Legal Research Notes

PEOPLE V ARBALATE- Self Defense
Facts of the case:

On July 7, 2002, around 3:00 pm, Gualberto Selemen, Jose Ragasa and Ruperto Arbalate drank alcohol at
Selemens home at Samar. Two hours into the drinking, good-natured teasing turned into an altercation. Alarmed,
Selemens common law wife, Jovita Quijano, hurried to seek help and subsequently came back with Rupertos wife.
Ruperto then struck Selemens hand with a piece of wood, however, Ruperto headed home when his wife convinced
him to do so.
Shortly, Ruperto came back with both his sons, Roel and Ramil, all armed with bolos. When Roel was able to trace
Selemens face with a flashlight, Ruperto and Ramil started to hack Selemen in various parts of his body with their
bolos. Selemen ran to the rice field to escape but was chased down by the Arbalates. When Selemen was lifeless,
Ramil beheaded Selemen. Ruperto carried the head to the street, and told Quijano that her husbands head was
already his. Ruperto left the head at the ground before he reached home.
Ruperto invoked self-defense, stating that Selemen hit him in the face with his fist. Ruperto grabbed a bolo and ran to
the rice field where he was chased by Selemen. Both men fought. Ruperto went home and later surrendered to the
police. He only saw Selemens head when he was brought to the Municipal Hall.
The Trial Court found Ruperto guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt. His two sons Roel and Ramil remain at
large. Ruperto brought the case to the Court of Appeals on appeal. The appellate court upheld the trial courts
findings. The case is now before the Supreme Court on appeal.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the court gravely erred in convicting the appellant despite his plea of self-defense
(2) Whether or not the appellant was correctly convicted of the crime of murder instead of homicide
Held:
(1) No, the court did not err in convicting the appellant.
For Ruperto to avail of the defense of self-defense, he must meet the requirements, prescribed in Article11 of the
Revised Penal Code. (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is an actual
physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. There must be an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger, which puts the defendants life in real peril. In the case at bar, there was no
unlawful aggression shown by the victim. It was Ruperto who struck first, not the victim. The wounds as well as the
act of beheading the victim clearly belie self-defense. There was also a lapse of time between the altercation with
victim and his murder. The Arbalates purpose was to exact vengeance and nothing more. The act of bringing the
head to the street was also an act of scoffing at the corpse of the dead.
(2) Yes, the appellant was correctly convicted of the crime of murder.
The appellate and trial courts correctly held that there is no homicide since there was the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength is present when the attackers cooperated in such a way as to
secure advantage of their combined strength to perpetrate the crime with impunity. It is considered whenever there is
a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressors, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressors which are selected or taken advantage of by them in the commission of the crime.
Such aggravating circumstance was perpetrated by Ruperto and his two sons in chasing the victim with bolos. The
unarmed victim did not stand a chance against these three men. Although the presence of abuse of superior strength
alone qualifies the killing to murder, in the presence of both treachery and abuse of superior strength, the latter is
absorbed by treachery.
Rupertos voluntary surrender is a mitigating circumstance, since he gave himself up to the police when the latter
arrived at his house.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7659, murder is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. With no generic aggravating circumstance and one generic mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the penalty imposable on accused-appellant, in accordance with Art. 63(3) of the Revised Penal
Code should be the minimum period, which is reclusion perpetua.
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 169084
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
- versus -
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
MELANIO DEL CASTILLO
VILLARAMA, JR., and
y VARGAS,
HERMOGENES
DEL *PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
CASTILLO y VARGAS, ARNOLD AVENGOZA y
DOGOS, FELIX AVENGOZA
y DOGOS, RICO DEL CASTILLOy RAMOS, and
JOVEN DEL CASTILLO
Promulgated:
y ABESOLA,
Accused-Appellants.
January 18, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case illustrates yet again why denial and alibi are not the best defenses when there is positive
identification of the accused for their complicity in the commission of a crime.
Antecedents
All the accused are related to one another either by consanguinity or by affinity. Melanio del Castillo and
Hermogenes del Castillo are brothers. Rico del Castillo and Joven del Castillo are, respectively, Melanios son and
nephew. Felix Avengoza is the son-in-law of Melanio and the brother of Arnold Avengoza. Both Felix and Arnold lived
in the house of Melanio.
On March 28, 2000, the City Prosecutors Office of Batangas City charged all the accused in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Batangas City with three counts of murder, alleging as follows:
Criminal Case No. 10839
That on or about March 21, 2000, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening at Sitio Bulihan,
Brgy. Balete, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, while armed with bolos,
kitchen knife and pointed instrument, all deadly weapons, with intent to kill and with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab with said deadly weapons one Sabino Guinhawa y
Delgado @ Benny, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body, which directly caused the
victims death.1
and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab with said deadly weapons one Graciano Delgado y
Aguda @ Nonoy, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body, which directly caused the
victims death.2
and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab with said deadly weapons one Victor Noriega y
Blanco, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body, which directly caused the victims
death.(emphases and italics supplied).3
The cases were consolidated for arraignment and trial. On April 7, 2000, the accused pleaded not guilty to
the informations.4
Version of the Prosecution
The witnesses for the State were Froilan R. Perfinian, PO3 Pablo Aguda Jr., Dr. Luz M. Tiuseco, Rosalia
Delgado, Domingo Guinhawa, Abella Perez Noriega, SPO3 Felizardo Panaligan, Sr. Insp. Marcos Barte and SPO3
Danilo Magtibay.
The eyewitness version of Perfinian follows. On March 20, 2000, at about 9:00 pm, he had just left the
house of one Lemuel located in Sitio Bulihan, Barangay Balete, Batangas City (Bulihan) to walk to his own home
located also in Bulihan when he heard someone pleading: Huwag po, huwag po! He followed the direction of the
voice, and saw the assault by all the accused against Sabino D. Guinhawa (Sabino), Graciano A. Delgado
(Graciano), and Victor B. Noriega (Victor). He recognized each of the accused because he saw them from only six
meters away and the moon was very bright. Besides, he was a godfather of Hermogenes son, and the other accused
usually passed by his house.
Perfinian recalled that the accused surrounded their victims during the assault; that Arnold stabbed
Graciano on the stomach with a bolo, causing Graciano to fall to the ground; that Rico hacked Graciano with a bolo;
that when Victor tried to escape by running away, Hermogenes and Felix pursued and caught up with him; that Felix
hacked Victor; and that when Sabino ran away, Melanio and Joven pursued him.
Perfinian rushed home as soon as all the accused had left. He narrated to his wife everything he had just
witnessed. On the following day, he learned that the police authorities found the dead bodies of Sabino, Graciano
and Victor. Afraid of being implicated and fearing for his own safety, he left for his fathers house in Marinduque. He
did not return to Bulihan until after he learned from the TV newscast that all the accused had been arrested. Once
returning home, he relayed to the victims families everything he knew about the killings. Also, he gave a statement to
the Batangas City Police.5
PO3 Aguda was on duty as the desk officer of the Batangas City Police Station in the morning of March 22,
2000 when he received the report about the dead bodies found in Bulihan. He and other police officers went to
Bulihan, and found the dead bodies of Sabino, Graciano, and Victor sprawled on the road about 20 meters from each
other. The bodies were all bloodied and full of hack wounds. During his investigation, he came upon one Rene Imbig
(Rene) who mentioned seeing the six accused wielding bolos and running on the night of March 21, 2000. From the
