Professional Documents
Culture Documents
U-BIX CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus -
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
RICHEL BANDIOLA,
Respondent.
June 26, 2007
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision,[1] dated 27 June 2002, rendered by the Court of Appeals,
partially affirming the Resolution,[2] promulgated by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) on 16 August 2000. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed
Decision, sustained the award of actual damages in the amount of P7,742.50, moral
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 in favor of respondent Richel Bandiola (Bandiola), in relation to an
injury sustained by the latter in the course of his employment with petitioner UBIX Corporation, (U-BIX)
Sometime in April 1995, Bandiola was employed by U-BIX to install furniture for
its customers. On 13 April 1997, Bandiola and two other U-BIX employees were
involved in a vehicular accident on their way to Baguio, where they were assigned
by
U-BIX
to
install
furniture
for
an
exhibit. As
result
of
the
his
co-employees
were
initially
brought
to
the Rosario District Hospital. The next day, 14 April 1997, they were transferred to
the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital (Orthopedic). After his broken leg was
cemented, Bandiola was advised to go back for further medical treatment. U-BIX
paid for the medical expenses incurred in both hospitals.[4]
Bandiola claims that he asked U-BIX for financial assistance but that the latter
refused. As a consequence, he could no longer afford to go back to the Orthopedic
inQuezon City, which
is
of
considerable
distance
from
his
residence
in Paraaque. Instead, he went to Medical Center Paraaque (MCP) where he had his
leg cast in fiberglass.[5] He attached the receipts, issued by MCP and
Dr. Celestino Musngi, for medical expenses with a total amount of P7,742.50.[6] He
also attached a copy of the Roentgenological Report, dated 24 April 1997,
of Amado V. Carandang, a Radiologist in MCP.[7] The said report affirmed
that Bandiolas left leg was still fractured, even after the doctors at the Orthopedic
put a plaster cast on his leg. Bandiola added that he paid for other medical
expenses for which no receipts were issued.
Bandiola maintains that before his leg was cast in fiberglass, he asked Rey Reynes,
U-BIXs Assistant Manager for Project Management, for financial assistance but
was refused. After the medical procedure, he again went to Reynes and presented a
receipt for his medical expenses, but was told to pay for them in the
meantime.Bandiola also avers that while he was waiting for his injuries to heal, he
called the U-BIX office in Makati to ask for a salary advance, but was told by a
secretary, a certain Ms. Clarisse, that this was not possible since he had not worked
after 13 April 1997.[8]
On September 1998, Bandiola filed a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter, where
he alleged underpayment of salary; non-payment of overtime pay; premium pay for
work performed on holidays and rest days; separation pay; service incentive leave
pay; 13th month pay; and the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages.
[9]
The Labor Arbiter ordered in its Decision, dated 16 September 1998, that[10]:
Accordingly, complainant is entitled to salary differential, service incentive leave
pay and 13th month pay computed as follows:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant the
following:
Salary Differential P20,424.00
Service incentive leave 825.00
13th Month pay 10,324.15
GRAND TOTAL P31,573.15
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Bandiola asserts that U-BIX failed to extend to him any financial assistance
after he was injured in the performance of his duties, and that as a result, he
suffered physical pain, mental torture, fright, sleepless nights, and serious
anxiety. He claims that this entitles him to moral and exemplary damages.[11]
U-BIX, on the other hand, denies that Bandiola notified it of any medical expenses
he purportedly incurred until the complaint was filed before the Labor Arbiter.[12]
As can be gleaned from above, the Labor Arbiter allowed Bandiolas claim for
salary differential, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay due to UBIXsfailure to present payrolls or similar documents. Incidentally, the award of
these claims is no longer questioned in the present petition. The other claims,
particularly those for medical expenses that Bandiola allegedly incurred and for
moral and exemplary damages, were dismissed.
Bandiola filed an appeal before the NLRC. In a Resolution dated 16 August
2000, the NLRC amended the Decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter on 16
September 1998. It ruled that U-BIX should reimburse Bandiola the amount
of P12,742.50 for the medical expenses he incurred in connection with his
fractured leg.It further ruled that U-BIX is liable to pay Bandiola P25,000.00 in
moral damages and P25,000.00 in exemplary damages for refusing to
reimburse Bandiola for the medical expenses he incurred after it failed to report to
the Social Security System (SSS) the injuries sustained by Bandiola.[13] The
aforementioned NLRC Resolution decrees that[14]:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein respondent Bandiolas] appeal
is GRANTED. The Labor Arbiters decision in the above-entitled case is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in addition to the monetary award
granted to [herein respondent Bandiola] by the Labor Arbiter, [herein petitioner
UBIX] is ordered to reimburse [herein respondent Bandiola] the amount
of P12,742.50 for the medical expenses which he incurred in line of duty. [Herein
petitioner UBIX] is likewise ordered to pay [herein respondent Bandiola] the
amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for moral damages and
Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for exemplary damages.
