In The Shadow of Power Civil-Military Relations and The Tunisian Popular Uprising PDF

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In the shadow of power:

civilmilitary relations and the
Tunisian popular uprising
a
Noureddine Jebnoun
a
CCAS, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

Published online: 03 Mar 2014.
To cite this article: Noureddine Jebnoun (2014) In the shadow of power: civilmilitary
relations and the Tunisian popular uprising, The Journal of North African Studies, 19:3,
296-316, DOI: 10.1080/13629387.2014.891821
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The Journal of North African Studies, 2014

Vol. 19, No. 3, 296316, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2014.891821
In the shadow of power: civilmilitary

relations and the Tunisian popular uprising
Noureddine Jebnoun*
CCAS, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA
This study examines the relative unknown strategic decisions inside the black box of Ben Alis
authoritarian regime under stress, and questions the broader narrative claiming that the fall of his
regime was mainly the result of the mass uprising. Making use of new primary and secondary
material, the author argues that the demise of the autocratic ruler was caused by the failure of
the regimes controlling strategies due to the defunct communication among key security
figures that represented its coercive apparatus: military, ministries of Defense and Interior, and
different domestic security organisations. Indeed, the dysfunctional intra-regime dynamics were
responsible for the outcome of the popular uprising, not the number of the demonstrators across
the country. In this regard, Ben Alis departure was the unintended outcome due to his
misreading of the civilmilitary relations, as well as his own ambiguous perception of the
military as a protector and potential threat that led to a lack of loyalty on the side of senior
army officers. His departure was not the result of a deliberate decision or a coup dtat, per se,
but rather the consequence of miscommunication between representatives from different bodies
in the security establishment. In addition, the article shed lights on the role the military played
in securing the countrys political transition during the immediate aftermath of the dictatorships
fall.
Keywords: Tunisian popular uprising; civilmilitary relations; armed forces; internal security
forces; senior army officers; senior security officers; senior officials; military intelligence;
security apparatuses; police state; authoritarian regime
The political unrest currently transpiring in Arab nations is much more complex than observers
typically acknowledge. An important yet often overlooked dynamic in these uprisings is the
part internal security apparatuses (police, paramilitary forces, militias, presidential security
guard, and secret police) played in their countries uprisings. Studying this issue will better
enable us to understand how regimes use force to suppress popular unrests, to help us differentiate
between the roles disparate branches of the security apparatuses played in the uprisings, and to
help us identify the nature of these apparatuses interactions with the political sphere during
their countries transitional periods.
In this article, I study the role the Tunisian military played in Tunisias uprising before and after
the fall of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali by drawing on information from a large number of confidential
*Email: nj64@georgetown.edu
2014 Taylor & Francis
The Journal of North African Studies
297
documents obtained from the Tunisian government,1 I use the example of the Tunisian military to
challenge the theory that militaries in the Middle East and North Africa inevitably assist in the
repression of their countries populace and interfere in their countries politics. I also hope to
assist Tunisians in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of their countrys previous
regime so that they can better manage this sensitive period of transition. Tunisians will be able
to end their leaders misuse of security forces only if they know the complexity of the countrys
civilmilitary relations as they existed under the previous authoritarian regime. As it will be
demonstrated in this article, Ben Alis marginalisation of the military undermined its support
of the regime during the uprising, though Ben Alis authoritarian political system and the
regimes communication failures may have more to do with the dictators fall than did the
mass uprising itself.
Theoretical framework for civilmilitary relations

To thoroughly treat the topic of civilmilitary relations in Tunisia during the popular uprising, I
must first review theories of civilmilitary relations in general and of such relations in the Middle
East in particular. Traditional Western models of civilmilitary relations conceptualise their
subject in simplistic terms, identifying only a civilian government and a professional military.
Samuel Huntington in his 1957 study on civilmilitary relations articulates one of the most
widely held tenets of such models that the professionalisation and modernisation of a military
(via education, training, and appointment of professional soldiers) help to keep it in the barracks
and out of politics (Huntington 1957). Of course, such models cannot account for civilmilitary
relations in situations where a professional, modern army is, directly or indirectly, the dominant
actor in the political process, or in societies whose political systems fundamentally differ from the
systems common in the West, as is the case among Arab countries (Albright 1980).
With the end of the Cold War, and the geopolitical changes and re-examination of the status of
the military in Western countries that accompanied it, scholars proposed new approaches to civil
military relations. To explain the friction that began to arise between civilian authorities and top
military commanders, Feaver argued that political decision-makers and armed servants negotiate the character of civilmilitary relations a perspective that challenges Huntingtons traditional conception of military professionalism (2002). Rebecca Schiff, meanwhile, has
proposed a concordance theory, claiming that a three-part entente between the army, the political
elite, and the citizens determines the behaviour of the military institution within its societies.
Indeed, from Schiffs perspective, the consensus of these three (military, political leadership,
and citizenry) in regard to the social composition of the officer corps, the political decisionmaking process, the recruitment method, and the peoples perception of the military reduces
the risk that military intervention in the nations domestic affairs will occur (2009).
Turning to the academic literature on civilmilitary relations in the Middle East and North
Africa, it is clear that the military coups of the 1960s and 1970s formed most scholars views
of the topic for the entire second half of the twentieth century. According to their theories,
civilmilitary relations in the Arab world have passed through two principal stages. In the first
phase, which spanned the 1950s and 1960s, the army constituted the principal rival of undemocratic governments. In the second stage, which began in the 1970s and continues until today, the
military establishment has acted as the primary guardian of authoritarian regimes (Rubin and
Kearney 2002).
Although most of the literature focused on civilmilitary relations in Arab countries corresponds to the general literature on civilmilitary relations, some of this literature has developed
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N. Jebnoun
in a different direction, focusing on the influence of the military and its role in state-building. Just
as importantly, some researchers have recognised the complicated and repressive roles certain
paramilitary apparatuses, including various secretive branches like the intelligence services and
armed militias tasked with supporting authoritarian Arab regimes, play in the region. These developments have led some states to adopt the notion that security matters more than developing
effective military leadership (Janowitz 1977; Sassoon 2012).
Morris Janowitz further claims that it is not possible to understand civilmilitary relations
without taking into consideration the internal social organization of the military, which conditions its political capabilities. He mentions organizational format, skill structure and career
lines, social recruitment and education, and professional and political ideology as well as cohesion and cleavage (Janowitz 1964, 2). All of these factors, often overlooked, allow us to
better understand the motivations behind officers actions, their ability to influence politics,
and patterns in their behaviour when they choose to intervene in politics. Further, in order to
analyse civilmilitary relations well, Janowitz contends that it is necessary to understand the
effects of various social, economic, and political pressures on the local environment in which
the members of the military evolve. Finally, to gain a comprehensive view of civilmilitary
relations, in this scholars view it is also important to consider the influence foreign actors
have on the military establishment and other domestic parties, as well as the consequences that
influence might have on the future development of civilmilitary relations.
The fall of Ben Alis authoritarian regime offers us the opportunity to study the part civilmilitary relations may play in influencing a nation to reject authoritarianism and embrace democracy.
Indeed, it should not be expected that the uprising will inevitably lead to the formation of democratic government. The historic popular uprising in Tunisia will only evolve into a stable democracy if the Tunisian citizenry, the political elite, and the military leadership come to a consensus on
how these groups ought to properly relate to one another in the countrys new political system. If
they do not, democracy will remain an unattainable dream.