site of the crime, he and his fellow officers went to the houses of Melanio and Rico, which were about 20 meters from
where the bodies were found. The houses were abandoned, but he recovered a blood-stained knife with a curved
end in Melanios house. Returning to the station, he saw Hermogenes there, who informed him that the other
suspects had fled to Sitio Tangisan, Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal (Sitio Tangisan), where Melanios mother-inlaw resided. Accompanied by Rene and other police officers, he travelled to Sitio Tangisan that afternoon. Upon
arriving in Sitio Tangisan, Rene pointed to Melanio who was just stepping out of his mother-in-laws house. Melanio
ran upon seeing their approach, but they caught up with him and subdued him. They recovered a bolo from Melanio.
They found and arrested the other suspects in the house of Melanios mother-in-law, and brought all the arrested
suspects back to Batangas City for investigation. There, the suspects admitted disposing some of their clothes by
throwing them into the Pasig River, and said that their other clothes were in the house of Melanio. They mentioned
that the bolo used by Hermogenes was still in his house.
On the morning of March 23, 2000, PO3 Aguda and his fellow officers recovered two shorts, a shirt, and a
knife - all blood-stained from Melanios house in Bulihan. Going next to the house of Hermogenes, Winifreda del
Castillo, the latters wife, turned over the bolo of Hermogenes. They learned that prior to the killings, Melanio had
been fuming at being cheated in a cockfight, and had uttered threats to kill at least three persons in Bulihan.6
Sr. Insp. Barte, SPO3 Panaligan and SPO3 Magtibay corroborated PO3 Agudas recollections.7
Dr. Luz M. Tiuseco (Dr. Tiuseco), a Medical Officer of Batangas City Health Office, conducted the postmortem examinations on the remains of Sabino, Graciano, and Victor on March 22, 2001. She found that Sabino
sustained 11 hack wounds and 12 stab wounds; that Graciano suffered four stab wounds and a hack wound; and that
Victor had three hack wounds. She certified that the victims had died from hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple
stab and hack wounds.8
Domingo Guinhawa, the elder brother of Sabino, declared that his family spent P50,000.00 for Sabinos
funeral and burial expenses.9 Rosalia Delgado, a sister of Graciano, attested that the expenses incurred for
Gracianos burial amounted to P51,510.00.10 Abella Perez Noriega, the wife of Victor, claimed that her family
spent P53,395.00 for Victors wake and interment.11
Version of the Accused
The Defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Winifreda. The accused admitted being in Bulihan
at the time of the incident, but denied liability. Arnold and Joven invoked self-defense and defense of strangers, while
Melanio, Hermogenes, Rico and Felix interposed denial. Winifreda corroborated the testimonies of Arnold and Joven.
The evidence of the accused was rehashed in the appellees brief submitted by the Public Attorneys Office,
as follows:
Arnold Avengoza testified that on March 21, 2001, he had a drinking spree with Rico del
Castillo in their house. After about an hour, he was requested by Winifreda del Castillo, wife of
Hermogenes del Castillo, to accompany them to their house. Together with Joven del Castillo, they
brought Winifreda and her son to their house. Before they were able to reach Winifredas house,
three (3) men appeared. One of them held Winifreda and when he tried to help her, the other
persons attempted to draw something from their waists prompting him to hacked one of them. He
told the man to stop, but the latter refused. When the other man got mad, he hacked him twice.
Then, they brought Winnie and her son to the house of Melanio del Castillo. He did not inform
Melanio del Castillo about what transpired, but told him to take his family away, because he saw
dead persons near his place. He threw his bolo into the Pasig River.
Joven del Castillo, corroborated Ricos testimony and admitted that he was the one who
stabbed the other man, who attempted to draw something from his waist while Arnold hacked the
other man. He was no longer aware how many times he stabbed the said man. Victor Noriega was
one of the three (3) men who blocked their way. They left Sitio Bulihan at about 11:00 oclock in the
evening, together with Felix Avengoza, Arnold Avengoza, Rico del Castillo, Melanio del Castillo and
his family. They went to Antipolo, Rizal, where they were arrested by the police authorities.
Hermogenes del Castillo slept the whole night of March 21, 2000 and came to know that the
three (3) persons were killed during the night near the house of his brother Melanio only from his
wife Winifreda. Fearing retaliation from the relatives of the persons who were killed, because the
bodies were found near his brothers house, he went to the house of Barangay Captain Aloria, who
in turn told him to go to the police station. He came to know that he was being implicated in the
killing when he was incarcerated.
Rico del Castillo testified that on the night of March 21, 2001 at about 7:00 oclock in the
evening, he fetched Winifreda del Castillo to treat the sprain of his daughter. At about 9:00 oclock
in the evening, since his daughter was still crying, he requested Joven and Arnold to accompany
Winifreda and her son in going home. Arnold and Joven returned at around 10:00clock in the
evening. He was told that they saw dead people and was asked to leave the place together with his
family.
Felix Avengoza said that on the night of March 21, 2001, he was informed by Joven and
Arnold that they saw two (2) dead persons near their house. For fear of becoming a suspect, he
was told to leave his house together with his family.
Melanio del Castillo affirmed the testimony of Felix and added that he was at first hesitant to
leave his house because of his personal belongings and animals, but due to insistence of Arnold
and Joven, he also left with them for Manila.
Winifreda del Castillo confirmed that she was fetched by Rico del Castillo to treat his
daughter. When Rico was unable to bring her back home, Joven and Arnold accompanied her.
While they were on their way, three (3) persons suddenly blocked them. One of them held her hand
and tried to drag her away. When Arnold tried to pacify them, they got angry and attempted to pull
something from their waists so Arnold hacked him.12
Decision of the RTC
On October 23, 2001, the RTC convicted the accused of murder, but appreciated voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance in favor of Hermogenes, viz:
In the light of all the foregoing considerations, accused Arnold Avengoza, Felix Avengoza,
alias Alex, Rico del Castillo, Joven del Castillo, Hermogenes del Castillo, alias Menes and Melanio
del Castillo are all hereby found Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined
and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659
charged in these three cases namely: Criminal Case No. 10839, Criminal Case No. 10840 and
Criminal Case No. 10841.
Wherefore, accused Arnold Avengoza, Felix Avengoza, Rico del Castillo, Joven del Castillo
and Melanio del Castillo are sentenced in each of the above mentioned criminal cases to suffer the
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua together with all the accessory penalties inherent therewith and
to pay the costs. With respect to accused Hermogenes del Castillo, considering the presence of
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor and further applying the provisions of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in each of the aforesaid criminal cases, he is hereby sentenced
to imprisonment of Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day as minimum to Twenty
(20) Years of reclusion temporal as maximum together with its inherent accessory penalties.
As to the civil aspects of these cases, in Criminal Case No. 10839, all the herein accused
are directed to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Sabino Guinhawa the amount
of P58,510,00 as actual funeral expenses and the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages. In
Criminal Case No. 10840, all the herein accused are directed to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of Graciano Delgado with the sum of P51,510.00 as actual funeral expenses and P75,000.00
as moral damages. And in Criminal Case No. 10841, all the above-named accused are further
directed to indemnify the heirs of Victor Noriega with the sum of P53,395.00 as actual funeral
expenses and the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages.
Finally, let accused Hermogenes del Castillo be credited with his preventive imprisonment if
he is entitled to any.
SO ORDERED.13
Decision of the CA
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) upon the following assigned errors, to wit:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ALL THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT TWO
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS HAVE ALREADY ADMITTED KILLING THE THREE VICTIMS
