Cases 1-5

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA

HYATT (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN),
Petitioner,
- versus -

G.R. No. 164939

HON. VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATORBUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALI
N and HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------x
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA
HYATT (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN),
Petitioner,
- versus -

G.R. No. 172303

Present:

HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondent.

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
June 6, 2011

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DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before

this

Court

are

two

consolidated

petitions

filed

by

petitioner SamahanngmgaManggagawasa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended. The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 164939, assails the Resolutions dated October
3, 2003[1] and August 13, 2004[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78364, which dismissed
petitioners petition for review at the CA for being the wrong remedy. The second petition, docketed as G.R.
No. 172303, assails the Decision[3]dated December 16, 2005 and Resolution[4] dated April 12, 2006 of the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 77478, modifying the judgment of the Voluntary Arbitrator in NCMB-NCR-CRN-07008-01.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner SamahanngmgaManggagawasa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL is a duly registered union and
the certified bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Hyatt Regency Manila, a five-star
hotel owned and operated by respondent Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. On January 31, 2001, Hyatts
General Manager, David C. Pacey, issued a Memorandum [5] informing all hotel employees that hotel security
have been instructed to conduct a thorough bag inspection and body frisking in every entrance and exit of the
hotel. He enjoined employees to comply therewith. Copies of the Memorandum were furnished petitioner.
On February 3, 2001, AngelitoCaragdag, a waiter at the hotels Cafe Al Fresco restaurant and a
director of the union, refused to be frisked by the security personnel. The incident was reported to the hotels
Human Resources Department (HRD), which issued a Memorandum [6] to Caragdag on February 5, 2001,
requiring him to explain in writing within forty-eight (48) hours from notice why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him. The following day, on February 6, 2001, Caragdag again refused to be frisked by the
security personnel.Thus, on February 8, 2001, the HRD issued another Memorandum[7] requiring him to
explain.
On February 14, 2001, the HRD imposed on Caragdag the penalty of reprimand for the February 3,
2001 incident, which was considered a first offense, and suspended him for three days for the February 6,
2001 incident, which was considered as a second offense.[8] Both penalties were in accordance with the hotels
Code of Discipline.
Subsequently, on February 22, 2001, when Mike Moral, the manager of Hyatts Cafe Al Fresco and
Caragdags immediate superior, was about to counsel two staff members, Larry Lacambacal and Allan Alvaro,
at the training room, Caragdag suddenly opened the door and yelled at the two with an enraged look. In a
disturbing

voice

he

said, Angtitigastalagangulonyo. Sinabikonasainyonahuwagkayongmakikipagusapsa

management habangongoing pa angkaso! (You are very stubborn. I told you not to speak to management

while the case is ongoing!) Moral asked Caragdag what the problem was and informed him that he was simply
talking to his staff. Moral also told Caragdag that he did not have the right to interrupt and intimidate him
during his counseling session with his staff.
On February 23, 2001, Moral issued a Memorandum[9] requiring Caragdag to explain his actions in
the training room. Caragdag submitted his written explanation on February 25, 2001[10] narrating that he was
informed by someone that Lacambacal and Alvaro were requesting for his assistance because Moral had
invited them to the training room. Believing that he should advise the two that they should be accompanied by
a union officer to any inquisition, he went to the training room. However, before he could enter the door,
Moral blocked him. Thus, he told Lacambacal and Alvaro that they should be assisted by a union
representative before giving any statement to management. Caragdag also prayed that Moral be investigated
for harassing union officers and union members.
On February 28, 2001, Moral found the explanations unsatisfactory. In a Memorandum[11] issued on
the same date, Moral held Caragdag liable for Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Action (OSDA) 3.01 of the
hotels Code of Discipline, i.e., threatening, intimidating, coercing, and provoking to a fight your superior for
reasons directly connected with his discharge of official duty. Thus, Caragdag was imposed the penalty of
seven days suspension in accordance with the hotels Code of Discipline.
Still later, on March 2, 2001, Caragdag committed another infraction. At 9:35 a.m. on the said date,
Caragdag left his work assignment during official hours without prior permission from his Department
Head. He was required to submit an explanation, but the explanation [12] he submitted was found
unsatisfactory. On March 17, 2001, Moral foundCaragdag liable for violating OSDA 3.07, i.e., leaving work
assignment during official working hours without prior permission from the department head or immediate
superior, and suspended him for three days.[13]
Because of the succession of infractions he committed, the HRD also required Caragdag to explain
on May 11, 2001 why the hotels OSDA 4.32 (Committing offenses which are penalized with three [3]
suspensions during a 12-month period) should not be enforced against him. [14] An investigation board was
formed after receipt of Caragdags written explanation, and the matter was set for hearing on May 19,
2001. However, despite notice of the scheduled hearing, both Caragdag and the Union President failed to
attend. Thereafter, the investigating board resolved on the said date to dismiss Caragdag for violation of OSDA
4.32.[15] Caragdag appealed but the investigating board affirmed its resolution after hearing on May 24, 2001.

