Brumfiel Aztec State Making

Aztec State Making:
Ecology, Structure, and the Origin of the State

ELIZABETH M. BRUMFIEL
A lbion College
It has become increasingly difficult to account for state formation solely in terms of eco
logical variables. It is suggested that consideration of prestate political structure and t
interplay of ecological variables and political dynamics (political ecology) would enhan
our understanding of why and how states emerge. The Aztecs provide a case for exam
nation. [Aztecs, ecology, political competition, state origins]
THE STATE IS A POWERFUL, COMPLEX, PERMANENTLY INSTITUTED SYSTEM Of cen
political administration. It exercises sovereignty in carrying out basic political fun

(maintaining territorial rights, maintaining internal order, making and executing
sions regarding group action), and its authority in these matters is buttres
sovereignty in the use of force within its jurisdiction (Keesing 1976:348; Sahlins 1
Yoffee 1979:14-17). States are characterized by administrative complexity; adm
tive personnel are hierarchically ordered and specialized by administrative tasks (J
1973:1-4; Wright 1978:49-68).
The numerous attempts to explain why states emerge in some times and places b
others have been dominated by two contrasting approaches: the ecological and the
tural. The first, based on the work of Julian Steward, relates state formation to th
lems and/or opportunities presented to a human population by its environmental
In this approach, population growth and its resulting pressures provide the dynam
state formation, and at least the initial stages are said to be promoted by the ecolo
benefits that the state confers on its general population. The second approach, gro
out of the Marx-Engels tradition, regards state formation as a process generated b
ticular sociocultural orders. Certain types of societies (stratified societies, for exam
said to possess an internal dynamic that exerts pressure for state formation even w
relationship between the human population and its environment is stable. In

proach, the focus is less on a human population as a whole and more on soc
ponents and their interactions. Of these two approaches, the first has received a g
share of attention and has been elaborated more fully. As a result, some of its dif
are now evident. The structural approach has been less thoroughly explored.
This paper has three objectives: to discuss the strengths and weaknesses o
ecological approach to state formation in its current form; to suggest how a great
ELIZABETH M. BRUMFIEL is Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Albion College, Al
49224.
Copyright ? 1983 by the American Anthropological Association

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262 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [85, 1983
phasis on the internal dynamics of political syste

state formation; and to illustrate the utility of a
developmental history of the Aztec state.
THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH
By definition, the state is a powerful, specialized institution for

tion; therefore, state officeholders can function as highly effectiv
can use the resources of their positions to gather information conc
facing society; they can develop expertise in effective problem
mobilize the food, materiel, and manpower needed to effect their s

of the superior managerial capacity of state government has been o
sights supplied by the ecological approach. It is also the basis from
hypothesis of state formation is derived: states arise in socioenviron
effective management is either necessary or especially beneficial.
This hypothesis has proven durable. Initially, it was argued that s
to the organizational problems of constructing and maintaining
(Steward 1949; Wittfogel 1957). This view is no longer universally v

logical research has revealed instances where states emerged-in the
irrigation or where it was utilized only after the state had com
1960:281: Chang 1963:316; Carneiro 1970:734; Millon 1973:47-49)
lem solving is a widely applicable asset, and numerous variant
hypothesis have emerged during the past 20 years. For example
that states arose to facilitate internal distribution (Sanders 1956, 19
procure essential extralocal raw materials (Hole 1966; Rathje 19

sistence systems (Wright 1969), to defend a population's resou
resources of others (Sanders and Price 1968; Carneiro 1970; Webster
to meet the demands for goods made by potentially dangerous
Johnson 1975), to stabilize agricultural productivity (Athens 1977),

of these functions simultaneously (Adams 1966; Flannery 1972; Log
Wright 1978). It has been proposed that states emerged for differe
that the developmental histories of states share not a specific set o
requiring management, but simply some set to which the state is a
(Flannery 1972). Thus, emphasis on the managerial effectiveness
the ecological approach with the capacity to deal with a widely dive
cases within a single, broad explanatory framework.
However, the wide applicability of the managerial hypothesis has
further theoretical elaboration, because if the state is such an e
many different kinds of problems, then it is necessary to account fo
emerged only in some times and in some places. For this, those
ecological paradigm have most often focused on the interaction
and environmental setting.
Population growth and its ensuing problems would explain w

without the benefits of state organization, a human population
state system either beneficial or necessary (Steward 1949:19, Sander
Carneiro 1970:735-736; Kottak 1972:368; Logan and Sanders 1976:33; Athens
1977:366; Santley 1980:141). States would emerge only in certain environmental settings:
where the problems of population growth were particularly severe because growth rate
was high or arable land limited or where overpopulation could be accommodated by the
application of some managerial strategy (construction of irrigation systems or other
means of agricultural intensification, administration of local exchange systems or long
distance trade, etc.).
Brumfiel] AZTEC STA TE MAKING 263
But the attempt to account for the timing a

population growth and environment has not b
have emerged in the absence of population

Johnson 1975:276; Brumfiel 1976a:246; Kot
possibly O'Connor 1972:92). And it has prove
tween environments that would foster state formation and those that would not. States
have formed in areas where agricultural land is limited geographically (coastal Peru) a
where stringent limits are absent (the southern Maya lowlands), where resource
unevenly distributed (Central Mexico), and where resource distribution is quite homo
eneous (the Nile Valley). And while state formation is generally accompanied by
form of agricultural intensification, this can occur in a variety of environments (for
ample, see accounts of agricultural intensification among the lowland Maya [Mat
1976; Harrison and Turner 1978; Flannery 1982]).
Cases of state formation in the absence of population pressure have been particular
vexing. Most ecological models of state formation have relied on positive feed
through the channels of population growth and recurring population pressure to mai
tain the system in a state of evolutionary change (Steward 1949:19; Sanders and
1968:96-97; Carneiro 1970:735-736; Webster 1975:466-467, Logan and Sanders
1976:33; Santley 1980:141). But if state formation occurs in the absence of a serious
disparity between population and resources, it seems necessary to search for some other
source of systematic dynamic. Yoffee (1979:26-27) has suggested that we look within the
system itself.
THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH: MARX-ENGELS
A number of anthropologists have argued that certain sociocultural

of their inherent structural properties, are dynamic. Some of these s
their very nature, be impelled along a course of evolutionary ch

culminate in state formation. Service (1975:308) characterizes the d
state and civilization as being "orthogenetic" and "self-contained
Rowlands (1978:204) speak in terms of "epigenesis": structural transfo