It is commonly accepted that engaging in political discussions about the role of the military
during times of crisis or war should be avoided, as such questioning could damage the morale
of servicemen and women. Some further believe in refraining from such discussion when the
armed forces are actively protecting and sustaining a nation and their institutions, as the Tunisian
armed forces currently are. However, this policy is not appropriate in Arab countries for two
reasons. The first is that most armies in the Middle East and North Africa, unlike armed forces
in Western countries, are not neutral with regard to the political process but rather have a stake
in the rule of the regime. The second is that since no Arab military has engaged in significant
defensive operations against a foreign power since the end of the IranIraq war in August
1988, the funds allocated to Arab armies have served regime security more than they have homeland defence. Consequently, this article does not concentrate on the role of the Tunisian military in
protecting the territorial integrity of its country, per se, but is rather a study of the relationship
between the army and the regime, and the breakdown of this relationship during one of the
most serious crises Tunisian authorities have faced since the country gained its independence
in 1956.
The development of civilmilitary relations in Tunisia since independence
Despite its modest size and access to resources, the Tunisian military has maintained a reputation
for being well managed and professional ever since the country gained its independence. The
army has not engaged in coups or rebellions against the state, and it did not participate in Tunisias
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struggle for national liberation. Rather, the government has limited the militarys role since independence to maintaining order during national crises. The late former President Habib Bourguiba
established certain boundaries for military activity by preventing members of the army from
forming or even joining political organisations such as the Destour Socialist Party (PSD), the
ruling party at that time. At first he did not use the army to suppress political opposition,
relying instead on paramilitary forces such as the National Guard and certain units of the
police, such as the Public Order Brigade (BOP). The army was not allowed to participate in
the political decision-making process or even assist in drawing up plans for policies, including
those for national defence. Rather, Bourguiba restricted the mission of the Tunisian armed
forces to defending Tunisias national sovereignty and provided it with minimal means for carrying out this mission. It is clear that Bourguiba feared a strong military might threaten his control of
the country, which he ruled through his radical secular and Westernising ideology Bourguibism,
similar to Turkish Kemalism.2 Despite its restrictions, the military assisted in building the modern
nation-state of Tunisia by providing the country with a symbol of national unity, and a means of
connecting the citizen to the state in the form of mandatory military service.
Most of the officers and members of the three branches of the Tunisian armed forces the
Army, Air Force, and Navy themselves belong to Tunisias educated, politically conscious
middle class and come from families which comprise part of the countrys urban elite. Officers
of the military serving since independence may be divided into three generations. The first generation of officers began their careers in the Tunisian military under Bourguiba at the start of the
countrys state-building process. Most of them served in the French army, some participating in
Frances colonial wars, such as the Indochina War. This generation dominated the leadership of
the army through the end of the 1960s. The second generation consists of the classes of officers
that the Tunisian government sent to European and American educational institutions from 1956
to 1967 for military training, and who make up the group primarily responsible for building Tunisias armed forces.3 This generation of officers held most of the important leadership positions in
the armed forces from the mid-1970s until the beginning of the 2000s. The third generation of
military officers trained after 1967 mainly in Tunisias national military institutions, most importantly the Military Academy for Army Officer Training.
The majority of senior officers in the military draws its core strength from the vicinity of Tunis,
the capital of Tunisia, as well as the politically and economically important Sahel region located
in the central part of the eastern shore of the Country from Hammamet in the North to Mahdia in
the South. Other regions, especially the Centre and South of the country, continue to suffer from
underrepresentation in the militarys senior leadership due to a bloody power struggle that Tunisia
witnessed following the countrys independence movement. At that time, the two wings of the
Neo-Destour Party, one led by Bourguiba and supported by France and the Sahel region, the
other led by Saleh bin Youssef and supported by Nassers Egypt as well as the central and
southern regions, fought for control of the country. Bourguibas wing won, and the conflict left
in its wake a rift between the new Tunisian government and the central and southern parts of
the country. This subsequently led to their political and economic marginalisation, and for the
most part, low-ranking and noncommissioned officers come from the interior regions.
The end of the 1970s witnessed two significant developments affecting civilmilitary relations
in Tunisia. First, as Tunisias economic situation deteriorated, the state reduced funding for the
countrys military. Second, a rise in internal unrest prompted the state to request that the military
play a more active role in repressing internal political dissent. The first such instance occurred
when the states internal security forces failed to subdue the social demonstrations led by the Tunisian General Union of Labor (UGTT) in January 1978 (Disney 1978). The government called on
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N. Jebnoun
the army to confront the protest movement even though the military had no experience in dealing
with domestic unrest, and as a result, a large number of protestors died in clashes with the army in
what was later termed Black Thursday, indicated a shift toward a more autocratic regime in a
country where the military has deliberately been left inactive (Vandewalle 1980, 159). The same
scenario repeated itself in January 1984, when internal security forces proved once again incapable of dealing with large and determined popular demonstrations (Paul 1984). About the same
time, it became clear that the senior military leadership was becoming uncomfortable with
their forces playing the role of a police force and suppressing its people. Distrust began to
grow between certain members of the military and the leadership of the Interior Ministry, and
military leaders started to voice concerns that the armys resources were being wasted in social
conflicts caused by poor decision-making on the part of the countrys political leaders. This
resentment only increased as the government refused to spend sufficient funds on the military
to modernise its equipment.
The rift that began to form between the ruling regime and the military in the late 1970s deepened throughout the 1980s. The military grew frustrated with the lack of direction the regime
provided in matters of national security, and after the radical and belligerent Colonel Qaddafi
seized power in neighbouring Libya and began threatening Tunisia with terrorism, officers
feared that the government had failed to equip the army to adequately deal with the threat,
especially that their arms and aircraft so obsolete that they could not mount a credible defense
against a Libyan attack (Wright 1982, 124). Meanwhile, the rise of Islamism in North Africa
and its adoption by certain members in the armed forces began to create a gulf between generations of officers within the military itself. On the one hand, there were officers who sympathised
with and were not hostile to the French cultural legacy in Tunisia, while on the other, there were
those who believed rightly or wrongly that they represented the true Tunisia in its ArabIslamic legacy, as well as its intellectual and cultural diversity. As the political elites legitimacy
steadily eroded among both the populace and the military, and as the countrys political leadership
failed to respond to external threats like Qaddafi as well as the challenge posed within by Islamism, it became increasingly likely that the regime would fall.
In 1987, the then Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali overthrew
Bourguiba in what is now remembered as the Medical-Constitutional Coup. The coup was led
by one of Ben Alis comrades, Major General Habib Ammar, the commander of the National
Guard at the time. The military leadership was not informed of the coup until late on the night
of 67 November 1987, when Ben Ali summoned individually the Army Chief of Staff MajorGeneral Youssef Barakat (later promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General) and the Director
of General Directorate of Military Security (DGSM) (or Military Intelligence), Colonel
Youssef Ben Sliman (promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General in the aftermath of the coup)
to the Interior Ministry and informed them of what was already a fait accompli. The Air Force
Chief of Staff Brigadier General Ahmed Noaman, who was a relative of Bourguiba, was not
called to the meeting but, rather, physically assaulted and restrained at his home by members
of the National Guards Special Intervention Unit. Ben Ali ordered this to prevent the officer
from mobilising the Air Force and attempting to abort the coup.
A look at Ben Alis professional background helps to explain his political views and aspirations. Ben Ali graduated from the Saint-Cyr Military Academy in France in the mid-1950s, at
which point he enrolled in the French Artillery School at Chalons-sur-Marne. In the early
1960s, he was sent as part of a training delegation to Fort Bliss in Texas to continue his training
with artillery weapons systems. He then attended and graduated from the Military Intelligence
Officer Basic Course of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Holabird in
301
Maryland. Following that, he was appointed Director of Military Intelligence in Tunisia, a position he held until 1974 when he was appointed as a military attach to Rabat. In 1977, he
became Tunisias Director of National Security, a post he held until 1980, when he was
removed from the position and sent to serve as the Tunisian ambassador to Poland due to his
failure to prevent a Libyan-aided armed insurrection in Gafsa, a city 217 miles southwest of
Tunis, in January of 1980. Ben Ali served as Tunisias ambassador to Poland until 1984, when
Tunisia witnessed a number of popular protests and he was reappointed as Director of National
Security. In 1985, Ben Ali became Tunisias Minister of State, at which point he was tasked
with the countrys national security. Shortly afterward, he was appointed Interior Minister, and
in the beginning of October 1987, to the position of prime minister.