IN DEFENSE OF WINIFREDA DEL CASTILLO.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF STRANGERS IN FAVOR OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARNOLD AVENGOZA AND JOVEN DEL CASTILLO.
III.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES
DESPITE THE LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE SAME.
On April 28, 2005, the CA affirmed the convictions, correcting only the awards of damages and the penalty
imposed on Hermogenes,14 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that
appellant Hermogenes Del Castillo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all
the accused are ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of each victim; the sum of P15,000.00
andP8,000.00 as actual damages to the heirs of Sabino Guinhawa and Graciano Delgado,
respectively, and P10,000.00 as nominal damages to the heirs of Victor Noriega.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Hence, the accused have come to us in a final appeal, submitting that because Arnold and Joven had
already admitted killing the victims, the rest of them should be exculpated; that Arnold and Joven should be absolved
of criminal liability because they acted in self-defense and defense of strangers; and that conspiracy among them
was not proven.15
Ruling
The conviction of appellants is affirmed, but the damages awarded and their corresponding amounts are
modified in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.
I.
Factual findings of the RTC
and CA are accorded respect
Both the RTC and the CA considered Perfinians eyewitness testimony credible.
We concur with both lower courts.
We reiterate that the trial judges evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of his testimony is accorded
the highest respect because of the trial judges unique opportunity to directly observe the demeanor of the witness
that enables him to determine whether the witness is telling the truth or not. 16 Such evaluation, when affirmed by the
CA, is binding on the Court unless the appellant reveals facts or circumstances of weight that were overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would materially affect the disposition of the case.17
The accused did not present any fact or circumstance of weight that the RTC or the CA overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would alter the result herein. Accordingly, we have no reason
to disregard their having accorded total credence to Perfinians eyewitness account of the killings. In contrast, we
have the bare denials of Melanio, Hermogenes, Felix, and Rico, but such denials were weak for being self-serving
and unnatural. Their own actuations and conduct following the attack even confirmed their guilt, for had Melanio,
Felix, and Rico been innocent, it was puzzling that they had to suddenly abandon their homes to go to Antipolo City in
Rizal. Their explanation for the hasty departure - that Arnold and Joven warned them to leave because dead bodies
had been found near Melanios house, and they might be implicated - was unnatural and contrary to human nature.
The normal reaction of innocent persons was not to run away, or instead to report to the police whatever they knew
about the dead bodies. In any case, they did not need to be apprehensive about being implicated if they had no
participation in the crimes.
The lower courts correctly evaluated the evidence. To us, Perfinians identification of all the accused as the
perpetrators was positive and reliable for being based on his recognition of each of them during the incident. His
being familiar with each of them eliminated any possibility of mistaken identification. He spotted them from a distance
of only six meters away under a good condition of visibility (i.e., the moon then being very bright). Consequently,
their denials and alibi were properly rejected.
Likewise, Perfinian detailed the distinct acts done by each of the accused during their assault.
Such recollection of the fatal events was categorical and strong, and there was no better indicator of the reliability
and accuracy of his recollection than its congruence with the physical evidence adduced at the trial. For one, the
results of the post-mortem examinations showing that the victims had sustained multiple stab and hack wounds
(i.e., Sabino sustained 11 hack wounds and 12 stab wounds; Graciano suffered four stab wounds and a hack wound;
and Victor had three hack wounds) confirmed his testimonial declarations about the victims having been repeatedly
stabbed and hacked.18 Also, the blood-stained bolos and blood-stained clothing recovered from the possession of the
accused confirmed his declarations that the accused had used bolos in inflicting deadly blows on their victims.
It is notable, on the other hand, that the Defense did not challenge the sincerity of Perfinians eyewitness
identification. The accused did not show if Perfinian had harbored any ill-feeling towards any or all of them that he
was moved to testify falsely against them. Any such ill-feeling was even improbable in light of the revelation that he
and Hermogenes had spiritual bonds as compadres. Without such showing by the Defense, therefore, Perfinian was
presumed not to have been improperly actuated, entitling his incriminating testimony to full faith and credence.19
II.
Arnold and Joven did not act
in self-defense and in defense of strangers
In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 20 On
the other hand, the requisites of defense of strangers are, namely: (a) unlawful aggression by the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; and (c) the person defending be not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.21
In self-defense and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element, a condition sine qua
non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense and defense of strangers are
unavailing, because there would be nothing to repel. 22 The character of the element of unlawful aggression has been
aptly described in People v. Nugas,23 as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in
defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused
must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must
be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least,
imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or
at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely
imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent
to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression
must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip
where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a
pot.
By invoking self-defense and defense of strangers, Arnold and Joven in effect admitted their parts in killing
the victims. The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accuseds defense is self-defense he
thereby admits being the author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. 24 The rationale for the shifting of the burden of evidence is that the
accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable unless he satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense.
But the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not thereby lifted from the shoulders of the State, which
carries it until the end of the proceedings. In other words, only the onus probandi shifts to the accused, for selfdefense is an affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and satisfactory proof.25 He
must now discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of that of the
Prosecution, considering that the Prosecutions evidence, even if weak, cannot be disbelieved in view of his
admission of the killing.26
Arnold and Joven did not discharge their burden.
Arnold and Joven did not adequately prove unlawful aggression; hence, neither self-defense nor defense of
stranger was a viable defense for them. We note that in addition to the eyewitness account of Perfinian directly
incriminating them, their own actuations immediately after the incident confirmed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
As the CA cogently noted,27 their flight from the neighborhood where the crimes were committed, their concealing of
the weapons used in the commission of the crimes, their non-reporting of the crimes to the police, and their failure to
surrender themselves to the police authorities fully warranted the RTCs rejection of their claim of self-defense and
defense of stranger.
Winifredas testimonial claim that the victims were the aggressors deserves no consideration. Her story was
that one of the victims had tried to attack her with a balisong.28 Yet, her story would not stand scrutiny because of the
fact that no such weapon had been recovered from the crime scene; and because of the fact that none of the
accused had substantiated her thereon. Neither Arnold nor Joven attested in court seeing any of the victims holding
any weapon.29
Nonetheless, even if we were to believe Arnold and Jovens version of the incident, the element of unlawful
aggression by the victims would still be lacking. The allegation that one of the victims had held Winifredas hand did
not indicate that the act had gravely endangered Winifredas life. Similarly, the victims supposed motion to draw
