Republic of the PH v.

Minerva
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which assails the February 22, 2007
Decision[1] and the May 15, 2007 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 93781. The CA reversed the November 21, 2005 Resolution of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) declaring the re-assignment of respondent
Minerva M.P. Pacheos (Pacheo) not valid and ordering her reinstatement to her
original station but without backwages under the principle of no work, no pay.
The Facts
Pacheo was a Revenue Attorney IV, Assistant Chief of the Legal Division of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in Revenue Region No. 7 (RR7), Quezon
City.
On May 7, 2002, the BIR issued Revenue Travel Assignment
Order (RTAO) No. 25-2002,[3] ordering the reassignment of Pacheo as Assistant
Chief, Legal Division from RR7 in Quezon City to RR4 in San Fernando,
Pampanga. The BIR cited exigencies of the revenue service as basis for the
issuance of the said RTAO.
Pacheo questioned the reassignment through her Letter dated May 9,
[4]
2002 addressed to Rene G. Banez, then Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR). She complained that the transfer would mean economic dislocation
since she would have to spend 200.00 on daily travel expenses or approximately
4,000.00 a month. It would also mean physical burden on her part as she would
be compelled to wake up early in the morning for her daily travel from Quezon
City to San Fernando, Pampanga, and to return home late at night from San
Fernando, Pampanga to Quezon City. She was of the view that that her
reassignment was merely intended to harass and force her out of the BIR in the
guise of exigencies of the revenue service. In sum, she considered her transfer
from Quezon City to Pampanga as amounting to a constructive dismissal.

Due to the then inaction of the BIR, Pacheo filed a complaint [5] dated May
30, 2002, before the CSC- National Capital Region (CSC-NCR), praying for the
nullification of RTAO No. 25-2002. In its July 22, 2002 Order,[6] the CSC-NCR
treated Pacheos Complaint as an appeal and dismissed the same, without prejudice,
for failure to comply with Sections 73 and 74 of Rule V(b) of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.[7]
In its Letter-reply[8] dated September 13, 2002, the BIR, through its Deputy
Commissioner for Legal and Inspection Group, Edmundo P. Guevara (Guevara),
denied Pacheos protest for lack of merit. It contended that her reassignment could
not be considered constructive dismissal as she maintained her position as Revenue
Attorney IV and was designated as Assistant Chief of Legal Division. It
emphasized that her appointment to the position of Revenue Attorney IV was
without a specific station. Consequently, she could properly be reassigned from
one organizational unit to another within the BIR. Lastly, she could not validly
claim a vested right to any specific station, or a violation of her right to security of
tenure.
Not in conformity with the ruling of the BIR, Pacheo appealed her case
before the CSC
RULING
The petition fails to persuade.
It appears undisputed that the reassignment of Pacheo was not valid. In its
memorandum, the OSG initially argues for the validity of RTAO No. 25-2002
authorizing Pacheos reassignment from Quezon City to San Fernando, Pampanga.
Later, however, it specifically prays for the reinstatement of CSC Resolution Nos.
051697 and 060397, which categorically declared RTAO No. 25-2002 as not valid.
In seeking such relief, the OSG has effectively accepted the finding of the CSC, as
affirmed by the CA, that Pacheos reassignment was indeed invalid. Since the issue
of Pacheos reassignment is already settled, the Court finds it futile to pass upon the
same at this point.
The question that remains to be resolved is whether or not Pacheos
assignment constitutes constructive dismissal and, thus, entitling her to