in which the trajectory of change is determined by the structural prop
system. This approach to state formation is designated here as the str
Various structural properties might generate the dynamic for sociocu
within the literature on state formation, structurally induced social c
the greatest attention.
The first social conflict theory of state formation was set forth by E
working from the notes of Marx. Engels argued that the state appeare
dustrial" techniques (cattle raising, loom weaving, forging metal tools
array of economic institutions (private property, money lending at in
exchange, and the use of slave labor) destined to divide society into a
(rich and poor, free people and slaves), each with differing, mu
economic interests. The state, distinguished by its specialized instituti

internal order (judicial courts, a constabulary, prisons, and other coer
arose to mediate and ultimately to suppress these conflicts.
Although it appears that Engels was mistaken in regarding state for
consequence of certain technological innovations, the evidence for pri
cantile exchange, and slave labor within early states has led some cont
pologists to accept conflicts of economic interest as the cause of state
view the early state, as Marx and Engels did, as an institution for sup
flict (Diakonoff 1969; Fried 1967, 1978). Others have demurred. Se
has sharply criticized the Marx-Engels theory on two grounds.
First, Service disputes the Marxist conception of
arguing that in early states, inequality is root
economic) institutions. According to Service, the

not private property or mercantile exchange or sl
a consequence of a politically instituted system of
tracts goods and services from the commoner str
elite. Here, Service sees a clear parallel to the econ
marked by permanent offices of political leadersh
hereditary differences in social status (based on g
regular flow of goods and services to the chief
payers since the chiefs use of coercion is limited)

sent an intensification of the inequalities already
have erred in focusing on the political implic
economic implications of politics.

Second, Service criticizes the Marxist notion that
economic interests. Given the structure of econom
states, Marxist theory would anticipate intens
gathering rulers and their tribute-rendering subj

no evidence of violent conflict between rulers and
cheological records of state formation. The few "ci
gests, were wars of succession between aristocrati
THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH REVISED
Service's characterization of economic inequality in early states seem
fogel 1955: Carrasco 1976, 1978:64-74; Wolf 1981:49-52; but see
dissenting view). However, his contention that conflicts of economic

role in early state formation and that suppression of conflict was no
of early states is open to debate, as will be discussed below. For th
more appropriate to observe that, having rejected the importance of

state origins, Service focuses attention on the realm of politics and ther
reason for state formation: "The classical civilizations . . . all must have had small
beginnings in the simple attempts of primitive leaders to perpetuate their s
nance" (1978:32).
Efforts of perpetual social dominance imply that the position of leaders in c

of prestate political systems is not totally secure. The same implication can b
statements by others who view the state as an organizational mechanism for
and augmenting the power of prestate leaders (Eisenstadt 1963:vii-viii; Round
see also Burling 1974:6-9). If it can be shown that, in certain types of politic
threats to the leader's status are regularly generated, then an alternative to
social conflict theory might be formulated - a theory that explains the stat
quence of conflicts arising from political, rather than economic, structures.
A review of the ethnographic literature on chiefdoms suggests that the pos
ruling paramounts is quite insecure. Incumbents often faced the specte

rebellion led by aristocratic pretenders to the paramount office (Fortes
Pritchard 1940:11; Fallers 1956:247; Gluckman 1956:42-45; Sahlins 1972:145-148;
Helms 1979:28). The potential for violent competition between political rivals
exists in any system where leadership is instituted in permanent offices because, as

(1966:2) points out, these offices are unique social statuses that are filled from a p
socially qualified individuals. But competition will be particularly intense in chief
where the leader's right to use coercion is limited. In the absence of coercive forc
cumbent chiefs seek to enhance their authority by actively promoting the presti
Brumfiel] AZTEC STA TE MA KING 265
fice (Sahlins 1968:92). This generates a co
cumbents buttress their authority with pres

petitors to vie more diligently for it (Goldm
However, competition for office is not ent
all conflicts of economic interest between rul
polities often serves as the mechanism by w
against oppressive political elites. Fallers' a

colonial Uganda provides a typical exampl
The sharing by the ruler's brothers of his ascr

of leadership for revolt against what customar
burdensome demands for tribute and the like a
tributory to revolt and usurpation. [1956:247]
It appears, then, that structurally induce
economic basis in political systems where lea

offices. It is a three-party affair where com
tribute demands, while rival elites exploit co
and the ruling paramount uses whatever str
tion against both commoners and rival elit
nothing more (or less) than a series of effec
beleaguered rulers to survive these challen
paper to designate the full range of strategi
complish state formation, but Webster (
Rowlands (1978), state-sponsored craft produ
(1976b), the manipulation of marital allian
provides an excellent case study of how warf
agricultural lands were used by rulers of

power.
The specific strategies implemented by individual state makers would vary according
to the specific dimensions of the structurally generated conflict (i.e., the identity of
political competitors and the resources at their disposal) and the costs of various centralizing strategies in different technoenvironmental contexts. Thus, the actual process of
state formation might differ from case to case, especially in the initial stages where
rulers' options were most narrowly constrained by the threat of rebellion and usurpation.
But as the centralization of authority proceeded, rulers could be expected to employ the
power gained by one means to enhance other means of power, leading to convergent
evolution (Cohen 1978:8).
The structural attributes of the prestate system and its technoenvironmental context
could also account for the distribution of state formation in time and space. According to
the analysis presented above, the pressures for state formation are generated by some
sociocultural systems, but in others such pressures do not exist and state formation will
not occur. Identifying the structures that lead to state formation and the conditions
determining their distribution in time and space constitutes a major task for future
research.
Even with the appropriate internal dynamic, state formation might be contingent
technoenvironmental conditions (Friedman and Rowlands 1978:203). Certainly F

man's (1975) analysis of political development among the Kachin suggests that ce
izing trends were cut short by the limited potential of the native agricultural system
Hawaiian chiefdoms also seem to have been condemned to cycles of centralizatio
decentralization by the difficulties of inter-island transport and communication (Sah
1968:93; Earle 1978:172-173). Hence, environmental suitability plays a critical ro
structural models of state formation as it does in ecological models. But the difficul
differentiating between technoenvironmental reg
those that do not will probably diminish as ant

population ecology with a special concern for p
present obstacles and opportunities to individuals
structural contexts.
The following sections attempt to illustrate the utility of the structural approach by
amining a specific case of state formation: the emergence of the Aztec state in Centra
Mexico during the 15th century. Discussion focuses on two issues. First, was the warfa
that brought the Aztec state into being caused by population growth and a resulting c
petition for scarce resources, or was it rooted in the internal political dynamics of the
prestate polities? Second, did the centralization of authority occur because politic
leaders carried out managerial functions, or was it due to new political options suddenl
opened by the evolving dynamics of political interaction?
A CASE STUDY: THE AZTEC STATE
The choice of the Aztec example deserves some comment. The emer
state clearly is not primary state formation since states already had
Mexico for 15 centuries. But neither is the emergence of the Azt
ondary state formation if this term is reserved for states which ari
tacts, warfare, or political alliance with states already in existence. A
was the result of interactions among small, autonomous polities w

