Vivencio Jumamil vs Jose Caf et.

al
GR No. 145570; September 21, 2005
Corona, J.:
Facts:

Petitioner Jumamil filed before the RTC Panabo a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining
order against public respondents Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the
constitutionality of Municipal Resolution No. 7, Series of 1989 (Resolution No. 7).
Resolution No. 7, enacting Appropriation Ordinance No. 111, provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the construction of stalls
around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire.
Subsequently, the petition was amended due to the passage of Resolution No. 49, series of 1989 (Resolution No. 49), denominated as
Ordinance No. 10, appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls in the same public market.
The construction of the stalls that petitioner sought to stop was finished rendering the prayer moot and academic. The lease of the stalls were
then awarded by public raffle to those who had deposited P40,000 each. The petition was then amended to include the 57 awardees of the
stalls as private respondents.
According to petitioner, Resolutions Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional because they were: passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment
and benefit of private respondents who deposited the amount of P40,000.00 for each stall, and with whom also the mayor had a prior contract
to award the would be constructed stalls to all private respondents. As admitted by public respondents, some of the private respondents are
close friends and/or relatives of some of the public respondents which make the questioned acts discriminatory. The questioned resolutions
and ordinances did not provide for any notice of publication that the special privilege and unwarranted benefits conferred on the private
respondents maybe (sic) availed of by anybody who can deposit the amount of P40,000.00. Neither was there any prior notice or publication
pertaining to contracts entered into by public and private respondents for the construction of stalls to be awarded to private respondents that
the same can be availed of by anybody willing to deposit P40,000.00.
The issue of constitutionality of the questioned resolutions was not, however, ruled upon by both the RTC and CA. It appears that both parties
agreed to await the decision in CA GR No. SP No. 20424 of an earlier case involving same facts and parties for Declaratory Relief, Annulment of
Award or Compromise Agreement. In the said case, both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents.
Before the SC, petitioner sought for the reversal of CAs decision via petition for review, which was denied. RTC, after receipt of entry of SC
judgment, dismissed pending petition and adopted ruling in CA GR SP No. 20424. CA affirming the RTC, ruled that petitioner had no standing to
challenge the two resolutions/ ordinances because he suffered no wrong under their terms. It ruled that petitioner, who was not a party to the
lease contracts, had no standing to file the petition for declaratory relief and seek judicial interpretation of the agreements. Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N petitioner had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief.
Ruling: NO.

The petition for declaratory relief challenged the constitutionality of the subject resolutions. There is an unbending rule that courts will not
assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following requisites are satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial review; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of the act
must have standing to do so; (4) the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and (5) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term "interest" means a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
Unless a persons constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing.
Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and not in his personal capacity. He
was questioning the official acts of the public respondents in passing the ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with private
respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity.
Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. The
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds. The resolutions being assailed were appropriation ordinances.
Petitioner alleged that these ordinances were "passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents" (that is,
allegedly for the private benefit of respondents) because even before they were passed, respondent Mayor Cafe and private respondents had
already entered into lease contracts for the construction and award of the market stalls. Private respondents admitted they deposited P40,000
each with the municipal treasurer, which amounts were made available to the municipality during the construction of the stalls. The deposits,
however, were needed to ensure the speedy completion of the stalls after the public market was gutted by a series of fires. Thus, the award of
the stalls was necessarily limited only to those who advanced their personal funds for their construction.
However, in this case, Petitioner did not seasonably allege his interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds or the specific
injury to him as a result of the enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts. It was only in the "Remark to Comment" he filed in
this Court did he first assert that "he (was) willing to engage in business and (was) interested to occupy a market stall." Such claim was
obviously an afterthought.
Rule on locus standi must not be relaxed since objections to a taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are
procedural matters. The Court, has on several occasions, relaxed the application of these rules when a petition raises an issue of
transcendental importance.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of
any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
But, even if we disregard petitioners lack of legal standing, this petition must still fail. Petitioner failed to prove the subject ordinances and
agreements to be discriminatory. Considering that he was asking this Court to nullify the acts of the local political department of Panabo,
Davao del Norte, he should have clearly established that such ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not notified and who were
thus not given the opportunity to make their deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation that the public was not notified did not suffice.
Furthermore, there was the time-honored presumption of regularity of official duty, absent any showing to the contrary.

Crisostomo Aquino vs Municipality of Malay Aklan

GR No. 211356; September 29, 2014
Velasco Jr., J.:
Facts:

Petitioner, Aquino, is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove).
On January 7, 2010, company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. While the company was already
operating a resort in the area, the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a
parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land
Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay
West Cove.
The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioners application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the no build
zone demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which prohibits construction of building or structure of any kind, temporary or
permanent, on the beaches around the Island of Boracay and its offshore waters within the space 25 meters from the edge of the mean high
water mark measured inland.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Office of the Mayor on February 1, 2010, but no action was ever taken by the latter. On April 5, 2011,
however, a Notice of Assessment was sent to petitioner asking for the settlement of Boracay West Coves unpaid taxes and other liabilities
under pain of a recommendation for closure in view of its continuous commercial operation since 2009 sans the necessary zoning clearance,
building permit, and business and mayors permit. In reply, petitioner expressed willingness to settle the companys obligations, but the
municipal treasurer refused to accept the tendered payment. Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the construction, expansion, and operation
of the resort hotel.
On March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7,
2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves hotel.
Respondents proceeded to the demolition of the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove.
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
injunctive relief with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be directed
against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of
executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner,
according to the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.

Issue: W/N certiorari, instead of declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for the petitioner.
Ruling: NO.

The Sc found merit in SCs contention that the special writ of certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for assailing EO 10 by
citing Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising
thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues
arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A
petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is
immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of
obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10s enforcement and implementation. The closure and
demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying out the directives in the
challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a situation.
Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari. In this case, the CA immediately dismissed the Petition for Certiorari upon determining that the first
element is wantingthat respondent mayor was allegedly not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions when he issued EO 10. The SC
ruled otherwise. The first requirement for certiorari that the writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions is satisfied if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character. It is not essential that
the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice,
but it is sufficient if they are quasi-judicial.
In this case, however, the SC affirmed the decision of CA in favor of respondent. While the hotel is only classified as a nuisance per accidens, the
LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause.

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by

Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr.,
Petitioner,
- versus -

G.R. No. 175064

September 18, 2009

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; and CITY OF NAGA,

represented by Mayor Jesse M. Robredo,
Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:The property subject of the instant case is a parcel of land, known as Plaza Rizal, situated within the territory of herein respondent City
of Naga and with an aggregate area of 4,244 square meters, more or less.Plaza Rizal is located in front of the old provincial capitol building, where the
Provincial Government of Camarines Sur used to have its seat, at the time when the then Municipality of Naga was still the provincial capital.
On 18 June 1948, Republic Act No. 305[5] took effect and, by virtue thereof, the Municipality of Naga was converted into the City of Naga. Subsequently,
on 16 June 1955, Republic Act No. 1336[6] was approved, transferring the site of the provincial capitol of Camarines Sur from the City of Naga to the
barrio of Palestina, Municipality of Pili.[7] The Municipality of Pili was also named as the new provincial capital.On 13 January 1997, the City of Naga filed
a Complaint[9] for Declaratory Relief and/or Quieting of Title against Camarines Sur before the RTC.
The City of Naga alleged that, for a considerable length of time, Camarines Sur possessed and claimed ownership of Plaza Rizal because of a tax
declaration over the said property in the name of the province. As a result, Camarines Sur had long exercised administrative control and management of
Plaza Rizal, to the exclusion of the City of Naga. The City of Naga could not introduce improvements on Plaza Rizal, and its constituents could not use the
property without securing a permit from the proper officials of Camarines Sur. The situation had created a conflict of interest between the parties herein
and had generated animosities among their respective officials.
The City of Naga stressed that it did not intend to acquire ownership of Plaza Rizal. Being a property of the public domain, Plaza Rizal could not
be claimed by any subdivision of the state, as it belonged to the public in general. Instead, the City of Naga sought a declaration that the administrative
control and management of Plaza Rizal should be vested in it, given that the said property is situated within its territorial jurisdiction. The City
of Naga invoked Section 2, Article I of Republic Act No. 305, the Charter of the City of Naga, which states:
SEC. 2. Territory of the City of Naga. The city of Naga which is hereby created, shall comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of
the municipality of Naga, in the Province of Camarines Sur.
Camarines Sur asserted that the City of Naga was without any cause of action because the Complaint lacked any legal or factual basis. Allegedly,
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 305 merely defined the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Naga and did not vest any color of right to the latter to manage
and control any property owned by Camarines Sur. Furthermore, the remedy of Declaratory Relief was inappropriate because there was no justiciable
controversy, given that the City of Naga did not intend to acquire ownership of Plaza Rizal; and Camarines Sur, being the owner of Plaza Rizal, had the
right to the management, maintenance, control, and supervision thereof. There was likewise no actual or impending controversy, since Plaza Rizal had
been under the control and supervision of Camarines Sur since time immemorial. The remedy of Quieting of Title was inappropriate, as the City
of Naga had no legal or equitable title to or interest in Plaza Rizal that needed protection.Lastly, Camarines Sur stated that Plaza Rizal was not a property
of public domain, but a property owned by Camarines Sur which was devoted to public use.
The RTC: WHEREFORE, premises considered, [Section 2, Article I] of [Republic Act No.] 305 is hereby interpreted and declared in this Court to mean
that the administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal is within the City of Naga and not with the Province of Camarines Sur. The Notice of
Appeal was denied for lack of material he material data rule, which requires the statement of such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on
time.
The RTC reiterated that the enactment of Republic Act No. 305, which converted the Municipality of Naga into an independent city, had ipso factoceased
the power of administrative control and supervision exercised by Camarines Sur over the property within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Naga and vested into the City of Naga.
ISSUE: WON Petition for Declaratory Relief was proper.
RULING: Yes. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive
order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.[31] The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute.[32]
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy between persons whose interests
are adverse; (2) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (3) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[33]
The Court rules that the City of Naga properly resorted to the filing of an action for declaratory relief.
In the instant case, the controversy concerns the construction of the provisions of Republic Act No. 305 or the Charter of the City
of Naga. Specifically, the City of Naga seeks an interpretation of Section 2, Article I of its Charter, as well as a declaration of the rights of the parties to this
case thereunder.
To recall, Section 2, Article I of Republic Act No. 305 defines the territory of the City of Naga, providing that the City shall comprise the present
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Naga. By virtue of this provision, the City of Naga prays that it be granted the right to administratively
control and supervise Plaza Rizal, which is undisputedly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City.
Clearly, the interests of the City of Naga and Camarines Sur in this case are adverse. The assertion by the City of Naga of a superior right to the
administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal, because said property of the public domain is within its territorial jurisdiction, is clearly
antagonistic to and inconsistent with the insistence of Camarines Sur. The latter asserted in its Complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or Quieting of Title
that it should maintain administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal having continuously possessed the same under a claim of ownership, even
after the conversion of the Municipality of Naga into an independent component city. The City of Naga further asserted that as a result of the possession
by Camarines Sur, the City of Naga could not introduce improvements on Plaza Rizal; its constituents were denied adequate use of said property, since
Camarines Sur required that the latters permission must first be sought for the use of the same; and it was still Camarines Sur that was able to
continuously use Plaza Rizal for its own programs and projects. The City of Naga undoubtedly has a legal interest in the controversy, given that Plaza

Rizal is undisputedly within its territorial jurisdiction.Lastly, the issue is ripe for judicial determination in that, in view of the conflicting interests of the
parties to this case, litigation is inevitable, and there is no adequate relief available in any other form or proceeding.[34]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is hereby DISMISSED. The administrative control and
supervision of Plaza Rizal is hereby vested in the City of Naga. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA

Vs. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC
G.R. No. 150806, January 28, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS: Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., is the lessee of 7,348.25 square meters portion of Almeda Compound, with a monthly rental
of P1,107,348.69. The contract of lease contained the following:
SIXTH It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on the present rate of assessment on
the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by
authorities on the lot and building where the leased premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided
becomes due, the additional rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the event that
the present assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental,
likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him;
SEVENTH In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of Philippine peso at
the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment; [6]
On Dec. 29, 1997, petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals. In
response, respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were supposed to include the VAT therein,
considering that their contract was executed on May 1, 1997 when the VAT law had long been in effect.
On January 26, 1998, respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the former that its monthly rental should be increased by
73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent opposed petitioners demand and insisted that there was
no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the pronouncement of this Court in various cases.[9]Respondent refused to
pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract.
On February 18, 1998, respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation
of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice. [10]
On March 10, 1998, petitioners in turn filed an action for ejectment, rescission and damages against respondent and later moved for the
dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an improper remedy considering that respondent was already in breach of the obligation and that the
case would not end the litigation and settle the rights of the parties.
RTC: The trial court denied petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of paying the VAT since it was not a new tax and denied their right
to collect the demanded increase in rental, there being no extraordinary inflation or devaluation . This was affirmed by CA with modification.
ISSUE: WON DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER.
RULING: YES.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or
resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a
declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of
provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available
under the circumstances. [15]
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must
be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and
the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there
must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe
for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.[16]
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners insist that respondent was already in
breach of the contract when the petition was filed.
We do not agree.
After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in
their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of
the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not
barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.
Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages had been commenced before
another court; thus, the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same forum.
We are not convinced.
It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation]we held that the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the
pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer.However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer
case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the
action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved
the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on
appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.
We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol[18] where the declaratory relief action was dismissed because the issue therein
could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet, again, in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the
declaratory relief petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case.

Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it,
notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write finis to the
parties dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, dated September 3, 2001, and
its Resolution dated November 19, 2001, areAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE

VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 386 OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION INC.,
and JUNIOR CHAMBER OF BAGUIO CITY, INC.,
petitioners-appellants, vs.
THE CITY COUNCIL AND
CITY MAYOR OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO,
respondents-appellees. (1983)
Doctrine:
All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall prejudice the rights
of persons not parties to the action. Therefore, the non-joinder of persons who have claim or interest which would be affected by the declaration is not a
jurisdictional defect."
Facts:
This is a petition for declaratory relief originally filed in the CFI of Baguio, Branch II involving the validity of Ordinance 386 passed by the City Council of
Baguio City.
Said ordinance considered all squatters of public land who are duly registered as such at the time of the promulgation of the ordinance as bonafide
occupants of their
respective lots.
- Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief, praying for a judgment declaring the Ordinance as invalid and illegal ab initio. Respondents-appellees,
the City Council and the City Mayor, filed motions to dismiss the petition which were denied.
- Nevertheless, CFI, later on, rendered a decision dismissing the petition on three grounds:
(1) that another court, the CFI of Baguio, Branch I, had declared the Ordinance valid in a criminal case filed against the squatters for illegal construction,
and the Branch II of the same court cannot, in a declaratory proceeding, review and determine the validity of said judgment pursuant to the policy of
judicial respect and stability;
(2) those who come within the protection of the ordinance have not been made parties to the suit in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 64 and it has been
held that the non-joinder of such parties is a jurisdictional defect; and
(3) the court is clothed with discretion to refuse to make any declaration where the declaration is not necessary and proper at the time under all
circumstances.
Issues:
(1) WON non-joinder of persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration is a jurisdictional defect? [No, it is not a
jurisdictional defect.]
(2) WON the Ordinance is valid? [No, not valid. City Council has no power to legalize squatting.]
Held:
(1) The non-inclusion of the squatters mentioned in the Ordinance in question as party defendants in this case cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the CFI of
Baguio. Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which merely states that "All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would
be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except or otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the
action."
This section contemplates a situation where there are other persons who would be affected by the declaration, but were not impleaded as necessary
parties, in which case the declaration shall not prejudice them. If at all, the case may be dismissed not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but for the
reason stated in Section 5 of the
same Rule stating that "the Court may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper at
the time under all circumstances."
The reason for the law requiring the joinder of all necessary parties is that failure to do so would deprive the declaration of the final and pacifying
function the action for declaratory relief is calculated to subserve, as they would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the identical issue. In the
case at bar, although it is true that any declaration by the court would affect the squatters, the latter are not necessary parties because the question
involved is the power of the Municipal Council to enact the Ordinances in question. Whether or not they are impleaded, any determination of the
controversy would be binding upon the squatters. The declaration here is not a mere exercise in futility because a declaration on the nullity of the
ordinance, would give the squatters no right which they are entitled to protect. The party most interested to sustain and defend the legality of the
Ordinance is the
body that passed it, the City Council, and together with the City Mayor, is already a party in these proceedings.
(2) The Ordinance in question is a patent nullity. It considered all squatters of public land in the City of Baguio as bona-fide occupants of their respective
lots. No amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate squatting from being an unlawful act into lawful. The land occupied by the
squatters are portions of water sheds, reservations, scattered portions of the public domain within the Baguio townsite. Certainly, there is more reason
then to void the actions taken by the City of Baguio through the questioned ordinance.

R. No. L-21036 June 30, 1977

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS FOR MANILA and CONRADO SOLEDAD, EDMUNDO POSTRERO, MAXIMINO ABRUGENA,
GERONIMO DERILO, SANTOS GUINTO and EUSTAQUIO MARANAN, as employees and duly authorized representatives of the House of Representatives,
Congress of the Philippines, petitioners, vs.HON. JUDGE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Presiding Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Manila, and
JOSE and SUSANA COCHINGYAN, respondents.
Doctrine: "Because of the absence of allegations seeking material or affirmative reliefs in a petition for declaratory relief, it has been held that when the
main case is for declaratory relief, a third party complaint is inconceivable. The relief sought in this kind of pleading is contribution, indemnity,
subrogation,or other relief from the third party defendant in respect of the claim of the plaintiff against him. Accordingly, this relief cannot be granted
because in a declaratory relief, the court is merely interpreting the terms of the contract."
Facts:
-There was a pending case before respondent court as Civil Case No. 52318, entitled Macario M. Ofilada vs. Reparations Commission, Jose Cochingyan and
Susana Cochingyan, a special civil action for declaratory relief, wherein Ofilada, as the Second Receiver of the World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc.
(Warvets) in Civil Case No. 34998, likewise pending in another Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sought a judicial declaration as to whether,
under the allocation granted to said Warvets to purchase reparations goods, the conversion into pesos of the dollar prices of said goods should be at the
rate of two pesos to one dollar or at the prevailing market rate at the time for payment, which would be much higher.
-Civil Case No. 34998 was a minority suit filed by certain stockholders of Warvets alleging irregularities in the management and disposition of the goods
being purchased by the corporation.
-On the same day, another motion was filed asking for immediate admission of the third party complaint, which likewise, was forthwith granted.
-Third-party plaintiffs further alleged that the delay in the release of the goods to them has caused and will cause them grave and irreparable damage and
injury; and unless a writ of preliminary injunction were to be issued ex-parte they will suffer greater and grave damages. Thus they were granted a writ
of preliminary injunction,
-In Our view of this case, the only question We have to resolve in order to dispose of it is whether or not respondent court gravely abused its discretion in
allowing the filing of and in admitting the third-party complaint of the Cochingyans. In the affirmative, it should follow that the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in question would have no legal basis, as also all subsequent orders of respondent court tending to enforce the same. And it is Our
considered opinion and so We hold that it was highly irregular and totally unwarranted for respondent court to have allowed said third-party complaint.
The circumstances surrounding the allowance and admission thereof indicate that respondent court's action was hasty, baseless and arbitrary.
Issue:
WON the relief sought in the third part complaint can be granted in a declaratory relief. No.
Held:
As already stated, Civil Case No. 52318 was a special civil action for declaratory relief under Rule 66 of the Rules of 1940 which were in force when it was
filed. The only purpose thereof was to secure from the court the proper interpretation or construction of the reparations contract between the
Reparations Commission and Warvets in regard to the rate of conversion of the dollar to the peso of the purchase price Warvets had to pay No positive or
affirmative, much less any material relief, was 'using sought therein.
Indeed, it is in the very nature of a 'declaratory relief special civil action that "the Relief is confined to a case of actual controversy within the Court's
jurisdiction, without the need of injunction, execution or other relief beyond the adjudication of the legal rights which are the subject of controversy
between the parties." ( 3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 146, 1970 ed.)
Because of the absence of allegations seeking material or affirmative reliefs in a petition for declaratory relief, it has been held that when the main case is
for declaratory relief, a third party complaint is inconceivable. The relief sought in this kind of pleading is contribution, indemnity, subrogation,or other
relief from the third party defendant in respect of the claim of the plaintiff against him. Accordingly, this relief cannot be granted because in a declaratory
relief, the court is merely interpreting the terms of the contract.
In other words, the plaintiff Ofilada in said case did not, as he could not pray for anything to be award or granted to him.

The Visayan Packaging Corporations, petitioner,

vs.
The Reparations Commission and the Court of Appeals, respondents.
Facts:

G.R. No. L- 29673

November 12, 1987

The petitioner herein entered into a Contract of Constitutional Purchase and Sale of Interpretation Goods with the private respondent. Subject of the
contract were a cannery plant, a tin manufacturing plant, and 3 filing boats sold to the petitioner. Prior to the due date of the first installment, the private
respondent sent a written reminder to the petitioner. However, the petitioner answered by filing in the Court of First Instance a special civil action for
declaratory relief alleging ambiguity in the contract entered into specifically on the on stating the precise time when the obligation to pay the first
installment of the price would arise.
On the other hand, due to the failure of the petitioner to heed to the numerous demands for the payment of the first installment, the private respondent
filed a civil action for the collection of sum of money. The petitioner moved for the dismissal of the collection suit arguing that until and unless the
pendency of the declaratory relief actions, no cause of action could be deemed to exist in favor of the private respondent for the collection of said first
installment.
The Court of First Instance denied the motion to dismiss and eventually ruled in favor of the private respondent. In the Court of Appeals, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of the declaratory relief suits, holding that the clarity of the terms of the contract eliminated all occasions for the interpretation
thereof. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition is with merit.
Ruling:
No. The petition is without merit.
Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for collection should have been dismissed and set up as acompulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief
suits, by way of an amended answer. This was not done. The actions proceeded separately and were decided on the merits. The final verdict was that
the declaratory relief suits instituted by VISPAC were unmeritorious, quite without foundation and, in the light of all the relevant facts, appear to have
been initiated by VISPAC merely to obstruct and delay the payment of the installments clearly due from it, payment of which was decreed in the collection
suit.
Under the circumstances, and taking account of the not inconsiderable length of time that the case at bar has been pending, it would be to do violence to
substantial justice to pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for breach of the rule on compulsory counterclaims. Rules of procedure are after all laid
down in order to attain justice. They cannot be applied to prevent the achievement of that goal. Form cannot prevail over substance. The petition must
then be dismissed for lack of merit.

ANGELES S. SANTOS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PATERIO AQUINO, as Municipal Mayor of Malabon, THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABON, A.A. OLIVEROS, as Municipal Treasurer of Malabon,
Province of Rizal, respondents-appellees. Arsenio Paez for appellant. Ireneo V. Bernardo for appellees.

G.R. No. L - 5101

November 28, 1953

Facts:
The petitioner is the manager of a theater known as "Cine Concepcion," located and operated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, and the
respondents are the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Council and the Municipal Treasurer, of Malabon.
This action purports to obtain a declaratory relief but the prayer of the petition seeks to have Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, and Ordinance No. 10,
series of 1947, of the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, declared null and void; to prevent the collection of surcharges and penalties for failure to
pay the taxes imposed by the ordinances referred to, except for such failure from and after the taxpayer shall have been served with the notice of the
effectivity of the ordinances; and to enjoin the respondents, their agents and all other persons acting for and in their behalf from enforcing the ordinances
referred to and from making any collection thereunder. Further, petitioner prays for such other remedy and relief as may be deemed just and equitable
and asks that costs be taxed against the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition must be granted.
Ruling:
No. The petition must not be granted.
This is not an action for declaratory relief, because the terms of the ordinances assailed are not ambiguous or of doubtful meaning which require a
construction thereof by the Court. And granting that the validity or legality of an ordinance may be drawn in question in an action for declaratory relief,
such relief must be asked before a violation of the ordinance be committed.
When this action was brought on 12 May 1949, payment of the municipal license taxes imposed by both ordinances, the tax rate of the last having been
reduced by the Department of Finance, was already due, and the prayer of the petition shows that the petitioner had not paid them. In those
circumstances the petitioner cannot bring an action for declaratory relief.
Angeles S. Santos, the petitioner, does not aver nor does he testify that he is the owner or part-owner of "Cine-Concepcion. He alleges that he is only the
manager thereof. For that reason he is not an interested party. He has no interest in the theater known as "Cine Concepcion" which may be affected by the
municipal ordinances in question and for that reason he is not entitled to bring this action either for declaratory relief or for prohibition, which
apparently is the purpose of the action as may be gleaned from the prayer of the petition. The rule that actions must be brought in the name of the real
party in interest applies to actions brought under Rule 66 for declaratory relief. The fact that he is the manager of the theater does not make him a real
party in interest.

G.R. No. L-24835 July 31, 1970

PREPARATIONS COMMISSION, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NORTHERN LINES INC., and FIELDMEN'S INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., defendants-appellants.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS:
Pursuant to Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Commission had awarded two (2) vessels to the Northern Lines Inc., (Buyer) for use in the
interisland shipping. According to the schedules of payment agreed upon between the parties, complete delivery of one of the vessels (M/S
Don Salvador) took place on April 25, 1960, and that of the M/S Don Amando on May 26, 1960.
These vessels were the object of separate deeds of conditional purchase and sale of reparations goods, executed by the Commission, as vendor,
and the Buyer, as vendee.. Surety Bonds Nos. 3825 and 4123 were executed, on April 25, 1960 and May 30, 1960, respectively, by the Buyer, as
principal, and the Fieldmen's Insurance Co., as surety, in favor of the Commission, to guarantee the faithful compliance by the Buyer of its
obligations under said contracts.
The Buyer undertook therein to pay for said vessels the installments specified in a schedule of payments, appended to each contract.
On April 24, 1962, and May 26, 1962 or one day before the stated due date of the first installment for M/S Don Salvador, and on the stated
due date of the first installment as to M/S Don Amando the Buyer instituted Civil Cases Nos. 50194 (regarding M/S Don Salvador, formerly
Magsaysay) and 50488 (regarding M/S Don Amando, formerly Estancia) of the Court of First Instance of Manila to secure, by way of
declaratory relief, a declaration to the effect that the first installments under the aforementioned contracts would be due and demandable on
April 25, 1963 and May 26, 1963, respectively.
On September 10, 1962, the Commission Commenced Civil Case No. 51542 of the same Court, against the Buyer and the Surety. The
Commission alleged in two separate causes of action set forth in the complaint therein that, despite repeated demands, the defendants
(Buyer and Surety) had refused to pay the first installments that had become due and demandable on April 25 and May 26, 1962, respectively.
Hence, it prayed that the Buyer and the Surety be sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, to the Commission the aggregate sum of P349,522.84,
with interest thereon at the legal rate, in addition to attorney's fees and the Costs.
The Buyer, by way of special defense, averred that the Commission has no cause of action until Civil Cases Nos. 50488 and 50194 . shall have
been decided. The Surety's answer contained similar admissions and denials, apart from adopting as its own those made in the Buyer's answer,
and set up a crossclaim against the Buyer, for reimbursement of whatever the Surety may have to pay to the Commission by reason of its
complaint.
Subsequently, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed Case No. 50488 involving the M/S Don Amando whereupon the Buyer
appealed to this Court. The same was, however, dismissed for failure of the Buyer, as appellant therein, to file its brief within the reglementary
period.
In due course thereafter, Court of First Instance rendered, in Cases Nos. 50194 regarding M/S Don Salvador or Magsaysay and 51542
the action filed by the Commission a decision dismissing the petition for a declaratory relief in Case No. 50194. A reconsideration of this
decision having been denied, the Buyer and the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals, which later certified the appeal to this Court.
The Buyer alleges that the trial court erred: xx (4) in not holding that the action filed by the Commission (Case No. 51542) is "barred" by
the actions for declaratory judgment filed by the Buyer (Civil Cases Nos. 50194 and 50488); xx
Appellants assail the decision appealed from, upon the ground that the Commission had no cause of action against them until the cases (Nos.
50194 and 50488) for a declaratory relief shall have been decided, and that, consequently, the lower court erred in dismissing Case No. 50194
instead of Case No. 51552.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE LOWER COURT WAS JUSTIFIED? YES.
HELD;
Case No. 50488 was dismissed by Branch XIII of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the order of dismissal became final and executory
upon the dismissal of the appeal of the Supreme Court, months before the rendition of the decision of Branch VII of the trial court, which is the
object of the present appeal .
As regards Case No. 50194, which was commenced on April 24, 1962, the contract involved therein (with reference to the M/S Don Salvador or
Magsaysay) was infringed by the Buyer when it failed to pay the first installment due the next day, April 25, 1962.
The lower court was, accordingly, justified in dismissing that case inasmuch as an action for declaratory relief may be entertained
only "before breach or violation" of the law or contract to which it refers. 3 The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under said law or contract, for their guidance in the enforcement thereof or
compliance therewith not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. 4 Accordingly, after such alleged breach of the law or
contract or once the aforementioned issue has arisen, an ordinary action is the proper remedy.
Thus, in Salmon v. Andal, this Court said:
... If there has been a violation, declaratory relief cannot be granted, for the reason that Sec. 2, Rule 66 relative to said remedy,
provides that 'A contract or statute may be construed before there has been a breach thereof.' After breach, the regular remedy
obtains.
What is more, Rule 64, Section 61 of the Rules of Court is clear and explicit about it. It provides:
... If before the final termination of case. a breach of violation of an instrument, or a statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance, should take place, the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary action and parties allowed to file such
pleadings as may be necessary or proper.
Then, too, the facts of record strongly suggest that Cases Nos. 50194 and 50488 for declaratory relief were commenced in anticipation of an
action for breach of contract, said cases having been filed precisely on the eve of the due date of the "first" installment, as to, M/S Don Salvador
or Magsaysay, and on the very due date of the first installment, as to M/S Don Amando or Estancia. The situation in the case at bar is thus
substantially identical to that obtaining in Teodoro v. Mirasol 8 in which the following language was used:
xx
It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action. They
provide that there is a pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit was of a later date is no bar
to the dismissal of the present action, ....
... plaintiff's action for declaratory relief is improper; this action is meant only for those cases where a contract is desired to be
construed prior to its breach because of an impending controversy that the parties thereto may be informed of the rights thereunder.
In the case at bar, ... there has already been a breach ... hence the action for a declaratory judgment is no longer proper.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no longer any need for the action, even if proper because the matter could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit that the
defendant had instituted in the municipal court. 9
DISPOSITION: The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants herein.

