Alawi vs Alauya

Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is
the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.Through
Alawis agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing
loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He
laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauyas letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of
attorney, which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, attorney, by the assertion that it is lexically synonymous with Counsellors-at-law. a title to which Sharia
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of attorney because counsellor is often mistaken for councilor, konsehal or the
Maranao term consial, connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney
Held: He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauyas use of the title of Attorney, this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not fullfledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counsellors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title of attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof
in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction
In Re: Garcia 2 SCRA 985
Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified
petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain the
course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University
of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law
profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he
is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
Issue:
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar.
Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain
cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens
of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is
therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting
state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional

prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement
such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
De Leon Vs. CA
For resolution is private respondents motion for reconsideration of the January 22, 2001 Decision of the Court, which reversed and set aside
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38664 and reinstated Resolution Nos. 953268 and 955201 of the Civil Service Commission.
In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we ruled that private respondents appointment on August 28, 1986, as Ministry Legal Counsel CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government, was temporary.Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig,[1] we held that since private respondent
was not a Career Executive Service (CES) eligible, his appointment did not attain permanency because he did not possess the required CES
eligibility for the CES position to which he was appointed. Hence, he can be transferred or reassigned without violating his right to security of tenure.
It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al., decided on September 26, 1990, [2] where the nature of private respondents
appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, was first contested, this Court issued a Minute Resolution
dated March 17, 1992, holding that Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of private respondent. The pertinent portion thereof reads The holding of this Court in the Achacoso case is not applicable to petitioner Montesa. Petitioner was appointed on August 28, 1996 by virtue of
Article III of the Freedom Constitution. He was extended a permanent appointment by then Minister Pimentel and subsequently confirmed as
permanent by the Civil Service Commission. He is a first grade civil service eligible (RA 1080) the appropriate eligibility for the position at that time
and a member of the Philippine bar.
There was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or at the time of appointment of petitioner. The CESO was only
reconstituted by the appointment of its Board of six (6) members sometime in August 1988. There was no CESO eligibility examination during
petitioner's incumbency in the Department, as there was no CESO board. The first CESO examination was given on August 5 and 12, 1990. The
CESO eligibility was not a requirement at the time of the appointment of petitioner. The only eligibility required is that of a first grader and petitioner is
a first grade eligible.Therefore, having met all the requirements for the position to which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in violation of the
constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due process.
Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature of his appointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in the
present case considering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Court.
Concededly, if we follow the conventional procedural path, i.e., the principle on conclusiveness of judgment set forth in Rule 39, Section 47,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, [3] would bar a re-litigation of the nature of private respondents appointment. Indeed, once an issue has been
adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be contoverted anew and should be finally laid to rest. [4]
Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res
judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It must be stressed that this is not the first time in Philippine and American jurisprudence
that the principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and jurisprudence. [5]
In the March 17, 1992 Minute Resolution, we held that private respondent who was appointed in 1986 pursuant to the Freedom Constitution,
though not a CES eligible, possessed all the requirements for the position of Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government,
since a CES eligibility was not, at that time, a requirement for the same position.
A reading, however, of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was adopted and declared part of the law of the land by Presidential Decree
No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, clearly shows that a CES eligibility is indeed a requirement for a position embraced in the CES. Thus:
c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Executive Service shall be made by the President from a list of career executive
eligibles recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which
qualify the incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent positions shall be with the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments. The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career Executive Service
eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted
to a higher class until he qualifies in such examination.