geographic confines: the Valley of Mexico and immediately adj
polities closely resembled developed chiefdoms both in terms of size

ture. It is highly probable that the causes and processes that brough
being are analogous to those in operation during primary state form
The Aztec case provides an unusually well-documented history of t
formation. Before Spanish conquest, the Aztecs and their neighbo
histories orally and pictorially. Many histories were recorded in wri
the first two centuries after Spanish conquest (Gibson 1975). They p
for analysis, but they contain numerous sources of bias. Traditions f
to inflate the antiquity and splendor of its past while denigrating al
were sometimes revised to cover up the more sordid phases of local
recorded the histories in postconquest times had their own reasons fo
their claims to certain privileges as members of the native nobility or
in colonial society by extolling the virtues of native civilization. Aga
of distortion stands the fact that the traditions of several locales have
recorded by more than one individual. Thus, it is often possible to c

one source by referring to the others. Together, they provide a fair
the events surrounding Aztec state formation, summarized below.
The 12th-century decline of the Toltec state created a vacuum
within the Valley of Mexico. This vacuum was filled by a score of sm

ternally unstable and mutually hostile political domains during the 1
centuries. By the end of the 14th century, warfare had resulted in t
some to others. Azcapotzalco on the western side of the valley and T
side emerged as the two dominant powers (Figure 1). With the defea
Azcapotzalco came to control almost the entire valley. However, Azcapotzalcan
hegemony was short-lived. In 1430, a military force assembled by the ruler of
Tenochtitlan (a client state of Azcapotzalco) and the deposed heir of Texcoco defeated
Azcapotzalco. In the wake of Azcapotzalco's defeat, the rulers of Tenochtitlan, Texcoco,

and Tlacopan (representing the more accommodating nobility of Azcapotzalco) forged a
AREA OF AZCAPOTZALCAN DOMINANCE N
/ AREA OF TEXCOCAN DOMINANCE
LAKE ZUMPANGO
Teotihuacan
.Otumba
C
Teotihuacan * Otumba
CuauhtitZan
Az/
AREA
OF
TEXCcap
EatCoatepec
CTenochtitlan
LAKE XOCHIMILCO
AREA OF THE
INDEPENDENT CHALCAN DOMAINS

0
10
15
20
25
Fig.
KM
1:
The
Valley
of
Mexico
in
14
military alliance, quickly consolidated t

a series of conquests that carried them
a century later, this Triple Alliance h

The defeat of Azcapotzalco, the form
tion
era.
of
control
The
over
shifting
the
Valley
alliances
of
and
Mex
endem
regional politics came to an end. In the

enough to withstand severe crop failur
sion. The birth of the Triple Alliance was acc
toward the centralization of political authority on

spheres of state concern and regulation, and the e
control. Thus, the era of Triple Alliance formatio
tion; understanding the events of this era should
forces that bring about major transformations in
THE VALLEY OF MEXICO POLITICAL SYSTEM: 13TH AND 14TH CENTURIES
Sanders, Parsons, and Santley (1979:150) have characterized the

turies in the Valley of Mexico as "a troubled era of struggle an
numerous small polities." It is to the structure of these small politie
that I now turn.
By the end of the 14th century, as many as 50 small, autonomous domains had
established within the Valley of Mexico. Each contained 5,000-50,000 people and
covered an area of from 80 to 200 km2 (Sanders 1968:99; Sanders, Parsons, and San
1979:151-152; Hicks 1982:231-232). Each domain was governed by a paramount (t
toani) who ruled by virtue of his membership in the local ruling lineage. Each paramo
was surrounded by a group of nobles who assisted in the administration and defense o
the domain (Carrasco 1971:351-354). This group contained the ruler's own children
the descendants of past rulers (all of whom were qualified to assume the paramount of
fice), and a number of vassal lords (teteuctin) who were ineligible for the paramountc
(Carrasco 1976 and Rounds 1977 provide extended discussions of this status). Members
the elite stratum probably constituted well under 10% of the population in each doma
(Carta de los Caciques 1870:299).

The rest of the people were commoners: food producers and craftsmen. In each
main, some commoners resided in close proximity to the ruler's palace in the cen
town, but others lived in surrounding villages and hamlets (Sanders, Parsons, and Sant
1979:153; Hicks 1982:231-232). Commoners provided material support to those w
governed by laboring in tribute fields and providing domestic service in the residence
the elite (Carrasco 1971:355-356, 1978:23-32). Commoners were also expected to se

as soldiers in time of war (Zorita 1963:181-188).
These small polities resembled chiefdoms in two important ways. First, each possess
a fairly simple administrative structure. The administrative hierarchy consisted of two,
three, decision-making levels. The paramount and his noble assistants reached decision
in councils at the highest level (Anales de Cuauhtitlan 1945:39; Tezozomoc

1975:237-239); at the lowest level, ward chiefs saw that the decisions were carried out
Vassal lords may have constituted a third (intermediate) level, responsible for the com-
moners attached to their noble estates (Carrasco 1971:365; Tezozomoc 1975:279). At al
levels of administration, specialization of personnel by task was rare.2 With only minimal
horizontal and vertical specialization, the organization of these polities more closely
resembles the administrative structure of chiefdoms than states (see Johnson 1973:2-4).3
Second, like the chiefdoms of eastern Polynesia described by Goldman (1970) and
Sahlins (1968), these polities were politically unstable. Their histories are marked by
numerous incidents of usurpation and regicide (Anales de Cuauhtitlan 1945:32;
Chimalpahin 1965:189, 197-198, 199; Davies 1980:19; Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 309;
Relaci6n de Genealogia 1891:271). There are also incidents of polities fissioning or simp-
ly disintegrating because of internal conflict (Anales de Cuauhtitlan 1945:29;

Chimalpahin 1965:177-178; Guzm~n 1938:92; Relaci6n de Genealogia 1891:274). This
violence is symptomatic of a political system where power is only weakly centralized and
authority is easily challenged.
Brumfiel] AZTEC STATE MAKING 269
The paramounts of these small polities seem

used by Polynesian chiefs to counter the thre
strengthen political support through the distr
ty and particularly in times of political crisis
fact, royal liberality seems to have been in

35). Paramounts seem also to have diverte
is hard to say how great an investment was m
tury elite residences and temples in the Va
gradual acceptance of "Toltec" forms of sacri

to replace the less showy "Chichimec" forms m
ty of office through impressive ritual activit
xochitl 1975-77:I, 332; II, 35).