Hence, the present petition, in which the following issues were raised[18]:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING
PETITIONER U-BIX TO REIMBURSE RESPONDENT BANDIOLA FOR
ALLEGED MEDICAL EXPENSES OF P7,742.50 WHEN THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT THEREOF.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES OF P25,000.00 AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P25,000.00 TO
RESPONDENT BANDIOLA WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS
APART FROM THE FACT THAT THE SAME ARE EXORBITANT AND
CLEARLY INTENDED TO ENRICH RESPONDENT.
to the arguments
put
forward by
U-BIX, it is
liable to
reimburse Bandiola the amount of P7,742.50 for medical expenses because its
failure to comply with its duty to record and report Bandiolas injury to the SSS
precluded Bandiola from making any claims. Moreover, U-BIX, by its own
admission, reimbursed its other employees who were involved in the same accident
for their medical expenses.[19] Clearly, the reimbursement of medical expenses for
injuries incurred in the course of employment is part of the benefits enjoyed by UBIXs employees. The only justification for its refusal to reimburse Bandiola was
that he intended to defraud the company by presenting spurious receipts amounting
to P7,742.50 that were allegedly issued four months before their presentation.
Articles 205 and 206 of the Labor Code set the reportorial requirements in
cases when an employee falls sick or suffers an injury arising in the course of
employment. An injury is said to arise in the course of employment when it takes
place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may
reasonably be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing
something incidental thereto.[20] The aforecited provisions of the Labor Code
provide that:
ART. 205 RECORD OF DEATH OR DISABILITY
(a)
(b)
All entries in the employers logbook shall be made by the employer or any
of his authorized official after verification of the contingencies or the
employees absences for a period of a day or more. Upon request by the
System, the employer shall furnish the necessary certificate regarding
information about any contingency appearing in the logbook, citing the
entry number, page number and date. Such logbook shall be made available
for inspection to the duly authorized representatives of the System.
xxxx
ART 206. NOTICE OF SICKNESS, INJURY OR DEATH
Notice of sickness, injury or death shall be given to the employer by the employee
or by his dependents or anybody on his behalf within five days from the occurrence
of the contingency. No notice to the employer shall be required if the contingency is
known to the employer or his agents or representatives.
As a general rule, the injured employee must notify his employer, who is
obligated to enter the notice in a logbook within five days after notification. Within
five days after making the entry, the employer of a private company reports the
work-related sickness or injury to the SSS. The claim is forwarded to the SSS,
which decides on the validity of the claim. When the SSS denies the claim, the
denial may be appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)
within 30 days.
However, the law provides an exception to the rule requiring an employee to
notify his or her employer of his injuries. Under Section B of ECC Board
Resolution No. 2127, issued on 5 August 1982, notice of injury, sickness or death
of the employee need not be given to the employer in any of the following
situations:
(1) When the employee suffers the contingency within the employers premises;
(2) When the employee officially files an application for leave of absence by
reason of the contingency from which he suffers;
(3) When the employer provides medical services and/or medical supplies to the
employee who suffers from the contingency; and
(4) When the employer can be reasonably presumed to have had knowledge of the
employees contingency, in view of the following circumstances:
(4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3)
(4.4)
In the present case, there is no dispute that Bandiolas leg injury was
sustained in the course of his employment with U-BIX. At the time of the
accident, Bandiola was on the way to Baguio, where he was ordered by U-BIX to
install furniture for an exhibit. Moreover, U-BIX was aware that Bandiola, as well
as his other co-employees, were injured during the accident. U-BIX admitted to
providing Bandiola and his co-employees with medical assistance and it even sent
its representative, Rey Reynes, to Rosario District Hospital, where they were
confined, and had them transferred to the Orthopedic. U-BIX was also aware that
the Orthopedic instructed Bandiola to return for further medical treatment. It is
implicit that Bandiola needed further treatment for his broken leg and was, thus,
incapacitated to work.
Given the foregoing circumstances, U-BIX had the legal obligation to record
pertinent information in connection with the injuries sustained by Bandiola in its
logbook within five days after it had known about the injuries; and to report the
same to the SSS within five days after it was recorded in the logbook, in
accordance with Articles 205 and 206 of the Labor Code. Had U-BIX performed
its lawful duties, the SSS, or the ECC on appeal, could have properly considered
whether or not Bandiola was entitled to reimbursement for his medical expenses,
as well as disability benefits while he was unable to work. However, U-BIX did
not present any evidence showing that it had complied with these legal
requirements. It had not even replied to Bandiolas allegations in his Position Paper,
dated 13 April 1998, that its employees were not even members of the SSS.[21]
As early as 1938, this Court emphasized, in the case of Murillo v. Mendoza,
[22]
that labor laws have demonstrated an impetus towards ensuring that employees
are compensated for work-related injuries. The law has since treated such
compensation as a right, which the employees can claim, instead of an act of
charity to be given at the employers discretion.