G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004

Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Case
The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the
candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or
spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x."
FACTS

On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid corespondents.

SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state;
and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or
requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

Bro. Eddie Villanueva, Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, and Bro. Eli Soriano, all
sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy.

The Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive
Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss.

The trial court proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state even tracing, to some
extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the "[e]ndorsement of
specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause."

However, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court. Hence, this Petition for Review.
The Issues

Whether or not the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy;

Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.
Requisites of Petitions for Declaratory Relief
(Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for declaratory relief)
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the
written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder. The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1)
there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest
in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
Justiciable Controversy
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or
merely anticipatory. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between
the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by
the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.
An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain "a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim x x x." Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.
Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below had
endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened endorsement "will enable [them] to
elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the government"[;]21 and "pos[ing] a clear
and present danger of serious erosion of the peoples faith in the electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders determine the
ultimate result of elections," which would then be violative of the separation clause.
Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy. The Petition
does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their socalled flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.
Cause of Action
A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter.
The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright dismissal. However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the
concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should
be impending, imminent or at least threatened.
A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation that the former had any legal right in its favor that it sought to protect.
We can only infer the interest, supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation that it "has thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered
voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of the constitutionality of the partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine
politics and in the process to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone x x x."
Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is
likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain. The Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act
or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the question raised.
The Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents.
In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be
invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have
provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.
Legal Standing
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished
from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show "not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but also that [they
have] sustained or [are] in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that [they] suffer
thereby in some indefinite way." They must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully
entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.
A taxpayers action may be properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the present case, there is no
allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers money is being illegally disbursed.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely
affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be
deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or
the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the
contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a
cause of action. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION/G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.:
NOTE:
THE REAL ISSUE IN THIS CASE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE. HOWEVER, FOR
PURPOSES OF OUR DISCUSSION, I WILL ONLY LAY DOWN THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN RELATION TO RULE 63 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT, SPECIFICALLY SECTION 1 OF THE RULE AND ITS REQUISITES.
FACTS:

On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III (Cipriano) married Lady Myros M. Villanueva (Lady) at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines.
They were blessed with a son and a daughter, KristofferSimbortriz and Lady Kimberly.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.

A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen, and that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. The trial court granted the same.

The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: IS THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO REMARRY CONSTITUTES A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
RULING:
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights
or duties, thereunder.
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship,
obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its
duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for
relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

EN BANC/G.R. No. L-5204/March 27, 1953/Ponente:LABRADOR, J

In re: The petition for declaratory relief of Hospicio Obiles and for cancellation of erroneous registration as alien. HOSPICIO OBILES, petitionerappellant, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
FACTS:

Petitioner Hospicio Obiles filed a petition for declaratory relief, alleging that he is a Filipino citizen by birth and parentage, residing in Bacacay,
Albay.

Further, he alleges that because "of erroneous belief and fear of criminal prosecution," Obiles registered himself with the municipal treasurer
of Bacacay as Chinese alien, but that notwithstanding said registration he never intended to give up his Filipino citizenship, and that he
continued to hold himself out as a Filipino citizen.

The Sol. Gen.opposed and alleged:

(1) that the petition contains no cause of action and that no actual controversy has arisen against anyone, and
(2) that if the Obiles desires to establish his Filipino citizenship, he should do so in another separate proceeding.

CFI Albay: sustained the above opposition, holding that there is no justiciable controversy.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief by the petitioner is the proper remedy for his desire to be declared as a Filipino citizen.
RULING: NO.
An action for declaratory relief under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION. 1. Construction. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for
a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.
The deed or written instrument, which petitioner claims and believes to have given rise to his cause of action, is his supposed registration as an alien filed
in the office of the municipal treasurer of Bacacay in the year 1941. This instrument is not a contract in which another party or person is involved. It is a
unilateral act of the petitioner himself not affecting nor binding anyone else but himself, not creating any right or obligation on the part of any other party
or on that of the state, and, therefore, no one has interest therein except himself. By such registration petitioner has not become a Chinese alien. By such
declaration alone no rights and obligations are created, no status fixed or determined. The registration, however, may be used as evidence against the
petitioner himself. There is no allegation in the petition, however, that by reason of such registration any official of the Government has taken steps, or is
intending to take steps or threatening to take steps, to hold the petitioner to any obligation, responsibility, or liability. As the petitioner himself candidly
admits in his complaint, he is only afraid lest this registration might involve the loss of his Filipino citizenship. This supposed fear in the mind of the
petitioner is not what the law considers as an actual controversy, or a justiciable controversy, which requires the intervention of the courts of justice in
order that the rights, obligations, or liabilities arising therefrom may be predetermined. In effect, petitioner's allegations of fact in his petition are entitled
to no more than an advisory opinion, because a ruling on the effect of the registration by petitioner involves no actual, genuine, live controversy affecting
a definite legal relation. (Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, pp. 29, 30.)
Besides, upon closer analysis, especially the prayer of the petition and the allegation to the effect that he is a Filipino citizen and is ready and willing to
submit evidence to sustain this allegation, what the petitioner desires is to be declared a Filipino citizen in spite of his registration as a Chinese citizen. As
contended by the Solicitor General, petitioner's remedy is clearly not by an action for declaratory relief.
For the reason, therefore, that petitioner's action for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy, because his desire is to be declared a Filipino citizen,
and because the facts alleged in his petition constitute no cause for a declaratory judgment, the judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is,
affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant.

RULE 63: Ollada vs. Central Bank

G.R. No. L-11357

May 31, 1962

FELIPE B. OLLADA, etc., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee.
DIZON, J.:
Facts:
Felipe B. Ollada is a certified public accountant, having passed the examination given by the Board of Accountancy, and is duly qualified to practice his
profession. On July 22, 1952, his name was placed in the rolls of certified public accountants authorized and accredited to practice accountancy in the
office of the Central Bank of the Philippines. In December, 1955, by reason of a requirement of the Import-Export Department of said bank that CPAs
submit to an accreditation under oath before they could certify financial statements of their clients applying for import dollar allocations with its office,
Ollada's previous accreditation was nullified.
Pursuant to the new requirement, the Import-Export Department of the Central Bank issued APPLICATION FOR ACCREDITATION OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS (CB-IED Form No. 5) and ACCREDITATION CARD FOR CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (CB-IED, Form No. 6) for CPAs to accomplish
under oath. Assailing said accreditation requirement on the ground that it was (a) an unlawful invasion of the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy, (b)
in excess of the powers of the Central Bank and (c) unconstitutional in that it unlawfully restrained the legitimate pursuit of one's trade, Ollada, for
himself and allegedly on behalf of numerous other CPAs, filed a petition for Declaratory Relief in the Court of First Instance of Manila to nullify said
accreditation requirement.
On April 16, 1956 the Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss the petition for Declaratory Relief for lack of cause of action. Its main contention was that the
Central Bank has the responsibility of administering the Monetary Banking System of the Republic and is authorized to prepare and issue, through its
Monetary Board, rules and regulations to make effective the discharge of such responsibility; that the accreditation requirement alleged in the petition
was issued in the exercise of such power and authority; that the purpose of such requirement is not to regulate the practice of accountancy in the
Philippines but only the manner in which certified public accountants should transact business with the Central Bank.
On May 3, 1956, petitioner Ollada applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the respondent Central Bank of the Philippines from enforcing
the accreditation requirement aforesaid until final adjudication of the case. In a memorandum submitted by said respondent opposing the issuance of the
writ, it manifested that it was willing to delete paragraph 13 from its CB-IED Form No. 5 (Application for accreditation of certified public accountants),
which required CPAs to answer the query whether they agreed, if accredited with the Import-Export Department, Central Bank of the Philippines, to
follow strictly the rules and regulations promulgated by the Philippine Institute of Accountants and, if not, to state their reasons therefor, and that it was
also willing to modify paragraph 14 of the same form
On May 22, 1956 the trial court required respondent to submit within ten days from notice, proof that it had deleted paragraph 13 and modified
paragraph 14 of its CB-IED Form No. 5, as manifested in its memorandum, otherwise the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioner would be
granted. Having complied with said order, the court, on June 27, 1956, denied the petition for preliminary injunction. On June 29, 1956, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration alleging that, despite the deletion of paragraph 13, it was still enforcing the rules and regulations of the Philippine Institute of
Accountants in its CB-IED Form No. which was still a part of the questioned accreditation requirement. All this notwithstanding, however, on July 5, 1956
petitioner, in the interests of its clients, filed his application for accreditation with the CB under protest.1wph1.t
On July 7, 1956, the court reconsidered its previous order and issued another granting the petition for the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of
a bond in the sum of P2,000.00 on the ground that CPAs applying for accreditation with respondent were still required to execute under oath CB-IED
Form No. 6 to be governed by the rules and regulations of the Philippine Institute of Accountants. In a motion for the reconsideration of this last order,
respondent stated that CB-IED Form No. 6 of its Import-Export Department had been modified by CB-ID Form No. 6 wherein the requirement that the
applicant should sign a statement under oath has been eliminated, and that, upon accreditation, a CPA would be governed by the rules and regulations of
the Central Bank and not by those of the Philippine Institute of Accountants
Consequently, on July 12, 1956, the court set aside its order of July 7, 1956 granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
Finally, on July 31, 1956, the lower court, resolving the motion to dismiss filed by respondent, dismissed the complaint.
Issue: WON a declaratory relief is proper.
Held: No.
The complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. In the present case such is
precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself, respondent had
already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury all these giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil
action or proceeding.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract, statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such action,
that there had been a breach which would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate
relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding.

RULE 63: ERLINDA REYES VS. ORTIZ

ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO,
Petitioners, vs.HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; SPOUSES BERNARD and FLORENCIA
PERL, represented by Attorney-in-Fact BENJAMIN MUCIO; HON. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding, Branch 124, Regional Trial
Court, Caloocan City and SEGUNDO BAUTISTA,
Respondents.
SPS. ALBERTO EMBORES and LOURDES EMBORES, SPS. ROBERTO AND EVELYN PALAD, DENNIS HENOSA and CORAZON LAURENTE,
Petitioners, vs. HON. RAYMUNDO G. VALLEGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; HON. ELEANOR R. KWONG,
Presiding Judge, Branch 51, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, Branch 49, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Caloocan City; VICTORIA C. SALIRE-ALBIS, represented by her attorney-in-fact MR. MENELIO C. SALIRE; MA. FE R. ROCO, ALFREDO
TAN, MANUELITO ESTRELLA; and HON. JUDGE ANTONIO FINEZA, Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 137794G.R. No. 149664August 11, 2010
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
The instant cases are consolidated Petitionsfor Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition. The parcels of land which are the subject matter of these
cases are part of the Tala Estate, situated between the boundaries of Caloocan City and Quezon City.
-(1st case) December 11, 1996Respondent Segundo Bautista, registered owner of a parcel of land, filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or
Ownership of Real Property (Recovery case) with the RTC of Caloocan against the occupants, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo.
December 27, 1996- A separate but related action was initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands before the
Quezon City RTC, Branch 85. The complaint was for the Annulment of Title/Reversion (Annulment/Reversion case) against Biyaya Corporation and the
Register of Deeds of the Cities of Pasig, Caloocan, and Quezon, the City of Manila, and the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority involving the
Tala Estate.
The (Annulment/Reversion case) sought to declare null and void the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Biyaya Corporation, and all
derivative titles emanating therefrom, and to revertthe land as part of the patrimonial property of the State, and awarded to the actual occupants. One of
the intervenors therein is Samahan ng Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay (SAMAKABA) of which petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo are
members.
- Quezon City RTC (in Annulment/Reversion case )issued a Preliminary Injunctionfreezing all ejectment cases involving the Tala Estate pending in the
MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City.
-Believing that the Injunction issued can be beneficial to them in the Recovery case, spouses Matienzo filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the
Recovery case but denied.
-(2nd case) June 25, 1997- spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl filed an ejectment complaint against Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan City MeTC.
-(3rd case) July 8, 1997- spouses Perl filed an ejectment action against Sergio Abejero with Caloocan City MeTC. The cases were consolidated.
- Erlinda Reyes moved for the suspension of the proceedings and/or for the dismissal of these cases citing the Injunction issued in the RTC of Quezon. The
motion was not entertained. Eventually, the court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate the contested property.
- Petitioners Rosemarie Matienzo and Erlinda Reyes, joined on March 25, 1999 in filing directly with the Supreme Court the instant petition denominated
as Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition, mainly assailing the denial of their respective motions for suspension.
-Petitioners asked that the proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the Recovery case be declared null and void for violating the Injunction order of the
Quezon City RTC. That the refusal to suspend the Ejectment cases is tantamount or amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.
Respondent Segundo Bautista contends that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy. He argues that the action for declaratory relief can only prosper if
the statute, deed, or contract has not been violated. Since the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC had already been violated before the filing of this
instant petition, resort to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court would not lie.
ISSUE: WON Declaratory Relief is a proper remedy
HELD: NO.
The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief namely, deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, a statute, executive order or regulation, or any government regulation. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed
excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius.
In a recent ruling of this Court, it was emphasized that a petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject
matterfor the simple reason that the Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or
clarified without need of resorting to the expedient prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].
The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have utilized from the denial of her motion to suspend proceedings in the Caloocan City
MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. On the other hand, petitioner Matienzo should have filed a special civil action on certiorari also under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals from the denial of her motion by the Caloocan City RTC.The necessity of filing the petition to the RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and
to the Court of Appeals in the case of Matienzo is dictated by the principle of the hierarchy of courts.
Bereft of merit too is petitioners argument that the Caloocan City MeTC cannot disregard the injunction order of the Quezon City RTC hearing the
Annulment/Reversion case. The established rule is that a pending civil action for ownership such as annulment of title shall not ipso facto suspend an
ejectment proceeding.The Court explained that the rationale for this is that in an ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an annulment case the
issue is ownership.In fact, an ejectment case can be tried apart from an annulment case.