On June 1, 2001, the hotel, through Atty. Juancho A. Baltazar, sent Caragdag a Notice of Dismissal,
[16]

the pertinent portion of which reads:

Based on the findings of the Investigation Board dated May 19, 2001 which was
approved by the General Manager Mr. David Pacey on the same day and which did not merit
any reversal or modification after the hearing on your appeal on May 24, 2001, the penalty of
DISMISSAL is therefore affirmed to take effect on June 1, 2001.
Caragdags dismissal was questioned by petitioner, and the dispute was referred to voluntary

arbitration upon agreement of the parties. On May 6, 2002, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision, [17] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Arbiter rules that the three separate
suspensions of Mr.Caragdag are valid, his dismissal is legal and OSDA 4.32 of Hyatts Code
of Discipline is reasonable.
However, for humanitarian considerations, Hyatt is hereby ordered to grant financial
assistance to Mr.Caragdag in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP100,000.00).
In finding the three separate suspensions of Caragdag valid, the Voluntary Arbitrator reasoned that the
union officers and members had no right to breach company rules and regulations on security and employee
discipline on the basis of certain suspicions against management and an ongoing CBA negotiation
standoff. The Voluntary Arbitrator also found that when Caragdag advised Lacambacal and Alvaro not to give
any statement, he threatened and intimidated his superior while the latter was performing his duties. Moreover,
there is no reason why he did not arrange his time-off with the Department Head concerned. Thus, Caragdag
was validly dismissed pursuant to OSDA 4.32 of Hyatts Code of Discipline, which states that an employee
who commits three different acts of misconduct within a twelve (12)-month period commits serious
misconduct.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision while respondent filed a motion for partial
reconsideration. However, the Voluntary Arbitrator denied both motions on May 26, 2003.[18]
On August 1, 2003, petitioner assailed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator before the CA in a
petition for certiorari which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78364. [19] As mentioned at the outset, the CA
dismissed the petition outright for being the wrong remedy. The CA explained:
Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that the
proper mode of appeal from judgments, final orders or resolution of voluntary arbitrators is
through a Petition for Review which should be filed within fifteen (15) days from the receipt
of notice of judgment, order or resolution of the voluntary arbitrator.

Considering that petitioner intends this petition to be a Petition for Certiorari, the
Court hereby resolves to dismiss the petition outright for being an improper mode of appeal.
Even if this Court treats the instant petition as a Petition for Review, still the Court
has no alternative but to dismiss the same for having been filed out of time. As admitted by
the petitioner it received the Order dated 26 May 2003 denying their motion for
reconsideration on 02 June 2003. The fifteen (15) day period within which to appeal through
a Petition for Review is until June 17, 2003. The petitioner filed the present petition
on August 1, 2003, way beyond the reglementary period provided for by the Rules.[20]
Petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal, but the motion was denied by the CA. Thus,
petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No. 164939.
In the meantime, on June 30, 2003, respondent also filed a petition for review[21] with the CA on the ground
that the Voluntary Arbitrator committed a grievous error in awarding financial assistance to Caragdag despite
his finding that the dismissal due to serious misconduct was valid. On December 16, 2005, the CA
promulgated a decision in CA-G.R. SP. No. 77478 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 6, 2002 of Voluntary Arbitrator
Buenaventura C. Magsalin is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by DELETING the award
of financial assistance in the amount of P100,000.00 to AngelitoCaragdag.
SO ORDERED.[22]
In deleting the award of financial assistance to Caragdag, the CA cited the case of Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Abad,[23] which held that the grant of separation pay or other financial assistance to an
employee dismissed for just cause is based on equity and is a measure of social justice, awarded to an
employee who has been validly dismissed if the dismissal was not due to serious misconduct or causes that
reflected adversely on the moral character of the employee. In this case, the CA agreed with the findings of the
Voluntary Arbitrator that Caragdag was validly dismissed due to serious misconduct. Accordingly, financial
assistance should not have been awarded to Caragdag. The CA also noted that it is the employers prerogative
to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to
provide certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to ensure compliance therewith.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence,
petitioner filed before us a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 172303.
Considering that G.R. Nos. 164939 and 172303 have the same origin, involve the same parties, and
raise interrelated issues, the petitions were consolidated.
Petitioner raises the following issues:

In G.R. No. 164939

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE SAME IS AN IMPROPER MODE OF
APPEAL.[24]
In G.R. No. 172303
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARD OF FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE IN THE AMOUNT OF P100,000.00 TO ANGELITO CARAGDAG.[25]
The issues for our resolution are thus two-fold: first, whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the
petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground that the same is an improper mode of appeal; and second,
whether the CA erred in deleting the award of financial assistance in the amount of P100,000.00 to Caragdag.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that because decisions rendered by voluntary arbitrators are issued
under Title VII-A of the Labor Code, they are not covered by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, by express provision of Section 2 thereof. Section 2, petitioner points out, expressly provides that
Rule 43 shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Hence, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy for questioning the decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator, and petitioner having availed of such remedy, the CA erred in declaring that the petition was filed
out of time since the petition was filed within the sixty (60)-day reglementary period.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that the CA acted correctly in dismissing the petition
for certiorari for being the wrong mode of appeal. It stresses that Section 1 of Rule 43 clearly states that it is
the governing rule with regard to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of voluntary
arbitrators. Respondent contends that the voluntary arbitrators authorized by law include the voluntary
arbitrators appointed and accredited under the Labor Code, as they are considered as included in the term
quasi-judicial instrumentalities.
Petitioners arguments fail to persuade.
In the case of SamahanngmgaManggagawasa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v. Bacungan,[26]we
repeated the well-settled rule that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via
petition for review under Rule 43. We held that:
The question on the proper recourse to assail a decision of a voluntary arbitrator has
already been settled in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees, where the Court held that the decision or award of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in
line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (now
embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like those of the quasi-

judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein, and consistent with the
original purpose to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications
of all quasi-judicial entities.
Subsequently, in Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, and Nippon Paint Employees UnionOlalia v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the aforequoted ruling. In Alcantara, the
Court held that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 43, the ruling in Luzon Development
Bank still stands. The Court explained, thus:
The provisions may be new to the Rules of Court but it is far from being
a new law. Section 2, Rules 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as presently
worded, is nothing more but a reiteration of the exception to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, as provided for in Section 9, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court took into account this exception in Luzon Development
Bank but, nevertheless, held that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators issued
pursuant to the Labor Code do not come within its ambit x xx
Furthermore, Sections 1, 3 and 4, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:
SECTION 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasijudicial functions. Among these agencies are the x xx, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.
x xxx
SEC. 3. Where to appeal. - An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the
Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner therein provided, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
SEC. 4. Period of appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its
last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court or agency a quo. x xx. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, upon receipt on May 26, 2003 of the Voluntary Arbitrators Resolution denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration, petitioner should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary
period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari.

Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cogent reason in this case
to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such
rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be
disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective
law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration
of justice.Rulesare not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a
vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct
forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties
of the procedural rules.[27]
On the second issue, petitioner argues that Caragdag is entitled to financial assistance in the amount
of P100,000 on humanitarian considerations. Petitioner stresses that Caragdags infractions were due to his
being a union officer and his acts did not show moral depravity. Petitioner also adds that, while it is true that
the award of financial assistance is given only for dismissals due to causes specified under Articles 283 and
284 of the Labor Code, as amended, this Court has, by way of exception, allowed the grant of financial
assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes based on equity.
Respondent on the other hand, asserts that the CA correctly deleted the award of financial assistance
erroneously granted to Caragdag considering that he was found guilty of serious misconduct and other acts
adversely reflecting on his moral character. Respondent stresses that Caragdagswillful defiance of the hotels
security policy, disrespect and intimidation of a superior, and unjustifiable desertion of his work assignment
during working hours without permission, patently show his serious and gross misconduct as well as amoral
character.[28]
Again, petitioners arguments lack merit.
The grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes is
based on equity.[29]In Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,[30] we ruled that severance
compensation, or whatever name it is called, on the ground of social justice shall be allowed only when
the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconduct or for causes which reflect adversely on the
employees moral character. The Court succinctly discussed the propriety of the grant of separation pay in
this wise:
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice
only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the
valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral
turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not

be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or

whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding
rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the
punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the
wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the
company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that
he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect
a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going
to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those
who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because
it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly
will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane
society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved
privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than
can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social
justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply
because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the
protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have
tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character.[31]
Here, Caragdags dismissal was due to several instances of willful disobedience to the reasonable rules and
regulations prescribed by his employer. The Voluntary Arbitrator pointed out that according to the hotels
Code of Discipline, an employee who commits three different acts of misconduct within a twelve (12)month period commits serious misconduct.He stressed that Caragdags infractions were not even spread in
a period of twelve (12) months, but rather in a period of a little over a month. Records show the various
violations of the hotels rules and regulations were committed by Caragdag. He was suspended for
violating the hotel policy on bag inspection and body frisking. He was likewise suspended for threatening
and intimidating a superior while the latter was counseling his staff. He was again suspended for leaving
his work assignment without permission. Evidently, Caragdags acts constitute serious misconduct.
In Piedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.,[32]we ruled that a series of irregularities when put
together may constitute serious misconduct, which under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, is a
just cause for dismissal.
Caragdags dismissal being due to serious misconduct, it follows that he should not be entitled to
financial assistance. To rule otherwise would be to reward him for the grave misconduct he
committed. We must emphasize that social justice is extended only to those who deserve its compassion.
[33]

WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are DENIED. The October 3, 2003 and
August 13, 2004 Court of Appeals Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 78364, as well as the Court of
Appeals December 16, 2005 Decision and April 12, 2006 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
77478, are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that the dismissal was valid. However, due to humanitarian cons
iderations, it ordered financial assistance. Petitioner assailed the decision of the Voluntary Arbit
rator before the CA in a petition for certiorari which was dismissed outright for being the wrong
remedy. The CA explained that Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
provides that the proper mode of appeal from judgments, final orders or resolution of voluntary
arbitrators is through a Petition for Review which should be filed within fifteen (15) days from th
e receipt of notice of judgment, order or resolution of the voluntary arbitrator. Considering that
petitioner intended the petition to be a Petition for Certiorari, the Court hereby resolves to dismi
ss the petition outright for being an improper mode of appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy for assailing the decision of Voluntary Arbitrator is a petition
for certiorari.
RULING:
No. Decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for review un
der Rule 43. Hence, upon receipt of the Voluntary Arbitrators Resolution denying petitioners m
otion for reconsideration, petitioner should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day re
glementary period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cogent reason in this case
to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disre
gard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural r
ules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenie
nce of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the
orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or comp
licate litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard fol
lowing judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are we
ll served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules.

PANAY RAILWAYS INC.,

Petitioner,

G. R. No. 154061
Present:

- versus HEVA MANAGEMENT and DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION,
PAMPLONA
AGROINDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION,
and
SPOUSES CANDELARIA DAYOT and
EDMUNDO DAYOT,
Respondents.