The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Workmens Compensation
Act was to secure workmen and their dependents against becoming objects of
charity, by making a reasonable compensation for such accidental calamities as are
incidental to the employment. Under such act injuries to workmen and employees
are to be considered no longer as results of fault or negligence, but as the products
of the industry in which the employee is concerned. Compensation for such injuries
is, under the theory of such statute, like any other item in the cost of production or
transportation, and ultimately charged to the consumer. The law substitutes for
liability for negligence an entirely new conception; that is, that if the injury arises
out of and in the course of the employment, under the doctrine of mans humanity to
man, the cost of compensation must be one of the elements to be liquidated and
balanced in the course of consumption. In other words, the theory of law is that, if
the industry produces an injury, the cost of that injury shall be included in the cost
of the product of the industry.
By failing to report Bandiolas injury to the SSS, U-BIX disregarded the law
and its purpose; that is, to provide a proper and prompt settlement of his
claims.Instead, U-BIX arrogated upon itself the duty of determining which medical
expenses are proper for reimbursement. In doing so, it could unnecessarily delay
and unjustifiably refuse to reimburse Bandiola for medical expenses even if they
were adequately supported by receipts, as was done in this instance. The expense
and delay undergone by Bandiola since 1997 in obtaining reimbursement for his
medical expenses of P7,742.50 very clearly defeat the purpose of the law.
U-BIX does not question its liability to pay for medical expenses incurred in
connection with the 13 April 1997 accident; it admits that it paid for all the medical
expenses of its other employees, who were involved in the accident.[24] It refused,
however, to reimburse Bandiola for further medical expenses on the ground that
the receipts were counterfeit and belatedly presented to U-BIX.
Bandiola presented eight receipts with a total amount of P7,742.50 issued by
MCP and his attending physician, Dr. Celestino Musngi. The amounts indicated
therein range from P200.00 to P2,936.00. The receipts were issued on 24 April
1997 and 6 May 1997, or around the time the accident occurred on 13 April
1997.From the face of the receipts, there is no showing that these documents are
false or falsified. U-BIX could have easily confirmed with MCP or
Dr. Celestino Musngi, who issued said receipts, the authenticity of the
documents. However, it failed to allege that it took any steps to check the
authenticity of the receipts. It also failed to present any evidence that these receipts
are fake. Absent any proof, no weight can be attached to the allegation that the
receipts are spurious.
The party who alleges the fact has the burden of proving it. The burden of
proof is assigned to the defendant of a claim when he or she alleges an affirmative
defense, which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the complainants cause
of action - the existence of the receipts, in the present case - but is one which, if
established, will be a good defense, i.e., an avoidance of the claim.[25] One who
alleges an affirmative defense that is denied by the complainant - the falsity of the
receipts, in this case - has the burden of proving it. Unless the party asserting the
affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof, his or her cause will not
succeed.If he or she fails to establish the facts of which the matter asserted is
predicated, the complainant is entitled to a verdict or decision in his or her
favor. [26] In this case, U-BIXs affirmative defense that the receipts are spurious is
rejected due to utter lack of proof.
U-BIX asserts that no demand was made by the petitioner and that it only came to
know of Bandiolas medical expenses when it received the Summons to attend a
preliminary conference before the Labor Arbiter. For his part, Bandiola insists that
before filing the case with the NLRC, he approached U-BIX three times for
financial assistance in connection with his medical expenses, but he was
refused. Bandiola identified the persons he spoke to as Rey Reynes and a certain
Ms. Clarisse.[27] U-BIX alleges that it sent Rey Reynes to look for Bandiola in the
address recorded in their office files, but that he no longer resided therein.
[28]
Bandiola contested this allegation by stating that he had not changed his
the
Certificate
of Indigency issued
by Barangay BF
Homes
U-BIX failed to perform its legal obligation to report to the SSS the injuries
suffered by Bandiola, and, thereafter, failed to extend the same financial aid it
extended to other employees who were involved in the same accident. After it was
shown the receipts for the medical expenses Bandiola paid for in connection with
the injuries, U-BIX unreasonably refused to reimburse him for the expenses. It is
not difficult to accept Bandiolas claim that he suffered mental anguish, serious
anxiety and fright when U-BIX left him without any options for financial support
while he was suffering from and rendered incapacitated by work-related
injuries. He was severely distressed by his plight that he felt that he could no
longer continue to work for U-BIX. U-BIXs unjustified and continued refusal to
reimburse Bandiolaafter it failed to report his injury to the SSS, despite the receipts
he presented, demonstrates bad faith. By singling out Bandiola from its other
employees, who were reimbursed for their medical expenses, and forcing him to
litigate for ten years in order to claim the unsubstantial amount of P7,742.50, UBIX was clearly indulging in malicious conduct.
