before his leg was cast in fiberglass, he

asked Rey Reynes,

U-BIXs Assistant

Manager

for

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

Project

Management, for financial assistance but was refused.After the

medical procedure, he again went to Reynes and presented a
receipt for his medical expenses, but was told to pay for them in
the meantime. Bandiola also avers that while he was waiting for his
injuries to heal, he called the U-BIX office in Makati to ask for a
salary advance, but was told by a secretary, a certain Ms. Clarisse,
that this was not possible since he had not worked after 13 April
1997.[8]

hereby

Bandiola asserts that U-BIX failed to extend to him any

financial assistance after he was injured in the performance of his
duties, and that as a result, he suffered physical pain, mental
torture, fright, sleepless nights, and serious anxiety. He claims that
this entitles him to moral and exemplary damages.[11]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein

respondent Bandiolas] appeal is GRANTED. The Labor
Arbiters decision in the above-entitled case is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in addition to
the
monetary
award
granted
to
[herein
respondent Bandiola] by the Labor Arbiter, [herein
petitioner UBIX] is ordered to reimburse [herein
respondent Bandiola] the amount of P12,742.50 for
the medical expenses which he incurred in line of
duty. [Herein petitioner UBIX] is likewise ordered to
pay [herein respondent Bandiola] the amount of
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for moral
damages
and
Twenty-five
Thousand
Pesos
(P25,000.00) for exemplary damages.

U-BIX, on the other hand, denies that Bandiola notified it of any

medical expenses he purportedly incurred until the complaint was
filed before the Labor Arbiter.[12]

As

can

be

gleaned

from

above,

the

Labor

Arbiter

allowed Bandiolas claim for salary differential, service incentive

leave pay and 13th month pay due to U-BIXs failure to present
payrolls or similar documents. Incidentally, the award of these
claims is no longer questioned in the present petition. The other
claims,

particularly

those

for

medical

expenses

thatBandiola allegedly incurred and for moral and exemplary

damages, were dismissed.

dated 16 August 2000, the NLRC amended the Decision rendered

by the Labor Arbiter on 16 September 1998. It ruled that U-BIX
reimburse Bandiola the

was denied by the NLRC in another Resolution on 11 October 2000.

[15]

Bandiola filed an appeal before the NLRC. In a Resolution

should

Thereafter, U-BIX filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which

amount

of P12,742.50

for

the

medical expenses he incurred in connection with his fractured

leg. It further ruled that U-BIX is liable to pay Bandiola P25,000.00
in moral damages and P25,000.00 in exemplary damages for
refusing to reimburse Bandiola for the medical expenses

he

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the NLRC Resolution,

dated 16 August 2000. It affirmed Bandiolas entitlement to
reimbursement of his medical expenses, but reduced the amount
to P7,742.50, the amount of actual damages he was able to
prove. It also affirmed without modification the award of moral
and exemplary damages, and the monetary award granted by
the Labor Arbiter.[16] In the dispositive portion of its Decision,
dated 27 June 2002, the Court of Appeals ruled that[17]:

incurred after it failed to report to the Social Security System (SSS)

the injuries sustained by Bandiola.[13] The aforementioned NLRC
Resolution decrees that[14]:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY

GRANTED and the assailed resolution of the NLRC
is accordingly AFFIRMED WITH MODICATION such
that the actual damages in the form of
reimbursement for the medical expenses incurred
by [herein respondent Bandiola] is REDUCED

to P7,742.50 instead of the P12,742.50 which was

granted by the NLRC.

other employees who were involved in the same accident for their
medical

expenses.[19] Clearly,

the

reimbursement

of

medical

expenses for injuries incurred in the course of employment is part

of the benefits enjoyed by U-BIXs employees. The only justification
Hence, the present petition, in which the following issues
were raised

[18]

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ORDERING PETITIONER U-BIX TO REIMBURSE
RESPONDENT BANDIOLA FOR ALLEGED MEDICAL
EXPENSES OF P7,742.50 WHEN THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF.

for its refusal to reimburse Bandiola was that he intended to

defraud the company by presenting spurious receipts amounting
to P7,742.50 that were allegedly issued four months before their
presentation.

Articles 205 and 206 of the Labor Code set the reportorial
requirements in cases when an employee falls sick or suffers an
injury arising in the course of employment. An injury is said to arise

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES OF P25,000.00 AND
EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES
OF P25,000.00
TO
RESPONDENT BANDIOLA WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL OR
LEGAL BASIS APART FROM THE FACT THAT THE SAME
ARE EXORBITANT AND CLEARLY INTENDED TO
ENRICH RESPONDENT.

in the course of employment when it takes place within the period

of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be,
and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing
something incidental thereto.[20] The aforecited provisions of the
Labor Code provide that:
ART. 205 RECORD OF DEATH OR DISABILITY

The petition is without merit.

Contrary to the arguments put forward by U-BIX, it is liable to

reimburse Bandiola the amount of P7,742.50 for medical expenses
because its failure to comply with its duty to record and
report Bandiolas injury to the SSS precluded Bandiola from making
any claims. Moreover, U-BIX, by its own admission, reimbursed its

(a)

All employers shall keep a logbook to

record chronologically the sickness, injury or
death of their employees, setting forth
therein their names, dates and places of the
contingency, nature of the contingency and
absences. Entries in the logbook shall be
made within five days from notice or
knowledge
of
the
occurrence
of
contingency. Within five days after entry in
the logbook, the employer shall report to the

System only those contingencies he deems

to be work-connected.
(b)

All entries in the employers logbook shall

be made by the employer or any of his
authorized official after verification of the
contingencies or the employees absences for
a period of a day or more. Upon request by
the System, the employer shall furnish the
necessary certificate regarding information
about any contingency appearing in the
logbook, citing the entry number, page
number and date. Such logbook shall be
made available for inspection to the duly
authorized representatives of the System.

However, the law provides an exception to the rule

requiring an employee to notify his or her employer of his
injuries. Under Section B of ECC Board Resolution No. 2127, issued
on 5 August 1982, notice of injury, sickness or death of the
employee need not be given to the employer in any of the
following situations:
(1)

When the employee suffers the contingency

within the employers premises;

(2)

When the employee officially files an application

for leave of absence by reason of the
contingency from which he suffers;

(3)

When the employer provides medical services

and/or medical supplies to the employee who
suffers from the contingency; and

(4)

When the employer can be reasonably

presumed to have had knowledge of the
employees contingency, in view of the following
circumstances:

xxxx
ART 206. NOTICE OF SICKNESS, INJURY OR DEATH
Notice of sickness, injury or death shall be given to
the employer by the employee or by his dependents
or anybody on his behalf within five days from the
occurrence of the contingency. No notice to the
employer shall be required if the contingency is
known to the employer or his agents or
representatives.