Both these stratagems required a ruler to
Hence, the extent to which they could be em
tribute receipts. These could not easily be
resisting excessive demands. They might supp

planning revolt (Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:II, 21-22
a ruler who demanded too much simply by le
another (Anales de Cuauhtitlan 1945:29; Relaci6n de Genealogia 1891:274; Hicks

1982:243).
Hence, despite the fact that these small Mexican polities were not chiefdoms (in the
sense that kinship ties between ruler and ruled did not supply the ideological basis for
governance, see Carrasco 1976; Hicks 1982), their political instability may have stemmed
from similar structural problems. Faced with many noble competitors and restless commoners, paramounts sought to secure their positions by engaging in royal liberality and
conspicuous display. But as they increased the tribute burden to finance liberality and
display, they also increased the likelihood of popular revolt or desertion, and undermined
the security they hoped to gain. If anything, the absence of kinship ties between ruler and
ruled must have heightened instability in these small polities; if rulers were released from
the constraints of the kinship ethic in dealing with commoners so, too, were the commoners in their relation with rulers. Not bound to their rulers by kinship, commoners
were free to throw their support to any noble competitor who gained their confidence. I
would argue that the chronic warfare that characterized relations between the small
polities in the Valley of Mexico during the 13th and 14th centuries was rooted in the
quandary rulers faced when dealing with noble competitors and fickle commoners within
their domains.
The conquest of a neighboring domain opened two new options for a paramount see
ing to secure his position. First, his own close kinsman could be sent to replace
defeated paramount (Chimalpahin 1965:90-91; Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 313-3
Establishing such a kinsman as a ruler in his own right might satisfy the ambitions o
least one of the conquering paramount's noble rivals. Alternatively, the conquerer cou
incorporate the defeated polity into his own domain (Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 31
346-347). This would result in an increase in the number of tribute-paying comm
within the conqueror's domain, an increase in the size of the royal treasury, and an i
crease in the ruler's ability to engage in liberality and display without provoking pop
revolt or desertion.
Hence, it is possible to view both the internal and external conflicts of the 13th- an
14th-century domains as rooted in internal political structure. I think this vie
preferable to one citing population growth and population pressure as the causes of co
flict because, throughout this epoch of conflict, rulers of the small polities consisten
practiced a policy of extending a friendly reception to immigrant populations. For ex
ple, the ruler of Culhuacan allotted land to Mex

major role in the attack that drove them from
(Anales de Cuauhtitlan 1945:22). The 14th-centu
sionary warfare (Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 315-318
waves of immigrants to Texcoco (Ixtlilxochitl 1975
settling of two new domains within Texcoco's

1905-48:VI, 233; Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 323). G
modated in Cuauhtitlan both before and after C
longed war with its neighbor, Xaltocan (Anales
late as the 15th century, rulers seem to have desi
tions. In two separate incidents, conquering pa
peoples fleeing their homes to assure them that t
them to return (Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 379; Te

If population growth had already reached a po
conflicts within and between domains, rulers wou
granting still more people access to their local
were primarily intent on surviving elite rivalry an
tion of immigrants becomes comprehensible. L
neighboring polities, it would have increased the

and the ruler's income without increasing the per
Warfare intensified during the 13th and 14th
always short-lived, and warfare itself created a si

Over time, the nobles established as rulers in thei
with their own problems of internal conflict. Un
forged military alliances which decreased the n
poration and increased the number of individuals
to be shared. Such alliances were often sealed by

tlilxochitl 1975-77:II, 37; Tezozomoc 1975:234), c
of the different ruling houses. This radically u
small domains. The threat of usurpation became m
draw support from their kinsmen who ruled in n
creasingly difficult to present a united resist
neighboring rulers bent on conquest could find al
under attack. Wars of usurpation within a dom
mains became different facets of a single phenome
cation of civil war, invasion, and shifting allian
structural change in the Valley of Mexico politica

AZTEC STATE FORMATION:
STEP 1, COLLAPSE OF THE PRESTATE STRUCTURE
The late 13th through 14th centuries were a period of militaristic ex

Historical accident and local ecology seem to have favored the paramou
latitude domains within the valley. While the rulers of domains in the more
tled south (e.g., Culhuacan and Xochimilco) struggled to more or less a milita
(Anales de Cuauhtitlan 1945:16, 22), the rulers of the closely allied
Coatlichan-Huexotla-Texcoco in the east and Azcapotzalco-Tlacopan in t

their numerical superiority to dominate peoples of the less densely pop
(Anales de Tlatelolco 1948:22; Guzmin 1938:91; Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 303,
316-318, II, 23; Torquemada 1969:I, 64; see Sanders, Parsons, and Santley 1979:
149-153 for a discussion of demographic variation within the Valley of Mexico during the
12th through 14th centuries).
Through the conquest and incorporation o

latitude domains increased to the point wh
ern communities (Anales de Cuauhtitlan

de los Mexicanos 1965:54; Ixtlilxochitl 19
century, Azcapotzalco defeated the northe
1945:33-34, Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 322-32

tation between Azcapotzalco and its allie
in the east. The eastern powers were route
the dominant power in the Valley of

Chimalpahin 1965:189; Historia de los
339-341). Structurally, however, the Va

changed. Azcapotzalco's hegemony was fo
alliances similar to those in the earlier pet
During the final year of Tezozomoc's

(1343-1426), a dispute arose among the
treatment given the rulers of Tenochtitlan
allies and both his lineal descendents (d

(Tezozomoc 1975:237-238). These rulers
tribute they were required to pay the Azc
recipients of tribute gathered from Te