something from their waists did not put Arnold and Jovens lives in any actual or imminent danger. What the records
inform us is that Arnold and Joven did not actually see if the victims had any weapons to draw from their waists. That
no weapons belonging to the victims were recovered from the crime scene confirmed their being unarmed. Lastly,
had they been only defending themselves, Arnold and Joven did not tell the trial court why they had repeatedly
hacked their victims with their bolos; or why they did not themselves even sustain any physical injury.Thus, the CA
and the RTC rightly rejected their plea of self-defense and defense of stranger, for the nature and the number of
wounds sustained by the victims were important indicia to disprove self-defense.30
III.
The State duly established
conspiracy and abuse of superior strength
The CA upheld the RTCs finding that conspiracy and abuse of superior strength were duly established.
We affirm the CA.
The accused, armed with bolos, surrounded and attacked the victims, and pursued whoever of the latter
attempted to escape from their assault. Thereafter, the accused, except Hermogenes, fled their homes and together
hastily proceeded to Antipolo, Rizal. Their individual and collective acts prior to, during and following the attack on the
victims reflected a common objective of killing the latter. Thereby, all the accused, without exception, were coconspirators.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it.31 Conspiracy is either express or implied. Thus, the State does not always have to prove the
actual agreement to commit the crime in order to establish conspiracy, for it is enough to show that the accused
acted in concert to achieve a common purpose. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime
indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest. 32 Where the acts of the
accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals. 33Once a
conspiracy is established, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A
co-conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither does he have to know the exact
part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal act.34
In view of the foregoing, the Court rejects the pleas for exculpation of the other accused grounded on their
respective alibis considering that Arnold and Jovens admission of sole responsibility for the killings did not eliminate
their liability as co-conspirators.
Abuse of superior strength is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder. 35 It
is present if the accused purposely uses excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked, or if there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and the latter takes
advantage of superior strength. Superiority in strength may refer to the number of aggressors and weapons used.36
A gross disparity of forces existed between the accused and the victims. Not only did the six accused
outnumber the three victims but the former were armed with bolos while the latter were unarmed. The accused
clearly used their superiority in number and arms to ensure the killing of the victims. Abuse of superior strength is
attendant if the accused took advantage of their superiority in number and their being armed with
bolos.37 Accordingly, the crimes committed were three counts of murder.
The CA concluded that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should not be appreciated in favor
of Hermogenes.
In order that voluntary surrender is appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the accused has not been actually arrested; (b) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or
the latters agent; and (c) surrender is voluntary.38 The third requisite requires the surrender to be spontaneous,
indicating the intent of the accused to unconditionally submit himself to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessary for his search and capture.39
Although Hermogenes went to Barangay Chairman Aloria of Bulihan after the killings, he did so to seek
protection against the retaliation of the victims relatives, not to admit his participation in the killing of the
victims.40 Even then, Hermogenes denied any involvement in the killings when the police went to take him from
Chairman Alorias house.41 As such, Hermogenes did not unconditionally submit himself to the authorities in order to
acknowledge his participation in the killings or in order to save the authorities the trouble and expense for his arrest.42
Nonetheless, any determination of whether or not Hermogenes was entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender was vain in light of the penalty for murder being reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Due to both such penalties being indivisible, the
attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances would not affect the penalties except to aid the trial court in
pegging the penalty to reclusion perpetua if the only modifying circumstance was mitigating, or the mitigating
circumstances outnumbered the aggravating circumstances; or to prescribe the death penalty (prior to its prohibition
under Republic Act No. 934643) should there be at least one aggravating circumstance and there was no mitigating
circumstance, or the aggravating circumstances outnumbered the mitigating circumstances. This effect would
conform to Article 63, (2), of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxx
IV.
Civil liability
The awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are also proper, but their corresponding amounts should
be increased to P75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.44 The actual damages of P15,000.00 and P8,000.00
granted to the heirs of Sabino and Graciano, respectively, were also warranted due to their being proven by
receipts.45 However, the Court has held that when actual damages proven by receipts amount to less
than P25,000.00, as in the case of Sabino and Graciano, the award of temperate damages amounting to P25,000.00
is justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. 46 This is based on the sound reasoning that it would be
anomalous and unfair that the heirs of the victim who tried and succeeded in proving actual damages of less
than P25,000.00 only would be put in a worse situation than others who might have presented no receipts at all but
would be entitled toP25,000.00 temperate damages.47 Hence, instead of only P15,000.00 and P8,000.00, the amount
of P25,000.00 as temperate damages should be awarded each to the heirs of Sabino and Graciano.
The heirs of Victor did not present receipts proving the expenses they incurred by virtue of Victors death.
Nonetheless, it was naturally expected that the heirs had spent for the wake and burial of Victor. Article 2224 of
the Civil Code provides that temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount cannot be proved with certainty. Hence, in lieu of nominal damages of P10,000.00 awarded by the CA,
temperate damages of P25,000.00 are awarded to the heirs of Victor.
Exemplary damages of P30,000.00 should be further awarded to the heirs of the victims because of the
attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may
be granted when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstance. It was immaterial that such
aggravating circumstance was necessary to qualify the killing of each victim as murder.48
WHEREFORE, the
Court AFFIRMS the
decision
promulgated
on April
28,
2005,
with
the
following MODIFICATIONS, to wit: (a) the civil indemnity and moral damages are each increased to P75,000.00; (b)
temperate damages of P25,000.00 is granted, respectively, to the heirs of Sabino and Graciano in lieu of actual
damages; (c) instead of nominal damages, temperate damages of P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Victor; and
(d) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is given, respectively, to the heirs of Sabino, Graciano and Victor.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Vice Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, who penned the decision of the Court of Appeals, per raffle of January 16,
2012.
1 Records, pp. 1-2.
2 Id., pp. 260-261.
3 Id, pp. 271-272.
4 Id, p. 25.
5 TSN, June 20, 2000, pp. 1-6.
6 TSN, August 29, 2000, pp. 1-19.
7 TSN, September 29, 2000, pp. 1-8; October 6, 2000, pp. 23-30; November 14, 2000 pp. 1-14.
8 TSN, October 6, 2000, pp. 5, 13 and 16.
9 TSN, November 14, 2000, pp. 15-20.
10 TSN, September 29, 2000, pp. 13-18.
11 TSN, December 12, 2000, pp. 1-8.
12 Rollo, pp. 47-49.
13 CA rollo, pp. 39-40.
14 Rollo, pp. 3-27; penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of the Court), with Associate
Justice Regalado E. Maambong (deceased) and Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon concurring.
15 Id., pp. 49-57.
16 People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 173309, January 23, 2007, 512 SCRA 385, 392.
17 People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184958, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 280, 293; Gerasta v. People, G.R. No.
176981, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 503, 512.
18 Records, pp. 186-187, 190, and 193.