G.R. No. 177056 September 18, 2009

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Petitioner,
vs.
AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS,
INC., Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land
Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime)
could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to National Building Code and
figuratively speaking, the Code has expropriated the land for parking. Also, Committee stated that the collection of parking fees would be against Article
II of RA 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) as to the States policy of protecting the interest of consumers. Moreover, Section 201 of the National
Building Code gives the responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Code, including the imposition of penalties for
administrative violations thereof to the Secretary of Public Works. This is not being strictly followed as the LGUs are tasked to discharge the regulatory
powers of DPWH instead of DPWH instead.
As such, Senate Committee recommended that: 1) Office of Solicitor General should institute the action to enjoin the collction of parking fees and enforce
the sanctions for violation of National Building Code; 2) DTI pursuant to RA 7394 should enforce the provisions of Code relative to parking; and 3)
Congress should amend and update the National Building Code to prohibit the collection of parking fees and its waiver of liability.
Respondent SM Prime assailed the recommendation of the Committee and filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of
Court against DPWH and local building officials, contending that: 1) Rule XIX of Implementing Rules and Regulations of National Building Code is
unconstitutional and void; 2) respondent has the legal right to lease parking spaces; and 3) National Building Code IRR is ineffective as it was not
published for 3 consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation as mandated by Section 211 of PD 1096.
OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) to the
RTC against respondents, prohibiting them from collecting parking fees and contending that their practice of charging parking fees is violative of National
Building Code.
The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity to institute the proceeding it being a controversy of public welfare; 2) a petition for declaratory relief is proper
since all the requisites are present; 3) the Building Code with its IRR does not necessarily impose that parking spaces shall be free of charge and
providing parking spaces for free can be considered as unlawful taking of property right without just compensation; and 4) there was no sufficient
evidence to justify any award for damages. They deemed that the respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces free of charge.
OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying that RTC erred in holding that the National Building Code did not intend the parking spaces to be free of charge.
On the otherhand, respondent SM filed a separate appeal to the CA, contending that: 1) RTC erred in failing to declare Rule XIX of IRR as unconstitutional;
2) RTC erred in failing to declare IRR ineffective for not having been published as required by law; 3) RTC erred in dismissing the OSGs petition for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and 4) RTC erred in failing to declare that OSG has no legal standing as it is not a real party-in-interest.
CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and respondents on the following grounds: 1) OSG did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies and that an
administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief where the question in dispute is purely a legal one and nothing of an administrative
nature is to be or can be done; 2) the validity of National Building Code IRR cannot be proceeded as it was not discussed in RTC and the controversy could
be settled on other grounds without touching the issue of validity since the courts should refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of a law; and 3)
Section 803 of National Building Code and Rule XIX of IRR are clear that they are only intended to control the occupancy of areas and structures, and in
the absence of provision of law, respondents could not be obliged to provide parking spaces free of charge.
As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the instant Petition for Review.
Issues:
1. Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a valid exercise of the police power of State.
Held:
No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid exercise of the police power of State.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries
with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees. Firstly, the fees within the
power of regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental
competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific
measures that govern the relations not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and the political society. True, if the regulatory
agencies have the power to impose regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the
present case does not involve the imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon respondents; but the collection by
respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials do have regulatory powers over the collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such
collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be
accomplished.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the public
for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond the
bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to
merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori,
the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of
a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting
the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers,
namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation
to the owner.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title
and possession. It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title
remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a
compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation,
unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably
restricts the right to use business property for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may recover therefor.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of
parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not only
requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latters properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to
said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right
to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses
for the maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in
the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition
amounts to a taking of respondents property without payment of just compensation.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 25 January 2007 and Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in
Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

G.R. No. 193808 : June 26, 2012

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) ET AL., Respondents.
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As
stated in its constitution and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the countrys public service.
Under the leadership of the National Council, its highest policymaking and governing body, the party participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections.
On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in
the Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010 Elections.
The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another
Manifestation6 was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and secretary-general,
respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due course to CIBACs Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination
which of the two factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the
official representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations.
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the
COMELEC Law Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate
of Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin and Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as acting
secretary-general of CIBAC.
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The
Records And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as
acting secretary-general, when she was not even
a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and
that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its behalf.
In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the
records, and declared respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the
COMELEC en banc affirmed the Divisions findings.
Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC partylist.
HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for being filed outside the requisite period. The review by this Court of judgments and
final orders of the COMELEC is governed specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which states:
REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the COA
Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the
aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the immediately succeeding provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for the
allowable period within which to file petitions for certiorari from judgments of both the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Thus, while Rule 64
refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot be equated, as they provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65
provides for a period of 60 days from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while Section 3 expressly provides for only 30 days,
viz:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the
Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining
period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the
COMELEC en banc issued the second assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on 1 September
2010.16 Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three days it took petitioners to file the Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining
period of 27 days or until 28 September 2010 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari with this Court.
However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly outside the required period.

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN
VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, Respondents.
DOCTRINE: Neypes rule does not apply to Rule 64.
FACTS:

Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance
coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers andtanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and
subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit.4 The latter office disallowed the payment for
lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.

Petitionerfiled its petition for money claim in the COA.

On November 15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition. The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14,
2012, and filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013.

COA denied the motion,the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014.

Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorariwas dismissed through the resolution
promulgated on August 19, 2014 for the late filing of the petition.

Petitioner seeks reconsideration for the August 19, 2014 resolution submitting that it filed the petition for certiorari within the reglementary
period following the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition was filed within the reglementary period.

HELD:NO. The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial.
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima
facieshowing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final
order.17 In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors
of judgment.18 Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for
review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.19 In the
latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the
motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event,
reckoned from the notice of denial.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December
14, 2012.21 Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition.
Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the
petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.

G.R. No. 162575

December 15, 2010
BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG, Petitioner,
vs.
SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., Respondent.
PONENTE: JUSTICE PERALTA
FACTS:
Petitioner and Respondent herein entered into a distributorship agreement. Under the Agreements, respondent, as seller, will sell, deliver or
procure to be delivered petroleum products, and petitioner, as distributor, will purchase, receive and pay for its purchases from respondent. The
Distributorship Agreement provides that respondent may require petitioner to put up securities, real or personal, or to furnish respondent a
performance bond issued by a bonding company chosen by the latter to secure and answer for petitioner's outstanding account, and or faithful
performance of her obligations as contained or arising out of the Agreement. Thus, petitioner applied for and was granted a credit line by the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), International Exchange Bank (IEBank), and Security Bank Corporation (SBC). Petitioner also applied with the Asia United
Bank (AUB) an irrevocable domestic standby letter of credit in favor of respondent.
Petitioner allegedly failed to pay her obligations to respondent despite demand, thus, respondent tried to withdraw from these bank undertakings.
Petitioner then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City separate petitions 3 against the banks for declaration of nullity of the several bank
undertakings and domestic letter of credit which they issued with the application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction.
RTC granted TRO.
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against respondent Judge
Pizarro and petitioner.
CA granted respondents petition, thus the order of the RTC was set aside and the TRO was lifted.
Petitioner filed the instant petition before the SC faulting the CA that it committed an error in granting respondents petition despite the fact that
RESPONDENT FAILED TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION BEFORE THE
CA and that RESPONDENT FAILED TO IMPLEAD THE BANKS which is according to petitioner, are indispensable parties.
ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not CA erred in granting respondents petition despite the latters failure to file a
before the trial court.
2.) Whether or not the banks are indispensable parties in the instant case.

motion for reconsideration

HELD:
1.) NO.
Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition
for certiorari.18 Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case.19 The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a)where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Respondent had filed its position paper in the RTC stating the reasons why the injunction prayed for by petitioner should not be granted.
However, the RTC granted the injunction. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and presented the same arguments which were
already passed upon by the RTC. The RTC already had the opportunity to consider and rule on the question of the propriety or impropriety of
the issuance of the injunction. We found no reversible error committed by the CA for relaxing the rule since respondent's case falls within the
exceptions.
2.) NO
An indispensable partyis a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in
his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an
interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose
absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an
indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other
parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an
indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in
the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.
When the RTC issued its Order dated December 17, 2002 granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the banks could have challenged the
same if they believe that they were aggrieved by such issuance. However, they did not, and such actuations were in consonance with their earlier position
that they would submit to the sound judgment of the RTC.
When the CA rendered its assailed Decision nullifying the injunction issued by the RTC, and copies of the decision were furnished these banks, not one of
these banks ever filed any pleading to assail their non-inclusion in the certiorari proceedings.
Indeed, the banks have no interest in the issuance of the injunction, but only the petitioner. The banks' interests as defendants in the petition
for declaration of nullity of their bank undertakings filed against them by petitioner in the RTC are separable from the interests of petitioner
for the issuance of the injunctive relief.

Ruben Magtoto and Artemia Magtoto vs

CA and Leonila dela Cruz
GR 175792 (Nov. 21, 2012)
Facts:
Private respondent sold 3 parcels of land to petitioner spouses for Php 11,952, 750.00, for which petitioner Ruben issued postdated checks.
Meanwhile, most of the checks that Ruben issued were dishonored, prompting demands from private respondent. On June 6, 2003, respondent spouses
were served with summons requiring them to file an Answer within 15 days from notice. However, petitioner spouses thrice moved for extensions of
time within which to file the same. A final extension was granted by the RTC on August 4, 2012. Two days after, petitioner spouses filed instead a Motion
to Dismiss.
On January 23, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and to Render Judgment Based on the Complaint. On
June 25, 2004, or almost 3 months after they were declared in default, petitioner spouses, through their new counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Lift
Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer, which was denied by the RTC.
On November 22, 2004, the RTC issued its decision finding that petitioner spouses failed to comply with their obligation for the purchase of the
3 parcels of land and ordering them to pay the balance thereof. Petitioner spouses timely filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA which was dismissed for
lack of merit. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners availed of the correct remedy.
Held:
No. The petition lacks merit. Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy.
Petitioners resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Petitioners remedy from the adverse
decision of the CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This petition should have been dismissed outright for being a wrong mode
of appeal. Even if the petition is to be treated as filed under Rule 45, the same must still be denied for late filing. Records show that petitioners received a
copy of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on October 30, 2006. They thereafter had 15 days or until November 14, 2006
within which to file their Petition for Review on Certiorari. However, they filed their petition for Certiorari on December 29, 2006, after the period to file
a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 had expired. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was resorted to as a substitute for a lost
appeal which is not allowed.

San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. vs.

Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation and Dominic G. Aquino
GR 168088 (April 3, 2007)

Facts:
Respondent Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation (PODC) secured 2 loans from petitioner amounting to Php 750,000.00 each
evidenced by separate promissory notes and secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in San Fernando, Pampanga which respondent PODC
owns. Meanwhile, PODC president Eliza M. Garbes and her husband secured a Php 950,000.00 loan from petitioner secured by a chattel mortgage over
their personal property.
Upon respondent PODCs failure to pay its loan, petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. The Ex-Officio
Sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale on May 9, 2001, which stated that the period for redemption of the property shall expire 1 year after registration in
the Register of Deeds. Petitioner did not file a writ of possession during the redemption period.
On May 11, 2002, petitioner executed a notarized deed of assignment in favor of respondent Dominic G. Aquino over its right to redeem the
property. Respondent Aquino redeemed the property for Php1,588,094.00 but petitioner rejected the offer and demanded the payment of Php
16,805,414.00 (including the loan of Garbes). Respondent Aquino rejected petitioners demand. In a letter dated June 4, 2002, the Ex-Officio Sheriff
informed petitioner that subject property had been redeemed by respondent Aquino.
On June 10, 2002, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation over the subject property, which respondent Aquino opposed in a letter
dated June 14, 2002 and requesting the Register of Deeds not to register the petitioners Affidavit of Consolidation.
On October 15, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Possession in the RTC of Pampanga which PODC opposed claiming that it is
respondent Aquino who is entitled to a Writ of Possession. Said petition was granted in favor of the petitioner on December 20, 2002. Respondents filed
a joint motion to quash the writ of possession with the CA, which the latter granted. Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner availed of the correct remedy.

Held:
Yes. The petition is meritorious.
The December 20, 2002 order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession is final. The remedy of respondents was to appeal to the
CA by filing their notice of appeal within the period therefor. Indeed, when the RTC denied the motion of respondents to quash the writ, respondents
appealed to the CA under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
An order granting a writ of possession under Act No. 3135 as amended is final, hence appealable. Even if the trial court erred in granting a
petition for a writ of possession, such an error is merely an error of judgment correctible by ordinary appeal and not by a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. Certiorari will issue
only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of judgment. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed
in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved party raised factual
and legal issues or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of law are involved.
A cert writ maybe issued if the court
or quasi-judicial body issues an order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The threshold issue between petitioner and respondents in the RTC was the correct amount of redemption money. The ministerial duty of the
RTC to issue a writ of possession does not become discretionary simply because the Register of Deeds had elevated to the LRA the question of who should
be given the Torrens title of the subject property. The issue of the amount of redemption is a matter that should be resolved by the courts. The LRA was
vested with jurisdiction to resolve only the registrability of the Affidavit of Consolidation and Certificate of Redemption. Hence, the remedy availed of is
proper.