Cuauhtitlan 1965:37; Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 346-347; Tezozomoc 1975:236-237).
When Tezozomoc died, the factions to this dispute threw their support to different con-
tenders for Azcapotzalco's paramount office. Maxtla, leader of the anti-TenochtitlanTlatelolco faction and Tezozomoc's eldest son, managed to seize the paramount office,
but the rulers of Tenochtitlan and Tlatelolco conspired with Maxtla's younger brother to
usurp the throne (Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 351-354). Maxtla discovered the plot and
ordered the execution of both rulers. However, the structural basis of conflict between
Maxtla as ruler of Azcapotzalco and the rulers of the allied but autonomous domains of
Tenochtitlan and Tlatelolco remained. In 1427, the conflict between Azcapotzalco and
Tenochtitlan erupted into open warfare (Chimalpahin 1965:91).
Meanwhile, Maxtla lost control of the eastern side of the valley. Taking advantage of
the successional disputes in the west, the rulers of Chalco supported the efforts of
Nezahualcoyotl, the deposed heir of Texcoco, to recover his domain. This effort was successful. Nezahualcoyotl managed to dispose of his own half-brother and expel Azcapotzalco's administrators from the Coatlichan-Huexotla-Texcoco domains. The following
year, Nezahualcoyotl and Itzcoatl (the current ruler of Tenochtitlan and
Nezahualcoyotl's mother's brother) launched an offensive against Maxtla and his allie
Azcapotzalco was defeated in 1428 (Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 368-376). Itzcoatl quickly
established control over the western and southern areas of the valley; Nezahualcoyo
reestablished his control in the east (where many of his nobles had rebelled in protest of
the alliance with Tenochtitlan). By 1434, the Valley of Mexico was again dominated by a
single ruling clique; the paramounts of Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, and Tlacopan h
forged the Triple Alliance (Anales de Cuauhtitlan 1945:46-47; Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I,

377-379; Tezozomoc 1975:245-281).
The civil wars, invasions, and shifting alliances that marked the expansion of Azcapotzalco's power and its final disintegration had eliminated the cliquish nobilities of the local
domains in the Valley of Mexico (Table I). Most high-ranking nobles had been
assassinated, killed in warfare, or driven into exile, leaving only the low-ranking nobles of
ruling families, all of whom had equally weak claims to the local paramount offices. The
surviving nobles could only hope to win out against their rivals for local paramount offices by gaining the backing of the Triple Alliance rulers. Because so many high-ranking
TABLE I: LOCAL DYNASTIES DISRUPTED BY WARFARE
1. Acolman
1427 Teyolcocoatzin deposed in battle with Nezahualcoyotl.

1431 Succeeded by his son, Motlatocatzomatzin, under mandate of Nezahualco
de Cuauhtitlan 1945:47; Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 380, 441).
2. Azcapotzalco
1426 Tezozomoc dies from natural causes. His older son, Maxtla, usurps the rul
designated heir, his younger brother.

1428 Maxtla deposed in battle with Itzcoatl and Nezahualcoyotl. Azcapotzalco is l
a legitimate local ruler for at least 16 years (Anales de Cuauhtitlan 1945:37-38; Ch
1965:190-194; Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:I, 350-353; II, 88; Torquemada 1969:I, 2523. Coatepec
1418 Totomihua flees his domain after conquest by Tezozomoc.
1427 Totomihua returns to power with Nezahualcoyotl's victory in Texcoco.
1430 Totomihua flees his domain again after an unsuccessful revolt against Neza
Coatepec is left without a legitimate local ruler. (Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77: II, 45, 8
4. Coatlichan
1418 Paynitzin flees his domain after conquest by Tezozomoc.

1420 Succeeded by Quetzalmaquitztli, Tezozomoc's grandson.
1427 Quetzalmaquitztli killed in battle with Nezahualcoyotl. Succeeded by Mot
member of Coatlichan's local nobility.
1430 Motoliniatzin flees his domain after an unsuccessful revolt against Nezahu
1431 Motolinatzin pardoned and returned to rule by Nezahualcoyotl (Anales de
1945:47; Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77: I, 342, 380; II, 45, 75, 84, 89).
5. Cuauhtitlan
1408 Xaltemoctzin killed by order of Tezozomoc of Azcapotzalco.

1418 Succeeded by Tezozomoc, a noble from Tlatelolco.
1430 Tezozomoc, ruler of Cuauhtitlan, commits suicide when his domain is razed
Succeeded by Tecocohuatzin, a member of Cuauhtitlan's local nobility and an ally
(Anales de Cuauhtitlan 1945:35, 36, 44).
6. Culhuacan
1413 Nauhyotzin killed by order of Tezozomoc. Succeeded by Acoltzin.

1429 Acoltzin killed in battle. Succeeded by his son, Xilomantzin (Anales d
1945:36, 47, 50, Cr6nica Mexicayotl 1949:121).
7. Huexotla
1418 Tlacotzin (Itlacauhtzin?) flees his domain after conquest by Tezozomoc.
left without a legitimate local ruler.

1427 Itlacauhtzin brought to power by Nezahualcoyotl's victory in Texcoco.
1430 Itlacauhtzin flees his domain after an unsuccessful revolt against Nezahual
1431 Succeeded by his son, under mandate of Nezahualcoyotl (Ixtlilxochitl 197
377, 380; II, 45, 78, 84, 89).
8. Otumba
1418 Quetzalcuixtli sides with Tezozomoc, retains his rule after Tezozomoc's
Texcoco.
1431 Replaced by Quechotecpantzin, under mandate of Nezahualcoyotl (Ixtlilx

I, 344, 347, 380; II, 45-46, 89).
9. Tenochtitlan
1426 Chimalpopoca assassinated. Succeeded by Itzcoatl, his father's brother (A

Cuauhtitlan 1945:37-38; Chimalpahin 1965:190; Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77: I, 355-356
10. Teotihuacan
1418 Quetzalmamatlictzin flees his domain after conquest by Tezozomoc.

1431 Quetzalmamatlictzin returns to power, under mandate of Nezahualcoyotl
92-94, Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77: I, 380: II, 89).
11. Tepexpan
1426 Incumbent ruler killed in battle.

Table I continued
1431 Successor installed under mandate of Nezahualcoyotl (Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77: I,

II, 89; Paso y Troncoso 1905-48: VI, 235).
12. Texcoco
1418 Ixtlilxochitl killed in battle with Tezozomoc. Texcoco is left without a le

ruler.
1426 Yancuiltzin, Nezahualcoyotl's half brother, comes to rule under mandate of Maxtla,
Yancuiltzin's mother's brother.
1427 Yancuiltzin flees his domain after Nezahualcoyotl's victory. Succeeded by Nezahualc
(Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77: I, 341, 440, 540; II, 48, 75).
13. Tlatelolco
1427 Tlacateotzin assassinated. Succeeded by Cuauhtlatoatzin, his son's son (Ana