As regards the award of moral damages, this Court has ruled that there is no
hard and fast rule in determining the fair amount for moral damages, since each
case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.[33] It should enable the
injured parties to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral sufferings the injured party has undergone by reason of
defendants culpable action. In other words, the award of moral damages is aimed
at a restoration within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual and/or
psychological status quo ante; and therefore it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. Therefore, in light of the sufferings sustained by Bandiola, this
Court sustains the award of P25,000.00 as moral damages.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for public good.[34] It reads:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.
Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has
socially deleterious consequences, and their imposition is required by public policy
to suppress the wanton acts of the offender.[35]
The Labor Code provides for the medical expenses, as well as disability benefits of
workers suffering from work-related injuries and recognizes such compensation as
their right. Indeed, a system has been put in place for the prompt collection of the
benefits, which are given by law to injured employees. All that U-BIX was
required to do was to report the injury; it need not have defended itself from what
it perceived to be spurious claims. Instead, it took upon itself the duty of
determining the validity of Bandiolas claims and unjustifiably refused to reimburse
his properly receipted medical expenses. The prolonged litigation of his valid
claims is not the only miserable situation which the present labor laws sought to
prevent, but the pathetic situation wherein a laborer is placed at the mercy of his or
her employer for recompense that is his or hers by right. Exemplary damages are,
thus, rightfully imposed against U-BIX.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This
Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated
on 27 June 2002, finding U-BIX liable to Bandiola for P7,742.50 in actual
damages, P25,000.00 for moral damages and P25,000.00 in exemplary damages.
Costs against the petitioner.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court questioning the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 76289 and the Resolution [2] denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof. The appellate court affirmed the November 15,
2002 Resolution[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
NLRC RAB IV Case No. 3-10931-99-L (CA No. 023462-2000).
The Antecedents
On May 22, 1998, Torreda and his four co-employees in the Finance and
Accounting Department reported to Senior Vice-President Hisao Tanaka
that, before and after the reorganization, Finance Manager Teresita
Sepulveda had ordered them to prepare petty cash vouchers in their
names and that the sums covered by the vouchers were received by
Sepulveda for her own personal use. [9] Tanaka told them that he would
bring the matter to Gerardo Cristobal, Jr., the Manager of the Human
Resources Department.[10] Consequently, Sepulveda was barred from
approving petty cash vouchers with an amount beyond P1,000.00. She was
also required to make monthly reports of petty cash vouchers to the Senior
Vice-President. Thus, restrictions were imposed on Sepulvedas authority to
approve petty cash vouchers.[11]
On July 22, 1998, Sepulveda opened Torredas personal computer and read
his Lotus Notes mail and other personal files, specifically the report he had
sent to Tanaka about her. She reprimanded Torreda and told him that he
should not send mails to Tanaka without her approval. [12] Upset over
Sepulvedas actuations, Torreda reported the incident via electronic mail (email) to Tanaka[13] on the same day. He complained that Sepulveda had no
right to open the computer because it was his, and it contained his personal
files. He told Tanaka that Sepulveda used to open the employees
computers; hence, she could no longer be trusted. [14]
Sepulveda filed a complaint against Torreda with the Human Resources
Department (HRD) for repeated tardiness during the period of April to July
1998.
On August 27, 1998, Sepulveda ordered Torreda to make a summary
of payroll overpayments from October 1996 to June 1998. [15] Torreda
refused and informed Sepulveda that all countermeasures for immediate
and long-term solutions had been identified, and that what was needed was
a strict implementation of countermeasures.[16] He further questioned the
propriety of his being ordered to prepare financial summaries starting
October 1996, when he was employed only onJuly 1, 1997. [17]
From September 1 to 3, 1998, Sepulveda received complaints from
separated employees regarding full salary claims, and from incumbent
employees on maternity and other benefits. Torreda failed to process the
claims before taking a leave of absence on September 3, 1998. In order to
retrieve the claimants payrolls and Social Security Services (SSS) files,
which Torreda kept in his drawer, Sepulveda, with prior approval from
Kobayashi, had the drawer forcibly opened by Ruben delosSantos, a staff
member of the General Administration Section. The drawer was opened in
the presence of Oscar Eusebio, Noralyn Florencio and Flor Berdin of the
Finance Department. The claims of the employees were later processed
and released.[18] As shown by official records, Torreda went to his office
on September 5, 1998, a Saturday, and stayed thereat for several hours.
