PEOPLE VS.

TUANDA
Facts;
Respondent was suspended for practicing his profession until further notice from
the Supreme Court finding her guilty of violating BP 22.
Atty. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted
arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to
her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no
damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the
offense charged.
Issue;
WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted.
Ruling;
The Supreme Court ruled to DENY the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the
suspension. The court found Atty. Fe Tuanda guilty of an offense involving moral
turpitude citing Secs 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC

FACTS:
Ulep prays the Supreme Court to order the Legal Clinic to cease, issuing
advertisement similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes A and B
(p381). Legal Clinic admits the facts of publication of said advertisement
that claims that it is not engage in the practice of law but in the rendering of
legal support services through paralegals with the use of modern computers
and electronic machine.
ISSUE:
W/N the services offered by Legal Clinic as advertised by it constitutes
practice of law
Whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisement
complained of
HELD:
According to the IBP, notwithstanding the manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the 2 terms, legal support services and legal
services, common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. The use of the name the Legal Clinic gives
the impression that the respondent corporation is being managed by lawyers
and that it renders legal services. The advertisement in question is meant to
induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy. This is in violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.02 that is counseling
illegal activities.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court which requires that
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience.
Applying the case Cayetano vs. Monsod, the court agrees that the activities
of the respondent Legal Clinic constitute the practice of law. Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent does not represent
clients in court since law practice is not limited merely to court appearances.
Regarding the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the
Code of Profession Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known
his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, and objective information
or statement of facts. The proscription against advertising of legal services
rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.
Exceptions:

o Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the

standards of conduct imposed by the canon
o Ordinary, simple professional card. The card may contain only the
statement of his name, the law firm, address and branch of law
practiced.
Considering that Atty. Nogales who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of the legal clinic is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded with a warning that the repetition of the same or similar acts which
are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

IN RE CUNANAN
Facts:
This is the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 case.
As per the Rules of Court. A bar candidate must have a general average of 75% in
all subjects without failing below 50% in any subject.
In spite of this, the court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had
obtained an average of only:
72% in 1946
69% in 1947
70% in 1948
74% in 1949
In 1950 to 53, the 74% was raised to 75%
A few candidates who missed the above marks set by the courts approached
Congress. Congress made a bill, which was allowed by the president to become a
law without his signature. This is RA 972.
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar
examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and
those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent,
which has been invariably followed since 1950.
A breakdown of the numbers is on page 538.
The additional candidates who want to be admitted claim that they suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and of inadequacy of preparation.
Issue:
W/N RA 972 is valid.
Held:

RA 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession. The
public interest demands of the legal profession, adequate preparation and
efficiency, precisely more so as legal problems evolved by the times become more
difficult.
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to
1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this
Court during the years affecting the bar candidates concerned
Although the SC certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only the SC, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments
would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as in this case.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but
the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision remain vested in the
Supreme Court.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
"Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade and shall not diminish increase or modify substantive rights.
The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines."
The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the SC equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in the SC.

Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it
would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.
The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar
or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the
practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing
rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the
legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its
responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise
the practice of the legal profession.
There is no motive stated by the authorities for the qualification in RA 972 because
of this, the classification is fatally defective.
1.
That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2.
That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which
refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953
to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with
section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in
the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who
in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more,
without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having
passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision
has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the Chief Justice may
set.

In Re Integration of the IBP

Facts:
RA6397, An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds therefore, passed in September 1971, ordaining within two
years from its approval, the SC may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of
the Phil Bar.
SC formed Commission on Bar Integration. On December 1972, the Commission
earnestly recommended the integration of the bar.
Issue:
Does the Court have the power to integrate the Phil Bar?
Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?
Held:
The integration of the PhilBar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Phil.
This requires membership and financial support of every atty as conditions sine
qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attys of
the SC.
The term Bar refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the
Rolls. An integrated bar (or unified bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
First Issue
Court may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Courts
constitutional authority over the bar.
Second Issue
Integration is not violative of freedom of association as it does not compel a lawyer
to become a member of any group of which he is not already a member.

All it does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyers is already a member.
The dues exacted is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of
regulation.