Cuauhtitlan 1945:38; Chimalpahin 1965:190-191; Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77: I, 358).
14. Toltitlan
1428 Epcoatl dies in battle. Toltitlan is left without a legitimate local ruler for the
years (Anales de Cuauhtitlan 1945:36).
15 and 16. Ecatepec and Ixtapalapa
1428 A dynasty of Aztec lineage is established at Ecatepec.
1430 A dynasty of Aztec lineage is established at Ixtapalapa. The founding of th
dynasties suggests the disruption of local ruling lineages in both these domains (Cha
1965:93-94, 193).
nobles had died almost simultaneously, throwing kingdom after kingdom into di
over succession, no other alliances could be forged. Local resistance to Tripl

dominance was undermined as these lesser nobles competed with each other
patronage of Triple Alliance paramounts. These paramounts took advantag
situation to strengthen their administrations in ways that had never been possib
This was the first step in the formation of the Aztec state.
STEP 2, ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM
The principle of rule by a local ruling lineage member was reaffirmed (I

1975-7:I, 379-380; II, 89) partly as a public relations gesture (Azcapotzalco'
could then be disparaged as a tyranny that had deprived local paramoun
rightful patrimonies, see Ixtlilxochitl 1975-77:II, 89), and partly as a str
balancing the power of the nobility within Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, and
Within the Tenochca sphere of influence, however, newly installed local
forced to pay a price for Triple Alliance patronage: they were required t
rights to the produce of some of their patrimonial tribute fields to the ruler
titlan (Anales de Cuauhtitlan 1945:50; Tezozomoc 1975:253, 271, 277). This

come to local rulers ensured their continued dependence on the patronag
Alliance rulers and, at the same time, augmented the ability of Triple Alliance
control their own nobles (for a description of the centralization of power wit
titlan, see Rounds 1979).
In Tenochtitlan, loyal nobles were rewarded not with the administration of

mains which might serve as a basis for the accumulation of power, but with the
expropriated tribute fields allotted on a field-by-field basis. Tenochtitlan's rul
the majority of the fields for the support of the throne, but many others wer
to individual nobles, specifically, the ruler's dynastic competitors: his sons, br
the descendants of previous rulers (Durin 1967:II, 101-102, 114). Thus, t
quired wealth in excess of his nobles, and noble

perpetuation of Triple Alliance hegemony which
from the newly expropriated fields.

The distribution of tribute fields was determined b
royal descent. This may have been a useful device fo
could put forward a legitimate claim to royal liberality, thus husbanding the
paramount's wealth. It may also have created a division of interest among the nobles,
preventing them from confronting the ruler as a unified class. At any rate, this distinction between nobles who had demonstrated military prowess and those who had not was
formalized shortly after the defeat of Azcapotzalco by the award of honorary titles of
distinguished noble warriors (Tezozomoc 1975:268-269).

At this time, too, the threat of usurpation by higher-ranking nobles was reduced by the
creation of a four-member royal council (Durin 1967:II, 103-104). The members of this
council were to share in the ruler's executive decision making, and all future rulers of
Tenochtitlan were to be selected from among the council incumbents rather than from
the nobility at large. In the first council, membership was conferred on the four men
most likely to succeed: two of the paramount's brothers, and two sons of an earlier ruler
of Tenochtitlan. Thus, four major collateral lines of the Tenochca nobility were given a
voice in high-level decision making and prospects of succeeding to the paramount office.
As designated heirs apparent, each of the council members would have jealously guarded
against efforts by any of the other three to usurp rule.
Thus, the birth of Triple Alliance hegemony in the Valley of Mexico was accompanied
by extensive and significant organizational reform. The reforms allocated administrative
and economic power in ways that would ensure continuation of the political status quo.
They did little to enhance the efficient flow of information to and the decision-making
capability of the state. The administration of Tenochtitlan continued to be provided by a
two-level hierarchy. The paramount and his nobles formulated policy; the ward chiefs
carried it out. Communication between the paramount and the ward chiefs was effected
by nobles who served as messengers of the paramount on an ad hoc basis (Tezozomoc
1975:291, 327). Regional administration did involve a three-level hierarchy; the policy
decisions of the Triple Alliance paramounts were communicated to subordinate local
rulers, and these rulers were expected to mobilize their own populations through communication with their ward chiefs (Durin 1967:II, 112; Tezozomoc 1975:287-289, 335,
348). Still, there was little specialization of administrative personnel by task. True
bureaucratic complexity did not emerge until some 30 years after the formation of the
Triple Alliance, as the state began to consolidate its power by monitoring a greater range
of activities.
STEP 3, CONSOLIDATION OF POWER
Almost immediately after establishing control over the Valley of Mexic

Alliance initiated large-scale public works within the valley and expansionary
beyond. The last years of Itzcoatl's reign in Tenochtitlan were marked by th
tion of a causeway linking Tenochtitlan with towns on the shore of Lake Xoc
by the conquest of towns in Morelos and northern Guerrero, more than 100
the Valley of Mexico (Tezozomoc 1975:277; Kelly and Palerm 1952:284-2

successor, Moctezuma I (1440-1469), sponsored a major renovation of Hu
temple in Tenochtitlan, the construction of an extensive royal residence, of
ning Lake Texcoco, of a canal that facilitated access to the market at Tlat
an aqueduct that brought fresh water to Tenochtitlan from Chapultep
Cuauhtitlan 1945:53-54; Chimalpahin 1
157-158). Moctezuma's reign was also mar
quests were made in Morelos, northern Gue
ca, Puebla, and Veracruz (Kelly and Paler
Much if not all of this activity seems to h

power within the Valley of Mexico. As Teno
my it could field against potentially rebelli
the valley became more secure. The cons
facilitated the transport of food and water

could grow and its political superiority be m
served as dikes that defended the city's pop
enabled the Aztecs to control water levels in the southern lakebeds so that the entire area
could be reclaimed for agricultural production. Lakebed agriculture came to supply over
half of the food consumed by Tenochtitlan's population (Parsons 1976:250), and reclaimed agricultural land was used to satisfy the nobility's demand for individually
allocated tribute receipts (Calnek 1975).
Conquest and tribute extraction from an ever-expanding area were also useful in
maintaining Tenochtitlan's demographic preeminence in the Valley of Mexico. Tribute
in foodstuffs from nearby provinces supplied another third of the food consumed by the
city, and nonfood tribute goods such as cloth and obsidian apparently were circulated
through the regional market system, which encouraged food production for market sale
by the valley's rural populace (Calnek 1975; Parsons 1976; Brumfiel 1980).
Moctezuma's conquests also included many towns that paid tribute primarily in luxury
products and raw materials (Barlow 1949; Informaci6n 1957). These conquests seem to
have been made to enable the Triple Alliance paramounts to satisfy the demand of
nobles and subject rulers for high-prestige items. Such goods were acquired directly,
through the extraction of tribute in finished goods, and indirectly, through the extrac-
tion of tribute in valuable raw materials that were converted into finished goods by
Aztec craftsmen working under royal patronage. Luxury goods were also acquired
through state-sponsored, long-distance trade, where goods procured through tribute extraction and the patronage of craftsmen were exchanged for goods originating in areas
beyond the sphere of Triple Alliance conquests (Berdan 1975:268). State involvement in
the procurement and distribution of high prestige goods may well have discouraged
Tenochtitlan's nobility and the nobles of subject city-states from disrupting the existing
power structure (Calnek 1978:467).
STEP 4, BUREAUCRATIC COMPLEXITY
The initiation of public works and militaristic expansionism was accompani
gradual development of bureaucratic complexity. Although the native hi
provide a step-by-step account of the process of bureaucratic elaboration, sev
indicate that significant administrative reforms were made during th