(4.1)

The employee was performing an

official function for the employer when
the contingency occurred;

(4.2)

The employees contingency has been

publicized through mass media outlets;
or

(4.3)

The specific circumstances of the

occurrence of the contingency have been
such that the employer can be
reasonably presumed to have readily
known it soon thereafter; or

(4.4)

Any other circumstances that may

give rise to a reasonable presumption

As a general rule, the injured employee must notify his

employer, who is obligated to enter the notice in a logbook within
five days after notification. Within five days after making the entry,
the employer of a private company reports the work-related
sickness or injury to the SSS. The claim is forwarded to the SSS,
which decides on the validity of the claim. When the SSS denies
the claim, the denial may be appealed to the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) within 30 days.

that the employer has been aware of the

contingency.

benefits while he was unable to work. However, U-BIX did not

present any evidence showing that it had complied with these legal

In the present case, there is no dispute that Bandiolas leg

requirements. It had not even replied to Bandiolas allegations in his

injury was sustained in the course of his employment with U-BIX. At

Position Paper, dated 13 April 1998, that its employees were not

the time of the accident, Bandiola was on the way to Baguio, where

even members of the SSS.[21]

he

was

ordered

by

U-BIX

to

install

furniture

for

an

exhibit. Moreover, U-BIX was aware that Bandiola, as well as his

As early as 1938, this Court emphasized, in the case

other co-employees, were injured during the accident. U-BIX

of Murillo v. Mendoza,[22] that labor laws have demonstrated an

admitted to providing Bandiola and his co-employees with medical

impetus towards ensuring that employees are compensated for

assistance

representative, Rey Reynes,

work-related injuries. The law has since treated such compensation

to Rosario DistrictHospital, where they were confined, and had

as a right, which the employees can claim, instead of an act of

them transferred to the Orthopedic. U-BIX was also aware that the

charity to be given at the employers discretion.

Orthopedic

and

it

even

sent

its

instructed Bandiola to

return

for

further

medical

treatment. It is implicit that Bandiola needed further treatment for

his broken leg and was, thus, incapacitated to work.

Given the foregoing circumstances, U-BIX had the legal

obligation to record pertinent information in connection with the
injuries sustained by Bandiola in its logbook within five days after it
had known about the injuries; and to report the same to the SSS
within five days after it was recorded in the logbook, in accordance
with Articles 205 and 206 of the Labor Code. Had U-BIX performed
its lawful duties, the SSS, or the ECC on appeal, could have
properly considered whether or not Bandiola was entitled to
reimbursement for his medical expenses, as well as disability

The intention of the Legislature in enacting

the Workmens Compensation Act was to secure
workmen and their dependents against becoming
objects of charity, by making a reasonable
compensation for such accidental calamities as are
incidental to the employment. Under such act injuries
to workmen and employees are to be considered no
longer as results of fault or negligence, but as the
products of the industry in which the employee is
concerned. Compensation for such injuries is, under
the theory of such statute, like any other item in the
cost of production or transportation, and ultimately
charged to the consumer. The law substitutes for
liability for negligence an entirely new conception;
that is, that if the injury arises out of and in the
course of the employment, under the doctrine of
mans humanity to man, the cost of compensation
must be one of the elements to be liquidated and
balanced in the course of consumption. In other
words, the theory of law is that, if the industry
produces an injury, the cost of that injury shall be
included in the cost of the product of the industry.

In De Jesus v. Employees Compensation Commission,

[23]

this Court further noted that while the present law protects

employers from spurious and long overdue claims, it stresses at

the same time that the claims for compensation are to be promptly
and properly addressed. More importantly, employers no longer
need to determine the validity of a claim or to defend themselves
from spurious claims. Their duties are thus limited to paying the

compensation. The Commission administers and

settles claims from a fund under its exclusive
control. The employer does not intervene in the
compensation process and it has no control, as in the
past, over payment of benefits. x x x.
Since there is no employer opposing or
fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on
presumption
of
compensability
and controversion cease to have importance. The
lopsided situation of an employer versus one
employee, which called for equalization through the
various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is
now absent.

monthly premiums and reporting the sickness, injury or death for

which compensation is due.
The new law establishes a state insurance
fund built up by the contributions of employers based
on the salaries of their employees. The injured
worker does not have to litigate his right to
compensation.No employer opposes his claim. There
is
no
notice
of
injury
nor
requirement
of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim
with a new neutral Employees Compensation
Commission which then determines on the basis of
the employees supporting papers and medical
evidence whether or not compensation may be
paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The
cost of administration is low. The amount of death
benefits has also been doubled.

By failing to report Bandiolas injury to the SSS, U-BIX

disregarded the law and its purpose; that is, to provide a proper
and prompt settlement of his claims. Instead, U-BIX arrogated upon
itself the duty of determining which medical expenses are proper
for reimbursement. In doing so, it could unnecessarily delay and
unjustifiably refuse to reimburseBandiola for medical expenses
even if they were adequately supported by receipts, as was done in
this instance. The expense and delay undergone by Bandiola since
1997 in obtaining reimbursement for his medical expenses
of P7,742.50 very clearly defeat the purpose of the law.

On the other hand, the employers duty is

only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the
scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to
meet sudden demands for compensation payments
or set up its own funds to meet these
contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from
spuriously documented or long past claims.

expenses incurred in connection with the 13 April 1997 accident; it

The new law applies the social security

principle
in
the
handling
of
workmens

however, to reimburse Bandiola for further medical expenses on

U-BIX does not question its liability to pay for medical

admits that it paid for all the medical expenses of its other
employees, who were involved in the accident. [24] It refused,

the ground that the receipts were counterfeit and belatedly

affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof, his or her

presented to U-BIX.

cause will not succeed. If he or she fails to establish the facts of

which the matter asserted is predicated, the complainant is

Bandiola presented eight receipts with a total amount

of P7,742.50

issued

by

Dr. Celestino Musngi. The

MCP

and

amounts

his

attending

indicated

physician,

therein

range

entitled to a verdict or decision in his or her favor. [26] In this case,

U-BIXs affirmative defense that the receipts are spurious is rejected
due to utter lack of proof.

from P200.00 to P2,936.00. The receipts were issued on 24 April

U-BIX asserts that no demand was made by the petitioner and that

1997 and 6 May 1997, or around the time the accident occurred

it only came to know of Bandiolas medical expenses when it

on 13 April 1997. From the face of the receipts, there is no showing

received the Summons to attend a preliminary conference before

that these documents are false or falsified. U-BIX could have easily

the Labor Arbiter. For his part, Bandiola insists that before filing the

confirmed with MCP or Dr. Celestino Musngi, who issued said

case with the NLRC, he approached U-BIX three times for financial

receipts, the authenticity of the documents. However, it failed to

assistance in connection with his medical expenses, but he was

allege that it took any steps to check the authenticity of the

refused. Bandiola identified

receipts. It also failed to present any evidence that these receipts

as Rey Reynes and a certain Ms. Clarisse.[27] U-BIX alleges that it

are fake. Absent any proof, no weight can be attached to the

sent ReyReynes to look for Bandiola in the address recorded in

allegation that the receipts are spurious.

their
[28]

office

files,

but

that

the

he

persons

no

longer

he

spoke

resided

to

therein.