On September 7, 1998, Sepulveda requested Torreda to submit his
key for duplication to prevent similar incidents. [19] Torreda refused.
Sepulveda sent a formal request via e-mail directing him to turn over his
drawer key to the General Administrator of the company for duplication and
to explain in writing why he refused to surrender his key. [20] Torreda replied
via e-mail to Sepulveda, to wit:
I WILL ONLY GIVE YOU THE DUPLICATE COPY (sic) IF YOU CAN PROVIDE
ME WITH OR (SIC) AN EXPLANATION OF THE FOLLOWING:
1.) TIP policy on Key duplication to be submitted to your possession (sic).
2.) Why is is (sic) that my Php 200.00 pesos (sic) in my drawer is missing (or
STOLEN, by WHO ELSE____)?? Because you are the only one who FORCIBLY
open (sic) my drawer without my knowledge. This is a plain and simple robbery
on your part[21]
INTIMIDATING
AND
THREATENING
1st Offense
to accuse Sepulveda of stealing because she was the one who ordered his
drawer forcibly opened. His charge of robbery against her was the normal
reaction of one who finds out that something he owns is missing due to an
unlawful act. He pointed out that he had been a victim of Sepulvedas
unauthorized acts on prior occasions. She repeatedly opened his computer
and his drawer on September 10 and 11, 1998 while he was on leave. Had
Sepulveda acted rightly, he (Torreda) would not have committed grave
slander against her.[33] He also pointed out that since his contact numbers
were known to his officemates, Sepulveda should have called him up
before ordering the opening of his drawer on September 3, 1998.[34]
In a letter[35] addressed to Hisao Tanaka dated October 7, 1998,
Torreda, Finance Supervisor Visitacion Agustin, and Finance Assistant
Rowena Alinas demanded that appropriate action be taken against
Sepulveda for various offenses or violations. They alleged that Sepulveda
had degraded and humiliated them (specifically Torreda); that she looked
into their personal computer files without authority; that she mishandled
and appropriated for herself the companys petty cash; that she forcibly
opened the drawer of Torreda resulting in the loss of documents and
money; that there were cases of negligent payment of SSS contribution
and under-declaration of withholding tax due to Sepulvedas fault; that
Torreda was warned for tardiness without due process; that Sepulveda
unjustifiably disapproved Torredas leave application; that Torreda was
stripped of his duties and responsibilities and given new ones alien to him;
that she intimidated Torreda by ordering the removal of his Lotus Notes
Software from his computer without any explanation; that she deliberately
caused the payments of allowances to employees who were not entitled
thereto and the deduction of performance bonuses from employees so
entitled; and that overpayments of salaries to several employees occurred
due to Sepulvedas negligence in checking the payroll.
On October 14, 1998, Torreda received a letter [36] from Gerardo
Cristobal, Jr. informing him that his employment had been terminated
effective at the end of official working hours on that day, for grave slander,
After a thorough review and evaluation of the Grave Slander charge by your
superior and your reply/explanation, the following points become relevant; (sic)
Your false accusation has caused her undue embarrassment and has cast aspersion
on her character as Manager of TIP. This is strengthened by the fact that you
furnished a copy of the said e-mail to other parties, e.g., K. Kobayashi, R. Suarez,
N. Florencio and H. Tanaka.
As a subordinate, you (sic) action shows an utter disrespect and disregard to her
as a person of authority and the Company considers this a grave and serious
violation of our existing policies on Offenses Related to Conduct and Behavior.
And as stated in our Employee Handbook, the penalty for Grave Slander is
Dismissal for the first offense.
In view hereof, you are hereby formally informed that your employment with
Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), is terminated effective at the end of
official working hours today October 14, 1998.
On March 23, 1999, Torreda filed a complaint [39] for illegal dismissal against
Cristobal and Toshiba. The case was docketed as NLRC RAB IV Case No.
3-10931-99-L.
On February 15, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,
[40]
declaring that Torredas dismissal from employment was unjustified. The
series of events indicated that Torreda was harassed by Sepulveda
because of his expos of irregularities she had committed. The opening of
his drawer formed part of her harassment tactics. [41] Thus, Torreda had all
the right to demand an explanation for the forcible opening of his computer
files and drawer which resulted in the loss of some amount of money.[42]
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that respondent Toshiba did not observe
the rudiments of due process in terminating Torredas employment. The
result of the investigation on the charges against him came out on October
2, 1998, or four days before Torreda submitted his written explanation to
the charges.[43] The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, respondent company is found
guilty of illegal dismissal and is hereby ordered to reinstate the complainant to
his former position without loss of seniority rights and to pay him backwages in
the amount of P238,745.00 [(P14,692.00 x 15 months = P220,380.00) + (13th
month pay P220,380.00/12 = P18,365.00)] computed from the time of dismissal
up to the date of this decision. In the event that reinstatement is no longer
possible, respondent company is hereby ordered to pay complainant separation
pay in the amount of P44,076.00 (P14,692.00 x 3 years) plus backwages.