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

PEREZ,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 25, 2012

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DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The present Petition stems from the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City of
a Notice of Appeal for petitioners failure to pay the corresponding docket fees.
The facts are as follows:
On 20 April 1982, petitioner Panay Railways Inc., a government-owned and controlled
corporation, executed a Real Estate Mortgage Contract covering several parcels of lands, including Lot
No. 6153, in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) to secure 20 million worth of loan and credit
accommodations. Petitioner excluded certain portions of Lot No. 6153: that already sold to Shell Co., Inc.
referred to as 6153-B, a road referred to as 6153-C, and a squatter area known as 6153-D. [1]
Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the bank to extra-judicially foreclose
the mortgaged properties including Lot No. 6153. On 20 January 1986, a Certificate of Sale was issued in
favor of the bank as the highest bidder and purchaser. Consequently, the sale of Lot No. 6153 was
registered with the Register of Deeds on 28 January 1986 and annotated at the back of the transfer
certificates of title (TCT) covering the mortgaged properties.
Thereafter, TRB caused the consolidation of the title in its name on the basis of a Deed of Sale
and an Affidavit of Consolidation after petitioner failed to exercise the right to redeem the properties. The
corresponding TCTs were subsequently issued in the name of the bank.
On 12 February 1990, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession against petitioner. During the
proceedings, petitioner, through its duly authorized manager and officer-in-charge and with the assistance

of counsel, filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for Suspension of the Petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession.[2] The pertinent portions of the Manifestation and Motion state:
3. That after going over the records of this case and the case of Traders Royal
Bank vs. Panay Railway, Inc., Civil Case No. 18280, PRI is irrevocably withdrawing its
Motion for Suspension referred to in paragraph 1 above, and its Motion for
Reconsideration referred in paragraph 2 above and will accept and abide by the
September 21, 1990 Order denying the Motion For Suspension;
4. That PRI recognizes and acknowledges petitioner (TRB) to be the
registered owner of Lot 1-A; Lot 3834; Lot 6153; Lot 6158; Lot 6159, and Lot 5
covered by TCT No. T-84233; T-84234; T-84235; T-84236; T-84237, T-84238 and T45724 respectively, free of liens and encumbrances, except that portion sold to Shell
Co. found in Lot 5. That Petitioner (TRB) as registered owner is entitled to peaceful
ownership and immediate physical possession of said real properties.
5. That PRI further acknowledges that the Provincial Sheriff validly foreclosed
the Real Estate Mortgage erected by PRI due to failure to pay the loan of
20,000,000.00. That TRB was the purchaser of these lots mentioned in paragraph 4
above at Sheriffs Auction Sale as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated January 20,
1986 and the Certificates of Titles issued to Petitioner;
6. That PRI further manifests that it has no past, present or future
opposition to the grant of the Writ of Possession to TRB over the parcels of land
mentioned in paragraph 4 above and subject of this Petition and even assuming
arguendo that it has, PRI irrevocably waives the same. That PRI will even assist
TRB in securing possession of said properties as witness against squatters, illegal
occupants, and all other possible claimants;
7. That upon execution hereof, PRI voluntarily surrenders physical possession
and control of the premises of these lots to TRB, its successors or its assigns,
together with all the buildings, warehouses, offices, and all other permanent
improvements constructed thereon and will attest to the title and possession of
petitioner over said real properties. (Emphasis supplied)
TCT No. T-84235 mentioned in the quoted portion above is Lot No. 6153, which is under
dispute.
It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial foreclosure included some
excluded properties in the mortgage contract. Thus, on 19 August 1994, it filed a Complaint for Partial
Annulment of Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum; Cancellation of Title No. T89624; and Declaration of Ownership of Real Property with Reconveyance plus Damages. [3]
It then filed an Amended Complaint [4] on 1 January 1995 and again filed a Second Amended
Complaint[5] on 8 December 1995.
Meanwhile, respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on these grounds: (1) petitioner
had no legal capacity to sue; (2) there was a waiver, an abandonment and an extinguishment of petitioners
claim or demand; (3) petitioner failed to state a cause of action; and (4) an indispensable party, namely
TRB, was not impleaded.

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order [6] granting the Motion to Dismiss of respondents. It
held that the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner was a judicial admission of TRBs ownership of
the disputed properties. The trial court pointed out that the Manifestation was executed by petitioners duly
authorized representative with the assistance of counsel. This admission thus operated as a waiver barring
petitioner from claiming otherwise.
On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the necessary docket fees.
Immediately thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of nonpayment of
docket fees.
In its Opposition,[7] petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet familiar with the revisions of the
Rules of Court that became effective only on 1 July 1997. Its representative was likewise not informed by
the court personnel that docket fees needed to be paid upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal.
Furthermore, it contended that the requirement for the payment of docket fees was not mandatory. It
therefore asked the RTC for a liberal interpretation of the procedural rules on appeals.
On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order [8] dismissing the appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule
41[9] of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the Order [10] alleging that the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the case after the former had filed the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner also alleged that the
court erred in failing to relax procedural rules for the sake of substantial justice.
On 25 November 1997, the RTC denied the Motion.[11]
On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and
that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied procedural rules.
On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision [12] on the Petition. It held that while the
failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period was a ground
for the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
jurisdiction to do so belonged to the CA and not the trial court. Thus, appellate court ruled that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal and set aside the latters assailed Order dated
29 September 1997.
Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration.
It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CAs Decision, this Court issued Administrative
Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which took effect on 1 May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of
Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The circular expressly provided that trial courts
may, motuproprio or upon motion, dismiss an appeal for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of

docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. Subsequently, Circular No. 48-2000 [13] was
issued on 29 August 2000 and was addressed to all lower courts.
By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the questioned Orders of the trial court by
issuing the assailed Amended Decision[14] in the present Petition granting respondents Motion for
Reconsideration.
The CAs action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that SC
Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given retroactive effect. It also alleged that the CA should consider
the case as exceptionally meritorious. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rexes V. Alejano, explained that he was
yet to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court, which became effective a little over a month
before he filed the Notice of Appeal. He was thus not aware that the nonpayment of docket fees might
lead to the dismissal of the case.
On 30 May 2002, the CA issued the assailed Resolution [15] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs dismissal of the Notice of Appeal.
Petitioner contends that the CA had exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal at the time of
filing. Alternatively, petitioner argues that while the appeal was dismissible for failure to pay docket fees,
substantial justice demands that procedural rules be relaxed in this case.
The Petition has no merit.
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending
and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a
person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that a person has no
vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure. [16] More so when, as in this
case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there were no
substantive rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal.
The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal has no merit. When
this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41 through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTCs dismissal of
the action may be considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the CA committed no
reversible error when it sustained the dismissal of the appeal, taking note of its directive on the matter
prior to the promulgation of its Decision.