Bandiola contested this allegation by stating that he had not

The party who alleges the fact has the burden of proving

changed his residence.[29] As of 20 September 2006, Bandiola still

it. The burden of proof is assigned to the defendant of a claim

resided at the same address, Sampaloc Site II-B, Barangay B.F.

when he or she alleges an affirmative defense, which is not a

Homes, Paranaque City,

denial of an essential ingredient in the complainants cause of

of Indigency issued

action - the existence of the receipts, in the present case - but is

Chairperson Florencia N. Amurao.[30]

as

evidenced

by

by Barangay BF

the

Certificate
Homes

one which, if established, will be a good defense, i.e., an avoidance

of the claim.[25] One who alleges an affirmative defense that is

U-BIX maintains that Bandiola kept the company in the

denied by the complainant - the falsity of the receipts, in this case -

dark regarding his medical expenses because he intended to file a

has the burden of proving it. Unless the party asserting the

baseless suit aimed at extorting money from the company. This

Court finds it implausible that a worker who received less than

minimum wage[31] would choose to initiate legal proceedings before
even seeking to collect from his employer. To automatically
presume that Bandiola intended to defraud the company despite

shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Though

incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendants wrongful act for omission.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered
in the following and analogous cases:

the absence of supporting evidence would constitute a hasty and

unsubstantiated generalization, which displays a prejudice against
ordinary workers, such as Bandiola.

U-BIXs continued

and

stubborn

refusal

to

reimburse Bandiolas medical expenses was made evident during

xxxx
(10)Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

the mandatory conference before the Labor Arbiter when it refused

to recognize the receipts shown to it. If U-BIX had refused to take

U-BIX failed to perform its legal obligation to report to the

cognizance of the receipts presented during a quasi-judicial

SSS the injuries suffered by Bandiola, and, thereafter, failed to

proceeding before a public officer, then it would have been more

extend the same financial aid it extended to other employees who

likely that it ignored, if not flat-out refused, to consider the said

were involved in the same accident. After it was shown the receipts

receipts when the same were presented by a lowly employee.

for the medical expenses Bandiola paid for in connection with the
injuries, U-BIX unreasonably refused to reimburse him for the

Under the facts of the case, Bandiola is entitled to moral and

expenses. It is not difficult to accept Bandiolas claim that he

exemplary damages. There is no question that moral damages may

suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and fright when U-BIX left

be awarded in cases when a wrongful act or omission has caused

him without any options for financial support while he was

the complainant mental anguish, fright and serious anxiety.

suffering

[32]

Articles 2217 and 2219, in connection with Article 21 of the Civil

Code, read:
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral

from

and

rendered

incapacitated

by

work-related

injuries. He was severely distressed by his plight that he felt that

he could no longer continue to work for U-BIX. U-BIXs unjustified
and continued refusal to reimburse Bandiola after it failed to report
his injury to the SSS, despite the receipts

he presented,

demonstrates bad faith. By singling out Bandiola from its other

Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould

employees, who were reimbursed for their medical expenses, and

behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and their

forcing him to litigate for ten years in order to claim the

imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts

unsubstantial amount of P7,742.50, U-BIX was clearly indulging in

of the offender.[35]

malicious conduct.
The Labor Code provides for the medical expenses, as well as
As regards the award of moral damages, this Court has

disability benefits of workers suffering from work-related injuries

ruled that there is no hard and fast rule in determining the fair

and recognizes such compensation as their right.Indeed, a system

amount for moral damages, since each case must be governed by

has been put in place for the prompt collection of the benefits,

its own peculiar circumstances.[33] It should enable the injured

which are given by law to injured employees. All that U-BIX was

parties to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve

required to do was to report the injury; it need not have defended

to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured party has undergone

itself from what it perceived to be spurious claims. Instead, it took

by reason of defendants culpable action. In other words, the award

upon itself the duty of determining the validity of Bandiolas claims

of moral damages is aimed at a restoration within the limits of the

and unjustifiably refused to reimburse his properly receipted

possible, of the spiritual and/or psychological status quo ante; and

medical expenses. The prolonged litigation of his valid claims is not

therefore it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.

the only miserable situation which the present labor laws sought to

Therefore, in light of the sufferings sustained by Bandiola, this

prevent, but the pathetic situation wherein a laborer is placed at

Court sustains the award of P25,000.00 as moral damages.

the mercy of his or her employer for recompense that is his or hers
by right. Exemplary damages are, thus, rightfully imposed against

Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary

U-BIX.

damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for

public good.[34] It reads:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages
are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition

is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals, promulgated on 27 June 2002, finding U-BIX liable
to Bandiola for P7,742.50 in actual damages, P25,000.00 for moral

damages and P25,000.00 in exemplary damages. Costs against the

petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22117

April 29, 1966

PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
DONATO QUIROZ, respondent.
Gil R. Carlos and Associates, for petitioner
Dioscoro G. Pineda, for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:

Although entitled "Petition for Certiorari" and the prayer thereof

suggests that it is an original action for certiorari, this proceeding
is, in effect, an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission sentencing herein
petitioner, Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc., hereinafter
referred to as the Company, to pay P1,899.24 to Donato Quiroz,
plus P142.44 to his counsel and P24.00 to the Workmen's
Compensation Fund.
The facts are set forth in said decision, from which we quote:
There is practically no controversy as to the circumstances
surrounding the accident that befell the claimant. The
caimnant,1 who was employed as centrifugal operator by
the respondent2 reported for work on March 7, 1958 at
around 9:30 p.m. and was dismissed at around 5:30 a.m.
the following day. Soon after he stepped out of the
company gate, and while standing about 2 1/2 meters from
it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that
came from inside the compound and intersected the
highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a
jeepney as a result of which he sustained various wounds
on his body as well as a complete fracture of his left
clavicle. According to the records of the case, the injured
was with other employees of the same company waiting
for transportation. There is nothing in the records which
shows that respondent had taken measures to make the
waiting place safe for the employees.
The main issue for determination in this case is whether the
injuries sustained by claimant Quiroz, under the circumstances
indicated, were produced by an accident "arising out of and in the
course of employment", as this clause is used in Section 2 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
As stated in In re McNicol (102 NE [1913] 697):
. . . It is sufficient to say that an injury is received "in the
course of" employment when it comes while the workman
is doing the duty which he is employed to perform. It arises