19 Ardonio v. People, G.R. No. 134596, September 21, 2001, 365 SCRA 579, 583-584.
20 Article 11 (1), Revised Penal Code.
22 Calim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140065, February 13, 2001, 351 SCRA 559, 571.
23 G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011.
24 People v. Capisonda, 1 Phil. 575 (1902); People v. Baguio, 43 Phil. 683 (1922); People v. Silang Cruz, 53 Phil.
625 (1929); People v. Gutierrez, 53 Phil. 609 (1929); People v. Embalido, 58 Phil. 152 (1933); People v. Dorico, No.
L-31568, November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 172, 183; People v. Boholst-Caballero, G.R. No. L-23249, November 25,
1974, 61 SCRA 180, 186. People v. Quio, G.R. No. 105580, May 17, 1994, 232 SCRA 400, 403; People v.
Camacho, G.R. No. 138629, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 200, 207; People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 130397, January 17,
2002, 374 SCRA 10, 16; People v. Mayingque, G.R. No. 179709, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 123.
25 People v. Gelera, G. R. No. 121377, August 15, 1997, 277 SCRA 450, 461.
26 People v. Molina, G.R. No. 59436, August 28, 1992, 213 SCRA 52, 65; People v. Alapide, G.R. No. 104276,
September 20, 1994, 236 SCRA 555, 560; People v. Albarico, G.R. Nos. 108596-97, November 17, 1994, 238 SCRA
203, 211; People v. Camahalan, G.R. No. 114032, February 22, 1995, 241 SCRA 558, 569.
27 Rollo, p. 21.
28 TSN, April 24, 2001 pp. 10-11.
29 TSN, March 9, 2001 p. 12.
30 Palaganas v. People, G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533, 552.
31 Article 8, second paragraph, Revised Penal Code.
32 Angeles, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101442, March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 509, 518.
33 People v. Estorco, G.R. No. 111941, April 27, 2000, 331 SCRA 38, 50.
34 People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 384, 404; People v. Masagnay, G.R. No. 137264,
June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 572, 580.
36 People v. Carpio, G.R. Nos. 82815-16, October 31, 1990, 191 SCRA 108, 119.
37 People v. Ballabare, G.R. No. 108871, November 19, 1996, 264 SCRA 350, 370.
38 People v. Ignacio, G.R. No. 134568, February 10, 2000, 325 SCRA 375, 384.
39 Id.; see also People v. Lagrana, No. L-68790, January 23, 1987, 147 SCRA 281, 285.
40 TSN, March 9, 2001, p. 20.
41 Id., p. 17.
42 Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139150, July 20, 2001, 361 SCRA 636, 650.
43 An Act Prohibiting The Imposition of Death Penalty in The Philippines, repealing Republic Act 8177 otherwise
known as the Act Designating Death By Lethal Injection, Republic Act 7659 otherwise known as the Death Penalty
Law and all other laws, executive orders and decrees (The law was signed on June 24, 2006).
44 People v. Arbalate, G.R. No. 183457, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 239, 255; People v. Satonero, G.R. No.
186233, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 769.
45 People v. De Castro, G.R. No. 142467, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 543, 557.
46 Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 6, 2008, 574 SCRA 737, 756.
47 Id.
48 See People v. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621, 631.