As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia,[17] we have held that the payment of the full amount of
the docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. [18]
Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with the law.[19]
We have repeatedly stated that the term substantial justice is not a magic wand that would
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in prejudice to apartys substantive rights. Like
all other rules, they are required to be followed, except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they
may be relaxed to relieve litigants of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of their
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. [20]
We cannot consider counsels failure to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court as a
persuasive reason to relax the application of the Rules. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel
binds the client. This principle is based on the rule that any act performed by lawyers within the scope of
their general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client. Consequently, the mistake or
negligence of the counsel of petitioner may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it.
[21]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

RISCILLA ALMA JOSE,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 158239

Present:

- versus -

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

RAMON C. JAVELLANA,
January 25, 2012
ET AL.,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending partys motion to
dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or
settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to
execute the order.[1] Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the
denial within which to appeal the denial.[2]
Antecedents
On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration
of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land with areas
of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that
Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the
registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration being undertaken by
Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son
and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose,
would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration. [3]
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendors
undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did
not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and,
instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of
converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision. [4] Faced with Priscillas refusal to
comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for specific performance, injunction, and
damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No.
79-M-97 entitled Ramon C. Javellana, represented by Atty. Guillermo G. Blanco v. Priscilla Alma Jose.
In Civil Case No. 79-M-97, Javellana averred that upon the execution of the deed of conditional
sale, he had paid the initial amount of P80,000.00 and had taken possession of the parcels of land; that he
had paid the balance of the purchase price to Juvenal on different dates upon Juvenals representation that
Margarita had needed funds for the expenses of registration and payment of real estate tax; and that in
1996, Priscilla had called to inquire about the mortgage constituted on the parcels of land; and that he had
told her then that the parcels of land had not been mortgaged but had been sold to him. [5]
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be
ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor. [6]
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription;
and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. [7]

The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss on February 4, 1998. [8] However, upon her
motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself on June 24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss,
opining that Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her not being bound to comply with the
terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being a party thereto; that there was no evidence showing the
payment of the balance; that he had never demanded the registration of the land from Margarita or
Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific performance against Margarita or Juvenal; and that his claim of
paying the balance was not credible.[9]
Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation of evidence of full payment
was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings; and that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint were hypothetically admitted and
only the allegations in the complaint should be considered in resolving the motion. [10] Nonetheless, he
attached to the motion for reconsideration the receipts showing the payments made to Juvenal.
[11]

Moreover, he maintained that Priscilla could no longer succeed to any rights respecting the parcels of

land because he had meanwhile acquired absolute ownership of them; and that the only thing that she, as
sole heir, had inherited from Margarita was the obligation to register them under the Torrens System. [12]
On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb
the order of June 24, 1999.[13]
Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order, [14] which the RTC
gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).
In his appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259), Javellana submitted the following as errors of the RTC,
[15]

to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT
THAT PLAINTIFF-APELLANT HAD LONG COMPLIED WITH THE FULL
PAYMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND HAD IMMEDIATELY TAKEN ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL
POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTY UPON THE SIGNING OF THE CONDITIONAL
DEED OF SALE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN MAKING TWO CONFLICTING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROVISION OF THE CIVIL [CODE],
PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 1911, IN THE LIGHT OF THE TERMS OF THE
CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLEE BEING
NOT A PARTY TO THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY HER
MOTHER IN FAVOR OF PLAINTFF-

APPELLANT IS NOT BOUND THEREBY AND CAN NOT BE COMPELLED TO DO

THE ACT REQUIRED IN THE SAID DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITHOUT HEARING THE CASE ON THE MERITS.
Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable; that the appeal was not
perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping. [16]
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail
the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455). On
August 6, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari,[17] finding that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding that it only committed, at most, an
error of judgment correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged orders.
On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259,
[18]

reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and remanding the records to the

RTC for further proceedings in accordance with law. [19] The CA explained that the complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action; that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the rights and obligations of Margarita
with respect to the parcels of land; that Margaritas undertaking under the contract was not a purely
personal obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla, who was consequently bound to comply with the
obligation; that the action had not yet prescribed due to its being actually one for quieting of title that was
imprescriptible brought by Javellana who had actual possession of the properties; and that based on the
complaint, Javellana had been in actual possession since 1979, and the cloud on his title had come about
only when Priscilla had started dumping filling materials on the premises. [20]
On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, [21] stating that it decided to give
due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention to delay the
proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an extension of time to file his appellants brief; that current
jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to present their cases free from the constraints of
technicalities, such that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was given the
discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.
Issues
Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in not outrightly dismissing
Javellanas appeal because: (a) the June 21, 2000 RTC order was not appealable; (b) the notice of appeal
had been filed belatedly by three days; and (c) Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA
a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of his appeal pending
in the CA. She posited that, even if the CAs decision to entertain the appeal was affirmed, the RTCs

dismissal of the complaint should nonetheless be upheld because the complaint stated no cause of action,
and the action had already prescribed.
On his part, Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by Priscilla involved questions of
fact not proper for the Court to review through petition for review on certiorari; that the June 21, 2000
RTC order, being a final order, was appealable; that his appeal was perfected on time; and that he was not
guilty of forum shopping because at the time he filed the
petition for certiorari the CA had not yet rendered a decision in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 68259, and because the issue of ownership raised in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 was different from
the issue of grave abuse of discretion raised in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.
Ruling
The petition for review has no merit.
I
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable

Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an appeal considering that
Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a
motion for reconsideration.
Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC
because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an
interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido
v. Tortogo,[22] thuswise:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The
first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something
else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the
trial
on
the
merits
is
yet
to
be
held
and
the
judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the
trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct
remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable;[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action
for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is
apt:
xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting
multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a
considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the
lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in
the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then
is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final
order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly
clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order. [24]
II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out that he
received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on
July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration through
the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days
from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that having filed his
notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days
beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal
is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)

Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16,
2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration
interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only on July 19,
2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering that the
Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] by which an aggrieved
party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals
to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. [26]

The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively extended
the fresh period rule to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested
rights in rules of procedure.[27] According toDe los Santos v. Vda. deMangubat:[28]
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not

come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statues they may be given retroactive effect on actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested
rights in rules of procedure.
The fresh period rule is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days
within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is
denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the
"fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the fresh period rule will amount to
injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued
two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order
in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties
receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the
benefit of the fresh period rule while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the
instant case, will not.[29]
Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh
period rule.
III
No forum shopping was committed

Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a notice of appeal and a
petition for certiorari against the same orders. As earlier noted, he denies that his doing so violated the
policy against forum shopping.
The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping in In Re: Reconstitution of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and Issuance of Owners Duplicate Certificates of
Title In Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:[30]

Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of
two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in
the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of
action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litispendentia are present,
and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is
forum shopping. For litispendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there
must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other.

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same
essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter
and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct
causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

Should Javellanas present appeal now be held barred by his filing of the petition for certiorari in
the CA when his appeal in that court was yet pending?
We are aware that in Young v. Sy,[31] in which the petitioner filed a notice of appeal to elevate the
orders concerning the dismissal of her case due to non-suit to the CA and a petition for certiorari in the
CA assailing the same orders four months later, the Court ruled that the successive filings of the notice of
appeal and the petition for certiorari to attain the same objective of nullifying the trial courts dismissal
orders constituted forum shopping that warranted the dismissal of both cases. The Court said:
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition
for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced
the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA
the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this Court by
way of the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of litispendentia are present
between the two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth Division, correctly noted, both
suits are founded on exactly the same facts and refer to the same subject
matterthe RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for
failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC
orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are
all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata in
the other.
xxxx
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy. The petitioner cannot hedge
her case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in the event that the ordinary appeal lags
significantly behind the others, she cannot post facto validate this circumstance as a
demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not been speedy or adequate enough, in order
to justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if adopted, would sanction the filing of
multiple suits in multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner couches it, becomes a
precautionary measure for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a favorable
decision. This is the very evil that the proscription on forum shopping seeks to put right.
In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated that the grave evil sought to be
avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of
two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage
of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several
different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, the
Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these
rules results in the dismissal of the case.[32]

The same result was reached in Zosa v. Estrella,[33] which likewise involved the successive filing
of a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari to challenge the same orders, with the Court upholding
the CAs dismissals of the appeal and the petition for certiorari through separate decisions.

Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here even if the orders of the RTC
being challenged through appeal and the petition for certiorari were the same. The unjustness exists
because the appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought different objectives. In his appeal in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and determined in due
course by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective to prevent (Priscilla) from
developing the subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally
resolved, as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455. [34]
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping designed to
prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same
cause of action, would not materialize considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the
unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment
after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No.
68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.
Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent remedial approaches to be the result
of the tactical misjudgment by Javellanas counsel on the efficacy of the appeal to stave off his caretakers
eviction from the parcels of land and to prevent the development of them into a residential or commercial
subdivision pending the appeal. In the petition for certiorari, Javellana explicitly averred that his appeal
was inadequate and not speedy to prevent private respondent Alma Jose and her transferee/assignee xxx
from developing and disposing of the subject property to other parties to the total deprivation of
petitioners rights of possession and ownership over the subject property, and that the dismissal by the
RTC had emboldened private respondents to fully develop the property and for respondent Alma Jose to
file an ejectment case against petitioners overseer xxx. [35] Thereby, it became far-fetched that Javellana
brought the petition for certiorari in violation of the policy against forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on November 20, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ G.R. No. 141524
FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,
LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO Present :

CABACUNGAN,
Petitioners, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS
OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO,
namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all
surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.
ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding
Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Respondents.Promulgated :

September 14, 2005

x-----------------------------------------x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Petitioners

Domingo

Neypes,

Luz

Faustino,

Rogelio

Faustino,

LolitoVictoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for

annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion
with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands,
Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe,
Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents)
filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by
petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of
Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent
heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent
Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners
motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in
default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the
respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them

was improper; (2) the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was
denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be
determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of
del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters
that could be determined only after trial.[1]

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying
their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the
issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting
for the trial proper.