reinstatement and backwages. Was Pacheo constructively dismissed by reason of

her reassignment?
The Court agrees with the CA on this point.
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even
without the employee's prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a
preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or
force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision
which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.[19]
Significantly, Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,
series of 1998, defines constructive dismissal as a situation when an employee
quits his work because of the agency heads unreasonable, humiliating, or
demeaning actuations which render continued work impossible. Hence, the
employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This may occur although
there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the employee. It may be a transfer
from one position of dignity to a more servile or menial job.
The CSC, through the OSG, contends that the deliberate refusal of Pacheo to report
for work either in her original station in Quezon City or her new place of
assignment in San Fernando, Pampanga negates her claim of constructive dismissal
in the present case being in violation of Section 24 (f) of P.D. 807 [now Executive
Order (EO) 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6)]. [20] It further
argues that the subject RTAO was immediately executory, unless otherwise ordered
by the CSC. It was, therefore, incumbent on Pacheo to have reported to her new
place of assignment and then appealed her case to the CSC if she indeed believed
that there was no justification for her reassignment.
Anent the first argument of CSC, the Court cannot sustain the proposition. It
was legally impossible for Pacheo to report to her original place of assignment
in Quezon Cityconsidering that the subject RTAO No. 25-2002 also reassigned
Amado Rey B. Pagarigan (Pagarigan) as Assistant Chief, Legal Division, from
RR4, San Fernando, Pampanga to RR7, Quezon City, the very same position
Pacheo formerly held. The reassignment of Pagarigan to the same position
palpably created an impediment to Pacheos return to her original station.

The Court finds Itself unable to agree to CSCs argument that the subject
RTAO was immediately executory. The Court deems it necessary to distinguish
between a detail and reassignment, as they are governed by different rules.
A detail is defined and governed by Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1,
Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), thus:
(6) Detail. A detail is the movement of an employee from one
agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and
shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees
occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the
employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he
may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the
decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless
otherwise ordered by the Commission. [Underscoring supplied]

On the other hand, a reassignment is defined and governed by E.O. 292,

Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7), thus:
(7) Reassignment.An employee may be reassigned from one
organizational unit to another in the same agency; Provided, That
such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or
salaries. [Underscoring supplied]

The principal distinctions between a detail and reassignment lie in the place
where the employee is to be moved and in its effectivity pending appeal with the
CSC. Based on the definition, a detail requires a movement from one agency to
another while a reassignment requires a movement within the same agency.
Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail is immediately
executory, whereas a reassignment order does not become immediately effective.
In the case at bench, the lateral movement of Pacheo as Assistant Chief, Legal
Division from Quezon City to San Fernando, Pampanga within the same agency is
undeniably a reassignment. The OSG posits that she should have first reported to
her new place of assignment and then subsequently question her reassignment. It is
clear, however, from E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26
(7) that there is no such duty to first report to the new place of assignment prior to
questioning an alleged invalid reassignment imposed upon an employee. Pacheo
was well within her right not to report immediately to RR4, San Fernando,
Pampanga, and to question her reassignment.

Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an

employees security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the
Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed without cause,
but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are tantamount to
illegal/constructive removal.[21]
Having ruled that Pacheo was constructively dismissed, is she entitled to
reinstatement and back wages? The Court agrees with the CA that she is entitled to
reinstatement, but finds Itself unable to sustain the ruling that she is entitled to full
back wages and benefits. It is a settled jurisprudence [22] that an illegally dismissed
civil service employee is entitled to back salaries but limited only to a maximum
period of five (5) years, and not full back salaries from his illegal dismissal up to
his reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed February 22,
2007 Decision and May 15, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 93781, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that respondent
Minerva M.P. Pacheo is hereby ordered reinstated without loss of seniority rights
but is only entitled to the payment of back salaries corresponding to five (5) years
from the date of her invalid reassignment on May 7, 2002.
ULYSSES v. BLANCO
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule
45
[1]
of the Rules
of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the Decision dated
September 10, 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) and the
Resolution[2] dated November 24, 2009 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
thereof in CA-G.R. SP No. 102174 which reversed and set aside Resolution Nos.
071693 and 072374 dated August 24, 2007 and December 17, 2007, respectively,
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

Petitioner Russel Ulysses I. Nieves (Nieves) is a regular employee of the

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) with the position of Trade and Industry

Development Specialist. He was formerly assigned to the DTIs office in Sorsogon

(DTI-Sorsogon). On the other hand, respondent Jocelyn LB. Blanco (Blanco) is the
Regional Director of DTI Regional Office in Region V.

On February 10, 2005, Blanco issued Regional Office Order No. 09 which
directed Nieves reassignment from DTI-Sorsogon to DTIs provincial office in
Albay (DTI-Albay). Nieves appealed his reassignment to the CSCs Regional
Office in Legazpi City (CSC Regional Office No. V) which, however, dismissed
his appeal on March 18, 2005 for his failure to comply with the requirements of an
appeal. Nieves forthwith complied with the reassignment order and reported for
work at DTI-Albay.