RULE 65
GR No. 165851 February 2, 2011
Catindig vs. vda de Meneses
Roxasvs CA and vda de Meneses
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
The property subject of this controversy pertains to a parcel of land situated in Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent Aurora Irene C. Vda.deMeneses is
the surviving spouse of the registered owner, RosendoMeneses, in her capacity as administratrix of her husband's estate, filed a Complaint for Recovery
of Possession, Sum of Money and Damages against petitioners Manuel Catindig and SilvinoRoxas, Sr. before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
to recover possession over the Masusuwi Fishpond.
Respondent alleged that petitioner Catindig, the first cousin of her husband, deprived her of the possession over the Masusuwi Fishpond,
through fraud, undue influence and intimidation. Since then, petitioner Catindig unlawfully leased the property to petitioner Roxas. Respondent verbally
demanded that petitioners vacate the Masusuwi Fishpond, but all were futile.
In his Answer, petitioner Catindig maintained that he bought the Masusuwi Fishpond from respondent and her children in January 1978, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Petitioner Roxas, on the other hand, asserted in his own Answer that respondent has no cause of action against him, because Catindig is the lawful owner
of the Masusuwi Fishpond, to whom he had paid his rentals in advance until the year 2001.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent. The trial court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between respondent and petitioner
Catindig was simulated and fictitious
The CA dismissed both the petitioners' appeals and affirmed the RTC..
Petitioner SilvinoRoxas, Sr. filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue:

W/N petition for certiorari under rule 65 is the proper remedy of petitioner Roxas in assailing the decision and resolution of the CA?

Held:
Petitioner Roxas assailed the Decision and the Resolution of the CA via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy should
have been the filing of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
While petitioner Roxas claims that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that the assailed findings of the CA, that
Roxas is jointly and severally liable with petitioner Catindig and in not considering him as a lessee in good faith of the subject property, amount to
nothing more than errors of judgment, correctible by appeal. When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of
the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of
said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a
special civil action for certiorari. Where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of
the court to render said decision, the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action for certiorari will not be entertained remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
any case,regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the
specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that to be
taken under Rule 45.One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his
petition may be dismissed outright.

GR No. 154462 January 19, 2011

Spouses Leynes vs. Former Tenth Division Of The Court Of Appeals, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Branch 1, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, AndspousesGualberto& Rene Cabahug-Superales
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts:
This case originated from a Complaint for forcible entry, damages, and attorneys fees filed by respondents spouses Gualberto and Rene
CabahugSuperales (spouses Superales) against the spouses Leynes before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Branch 1 of Bansalan-Magsaysay,
Davao del Sur.
That the [spouses Superales] were the actual occupants and possessors, being lawful owners of that certain parcel of a residential lot within
the NebradaSubd., Bansalan, Davao del Sur,
That sometime in February 2000, the [spouses Leynes] through force, stealth and strategy encroached upon and occupied a portion of the [spouses
Superales] titled property
Summons together with a copy of the aforementioned Complaint was served on the spouses Leynes on May 10, 2000, giving them ten (10)
days from receipt within which to file their answer pursuant to Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. The 10-day period for the filing of the
spouses Leynes answer prescribed on May 20, 2000, a Saturday.
The spouses Superales subsequently filed an Ex Parte Motion for in which they prayed that since the spouses Leynes failed to file their answer
to the Complaint within the prescribed period, then judgment could now be rendered based on the evidence and allegations contained in the Complaint.
MCTC rendered its Judgment denying the spouses Leynes Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer and resolving Civil Case entirely in the spouses
Superalesfavor.
Aggrieved, the spouses Leynes appealed the foregoing MCTC Judgment to the Regional Trial Court
The spouses Leynes filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration in which they sought the recall of the Decision dated July 9, 2001 and the
remand of the case to the MCTC for trial on the merits. However, the RTC, refused to reconsider its earlier decision.
On October 11, 2001, the spouses Superales filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution pursuant to Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of
Courtwhich provides for the immediate execution of the RTC judgment against the defendant notwithstanding further appeal of the same before the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.Expectedly, the spouses Leynes opposed the spouses Superales Motion for Execution.
The spouses Leynes then filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
with the Court of Appeals on November 17, 2001. In its Resolution dated December 20, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the spouses Leynes petition
outright for being the wrong remedy
On January 28, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the spouses Superales Motion for Execution.
On February 11, 2002, the spouses Leynes filed with the RTC a Manifestation with motion to hold in abeyance the enforcement of the writ of
execution, considering their pending Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated December 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals.
On May 17, 2002, the spouses Leynes received a copy of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated May 7, 2002 denying their Motion for
Reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK. Thereafter, on July 17, 2002, the spouses Leynes filed the instant Petition
for Certiorari charging the Court of Appeals, as well as the RTC and the MCTC, with grave abuse of discretion
Issue: W/N the proper remedy of the spouses Leynesis to file Petition for Certiorari under rule 65?
Held: Certiorari Not the Proper Remedyif Appeal Is Available
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including
petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for
an appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites
of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.We reiterate the
well-settled rule that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary
course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the
right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive. The special
civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which the petitioner already lost.
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods
Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the
province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy.

As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court
uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a
continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the
parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial
agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are appealable. Since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the
judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said
notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision,
or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also
within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition
for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.
The RTC decided Civil Case No. XXI-228 (00) in its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the RTC Decision dated July 9, 2001, which affirmed the MCTC
Judgment of May 29, 2000 against the spouses Leynes, and Resolution inadvertently also dated July 9, 2001, which denied the spouses Leynes Motion for
Reconsideration, should have been appealed to the Court of Appeals by means of a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.he spouses
Leynes, however, went before the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
The spouses Leynes, however, went before the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

RULE 65 (#6)
CHUA VS CA [G.R. No. 121438. October 23, 2000]
Facts:
On January 20, 1988, the probate court again issued an order allowing the re-sale of said lot, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the P200,000.00
already paid by the Enriquez spouses.On April 15, 1991, a Deed of Absolute Sale thereof was executed in favor of Sofia Sanchez, herein private
respondent, for one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) payable with a down payment of P500,000.00 and the balance to be paid after the lot was cleared of
squatters.
On July 16, 1991, after more than two months from the date of approval of the sale, Intervenor Sagrario Morelos, filed a motion for reconsideration
opposing the sale alleging that the sale was prejudicial to the minor heirs of Fernando. He claimed that the lot could be sold for P1.5 million pesos. Judge
Abarquez held a conference in chambers attended by Aida and her counsel Atty. Recto de Dios, Atty. Rodolfo M. Morelos, counsel of Sagrario Morelos, and
Atty. Federico Cabilao, another intervenor who represented undisclosed clients interested to purchase the land.During the conference, Atty. Cabilao
revealed that he offered P2 million pesos for the lot with the seller undertaking the eviction of the present occupants, or P1.5 million with the buyer
shouldering the expenses to clear the lot of its present occupants. Aida objected to Atty. Cabilaos statement. She explained that the latters offer was made
only after the sale to Sanchez was already approved by the court.
On August 6, 1991 Atty. Cabilao, on instructions of Judge Abarquez, filed his Proposal to Purchase the Property. In her comment and opposition to the
proposal of Atty. Cabilao, Aida Morada said that the courts order approving the sale to Sofia Sanchez had already become final and executory, and that she
had bought the land from the administratrix in good faith and for value. She added that she should not suffer whatever missteps were committed by the
administratrix.
On November 15, 1991, Judge Abarquez issued an order revoking his approval of the sale and declared void and without effect the deed of absolute sale
he had earlier approved on the basis that the Administratrix and Sanchez are both guilty of misrepresentation. On her part, the Administratrix
deliberately concealed from the Court the fact that Sanchez had extended to her a loan of P300,000.00 before the execution of the Deed of Sale and that
the said amount was already deducted by Sanchez from the down payment of P500,000.00, where the procedure jointly resorted to by the Administratrix
and by Sanchez was tantamount to a foreclosure of their loose mortgage agreement, a procedure that is not allowed to take place in a probate court.
Almost immediately after his order, Judge Abarquez also approved the proposal of Atty. Cabilao to purchase the property for P1.5 million.
On January 29, 1992, Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration and made a counter-offer of P1.6 million, a hundred thousand pesos more than the
amount offered by Atty. Cabilao. The motion was denied in an order dated February 25, 1992. The court said that the Order approving the sale to Atty.
Cabilao had become final and executory and that the counter offer was not a compelling reason for the court to vacate its order. As it turned out, the
property was bought by Felix Uy Chua, Roberto Iping Chua and Richard Uy Chua, the clients of Atty. Cabilao who are now petitioners before this Court.
Sanchez filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent Judges Abarquez and Alio-Hormachelos abused their discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they issued the questioned orders dated November 15, 1991, January 13, 1992 and February 25, 1992.
The appellate court granted the petition in favor of private respondent Sanchez and the Deed of Absolute Sale in her favor was affirmed and reinstated.
Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
WON the proper remedy for respondent was to appeal under Rule 45.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. The Court held that the proper remedy was to appeal under Rule 65. Petitioners allege that the proper remedy for
respondent was to appeal under Rule 45 under which private respondent was already time-barred and the Court of Appeals should not have taken
cognizance of the petition. Petitioners misread the applicable law, Rules and precedents.
A special civil action for certiorarichallenging the RTC with grave abuse of discretion may be instituted either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court. Both have original concurrent jurisdiction. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.nWhile ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions.
Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the
writs issued are null and void; (d) or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.As early as Crisostomo vs.
Endencia,we held:
The remedy by certiorari may be successfully invoked both in cases wherein an appeal does not lie and in those wherein the right to appeal having been
lost with or without the appellants negligence, the court has no jurisdiction to issue the order or decision which is the subject matter of the remedy.
The questioned orders of the probate court nullifying the sale to Sanchez after it approved the sale and after its order of approval had become final and
executory amount to oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Further orders stemming
therefrom are also null and without effect.

G.R. No. 85466 October 16, 1992

HUALAM CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. and TAN BEE GIOK, petitioners, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and STATE INVESTMENT
HOUSE, INC., respondents.
Facts:
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioners assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 5 August 1988 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 13060 reversing the 7 August 1987 Decision of Branch 49 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 87-39946 and reinstating the 27 October 1986 Decision of Brach 27 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Manila in an ejectment case, Civil Case NO. 11274. The decision of the RTC declared as null and void the orders of the MTC granting the
motion for execution of judgment for failure to file a supersedeas bond and directing the ejectment of the petitioners, and set aside the sheriff's execution
sale.
Private respondent is the owner of State Centre Building located at 333 Juan Luna Street, Binondo, Manila; the building is divided into several office
condominium units offered for sale or lease to the general public.
Pursuant to a Contract to Sell executed on 22 September 1983 between the private respondent as Vendor, and petitioner Hualam Construction and
Development Corporation as Vendee, the latter occupied unit No. 1505 of said State Centre Building.
For petitioners' failure and refusal to pay, despite repeated demands, the accumulated downpayment, installments, utility charges and other assessments
mentioned in the Contract to Sell such as those for airconditioning service, electrical consumption, rentals on telephone lines and use of the parking lot,
together with the association dues, the proportionate share in real estate taxes and other charges private respondent filed on 8 July 1985 a complaint
for ejectment against the petitioners with the MTC of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 111274 and was raffled off to Branch 27 of said
court.
On 25 July 1985, petitioners filed their Answer with Special Defenses. They subsequently filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the court.
Thereupon the court calendared the case for pre-trial conference on 7 August 1986. This setting was postponed to 11 September 1986; the parties were
given due notice thereof.
On 11 September 1986, however, petitioners and their counsel failed to appear. Upon motion of the private respondent, the MTC declared the petitioners
as in default and allowed the private respondent to present its evidence ex-parte.
On 27 October 1986, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent.
On 19 January 1987, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal before the MTC.
Thereafter, private petitioner filed on 9 January 1987 a Motion for Immediate Execution of the decision based on Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
On 27 January 1987, the MTC issued an order granting the private petitioner's Motion for Immediate Execution.
On 29 January 1987, respondents, as defendants therein, filed a motion to reconsider the said order, alleging, inter alia, that (1) it is not necessary for
them to post a supersedeas bond under Section 8 of Rule 70 because the case does not involve unpaid rents, but unpaid downpayment, installments and
other charges, and that the perfection of their appeal automatically stays the execution of judgment; (2) the complaint, although captioned as on "For
Ejectment", is in reality one for a sum of money as alleged therein and as found by the said court; (3) the case being for a sum of money which exceeds
P20,000.00, said court has no jurisdiction to try the same; and (4) no writ of execution having yet been issued, justice demands that the issuance thereof
be held in abeyance until after the outcome of such motion and the pending appeal shall have become known. They then prayed that the order of
execution be set aside and the appeal be given due course. Private respondent filed an opposition thereto.
On 9 March 1987, the MTC denied the motion and directed the issuance of a writ of execution; the writ of execution was issued on 11 March 1987.
On 16 March 1987, the pursuant to the writ of execution, Deputy Sheriff Justiniano dela Cruz of Branch 27 of the MTC restored the possession of said Unit
No. 1505 to the private respondent and simultaneously levied upon the personal properties of the petitioners found in the premises to satisfy the money
judgment decreed in the decision. Accordingly, he issued a Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution of Personal Properties which set the public auction sale
for 26 March 1987 at 10: A.M.
On 23 March 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari with injunction against the Hon. Jose R. Bueno, presiding Judge of
Branch 27 of the MTC of Manila, the Sheriff and the private respondent. The same was docketed as Civil Case No. 87-39946 and was raffled off to Branch
49. The petitioners sought the issuance of an order enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No.
111274. For such purpose, they asked that a preliminary injunction be issued and, after hearing, for judgment to be rendered declaring such injunction
permanent and ordering the respondents to restore to the petitioners the possession of the properties levied upon as well as of the premises in question.
At 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 26 March 1987, Sheriff de la Cruz, Jr. proceeded with the public auction sale of the levied properties. Private
respondent was the sole bidder with a bid of P30,145.00; a Certificate of Sale was therefore issued to it on that date. On the same day, however, the RTC
issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents in said Civil Case No. 87-339946 from enforcing the Writ of Execution earlier issued by the MTC
together with the Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution of Personal Properties. however, this order, to which a copy of the petition for certiorari was
attached, was received by the Sheriff only at 1:35 o'clock in the afternoon; the private respondent itself received notice thereof ten (10) minutes later.
Clearly then, notice was received by both after the termination of the public auction sale.
On 15 April 1987, private respondent filed its Answer in Civil Case No. 87-39846.
On 27 August 1987, the RTC rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 87-39946.
In finding for the petitioners, the RTC ruled that since the MTC did not, in its decision, fix the rentals due up to the rendition of the judgment subject of the
petition, it was necessary for the petitioners to file a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of judgment. The purpose of a supersedeas bond under

Section 8 of Rule 70 is to assure the plaintiff that the rents, damages and costs accruing "down to the time of the judgment appealed from" will be paid in
case said plaintiff eventually prevails. Hence, the amount of the bond will depend upon the amount of rental or damages fixed in the decision. The
decision of the MTC fixed neither the rentals nor the damages. The adjudged amount of P161,478.61 constitutes the totality of the unpaid installments on
the downpayment of the purchase price of the condominium unit, as well as the following charges: parking fees, electric bills, real estate taxes, telephone
charges, association dues and charges for the use of the airconditioning unit. It does not, however, include back rentals or the reasonable value for the use
of the condominium unit. Moreover, it rejected the claim of private respondent that the award could fall under the concept of damages provided for in
Section 8 of the aforesaid Rule 70 because the damages contemplated for the use and occupation of the premises, generally measured by the fair rental
value of the property, and does not include other kinds of damages such as unpaid downpayments, association charges, costs of electricity and
airconditioning, real estate taxes, parking dues and the like.
Its motion to reconsider said decision having been denied in the Order of 7 October 1987, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, which was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 13060, on 2 November 1987.
ISSUE:
whether or not it was necessary for the petitioners to file a supersedeas bond in order to stay the execution of the adverse judgment of the MTC.
HELD:
Accordingly, the respondent Court erred in holding that the supersedeas bond should fully cover the adjudged amount of P161,478.61. Nevertheless, the
filing of a supersedeas bond to cover that portion representing the unpaid downpayments and installments was necessary to stay the execution of
judgment; this a mandatory requirement. In short, the adjudged amount is divisible. So much thereof that would represent the unpaid downpayment and
installments already due as of the rendition of the decision should be covered by the supersedeas bond. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the
execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a matter of right andmandatory.
The duty to order the immediate execution is ministerial and imperative; it cannot be avoided. The only way to stay execution is by perfecting an appeal
from the decision and filing a supersedeas bond, depositing from time to time with the Regional Trial Court, during the pendency of such appeal, the
amounts of rent or the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the property as fixed by the court of origin. The reason for this is to prevent further
damages to the plaintiff caused by the loss of his possession of the property. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, as (a) where delay in the deposit
is due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, or (b) where supervening events occurring subsequent to the judgment bring about a material
change in the situation of the parties which makes execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not
justified by the prevailing circumstances. The first exception also applies to the filing of the supersedeas bond. These exceptions are not invoked in this
case.
Thus, the MTC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for immediate execution because no supersedeas
bond for that portion of the adjudged amount which represents the unpaid downpayment and installments was filed by the petitioners. On the
contrary, it was the court's ministerial duty to grant the same. The respondent Court then correctly reversed the decision of the RTC which nullified the
said MTC order, together with the subsequent related orders, and set aside the sheriff's execution sale.
We are, however, unable to agree with the opinion and conclusion of the respondent Court that the proper remedy to assail the orders of the MTC is an
ordinary appeal and not a petition for certiorari. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court could be availed of by the petitioners. They had filed a notice of appeal. The MTC took no action thereon either by denying or giving due
course to the same. In the meantime, a motion for execution under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court was filed and granted by the MTC; thus,
petitioners' ouster from the premises was imminent. If the petitioners' theory that a supersedeas bond was not necessary were correct, then
certainly the MTC, in granting the motion, would have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The appeal earlier interposed cannot then be said to constitute an adequate remedy to prevent heir ouster from the premises. They cannot
be confined or restricted to the sole remedy of an appeal and, as suggested by the respondent Court, simply wait for the judgment thereon by the RTC.
Under Section 5 of Rule 39, the said court may issue such orders of restitution as equity and justice may warrant in the event of a partial or total reversal
of the appealed decision. Under such circumstances, the appellate process would be too slow and the wait too long; it is also evident that such mode of
review would be inadequate and insufficient. It is settled that although the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is
available it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve a party from the
injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual.
Prescinding, therefore, from the foregoing discussions, it is clear that the dispositive portion of the challenged decision of the respondent Court is correct,
except insofar as that portion reinstating the decision of the MTC is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of 5 August 1988 is AFFIRMED subject to the
modification above indicated.
Costs against petitioners.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al.

CARPIO MORALES,J.:
FACTS:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as
respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as
Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security
Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except
that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar
Calderon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should prosper
HELD: No. Petitions Dismissed
REMEDIAL LAW- certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Rule 65 #10
G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA),Petitioner,
Respondent.

versus -THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,

PEREZ, J.:
Facts
-

This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA)
seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended by DAR
AO No. 05-07,[1] and DAR Memorandum No. 88,[2] for having been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.

Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
involved in land and housing development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and services in the various related
fields of engineering, architecture, community planning and development financing. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is the
duly appointive head of the DAR whose administrative issuances are the subject of this petition.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural
Uses. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled
agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses.
Subsequently, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99,[4] entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses, amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion.
February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled 2002 Comprehensive
Rules on Land Use Conversion, which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The
aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.
Thereafter, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain provisions [8] of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly
addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued
Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.
Issue: WON the PETITION for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under
Rule 65 filed by herein respondents is proper.
Held: This petition must be dismissed.
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum.[15] In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,[16] citing People v. Cuaresma,[17] this Court made the following pronouncements:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and
with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.[18]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable
and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.[19]
This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of
the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and important reasons to justify direct recourse
to this Court and why this Court should give due course to this petition in the first instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set forth in Heirs of
Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor.[27] The present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition.
Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a Petition
for Declaratory Relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. [28] Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphasis supplied.)

With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if
only questions of law are involved.
Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, this Petition is still dismissible.
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[30]
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or
officer, is not authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general
power in respect of it are wanting.[31] Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes,
considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority. [32] Grave abuse of discretion implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [33]
In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the above-mentioned requisites for the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform in issuing the assailed DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, as well as Memorandum No. 88 did so in
accordance with his mandate to implement the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the process, he neither acted in any judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. A Petition for Certiorari is a special civil
action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure is explicit on this matter, viz.:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment must be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer.
A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the
other hand, is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.[34]
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal,
board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.[35]
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The issuance and enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were
done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing the aforesaid
administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No.
01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and
administrative functions.
The adequate and proper remedy for the petitioner therefore is to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which this Court has only appellate and
not original jurisdiction. It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal because
certiorari is confined only to the determination of the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot
simply allege grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative
issuances unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.[36]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORPORATION, FERRY CASINOS LIMITED and PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. JENNIFER ANNE B. ACUA, HAYDEE ANNE B. ACUA, MARITES T. CLARION, MARISSA C. ENRIQUEZ, GRACIELA M. TORRALBA and
MARY PAMELA A. SANTIAGO, respondents. ( G.R. No. 140189 , February 28, 2005)
FACTS:
Petitioner Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation (GSMSC) is a manning agency organized and existing under Philippine laws. It is the local agent
of petitioner Ferry Casinos Limited. Petitioner Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation is the surety company of petitioner GSMSC.
On October 7, 1993, respondents Jennifer Anne B. Acua, Haydee Anne B. Acua, Marites T. Clarion, Marissa C. Enriquez, Graciela M. Torralba, and Mary
Pamela A. Santiago filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Respondents claim that: between the months of March and April 1993, they were deployed by petitioner GSMSC to work as croupiers (card dealers) for
petitioner Ferry Casinos Limited under a six-month contract. Sometime in July 1993, Sue Smits, the Casino Manager, informed them that their services
were no longer needed.Considering that their plane tickets were already ready and they were subjected to harassment, they had no alternative but to
sign documents on July 11 and 12, 1993 specifying that they were the ones who terminated their employment and they were repatriated on July 25, 1993.
Petitioners denied the allegations of respondents and averred that respondents voluntarily resigned from employment.
On October 5, 1995, the POEA decided the case against petitioners.
Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which, on January 15, 1997, set aside the decision of the POEA and dismissed the complaint for illegal
dismissal.Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in a Resolution dated April 30, 1997.
On July 18, 1997, respondents filed a petition for certiorari.
On October 3, 1997, petitioners, in their Comment, prayed for outright dismissal of the petition for:
(a) failure of respondents to submit a verified statement of the material dates to show that the petition was filed on time; and
(b) filing a certification on non-forum shopping signed only by their counsel.
On January 27, 1998, the Solicitor General, in lieu of Comment, manifested that he is unable to sustain the position of the NLRC because the allegation that
respondents voluntarily resigned was not substantially established and respondents non-compliance with the formal requirements of the petition should
be waived since the petition is meritorious.
The NLRC, in compliance with our Resolution dated March 16, 1998, filed its own Comment praying for the dismissal of the petition and the affirmance of
its decision with finality.
On July 21, 1999, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied it in a Resolution dated September 22, 1999.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents should have been denied outright for non-compliance with the requirements for filing a
Petition for Certiorari.
RULING: Section 3of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that there are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari
brought under Rule 65:
(a) the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received;
(b) the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration when one such was filed; and
(c) the date when notice of the denial thereof was received.
This requirement is for the purpose of determining the timeliness of the petition, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as required by law renders the judgment final and executory.
The same rule requires the pleader to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping to be executed by the plaintiff or principal party. Obviously, it is the
plaintiff or principal party, and not the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know
whether he or it actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case.
As a general rule, these requirements are mandatory, meaning, non-compliance therewith is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
In the case before us, the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the
records. A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the January 15, 1997 decision of the NLRC was received by respondents counsel on January 24,
1997.On February 19, 1997, respondents filed a motion for reconsiderationwhich was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated April 30, 1997. Respondents
counsel received the resolution on May 30, 1997 and they filed the petition for certiorari on July 18, 1997.
In view of the retroactive application of procedural laws, Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure,as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03 which took effect
on September 1, 2000, is the governing provision. It provides that when a motion for reconsideration is timely filed, the 60-day period for filing a petition for
certiorari shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. While respondents motion for reconsideration was filed 16 days later, the NLRC
nonetheless acted thereon and denied it on the basis of lack of merit. In resolving the merits of the motion despite being filed out of time, the NLRC
undoubtedly recognized that it is not strictly bound by the technicalities of law and procedure. Thus, the 60-day period for filing of a petition for
certiorari should be reckoned from the date of the receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, i.e., May 30, 1997, and thus,
the filing made on July 18, 1997 was well within the 60-day reglementary period.
As regards the verification signed only by respondents counsel, this procedural lapse could have warranted the outright dismissal of respondents petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. However, it must be remembered that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective which is the goal of all rules of procedure - that is, to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
Needless to stress, rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to
effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice,
courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive
rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our
power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation.
As the Court eloquently stated in the case of Aguam vs. Court of Appeals.
The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a
sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities,
however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A
litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an
aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits
and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage
hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to
help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave

injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of
justice. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, where a decision may be made to rest on informed judgment rather than rigid rules, the equities of the case must be accorded their due weight
because labor determinations should not only be secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem.
In this case, the Court of Appeals aptly found compelling reasons to disregard respondents procedural lapses in order to obviate a patent injustice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50504 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, Petitioners,

vs. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 196894 (March 3, 2014)
This controversy stemmed from various cases of collection for sum of money filed against So Keng Kok, the owner of various properties including two (2)
parcels of land, which were attached by various creditors including the petitioners in this case. As a result, the levies were annotated on the back of the
said titles.
JEWM asserts that Spouses Crisologos failure to file a motion to intervene, pleadings-in-intervention, appeal or annulment of judgment, which were plain,
speedy and adequate remedies then available to them, rendered recourse to Rule 65 as improper; that Spouses Crisologo lacked the legal standing to file
a Rule 65 petition since they were not impleaded in the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14; and that Spouses Crisologo were not indispensable parties since
their rights over the properties had been rendered ineffective by the final and executory October 19, 1998 Decision of RTC-Br. 8 which disposed
unconditionally and absolutely the subject properties in favor of its predecessor-in-interest.
HELD:
Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14, JEWM asserts technical grounds on why the CA did not err in dismissing
the petition via Rule 65. It states that:
a) The Crisologos could have used other available remedies such as intervention under Rule 19, an appeal of the judgment, or even an annulment of
judgment, which are, by all means, plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law;
b) The Crisologos lack legal standing to file the Rule 65 petition since they were not impleaded in the Branch 14 case.
The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was available to Spouses Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65.
Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have been availed of, failing to use this remedy should not prejudice Spouses Crisologo. It is the duty of RTCBr. 14, following the rule on joinder of indispensable parties, to simply recognize them, with or without any motion to intervene. Through a cursory
reading of the titles, the Court would have noticed the adverse rights of Spouses Crisologo over the cancellation of any annotations in the subject TCTs.

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193494, March 07, 2014
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, Lui Enterprises argued that the Court of Appeals applied the rules of procedure strictly and dismissed its appeal
on technicalities. According to Lui Enterprises, the Court of Appeals should have taken a liberal stance and allowed its appeal despite the lack of subject
index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited, and the statement of issues in its appellants brief.
Lui Enterprises also claimed that the trial court should have set aside the order of default since its failure to file a motion to dismiss on time was due to
excusable negligence.
HELD: Upon the grant of a motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, or a petition for relief from judgment, the defendant is given the
chance to present his or her evidence against that of plaintiffs. With an appeal, however, the defendant has no right to present evidence on his or her
behalf and can only appeal the judgment for being contrary to plaintiffs evidence or the law.
Similar to an appeal, a petition for certiorari does not allow the defendant to present evidence on his or her behalf. The defendant can only argue that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring him or her in default.
Thus, should a defendant prefer to present evidence on his or her behalf, he or she must file either a motion to set aside order of default, motion for new
trial, or a petition for relief from judgment.
In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered judgment. Thus, it timely filed a motion to set
aside order of default, raising the ground of excusable negligence.