The most striking aspect of Ben Alis career is how much of it he spent working in the security
sector. He first served for 10 years as the head of the Military Intelligence Department from 1964
to 1974, where in addition to his regular duties, he began assembling files on military officers,
including his comrades, with the purpose of blackmailing them when Ben Ali thought it would
be to his advantage to do so. The success he achieved in that position paved the way for him
to enter the Interior Ministry, where he was able to consolidate his expertise in building networks
within the security apparatus and put it to use in a way that helped him achieve his short- and longterm goals. It is worth noting here that during the 20 years he spent in the military from 1956 to
1977, Ben Ali did not assume leadership of any combat units, nor did he ever attend the
Command and General Staff Officer Course. We can infer from this that a security mentality,
rather than an understanding of the militarys actual needs, guided Ben Alis political views
and aspirations for the larger part of his career. This preoccupation with security eventually
impacted the institutions of the Tunisian state, as it increasingly became a police state under
Ben Alis rule and was censured by the international community (Henry 2007, 301302). Ben
Ali even spread his security expertise to other Arab countries through Tunisias embrace of the
Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior, generally considered the only effective institution
in the so-called Joint Arab Action initiatives.
As Ben Ali ascended to power, he began to conceive and then implement this new policy
towards the Tunisian military. On 23 November 1987, Ben Ali founded the National Security
Council (NSC), which included the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Foreign Minister,
the Interior Minister, the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces (this position was later eliminated and then reinstituted on 19 April 2011), and the
General Director of the Military Intelligence. The NSC was given the task of gathering, assessing,
and evaluating information concerning internal and external policies, and formulating defence
policies to protect the countrys internal and external security. However, in the last 23 years of
his rule, Ben Ali gave no substantial responsibility to the Council in setting these policies as
he managed the countrys security primarily through a complex apparatus networks affiliated
to the Interior Ministry, among them the State Security Service (SSS), General Directorate of
National Security, General Directorate of Public Security, General Directorate of Special Services,
General Directorate of Intervention Units, Directorate of Borders and Aliens, Directorate of Technical Services, Central Directorate of Counterterrorism, and General Intelligence Directorate
known as la police politique (GID). Also, Ben Alis security system relied on the ruling party
intelligence cells, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Dmocratique or RCD) as well as the intelligence service within the Presidential Guard.
Ben Ali probably founded the Council to address domestic security issues that arose from his
coup. Indeed, on the same day that the Tunisian government announced the establishment of the
NSC, it also announced the discovery of a network of 73 individuals believed to be members of
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N. Jebnoun
the banned Tunisian Islamic Tendency Movement (MIT), and charged them with conspiring
against the security of the state. Ben Ali likely intended the announcement for both foreign
and domestic consumption, as he sought to build a security-oriented state. In particular, the
regime sought to convey this message to the USA and France, which approved Ben Alis coup
on the basis that Ben Ali would help Washington and Paris counter the North African Islamist
movements.
Meanwhile at home the regime implemented an iron-fisted policy against all who opposed or
even appeared neutral towards the waves of repression that distinguished Ben Alis new securityoriented regime. In tandem with its policy of eradicating the Islamists what was known as
drying up the springs the regime targeted the armed forces. In the period between April
and July 1991, Ben Ali arrested a group of 116 officers and 128 non-commissioned officers,
accusing them of belonging to the banned al-Nahda Movement and conspiring to overthrow
the ruling regime. In this way, the regime purged officers from the ranks of the armed forces
just as it had purged the ranks of the state apparatuses. The government then followed up
these arbitrary detentions with investigative proceedings into the jails of the Interior Ministry,
during which they used brutal acts of torture to extract confessions even to the point of death.
This heavy-handed policy demoralised officers and their families, who suffered from social maltreatment and marginalisation, especially after the government dismissed the defendants from
their duties and forced most of them into early retirement (Al-Mkashar 2012; Srni 2012).4
By using such repressive measures, Ben Ali wished to send a clear message to members of the
military institution that the regime would not tolerate anyone who might question or oppose its
decisions. Anticipating that a certain tank field regiment (the 32nd Armored Regiment based
in the city of Menzil Jemil on the northern fringes of the capital) might attempt to spearhead a
military action against the regime, Ben Ali redeployed the unit into the countryside away from
Tunis. He also redrew the operational responsibilities for all units, especially those of the brigades, which represented the principal combat formations of the army. As security deteriorated
in neighbouring Algeria in the early 1990s, Ben Ali revised the operational mission of the
army, shifting it from a purely defensive mission (in which it might respond to a military
attack) to patrolling the TunisianAlgerian border and preventing any infiltration by armed
groups. In particular, Ben Ali assigned to the army the responsibility to protect the forward operation positions of the National Guard along the entire border with Algeria as part of the Border
Security System. This mission served only to drain the army of equipment and personnel,5 as
some personnel needed to be ready to mobilise during an emergency. These security missions
also sapped the fighting capabilities of the army by decreasing the number of units involved as
well as the number of joint exercises that had been held frequently during the 1970s and
1980s due to threats from Libya.
As Ben Ali poured his resources into security, he neglected to properly fund the maintenance
and upgrade of military equipment, which in turn led to lost lives. On 30 April 2002, an old,
improperly maintained American-made HH3 helicopter crashed in the village of Warfalla Laj
al-Dukhan (33 miles West of Tunis), killing the Army Chief of Staff and 12 officers aboard,
including 2 officers with the rank of brigadier general. This tragedy happened as Major
General Abdelaziz Skik visited some of the combat units stationed on the northwest and northcentral borders engaged in securing the border with Algeria. However, rather than being transparent about the governments failure to maintain the helicopter, Ben Ali had the investigative file on
this affair sealed without giving any convincing explanations to the families of the victims or to
the Tunisian public concerning the reasons and circumstances of the accident. This action led the
majority of senior officers to prefer using their cars for field visits rather than travelling in what the
303
officers called flying coffins. The combat air fleet had not undergone any modernisation since
the mid-1980s (Cordesman and Nerguizian 2010, 35).6 While Ben Ali provided the armed forces
with inadequate budgets, he and his entourage embezzled from the financial assets and facilities
of the Ministry of Defense (Dermech 2011b).7 Tunisian governments spending on the military in
2006 represented only 1.4% of its GDP, a percentage that is low when compared with other
countries in the region: Algeria dedicated 3.3% of GDP to its defence budget in 2006; and in
2005, Libya spent 3.9% of GDP on its military apparatus, Morocco spent 5% of its GDP on
its military, and Egypt dedicated 4.3% of its GDP to its armed forces (CIA World Factbook).8
While Ben Ali may have succeeded in overcoming his immediate opponents, his focus on
security at times (ironically) endangered the military and consequently his rule. When a jihadist
group crossed the AlgerianTunisian border in late December 2006, sections of the army and the
internal security forces confronted the group in the city of Soliman (28 miles southeast of Tunis).
The president tried to micromanage the crisis and gave General Ali Seriati, Ben Alis Presidential
Security Chief, command of the operation. The militarys leadership viewed Seriatis appointment
as interfering with their sphere of responsibilities and further undermining the trust between the
president and the army. The SSS and the GID, which reported directly to Ben Ali via Seriati,
closely supervised the army officers who led the operations, and they (apparently) oversaw the
distribution of live ammunition to every combatant, regardless of rank or position, for fear that
the military might use this ammunition against the regime. This irresponsible behaviour might
have hampered the militarys effectiveness had their opponents been better trained and armed.
It is possible that this policing convinced the armys leadership to remain neutral when Ben
Alis regime faced mass protests in January 2011.
Ben Alis unease about his militarys loyalty is not unique to but rather a common problem for
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. He desperately needed the protection of the army, but how
could the armed forces offer such protection without increasing in power, which in turn might
threaten the regime? Over the course of his 23-year rule, Ben Ali chose to limit, weaken, and marginalise the military institution in favour of the security apparatus. When the support of the army
became vital to the survival of Ben Ali and his regime in January 2011, Ben Ali no longer had any
friends there to draw on.
The army and the uprising: from cautious neutrality to positive adaptation
Mohammed Bouazizis self-immolation on 17 December 2010 in the city of Sidi Bouzid (175
miles south-central of Tunis) ignited popular indignation against the regime, and protests
spread rapidly to cities across the country.9 Over the course of three weeks, they developed
from a simple call for the government to provide citizens with the basic necessities of life into
a massive popular revolt that demanded the peoples right to self-esteem, dignity, and sovereignty,
which had been so grossly violated for more than five decades. This popular uprising, which culminated in the overthrow of one of the most powerful and heinous security regimes in the Arab
world (Jebnoun 2012), would arguably not have succeeded had the army thrown its full support
behind Ben Ali.
Ben Alis regime responded to the uprising by using every means of repression at its disposal.
The government smeared the memory of Bouazizis suicide by convincing the Mufti of the
Republic to make a public statement on 8 January 2011 that there is no legal difference
between one who deliberately kills himself [or herself] and one who kills others. Moreover,
the mufti who was acting as the highest religious authority of the Tunisian state but justifying
the official religious discourse of Ben Alis regime forbade any Muslim from praying for a
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N. Jebnoun
suicide or from burying a suicide victim in a Muslim cemetery (Assabah, January 8, 2011). This
position accorded with Ben Alis first public statement, which overtly criticised the psychological fragility of a person who would commit such an act (2010). In this speech, Ben Ali failed to
acknowledge or comprehend that five decades of autocratic rule played a part in the crisis of identity that drove such behaviour in the first place. Throughout this period, no policymaker dared to
consider that a society that prizes individual freedom might grant them the right to dispose of their
personal property freely, including their bodies.
Yet despite the regimes excessive use of force against the protesters and its attempt to portray
them as gangs who wanted nothing more than to loot, pillage, and attack public and private property, the regime succeeded only in increasing the resolve of the protesters to oust Ben Ali from
power. Ben Alis decision to use live ammunition against the protestors with the aim of premeditated, targeted killing, and his attempt to portray the security disruptions as the work of alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, marked a turning point in the uprising (Mandraud 2011a). Over
the course of the next three weeks, the security situation deteriorated rapidly. As in times past,
the army was summoned when the internal security apparatus (despite its numbers and equipment) failed to control the streets. Clearly, Ben Ali was unable to deal in a civilised manner
with the people, surviving only by relying on the force of might (Jebnoun 2011). The security
forces used so much ammunition on the protestors that it ran short on teargas grenades and
were forced to appeal to the security apparatus in neighbouring Libya for more ammunition.
These were delivered on 14 January 2011, under the instructions of General Seriati who had estimated that supplying security forces with teargas from Brazil would take no less than one month
to deliver the ammunition, time which the government could no longer afford (Mandraud 2011b,
8; Seriati 2011b and, 2012).10
Even though the security situation was rapidly deteriorating, Ben Ali refused to keep the army
well informed about what was happening. Lieutenant-General Rachid Ammar, the then Army
Chief of Staff, admitted in his deposition that he was not aware of the protests spreading in
Tunisia following Bouazizis self-immolation; at the time he was monitoring a military exercise
led by the Third Infantry Mechanized Brigade in the governorate of Gabes (202 miles southeast of
Tunis) (2011, 302). According to Ammar, such emergencies as Ben Alis government was facing
would normally require both the cancellation of any military exercise and placing the military on
high alert. A full week transpired after riots broke out in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid before the
Minister of Defense Ridha Grira instructed Ammar to prepare three battalions (giving him only 15
minutes to do so!), and the presidential security chief, General Seriati, identified for Ammar
potential areas of conflict. Early on 24 December 2010, the battalions based in Gafsa (217
miles southwest of Tunis), Sbeitla (130 miles southwest of Tunis), and Maknassy (155 miles
south-central of Tunis) were put on high alert in readiness for possible intervention.
That same day, the Minister of Defense, Ridha Grira, contacted General Ammar and informed
him that he had received a call phone from one of Ben Alis advisors, Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, who
reported to Grira that General Seriati called him and claimed that the battalions were not yet ready
to be deployed in Sidi Bouzid. The Army Chief of Staff resented this assertion, as he had clearly
expressed to Seriati the readiness of these battalions. General Ammar put the battalions on
standby without assigning any security missions, but he instructed the army chain of command
that all of the military combat units needed to remain on full alert, monitoring, and assessing
the situation in the field through up-to-date intelligence. Although Ammar did not receive any
order from the political leadership to militarily intervene in Sidi Bouzid, he established a plan
for gradual military deployment and sought to secure a number of sensitive and vital public facilities in other regions where turmoil was spreading. Thus, on 8 January 2011, the army entered the
305
city of Kasserine (136 miles west-central of Tunis) to protect banking institutions from looting
and vandalism. That same day, the army intervened in the city of Tala (124 miles southwest of
Tunis) where security forces had recently used disproportionate force against protestors, force
that Ammar thought had created a catastrophic situation (2011, 303). Taoufik Bouderbala,
head of the National Commission of Investigation of Violations and Abuses, later affirmed this
assessment, reporting that
on 9 January, eight protesters were killed in Ezzouhour neighborhood, in Kasserine city, where, in
fact, the fallen dictator had given the army the order to bomb the area from the air. The army did
not obey orders; while funerals had been prohibited [by security forces] and families were not
even allowed to mourn their slain children. (Jaibi 2011)
On 9 January, the Minister of Defense, Ridha Grira, ordered General Ammar to attend a security
coordination meeting between the ministries of Defense and the Interior, which included senior
security officials like Seriati and Mohammed Ghariani, the former Secretary General of the
ruling party (RCD). According to the Army Chief of Staff, the meeting was superficial and did
not attempt to ascertain the roots of the uprising (Ammar 2011, 303). General Ammar observed
that because Seriati was the only official present who was well informed about the states security
needs, he dominated the meeting. Yet Seriati was neither able to control military decisions nor
even influence them. When the army started deploying its units in different districts within the
governorates of Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine, Grira demanded that Ammar instruct deployed military units to wear the blue uniform of the Intervention Units of the Interior Ministry (2011, 293).11
Ammar categorically rejected these instructions, and in addition to affirming the existing guidelines that regulated the use of live ammunition under exceptional circumstances, he issued an
additional military cable to all units in which he reiterated that any decision to open fire must
come from the top of the military chain of command (2011, 304).
Meanwhile, Seriati contacted Ammar concerning the news spreading via Facebook that the
Army Chief of Staff was resigning his post after his refusal to fire on the crowds. Ammar dismissed these reports as rumours and told Seriati that he did not receive orders authorising the
use of force but that he had tightened the rules on opening fire on protestors. Ammar assumed
from this phone call that Seriati distorted the content of Ammars military cable (issued to
troops on 10 January) in order to undermine Ben Alis trust in Ammars loyalty to the regime.
On 11 January, Ammar received military directives from Ben Ali via Grira ordering the deployed
troops in the field to take off their military helmets (2011, 304). Ammar quickly realised that such
a decision would make it difficult to distinguish between the army and the National Guard (since
both wore the same green uniform), and he worried that Ben Alis inner circle was attempting to
compromise the safety of the army troops and to jeopardise their mission. Therefore, he ordered
all deployed forces to wear their red berets in order to mark them out clearly from the National
Guard. On 12 January, Ammar was informed that units from the National Guard wearing the
same uniform as the army had taken their positions next to the branch of the Central Bank of
Tunisia located in the city of Kasserine, where the army had already deployed its troops. Realising
that the army would be blamed if the National Guard used excessive force against protestors,
Ammar ordered the military commanding field officer in this zone to expel the National Guard
from those areas assigned to the Army.
Despite these acts of independence, however, the Army Chief of Staff was still loyal to the
regime. On 13 January, Major General Ahmed Chabir, the Director of Military Intelligence
(DGSM), informed Ammar that the army tactical intelligence system had intercepted a radio
message among security forces spreading rumour asserting that the military troops deployed in
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N. Jebnoun
Tunis had withdrawn from the capital (2011, 305). Ammar ordered his units to clearly announce
their presence and display a posture of strength in the capital. He was concerned that the rumour
would negatively impact the morale of the security forces, who might then attempt a unilateral
withdrawal from the city of Tunis. Later in the afternoon, he learned that some in the security
forces, including the National Guard and customs, had begun handing over their weapons to military bases across the country, and he immediately reported this fact to Grira (Ammar 2011, 305).12
Later that day, Seriati called and urged Ammar to send armoured combat units to the vicinity of
the presidential palace in Carthage in order to reinforce the security of this building. However,
Seriati left Ammar the freedom to determine the plan of deployment of these units as well as
their posture, though they agreed to embed some of the Presidential Guard in these military
units for coordination purposes (2011, 305).
As protests spread to the capital, army units took up their positions in Tunis and its suburbs on
11 January. The first units given the task of maintaining security in Tunis were the Special Forces
Group. These are the elite forces of the army, trained for a variety of tasks including sabotage
operations behind enemy lines and combating irregular forces without heavy field weapons.
Clearly, Ben Ali was reluctant to hand over the capital to heavily armed forces, which he
feared might join the protest movement. Mostly likely, this concern with security informed all
of the subsequent steps taken by the regime in its desperate attempts to regain the initiative.
Ben Ali deployed armoured vehicles belonging to the National Guard alongside the Special
Forces, which boasted an armoured personnel carrier in their possession that gave them superior
mobility, manoeuvring, and firepower. If we consider also the Presidential Security Guard, who
were also armed with high-quality weapons and remained under the direct control of Ben Ali, it
becomes clear the regime was trying to prevent the army from staging a coup. The National Guard
retained its dominant position in the capital until the morning of 13 January, when army forces
especially tanks, armoured vehicles, and personnel carrier units rapidly assumed their positions
within Tunis and its suburbs, a move which tipped the balance of power in favour of the army.
The promises made by Ben Ali on 13 January (what would in retrospect be his last speech)
drew the attention of national and foreign media, which interpreted them as important concessions
that would begin a new chapter in Tunisian political history. However, they did nothing to lessen
the determination of the Tunisian people to be rid of Ben Ali. As his desperation grew, Ben Ali
agreed to positively respond to protesters legitimate demands. However, the former Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi affirmed that the dictator told him during a phone call on 14
January that the number of dead people matter little, whether it is one thousand Tunisians that
are killed or more. According to Ghannouchi, Ben Ali blamed the security leaders for their
failure in performing their duty, and he ordered the arrest of all union leaders and political
opponents, including the Islamists. Furthermore, Ben Ali claimed that the use of live ammunition
against protestors was justified by the legitimate right of self-defense (Ghannouchi 2012).
On the morning of Friday, 14 January 2011, more than 30,000 people gathered in front of the
Interior Ministry on Habib Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis to demand the resignation of Ben Ali. As
the movement swept throughout the country, protestors sent a clear message to the head of the
regime that the dictator must remove himself from power, or be removed. That morning,
Seriati called Ben Ali and informed him that 28 people had been killed in the last 24 hours
(many of them in the vicinity of Tunis), and that several weapons had been stolen from police
stations. He added that intelligence reported that some Internet users had organised demonstrations on Avenue Habib Bourguiba in Tunis seeking to topple the regime, and that he had
already sent this document to the Director of National Security and the Army Chief of Staff.
He admitted to Ben Ali that the day would be even more difficult as it coincided with the funerals
307
of the victims, and the president responded by ordering him not to disclose the number of dead to
the press and to give the amount of 5000 dinars (US$3000) to each family of victims in order to
help assuage their anger and sorrow (Seriati 2011a).
The situation, however, continued to deteriorate. Later that same morning, Seriati contacted
Ammar to inquire about the situation on Habib Bourguiba Avenue and demand that the army
reinforce the security forces deployed in the area. Ammar replied that any further demonstration
of force might provoke the demonstrators and must be avoided. Seriati, however, was afraid protestors might march towards the presidential palace and pressed Ammar to send additional forces
to reinforce its security. Complying with the request, Ammar expedited three armoured units to
join the forces already deployed around the presidential palace. Seriati then informed Ammar
that several private residences of the Trabelsi clan had been attacked and torched by the protestors, and he requested that Ammar send troops for their protection. However, Ammar rejected this
request, holding that the responsibility of the army was to provide protection only to state institutions and public facilities (2011, 306). At 3 pm, martial law was declared across the country, and
Ben Ali instructed Grira to put Ammar in charge of both the security of the country and the
coordination of the operations between the army and security forces (2011, 307). At 4:15 pm,
Grira called Ammar and inquired if he had been given any instructions to close the Tunisian airspace, from which Ammar assumed that someone misled Ben Ali and misinformed him that
Ammar was behind a decision to prevent aircraft from leaving the country. Several minutes
later, Grira called once again to say that Islamists from an antiterrorist unit within the Interior Ministry had detained Ben Alis family at the Tunis-Carthage airport and had prevented them from
leaving the country. Ben Ali via the Minister of Defense commanded Ammar to neutralise
these elements, if necessary, by using live ammunition (2011, 307).
What had actually happened was this. The small team intercepting Ben Alis family at the
airport consisted of 10 members belonging not to Islamist parties but to the Anti-Terrorist
Brigade of the National Police (BATPN). They had arrested 28 members from the Trabelsi and
Ben Ali clans who were preparing to embark to Lyon at 3 pm. Later in the afternoon, defectors
from four major security force units joined this team. Initially distinguished from the different
security services within the Interior Ministry by their high level of training and special equipment,
these units operate as task forces that can be mobilised and used in emergencies by presidential
instruction. It includes the BATPN, the Special Unit of the National Guard (USGN), and the
National Brigade for Rapid Intervention (BIR). The Intervention Group for the Protection of Prominent Figures (GIPP), which comprises the heart of the General Directorate of the Presidential
Security and Protection of Prominent Figures, was still at this time under the control of Seriati.
Though the officer who carried out the hostage operation later confirmed that it was a personal
and spontaneous decision motivated by his patriotism and devotion to his country (La Presse,
August 8, 2011; Tarhouni 2011), Ammar believes that an unknown actor was the mastermind
of the whole affair (2011, 308). Instead of using lethal force to free the hostages, he sent one
of the senior security officers to the airport to negotiate the release of Ben Alis family. Throughout this turn of events, Ammar kept Grira informed about the progress of the negotiations with the
hostage-takers. The Minister of Defense repeatedly ordered Ammar to intervene militarily, and
called on the army to kill those officers holding the family hostage (Ammar 2011, 308).
Ammar refused, replying that these men were well armed, and that with the airport so crowded
with people, any attack could lead to a bloodbath. Instead, Ammar insisted on negotiating their
release and was rewarded for this course of action when the unit released its hostages to the
army three hours later. Eight months later, the head of the BATPN affirmed that he decided to
deliver the apprehended group to the army because it was the only legitimate institution at that
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N. Jebnoun
time. Moreover, he insisted on keeping the Army Chief of Staff informed of the situation as it
developed (Dermech 2011a).
The Minister of Defense, however, did not keep Ammar so well informed. When Grira called
him at 6 pm that night, the Army Chief of Staff did not know yet that Ben Ali had already fled the
country (Ammar 2011, 308), even though Ammar was one of the senior officials charged with the
security of the country during the crisis. As a rule, Ben Ali used the presidential airport located
between Tunis-Carthage airport and El-Aouina Air Force Base, but he changed plans and decided
to use the latter instead. This was against military protocol, for the civilian crew of the presidential
jet did not have clearance to use the base, which required the authorisation of the Military Intelligence, which in turn has to report to the Army Chief of Staff. Nor did the presidential jets crew
follow the safety rules for pre-flight inspection; Air Force Chief of Staff Major General Taieb
Lajimi pointed out in his deposition that the jet refuelled in a hangar that might have set off an
explosion, even though the plane was new enough to satisfy international safety standards
(2011, 333). From this chain of events, one can conclude that Ben Alis decision to leave the
country was improvised, unexpected, and took many senior security officers by surprise.
Indeed, several military chiefs found themselves reacting to events rather than participating in
leadership decisions.
The events leading up to Ben Alis departure happened in rapid succession. At 4:45 pm, Seriati
called Lajimi to tell him that he was on his way to El-Aouina Air Force Base to use the presidential aeroplane (2011, 331). Grira via Lajimi gave Seriati access to the base without notifying the
Army Chief of Staff of his plan, even though Ammar was the main officer responsible for national
security.13 It seems at that time Seriati already knew about the capture of Ben Alis family in the
Tunis-Carthage airport, and decided that the Air Force base represented the presidents best
chance at escape. At 4:53 pm. Grira called the Air Force Chief of Staff to call off an antiterrorist
jet from firing on the presidential convoy, to which Lajimi retorted that he had none flying over
Ben Alis convoy (Lajimi 2011, 333334). Meanwhile, Lajimi ordered the colonel in charge of
the military air traffic to ground all military planes. A few minutes later, the Minister of
Defence called again, insisting that a helicopter was in attack posture, and if the Air Force did
not remove it, the Presidential Guard would fire on it. In retrospect, Lajimi thinks that this call
was for the benefit of Ben Ali: Grira was embarrassed by his failure to show Ben Ali that he
was in control of the situation (Lajimi 2011, 332).
Seemingly, the Minister of Defence would not take responsibility for the fact that he himself
had authorised the military air traffic that Ben Ali and his praetorian guard mistakenly thought
was trying to prevent their escape. Indeed, he had earlier given his permission for four helicopters
to transfer Army Special Force troops from bases in Sidi Ahmed and La Kharouba (both located
in the suburbs of Bizerte city 38 miles northeast of Tunis) to El-Aouina (Lajimi 2011, 332333).
Indeed, Grira had decided without Ammars consent to reinforce Tunis with extra Army Special
Force troops (even though the Army Chief of Staff was the effective commander of these troops).
In the space of one hour, six helicopters coming from Bizerte landed at El-Anouina, the last two of
which coincided with the arrival of Ben Alis convoy at the base. The fallen dictator feared these
elite troops were there to target him, causing everyone in his entourage to panic. Lajimi reported
that members of the Presidential Guard appeared anxious and adopted an aggressive posture
towards the military personnel upon arriving at the base (Lajimi 2011, 332).
Meanwhile, at 5:10 pm, the Military Coordination Cell issued a flight plan for the presidential
aeroplane to the Air Force Operations Room, indicating that the take-off was scheduled for 5:30
pm, with Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, as the destination. However, the report did not mention the
presence on-board of Ben Ali and his wife Leila Trabesli, whose code names were usually
309
communicated to air traffic control towers for security purposes as TUN 01 and TUN 02 (Lajimi
2011, 338). At 5:30 pm, Seriati issued another false flight plan to throw off any defecting officers
within the different security teams from discovering Ben Alis actual flight. As he later admitted to
the general attorney investigator, Seriati was no longer able to assure the security of Ben Ali and
his family (Seriati 2011a). However, at 5:47 pm, Oscar-Oscar, the presidential aeroplane, took off,
and a half hour later, passed into Libyan airspace.
The secrecy surrounding Ben Alis flight from the country deepened the mistrust already
brewing between various senior security officers in the government. Earlier that morning, Presidential Security Chief Seriati demanded from Grira a helicopter for a reconnaissance mission over
Tunis and its suburbs and for which Seriati had appointed an officer from the National Guard. The
Minister of Defence acquiesced to this demand; however, he ordered Lajimi, the Air Force Chief
of Staff, to send an officer from Military Intelligence with the crew in case Seriati instructed the
helicopter to fly over the presidential palace and assassinate Ben Ali. Although surprised by
Griras comments, Lajimi did not then fully grasp the extent of the Ministers suspicions
(Lajimi 2011, 330). By the end of the day, Grira would instruct the Air Force Chief of Staff to
capture Seriati at El-Aouina Military Air Force Base, and when Ammar asked the reason for
the arrest, the Minister delivered to him the following enigmatic answer: Cet homme (General
Seriati) veut le beurre et largent du beurre (This man wants the butter and the money from
selling the butter) (Ammar 2011, 308).
Seriati thought he knew who was behind his arrest, claiming that it was the Minister of
Defense who gave the order to arrest me with the consent of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, and
who insinuated to the latter that I was preparing a coup against him (AFP, August 13, 2011)
(Technically, Lajimi had ordered Seriatis arrest, but he had done so at Griras bidding. The Minister later admitted in his deposition that he ordered Seriatis capture out of fear that the Presidential Guard might clash with the military personnel at El-Aouina Air Force Base) (Grira 2011, 291;
Lajimi 2011, 335). Seriati claimed that he pushed Ben Ali to leave the country in order to save
Tunisia from a bloodbath and not to seize power himself. He reiterated that he was not a politician
and had no ambitions of becoming so. He added that after the apprehension of the Trabelsi [clan],
he was afraid that Ben Ali would attempt to free them, and thus would cause a bloody battle
between the different security services, [between] those who were still loyal to him, and those
who [had] defected (AFP, August 13, 2011).
Furthermore, Seriati asserted that the president had called Grira three times from his flight to
Jedda, ordering the Minister of Defence to apprehend Seriati for betraying him and trying to overthrow him (AFP, August 13, 2011). Though Grira admitted Ben Ali did call him after leaving the
country, the Minister of Defence claimed that he was unable to understand the content of the conversation as he argued the call quality was not clear. Moreover, the phone call history delivered to
the Tunisian investigator by the US company Satcom Direct in charge of securing the communications to and from the presidential aeroplane confirmed that Ben Ali did not call Grira until 7:46
pm (local time), after which he spoke with him for a total of 13 minutes over the course of three
conversations (Grira 2011, 301). Given that Seriati was apprehended at 6:15 pm, it is difficult to
argue that Ben Ali ordered Grira to arrest Seriati. Most likely, the Minister did this out of his own
assessment, as stated in his deposition. Nevertheless, it is possible that Ben Ali could have ordered
Grira to arrest Seriati before he fled the country.
It was extremely difficult for Ben Ali to acknowledge and accept the peoples rejection of his
rule and withdraw from Tunisias political arena as the Shah of Iran had done in 1979. He tried
until the last moment to glorify his military past as a humble servant of the Tunisian state. It was
not Ben Alis plan to step down permanently so much as to travel abroad until things settled down,
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N. Jebnoun
and then return to Tunis as soon as the security situation would permit. Such intentions were later
confirmed by the former Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, who in his deposition admitted
that Ben Ali called him several times on 14 and 15 January, blaming him for the constitutional
measures he had taken, and expressing his desire to return to the country (Ghannouchi 2011,
177178).
After Ben Alis departure, the armys greatest challenge was to put an end to the killings,
looting, and pillaging by remnants of the security forces and former ruling party still trying to preserve Ben Alis government. But as the security apparatus through which Ben Ali had ruled
Tunisia for more than two decades disintegrated, the military forces, with the cooperation of
Figure 1. Author meeting with the Chief of Staff of the Tunisian Armed Forces General Rachid Ammar in his
office at the Tunisias Ministry of National Defense on 13 March 2012.
311
local neighbourhood committees, gradually managed to restore order. The army took control of
the perimeter of the presidential palace without any resistance from the Presidential Guard.
Indeed, General Ammar underscored in his deposition that the Presidential Guard started cooperating and patrolling with the army immediately after Ben Alis departure, since it realised
that confrontation with the military was vain.
As the security situation normalises in Tunisia, the army continues to have a hand in keeping
order across the country, and has become more involved in the daily lives of Tunisian people. It
has remained fully mobilised since 24 December 2010 (Figure 1)14 and continues to protect
public buildings, ports, prisons, and even the state media. Arrested officials of the former
regime are awaiting trial by civil authorities, having been handed over by the army in June
2012. The army has secured the 2011 harvest (including wheat, date, and olive crops), has run
high school examinations, and it protected more than 4500 poll stations during the October
2011 elections of the National Constituent Assembly (Mandraud 2012).15 Officially neutral
during the 2011 Libyan rebellion against the regime of Colonel Qaddafi, the Tunisian army
aided the rebels without being directly involved in the conflict and sheltered almost 1.6 million
refugees from Libya, including more than 100 defected senior officers from the Libyan army.
While some politicians have tried to cast doubt on the intentions of the army, the then Chief of
Staff of the Tunisian Armed Forces General Rachid Ammar,16 the highest ranking figure in the
Tunisian army, has claimed the title Guardian of the Revolution for the Army and declared
that it will not deviate from the Constitution (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, January 22, 2011), thereby
leaving no room for misinterpreting the role of the military in the post-Ben Ali government
(Kirpatrick 2011).17
Conclusion
The Tunisian army, with its long history of professionalism and independence from politicians,
will not easily be divided into factions as happened in Algeria following its political upheaval
in the 1990s. As an institution, the Tunisian military differs from its counterparts in other Arab
nations through the professionalism and education it invests in its officers.18 Likewise, the dynamism of the Tunisian people, the vibrancy of its civil society, the homogeneity of its population,
and the absence of tribal and sectarian conflicts (considered the last refuge of Arab dictatorships)
will make it difficult for a military or security junta to rule over the Tunisian people in the future.19
In the words of General Ammar, the Tunisian Armed Forces have to keep the same distance from
all political actors.20 Although they have to back the legitimate democratically elected leaders,
they should act as the guardian of the temple, seeking to preserve and secure the civil nature of
the Tunisian state and the durability of the republican regime.21 In doing so, Ammar concludes,
they contribute to the achievement of the Tunisian peoples well-being and their aspiration to
improve their living conditions for the sake of social justice and freedom, which are necessary
for the success of the countrys transition to democracy.22
The armys preservation of internal security during a critical period in the countrys history
should inspire other Arab military institutions as well.23 Indeed, Tunisia has nothing to fear
from its military,24 but rather must ascertain what will be the future role of its security apparatus,
which historically is associated with the oppression and violence carried out against Tunisian citizens. The large number of internal security forces, which are incommensurate with the small
Tunisian population, makes this bloated apparatus a social and economic burden on state institutions.25 Additionally, large segments of the security apparatus have loyalties based more on
devotion to individuals than to institutions. Reforming these security forces will be a challenge
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N. Jebnoun
not only for any future democratic government, but for the Tunisian society as a whole. The
power or prestige of the state, which the former interim Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi
and later the tripartite government coalition in power led by the party al-Nahda were fond of
defending, can only be achieved in an environment in which a social contract clearly defines
the new relationship between the state and its citizens, and not through the security mentality
that is the product of the police state. After all, Tunisias popular uprising grew out of a yearning
for dignity, self-respect, and freedom.
Notes on contributor
The author of this article served within the Tunisian Ministry of National Defense (1998-2004), mainly in his
capacity as an assistant professor at the National War College, Command and General Staff College, National
Defense Institute and the Military Academy for Army Officer Training, where he taught courses on strategy,
geopolitics, and international humanitarian law.
Notes
1. Legal extracts from the depositions made before the Attorney General Investigator by the main actors involved in the
strategic decisions related to the events that took place in Tunisia between 17 December 2010 and 14 January 2011
which culminated with the fall of Ben Alis regime. Copies of the original depositions are in the authors possession.
2. Bourguiba did not need to explicitly announce the separation of religion and state as Ataturk did. The ghost of
the Ottoman caliphate threatened to strangle Ataturkism in its cradle, while Bourguiba benefited from his charismatic personality, his role as a political national figure, and elite supporters from the colonial period in shaping the
project of Tunisias modernisation and Westernisation. Bourguiba applied Ataturkism in its soft form, unequivocally rejecting Shara as a source of legitimacy for the constitution and laws in general (such as the personal
status code); and reducing popular Islam, to rituals framed by the state. Bourguibas modernising project marginalised those who wished to frame Tunisias history and culture as Arab-Islamic; he was fond of calling Tunisias identity Mediterranean in his speeches and statements; while Ben Ali dealt with this question through
enhanced security, repression, and emaciated political discourse. For further views on Bourguibism, see
Brown (2001) and Moore (1988).
3. In the aftermath of the Bizerte crisis (July 1961), Tunisia sent most training delegations to other European countries,
and especially Belgium, but special relations with France were maintained in the context of basic officer training.
4. These officers established an association called Equity for Ancient Militaries to defend themselves after the fall
of Ben Ali, and they proceeded to file lawsuits against those who had tortured them. On 29 November 2011, the
Criminal Court of the Permanent Military Tribunal in Tunis rendered its verdicts in the first trial of crimes of tortures committed by the former regime. The fallen dictator Ben Ali was sentenced to five years in prison; his
former Minister of Interior Abdallah Kallel and the Director of National Security, Mohamed Ali Ganzoui
central figures of Ben Alis oppressive regime were both convicted to serve four years in prison. Nevertheless,
the suits put before the Tunisian courts led, at best, to the incrimination of only some of the individuals who were
responsible for committing torture and murder. They exonerated the Tunisian state apparatuses from the charge of
using torture systematically and methodologically, meaning that the state will not have to face the legal, ethical,
moral, or material consequences for its crimes. In addition, the Minister of Defense and main senior military officers (Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Chief of Staff of the Navy, Director of Military
Intelligence, and General Military Attorney) who were allegedly responsible for handing the victims over to the
Interior Ministry where they were tortured, in the early 1990s, have not been brought to justice.
5. In April 1998, Brigadier General Mohammed Bezzaz commandant of the Third Infantry Mechanized Brigade was
killed in car accident when his light armoured car (an American-made Humvee) flipped over during a military
exercise. The latter was seeking to test the efficiency of the Border Security System in Bezzazs area of responsibility. The investigators at that time pointed out that fatigue among military personnel in charge of driving the
vehicle caused the accident.
6. In the period from 2001 to 2010, the Tunisian Air Force purchased only 12 SH-60 F multi-purpose helicopters
from the USA at a cost of nearly US$282 million.
7. Brigadier General Marouane Gouider, former Attorney General and Chief of Military Justice, revealed that
313
investigations conducted by the Investigative Unit of Misappropriation and Corruption Affairs within the
Ministry of Defense has led to the following cases against Ben Ali, his wife, his sons-in-law, and former
Ministers of Defense:
The transfer of real estate assets belonging the Ministry of Defense to Ben Ali, some members of his
family and former senior officials at low prices.
The building of the presidential palace in Hammamet and the acquisition of the yacht Alyssa on the
budget of the Ministry of Defense. The purchase price of the yacht Alyssa is estimated at 1.8
million dinars (1.2 million dollars), while the cost of maintenance is valued at 1.7 million dinars
($1.1 million dollars).
The cost of work conversion of the plain of Sidi Bou Said on which Ben Alis palace was built had
been estimated at 4 million dinars (2.8 million dollars).
The healthcare offered by the Military Hospital of Tunis to the families of Ben Ali and his wife, and
former dignitaries who were never honored are estimated at 0.758 million dinars ($0.4 million dollars).
8. CIA World Factbook. One might think that Ben Ali would have used the money he saved on the military to build
his security apparatus, but he did not so much build a professional security force as he encouraged the penetration
of the security mindset into all classes and institutions of Tunisian society, including those of the state. In this
regard, the leaders of the security apparatus managed to forge special relationships with various factions in the
presidential palace, which in turn led to deepening divisions within the security apparatus during the course of
what became known as the war of the apparatuses (see Camau and Geisser 2003, 207).
9. Mohammed Bouazizi burned himself to death after the municipal police refused to let him run a business that fed
him and his family.
10. Summary of Record of the Confessions of Ali Seriati before the Criminal Court of the Permanent Military Tribunal in El-Kef (29 November 2011) and before the Court of First Instance of the Permanent Military Tribunal in
Tunis, 3 January 2012. He pointed out that he was instructed [by Ben Ali] to contact some of his friends network
within the Libyan security establishment, who on 14 January at 10 a.m., delivered to him a shipment of 1,500
teargas grenades. He later confirmed that 10,000 teargas grenades had been ordered from France and arrived
to Tunis on January 15 (also see Mandraud 2011b, 8).
11. Later Ridha Grira confirmed in his deposition before the Attorney General Investigator that the former Interior
Minister made this request of him.
12. When the Army Chief of Staff suggested that the army should store these weapons in a safe place as most of the
security stations had already been scorched and looted, Grira suspected that Ammar intended to disarm the security forces, which in turn could pave the way for the army to seize power.
13. Why would Grira do this, if he suspected Seriati of treason? Some observers argue that Grira wanted to get rid of
Seriati so that he could take over the government in case something happened to Ben Ali. But this hypothesis does
not take into account Ammars loyalty to the state; it is unlikely that Grira would be able to stage a coup without
being supported by Ammar. Others hypothesise that Grira suspected that Seriati pushed Ben Ali to leave the
country, and that if Ben Ali would be allowed to return, he would likely appoint Grira as prime minister, thinking
that Seriati had turned traitor. Such a scenario would allow Grira to manage the transition until 2014 and then be
selected by the RCD to succeed Ben Ali.
14. Authors meeting with the former Chief of Staff of the Tunisian Armed Forces General Rachid Ammar at the
Tunisias Ministry of National Defense, 13 March 2012.
15. The army mobilised 22,313 armed military personnel to protect 4593 poll stations, and transported by air and land
320 tons of voting and electoral equipment, including station supplies such as booths, ballot boxes, and election
accessories. Figures revealed by the spokesman of the Tunisian armed forces Brigadier General Mokhtar Ben
Nasr to the French journalist Mandraud (2012).
16. On 19 April 2011, Lt Gen. Rachid Ammar was promoted Chief of Staff of the Tunisian Armed Forces while maintaining his previous position as an Army Chief of Staff.
17. During the first few months after Ben Ali fled the country, there was much debate among the countrys political
elite concerning the possibility that the army might play a direct political role in politics, and some even hinted at
the necessity of the military entering the political arena under the pretext of protecting the new political order.
Nevertheless, this concern remains unrealistic for the following reasons: (1) the Tunisian army had the opportunity to seize power before Ben Ali left the country on 14 January 2011, but it did not do so, believing that the
national interest required that the army remain apart from political affairs, which had never been a priority for
the army. (2) The Tunisian military leadership, in comparison with its Arab counterparts, does not have a clear
314
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
N. Jebnoun
ideological background, without which it is difficult to define a political project and hence an identity for a political system. The principal factors that allowed the Tunisian military to maintain its cohesion during the presidencies of Bourguiba and Ben Ali were its spirit of professionalism and its political neutrality. (3) According
to more than one specialist in military affairs, the Tunisian army has not concluded any notable arms deals
since Ben Alis escape, despite the militarys responsibility of the countrys security. One would think that this
additional burden would force the army to develop its capabilities to face internal security challenges and external
threats, but the military leadership of the army hesitates to take this step, believing that an elected parliament and a
legitimate government representing the will of the people must initiate such changes. Likewise, the leadership
understands that any reinforcement of the armys military capabilities under the present circumstances will be
seen by some political and security elements as an attempt by the military to interfere in political affairs. (4)
Those warning against a military intervention in politics do not have a precise understanding of the characteristics
of the Tunisian army. Tunisian political elite woke up on the morning of 14 January 2011, to the reality that the
state not the regime has an army, whereas the opposite is true in most Arab countries. Nevertheless, such critics
have insisted on questioning the intentions of the army, despite the clear and unequivocal statements issued by its
leadership concerning the commitment of the military institution to not take part in any political activity. By questioning the intentions of the armed forces, these elites tried to conceal their unpreparedness in leading the Tunisian
people through the transition process towards democratisation.
Authors meeting with General Rachid Ammar, 13 March 2012.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
I have deliberately avoided indicating specific figures with regard to the bloated numbers of the security forces
under Ben Ali regime due to the lack of accurate and detailed data on this subject. It is likewise worth noting that
the statement made by former Interior Minister Farhat Rajhi in the aftermath of the fall of the autocratic ruler
asserting that the total number of these forces does not exceed 50,000 is unreliable, especially given that he
admitted in the context of this statement that this number was given to him and that he himself did not verify
it. Additionally, this statement should not be read out of context: the former ministers statement was a desperate
attempt to calm Tunisians and to ease the tension in the Tunisian street stemming from systematic repression,
including torture, killings, and deliberate infringement of the dignity of the Tunisian citizenry at the hands of
the security apparatus during the two decades and more of Ben Alis rule. The number given by the former Interior
Minister does not take into account the full extent of this apparatus. If we accept for the sake of argument that the
stated number is correct, it still does not include the various units of plainclothes detectives, the individuals
holding positions as village or neighbourhood headmen, the neighbourhood watch committees, the vigilance
committees, the proprietors of cafes, bars, and hotels, the citizen spies in the public administration and militias
of the ruling party representing the hidden reserve legions of the Interior Ministry. Indeed, all of these were
part of the security system that Ben Ali excelled in building and developing. With his statement, the former
Interior Minister was trying intentionally or unintentionally to make Tunisians forget the true numbers of
the internal security forces, which is several times the stated number, in order to minimise the role that these
forces played in the former regimes oppressive activities, as a transitional step aimed at bringing about reconciliation without accountability.
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