In fact, in March 1974, the CES Board issued CESB Circular No. 1 which laid down the requirements for membership in the CES, to wit:
a) Successful completion of CESDP shall constitute one of the requirements for membership in the CES. Except as otherwise provided by law, no
person shall be admitted into the CES without having satisfactorily completed the program;
b) Admission into CESDP shall be limited to incumbents of positions falling within the CES duly nominated by their Department Heads;
c) Upon satisfactory completion of the program, the incumbent-participant shall be enrolled in the roster of CES eligibles and shall be qualified for
appointment by the President to the appropriate rank in the CES upon recommendation of the Board. He may then be assigned to any position in the
CES by the President.
The foregoing law and circular were never amended nor repealed by the Freedom Constitution. A CES eligibility was an existing and operative
requirement at the time of private respondents appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV. Neither were the said law and circular inconsistent
with the Freedom Constitution as to render them modified or superseded. In fact, the Integrated Reorganization Plan allows the appointment of nonCES eligibles, like private respondent, provided they subsequently acquire the needed eligibility.
It bears stressing that in Achacoso v. Macaraig, the questioned appointment was made on October 16, 1987, before the CES Board was
reconstituted in 1988, and before the first CESO examination was given in 1990, as in the present case. Nevertheless, the Court, in Achacoso, ruled
that a CES eligibility is required for a CES position, such that an appointment of one who does not possess such eligibility shall be
temporary. Evidently, a CES eligibility has always been one of the requirements for a position embraced in the CES. The Court finds no reason to
make an exception in the instant controversy.
Moreover, in the recent case of Secretary of Justice v. Josefina Bacal,[6] we ruled that security of tenure in the CES is acquired with respect to
rank and not to position. Hence, assuming ex gratia argumenti that a CES eligibility is not a requirement in the case of private respondent, the
mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of personnel in the CES, which allow transfer or reassignment of CES personnel to other positions
of the same rank or salary,[7] justify his transfer to other CES position without violating his right to security of tenure.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, De Leon, Jr., SandovalGutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on official leave.

ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN

Petitioner Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B.
Belen of demeaning, humilating, and berating him during a hearing of Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samue Malabanan, et al. where Mane was
counsel for the plaintiff. During the proceedings, Belen asked Mane about the latters law school. When Mane answered that he came from Manuel
L. Quezon University (MLQU), Belen told him: Then youre not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I
know this, not all law students are created equal, notall law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme
Being that we all are created equal in His form and substance.
Belen further lambasted Mane and lectured him on the latters person, seemingly disregarding the case at hand. Subsequently, the OCA, upon
evaluation, found that Belens insulting remarks were unwarranted and inexcusable and recommended a reprimand of Belen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen during the hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct

HELD:
The Court held that an alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which the
Court administers, taking of the Lawyers oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions
and duties as, inter alia an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For ajudge to determine the fitness or competence
of a lawyer primarily on his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not the person of the counsel. IfJudge Belen felt that his integrity and dignity were being
assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however,
when he engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.
The Court reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in
a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court.

In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee, Haron S. Meiling in the 2002
FACTS:
1.
1.

2.
2.
2.
2.
3.
2.
3.

MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal
cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
i. Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people.
ii. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite
the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to
settle misunderstanding.
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, considered the
three cases that arose from a single incident as closed and terminated.
i. Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral turpitude.
Use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word Attorney as they were
typed by the office clerk.
Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:
Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law
professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.
Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character.
ISSUE:
WON Melings act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES.
HELD:
PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the
same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic (Meling did not pass the bar).

1.
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.

Rule 7.01: A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his
application for admission to the bar.
He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney whoever may have typed
the letters.
i. Unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.
PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.
Limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration
of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act
or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any
court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her.

1.

Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath
at that.
In The Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon etc.
92 SCRA 1
July 30, 1979
Melencio-Herrera, J.:
Facts:
The surviving parters of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a petition praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the name of their firm, the names of
their partner who passed away. One of the petitioners arguments stated that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partners
name in a professional firms name in so far as Greater Manila Area is concerned. No custom exists which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm. They also stated that the continued use of a deceased partners name in the firm name of
law partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.
Issue: Whether or not the law firm Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes is allowed to sustain the name of their deceased partner, Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, in the name of their firm.
Held: NO. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association stated the following:
The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use. No local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partners name
in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under Philippine custom, identify the more active or senior partners in a firm. Firm names in the
Philippines change and evolve when partners die, leave or a new one is added. It is questionable to add the new name of a partner and sustain the
name of the deceased one since they have never been, technically, partners in the first place. When it comes to the arguments of the
petitioners stating that U.S. Courts grant the continued use of the deceased partners name, this is so because in the U.S., it is a sanctioned custom
as stated in the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S 2d 733). This does not apply in the Philippines. The petition filed
herein is denied and petitioner is advised to drop the name OZAETA from the firm name.
Cayetano vs. Monsod
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. Monsods appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the
Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:

1.

Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

2.

Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.

3.

Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various positions in various foreign corporations.

4.

In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations until 1986.

5.