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R. No. 176061

Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
- versus -
BINGKY CAMPOS and

DANNY BOY ACABO,
Promulgated:
Appellants.
July 4, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
We reiterate in this case the time-honored doctrine that although it is a cardinal principle in criminal law that the prosecution has
the burden of proving the guilt of the accused, the rule is reversed where the accused admits the commission of the crime and
invokes self-defense.
This is an appeal from the September 25, 2006 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR H.C. No. 00241. The
CA affirmed in toto the April 2, 2004 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 37, Dumaguete City
finding appellants Bingky Campos (Bingky) and Danny Boy Acabo (Danny) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.
In an Information filed by the Assistant Prosecutor of Dumaguete City, Bingky and Danny were charged with the crime of murder
committed as follows:
That on August 19, 2001 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening at Arellano Street, Poblacion
Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent
to kill, armed with a plamingco - a bladed weapon of which said accused were armed and provided, and [by]
means of treachery, and disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his age, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, stab and wound ROMEO F. ABAD, 64 years of age, thereby
inflicting upon the latter stab [sic] wound with injury to the liver, gallbladder thru/thru; duodenum thru/thru;
pancreas, which cause[d] his death on the following day while undergoing medical treatment at the Holy Child
Hospital.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.[3]
Arraigned on September 25, 2001, appellants, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was deemed
terminated on March 25, 2002. Trial on the merits thereafter proceeded.
A brief summary of the pertinent facts constituting the prosecutions version of the incident was unveiled by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in this manner:
[A]t around [8:00] oclock in the evening of August 19, 2001, prosecution eyewitness Lester Huck Baldivino
(Lester) was tending his sari-sari store near his house located at Arellano St., Brgy. Calango, Zamboanguita,
Negros Oriental when [the victim] Romeo Abad (Romeo), his maternal uncle, came to buy cigarettes and
candies. Lester was about to call it a night and was already preparing to close his store, but Romeo lit up a
cigarette and started to converse with him.
Romeo was jesting about Lesters skin rashes, as the latter was applying medicine on his irritated skin. They
were in this bantering mood, when Lester, who was facing the highway, suddenly heard footsteps and
immediately saw Danny Boy Acabo (Acabo) running towards his uncles direction, closely followed by Bingky
Campos (Campos). Before Lester can utter a word of warning, Danny swiftly stab[bed] Romeo at the lower
right side of the latters abdomen with a plamingko while Bingky stood nearby. Immediately after stabbing
Romeo, Danny and Bingky fled.
Lester was shocked but darted out of his store to apply pressure on Romeos wound when he heard the latter
cry out for help. Lester told Romeo to hang on and ran inside his house to call his mother and Romeos son
and told them to prepare the car.
Romeo was brought to the Holy Child Hospital where he died.
The medical examination conducted by Dr. Johnny B. Yee (Dr. Yee), the attending physician at
the Holy Child Hospital who prepared the Certificate of Death, revealed that Romeo sustained a stab[bed]
wound that could have been inflicted by a sharp and pointed long instrument. The weapon hit him at the right
upper quadrant of the abdomen, penetrating and causing injury to the liver, with through and through
laceration of the gall bladder and the duodenum, and transecting the whole length of the pancreas. Dr. Yee
further testified that the injury to the pancreas caused the massive blood loss which [made] Romeo to suffer
hypovolemic shock [resulting to] cardio-pulmonary arrest [and, eventually, his] death.[4]
Version of the Defense
For the defense, the following is their own version of the incident as narrated in their Brief:
On August 19, 2001 while on their way to the house of their uncle, Danny and Bingky met four men who mauled Bingky. When
Bingky was able to run away, they approached Danny and kicked his buttocks. Danny pulled out a knife and thrust it towards one
of the men. Danny then ran away to escape.[5]
Bingky corroborated the testimony of Danny that four men approached him (Bingky) and mauled him. He does not know who
these persons were.[6]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 2, 2004, after evaluating the conflicting evidence before it, the RTC meted out a judgment of conviction and sentenced
both Bingky and Danny to reclusion perpetua and ordered them to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Romeo the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages plus cost.[7]
Appellants appealed to this Court in view of the penalty imposed on them. On September 15, 2004, this Court accepted the
appeal and notified the parties to file briefs. [8] On March 7, 2005,[9] the Court transferred the case to the CA in conformity with the
Decision in People v. Mateo.[10]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA found no error in the appreciation of the evidence and applicable law by the trial court. On September 25, 2006, the
appellate court, in rendering its assailed Decision, dispositively ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered affirming the Decision of the trial court in
toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, this appeal.

On May 3, 2007[12] and May 7, 2007,[13] appellants and appellee People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), respectively, filed similar manifestation that they are no longer filing their supplemental briefs.
Appellants pray for the reversal of their conviction alleging that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. They claim that the stabbing of the victim was done in self-defense. They take exception to the finding of the trial court
regarding the presence of conspiracy asserting that the mere presence of Bingky at the scene of the crime does not prove the
existence of conspiracy.
For the appellee, the OSG argues that Danny failed to prove his plea of self-defense; that conspiracy attended the killing of the
victim and that appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellee thus prays for the affirmance of the judgment of
conviction with modification as to the award of civil indemnities.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.[14] However, once the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying
circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He cannot rely on the weakness of the evidence for the
prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be doubted especially after he himself has admitted the killing. [15] This is because a
judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order.
Danny categorically admits that he stabbed Romeo. However, he boldly claims that he did it in self defense. He avers
that on that fateful night of August 19, 2001, he and Bingky were attacked along the way home by four unknown persons for no
apparent reason. He observed that one of the men was pulling an object from his waistband which he thought was a bladed
weapon so he drew his own knife and thrust it at the man rushing at him, hitting the latter on the right side of his body. His reaction,
he asserts, was defensive arising from a prior act of aggression and provocation by the victim and his companions.
The essential elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, which the accused must prove by clear and
convincing evidence are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the
accused to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused defending
himself.[16] The first element of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense unless there was
unlawful aggression from the person injured or killed by the accused; for otherwise, there is nothing to prevent or repel.
In the present case, Dannys claim of self-defense is belied by his own testimony:
Q Now after they attacked Bingky Campos what did they do?
A They were not able to hit again Bingky because Bingky ran away.
Q How about you? What did they do to you?
A I was held by the other person when he approached me because Bingky was no longer there.
Q And who was that person who held you?

A I do not know him.
Q How about now, do you know his name?
A What I know only was Jaime and Iko.
Q Who [between] the two, Jaime and Iko [took] hold of you?
A Jaime and Iko were not able to hold me.
Q Was there an attempt by Jaime and Iko to maul you also?
A Yes.
Q What did they do?
A They kicked my left butt and the other person held me.
Q Then what did you do?
A I pulled a knife from my waist.
Q Who [between] the two kicked you at your butt and who was the person who took hold of you?
A It was Iko who kicked my buttocks but the other person who held me, I do not know his name.
Q Now what happened when you drew you[r] knife?
A The two persons who attempted to attack me, when I pulled a knife, I thrust the knife to the person who
rushed at me.
Q Did you hit that person?
A Yes, he was hit.
Q Where was he hit?
A At the side.
Court Interpreter:
The witness is touching his lower right side.
Atty. Vailoces:
Q And what were the other companions doing at that time?
Witness:
A After thrusting the knife to the person, I ran away and the three (3) ran after me.[17]
As can be gleaned from the foregoing narration, there is no mention at all that Romeo was among the four persons who allegedly
attacked Danny and Bingky. Likewise, there is nothing in the narration which evinces unlawful aggression from Romeo. Dannys
testimony shows that there was only an attempt, not by Romeo but by Jaime and Iko, to attack him. Following his version, Danny
then became the aggressor and not the victim. Even if the version of Danny is given a semblance of truth, that there was an
attempt to hurt him, though intimidating, the same cannot be said to pose danger to his life and limb. This conclusion was drawn
from the fact that no bladed weapon was found at the alleged scene of the crime and nobody testified about it. For unlawful
aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude[18] and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. For this
reason, Dannys observation that one of the men was pulling an object from his waist is not a convincing proof of unlawful
aggression. [A] threat, even if made with a weapon or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. [19] An
intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. In this case, other than the self-serving allegation of Danny, there is no
evidence sufficiently clear and convincing that the victim indeed attacked him. The prosecutions rebuttal witnesses Jaime
Maquiling and Francisco Austero[20] who admittedly were among those whom Danny and Bingky had an encounter with on the
night of August 19, 2001, never said in their testimonies that Romeo attacked Danny and a bladed weapon was used. These
witnesses were categorical that Romeo was not with them during the incident. This testimonial evidence was not refuted by the
defense. Even Bingky who claimed to be a friend of Romeo [21] was not able to identify the latter as one of those present at the
time. Candid enough, Bingky declared that it was only a certain Ago and Jaime who confronted Danny. [22] Resultantly, Danny
failed to discharge his burden of proving unlawful aggression, the most indispensable element of self-defense. Where no unlawful
aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.[23]
Moreover, as testified to by the attending physician Dr. Yee, Romeo sustained a stab wound causing injuries on his liver, gall
bladder, duodenum and the pancreas which resulted to massive blood loss. [24] He eventually died of multiple vital organ
failure. Clearly the wound inflicted by Danny on Romeo indicate a determined effort to kill and not merely to defend. [25] As has
been repeatedly ruled, the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense.[26]
Furthermore, Dannys actuation in not reporting the incident immediately to the authorities cannot take out his case within the
ambit of the Courts jurisprudential doctrine that the flight of an accused discloses a guilty conscience. The justifying circumstance
of self-defense may not survive in the face of appellants flight from the scene of the crime coupled with his failure to promptly
inform the authorities about the incident.[27]
Indeed, appellants conviction was principally anchored on the testimony of Lester as an eyewitness. Like the courts below, we too
find Lesters testimony consistent, credible and trustworthy.We have reviewed his declaration in court as contained in the pertinent
transcript of stenographic notes and we discern nothing therein that casts doubt on his credibility. His testimony is clear, positive in
its vital points and full of details substantiating the circumstances of how, where and when the offense charged happened
including the identity of the knife wielder, Danny. It is most unlikely that he could narrate all the details of the crime with clarity and
lucidity unless he was personally present at the situs criminis before and during the incident. The testimony of a witness, giving
details of a startling incident that cannot easily be fabricated, deserves credence and full probative weight for it indicates sincerity
and truthfulness in the narration of events.[28]Findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding
upon this Court.[29] Though there are recognized exceptions to this rule, none is present in this case. We are bound by the trial
courts assessment, as affirmed by the appellate court, that the stabbing of Romeo took place in the manner proven by the
prosecution, that is, in front of the store of Lester and not elsewhere, at the time the victim was buying cigarette and candies.
Treachery attended the killing of the victim
The trial court, in convicting appellants of murder, ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery.
We agree.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.[30] To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (a) that at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and, (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of
attack employed.[31]
In this case, it is at once evident that Dannys attack on the victim was sudden and deliberate as testified by eyewitness Lester. The
attack was unexpected and without the slightest provocation on the part of the unarmed Romeo considering that he was casually
talking to Lester after buying something from the store with no inkling that an attack was forthcoming. The attack was executed in
a manner that Romeo was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. The severity of the lone stab wound forestalled any
possibility of resisting the attack. Danny without doubt took advantage of this situation. As correctly held by the trial court, the act of
Danny in positioning himself in a place where Romeo could not see him and then suddenly and deliberately inflicting a fatal wound
are clear indications that he employed means and methods which tended directly and specifically to ensure the successful
execution of the offense.[32]
Conspiracy adequately established
Notably, a relevant portion of the appellants brief was focused on the discussion of the conspiracy angle in the commission of the
crime. The defense challenges the trial courts finding of conspiracy, arguing that Bingkys mere presence at the scene of the crime
does not prove the existence of conspiracy.
Appellants argument is untenable.
Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it.[33] Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy [for] it may be deduced [from] the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there is a common purpose to commit
the crime.[34]
Indeed, mere presence at the scene of the incident, by itself, is not a sufficient ground to hold a person liable as a
conspirator. However, conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which when taken together indicate that
they are parts of the scheme to commit the crime. In the present case, Bingkys presence at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission as testified to by prosecution eyewitness Lester was never rebutted. According to Lester, Danny arrived first at the
scene of the crime followed by Bingky. During the stabbing incident, Bingky was around three meters away from
Danny. Immediately after the incident, both appellants scampered away. [35] To the mind of the Court, Bingkys presence at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission was not just a chance encounter with Danny. His overt act of keeping himself
around served no other purpose than to lend moral support by ensuring that no one could give succor to the victim. His presence
at the scene has no doubt, encouraged Danny and increased the odds against the victim. One who participates in the material
execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the
same extent as the actual perpetrator.[36] Moreover, the record is bereft of any hint that Bingky endeavored to avert the stabbing of
the victim despite the particular distance between them. Under the circumstances, we can hardly accept that Bingky has nothing
to do with the killing. No conclusion can be drawn from the acts of Bingky except that he consented and approved the acts of his
co-accused in stabbing the victim. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. It matters not who
among the accused actually killed the victim. Thus, the trial court did not err in its ruling that conspiracy existed between appellants
in the commission of the crime charged.
The Proper Penalty
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder.[37] Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. The two penalties being both indivisible and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance to
consider, the lesser of the two penalties which is reclusion perpetua should be imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 63[38] of the RPC. Hence the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court is
proper.
As to Damages
The trial court likewise correctly awarded civil indemnity and moral damages to the heirs of the victim. However, in line with
prevailing jurisprudence the award of civil indemnity shall be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. This amount is granted to
the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. We retain the award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages. Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victims heirs.
Significantly, both lower courts failed to award exemplary and actual damages to the heirs of the victim. Exemplary damages
should be awarded in accordance with Article 2230[39] of the Civil Code given the presence of treachery which qualified the killing
to murder. We therefore award the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim.[40]
Settled is the rule that only duly receipted expenses can be the basis of actual damages. Dominic Abad, son of the victim testified
that the family spent P65,000.00 for the hospitalization of the victim, P45,000.00 for the coffin and P35,000.00 for the wake but
failed to present receipts to prove these expenses.[41] However, notwithstanding the absence of receipts to prove actual damages,
we find it imperative to award the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. Under Article 2224 of
the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss
although the exact amount was not proved.[42]
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal
rate of 6% from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that appellants Bingky Campos and Danny
Boy Acabo are ordered to jointly and severally pay the heirs of the victim Romeo Abad, the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages, all in addition to the P50,000.00 moral
damages which is retained, as well as interest on all these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6% from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
C E R T IF I CAT I ON
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
CA rollo, pp. 116-122; penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon and concurred in by Associate Justices
Pampio A. Abarintos and Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla.
[2]
Id. at 17-31; penned by Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino.
[3]
Records, p. 1.
[4]
CA rollo, pp. 86-88.
[5]
Id. at 56.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 31.
[8]
Id. at 34.
Id. at 44.
[10]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640. In this case, the Court provided a review by the Court of
Appeals of cases where the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed before same is
elevated to the Supreme Court.
[11]
CA rollo, p. 122.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[13]
Id. at 13-15.
[14]
Boac v. People, G.R. No. 180597, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 533, 548.
[15]
Palaganas v. People, G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533, 553-554.
[16]
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 737, 746.
[17]
TSN, November 11, 2002, pp. 10-11.
[18]
People v. Rubiso, 447 Phil. 374, 381 (2003).
[19]
Id.
[20]
They are the Jaime and Iko referred to by Danny in his abovequoted testimony; see TSN, April 1, 2003.
[21]
TSN, December 2, 2002, p. 13.
[22]
Id. at 12.
[23]
People v. Abesamis, G.R. No. 140985, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 300, 311.
[24]
TSN, August 13, 2002, p. 13.
[25]
People v. Pateo, G.R. No. 156786, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 609, 617.
[26]
Id.
[27]
David, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 136037, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 22, 35.
[28]
People v. Clario, 414 Phil. 358, 374 (2001).
[29]
Alcantara v. Roble de Templa, G.R. No. 160918, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 254, 266.
[30]
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 174371, December 11, 2008, 573 SCRA 708, 721-722.
[31]
Id.
[32]
RTC Decision, CA rollo, p. 13.
[33]
People v. Pagalasan, 452 Phil. 341, 363 (2003).
[34]
People v. Martin, G.R. No. 177571, September 29, 2008, 567 SCRA 42, 51.
[35]
TSN, July 1, 2002, p. 9.
[36]
People v. Sicad, 439 Phil. 610, 626 (2002).
[37]
People v. Ramos, 471 Phil. 115, 125 (2004).
[38]
ART. 63 Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules shall
be observed in the application thereof.
xxxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
xxxx
[39]
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines
and shall be paid to the offended party.
[40]
People v. Asis, G.R. No. 177573, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 509, 531.
[41]
TSN, October 14, 2002, p. 7.
[42]
People v. Surongon, G.R. No. 173478, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 577, 588.
[9]