SO ORDERED.[44]
When his motion for reconsideration [53] was denied by the NLRC in
its January
27,
2003 Resolution,[54] Torreda
filed
a
petition
for certiorari[55] before the CA onApril 1, 2003. He alleged that the NLRC
committed grave and patent abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the Labor Arbiters decision and in
finding that his dismissal was justified.[56]
Unpersuaded, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition
on February 27, 2004.[57] It affirmed the NLRC ruling dismissing petitioners
It bears stressing that what petitioner filed before the CA was one
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, he was burdened
to prove that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed his petition. The Court has
invariably defined grave abuse of discretion, thus:
x x x By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must
be
shown
that
the
discretion
was
exercised
arbitrarily
or
despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in
accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.[69]
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. [70] The only question involved
is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion
warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when
the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ
of certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
and not errors of judgment. [71] An error of judgment is one which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only
by an appeal.[72] In Cosep v. NLRC,[73] this Court held that decisions of
administrative agencies which are declared final by law are not exempt
from judicial review for want of substantial basis in fact and in law.
A careful review of the decisions of the NLRC and the CA reveal that
they differ on their bases for the dismissal of petitioners complaint. The
NLRC declared that the charge of robbery which was fabricated by
petitioner against his immediate superior, Sepulveda, constitutes serious
misconduct punishable by dismissal under Article 282(a) of the Labor
Code; in contrast, the CA ruled that petitioner committed grave slander - an
act punishable by dismissal under the Employees Handbook.
We hold that the CA correctly affirmed the NLRC Resolution ordering
the Labor Arbiter to dismiss petitioners complaint. However, the appellate
court erred in ruling that petitioner committed grave slander against
Sepulveda and in applying the Employees Handbook as basis for his
dismissal.
The rule in labor cases is that the burden is on the employer to prove
that the dismissal of an employee is for a just or valid cause. Evidence
must be clear, convincing and free from any inference that the prerogative
to dismiss an employee was abused and unjustly used by the employer to
further any vindictive end.[74]In this case, respondent Toshiba adequately
proved that petitioner was dismissed for just cause.
The NLRC did not err much less commit grave abuse of its discretion
when it based its ruling on Article 282(a) of the Labor Code on its finding
that petitioner committed serious misconduct for falsely accusing his
immediate superior of robbery. As the Court held in Villanueva v. People:[75]
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing.
The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The
gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used,
but also (2) on the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and
(3) the circumstances surrounding the case. Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending
not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary
meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the
case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.[76]
xxx
Art. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. A libel committed by
means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting,
theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine
ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may
be brought by the offended party.
employer
may
terminate
an
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
- versus -
That on or about the period covering the months of February 1997 up to April 1998 or immediately
before or subsequent thereto in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above name accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Robert Gubat, Junior
Agustin, Cesar Aquino, Richard Luciano, Fernando Rivera, Mariano R. Mislang, Helen B. Palogo,
Joebert Decolongon, Corazon S. Austria, Cristopher A. Bermejo, Letecia D. Londonio, Alma Borromeo,
Francisco Pascual, Raymundo A. Bermejo and Rosemarie A. Bermejo for a consideration ranging
from P2,000.00 to P32,000.00 or a total amount of P124,000.00as placement fee which the complainants paid
to herein accused without the accused having secured the necessary license from the Department of Labor and
Employment.[3](Emphases supplied.)
Three other Informations were filed before the RTC and docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303, this time charging
Ochoa with three counts of estafa, committed separately upon three private
complainants Robert Gubat (Gubat), Cesar Aquino (Cesar), and Junior
Agustin (Agustin), respectively.The Information in Criminal Case No. 9877301 accuses Ochoa of the following acts constituting estafa:
That on or about March 3, 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit and promise employment in Taiwan to
one ROBERT GUBAT for a consideration of P18,800.00 as placement fee,
knowing that she has no power, capacity or lawful authority whatsoever and with
no intention to fulfill her said promise, but merely as pretext, scheme or excuse to
get and exact money from said complainant, as she did in fact collect and
received the amount of P18,800.00 from said Robert Gubat, to his damage and
prejudice.[4] (Emphases supplied.)
The two other Informations for estafa were similarly worded as the
aforequoted Information, except as to the name of the private complainants
and the amount purportedly collected by Ochoa from them, particularly:
Docket No.