Moctezuma I. For example, Torquemada (1969:I, 169) states that Moctezum
his house with great majesty, naming many and diverse officials and . . . inc
number of priests and instituting some new positions and ceremonies."
Tezozomoc (1975:286, 333, 338, 360) remarks on several stages in the g
ministrative complexity in the area of tribute collection. Individuals respons

collection and storage of tribute (the calpixque) were at first selected by and
to the subordinate rulers of Moctezuma's domain. But by 1458, Moctezuma h
personal responsibility for naming these officials and had instituted an arra
double staffing where two calpixque were appointed fo

stationed at the site of tribute collection, the other st
tribute receipt. By 1462, the office of chief steward (
a middle-level administrative post to supervise the per
to issue orders to them on Moctezuma's behalf.
Durin (1967:II, 213) credits Moctezuma with having reformed the judicial syst
Separate courts were established for nobles and commoners, and a high court was for
to which lower court decisions could be appealed. Moctezuma is also said to have
stituted a set of sumptuary laws, among them an ordinance limiting the access of va
persons to the different rooms in Moctezuma's palace (Durin 1967:II, 213). It is c
from Sahag n's (1956:II, 309-314) description of Tenochtitlan's royal residence that dif
ferent rooms housed different segments of the ruler's administrative bureaucracy: t
royal council and high court, the lower courts, various grades of military personnel,
constabulary, the heads of the young men's houses of the various wards, the petlacalc
the calpixque, and so forth. Hence, Moctezuma's sumptuary ordinance may mark
formal inception of discrete, functionally specific branches of administra
bureaucracy.
ECOLOGY, STRUCTURE, AND STATE FORMATION: SOME CONCLUSIONS
Aztec state formation seems to have occurred in four logically discrete steps:
1. Intensification of competition within and between petty kingdoms which
power of local rulers and led to Triple Alliance hegemony with the Valley o
2. Centralization of power through organizational reforms that reduced the e
and political power of subordinate rulers and Tenochtitlan's nobility.
3. Consolidation of power through the initiation of public works within the
expansionary conquests beyond it.
4. Development of bureaucratic complexity characterized by the specialization
ministrative personnel by task and by the presence of three or more levels of
makers in many of the administrative branches.
These steps represent a temporal order of change: each step was made feasible
transformation that preceded it.
The intensification of competition within and between petty kingdoms was c
the entire process of Aztec state formation; it created conditions conducive to
centralization. The flurry of shifting alliances, conquests, and acts of usurpatio
companied the expansion and final collapse of the Azcapotzalco's power v
eliminated by death or exile the higher-ranking nobility of many petty k
Political coalitions at the local level were destroyed; networks of kinship allianc
local ruling lineages were disrupted.
Consequently the patronage of Triple Alliance rulers became a critical
resource for the low-ranking nobles seeking access to local offices of rule, and th
such patronage even though it entailed constraints on their political auton
reduction in their incomes. The decrease in the power of local paramounts was
by an increase in the power of Triple Alliance rulers. In Tenochtitlan, the loyal
nobles was secured by increasing the scale of royal generosity. Through the allo
tribute fields and other gifts, nobles came to share an interest in the perpetuatio
ple Alliance hegemony, the source of their newly gained wealth.
Access to the labor power of the large majority of commoners residing w

Valley of Mexico helped the Triple Alliance rulers consolidate their power. The
tion of public works and expansionary conquests increased the lands and w
could be redistributed to local nobles and the compliant rulers of subordinate d
Moreover, as the Triple Alliance came to
no longer escape the intensification of corv

dependent kingdom. Expansion of the politi
the structural weakness that had under

autonomous kingdoms.
With greater political leverage, larger

disposal, the Triple Alliance rulers moved
Kurtz 1978). Bureaucratic complexity develo
struction and maintenance of water con
administered agricultural lands, the assemb
the greater flow of tribute into Triple A
area, reliance on the market system for the

ship of craft production and long-distance
relationship to political legitimacy- all repr
from more careful monitoring and coordin
tions were made possible by the bureaucr

Without question, ecological variables we
formation. The early importance of Azca
distribution of population within the valley
this distribution was almost certainly affec
The overall agricultural productivity of the
tance. It sustained a great enough aggrega
to engage in public works and expansiona
Triple Alliance power might have been imp
tion brought about by the death and exile o
imity of the potentially fertile lakebed in t
Tenochtitlan through water-borne transpor
ening Tenochtitlan's military capability.
Also without question, Moctezuma's bureau
ment of numerous ecological variables. It ca
control, etc.) that ensured the population of
environmental fluctuations. The developmen
of foodstuffs to the valley in the form of t

food production within the valley through
regional marketing system supported pop
quest, the population of the Valley of Mexi
period of the prehistoric epoch (Sanders,
little doubt that the Aztec state came to pe
those taking the ecological approach wo
political systems. Clearly, then, ecological v

of state making, and an "appropriate" ecolo
for state formation. This conclusion has bee
1964; Palerm and Wolf 1957), and the pre
But the evidence does not confirm either o

through gradual improvement in ecological
Service (1975:290-308), for example, sug

strengthens the legitimacy of political le
tributes to the centralization of political
development of political authority; the auth
and then gives way to the concentration of
Aztec data present a rather different picture. Fir

ened as the conflict within and between petty kin
the managerial effectiveness of local rulers); this p
tralized power on the regional level. Second, the c
level was brought about the collusion of local rule
patronage; the legitimacy of regional rulers in th
relevant to the process.
Sanders and Price (1968:132, 187, 209) have o