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170462
February 5, 2014
RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari the decision dated October 24, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28899. The CA affirmed, with modification on the amount of
damages, the joint decision dated April 16, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20,
Cauayan City, Isabela, finding Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra (petitioners) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.
1
Factual Antecedents
Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide under
two Informations which read:
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide:
That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times
with a sharp pointed bolo one Erwin Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and
stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of the
said Erwin Ordonez, thus, performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the
crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said
Erwin Ordonez, which prevented his death.
4
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide:

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times
with a sharp pointed bolo one David Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and
stab wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.
5
Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8, 2000, the true date
of their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the CA through the records. The parties
failed to raise any objection to the discrepancy.
6
On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges. The cases were jointly tried with
the conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the pre-trial, the petitioners interposed selfdefense, which prompted the RTC to conduct a reverse trial of the case.
8
During the trial, the parties presented different versions of the events that transpired on November 8,
2000.
Version of the Defense
To prove the petitioners' claim of self-defense, the defense presented the testimonies of Rodolfo,
Joey, and the petitioners' neighbor, Balbino Agustin.
Testimony of Rodolfo
Rodolfo, who was then fifty-five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11 :00 p.m., on November 8,
2000, brothers Erwin Ordonez and David Ordonez, together with their companion, Philip Vingua,
forced their way into his compound and threw stones at his house and tricycle. Through the back
door of his house, Rodolfo went down to the basement or "silung' and shouted at the three men to
stop. David saw him, threatened to kill him, and struck him with a ''panabas," hitting him on the palm
of his left hand. Rodolfo responded by reaching for the bolo tucked in the "so/era" of his house, and
hacked and stabbed Erwin and David until the two brothers fell to the ground. Upon seeing Erwin
and David lying on the ground, Rodolfo called on someone to bring the brothers to the hospital. He
stayed in his house until the policemen arrived.
Testimony of Joey
Joey, who was then thirty-one (31) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m., on November 8,
2000, he was awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia,
Isabela. Through the window, he saw Erwin, David and Philip breaking into their gate, which was
made of wood and interlink wire and located five ( 5) to six ( 6) meters away from their house. He
then heard his father Rodolfo say to the three men, "kung ano man ang problema bukas na natin
pag-usapan," and David retorted in their dialect, "Okininam nga lakay adda ka gayam dita, patayin
taka."
10
11
Testimony of Balbino
Balbino narrated that, from inside his house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela, at around 10:00 p.m.,
on November 8, 2000, he heard a person from the outside saying "Sige banatan ninyo na." He
opened his door and saw David, Erwin and Philip throwing stones at the house of his neighbor
Crisanto Briones. Briones got mad and scolded the three men, "Why are you hitting my house? Why
don't you hit the house of your enemy, mga tarantado kayo!" David, Erwin and Philip then aimed
their stones at the petitioners' house. Balbino heard David calling out to Joey, "Joey, kung tunay
kang lalaki lumabas ka diyan sa kalsada at dito tayo magpatayan," but no one came out of
Rodolfo's house. The stoning lasted for about thirty (30) minutes.
12
13
14
Afterwards, Balbino saw David, Erwin and Philip destroy Rodolfo's gate and pull the gate towards
the road. He heard David say to his companions, "koberan ninyo ako at papasok kami." David,
Erwin and Philip entered the petitioners' compound and damaged Rodolfo's tricycle with stones and
their ''panabas." Also, he heard Rodolfo say to David in Filipino that they could just talk about their
problems with him the following day. But David approached Rodolfo and hacked him with a
''panabas." Rodolfo parried the blow with the back of his hand, and David and Rodolfo struggled for
the possession of the ''panabas."
15
Balbino also saw Erwin hit Rodolfo on the face with a stone and Joey was hit on his right foot,
causing Rodolfo and Joey to retreat to the "silung" of their house from where Rodolfo got "something
shiny," and with it stabbed David and Erwin. He saw the two brothers fall to the ground.
As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived the
hacking.
Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother David and
Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners' compound. He was walking
twenty (20) meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying that David
was being stabbed by Joey with a bolo. While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was
three (3) meters away from where his brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then
hacked him, hitting his arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the
petitioners' compound and kept on hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He
became weak and ultimately fell to the ground.
Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged Rodolfo's
tricycle. They did not likewise destroy the petitioners' gate, which was only damaged when his
brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound.
While they were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually rained on them
and people outside the petitioners' gate were saying, "Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come
out."
1wphi1
16
After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David died in
the hospital while being treated for his wounds.
The RTC's Ruling
In a decision dated April 16, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's version of the
incident and found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated
homicide and homicide. It disbelieved the defense's version of the events due to material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense witnesses. It denied the petitioners' claim of selfdefense for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory supporting evidence.
The RTC explained in its decision that "[w]hen an accused invokes the justifying circumstance of
self-defense, he loses the constitutional presumption of innocence and assumes the burden of
proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the justification for his act"; that self-defense is an
affirmative allegation which must be proven with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. The
RTC held that the petitioners miserably failed to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims, Erwin and David.
17
18
Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes for which they are charged, and absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance/s that attended the commission of the crimes, the Court hereby sentences each of the
accused to suffer -In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide - an indeterminate
penalty ranging from Three (3) years and one day of prision correccional as minimum to Nine (9)
years of prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify the victim Erwin Ordonez moral damages in
the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. Cost against the accused.
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8)
years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased David Ordonez Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00)
Pesos plus Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. Costs against the accused.
The bail bonds of the accused are CANCELLED.
19
The CA's Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of the crimes charged.
As the RTC did, the CA found that Erwin and David committed no unlawful aggression sufficient to
provoke the actions of the petitioners; that "aggression, to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent,
such that there is a real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to others
whom that person is seeking to defend." Even assuming the truth of the petitioners' claims that
David challenged Joey to a fight and threatened to kill Rodolfo on the night of November 8, 2000, the
CA held that these acts do not constitute unlawful aggression to justify the petitioners' actions as no
real or actual danger existed as the petitioners were then inside the safety of their own home.
20
The CA further held that the petitioners' plea of self-defense was belied by the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds on his arm and back, and David,
who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds on his back and stomach causing his death. These
wounds logically indicated that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined
homicidal aggression on the part of the petitioners.
21
The CA, however, found error in the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the
RTC. Thus, the CA modified the RTC's decision in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Crim. Case No. Br. 201561, appellants RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA are each ordered to pay the heirs
of the deceased David Ordonez the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P.50,000.00) as civil indemnity
and another Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
22
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners raise the following issues:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE
DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELFDEFENSE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
PETITIONER JOEY GUEVARRA WHO HAS NO PARTICIPATION IN THE SAID INCIDENT.
23
Our Ruling
We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of October 24, 2005.
At the outset, we emphasize that the Court's review of the present case is via a petition for review
under Rule 45, which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The wellsettled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject
only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court's
judgment or the appellate court's misapprehension of the adduced facts.
24
The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this case. Factual
findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court
and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record. We find that both
the RTC and the CA fully considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense,
and they have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the
petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.
25
In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts and
circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome of the present case, we uphold the rulings
of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of these crimes fully established during the trial.
The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an "accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present."
26
On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused
killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which
is presumed; and ( 4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder,
or by that of parricide or infanticide.
27
The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained
by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other
things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of,
or immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim. The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered
and which eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained,
confirmed the prosecution's theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David and
Erwin.
28
29
In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-trial that "the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin Ordonez
would have caused his death were it not for immediate medical attendance."
30
By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for which
they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With
this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated
killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to
self-defense.
31
Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person. The element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in order for
self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to
self-defense.
32
33
As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing by the
petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by Joey
while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the
petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner by
which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who
was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances,
coupled with the nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the
petitioners did not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in
fact, the real aggressors.
As to the penalties and damages
awarded
We affirm the penalties imposed upon the petitioners, as they are well within the ranges provided by
law, but modify the damages awarded by the CA.
In addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the CA, we
award P25,000.00 to each of the victims as temperate damages, in lieu of the actual damages they
sustained by reason of the crimes. Article 2224 of the Civil Code states that temperate or moderate
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty.
Also, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of six percent
( 6%) per annum from date of finality of the decision until fully paid.
34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated October 24, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the petitioners are also ordered to pay Erwin
Ordonez and the heirs of David Ordonez the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The petitioners shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil indemnity,
moral and temperate damages from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*

Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* In lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo per Raffie dated February 5, 2014.
1
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 22-39.
Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, and concurred in by Associate

Justices Portia Alifio-Hormachuelos and Mariano C. del Castillo (now a Member of this
Court); CA ro/lo, pp. 207-222.
2
Penned by Judge Henedino P. Eduarte; rollo, pp. 58-68.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 43.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id. at 59.
Translated into English as "If you have a problem with me, let us just discuss it tomorrow."
(Id. at 43.)
10
Translated into English as "Vulva of your mother, so there you are, old man. I am going to
kill you." (Id. at 43-44.)
11
12
Translated into English as "Go ahead, give him a beating." (Id. at 44.)
13
CA rollo, p. 55.
Translated into English as "Joey, if you are indeed a man, you come out to the street and
fight me." (Rollo, p. 44.)
14
15
Translated into English as "Provide us cover, as we will enter." (Ibid.)
16
Id. at 45.
17
Id. at 62.
18
Id. at 63.
19
Id. at 68; italics supplied.
20
Id. at 48.
21
Id. at 53.
22
CA rollo, p. 222; emphases supplied.
23
Rollo, p. 27; emphasis ours.
24
See Gotis v. People, 559 Phil. 843, 849 (2007).
Maxwell Heavy Equipment Corporation v. Yu, G.R. No. 179395, December 15, 2010, 638
SCRA 653, 658.
25
26
Josue v. People, G.R. No. 199579, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 675, 682.
27
SPO1 Nerpio v. People, 555 Phil. 87, 94 (2007).
28
People v. Lanuza, G.R. No. 188562, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 293, 300.
29
Rollo, p. 53.
30
Id. at 59.
People v. Silvano, 403 Phil. 598, 606 (2001); and People v. Plaza, 403 Phil. 347, 357
(2001).
31
32
People v. Basadre, 405 Phil. 216, 229-230 (2001).
33
People v. Catbagan, 467 Phil. 1044, 1075 (2004).
34
People v. Concillado, G.R. No. 181204, November 28, 2011, 661SCRA363, 384.

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PEOPLE V ARBALATE- Self Defense

Facts of the case:

Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 169084

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

MELANIO DEL CASTILLO

VILLARAMA, JR., and

Criminal Case No. 10839

Criminal Case No. 10840

Criminal Case No. 10841

Version of the Prosecution

Decision of the RTC

We concur with both lower courts.

Arnold and Joven did not discharge their burden.

We affirm the CA.

Court AFFIRMS the

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

18 Records, pp. 186-187, 190, and 193.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 176061

BINGKY CAMPOS and

Hence, this appeal.

Q And who was that person who held you?

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Republic of the Philippines

RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners,

In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide:

Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:

The CA's Ruling

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 22-39.

Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, and concurred in by Associate

Penned by Judge Henedino P. Eduarte; rollo, pp. 58-68.

Translated into English as "Provide us cover, as we will enter." (Ibid.)

Id. at 68; italics supplied.

CA rollo, p. 222; emphases supplied.

Rollo, p. 27; emphasis ours.

See Gotis v. People, 559 Phil. 843, 849 (2007).

SPO1 Nerpio v. People, 555 Phil. 87, 94 (2007).

People v. Basadre, 405 Phil. 216, 229-230 (2001).

People v. Catbagan, 467 Phil. 1044, 1075 (2004).

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