In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen
such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms.
General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time
doing what is loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig
engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no
means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the

exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
Justice Padilla dissenting:
Monsod did not practice law. Justice Padilla emphasized the following criteria in determining what constitutes practice of law:
1. Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
(People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within
the term practice of law (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. Peoples Stockyards State Bank,
176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term practice of
law. (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer
undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or
articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).
Monsod did not habitually practice law. It may be granted that he performed activities which are related to the practice of law like drafting legal
documents and giving legal advice, but he only did so as isolated incidents.
Justice Gutierrez dissenting:
Monsod did not practice law save for the one year he spent in his fathers law office. The Chairman of the COMELEC should have engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be engaged in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of ones decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding
committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one
joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
There is nothing in Monsods track record which will show that he Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a
lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the one adviced and those services as
an executive but not as a lawyer.

CRUZ VS MINA
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining
witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts
as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor
and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular
No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior
courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY

Facts:
1. Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.
2. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments.
3. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical aid program.
4. Became a Canadian citizen in May 2004
5. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to RA 9225, petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
6. He took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine consulate general in Toronto, Canada
7. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice

Issue:
Whether petitioner lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004
Ruling:
No. Practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public interest that is both a power and duty of the state to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Any breach by a lawyer of any of the conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and client repose in him for the
continued exercise of his professional privilege.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The rules of court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty one years of age, of good moral Character and a resident of the Philippines.
The constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and consequently the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. The practice of law is a privileged denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently acquired pursuant to
RA9225. This is because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.

Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume
law practice accrues. He must first secure from the court the authority to do so.

In Re: Gutierrez
5 SCRA 661 Legal Ethics Conditional Pardon will not bar disbarment
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the condition that he shall
not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself.
Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was
actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the
profession.

PEOPLE VS. TUANDA

FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her
by a decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of
P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks
were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made
no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The AntiBouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of
law, on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing
that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends
no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.
HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance
may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney
shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22
violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system
and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of
her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law
until further orders from this Court.
SANCHEZ VS. SOMOSO
In his complaint-affidavit filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Dr. Raul C. Sanchez, a
member of the medical staff of Sta. Lucia General Hospital, stated that he was the attending physician of respondent Atty. Salustino Somoso
during the latters confinement at the hospital from 31 March to 09 April 1998. When respondent was discharged on 09 April 1998, he urged
complainant that, since it was a public holiday and banks were closed that day for business, the latter be good enough to accept a check in payment
of the hospital bills due complainant totalling P44,347.00. Although apprehensive at first, complainant was later persuaded, however, by respondents
plea of his being a lawyer who can be trusted as such. Complainant thus accepted two personal checks from respondent; to wit:
BANK CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT
Metrobank 2620115754 04/14/98 P22,347.00
(Lagro Branch)
Metrobank 2620115755 04/16/98 P22,000.00
(Lagro Branch)[1]
When deposited, the checks were dishonored. Complainant immediately met with and informed respondent about it. Respondent promised to
redeem the dishonored checks in cash; he never did.
Ultimately, complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On 15
August 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution holding that the necessary Informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) should
be filed against respondent. Pursuant to the resolution, two Informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against respondent before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City. A warrant for his arrest was issued but, somehow, respondent was able to evade arrest.
Complainant in his administrative complaint submits that respondent is a disgrace to the law profession and unfit to be a member of the bar,
and that he should be disbarred and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Pursuant to an order, dated 31 July 2002, of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), respondent was
furnished with a copy of the complaint and ordered to submit his answer within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of a copy of the complaint. Despite
the receipt of the IBP-CBD order in his two given addresses, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint. Respondent was finally declared to
be in default.
In its report and recommendation, the IBP-CBD found sufficient evidence on record to substantiate the charges made by complainant against
respondent and recommended that the latter be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. In Resolution No. XV-2003-177,
dated 26 April 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
IBP-CBD.
The Court accepts the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Clearly, respondents action of issuing his personal checks in payment for his
medical bills, knowing fully well that his account with the drawee bank has by then already been closed, constitutes a gross violation of the basic
norm of integrity required of all members of the legal profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that:
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in the practice of the legal profession but also in his
personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all
times.[2]
When respondent paid, with a personal check from a bank account which he knew had already been closed, the person who attended to his
medical needs and persisted in refusing to settle his due obligation despite demand, respondent exhibited an extremely low regard to his
commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead,
hold in high esteem. His conduct deserve nothing less than a severe disciplinary sanction.
The law profession is a noble calling, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent and fit to exercise it.
[3]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Salustino Somoso GUILTY of misconduct, and he is ordered suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months effective from receipt of this decision, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with most
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

DANTES VS. DANTES

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of law
is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has good moral character, and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in
accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent [1] to the practice of law, but an unending
requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. [2]
In an Affidavit-Complaint[3] dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of
her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed
as CBD Case No. 01-851.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one after the
other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and
their children, thus forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent
constitute a violation of his lawyers oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community.
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order[4] requiring respondent to submit his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer[5] on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of their
children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their
Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted
that she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment.

Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided for their needs. He even bought two lots
in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and
documentary,[6] to support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979, complainant and respondent were
married[7] and lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet,
complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondents mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980,[8] October 14,
1981[9] and August 11, 1983,[10] respectively. Complainant narrated that their relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondents
extra-marital affairs.[11] Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent had
failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated that she was just
compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another
woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave, [12] all surnamed
Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour [13] to prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs
with two different women. Letters of complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer. [14]
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine complainant, after he failed to appear
during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence
with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings [15] on August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondents motion was
denied because it was filed after the complainant had already presented her evidence. [16] Respondent was given a final chance to present his
evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise
denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline.Respondent submitted his Position
Paper on August 4, 2003.
In respondents Position Paper,[17] he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the resolution of the
complaint for support with alimonypendente lite[18] filed against him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, [19] the
instant administrative case should be dismissed for lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant its Report[20] and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD
Case No. 01-851.[21] The IBP recommended that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct
has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community.[22] To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree [23] or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[24]
In Barrientos vs. Daarol,[25] we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member
of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself
as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect
the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves. [26]
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to
maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. [27] They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [28]
Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the
complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with
the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached
the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.[29]
In Toledo vs. Toledo,[30] we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a
child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[31] we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,[32] that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such,
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. [33] Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. [34] However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court
to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on official leave.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.

ROYONG VS. OBLENA

FACTS:
Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately
conducted an investigation and found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be
consensual sex.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of
other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for
admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit
relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the
permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants
disbarment.
HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.
RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in
the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as
ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and
unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency,
certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where
he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with
Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral
character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

ADVINCULA VS. MACABATA

Facts:
The case is a disbarment case against respondent on the ground of gross immorality. It was alleged that sometime in December 2004,
complainant seek for legal advice from peitioner regarding her collectibles from a travel company. Respondent sent Demand Letter and sometime in
February 2005, they met at Zensho Restaurant to discuss the possibility of filing complaint against the travel company because the latter failed to
settle the accounts. That after that said meeting, the respondent "held her arm and kissed her on the cheek while embracing her very tightly."
The two met again to finalize the draft for the complaint and while on their way home after the said meeting, the respondent suddenly
stopped the car and things went out of hand. Thus she decided to refer the case to another lawyer.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral which would warrant the disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.
Held:
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The SC held that lawyers are expected to abide the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but all throughtout
their legal career as lawyers belong to an exclusive and honored fraternity. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the legal profession
and should adhere to the unwaveringly to the highest standard of morality. The respondent admitted to the act of kissing the complainant on the lips
as evidenced as well of his asking for apology from complainant in his text message. Regardless of the fact that the respondent admitted that he
kissed the complainant but the Court held that this was not accompanied by malice because the respondent immediately asked for forgiveness after
sensing the annoyance of the respondent after texting him. Thus the Court held that this is not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible which will
warrant disbarment or suspension. But the Court reprimanded respondent to be more prudent and cautious.

PARAS VS PARAS
Facts: Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of Ledesma de Jesus Paras-Sumabong namely Conegunda, Justo, Corazon,
Carmen and Cataluna all surnamed Paras executed a Special Power of Attorney prepared by the respondent to sell parcels of land located in
Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving authority to their mother to sell the subject real properties previously registered in the name of the heirs of
Vicente Paras wherein respondent was one of the signatories therein.
Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special Power of Attorney, Ledesma J. Paras-Sumabang executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real property located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental which was with the respondents full
knowledge since he was residing at the house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that time, the Yap family had been in possession of the
subject real property up to the present.Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention was called to the fact that a free patent title to
the aforesaid property was issued in respondents name and upon verification with the DENR, Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant was
able to get copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585 pertaining to the Notice of Application for Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed
by the respondent; over the aforesaid lots previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap; Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and
Interest Over Real Property executed by Ledesma de Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application dated April 2, 1985 signed by respondent
under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized officer to administer oath; Letter of Certification signed by Apolonio Tan dated June 4, 1985 and Order
of Approval dated August 19, 1985 signed by District Land Officer Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J.
Paras.
Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made by the respondent without her knowledge and consent and those acts of deceit,
machinations and falsification of documents were deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed by the respondent in violation of Art. 172 in relation
to Art. 171 of the RPC; in betrayal of his oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleged that
respondent surreptitiously obtained a free patent title over real properties which had been previously sold by his own mother to Aurora D. Yap and
now still under the control and possession of complainants natural family, a fact respondent allegedly withheld from the Bureau of Lands which he
had full knowledge in successfully causing the release of a free patent in his name and unjustly and unlawfully deprived the rightful owners of their
legitimate title to the said property in betrayal of the court to pervert the administration of justice in gross violation of his oath of office.
Issue: Whether