Private Complainant
Amount Collected
Cesar Aquino
P19.000.00
Junior Agustin
P32,000.00
As prayed for by the State Prosecutor, all four criminal cases against
Ochoa before the RTC were consolidated. When arraigned, Ochoa pleaded
not guilty.Thereafter, joint trial of the four criminal cases ensued.
year
1998,
in
the
amount
of P5,000.00
each
or
total
of P15,000.00. Gubat started to worry when he was not able to leave for
Amounts Collected
P18,000.00 for placement and medical fees[17]
Junior Agustin
Francisco Pascual
Rosemarie Bermejo
Cesar Aquino
Christopher Bermejo
Joebert Decolongon
Fernando Rivera
3. In Criminal Case No. 98-77302, the Court finds the accused, ROSARIO ROSE OCHOA, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph
2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty
(20) days of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Cesar Aquino in the amount of
Seventeen Thousand (P17,000.00) Pesos.
4. In Criminal Case No. 98-77303, the Court finds the accused, ROSARIO ROSE OCHOA, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph
2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twentyone (21) days of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Junior Agustin in the amount of
Twenty-Eight Thousand (P28,000.00) Pesos.[26]
Despite its lack of jurisdiction over Ochoas appeal, the Court of Appeals did
not dismiss the same and merely ordered its transfer to us:
While the Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 directs the dismissal of appeals filed before the wrong
court, the Supreme Court has in practice allowed the transfer of records from this Court to the highest court. In
which case, we shall subscribe to this practice in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, our decision is declared NULL and VOID. We order
the TRANSFER of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 98-77300 to 98-77303 to the Supreme Court for proper
[36]
action.
11, 2005, the Court ordered the transfer of the records of G.R. No. 159252
to the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merit. We likewise directed the
Court of Appeals to raffle the said case to any of its regular divisions.
When Ochoas appeal was before the Court of Appeals a second
time, it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00888. The Court of
Appeals, in a Decision dated March 2, 2006, affirmed with modification the
RTC Decision dated April 17, 2000. The appellate court essentially affirmed
the findings of fact and law of the RTC, but reduced the award of damages
in Criminal Case No. 98-77301 and increased the prison sentence in
Criminal Case No. 98-77303. The decretal portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
l. The judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 98-77300 finding appellant Rosario Ochoa
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic sabotage under
Sec. 6 (l) and (m) in relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042 and sentencing her to life imprisonment and a fine of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) is AFFIRMED.
ll. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77301, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
estafa is MODIFIED. Appellant is, hereby, ordered to indemnify Robert Gubat in the amount of P15,000.00 only
as and by way of actual damages.
lll. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77302, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
estafa is AFFIRMED.
IV. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77303, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
estafa is MODIFIED. Appellant is, hereby, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS OF prision mayor as maximum.[41]
c.
d.
or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were
convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. [44] All eight
private complainants herein consistently declared that Ochoa offered and
promised
them
employment
overseas. Ochoa
required
private
Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave for work abroad. Private
complainants pleaded that Ochoa return their hard-earned money, but
Ochoa failed to do so.
Ochoa contends that Exhibit A, the POEA certification which states
that Ochoa, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment was already rejected by the RTC
during the hearings on bail for being hearsay, and should not have been
admitted by the RTC after the trial on the merits of the criminal
cases. Inadmissible evidence during bail hearings do not become
admissible evidence after formal offer. Without the POEA certification, the
prosecution had no proof that Ochoa is unlicensed to recruit and, thus, she
should be acquitted.
Ochoas contention is without merit.
We refer to the following ruling in Fullero v. People,[48] wherein we
rejected a similar argument raised by petitioner therein against a
certification
issued
by an
officer
of
the
Professional
Regulation
Commission:
Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended that the prosecution's
documentary evidence, consisting of Exhibits A, C, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P,
Q and R and their sub-markings, are inadmissible in evidence based on the
following reasons:
(1) Exhibit A, which is the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998,
confirming that petitioner's name does not appear in the registry books of
licensed civil engineers, was not properly identified during the trial. The proper
person to identify the certification should have been the signatory therein which
was PRC Director II Jose A. Arriola, or in his absence, a person who actually
witnessed the execution of the certification. Prosecution witness Atayza, who was
not present when the certification was executed, had identified the certification
during the trial. Thus, the contents of the certification are mere hearsay; x x x.
xxxx
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of or comes from his
personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. A witness,
therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either
because he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay
rule. One of the exceptions is the entries in official records made in the
performance of duty by a public officer. In other words, official entries are
admissible in evidence regardless of whether the officer or person who made
them was presented and testified in court, since these entries are
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Other recognized
reasons for this exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The necessity
consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance
as a witness to testify to innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. This
will also unduly hamper public business. The trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty by a public officer.