"out of" the employment when there is apparent in the

rational mind ... causal connection between the conditions
under which the work is required to be performed and the
resulting injury .... But it excludes an injury which cannot
fairly be traced to the employment as a
contributing proximate cause and which comes from a
hazard to which the workman would have been equally
exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger
must bepeculiar to the work, and not common to the
neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the
business, and not independent of the relation of master
and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected,
but after the event, it must appear to have had its origin
on a risk connected with the employment, to have flowed
from that source as a rational consequence.
An injury or accident "befalls a man in thec ourse of" his
employment, if it occurs while he is doing what a man may
reasonably do within a time during which he is employed,
and at a place where he may reasonably be during that
time. 13 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 28-29. And it "arises out of"
the work of the employer, when it results from a risk or
hazard which is necessarily or ordinarily or
reasonably inherentin our incident to the conduct of such
work or business. (Emphasis ours.)
As a consequence, the general rule, subject to exceptions, is that
injuries sustained by an employee, outside the premises of the
employer, while going to or returning from work,
are not compensable. Referring to the exceptions, Larson has this
to say:
. . . recoveries have been allowed off the employment
premises, outside business hours, when an employee going
to or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly
traceable to the employment, such as a traffic
jam overflowing from the employment premises, or a rock
flying through the air from ablast on the premises. Here, by
normal course of employment standards, there would be
no award, since the employee was not on the premises

while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of

the causal relation of the injury to the employment has
been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the
"course" factor. Another example of the same kind of
balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with
injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels
or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases
that, although the "course" factor is on the borderline when
the employee is sound asleep at the time of injury,
a strong causal relation of the injury to the conditions of
employment as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a
straw falls into a bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the
mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a burning
hotel will boost the case over the line to success; while a
weak causal relation, as where the salesman merely slips
in the hotel bath, coupled with the work "course" factor
due to the absence of any direct service performed for the
employer at the time, will under present decisions add up
to quantum of work-connection too small to support an
award.3(Emphasis ours.)
Thus, the compensability of an injury suffered by an employee
proceeding to or coming from his work depends upon whether or
not it is "work connected". As Chief Justice Kenison of New
Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee is travelling to or
from work on a pubIic highway does not necessarily excluded
coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Hills, 130 A 2d 543, 545).
Conversely, it is not enough to say that the employee would not
have been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since
the same can usually be said of the general public (Payne & Dolan
vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in effect,
insures the employee against losses arising from the perils of his
work. In other words, the Workmen's Compensation Act covers
occupational injuries, which, as such, must have a causative
connection with something, not merely in common with the public,
but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant recovery for
off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a
very special danger, some particular risk which the employer could
have caused or allowed to exist.4 Hence,

It is significant that practically all successful off-thepremises cases have involved either a dangerous railroad
crossing lying in the normal route of access to the plant, or
an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises and
therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the
employer should have removed the ice. In other words,
there has always been a very special danger.5 (Emphasis
ours.)
It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. vs. Ampil, G.R. No.
L-7130 (June 30, 1956), we held the employer liable for an injury
sustained by an employee who, as he was running to his place of
work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the
factory's main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in
itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the the
gate, the employer should have taken measures to remove. Thus,
thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the
occurrence of the accident.
In the case at bar, no such special circumstances appears to exist.
There is no particular causative connection between the injury
sustained by the employee and either his work or his employer.
Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the record does
not show that the company "had taken measures to make the
waiting place safe for the employees", neither does the record
show either that the accident occurred at the usual waiting place of
the employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and
petitioner herein absolved from the claim of Donato Quiroz, without
special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.1wph1.t

Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.

On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she
was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos
City on her way to the school, she was bumped and
run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which
resulted in her instantaneous death. She is
survived by her four sons and a daughter.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988
GENEROSO
ALANO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained by
the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is
compensable under the law as an employment accident.
The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation
Commission are as follows:
Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee
during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap
Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan.

On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of

the deceased, filed the instant claim for in come
benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the
decedent's children. The claim was, however,
denied on the same date on the ground that the
"injury upon which compensation is being claimed
is not an employment accident satisfying all the
conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977
appellant requested for a reconsideration of the
system's decision, but the same was denied and
the records of the case were elevated to this
Commission for review. (Rollo, p. 12)
The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System. It stated that Section I (a),
Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation
specifically provides that: "For the injury and the resulting disability
or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an
employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The
employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours;
(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his
work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been
performing his official functions." (Rollo, p. 13)
According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident
did not meet any of the aforementioned conditions. First, the
accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the
deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her
workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her
work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as
school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. The
case, therefore, was dismissed.

The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on

certiorari. He alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out
of or in the course of her employment."
The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that
the present provision of law on employment injury is different from
that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428)
and is "ategorical in that the injury must have been sustained at
work while at the workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order
from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44)
The Government Service Insurance System which received a copy
of the Court's resolution requiring the parties to submit their
memoranda, however manifests that it does not appear to be a
party to the case because it had not been impleaded as a party
thereto.
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier
case
of Vda.
de
Torbela
v.
Employees'
Compensation
Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual
background, this Court held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3,
1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to
injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident
while he was on his way to school from Bacolod
City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros
Occidental where the school of which he was the
principal was located and that at the time of the
accident he had in his possession official papers he
allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of
his death.
The claim is compensable. When an employee is
accidentally injured at a point reasonably
proximate to the place at work, while he is going to
and from his work, such injury is deemed to have
arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going
to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner
puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach
her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal
about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She
was there because her employment required her to be there.
As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation,
we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as
a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v.
Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and
recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R.
No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the
Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in
employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing
agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in
the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said
System in all aspects of employee compensation including
enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation
Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the
Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the heirs
of the deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00)
as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos
(P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

SALVADOR
LAZO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES), respondents.
Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883 which
affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation
against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central
Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate,
Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the
petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to
10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to
relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty
up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked
permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to
Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990

the

Philippines
COURT

On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June

1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned
turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and
was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He
was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he
was confined until 25 July 1986.
For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability
benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was
denied by the GSIS for the reason that

It appears that after performing your regular duties

as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. on
June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from
10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at
about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your
superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do
certain personal matter that of bringing home a
sack of rice and that, while on your way home, you
met a vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your
injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is
evident that you were not at your work place
performing your duties when the incident
occurred. 1
It was held that the condition for compensability had not been
satisfied.
Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation
Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which
involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while
he was attending to a personal matter.
Hence, the present recourse.
The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the
vehicular accident on his way home from work should be construed
as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus,
compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the
decision, the petitioner cites the case of Pedro Baldebrin vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2 where the Court awarded
compensation to the petitioner therein who figured in an accident
on his way home from his official station at Pagadian City to his
place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident,
petitioner's left eye was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a
bus.
Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from
cases earlier decided and hence, not applicable to the present
case.

The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments
of the parties and finds that the petitioner's submission is
meritorious. Liberally interpreting the employees compensation
law to give effect to its compassionate spirit as a social
legislation 3 in Vda. de Torbela u. ECC, 4 the Court held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3,
1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to
injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident
while he was on his way to school from Bacolod
City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental where the school of which he was the
principal was located and that at the time of the
accident he had in his possession official papers he
allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of
his death. The claim is compensable. When an
employee is accidentally injured at a point
reasonably proximate to the place at work, while
he is going to and from his work, such injury is
deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of
his employment.
Again in Alano v. ECC,

it was reiterated:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee

during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap
Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan.
Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.
On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M., while she
was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos
City on her way to the school, she was bumped and
run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which
resulted in her instantaneous death. ...
In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased
died while going to her place of work. She was at
the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job
necessarily required her to be if she was to reach
her place of work on time. There was nothing
private or personal about the school principal's

being at the place of the accident. She was there

because her employment required her to be there.
More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC,
above quoted decisions, enunciated:

this Court, applying the

Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of

Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a
Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his
motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on
his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the
following day, Monday. As they were approaching
Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle
skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown
overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's railing
which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to
the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared
dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.
We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing
rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2)
aforementioned cases, it was established that
petitioner's husband in the case at bar was on his
way to his place of work when he met the accident.
His death, therefore, is compensable under the law
as an employment accident.
In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In
the case at bar, petitioner had come from work and was on his way
home, just like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "...
figured in an accident when he was ping home from his official
station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora,
Zamboanga del Sur ...." 7 Baldebrin, the Court said:
The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury
comes within the meaning of and intendment of
the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of
employment.'(Section 2, Workmen's Compensation
Act). In Philippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs.
Flora S. Martin and Workmen's Compensation

Commission, 4 SCRA 356, We held that 'where an

employee, after working hours, attempted to ride
on the platform of a service truck of the company
near his place of work, and, while thus attempting,
slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by
the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may
be said to have arisen out of or in the course of
employment, for which reason his death is
compensable. The fact standing alone, that the
truck was in motion when the employee boarded,
is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had
been notoriously negligent, where it does not
appear that the truck was running at a great
speed.'And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock &
Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that
'(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of
the work, but a reasonable margin of time and
space necessary to be used in passing to and from
the place where the work is to be done. If the
employee be injured while passing, with the
express or implied consent of the employer, to or
from his work by a way over the employer's
premises, or over those of another in such
proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a
part of the employer's premises, the injury is one
arising out of and in the course of the employment
as much as though it had happened while the
employee was engaged in his work at the place of
its performance. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at
the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because
the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on
overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home.
There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his
usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the
journey.
While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act (under which

the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been abandoned under
the New Labor Code, 8 it is significant that the liberality of the law
in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As agent
charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and
secured by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation
Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the
employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where
there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to
the accident.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the
compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New
Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor.'
The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626)
to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.
This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give
maximum aid and protection to labor. 9
There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be
protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working
hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after
leaving the employer's premises.10
If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was
on his way from home to his work station one day before an official
working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for
accidental injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour
after he had left his work station.
We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril
doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the
employee because the Employees Compensation Act, like the
Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation
designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our
society.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for
disposition in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989
CIRIACO
HINOGUIN petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
and
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Armed Forces
of the Philippines), respondents.
Alexander A. Acain for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:
This Petition for Review is directed against the Decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission ("ECC") in ECC Case No.
3275 (Ciriaco Hinoguin v. Government Service Insurance System
[Armed Forces of the Philippines]) which affirmed the decision of
the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") denying
petitioner's claim for compensation benefit on account of the death
of petitioner's son, Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin
The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974,
when he was called to military training by the Philippine Army. He
later on enlisted in the Philippine Army as a private first class. At
the time of his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding the rank of
Sergeant per Special Order P-4200, HPA dated 15 October 1985, in
"A" company 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, PA. The
Headquarters of the 14th Infantry Battalion was located at Bical,
Muoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt. Hinoguin was Detachment NonCommissioned Officer at Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, "A"
Company being stationed at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.

On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his

Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog,
sought permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas, Commanding
Officer of "A" Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva
Viscaya, "to settle [an] important matter thereat." 1 Captain Besas
orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their
issued firearms with them, considering that Aritao was regarded as
"a critical place " 2 that is, it had peace and order problems due to
the presence of elements of the New People's Army ("NPA!') in or in
the vicinity of Aritao.
Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva
Ecija, about noon on 1 August 1985 and arrived in Aritao, Nueva
Viscaya, about 1:30 o'clock P.M. on the same day. 3 They proceeded
to the home of Dft. Alibuyog's parents where they had lunch. About
4:00 o'clock P.M., the three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian
and relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer, finishing a
bottle of gin and two (2) large bottles of beer. Three hours later, at
about 7:00 o'clock P.M., the soldiers left the Alibuyog home to
return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle,
presumably a motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo
seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Dft. Alibuyog occupied
the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching thepoblacion of Aritao,
Dft. Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards and in front of the
tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing
that the rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and not on
"safety"). He accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single shot in
the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in
the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize
immediately that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps forward,
cried that he had been hit and fell to the ground.
His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong,
Nueva Viscaya, for treatment. Their Company Commander, Capt.
Besas, hurried to the hospital upon being notified of the shooting
and there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter confirmed
to Capt. Besas that he had indeed been accidentally shot by Dft.
Alibuyog Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical Center
in Quezon City and there he died on 7 August 1985. The Death
Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate cause of death, and

"generalized septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent cause,

following his sustaining a gunshot wound.

Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA is in Line of

Duty.

An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion on 11

August 1985 concluded that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was
"purely accidental in nature." 4 On 19 November 1985, a "Line of
Duty Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q. 14th Infantry
Battalion, "to determine Line of Duty Status of [the] late Sgt.
Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA, a member of "A" Co., 14IB, 5 ID,
PA who died ... due to Gun Shot Wound as a result of an accidental
fire (sic) committed by Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog 085-5009 (Inf.)
PA ... ." After receiving and deliberating . g on the Investigation
Report dated 11 August 1985 together with the sworn statements
of witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo and Besas, and after some further
questioning of Capt. Besas, the Line of Duty Board reached the
following conclusion and recommendation:

The Board recommend farther that all benefits due

the legal dependents of the late Sgt. Lemick
Hinoguin be given. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Sgt. Hinoguin was then the designated Detachment

Commander of Capintalan detachment. On or
about 011300H August 1985 Dft. Alibuyog invited
Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo to his home to
celebrate at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They asked
permission to go on overnight and to allow them to
carry their firearms with them because the place
where they were going is critical. They were given
such permission verbally by their Commanding
Officer. The death of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely
accidental as the Investigation Report presented
here proved beyond reasonable [doubt] the fact
that Dft. Alibuyog had no grudge either [against]
Cpl. Clavo or Sgt. Hinoguin
RECOMMENDATION:
The recommendation written by the Chairman and
unanimously voted for by the members contain the
following:
The Board after a thorough deliberation on
presented evidences declares that the Death of

Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for

compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 (as amended), claiming
that the death of his son was work-connected and therefore
compensable. This was denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that
petitioner's son was not at his work place nor performing his duty
as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was,
however, denied by the GSIS. This denial was confirmed by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission ("WCC") in a Decision dated
24 May 1988 which stated that:
[F]rom the recital of the facts therein [we found it]
very difficult for us to perceive where the workconnection of the events that led to appellant's
son's death lies. Under the law, death resulting
from injury is considered compensable if it arises
out of and in the course of employment.
Definitely, the death of Hinoguin did not arises out
of employment. Clearly, the facts showed that he
was not on his place of work nor was he
performing official functions. On the contrary, he
was on pass and had just came from a
merrymaking when accidentally shot by his
companion, 7 (Emphasis supplied)
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is compensable under the applicable
statute and regulations.
Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the
applicable law is to be found in Book Four, Title III of the Labor
Code, as amended. It may be noted at the outset that under Article

167 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of
Rule I of the Amended (Implementing) Rules on Employees'
Compensation, the term "employee" includes a "member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines." Rule XIII entitled "Death", of the
Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as follows:
SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. (a) The
beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be
entitled to an income benefit if all of the following
conditions are satisfied:
(1) The employee had been duly reported to the
System;
(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and
(3) The System has been duly notified of his death,
as well as the injury or sickness which caused his
death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if
such death occurred before the employee is duly
reported for coverage of the System.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a
compensable "injury" quite simply as "any harmful change in the
human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course
of the employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have,
however, elaborated considerably on the simple and succinct
statutory provision. Rule III, Section 1 (a) reads:
SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
injury must be the result of an employment
accident satisfying all of the following grounds:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the
place work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his

official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order for
the employer.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are
intended to apply to all kinds of employment, such rules must be
read
and
applied
with
reasonable
flexibility
and
comprehensiveness. The concept of a "work place" referred to in
Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a
soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a
worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular
fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is
stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of
course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1-1/2
hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt.
Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their
Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that
a place which soldiers have secured lawfulpermission to be at
cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they
are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the
three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they
did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover,
they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which
presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements
happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with
which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they
might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact
encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been
fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA
bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any
difficulty in holding the death a compensable one.

Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing

official functions at the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it
has already been pointed out above that the Line of Duty Board of
Officers of the 14thInfantry Battalion Headquarters had already
determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred "in line of
duty." It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active
duty status is really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is
subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is
subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times,
7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave
status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not). 'Thus, we think that the workconnected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not
effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an
overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under
his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease
performing "official functions" because he was granted a pass.
While going to a fellow soldier's home for a few hours for a meal
and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was
nonetheless in the course of performance of official functions.
Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on
official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally
put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an
approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave may, it should be
remembered, be preterminated by superior orders.
More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain
risks, for instance, that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the
State or the Government. That is not, of course, the only ask that
he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or
profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are
necessarily also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms,
too. In other words, a soldier must also assume the risk of being
accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably
regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a
soldier.
We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted
from his being hit by an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft.
Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the
course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable.

It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect

of performance of official functions of members of the Armed
Forces must be understood in the context of the specific purpose at
hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the
compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related
regulations. It is commonplace that those provisions should, to the
extent possible, be given the interpretation most likely to
effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes infusing the
Labor Code.
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim
Review Committee dated 20 November 1986 and the Decision
dated 24 May 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission
in ECC Case No. 3275, are hereby REVERSED and the GSIS is
hereby DIRECTED to award all applicable benefits in respect of the
death of Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin, to petitioner. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 89217 September 4, 1991
JUANITA
NITURA, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
and
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (PHILIPPINE
ARMY), respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Jose T. Apolo and Cesar R. Vidal for G.S.I.S

PARAS, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (hereinafter
referred to as ECC for brevity) dated May 24, 1989 in ECC Case No.
3470 entitled "Juanita Nitura, Appellant, vs. Government Service
Insurance System (Philippine Army), Respondent", which affirmed
the denial by the Government Service Insurance System

(hereinafter referred to as GSIS for brevity) of the claim of herein

petitioner Juanita Nitura for the benefits under Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended, on account of the death of her son, Pfc.
Regino S. Nitura.

PA soldier when the accident occurred (Annex "D" of the Petition,

Rollo, p. 18).
On July 15, 1987, petitioner's claim was elevated to the respondent
ECC for review and docketed as ECC Case No. 3470.

The facts of the case are as follows:

The deceased Pfc. Regino S. Nitura, 681349 PA, started his military
service on October 5, 1978 when he was caged for military training
in the Philippine Army. At the time of his death on March 3, 1986,
he was assigned to the "D" Coy 44th Inf. Bn., lst Inf. (TABAK)
Division, stationed at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte.
In the evening of March 2, 1986, he was instructed to go to
Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City, which is more or less one (1)
kilometer from the Command Post of his Company, to check on
several personnel of the Command who were then attending a
dance party. This instruction was attested to by his Battalion
Commander, Col. Loreto M. Deus, 0-90573 Inf. (GSC) PA in his
affidavit dated July 8, 1986 (Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 15).
On his way back to the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from a
hanging wooden bridge connects Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City
and Barangay Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, his head
hitting the stony portion of the ground. His death certificate (Annex
'B" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 16) shows that he died of
"cardiorespiratory arrest, shock, traumatic due to hemorrhage,
intracranial due to severe concussion of the brain due to accidental
fall".
Herein petitioner Juanita Nitura filed a death claim for
compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, with the GSIS. In a letter dated October 27, 1986 signed
by Oscar R. Marcelino, Manager, Employees' Compensation
Department (Annex "C" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 17), petitioner's
claim was denied on the ground that the condition for
compensability, that the injury and the resulting disability or death
must be the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of
the employment, has not been satisfied. Her request for
reconsideration was likewise denied on the ground that her son
was not at his place of work nor performing his official function as a

As aforementioned, respondent ECC affirmed the denial of

petitioner's claim by the GSIS. Respondent ECC reasoned out that:
The deceased was not at his place of work nor was
he performing his official function as member of
the Philippine Army when the incident occurred. He
was, as appellant admits, coming from a dance
party. Despite appellant's contention, recreation is
no longer an employee's duty nor is it connected to
the performance of an employee's official function.
For to rule otherwise, would negate Rule III, Section
1.
Furthermore, even assuming that attending a
dance party is still a work-connected activity, we
believe that the deceased acted with notorious
negligence, for although he was already
intoxinated, he still proceeded to attend the dance
at a nearby barrio with full knowledge that it would
be dangerous to cross the hanging bridge in the
dark. (ECC Decision, Rollo, p. 23).
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue in the case at bar is whether or not the death of Pfc.
Regino S. Nitura is compensable pursuant to the applicable
statutes and regulations.
Respondent ECC avert that it is undisputed that when the incident
happened, the late Pfc. Regino S. Nitura had just come from a
dance party and was on his way back to the camp. Attending a
dance party is not a part of an employee's duty nor is it connected
with the performance of his official functions. To rule otherwise

would negate the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as

amended, that for the injury to be compensable, it must be the
result of an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment. While his Battalion Commander, Col. Loreto Deus
attested to the fact that the deceased was instructed to check on
several personnel of the command then attending the dance party,
he failed to state in his affidavit the reason why the deceased was
given such instruction. This is fatal to petitioner's case as it cannot
be determined if the instruction was indeed official and had
something to do with his duties as a soldier.

instructed to check on several personnel of the command then

attending the party, the incident happened after the same had
purportedly been accomplished. The ECC continues assuming
that he was not notoriously negligent in crossing the bridge, still,
the same cannot be removed from the prohibitive mantle of
Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation which considers the employee's intoxication as a
ground for denial of the claim (Memorandum for Respondent GSIS,
Rollo, pp. 119-121).
The petition is impressed with merit.

Respondent ECC insisted that even assuming that the deceased

was performing his duty when the incident occurred, he was at that
time intoxinated and acted with notorious negligence in crossing
the bridge. These facts according to the respondent ECC bar
petitioner's claim for benefits pursuant to Section 1, Rule IV of the
Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation which provides that:
Section 1. Limitation No compensation shall be
allowed to the employee or his dependents when
the injury, sickness, disability or death was
occasioned by any of the following:
(1) his intoxication;
(2) his willful attention to injure or kill himself or
another;
or
(3) his notorious negligence.
(Memorandum for Public Respondent, Rollo, pp.
107-109).
Public respondent ECC concurs with public respondent GSIS that
the injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment
as it happened when the deceased was crossing the bridge after
attending a dance party. Although the deceased had been

In resolving this issue in a similar case, this Court ruled that the
Employees' Compensation Act is basically a social legislation
designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our
surety. While the presumption of compensability and the theory of
aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have
been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that
the liberality of the law in general in favor of the working man still
subsists. As an official agent charged by law to implement social
justice guaranteed and affirmed by the Constitution, the ECC
should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding
claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in
the facts for inferring a work connection with the incident. This kind
of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the
compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New
Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its
implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of
labor." The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree
(P.D. 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits
thereunder, which includes protection to employees for a
reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a
reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the work
premises (Lazo v. ECC, 186 SCRA 574-575 [1990]).
Section 1, Rule III of the
Compensation provides that:

Amended

Rules

on

Employees'

Section 1. Grounds (a) For the injury and the

resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
injury must be the result of an employment
accident satisfying all the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the
place where his work require him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his
official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order of
the employer.
The concept of a "work place" referred to cannot always be literally
applied to a soldier in active duty status, as if he were a machine
operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a
particular fixed office. A soldier must go where his company is
stationed (Hinoguin v. ECC, 172 SCRA 350 [1990]). In the case at
bar, Pfc. Nitura's station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga
del Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was
with the permission of his superior officer having been directed to
go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. In carrying out said
directive, he had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the
two places. As held in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a place where
soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very
different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to
go by their commanding officer.
As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official
function at the time of the incident, it has been held that a soldier
on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty
status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours
a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers
at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is
on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be
on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by
going on an approved vacation leave. Even vacation leaves may, it

must be remembered, be pre-terminated by superior orders

(Hinoguin v. ECC, supra.). In the instant case, the deceased was
neither on vacation leave nor on an overnight pass when the
incident occurred. In fact, he was directed by his superior to check
on several personnel of the command then attending the dance
party, as attested to by his Battalion Commander. Hence, since Pfc.
Nitura was not on vacation leave, he did not effectively cease
performing "official functions."
More than that, it was correctly pointed out by petitioner Juanita
Nitura that the contention of the GSIS and the ECC that the
deceased did not sustain the injury while performing the
instructions of his superior would put to naught an actual factfinding and evaluation undertaken by the military that the death of
Pfc. Regino S. Nitura was in line of duty. She pointed out that the
Line of Duty Board of Officers which convened on March 4, 1986 at
the Hqs. 44th W Bn 1st Inf. (TABAK) Division, PA at Anastacio,
Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte made the following findings:
... a careful analysis of the situation surrounding
the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura 681349 PA of the
Delta Coy 44th Inf. Bn., IID PA proves that he was
performing official duties with this unit. (Annex "F"
of the Petition, Rollo, p. 24).
Hence, General Orders No. 109 dated November 19, 1986 declared
that:
3. Death of Private First Class Regino S. Nitura
681349, Philippine Army of 44th Infantry Batallion,
lst Infantry Division, Philippine Army who died on
March 3,1986 due to cardiorespiratory arrest at
Katipunan, San Jose, Zamboanga del Norte is
declared in Line of Duty.
(Annex "G" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 25).
Consequently, Leon O. Ridao Assistant Secretary, Legal Affairs, in
his 3rd Indorsement to the Administrator, Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office, dated January 26, 1988 (Annex 'H" of the Petition,

Rollo, p. 26) ordered the payment of the death gratuity under the
provisions of Republic Act NO. 610, as amended, to his rightful
heirs, as may be determined by the Claims Division, OTJAG AFP
(Memorandum for the Petitioner, Rollo, pp. 9395).
With regard respondents' contention that the claim is precluded by
the fact that the deceased was drunk and acted with notorious
negligence, it has been held that even if it could be shown that a
person drank intoxicating liquor it is incumbent upon the person
invoking drunkenness as a defense to show that said person was
extremely drunk. This is so because a person may take as much as
several bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor and still
remain sober and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. Thus,
intoxication which does not incapacitate the employee from
following his occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of
compensation, although intoxication may be a contributory cause
to his injury. It must be shown that the intoxication was the
proximate cause of death or injury and the burden of proof lies on
him who raises drunkenness as a defense (Vda. de Yohanan v.
Balena and WCC, 78 SCRA 348 [1977]). While it may be admitted
that the deceased drank intoxicating liquor at the dance party,
respondents ECC and GSIS have not established that the state of
drunkenness of the deceased is the proximate cause of his death.
On the other hand, notorious negligence has been defined as
something more than mere or simple negligence or contributory
negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to
disregard his own personal safety. Disobedience to rules, orders,
and/or prohibition does not in itself constitute notorious
negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end
his life (Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. WCC, 105 SCRA 675
[1981] reiterating Paez v. WCC, 7 SCRA 588 [1963]). As stressed by
the petitioner, it was not shown that the deceased had any
intention to end his life. Crossing a hanging bridge may seem
dangerous to an ordinary man but the deceased was a soldier who
had been trained and prepared for this kind of work. As explained
by his mother, petitioner herein, the deceased had seen the worse
and was not afraid or intimidated by the fact that he had to pass
through a hanging bridge. Facing danger had become second
nature to him (Rollo, pp. 98-99).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED, the decision of

respondent ECC dated May 24, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the petitioner and the illegimate minor children of the
deceased, namely Regina and Rogian, are AWARDED the full
benefits pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626,
as amended.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 90267 December 21, 1993