A year after his reassignment to DTI-Albay, Nieves requested Blanco for his
reassignment back to DTI-Sorsogon. He asserted that, under Section 6(a) of the
Omnibus Rules on Appointments and other Personnel Actions, as amended by CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 02-05 (Revised Rules on Reassignment), reassignment
of employees with station-specific place of work is allowed only for a maximum
period of one year. Considering that more than a year had passed since he was
reassigned to DTI-Albay, Nieves claimed that Blanco was duty-bound to reassign
him back to DTI-Sorsogon.

In a letter dated May 12, 2006, Blanco denied Nieves request, stating that
the latters appointment as Trade and Industry Development Specialist in the DTI is
not station specific and, hence, the one-year period limitation with regard to
reassignment of employees does not apply to his case.

On June 21, 2006, Nieves filed a complaint with the CSC Regional Office
No. V against Blanco, alleging that the latter committed grave abuse of authority,
grave misconduct and oppression when she denied his request for reassignment

back to DTI-Sorsogon. Nieves claimed that Blancos refusal to reassign him back to
DTI-Sorsogon was but an offshoot of the antipathy between him and DTISorsogon Provincial Director Leah Pagao (Pagao). Allegedly, Nieves had
previously filed a complaint with the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission against
Pagao and, in reprisal, Blanco reassigned him to DTI-Albay.

On July 12, 2006, Nieves complaint against Blanco was referred to the
Office of Legal Affairs of the CSC for appropriate action. On August 24, 2007, the
CSC issued Resolution No. 071693,[3] the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the complaint against Jocelyn LB. Blanco,

Regional Director, Department of Trade and Industry Regional Office
(DTI-RO) No. V, Legazpi City is herebyDISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction. The letter dated May 12, 2006 of Regional Director Jocelyn
LB. Blanco, DTI-RO No. V, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Russel Ulysses I. Nieves, Trade and Industry Development
Specialist, DTI-RO No. V, Legazpi City, shall be reinstated to his
original station in DTI-Sorsogon.

The Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. V,

Rawis, Legazpi City is directed to monitor the implementation of this
Resolution and to submit a report to the Commission within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the Resolution.[4]

The CSC, invoking the provisions of Rule I, Section 5, A(4) of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases, held that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
the charge against Blanco for grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct and
oppression, since the latter is a third level official who is a presidential appointee.

RULING
In reversing the CSCs disposition with regard to the propriety of Nieves
reassignment back to his original station in DTI-Sorsogon, the CA asserted that the
phrase reassignment outside geographical location should be confined to
reassignments from one regional office to another or from the central office to a
regional office and vice-versa.Accordingly, the CA held that Nieves reassignment
to DTI-Albay is not affected by the one-year limitation set forth under the Revised
Rules on Reassignment since the same is within the same regional office, i.e. from
DTI-Sorsogon to DTI-Albay. Thus:
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that a reassignment outside
geographical location is a reassignment from one regional office to
another regional office or from regional office to the central office or
vice versa. Since the reassignment of respondent from DTI-Sorsogon to
DTI-Albay is within same regional office which is Region V, the same
shall have no limit even if without his consent, as long as there is no
reduction in rank status and salary.[8]

Nieves sought reconsideration[9] of the Decision dated September 10, 2009

but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution[10] dated November 24, 2009.
Unperturbed, Nieves instituted the instant petition for review
on certiorari asserting that a reassignment outside geographical location should not
be restricted to a reassignment from one regional office to another or from the
regional office to the central office and vice-versa. He insists that it should include
movement from one provincial office to another because one such office is
necessarily outside the geographical location of the other. Further, he avers that the
CA should have accorded respect and finality to the CSCs interpretation of the
provisions of the Revised Rules on Reassignment.
On the other hand, Blanco, in her Comment, [11] contends that the CA did not err
when it delimited the phrase reassignment outside geographical location as
referring only to reassignments from one regional office to another or from the
regional office to the central office and vice-versa. Thus, she asserts that Nieves
could be reassigned anywhere within the geographical location of Region V

without his consent even for more than one year, provided that there is no
diminution in his rank, salary or status.
The petition lacks merit.
The CSC, being the central agency mandated to prescribe, amend, and enforce
rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service
Law and other pertinent laws, has the power to interpret its own rules and any
phrase contained in them, with its interpretation being accorded great weight and
ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.[12]
However, courts will not hesitate to set aside such executive interpretation
when it is clearly erroneous, or when there is no ambiguity in the rule, or when the
language or words used are clear and plain or readily understandable to any
ordinary reader.[13] This case falls within the exceptions.
At the crux of the instant controversy is the proper construction of the provisions
of Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Reassignment which, in part, reads:
Sec. 6. x x x
xxxx
Reassignment shall be governed by the following rules:
1. These rules shall apply only to employees appointed to first and
second level positions in the career and non-career
services. Reassignment of third level appointees is governed by
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1.
2. Personnel movements involving transfer or detail should not be
confused with reassignment since they are governed by separate
rules.
3. Reassignment of employees with station-specific place of work
indicated in their respective appointments shall be allowed
only for a maximum period of one (1) year. An appointment is
considered station-specific when the particular office or station

where the position is located is specifically indicated on the face

of the appointment paper. Station-specific appointment does not
refer to a specified plantilla item number since it is used for
purposes of identifying the particular position to be filled or
occupied by the employee.
4. If appointment is not station-specific, the one-year maximum
period shall not apply. Thus, reassignment of employees whose
appointments do not specifically indicate the particular office
or place of work has no definite period unless otherwise
revoked or recalled by the Head of Agency, the Civil Service
Commission or a competent court.
5. If an appointment is not station-specific, reassignment to an
organizational unit within the same building or from one building
to another or contiguous to each other in one work area or
compound is allowed. Organizational unit refers to sections,
divisions, and departments within an organization.
6. Reassignment outside geographical location if with consent
shall have no limit. However, if it is without consent,
reassignment shall be for one (1) year only. Reassignment
outside geographical location may be from one Regional
Office (RO) to another RO or from the RO to the Central
Office (CO) and vice-versa.
7. Reassignment is presumed to be regular and made in the interest
of public service unless proven otherwise or if it constitutes
constructive dismissal. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The language of the Revised Rules on Reassignment is plain and

unambiguous. The reassignment of an employee with a station-specific place of
work indicated in their respective appointments is allowed provided that it would
not exceed a maximum period of one year. On the other hand, the reassignment of
an employee whose appointment is not station-specific has no definite period
unless otherwise revoked or recalled by the Head of the Agency, the CSC or a
competent court.

Nevertheless, if the employee without a station-specific place of work is

reassigned outside the geographical location of his/her present place of work, then
the following rules apply: first, if the reassignment is with the consent of the
employee concerned, then the period of the same shall have no limit; second, if the
reassignment is without the consent of the employee concerned, then the same
should not exceed the maximum period of one year.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September 10,
2009 and the Resolution dated November 24, 2009 issued by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102174 are AFFIRMED.
CSC v. LUCAS
The petition for review on certiorari before the Court assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals[1] which set aside the resolution of the Civil Service
Commission[2] and reinstated that of the Board of Personnel Inquiry (BOPI for
brevity), Office of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, [3] suspending respondent
for one month, for simple misconduct.
To provide a factual backdrop of the case, a recital of the facts is necessary.
On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the
Agricultural Information Division, Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity), filed
with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint against respondent Jose J.
Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for misconduct.
Raquel described the incident in the following manner:
While standing before a mirror, near the office door of Jose J. Lucas, Raquel noticed a
chair at her right side which Mr. Jose Lucas, at that very instant used to sit
upon. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas bent to reach for his shoe. At that moment she felt Mr.
Lucas hand touching her thigh and running down his palm up to her ankle. She was
shocked and suddenly faced Mr. Lucas and admonished him not to do it again or she
will kick him. But Lucas touched her again and so she hit Mr. Lucas. Suddenly Mr.
Lucas shouted at her saying lumabas ka na at huwag na huwag ka nang papasok dito
kahit kailan A verbal exchange then ensued and respondent Lucas grabbed Raquel by

the arm and shoved her towards the door causing her to stumble, her both hands
protected her face from smashing upon the door.
Mr. Lucas, bent on literally throwing the affiant out of the office, grabbed her the
second time while she attempted to regain her posture after being pushed the first
time. x x x while doing all this, Mr. Lucas shouted at the affiant, saying, labas, huwag
ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan.[4]
On June 8, 1992, the Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA, issued a
summons requiring respondent to answer the complaint, not to file a motion to
dismiss, within five (5) days from receipt. On June 17, 1992, respondent Lucas
submitted a letter to Jose P. Nitullano, assistant head, BOPI, denying the
charges. According to Lucas, he did not touch the thigh of complainant Linatok, that
what transpired was that he accidentally brushed Linatoks leg when he reached for his
shoes and that the same was merely accidental and he did not intend nor was there
malice when his hand got in contact with Linatoks leg.
On May 31, 1993, after a formal investigation by the BOPI, DA, the board issued
a resolution finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct[5] and recommending a
penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day. The Secretary of Agriculture
approved the recommendation.
In due time, respondent appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). On July 7, 1994, the CSC issued a resolution finding respondent guilty
of grave misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
[6]
Respondent moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied the motion.
Then, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On October 29, 1996, the
Court of Appeals promulgated its decision setting aside the resolution of the CSC and
reinstating the resolution of the BOPI, DA, stating thus: It is true that the Civil Service
Act
does
not
define
grave
and simple misconduct. There is, however, no question that these offenses fall under
different categories. This is clear from a perusal of memorandum circular No. 49-89
dated August 3, 1989 (also known as the guidelines in the application of penalties in
administrative cases) itself which classifies administrative offenses into three: grave,
less grave and light offenses. The charge of grave misconduct falls under the
classification of grave offenses while simple misconduct is classified as a less grave

offense. The former is punishable by dismissal while the latter is punishable either by
suspension (one month and one day to six months), if it is the first offense; or by
dismissal, if it is the second. Thus, they should be treated as separate and distinct
offenses.[7]
The Court of Appeals further ruled that a basic requirement of due process on the
other hand is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him (Felicito
Sajonas vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 182). In the instant
case however, Lucas came to know of the modification of the charge against him only
when he received notice of the resolution dismissing him from the service. [8]
Hence, this petition.
The issues are (a) whether respondent Lucas was denied due process when the
CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct, and (b)
whether the act complained of constitutes grave misconduct.
Petitioner anchors its position on the view that the formal charge against a
respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an
information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the
substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts
complained of, and not the designation of the offense. [9]
We deny the petition.
As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing guideline of the CSC
distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. In the case of Landrito vs. Civil Service
Commission,
we
held
that
in
gravemisconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements
of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest,[10] which is obviously lacking in respondents case. Respondent
maintains that as he was charged with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of
his right to due process by convicting him of grave misconduct.
We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals [11] that: (a) a basic requirement of due
process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him [12] and
that (b) a person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged. [13]

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental

procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.[14]
The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in administrative
proceedings.[15]
Of course, we do not in any way condone respondents act. Even in jest, he had no
right to touch complainants leg. However, under the circumstances, such act is not
constitutive of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that respondent
was maliciously motivated. We note that respondent has been in the service for twenty
(20) years and this is his first offense.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for review
on certiorari and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No.
37137.
No costs.

CSC v. Aurora M. Clave

Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari assailing the 27 July 2010
Decision1 and 24 November 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 106229.
In G.R. No. 194645, petitioner Civil Service Commission (CSC) asks this Court to set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and to impose on respondent Aurora M.
Clave (Clave) the penalty of dismissal from service.
In G.R. No. 194665, petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
likewise prays this Court to set aside the Court of Appeals decision and to impose on
Clave the penalty of dismissal from service.
These cases originated from Administrative Case No. 05-055 filed by GSIS against
Clave. GSIS alleged that Clave was a Senior Computer Operator I of the Social
Insurance Group (SIG) at the Manila District Office of the GSIS. On 9 December
2003, Diosdado V. Estoque (Estoque), through the Mainframe Salary Loan System
(MSLS), granted Marie Ann F.Tornea (Tornea) an enhanced salary loan with net