In an order[2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly
received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15 th day
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998,
the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration [3]which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners
filed a notice of appeal[4] and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it
was filed eight days late.[5] This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998.[6]

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the
Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their
notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to
run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the
trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal.[7]

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It
ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998
or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
According to the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the
Rules. It held further:

Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the
(P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner
prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal
requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory.[8]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was
denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the
following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN
AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES
WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO,
EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON.
ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF
TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE
COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY
27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT

THE WORDS FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF
RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12,
1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY
OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON
JULY 22, 1998.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE
SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[9]

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners
should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to
appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to
the loss of the right to appeal. [10] The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and
procedural rules. BP 129,[11] as amended, provides:

Sec. 39.Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the
period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment
appealed from. x xx

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3.Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final
order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally

disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be
an order or judgment that dismisses an action.[12]

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration should be construed as the final order, not the February
12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the
denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal
on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of which triggers
the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the trial court declared
petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt
of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the
omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion.
He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been
filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after
the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under
the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final
order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et
al.[14] where we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyans motion for
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the
case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view that the order dated
July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsiderationwas the final order contemplated in
the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on
time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or
final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15 th day of the original
appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead
opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only
interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. [15] It ruled that petitioners,
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had
only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of
their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh
period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the order dismissing their motion for
reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of
the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule
in similar cases,[16]premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an

appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional.[17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and
awards of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law. [18]

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the
adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from
notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a
record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or
order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion
fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day
of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day
following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said
motion.[19] (emphasis supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days.
BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the
Committee on Judicial Reorganization[20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d etre behind
the amendment was to shorten the period of appeal [21] and enhance the efficiency and
dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance of this reglementary
period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal, [22] and only
in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of

Libmanan,[23] however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial

system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on
occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the
right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of
technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule, periods which

require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of
substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due
to strong considerations of fairness and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy
appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations
that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities
were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and
effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases
where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need
to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts
have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of
procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for
the just and proper disposition of his cause.[25]
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. [26] It has the
sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing
appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, [27] 43[28] and 45,[29] the
Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for
parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. [30]

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies[31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court.[32] The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15
days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive
word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. [33] Hence,
the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final
order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the
motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129
which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition

of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or
rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver
justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the
15-day appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3,
1998) or from receipt of notice of final order appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15
days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from
receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of
the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from
receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence,
the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.[34]

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v.

IAC[35] since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case
be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-286

March 29, 1946

FREDESVINDO S. ALVERO, petitioner,

vs.
M.L. DE LA ROSA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, JOSE R. VICTORIANO, and MARGARITA
VILLARICA,respondents.
Revilla and Palma for petitioner.
Francisco Claravall for respondents.
DE JOYA, J.:
This is an original petition for certiorari filed in this court.
The record shows that, on June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaint, in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, against petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one
Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action, to wit, (1) to declare in force the contract of sale,
made on October 1, 1940, between said Jose R. Victoriano and Margarita Villarica, of two (2)
parcels of land in the Manotoc subdivision, Balintawak, in the barrio of Calaanan, municipality of
Caloocan, Province of Rizal, with a combined area of 480 square meters, which land was
subsequently sold by said Villarica, in favor of petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December 31,
1944, for the sum of P100,000 in Japanese military notes; and (2) to declare said subsequent sale
null and void.
On July 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said complaint, expressly admitting having
sold said land to Fresdesvindo S. Alvero, for P100,000, in December, 1944, due to the imperative
necessity of raising funds with which to provide for herself and family, and that she did not remember
the previous sale; at the same time, offering to repurchase said land from Fredesvindo S. Alvero in
the sum of P5,000, but that the latter refused to accept the offer.
On July 13, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero, in answering said complaint, denied the allegations made
therein, and claimed exclusive ownership of the land in question, and at the same time set up a
counterclaim and crossclaim in his answer, demanding from Jose R. Victoriano a P200-monthly rent
on said property, beginning from February, 1945, plus P2,000 as damages.
On July 21, 1945, Jose R. Victoriano filed an answer to said counterclaim, denying Fredesvindo S.
Alvero's alleged ownership over said land, and the other allegations contained in Alvero's answer.
After the trial of the case before the Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of the City of Manila, one of the respondents in this case, on November 16, 1945, said respondent

judge rendered his decision, in which it was declared that the two (2) parcels of land in question, with
a combined area of 480 square meters had been sold by Margarita Villarica to Jose R. Victoriano,
since October 1, 1940, for the sum of P6,000, on the condition that the purchaser should make a
down payment of P1,700, and a monthly payment of P76.86 in 120 equal monthly installments; that
Jose R. Victoriano continued making said monthly payments until December, 1941, but that owing to
the war-time conditions then existing, Margarita Villarica agreed verbally to suspend such payments
until the restoration of peace; that immediately after said sale of said land to him, Jose R. Victoriano
took possession thereof and made improvements thereon to the amount of P800, and continued
occupying said property until December, 1944, when he abandoned the same to go to evacuation
places, but returned thereto in February, 1945; that Margarita Villarica, having forgotten the sale of
said land to Jose R. Victoriano, sold the same for P100,000 in Japanese military notes, on
December 31, 1944, to Fredesvindo S. Alvero, but afterwards offered to repurchase said property
from him, for the sum of P8,000 in genuine Philippine currency, after liberation; that Fredesvindo S.
Alvero presented the deed of sale, executed in his favor, to the Register of Deeds of the City of
Manila, on January 3, 1945, and took possession of said property in December, 1944, but afterwards
found Jose R. Victoriano in the premises in February, 1945; that in the contract of sale executed by
Margarita Villarica, in favor of Jose R. Victoriano, it was agreed that, upon failure of the purchaser to
make payments of three (3) successive mothlyinstallments, the vendor would be free to sell the
property again, forfeiting the payments made, except in the case of force majeure; that there was
really a verbal agreement between Margarita Villarica and Jose Victoriano, made in February, 1942,
for the suspension of the payment of the monthly installments until the restoration of peace; and that
although Jose R. Victoriano had presented the deed of sale, executed in his favor, to the Register of
Deeds, in Pasig, Rizal, like Fredesvindo S. Alvero, he had also failed to secure the transfer of title to
his name. And considering that Jose R. Victoriano's document was older than that of Fredesvindo S.
Alvero, and that he had taken possession of said property, since October 1, 1940, the respondent
judge rendered his decision in favor of Jose R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title over the property
in question, including all the improvements existing thereon, and dismissed the counterclaim.
On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified of said decision; and on December 27,
1945, he filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946; and
of said order he was notified on January 7, 1946.
On January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal
simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-appeal bond.
On January 14, 1946, Jose R. Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the same time,
asked for the execution of the judgment.
On January 15, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss, alleging
that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60 had been actually filed, and
allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife,
who died on January 10, 1946, and buried the following day.
On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the dismissal of
the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed in due
time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.
On January 23, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the said order
dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition for reconsideration was denied on
January 29, 1946. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
On February 11, 1946, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for certiorari, alleging (1)
that said petition is defective in form as well as in substance; (2) that there has been no excusable
negligence, on the part of the petitioner, or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
judge, in the instant case.