ROYONG v OBLENA
FACTS:
Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape case
against the latter.
In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to have
intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the incident because
Oblena threatened to kill her family.
As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child
Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a
relationship and Royong consented to have intercourse with him.
The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed
from the roll of attorney eventhough the acts of the Royong before and after
the rape incident showed that she is more of a sweetheart than a victim
because of the circumstances behind the incident
The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately
alleging in his application in the bar in1958 that he is a person of good moral
character while having an illicit and adulterous relationship with Angeles
who is not only the aunt of Royong but also has a legal husband in the
province
Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different
from those originally charged in the complaint but the court overruled his
petition
After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used his
knowledge in law to commit immoral acts without incurring any criminal
liability; B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with
Angeles, his common-law wife, even after he became a lawyer and C.)
Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character in his application to
take the bar.
ISSUE:
W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with
Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause Oblenas
disbarment
HELD:
YES!
Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or
adultery and he is not guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment

enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, the enumeration is
not exclusive and the power of the court to exclude unworthy members of
the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident to the proper administration of
justice and can be exercised even without any statutory authority, in all cases
unless properly prohibited by statutes.
American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of law. The loss requires suspension or disbarment eventhough the
statues do not explicitly specify that as a ground of disbarment.
Oblenas argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral
character when he filed his application to take the bar examination is wrong.
Ones own approximation of himself is not a gauge of his moral character.
Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. Moral character is what the person really is and not what
he other people thinks he is.
His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having carnal
knowledge with her shows the scheming mind of Oblena and his taking
advantage of his knowledge of the law.
Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed moral
ascendancy over her. Oblena took advantage of Royongs trust on him.
Oblenas contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the
present complain which is entirely different from the original complaint filed is
untenable. There is nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor General to charge in
his complaint the same offence charged in the original complaint. What the law
provides is that if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed against
the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint accompanied by the
evidence introduced in his investigation.

IN RE AL ARGOSINO
FACTS:
Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking
the Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide from a hazing incident. Later in his
sentence, he was granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme
Court praying that he be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Rolls of
Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral character he now possess, he
presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications among others from: two (2)
senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious order. In
addition, he, together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship
foundation in honor of their hazing victim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath, sign the
Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law.
HELD:
YES. Petition granted.
RATIO:
Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed
the required good moral character as required before taking the Lawyers Oath and
to sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he
is not inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino
was finally reminded that the Lawyers Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality
before the practice of law, and that the community assistance he had started is
expected to continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society.

TAN VS. SABANDAL

DOCTRINES:
The practice of law is not a matter of right.
No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness or candor.
FACTS:
Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his
oath in view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice
of law. Since then, he had filed numerous petitions for him to be allowed to take
his lawyer's oath.
Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province
where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to
be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his
comment that he is not aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would
disqualify him to from admission to the Bar. However, he added that respondent
has a pending civil case before his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in
which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, is
alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of
land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible
of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank. The
mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and
respondent has not redeemed the land since then.
The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable
settlement canceled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his
mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD
for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by
the aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of
possession or ownership over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a
certain sum for the loan and interest.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law
considering that he already submitted three (3) testimonials regarding his good

moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.
HELD:
His petition must be denied.
Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character.
It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of
Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the
property which he could not but have known was a public land. This was
manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a
manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be
erased by the termination of the case and where no determination of guilt or
innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad
reflection of his sense of honor and fair dealings.
Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for
Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several
petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and
truthfulness.
Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been
defined as "including at least common dishonesty." It has also been held that no
moral qualification for membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.

TACPUCAR VS TAPUCAR

Facts:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez
Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the
ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena
(Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times
for conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740,
resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was
meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay, while in Administrative
Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on
January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated canon 1 of the code of professional
responsibility
Ruling:
Yes.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with
the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such
positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been

compendiously described as moral character. To achieve such end, every lawyer

needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and
thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of
justice.

IN RE GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco
in 1956. He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after
serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the
President. He was released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime.
Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by
reason of the latters conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is
without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he
was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It
merely remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be
judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon
(which he invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by treachery and
aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his
official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of
motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his
being purged from the profession.