PERLITA
LOPEZ, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
Bernardo M. Norada for petitioner.
The Legal Services Group for respondent GSIS.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Article 181 of the
Labor Code and Section 16 of the Interim Rules of 1983 of the
decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC) dated June 28, 1989 in ECC Case No. 4331 entitled "Perlita
Lopez v. Government Service Insurance System," which affirmed
the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of
the claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, to claimantpetitioner, Perlita Lopez.
Petitioner's late husband, Pedro Lopez, was employed as a public
school teacher at the Urdaneta National High School, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan,
from
July 1, 1973 until his untimely demise on May 27, 1987.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

of

the

Philippines
COURT

On April 27, 1987, a memorandum was issued to Pedro Lopez by

the head of the school's Science Department and noted by Lino A.
Caringal, Sr. the principal, which reads:
In view of your long and competent teaching
experience as a PHYSICS Teacher and in
anticipation with (sic) the forthcoming Division
Search for Outstanding Improvised Secondary
Science Equipment for Teachers to be held at the
TAP Bldg. in Lingayen, Pangasinan on October 8
and 9, 1987, you are hereby designated to prepare

the MODEL DAM, UNHS official entry to said

contest.
In this connection, you are further advised to
complete this MODEL DAM on or before scheduled
date of the contest (Rollo, p. 54; emphasis
supplied).
Lopez complied with his superior's instruction and constructed an
improvised electric micro-dam, which he took home to enable him
to finish it before the deadline.
On May 27, 1987, at around 6:30 A.M., while he was engrossed in
his project, he in contact with a live wire was electrocuted. He was
immediately brought to a clinic for emergency treatment but was
pronounced dead on arrival. The death certificate showed that he
died of cardiac arrest due to accidental electrocution.
Petitioner then filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS, which
was denied on the ground that her husband's death did not arise
out and in the course of employment. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
She then elevated the case to the ECC for review, which affirmed
the decision rendered by the GSIS and dismissed the same.
The sole issue for us to resolve is whether or not respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the cause of
death of petitioner's husband is not work connected and therefore
it is not compensable under P.D. No. 626.
Respondent ECC argued that based on the certification issued by
the school principal, Lopez at the time of the accident was
supposed to report for duty to help in the enrollment of the 4th
year class, but he opted to remain at his house to finish the
project. Hence, respondent ECC contends, that the claim for death
benefits failed to satisfy the conditions set forth under Sec. 1 (a),
Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. Said
rule states:

For an injury and the resulting disability or death to

be compensable, the injury must be the result of
an employment accident, satisfying all the
following conditions:
1 The employee must have been injured at the
place where his work requires him to be;
2. The employee must have been performing his
official functions; and
3. If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order from
its superior.
The Employees Compensation Act is a social legislation whose
primordial purpose is to provide amelioration of the working class
of our society. As held in the case of Nitura v. Employees
Compensation Commission, 201 SCRA 278 (1991):
As an official agent charged by law to implement
social justice guaranteed and secured by the
Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal
attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims
for compensability especially where there is some
basis in the facts for inferring a work connection
with the incident. This kind of interpretation gives
meaning and substance to the compassionate
spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New
Labor Code which states that all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the Labor
Code including its implementing rules and
regulations should be resolved in favor of labor.
In the case of Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. v. Quiroz, 16
SCRA 784 (1966), we held:
xxx xxx xxx
An injury or accident befalls a man "in the course
of" his employment, if it occurs while he is doing

what a man may reasonably do within a time

during which he is employed, and at a place where
he may reasonably be during the time, 13 NACCA
LAW JOURNAL 28-29, And it "arises out of" the work
of the employer, when it results from a risk or
reasonably inherent in or incidental to the conduct
of such work or business.
"In the course of" points to the place and circumstances under
which the accident takes place and the time when it occurs. Of the
two phrases on work connection, "in the course of" is deemed
broader than "arising out of" (Fernandez and Quiason, Labor
Standards and Welfare Legislation, 1964 ed., pp. 563-564).
While the death of Pedro Lopez took place in his house and not in
his official work station, which is the school, he was still
discharging his function as the one in-charge of the project. He was
constrained to finish the project within a specific period of time and
he could only do so if he worked overtime in his house.
The death of petitioner's husband is service-connected even if it
happened during the summer vacation. He was still under the
employ of the government and there still existed an employeremployee relationship although teachers do not report for duty
during that period (Pepito v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 78 SCRA 35 [1977] ).
It can even be said that the conditions set forth under sec. 1, par.
(a), Rule III of the amended Rules on Employees Compensation,
have been complied with.
The said rule requires that the injury must have been sustained by
the employee at "the place where his work requires him to be" and
if the injury is sustained elsewhere the employees "must have
been executing an order from his superior." Inasmuch as Lopez had
to finish the project on the time for the contest scheduled on

October 5 and 9, 1987, it can be implied that Lopez was given

permission, if not direction, to perform his work at his house.
Respondent ECC cannot rely on the fact that Lopez had been
ordered by the school principal to report for duty to assist in the
enrollment of the fourth-year students on the day of the accident.
Lopez was electrocuted at 6:30 A.M. while he was working on the
model he was asked to build. To claim that he should have been in
school at the time he died in order to entitle his widow any
compensation benefits, is to strain good sense and logic.
For an injury to be compensable it is not important that the cause
therefor shall have taken place within the purview of his
employment, performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental
thereto, the injury sustained by reason thereof falls within the
protection of the law regardless of the place of injury (ECC
Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule III, Sec. 1; ECC
Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984; Enao v. Employees
Compensation Commission, 135 SCRA 660 [1985]).
The thrust of social justice is compassion for the poor. By denying
under the peculiar circumstances the claim of the petitioner for
benefits arising from the death of her husband, public respondents
ignored this public policy and committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the
decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission is
REVERSED. The Government Service Insurance System is
ORDERED to pay the death benefits to petitioner, with legal rate of
interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid, attorney's
fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the award and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.