G.R. No. 175723

February 4, 2014

THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM
PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES,
PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE LINES, Respondents.
Facts
The City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against private
respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care
Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private
respondents, said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a
precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed with the RTC Pasay City the complaint denominated as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or
Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied it.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC
In 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
Issues:
I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant petition should be denied for being moot and academic.
Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court discovered that a Decision in the main case had already been rendered by the RTC on
August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a tax refund or
credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the following amounts. Defendants
are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above Decision had already become final and executory per the Certificate of Finality
issued by the same trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution was issued by the RTC on November 25, 2009. In view of the foregoing, it
clearly appears that the issues raised in the present petition, which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, have
already become moot and academic.
However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to likewise address a procedural error which petitioners
committed.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the
Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute
that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an
assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action
based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a
petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within
which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation
of the rules.18 Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax
the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by
the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue
writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their appellate
jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines [G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016]

Petitioners in this case are former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and former Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts
Officer Benigno Aguas.
The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with plunder as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659 the following: (1) GMA, (2) Aguas, (3) former PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte, (4) former PCSO Chairman of
the Board of Directors Sergio O. Valencia, (5) former members of the PCSO Board of Directors, and (6) two former officials of the Commission on Audit
(COA).
The information read:
The accused: Public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions,
authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at
any time with minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the
aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund
from PCSOs accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement
vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and
(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich
themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW
The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisidiction over most of the accused, including petitioners. All filed petitions for bail, which the Sandiganbayan
granted except those of the petitioners. Their motions for reconsideration were denied. GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail before the
Supreme Court. However, this remains unresolved.
After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for
plunder against them.
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the accused within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. It held
that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder.
Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court on certiorari before the Supreme Court to assail the denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1.) Procedural Issue: WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence YES.
PROSECUTION: The petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of her demurrer to evidence.
HELD: Certiorari is proper since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying GMAs demurrer to evidence.
General rule: The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the
availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides, the order denying
the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
Exception: In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case as the
ends of justice may require. So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial

CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO and HON. MAURICIO DOMOGAN vs. ROLANDO BANIQUED,
FACTS:
GenerosoBonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya, Milagros Villar, Minerva Baluyut and Israel de Leon filed a complaint with the
Office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house built on a parcel of land located at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City.
On May 19, 1999, Domogan, the then city mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999, against spouses Rolando and
FidelaBaniqued showing that the structure was built sometime in 1999 without any building permit in violation of P.D. 1096 and possibly R.A. 7279,
qualifying the structures illegal, thus, subject to demolition.
In his complaint, Baniqued alleged that the intended demolition of his house was done without due process of law and was arrived at arbitrarily and in a
martial-law like fashion. Specifically, Baniqued alleged that he was (1) never given any copy of the complaint of GenerosoBonifacio; (2) never summoned
nor subpoenaed to answer that complaint; (3) never allowed to participate in the investigation and ocular inspection which the City Engineers Office
allegedly conducted, as a consequence of the complaint of Bonifacio, much less to adduce evidence in support of his position; (4) never summoned nor
subpoenaed to appear before the Anti-Squatting Committee; and (5) not given the opportunity to contest the complaint against him, before such
complaint was decided and to be carried out by the Defendants.Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with TRO/injunction
before Branch 60 of the RTC in Baguio City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Action for Prohibition filed by Baniquedwith the Trial Court is proper.
HOLDING:
Baniqued correctly availed of the remedy of prohibition. Prohibition or a writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior
courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law. As its name indicates, the
writ is one that commands the person or tribunal to whom it is directed not to do something which he or she is about to do. The writ is also commonly
defined as one to prevent a tribunal possessing judicial or quasi-judicial powers from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or
exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. At common law, prohibition was a remedy used when subordinate courts and inferior
tribunals assumed jurisdiction which was not properly theirs.
Prohibition, at common law, was a remedy against encroachment of jurisdiction. Its office was to restrain subordinate courts and inferior judicial
tribunals from extending their jurisdiction and, in adopting the remedy, the courts have almost universally preserved its original common-law nature,
object and function. Thus, as a rule, its proper function is to prevent courts, or other tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction with which they are not vested by law, and confine them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. However, the function of the writ
has been extended by some authorities to cover situations where, even though the lower tribunal has jurisdiction, the superior court deems it necessary
and advisable to issue the writ to prevent some palpable and irremediable injustice, and, x xx the office of the remedy in some jurisdictions has been
enlarged or restricted by constitutional or statutory provisions. While prohibition has been classified as an equitable remedy, it is generally referred to as
a common-law remedy or writ; it is a remedy which is in nature legal, although, x xx its issuance is governed by equitable principles.
Before resorting to the remedy of prohibition, there should be no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Thus, jurisprudence teaches that resort to administrative remedies should be had first before judicial intervention can be availed of.
Petitioners are of the view that the complaint of Baniqued for prohibition is fatally defective because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. If he
felt aggrieved by the issuance of the notice of demolition, administrative remedies were readily available to him. For example, he could have easily filed a
motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration.
The argument fails to persuade.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule. It admits of several exceptions. Jurisprudence is well-settled that the
doctrine does not apply in cases (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act
complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable
damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject
of the proceeding is private land; (10) in quo warranto proceedings; and (11) where the facts show that there was violation of due process.
Here, there was an urgent need for judicial intervention. The filing of a motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration would have been a useless exercise.
The notice of demolition is very clear and speaks for itself. City Mayor Domogan already made up his mind that the house of Baniqued was illegally built
and was thus subject to demolition. It could reasonably be assumed that a motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration would have also been denied
outright. The irreparable damage to Baniqued in case his house was demolished cannot be gainsaid.

G.R. No. 164242DestileriaLimtuaco& CO. vs. ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
The present dispute focuses mainly on the power of the Advertising Board of the Philippines (AdBoard) to require its clearance prior to commercial
advertising and to impose sanctions on its members who broadcast advertisements without its clearance.
AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, non-profit corporation created in 1974[1] composed of several national organizations in the advertising industry. In
January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As,
applied with the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a radio advertisement entitled, Ginagabi (NakatikimkanabangKinseAnyos).
AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Not long after the ad started airing, AdBoard was swept with complaints from the public. This
prompted AdBoard to ask SLG for a replacement but there was no response. With the continued complaints from the public, AdBoard, this time, asked
SLG to withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. Thus, AdBoard decided to recall the clearance previously issued, effective immediately.
On May 20, 2004, AdBoard issued ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, reminding its members-organizations of Article VIII of the ACRC Manual of Procedures,
which prohibits the airing of materials not duly screened by it.
Petitioners then filed with the Ombudsman a complaint for misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against AdBoard's
officers and filed the present petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a constitutionally protected right, as well as a property right. Petitioners believe that requiring a
clearance from AdBoard before advertisements can be aired amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. They also argue that
AdBoard's regulation is an exercise of police power which must be subject to constitutional proscriptions.
ISSUE:
WON petition for proihibition should be granted.
HOLDING:
No. Petition is bereft of merit.
First of all, the petition filed in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard to desist from requiring petitioners to secure a clearance and
imposing sanctions on any agency that will air, broadcast or publish petitioners' ads without such clearance.
Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be
directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or
person has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are,
and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the
action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions.[9] What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and
authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition
excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private
individuals or corporations so acting

G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno occurs just days after the coming presidential elections. Under the Constitution, the vacancy shall be
filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by JBC for every vacancy. Furthermore, the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within 2 months immediately before the next presidential elections up to the end
of his term.
As a result, JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
and The Philippine Star. Thereafter, the announcement of invitation to the public in filing their sworn complaints, written reports or opposition, if any,
was likewise published.
Although the process has begun, JBC has not yet decided on when to submit the list of nominees to the President due to the controversy. The actions of
the JBC have sparked a vigorous debate in both legal luminaries and non-legal quarters on whether the President can appoint the next Chief Justice or not.
Several petitions were filed which the court decided to consolidate in this case, one of which is mandamus against JBC.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC (May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President?
HELD:
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the
tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of
the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d)
the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three nominees to the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary:
Section 8. xxx
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. xxx
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the
JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy.
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable
the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the
President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For
the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time
granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the Presidents mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of
the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for
mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to
constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there
should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary one has been delineated in the following manner:
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment.
Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that
purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the
President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.

G.R. No. 142549 March 9, 2010

FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner,
vs.
The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and
SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are
entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of
Rizal, commenced a special civil action for partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT allegedly with the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. RTC directed the Register of Deeds of Caloocan and of Quezon City to issue the TCTs in the names of the co-owners.
Petitioner alleges that the respective Register of Deeds refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still awaiting the word from LRA
Administrator before proceeding. In reply to the request of the counsel for petitioner to comply with such order, LRA Administrator a letter-reply
informing that the request cannot be granted in view of the finding that there is only one OCT issued for the land and that their claimed OCT is fabricated.
Petitioner claims that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in the case cannot avail of the
benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than this action.
Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondents claim, she is entitled to file a petition for mandamus as she and her co-plaintiffs has been suffering
from damages and losses incapable of quantification, because of the wrongful act of the respondents, citing Rule 65 of Rules of Court.
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the mandatory duties being
compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of mandamus; he had no more duty resulting from the said position and could not perform an act
that pertained to said duty, even if he wanted to; and since he did not have the powers and duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore not a real
party-in-interest in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the public respondents may be compelled to issue the certificates by mandamus
HELD: No
We find that it was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of them is not their
ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must be dismissed.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists It is nonetheless
likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion
in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either
We find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority instructive, to wit: That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative.
Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby
destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the
performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right
which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical
questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where
they find that such would result to the double
titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of
Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels
of land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be
mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order. There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse
to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained in the cited documents, that the OCT, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case
clearly anchored their rights, did not exist.

G.R. No. 160932

January 14, 2013

SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION vs. CANDA

BERSAMIN, J.:
The peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to
afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.
Facts of the Case:
The petitioner, a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project that would involve the tapping and purifying of water and
distribution of the purified water to the residents, applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, seeking to be exempt from the requirement of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 on the following justifications, to wit:
1) The whole project simply involves tapping of water from the Loboc River, filtering and purifying it, and distributing the same to the
consumers in the covered towns;
2) From the source to the filtration plant, then to the purifier stations, then finally to the consumers households, water flows through steel
pipes;
3) The filtration and purifying process employs the latest technology"electrocatalytic"internationally accepted for safety and environment
friendliness;
4) No waste is generated, as the electrocatalytic process dissolves all impurities in the water;
5) The project involves no destruction [n]or harm to the environment. On the other hand, it is environment friendly.1
Upon evaluation, respondent Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, found:
1) The project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial Environmental Examination is required.
2) The project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof of social acceptability should be established. Proper indorsement from the
Protected Area Management Bureau or PAMB should be secured.
The petitioner appealed Candas findings to respondent EMB Region 7 Director Bienvenido L. Lipayon (RD Lipayon).
Upon submission of the required additional Certification from DENR-PENRO, PAG-ASA, PHILVOLCS, MGB, City Mayor's Office & City Engineer's Office,
NPAA, BSWM, Provincial Tourism Office, NWRB, DENR Regional Office or EMB7., RD Lipayon decided that the proposed project is covered by the EIS
System pursuant to P.D. 1586, the Environmental Impact Statement Law.
The petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right
after having complied with the certification requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar waterworks project in the
same area.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus upon the following considerations, namely: (1) PHIVOLCS certified that the project site had been subjected to
an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990; (2) the CNC issued by the EMB to a similar waterworks project of the DPWH in the same area was only for the
construction of a unit spring box intake and pump house, and the DENR issued a cease and desist order relative to the DPWHs additional project to put
up a water filtration plant therein; (3) the determination of whether an area was environmentally critical was a task that pertained to the EMB; (4) the
assignment of a control number by the EMB to the petitioners application did not mean that the application was as good as approved; (5) the RTC would
not interfere with the primary prerogative of the EMB to review the merits of the petitioners application for the CNC; and (6) there was already a
pending appeal lodged with the DENR Secretary.
Appeal has been brought directly to the SC via petition for review on certiorari.
Issue of the case:
W/N Petitioner has exhausted available administrative remedies through an appeal to DENR Secretary?
W/N the petitioner has a clear legal right to demand issuance of ECC/CNC?
W/N the grant or denial of an application for ECC/CNC is an act that is purely ministerial in nature?
Ruling of the case:
Mandamus was an improper remedy for petitioner
1. The petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies.

At the time RD Lipayon denied the petitioners application for the CNC, Administrative Order No. 42 dated November 2, 2002 had just vested the
authority to grant or deny applications for the ECC in the Director and Regional Directors of the EMB. Notwithstanding the lack of a specific implementing
guideline to what office the ruling of the EMB Regional Director was to be appealed, the petitioner could have been easily guided in that regard by the
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that the Director of a line bureau, such as the EMB, shall have supervision and control over all division and
other units, including regional offices, under the bureau. Verily, supervision and control include the power to "review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units.
Accordingly, the petitioner should have appealed the EMB Regional Directors decision to the EMB Director, who exercised supervision and control over
the former.
Moreover, the petitioner states in its pleadings that it had a pending appeal with the DENR Secretary. However, the records reveal that the subject of the
appeal of the petitioner was an undated resolution of the DENR Regional Director, Region VII, denying its application for the CNC,not the decision of RD
Lipayon. Nonetheless, even assuming that the pending appeal with the DENR Secretary had related to RD Lipayons decision, the petitioner should still
have waited for the DENR Secretary to resolve the appeal in line with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Its failure to do so rendered
its resort to mandamus in the RTC premature.
The omission is fatal, because mandamus is a remedy only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
2.
There is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the requirement to submit the needed certifications. It submitted
no certification to the effect that the project site was within the critical slope. PHILVOLCS's certification showed that the project site experienced
Intensity VII eartquake in 1990. Clearly, the petitioner failed to establish that it had the legal right to be issued the CNC it applied for, warranting the
denial of its application.
3.
The grant or denial of an application for ECC/CNC is not an act that involves the exercise and judgement and discretion by the EMB Director,
who must determine whether the project or project area is classified as critical to the environment based on the documents to be submitted by the
applicant.