As already stated, the decision rendered by the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, was
dated November 16, 1945, of which counsel for Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified on November 28,
1945; that his motion for reconsideration and new trial was filed on December 27, 1945, and denied
on January 3, 1946, and that said counsel for Alvero was notified of said order on January 7, 1946;
and that he filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal the following day, to wit, January 8, 1946,
and that the P60-appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946.
According to the computation erroneously made by the court, the last day for filing and perfecting the
appeal, in this case, was January 8, 1946, or which date, Fredesvindo S. Alvero should have filed his
(1) notice of appeal, (2) record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond. But the P60-appeal bond was filed
only on January 15, 1946.
Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court, will cause the judgment
to become final, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore the
jurisdiction which has been lost. (Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands, 34
Phil., 623; Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs.Alabado, 34 Phil., 920; and Bermudez vs. Director of
Lands, 36 Phil., 774.)
The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be perfected and filed may,
however, be extended by order of the court, upon application made, prior to the expiration of the
original period. (Layda vs.Legaspi, 39 Phil., 83.)
Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law; and rules of court
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)
Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and imperative, so that failure to
pay the docket fee in the Supreme Court, within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the
dismissal of the appeal. (Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39Phil., 922.) In the same manner, on failure of the
appellant in a civil case to serve his brief, within the time prescribed by said rules, on motion of the
appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its own motion, the court may dismiss the appeal.
(Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)
Counsel for the petitioner FredesvindoAlvero alleges as an excuse, for his failure to perfect and file
his appeal, in due time, the illness of his wife, which ended in her death on January 10, 1946, and by
which he was greatly affected.
How little, indeed, does one realize that in life he lives in the midst of death; and that every that
passes in a step nearer towards eternity. Yet, notwithstanding the inexorable laws of human destiny,
every mortal fears death, and such fear is worse than death itself. That is perhaps the reason why
those feeling its approach, in their last moments, want to be surrounded by the ones dearest to their
heart, to hear from them words of tenderness and eternal truth, and thus receive as balm their love
and the cheering influence of the traditional faith, and the consolation of religious hope.
The virtuous and loving wife is the peculiar gift of heaven, and Mother is the name for God in the
innocent lips and hearts of adoring children. "She looketh well to the ways of her household, and
eateth not the bread of idleness." "And her daughters arise up and call her blessed." And when she
dies in the bosom of God, her children find solace in the contemplation of her eternal bliss, as
mirrored in her tranquil beauty.
It is not, therefore, difficult to understand the state of mind of the attorney, and his intense devotion
and ardent affection towards his dying wife.
Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has created a difficult situation. In his motion for reconsideration
and new trial, dated December 27, 1945, he did not point out specifically the findings or conclusions
in the judgment, are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express

reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions, as expressly required by Rule 37, section 2,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. Motions of that kind have been considered as motions pro
forma intended merely to delay the proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will not interrupt or
suspend the period of time for the perfection of the appeal. (Valdez vs. Jugo, 74 Phil., 49, and
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Bautista, 74 Phil., 235.) Hence, the period for perfecting herein
petitioner's appeal commenced from November 28, 1945, when he was notified of the judgment
rendered in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice of appeal and
record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were filed out of time, and much more so his appeal
bond, which was only filed on January 15, 1946.
It is futile to speak of hospitals, doctors and nurses to minister alone to the needs of the sick and the
dying, who are dearest to us, for our reasoning powers are of little avail when sorrow or despair
rages within.
But human laws are inflexible and no personal consideration should stand in the way of performing a
legal duty.
The attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero could have asked for an extension of time, within
which to file and perfect his appeal, in the court below; but he had failed to do so, and he must bear
the consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules of court, which have been considered
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial
business, is an imperative necessity.
It may not be amiss to state in this connection that no irreparable damage has been caused to the
petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, as Margarita Villarica, the vendor to the two, of the land in question,
has shown readiness to repair the damage done.
No showing having been made that there had been merely excusable negligece, on the part of the
attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, and that there had been gave abuse of sound judicial
discretion, on the part of the respondent judge, the petition for certiorari filed in this case, is,
therefore, hereby dismissed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones
JJ., concur.