or

not

respondent

may

be

suspended

for

violating

the

Canons

of

Professional

Responsibility.

Held: The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession as the bar should always
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing among its members. By and large, a lawyer can do honor to the
legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any
member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession. In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his lawyers oath as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the courts, the obligation to obey the laws of the land
and to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member
of the Bar and an officer of the court in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue despite his knowledge that
the same had already been sold by his mother to complainants sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment that he filed before this
Court when he alleged that the said properties were public land under the Forestal Zone when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap
some portions of entire occupancy of the Parases. Moreover, respondent committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over the
said properties when he manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the fact that
these were continuously in the possession and occupation of complainants family, as evidenced no less by respondents own statements in the
pleadings filed before the IBP.
Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union (CFSWU) and Filemon Alvarez v. Lo Bu and Court of Appeals No. L-40136, March 25, 1975, 63 SCRA
321

Facts: After Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned , Ong Ting established Century Foundry Shop where he and his family resided in the premises.
After several attempts to settle a pending unfair labor practice case proved unsuccessful, Ong Ting sold all his business, including equipment and
rights in the New Century Foundry Shop to his compadre Lo Bu, for Php20,000.
On Jan 16, 1973, petitioner CFSWU obtained from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and
enforcement of the judgment in its favor. Thereafter, writ was served January 17 and 18, 1973, levying on the personalproperties of the Cosmos
Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale.
Respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The CIR,
in its order dated Feb 23, 1973, denied his motion. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration.
Lo Bu appealed by certiorari but the Court denied this petition in its resolution dated July 17, 1993. In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by Lo
Bu in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila covering the same properties.
Upon receipt of order from the Court denying certiorari, petitioner Labor Union filed a second motion to dismiss complaint. After the complaint was
dismissed by the lower court, decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner Labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition.
(2) Whether or not counsel Atty Busmente performed his obligation as an officer of the court while sustaining the dignity of the profession while
acting as counsel for Lo Bu.
Held:
Writ of certiorari is granted and the order of Respondent CA reinstating appeal is nullified and set aside.
The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, respondent CA being perpetually restrained from taking any further action in such appeal, except that of
dismissing it.
Courts should dismiss a suit which has all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a
judgment in an unfair labor controversy. There was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith, Lo Bu, which was dismissed by the CFI Manila.
What is worse, private respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance , as he himself was the petitioner in the certiorari proceedings before this
Court. He was a prinicipal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the award in favor of the petitioner labor union.
Rule that certiorari will not be granted where petitioners have plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law will not be enforced where it
would result in further delay in satisfaction of judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago. It is about time that a halt be called to the
schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labors just claim.
A legal counsel is expected to defend a clients cause but not at the expense of truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor laws. For even
such case, Atty Busmente had not exculpated himself. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of
the profession, requires that should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to
keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar.
IN RE: 1989 IBP ELECTIONS
FACTS: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention
Center, the newly-elected officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4, 1989 before the Supreme Court en banc. However, disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of
government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP ByLaws which prohibit such activities, the Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the
oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. The prohibited acts are against the IBP By-Laws more specifically
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Sec. 14. Prohibited
acts and practices relative to elections and Section 12[d] of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: Any violation of the
rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 [Prohibited Acts and Practices Relative to
Elections) of the By-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without
prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.

ISSUE Whether or not the candidates violated the IBP By-Laws.

DECISION: The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal
profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote
respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule
1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions
of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The
spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the
public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses,
including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent
investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired
among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign.