Exhibit A, or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was
signed by Arriola, Director II of the PRC, Manila. Although Arriola was not
presented in court or did not testify during the trial to verify the said certification,
such certification is considered as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein
and is therefore presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not present any
plausible proof to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in
evidence.[49]
In the case at bar, the POEA certification was signed by Dir. Mateo of
the POEA Licensing Branch. Although Dir. Mateo himself did not testify
before the RTC, the prosecution still presented Cory, Dir. Mateos
subordinate at the POEA Licensing Branch, to verify Dir. Mateos signature.
Also worth re-stating is the justification provided by the Court of
Appeals for the admissibility of the POEA certification, viz:
The certificate is admissible. It is true that the trial court, during the bail
hearings, rejected the certification for being hearsay because at that stage of the
proceedings, nobody testified yet on the document. However, as the trial
progressed, an officer of the POEA, specifically in its licensing branch, had
testified on the document. It does not follow, then, as appellant would want this
court to assume, that evidence rejected during bail hearings could not be
admissible during the formal offer of evidence.
This court admits that Ms. Cory Aquino was not the signatory of the
document. Nevertheless, she could testify on the veracity of the document
because she is one of the officers of the licensing branch of the POEA. Being so,
she could testify whether a certain person holds a license or not. It bears
stressing that Ms. Aquino is familiar with the signature of Mr. Mateo because the
latter is her superior. Moreover, as testified to by Ms. Aquino, that as a policy in
her office, before a certification is made, the office checks first whether the name
of the person requested to be verified is a reported personnel of any licensed
agency by checking their index and computer files.
As found in the offices records, appellant, in her personal capacity, is
neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. It
bears stressing, too, that this is not a case where a certification is rendered
inadmissible because the one who prepared it was not presented during the
trial. To reiterate, an officer of the licensing branch of the POEA, in the person of
Ms. Aquino, testified on the document. Hence, its execution could be properly
determined and the veracity of the statements stated therein could be
ascertained.[50]
they
had
paid
when
they
were
not
able
to
leave
Ochoa issued and signed the same on behalf of AXIL. Also, Ochoa was not
able to present any proof that private complainants money were actually
turned over to or received by AXIL.
There is no reason for us to disturb the weight and credence
accorded by the RTC to the evidence of the prosecution, over that of the
defense. As is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than the
accuseds denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime.
[51]
the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the
Supreme Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirmed such
findings. After all, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses. The absence of any
showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or that its
assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts
determination
[52]
according
credibility
to
the
prosecution
evidence.
liability for illegal recruitment also established her criminal liability for
estafa.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of
illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor
Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code. We explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut[54] that:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is
crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses
punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the
crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale,
and vice versa.[55]
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa
as:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another
by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party
or third person.[56] Both elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 9877301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. Ochoas deceit was evident in her false
representation to private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin that she
possessed the authority and capability to send said private complainants to
Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for employment as early as one to two weeks from
penalty
for
estafa
depends
on
the
amount
of
is prision
correccional maximum
to prision
mayor minimum (i.e., from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years). If the
amount of fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the aforementioned penalty shall be
imposed
in
its
maximum
period,
adding
one
year
for
each
additional P10,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20
years.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code, or anywhere within prision correccional minimum and medium
(i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). [57] Consequently,
the minimum terms in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302 were
correctly fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals at 2 years,
11 months, and 11 days of prision correccional. While the minimum term in
Criminal Case No. 98-77303 was increased by the Court of Appeals to 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, it is still within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by Section 315 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law shall be
that which, in view of attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the Revised Penal Code. To compute the minimum,
medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty for estafa when
the amount of fraud exceeds P12,000.00, the time included in prision
the
minimum
period
for prision
correccional maximum
we
take
into
consideration
that
the
amount
of
fraud
of
fraud
exceeded P22,000.00
by
only P6,000.00
(less
that the maximum term of 8 years fixed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal
Case No. 98-77303 is within the maximum period of the proscribed penalty,
we see no reason for disturbing the same.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the present appeal for lack of merit
and AFFIRM the Decision dated March 2, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00888, affirming with modification the Decision
dated April 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104,
in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77300 to 98-77303, to read as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-77300, accused-appellant Rosario Rose
Ochoa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in
large scale, constituting economic sabotage, as defined and penalized in
Section 6(l) and (m), in relation to Section 7(b), of Republic Act No. 8042,
and is sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos
(P1,000.000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 98-77301, accused-appellant Rosario Rose
Ochoa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as
defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
eleven (11) months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify private complainant Robert Gubat in
the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as actual damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. 98-77302, accused-appellant Rosario Rose
Ochoa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as
defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
eleven (11) months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify private complainant Cesar Aquino in
the amount of Seventeen Thousand Pesos (P17,000.00); and