They suggest that, among an array of competi
greater ecological resources and more statelike (an
of political administration. As populations gro

creases, the more statelike domains conquer and
with the eventual emergence of true states on th

suggest that the communities responsible for the
tion of the Triple Alliance enjoyed no significant
ness at the time of their triumph. On the contrar
tional effectiveness of the Aztec state dates to Montezuma's bureaucratic reforms, a
generation or two after the state had come into being.
In ecological approaches to state formation, there has been a tendency to focus exclusively upon the implications of ecological variables for human populations as whole
entities. The structural approach to state formation redirects attention to the implications of ecological variables for prestate political orders specifically. This narrower focus
is valuable because political consequences cannot be automatically derived from population status - a point which is sometimes recognized but rarely elaborated on in ecological
analyses of state formation (Sanders and Price 1968:230; Flannery 1972:411; Yoffee
1979:27). Ecologically minded anthropologists, taking whole populations as their unit
analysis, have not provided a satisfactory answer to the question of how ecological opportunity or necessity is translated into political change. But such an answer is crucial to an
adequate understanding of the process of state formation. As Cowgill notes:
We can never assume that stress... will automatically or even typically generate social or
cultural development. .. . We always have to ask, who is experiencing stress, who is in a position
to do something about it, and why might they see it to be in their interest to do what they do?
[1975:507]
Perhaps the conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is not that anthropologists
need less ecology in their efforts to understand state formation, but that they need to
focus more sharply on the interplay of ecological variables and political dynamics. Anthropologists need to understand the goals of political actors as generated by different
types of prestate political systems, and they need to be able to define how ecological
variables present obstacles and opportunities to political actors pursuing their goals.
From such studies, it should eventually be possible to derive a general theory of state formation, one that specifies the necessary ecological and political conditions under which
state formation occurs.
NOTES
Acknowledgments. This paper is the outgrowth of questions formulated

group on the Aztecs. I thank the other participants of that group (Charles Gi
Judith Nowack, and Jeffrey Parsons) for creating an atmosphere where halfback to the kitchen, not relegated to the garbage heap. I also have benefited f
on state origins with Gayle Rubin and Henry Wright. Charles Bright and Susa
stant encouragement while I was writing this paper; they and Lynn Eden off
ments on earlier drafts. I am grateful for their help.
1 For example, Keesing (1976:223) speculates tha

ly determined by the "unfolding or progressive
system." Friedman (1975) offers an intriguing
eventually the state, might arise from specific cul
ancestor worship. Conrad (1981) has attributed t
dean conceptions of ancestor worship and the norm

Such approaches to state formation seem to gran
held conceptual systems, although Sahlins (1976)

with just such autonomy and determinism.
2 Offner (1979) found no evidence of administ

(although he suspects that some complexity was
only two cases where administrative specializatio
century installation of a ruler of Texcoco, mention
of two neighboring domains (Ixtlilxochitl 1975-7
spheres of activity were divided (Van Zantwijk 1
for example, Tonga (see Sahlins 1976:44). Chim
century rulers of Tenochtitlan were assisted by
de Cuauhtitlan 1945:35). These titles later cam

served as judges and captains of war in 16th-c
whether such terms indicate the presence of a c

Lack of administrative complexity may also be
that one consequence of functional specialization
in the frequency with which polities fission into t
13th and 14th-century polities in the Valley of Me
quency (see, for example, Chimalpahin 1965:17
these polities were more chiefly than statelike in
3 Although Johnson (1973:3) defines a state
minimally three hierarchical levels," his discussi
he regards three hierarchical levels as a necess

(ibid.:7-8, 11).
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Aztec State Making:

Ecology, Structure, and the Origin of the State

THE STATE IS A POWERFUL, COMPLEX, PERMANENTLY INSTITUTED SYSTEM Of cen

political administration. It exercises sovereignty in carrying out basic political fun

Yoffee 1979:14-17). States are characterized by administrative complexity; adm

tive personnel are hierarchically ordered and specialized by administrative tasks (J

1973:1-4; Wright 1978:49-68).

relationship between the human population and its environment is stable. In

Copyright ? 1983 by the American Anthropological Association

262 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [85, 1983

phasis on the internal dynamics of political syste

By definition, the state is a powerful, specialized institution for

facing society; they can develop expertise in effective problem

mobilize the food, materiel, and manpower needed to effect their s

to the organizational problems of constructing and maintaining

(Steward 1949; Wittfogel 1957). This view is no longer universally v

that states arose to facilitate internal distribution (Sanders 1956, 19

procure essential extralocal raw materials (Hole 1966; Rathje 19

resources of others (Sanders and Price 1968; Carneiro 1970; Webster

to meet the demands for goods made by potentially dangerous

Johnson 1975), to stabilize agricultural productivity (Athens 1977),

(Flannery 1972). Thus, emphasis on the managerial effectiveness

further theoretical elaboration, because if the state is such an e

many different kinds of problems, then it is necessary to account fo

Population growth and its ensuing problems would explain w

state system either beneficial or necessary (Steward 1949:19, Sander

Carneiro 1970:735-736; Kottak 1972:368; Logan and Sanders 1976:33; Athens

application of some managerial strategy (construction of irrigation systems or other

means of agricultural intensification, administration of local exchange systems or long

distance trade, etc.).

Brumfiel] AZTEC STA TE MAKING 263

But the attempt to account for the timing a

have emerged in the absence of population

form of agricultural intensification, this can occur in a variety of environments (for

A number of anthropologists have argued that certain sociocultural

their very nature, be impelled along a course of evolutionary ch

Rowlands (1978:204) speak in terms of "epigenesis": structural transfo

economic interests. The state, distinguished by its specialized instituti

flict (Diakonoff 1969; Fried 1967, 1978). Others have demurred. Se

has sharply criticized the Marx-Engels theory on two grounds.

264 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [85, 1983

First, Service disputes the Marxist conception of

arguing that in early states, inequality is root

economic) institutions. According to Service, the

regular flow of goods and services to the chief

payers since the chiefs use of coercion is limited)

have erred in focusing on the political implic

economic implications of politics.

states, Marxist theory would anticipate intens

gathering rulers and their tribute-rendering subj

Service's characterization of economic inequality in early states seem

fogel 1955: Carrasco 1976, 1978:64-74; Wolf 1981:49-52; but see

dissenting view). However, his contention that conflicts of economic

of early states is open to debate, as will be discussed below. For th

more appropriate to observe that, having rejected the importance of

beginnings in the simple attempts of primitive leaders to perpetuate their s

Efforts of perpetual social dominance imply that the position of leaders in c

ruling paramounts is quite insecure. Incumbents often faced the specte

Pritchard 1940:11; Fallers 1956:247; Gluckman 1956:42-45; Sahlins 1972:145-148;

exists in any system where leadership is instituted in permanent offices because, as

Brumfiel] AZTEC STA TE MA KING 265

fice (Sahlins 1968:92). This generates a co

cumbents buttress their authority with pres

against oppressive political elites. Fallers' a