proceeds of P73,123.87 for which GSIS Check No. IC2123810 was issued. The check
was later released and negotiated.
On 16 December 2003, Clave, without proper authority or valid reason and in gross
violation of pertinent rules and procedure, cancelled the header of Torneas loan as
appearing in the MSLS. Clave used her operator ID (AMCO) and the computer
terminal assigned to her (SI42). By cancelling the loan, Clave made it appear that the
loan had not been granted toTornea.
Clave countered that she was not aware of Torneas loan because it was processed
by Estoque on 9 December 2003 and she was absent on that day. Clave further alleged
that the authority given to her on loan applications was limited only to granting salary
loan applications and cancelling voided checks or checks that were physically
defective due to computer malfunction. Clave alleged that she was not authorized to
use Function D which was the deletion function used in cancelling the header
of Torneas loan. According to Clave, only the section and division chiefs of the loans
administrative division and the Information Technology Services Group (ITSG) can
access Function D. Finally, Clave alleged that, at that time, she had been with the
GSIS for 28 years with unblemished service and dedicated loyalty.
The petitions are meritorious.
Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a
duty due to carelessness or indifference.9 The Court of Appeals sustained the findings
of the GSIS and the CSC, and found that there was substantial evidence to hold Clave
liable for simple neglect of duty. We agree with the Court of Appeals on this issue.
In these cases, the Court of Appeals found that while Clave was not specifically
authorized to delete headers, she had authority to cancel granted loans through the
transaction code LSLC. Further, Clave was one of the users of the computer terminal
SI42 that was used to cancel the header of Torneas loan. The Court of Appeals found
that the computer terminal SI42 that was used to cancel the header of Torneas loan
was also used by two persons, including Estoque who was previously found guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct for cancelling the loans and headers of some GSIS
members. Thus, it might be possible that Estoque used Claves operator ID and
password in cancelling the header of Torneas loan. However, granting that this might
be true, Clave still failed to explain why other persons knew her operator ID and

password that were used in the cancellation of the header. The Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that Clave was neglectful in safeguarding information that should have
been known only to herself.
However, we do not agree with the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals.
Simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month
and one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. 10
In reducing the penalty imposed on Clave, the Court of Appeals considered Section 53
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which states:
Sec. 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be
considered:
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
xxx
j. Length of service in the government.
xxx

The Court of Appeals ruled that length of service in the government can mitigate or
aggravate the penalty, depending on the circumstances of the case. The Court of
Appeals considered Claves 30 years of service in the government, as well as her lack
of bad faith, in reducing the penalty imposed by the GSIS and the CSC. While
acknowledging that this was not Claves first offense for simple neglect of duty, the
Court of Appeals invoked the courts discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment
with mercy and cited humanitarian reasons for the modification of the decisions of the
GSIS and the CSC.
Again, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals.

Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service is clear
that length of service may be considered either as mitigating or aggravating depending
on the circumstances of the case. Here, it was shown that Clave was previously found
guilty by the GSIS of simple neglect of duty in Adm. Case No. 05-027 11 in its
Decision dated 12 February 2007 for unauthorized cancellation of the loan and header
of one Basilio C. Benitez. In that case, the GSIS suspended Clave for three months.
Earlier, in another Decision12dated 10 November 2005, the GSIS found Clave guilty
of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service for her participation in a mass
action that resulted in the disruption of GSIS operations, for which she was meted the
penalty of suspension for six months and one day. Hence, Claves length of service in
the government could not mitigate her liability considering that the present offense is
not her first offense but her third offense. Applying Section 52(B) of the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty of dismissal imposed
by the GSIS and affirmed by the CSC should instead be imposed on Clave.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 27 July 2010 Decision and 24 November 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106229 insofar as it modified
the penalty imposed on Aurora M. Clave and REINSTATE Resolution No. 081951
dated 13 October 2008 of the Civil Service Commission dismissing Clave from
service with perpetual disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, cancellation of Civil Service eligibility, and
prohibition from taking Civil Service examinations.