The writ has remained to be an extraordinary remedy in the sense that it is only issued in extraordinary cases and where the usual and ordinary modes
of proceeding and forms of remedy are powerless to afford redress to a party aggrieved, and where without its aid there would be a failure of justice.
A doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the act
sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty to perform the same. The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a
clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act.
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that
are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary.
A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only
when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

G.R. No. 173428

November 22, 2010

DEJURAS v. HON. RENE C. VILLA

PERALTA, J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Eutiquio Dejuras, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioner, filed with the Laguna Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) a Complaint
against Luis and Anthony Delfino and Artemio Alon, Jr. (Artemio) for the redemption of a 19,570 square meter piece of land located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
The complaint alleged that Eutiquio had been a legitimate tenant/leaseholder on the land for 50 years with authority from the former owners thereof,
namely, the spouses Luis and Conchita Delfino, but that in 1987, Luis donated the property to his son, Anthony, who, without notice to Eutiquio, later sold
it to his cousin, Artemio. Eutiquio thus prayed that the sale to Artemio be revoked and that he be given the first option to buy the property in accordance
with Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 (the Agricultural Land Reform Code).6
The PARAD dismissed the complaint and found Eutiquio to be a mere civil law lessee and not an agricultural leaseholder or tenant-tiller as alleged, and
hence, not entitled to the right of redemption.
Eutiquio immediately appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
DARAB reversed the PARAD and held Eutiquio to be an agricultural lessee/tenant-tiller entitled to exercise the right of redemption.
The Delfinos and Artemio filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
DARAB reversed its earlier decision and reinstated the PARADs decision.
Eutiquio a Motion for Reconsideration.
Without action being taken on the motion, however, the DARAB, issued an entry of judgment in the case.
Consequently, the PARAD issued a Writ of Execution.
Eutiquio meantime died and was substituted by his son, Florencio Dejuras, who lost no time in seeking the quashal of the writ of execution on the ground
of the pendency of Eutiquios motion for reconsideration of the DARABs September 30, 1999 Resolution.
In the interim between the entry of judgment in the redemption case and the issuance of the writ of execution therein, former DAR Secretary Horacio
Morales, at the instance of Artemio, issued an Exemption Order on December 26, 2000 exempting Lot No. 1383 from the coverage of agrarian reform.
On the basis of this development, Conchita, as Artemios attorney-in-fact, executed a deed of absolute sale over the subject property in favor of SMPHI.
SMPHI then proceeded to buy out the surrounding pieces of property on which the SM City Sta. Rosa shopping mall was to be built.
Faced with the prospect of ejectment due to SMPHIs impending construction operations on the property, Florencio and his successor-in-interest, herein
petitioner, filed with the DAR Regional Office a "Petition for Coverage with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Cease-and-Desist Order"17 against SMPHI,
Conchita, Anthony and Artemio. They prayed that a cease-and-desist order be issued to enjoin SMPHI from entering the property; that the land be
declared as covered by the agrarian reform program and that their family be declared qualified beneficiaries thereof.
The DAR issued a Cease-and-Desist Order directing SMPHI to refrain from pursuing the development of the subject property.
SMPHI moved to recall the Cease-and-Desist Order and immediately filed an Opposition to the Petition for Coverage.
Florencio and petitioner also filed with the Office of Secretary Villa a "Petition for Revocation of Exemption Order" alleging that the exemption order
issued by former Secretary Morales was procured and issued with fraud, serious error, grave abuse of discretion and manifest partiality.
DAR Regional Director Dominador Andres issued an Order denying for lack of merit the Petition for Coverage and lifting the Cease-and-Desist Order.
Florencio and petitioner immediately lodged an appeal with the Office of Secretary Villa. Before the same office, they also filed an "Urgent Ex Parte
Motion for Issuance of Cease-and-Desist Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction" in connection not only with the Petition for Coverage under appeal, but
also in connection with the Complaint for Redemption as well as with the Petition for Revocation, whereby they prayed that SMPHI be enjoined from
entering into and carrying out development and construction operations on the subject property.24
Petitioner and Florencio had sought the early resolution of this motion, yet despite their efforts in filing six successive motions to that end, it appears that
the Office of the DAR Secretary had not promptly come up with a resolution on the application for injunctive relief.
Florencio meantime died and was survived by petitioner, who then instituted a Petition for Mandamus before the Court of Appeals, specifically praying
that a temporary restraining order be issued ex parte to prevent SMPHI from proceeding with its construction operations; that the DARAB be directed to
resolve Eutiquios earlier motion for reconsideration of the September 30, 1999 Resolution in DARAB Case No. 5485; and that Secretary Villa be ordered
to grant the urgent ex parte motion for injunctive relief .

The CA issued the assailed Decision denying due course to and dismissing the petition
ISSUE OF THE CASE
whether the CA was correct in declining to issue the writ of mandamus and in not compelling the DARAB to resolve Eutiquios motion for reconsideration
in the Petition for Redemption and the DAR to issue the cease-and-desist order, or writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, in the Petition for
Redemption, Petition for Coverage and Petition for Revocation.
RULING OF THE COURT
The Court denieD the petition.
Petitioner has made an extensive, effortful and elaborate essay on the factual aspects not only of the Petition for Redemption, but also of the Petition for
Coverage and the Petition for Revocation of Exemption Order particularly on the controverted nature of Eutiquios possession of the subject land. That
issue, however, is not for this Court to address, and certainly not in the instant petition which brings only the issue of
But perhaps as a last-ditch attempt to turn the table in his favor following the unfavorable issuance of the February 23, 2005 DAR Order denying the
"Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Cease-and-Desist Order" and of the April 20, 2005 DARAB Resolution denying
Eutiquios motion for reconsideration in the Petition for Redemption, petitioner now pursues a different theory by claiming that the DAR and the DARAB
have exceeded their authority and committed grave abuse of discretion and manifest injustice in issuing the said order and resolution. Verily, petitioner
is grasping at straws.
Established is the procedural law precept that a writ of mandamus generally lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, but not the
performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves the exercise of judgment.41 Thus, when the act sought to be performed involves the
exercise of discretion, the respondent may only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act in one way or the other.42 It is, nonetheless, also available
to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment in a particular manner. However,
this rule admits of exceptions. Mandamus is the proper remedy in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of
authority.
In Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Isabela, it was held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound
discretion of the issuing authority, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an
extraordinary peremptory remedy that may be availed of only upon the grounds expressly provided by law. In Government Service Insurance System v.
Florendo and Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, it was also held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or
preventive remedy to secure the rights of a party in a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the tribunal taking cognizance of the case, limited
only by the requirement that the use of such discretion be based on ground and in the manner provided by law. Bataclan v. Court of Appeals also points
out that although sufficient discretion is allowed in the grant of the relief, extreme caution must be taken in determining the necessity for the grant of the
relief prayed for, because it would necessarily affect the protective rights of the parties in a case.
Clearly, the grant of an injunctive relief in this case is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it requires discretion and judgment on the part
of both the DAR and the DARAB to find whether petitioner has a clear legal right that needs to be protected and that the acts of SMPHI are violative of
such right. On this score alone, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for its refusal to issue the writ of mandamus prayed for.1avvphi1
Be that as it may, whether the DAR or the DARAB could be properly compelled to respectively grant the "Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Ceaseand-Desist Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction" and resolve Eutiquios pending motion for reconsideration in the Petition for Redemption, is by all
means already moot and academic at this point. We take note that indeed, the measure of compulsion petitioner had sought before the Court of Appeals
against both the DAR and the DARAB is already unwarranted, because first, the DAR, on February 23, 2005, has already denied for lack of merit the
"Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Cease-and-Desist Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction." Second, in a Joint Order51 issued by the DAR , the
Petition for Coverage and the Petition for Revocation have been both denied, thereby affirming the Exemption Order issued by former Secretary Morales.
And third, the DARAB, has already issued a resolution in the Petition for Redemption denying for lack of merit Eutiquios motion for reconsideration of
its Resolution.

MMDA' et al., vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et al., G.R. No. 171947-48, Dec. 18, 2008 Velasco, Jr.,J.:
Facts: On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed acomplaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged
that the water qualify of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) I152 orthe
Philippine Environment Code.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a
violation of, among others:(l) Respondents' constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology; (2) TheEnvironment Code (PD 1152); (3) The
Pollution Control Law (PD 98\; @) The Water Code(PD 1067); (5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856); (6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD825); (7)
The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979); (8) Executive Order No. 192; (9) The ToxicandHazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); (10) Civil Code
provisions on nuisanceand human relations; (l l) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and (12)International Law.
Lower Court's Ruling: The RTC ruled in favor of the Concerned Residents of ManilaBayand rendered a decision ordering the defendant-government
agencies, jointly and solidarily,to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving
and other forms of contact recreation. Further, the RTC directed the defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, within six (6)months
from receipt of the Decision, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the
rehabilitation andrestoration of the bay. The RTC also ordered the different government agencies to act on specific activities in order to rehabilitate
Manila Bay.
Appellate Court's Ruling: The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC in toto.
Issues; Whether the cleaning of Manila Bay is a ministerial act which can be compelled bymandamus:
Whether the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning
in general.
Supreme Court's Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay and affirmed the Decisions of the RTC and Court of
Appeals with modifications.The Supreme Court went on further to order the heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM,
PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," to each submit to the Court a
quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordancewith the Decision.
On the First Issue The Supreme Court ruled that the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay can be compelled by mandamus. It enumerated the enabling
laws and issuances of each concerned agency and held that the mentioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete
as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law.
Petitioners' obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different
concepts. The govemment agencies (petitioners) are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or
indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.
On the Second Issue The Supreme Court held that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code include cleaning in general. Sec. 17 does not in any way state
that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution
incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident. A perusal of Sec. 20 of
the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to
clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters' account.
Petitioners' assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incidentand the erring
polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide
behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec.16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of aspecific pollution incident. In
this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse overSecs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote:
"PDIl52 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of
general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents."RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and
improvewaste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitlyprovides that the State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court
stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitionersto clean up the bay, they and the men and
women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as
humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of
the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers,
inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise,
for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other
relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on
continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the
quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus, the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative
inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges
River from industrial and municipal pollution.

Maricris DOLOT vs. Hon. Ramon PAJE, [G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013]
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order2dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution dated
October 18, 2011 issued by the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed issuances dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing Mandamus,
Damages and Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection Order.
Facts: On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of
Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorneys fees with the RTC of Sorsogon.
The petition contained the following pertinent allegations:
* Sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail;
* Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality;
* Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement,
ground subsidence and landslide hazard;
* after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required permit to operate;
* Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to
issue;
* the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the DENR, despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of
Matnog; and
* The respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
1995, and the Local Government Code.
Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the
Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake
the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. The case was summarily
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution. Aside from sustaining the
dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC further ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners
therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the
government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.w library Petitioner Dolot went straight to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
Issue: WoN there is a need for final court decree, order or decision for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus?
Ruling:
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay. Now
cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient
in form and substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however,
that the determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in
consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.
> The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by
law. The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTCs mistaken
notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective
until judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
> The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually
render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final. Under the Rules, after the
court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over
the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said
tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds
that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ of continuing mandamus is, in
essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision.
> The petition was granted.

Rule 65 (Writ of Kalikasan) No. 1

G.R. No. 206510

September 16, 2014

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, vs SWIFT

VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Facts of the case:

In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Aquino on August 11, 1988. In
1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. On
April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to
ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the
Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of
TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and
disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be
the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.

In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the vessel, USS Guardian "to enter and exit the
territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty." On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at
2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles eastsoutheast of Palawan.

On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization and others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet,
Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and
Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T.
Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis
M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore
Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the
"Philippine respondents."

Petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of
conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and
disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they
want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.

The petitioners prayed, among others, for the immediate issue upon the filing of the petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan.

ISSUE: W/N Petition for Writ of Kalikasan is the proper remedy.

RULING: (SC denied the petition)

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is expressly provided
in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, SC ruled on the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of local courts:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely
identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision
over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will
require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying
the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of
environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the
environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders
of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final
judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)

SC agreedwith respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage operation sought
to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to
Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stnicture and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are
concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef.
However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists and
experts in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.

SC denied the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.

Hon. Ramon Jesus Paje vs. Casino GR#207257 February 3, 2015

Factual Antecedents
In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency organized and established under Republic Act No. (RA) 7227,4 and
Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a power plant in Subic
Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP).5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power plant.
The SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC).
On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July 28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy),11 a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with the primary purpose of building, owning, and operating power plants in
the Philippines.
RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty, Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-fired power plant and to
assist RP Energy in applying for the issuance of an ECC from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On August 27, 2008, the SangguniangPanglungsod of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008, expressing the city governments objection
to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source and urging the proponent to consider safer alternative sources of energy for Subic Bay.
On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant.
On June 8, 2010, RP Energy and SBMA entered into a Lease and Development Agreement (LDA) over a 380,004.456-square meter parcel of land to be
used for building and operating the coal-fired power plant.
On August 1, 2011, the SangguniangPanglalawigan of Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-149, opposing the establishment of a coal-fired thermal
power plant at SitioNaglatore, Brgy. Cawag, Subic, Zambales.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On August 11, 2011, the Ligangmga Barangay of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12, Series of 2011, expressing its strong objection to the coal-fired
power plant as an energy source.
On July 20, 2012, Hon. Teodoro A. Casio,et al. (Casio Group) filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of kalikasan against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon.
Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR.
On July 31, 2012, this Court resolved, among others, to: (1) issue a Writ of kalikasan; and (2) refer the case to the CA for hearing and reception of
evidence and rendition of judgment.
On September 11, 2012, the Petition for Writ of kalikasan was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00015 and raffled to the Fifteenth Division of the CA.31 In the
Petition, the Casio Group alleged, among others, that the power plant project would cause grave environmental damage;32 that it would adversely affect
the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo;33 that the ECC was issued and the LDA
entered into without the prior approval of the concerned sanggunians as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code (LGC);34 that
the LDA was entered into without securing a prior certification from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as required under Section
59 of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA Law);35 that Section 8.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 (DAO 2003-30)
which allows amendments of ECCs is ultra vires because the DENR has no authority to decide on requests for amendments of previously issued ECCs in
the absence of a new EIS;36 and that due to the nullity of Section 8.3 of DAO 2003-30, all amendments to RP Energys ECC are null and void.
On October 29, 2012, the CA conducted a preliminary conference wherein the parties, with their respective counsels.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 30, 2013, the CA rendered a Decision denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and the application for an environment protection order
due to the failure of the Casio Group to prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened.53 The CA
likewise found no reason to nullify Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30. It said that the provision was notultra vires, as the express power of the Secretary of
the DENR, the Director and Regional Directors of the EMB to issue an ECC impliedly includes the incidental power to amend the same. In any case, the CA
ruled that the validity of the said section could not be collaterally attacked in a petition for a writ of kalikasan.
Thus, the CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and the application for an
environmental protection order.
Unsatisfied, the parties appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: W/N the denial of the Writ of kalikasan is proper?
HELD:YES.The Rules on the Writ of kalikasan, which is Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, was issued by the Court pursuant to its
power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, in particular, the individuals right to a balanced and healthful
ecology. Section 1 of Rule 7 provides:
Section 1.Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, peoples organization, nongovernmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces.
The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide judicial relief from
threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of damage that transcends

political and territorial boundaries. It is intended to provide a stronger defense for environmental rights through judicial efforts where institutional
arrangements of enforcement, implementation and legislation have fallen short and seeks to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale
ecological threats.
Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of
the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the
territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ
is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis.
If the petitioner successfully proves the foregoing requisites, the court shall render judgment granting the privilege of the writ of kalikasan. Otherwise,
the petition shall be denied. If the petition is granted, the court may grant the reliefs provided for under Section 15 of Rule 7, to wit:
Section 15.Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying
the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental
laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the
court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final
judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
It must be noted, however, that the above enumerated reliefs are non-exhaustive. The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are broad,
comprehensive and non-exclusive.
Prescinding from the above, The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casio Group failed to substantiate its claims that the construction and
operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy
presented evidence to establish that the subject project will not cause grave environmental damage, through its Environmental Management Plan, which
will ensure that the project will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and standards;
The Petition for Writ of kalikasan, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00015, is denied for insufficiency of evidence.