CASTANEDA VS. AGO

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners, vs. PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents. G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975 CASTRO, J. FACTS In 1955, the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin
suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). Ago failed to redeem, and on April
17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of
Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties. However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his coplaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale. The Court of First Instance of
Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from
registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from
carrying out any writ of possession. While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon
City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966. The Court found no merit in the petition
and dismissed it. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court. The Court dismissed the petition in
a minute resolution on February 8, 1967. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction. Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the present petition for
review of the aforesaid decision. ISSUE Whether or not the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies
and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment. HELD Yes. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for
the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted
the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of
counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5
times in the Supreme Court). 18 The Court condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries
for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his
exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of
a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice. NOTES However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago
upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their
conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not
and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to
advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's
cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to
his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
SAMAR MINING COMPANY VS. ARNADO
24 SCRA 402 Legal Ethics Duty to Assist in the Administration of Justice

In 1958, Rufino Abuyen won a labor case against Samar Mining Company. Abuyen was awarded compensation plus hospitalization expenses for a
disease he incurred while working for Samar Mining. The decision was rendered by Pompeyo Tan, a labor lawyer duly appointed by Francisco
Arnado, a regional administrator of the Department of Labor. In 1961, Samar Minings lawyer, Atty. Benedicto Arcinas, filed an action for certiorari
before CFI Cebu contending that Tan has no authority or jurisdiction over said case because he was a mere labor lawyer who had no authority to
render the award being complained of. CFI Cebu dismissed the petition of Arcinas.
Meanwhile, in the same year, the Supreme Court made a ruling in the case of Caltex v. Villanueva (L-15658, August 21, 1961) that duly appointed
hearing officers by regional administrators of the labor department may issue awards. Notwithstanding this ruling, Arcinas still filed an appeal before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal has merit.
HELD: No. It is obvious that the purpose of the filing is just to delay and prolong the litigation in the hope of draining the resources of the poorer
party and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion. The conduct of Atty. Arcinas is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in
the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same. The Supreme Court ordered Samar Mining and Atty. Arcinas to shoulder the
litigation costs of this case jointly and severally.

VDA DE BACALING VS. LAGUNA

Facts: Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential land wherepetitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling,
constructed a residential houseUnable to pay the lease rental an action for ejectment. The filing of said case spawnedvarious court suits such as
petition for certiorari, which further prolong the litigationprocess.
Issue: Should the petitioners counsel deserved condemnation before SC.
Held: Yes. The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attemptresorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination
of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her counseldeserves the vigorous
condemnation of this Court, because it evinces a flagrant misuseof the remedy of certiorari which should only be resorted to in case of lack of
jurisdictionor grave abuse of discretion by a inferior court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes theenergy and patience of courts and simply wastes
the precious time that they could welldevote to really meritorious cases

ROXAS VS. CA
DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS VS. BAYOT
74 Phil 579 Legal Ethics Malpractice
In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity;
that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is confidential. The Director of
Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and asked for the courts mercy as he promised to never
repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. . It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again
emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But
because of Bayots plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely
reprimanded him.
IN RE: TAGORDA
53 Phil 37 Legal Ethics Malpractice Solicitation of Legal Business Advertisement in the Legal Profession Stirring Up of Litigation

In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. Before his election, he campaigned that he is a lawyer and a notary public; that as
a notary public he can do notarial acts such as execution of deeds of sale, etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help clients collect debts; that he offers free
consultation; that he is willing to serve the poor.
When he won, he wrote a letter to the barrio lieutenant of Echague, Isable advising the latter that even though he was elected as a provincial board
member, he can still practice law; that he wants the lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is willing to receive works regarding preparations
of sales contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is willing to receive land registration cases for a charge of three pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
well- merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct.
Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by
the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyers position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of
our high calling, and are intolerable.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to
do so.
Tagordas liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced lawyer and that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So
instead of being disbarred, he was suspended from the practice of law for a month.
PEOPLE VS MCCABLE
ULEP VS THE LEGAL CLINIC INC
223 SCRA 378 42 SCAD 287 Legal Ethics Advertisement in the Legal Profession Practice of Law
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to
clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latters
advertisements which contain the following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated
that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a clients problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as
complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are specialists in
various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family
law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar
of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of
paralegals. The services it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex
litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of
law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyers advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage,
bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as
well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which
is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as
allowed forms of advertisement:
1.

Advertisement in a reputable law list

2.

Use of ordinary simple professional card

3.

Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization