Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CONCEPCION
FACTS:
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National
Bank and a member of the Board thereof, authorized an
extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C. to
the manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine National
Bank. "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a co-partnership
where Concepcion is a partner. Subsequently, Concepcion was
charged and found guilty in the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan with violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747. Section
35 of Act No. 2747 provides that the National Bank shall not,
directly or
indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board of
directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks.
Counsel for the defense argue that the documents of record do
not prove that authority to make a loan was given, but only
show the concession of a credit. They averred that the granting
of a credit to the co-partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C."
by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National
Bank, is not a "loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act
No. 2747.
ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of a credit of P300,000 to
the co-partnership "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of
the Philippine National Bank, a"loan" within the meaning of
section 35 of Act No. 2747.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The "credit" of an
individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the
confidence or trust reposed by a lender that he will pay what
he may promise. A "loan" means the delivery by one party and
the receipt by the other party of a given sum of money, upon
an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned,
with or without interest. The concession of a "credit"
necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit of the
amount fixed in the "credit".
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant. So ordered.
-----------XXX---------G.R. No. L-17474
October 25, 1962
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE V. BAGTAS, defendant,
FELICIDAD M. BAGTAS, Administratrix of the Intestate
Estate left by the late Jose V. Bagtas, petitioner-appellant.
FACTS:
On 8 May 1948 Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of
the Philippines through the Bureau of Animal Industry three
bulls: a Red Sindhi with a book value of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari,
of P1,320.56 and a Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for a period of one
year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949 for breeding purposes
subject to a government charge of breeding fee of 10% of the
book value of the bulls. Upon the expiration on 7 May 1949 of
the contract, the borrower asked for a renewal for another
period of one year. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources approved a renewal thereof of only one bull
for another year from 8 May 1949 to 7 May 1950 and
requested the return of the other two. On 25 March 1950 Jose
V. Bagtas wrote to the Director of Animal Industry that he would
pay the value of the three bulls. On 17 October 1950 he
reiterated his desire to buy them at a value with a deduction of
Cagayan, where the animal was kept, and that as such death
was due to force majeure she is relieved from the duty of
returning the bull or paying its value to the appellee. The
contention is without merit. The loan by the appellee to the late
defendant Jose V. Bagtas of the three bulls for breeding
purposes for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May
1949, later on renewed for another year as regards one bull,
was subject to the payment by the borrower of breeding fee of
10% of the book value of the bulls. The appellant contends that
the contract was commodatum and that, for that reason, as the
appellee retained ownership or title to the bull it should suffer
its loss due to force majeure. A contract ofcommodatum is
essentially gratuitous. If the breeding fee be considered a
compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull.
Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee would be
subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith,
because she had continued possession of the bull after the
expiry of the contract. And even if the contract be
commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942
of the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract of
commodatum
. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a
fortuitous event:
(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . .
(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its
value, unless there is a stipulation exempting the bailee from
responsibility in case of a fortuitous event;
The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May
1949. The loan of one bull was renewed for another period of
one year to end on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and
used the bull until November 1953 when during a Huk raid it
was killed by stray bullets. Furthermore, when lent and
delivered to the deceased husband of the appellant the bulls
had each an appraised book value, to with: the Sindhi, at
P1,176.46, the Bhagnari at P1,320.56 and the Sahiniwal at
P744.46. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull
due to fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would
be exempt from liability.
The appellant's contention that the demand or prayer by the
appellee for the return of the bull or the payment of its value
being a money claim should be presented or filed in the
intestate proceedings of the defendant who died on 23 October
1951, is not altogether without merit. However, the claim that
his civil personality having ceased to exist the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the case against him, is untenable, because
section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that
After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative
of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such
time as may be granted. . . .
and after the defendant's death on 23 October 1951 his
counsel failed to comply with section 16 of Rule 3 which
provides that
Whenever a party to a pending case dies . . . it shall be the
duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death .
. . and to give the name and residence of the executory
administrator, guardian, or other legal representative of the
deceased . . . .
The notice by the probate court and its publication in the Voz
de Manila that Felicidad M. Bagtas had been issue letters of
administration of the estate of the late Jose Bagtas and that "all
persons having claims for monopoly against the deceased
Jose V. Bagtas, arising from contract express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, for funeral
expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the said
decedent, and judgment for monopoly against him, to file said
claims with the Clerk of this Court at the City Hall Bldg.,
Highway 54, Quezon City, within six (6) months from the date
So long as valid consent was given, the fact that the loans
were solely for the benefit of the Lagasca spouses would not
invalidate the mortgage with respect to private respondents'
share in the property. In consenting thereto, even assuming
that private respondents may not be assuming personal liability
for the debt, their share in the property shall nevertheless
secure and respond for the performance of the principal
obligation. The parties to the mortgage could not have
intended that the same would apply only to the aliquot portion
of the Lagasca spouses in the property, otherwise the consent
of the private respondents would not have been required.
The supposed requirement of prior demand on the private
respondents would not be in point here since the mortgage
contracts created obligations with specific terms for the
compliance thereof. The facts further show that the private
respondents expressly bound themselves as solidary debtors
in the promissory note hereinbefore quoted.
Coming now to the extrajudicial foreclosure effected by GSIS,
We cannot agree with the ruling of respondent court that lack
of notice to the private respondents of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale impairs the validity thereof. In Bonnevie, et al.
vs. Court of appeals, et al., the Court ruled that Act No. 3135,
as amended, does not require personal notice on the
mortgagor, quoting the requirement on notice in such cases as
follows:
Section 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of sale for
not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the
municipality where the property is situated, and if such property
is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also
be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
There is no showing that the foregoing requirement on notice
was not complied with in the foreclosure sale complained of.
The respondent court, therefore, erred in annulling the
mortgage insofar as it affected the share of private
respondents or in directing reconveyance of their property or
the payment of the value thereof Indubitably, whether or not
private respondents herein benefited from the loan, the
mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were
valid.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and
REINSTATING the decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No.
Q-9418 thereof.
----------XXX---------G.R. No. 115324, 19 February 2003
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (now First
International Bank) v. CA and FRANKLIN VIVES
J. Callejo, Sr.
In 1979, Vives was asked by his neighbor and friend Sanchez
to help her friend and town mate, Col. Doronilla, in
incorporating his business, the Sterela Marketing and Services.
Vives was asked to deposit in a bank a certain amount of
money in the bank account of Sterela for purposes of
incorporation. She assured that Vives that he could withdraw
his money from said account within a months time. Relying on
the representations of Sanchez and Doronilla, Vives issued a
check in the amount of 200,000 in favor of Sterela.
Vives learned that Sterela was no longer holding office in the
address previously given to him. Alarmed, he and his wife
went to the bank to verify if their money was still intact, and
was thereafter informed by the bank manager that part of the
money had been withdrawn by Doronilla, and that only 90,000
remained therein. Vives was also informed that they could not
the starting date is October 13, 1982 and not May 1, 1981.
SO ORDERED.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 28, 1997,
of the Court of Appeals and its resolution dated April 21, 1998,
are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the award of
damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages in
favor of private respondents is DELETED, but the award to
them of attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000 is UPHELD.
Additionally, petitioner is ORDERED to pay private
respondents P25,000 as nominal damages. Costs against
petitioner.
----------XXX---------PANTALEON v. AMERICAN EXPRESS
FACTS: After the Amsterdam incident that happened involving
the delay of American Express Card to approve his credit card
purchases worth US$13,826.00 at the Coster store, Pantaleon
commenced a complaint for moral and exemplary damages
before the RTC against American Express. He said that he and
his family experienced inconvenience and humiliation due to
the delays in credit authorization. RTC rendered a decision in
favor of Pantaleon. CA reversed the award of damages in favor
of Pantaleon, holding that AmEx had not breached its
obligations to Pantaleon, as the purchase at Coster deviated
from Pantaleon's established charge purchase pattern.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not AmEx had committed a breach of its
obligations to Pantaleon.
2. Whether or not AmEx is liable for damages.
RULING:
1. Yes. The popular notion that credit card purchases are
approved within seconds, there really is no strict, legally
determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take for
a credit card company to approve or disapprove a customers
purchase, much less one specifically contracted upon by the
parties. One hour appears to be patently unreasonable length
of time to approve or disapprove a credit card purchase.
The culpable failure of AmEx herein is not the failure to timely
approve petitioners purchase, but the more elemental failure
to timely act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably.
Even assuming that AmExs credit authorizers did not have
sufficient basis on hand to make a judgment, we see no reason
why it could not have promptly informed Pantaleon the reason
for the delay, and duly advised him that resolving the same
could take some time.
2. Yes. The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not
simply because AmEx incurred delay, but because the delay,
for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the particular
injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral
damages are remunerative. The somewhat unusual attending
circumstances to the purchase at Coster that there was a
deadline for the completion of that purchase by petitioner
before any delay would redound to the injury of his several
traveling companions gave rise to the moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation sustained by Pantaleon, as concluded by the RTC.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 92-1665 is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against respondent.
their assets.
The two promissory notes signed by petitioners provide:
I/We hereby authorize the CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
to increase or decrease as the case may be, the interest
rate/service charge presently stipulated in this note without any
advance notice to me/us in the event a law or Central Bank
regulation is passed or promulgated by the Central Bank of the
Philippines or appropriate government entities, increasing or
decreasing such interest rate or service charge.36
Such escalation clause is similar to that involved in the case of
Floirendo, Jr. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company37
where this Court ruled:
The provision in the promissory note authorizing respondent
bank to increase, decrease or otherwise change from time to
time the rate of interest and/or bank charges "without advance
notice" to petitioner, "in the event of change in the interest rate
prescribed by law or the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of
the Philippines," does not give respondent bank unrestrained
freedom to charge any rate other than that which was agreed
upon. Here, the monthly upward/downward adjustment of
interest rate is left to the will of respondent bank alone. It
violates the essence of mutuality of the contract.
In this case, the trial and appellate courts, in upholding the
validity of the escalation clause, underscored the fact that there
was actually no fixed rate of interest stipulated in the
promissory notes as this was made dependent on prevailing
rates in the market. The subject promissory notes contained
the following condition written after the first paragraph:
With one year grace period on principal and thereafter payable
in 54 equal monthly instalments to start on the second year.
Interest at the prevailing rates payable quarterly in arrears.
In Polotan, Sr. v. CA (Eleventh Div.), petitioner cardholder
assailed the trial and appellate courts in ruling for the validity of
the escalation clause in the Cardholders Agreement. On
petitioners contention that the interest rate was unilaterally
imposed and based on the standards and rate formulated
solely by respondent credit card company, we held:
The contractual provision in question states that "if there
occurs any change in the prevailing market rates, the new
interest rate shall be the guiding rate in computing the interest
due on the outstanding obligation without need of serving
notice to the Cardholder other than the required posting on the
monthly statement served to the Cardholder." This could not be
considered an escalation clause for the reason that it neither
states an increase nor a decrease in interest rate. Said clause
simply states that the interest rate should be based on the
prevailing market rate.
Interpreting it differently, while said clause does not expressly
stipulate a reduction in interest rate, it nevertheless provides a
leeway for the interest rate to be reduced in case the prevailing
market rates dictate its reduction.
Admittedly, the second paragraph of the questioned proviso
which provides that "the Cardholder hereby authorizes Security
Diners to correspondingly increase the rate of such interest in
the event of changes in prevailing market rates x x x" is an
escalation clause. However, it cannot be said to be dependent
solely on the will of private respondent as it is also dependent
on the prevailing market rates.
Escalation clauses are not basically wrong or legally
objectionable as long as they are not solely potestative but
based on reasonable and valid grounds. Obviously, the
fluctuation in the market rates is beyond the control of private
respondent. (Emphasis supplied.)
In interpreting a contract, its provisions should not be read in
isolation but in relation to each other and in their entirety so as
to render them effective, having in mind the intention of the
parties and the purpose to be achieved. The various
stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result