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3.2.5. LIABILITY OF TEACHERS/HEADS OF


ESTABLISHMENTS
a.
Comparisons
Bet.
Obligations/Liabilities
As distinguished from Subsidiary Liability

Other

SPOUSES FRANCO (petitioners)


vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ANTONIO
REYES, MRS. SUSAN CHUAY and LOLITA LUGUE
(respondents)
FACTS:
At about 7:30 in the evening of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro
swerved the northbound Franco Bus driving to the left to avoid
hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing north along the
cemented pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga,
Capas Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus
being driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision
between the two (2) vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous
eventuality. The mini bus was dragged fifteen (15) meters from the
point of impact (midway the length of the parked truck with trailer)
and landed right side down facing south in the canal of the
highway. The Franco Bus was damaged but not severely. The
collision resulted in the deaths of the two (2) drivers, Macario Yuro
and Magdaleno Lugue, and two (2) passengers of the mini bus,
Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay.

Owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company


claimed they exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of all their employees, including the deceased driver
Macario Yuro.
RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, Antonio Reyes, Lolita Lugue, and
Susan Chuay, and against the defendants Mr. and Mrs. Federico
Franco.
CA affirmed the lower court. It further held that the civil obligation
of the appellants arises from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
resulting in the subsidiary liability of the appellants under the said
provisions; that the case subject of appeal is one involving culpable
negligence out of which civil liability arises and is not one of civil
negligence; and that there is nothing in Articles 102 and 103 of
the Revised Penal Code which requires a prior judgment of
conviction of the erring vehicle driver and his obligation to pay his
civil liability before the said provisions can be applied. Respondent
appellate court also increased the award of damages granted by
the lower court.
On appeal, petitioners contend that the allegations of herein
private respondents as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2154
unequivocally claim that the former as the employers of Macario
Yuro, the driver of the Franco Bus who caused the vehicular
mishap, are jointly and severally liable to the latter for the
damages suffered by them which thus makes Civil Case No. 2154
an action predicated upon a quasi-delict.

ISSUES:
Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus, Mrs.
Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita
Lugue, the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action
for damages against Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco, the owners and
operators of the Franco Transportation Company.

WON the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein


private respondents was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict;

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WON respondent appellate court may properly increase the award
of damages in favor of the private respondents Chuay and Lugue,
prevailing parties in the lower court, who did not appeal said
court's decision.

RULING:

In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the


person who should stand as the accused and the party supposed to
be primarily liable for the damages suffered by private respondents
as a consequence of the vehicular mishap died. Thus, petitioners'
subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that their
liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary liability.
There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant
employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code where his
employee has not been previously criminally convicted.

YES. Court found petitioners liable for the damages claimed


pursuant to their primary liability under the Civil Code.
Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the
employer under the Revised Penal Code and the employer's
primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or
tortious in character.
Under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is based
on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for
tortious acts of its employees subject, however, to the defense that
the former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employees.

On the otherhand, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,


liability originates from a delict committed by the employee who is
primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his
employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the employer's
subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that
there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal
negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved.
If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's liability would
not be predicated under Article 103.

NO. The Intermediate Appellate Court is without jurisdiction to


increase the amount of damages awarded to private respondents
Chuay and Lugue, neither of whom appealed the decision of the
lower court. While an appellee who is not also an appellant may
assign error in his brief if his purpose is to maintain the judgment
on other grounds, he cannot ask for modification or reversal of the
judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. For
failure of plaintiffs-appellees, herein private respondents, to appeal
the lower court's judgment, the amount of actual damages cannot
exceed that awarded by it.

As distinguished from Special Parental Authority


*see Family Code
As distinguished from Contractual Breach
SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON
CITY and/or TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
TAGUIAM, respondent.
558 SCRA 223 (2008)

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Holy Spirit
:
Tolentino
:
Taguiam
:
petitioner school

Petitioner school
Petitioner principal
Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the

FACTS:

Respondent Taguiam distributed parent/guardian permit


form to her students in connection with the year-end
celebration held at the school grounds (i.e., swimming
pool).

Chiara Mae Federicos permit was unsigned.


Yet,
respondent allowed her to join the activity because she
assumed that Chiara Mae's mother has allowed her to join
it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed
lunch and swimsuit.

Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils


to avoid the deeper area. Respondent followed two pupils
who sneaked out, thus, majority of the pupils were left
unsupervised since she was the only adult present.
Unfortunately during that time, Chiara Mae drowned.

Petitioners, after due process, dismissed respondent on


the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of
trust and confidence. Meanwhile, Chiara Mae's parents
filed a P7 Million damage suit against petitioners and
respondent, among others. They also filed against
respondent a
criminal
complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
LA and NLRC:
declared that respondent was validly terminated for
gross neglect of duty.
He opined that Chiara Mae drowned because
respondent had left the pupils without any adult
supervision. He also noted that the absence of
adequate facilities should have alerted respondent
before allowing the pupils to use the swimming pool.

CA reversed the ruling


The appellate court observed that there was
insufficient proof that respondent's negligence was
both gross and habitual
ISSUE:
Whether respondent had been grossly negligent amounting to loss
of trust and confidence which caused her dismissal

HELD:
Yes.
At the outset, respondent cannot simply ignore the purpose of the
permit by resorting to assumptions. She could have requested the
mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least
called her up to obtain her conformity.
As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent
should have made sure that the children were protected from all
harm while in her company. Respondent should have known that
leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves
may result in an accident. A simple reminder "not to go to the
deepest part of the pool" was insufficient to cast away all the
serious dangers that the situation presented to the children,
especially when respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim.
Dismally, respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed
the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This is a clear
violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on
her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself.
This cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent.

CONTRA
ST.
MARYS
CARPITANOS

ACADEMY

vs

WILLIAM

Facts:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for
the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from
where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin
Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the
other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by

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James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same


school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a
reckless manner which resulted for it to turned
turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.
Issue: WON petitioner should be held liable for the
damages.

Held:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin
under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where
it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a
minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany
the minor students in the jeep. However, for them
to be held liable, the act or omission to be
considered negligent must be the proximate cause
of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have
a causal connection to the accident. It must be
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the
victim failed to show such negligence on the part of
the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted
that the immediate cause of the accident was not
the reckless driving of James but the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore,
there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the
minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The
mechanical defect was an event over which the
school has no control hence they may not be held
liable for the death resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to 3 rd persons for injuries
caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not

the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle


who shall be held responsible for damages for the
death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial
court for determination of the liability of the
defendants excluding herein petitioner.

b. Liability of school where student Injures


another student
Old cases may now be overturned by application
of the Family Code as well as the contractual
obligation of the school
PALISOC vs BRILLANTES
FACTS:
In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was
watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in
their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a school of
arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around
like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of
Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon delivered
blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued
Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor
(Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis
of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable
for damages and that Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not
liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable so long as
they [the students] remain in their custody. And that this means,
as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of
establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of their students
if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other
officials of the school which Daffon was not.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.
HELD:
No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as
the ruling in the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL
Reyes dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton and
Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be
held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The
unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students
could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of
the students in the school premises to protect their students from
harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At
any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves
of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article
2180, Civil Code, by (proving) that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the light of the
factual findings of the lower courts decision, said defendants failed
to prove such exemption from liability. The SC reiterated that there
is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living
and boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads
and teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts
of their students.

PASCO vs CFI-BULACAN
FACTS:

Petitioner Reynaldo Pasco together with two companions


while walking in the campus of private respondent Araneta
University after attending class was accosted and mauled
by a group of muslim students led by Abdul alias Teng.

The said muslim group were also student on the


respondent university

Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and was


hospitalized at MCU (Manila Central University) Hospital.

Petitioner assisted by his father Pedro Pasco filed a


complaint for damages against Abdul and Respondent
University was impleaded as a party defendant under the
provision of the civil code (Art 2180 NCC)

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the following


grounds
o Art 2180 NCC applies only to vocational school and
not to academic institutions
o The civil liability arises from the criminal action
which defendant has not committed.
o Since it was a civil case, Demand should have been
made by the petitioner.
Respondent court (CFI) granted the motion to dismiss by
the respondent

ISSUE: W/N under Article 2180 NCC is applicable to educational


institutions (which are not school of arts and trades) and to have
the school or university itself (as distinguished from teachers or
heads) is liable?
RULING:
No Article 2180 NCC is not applicable to Respondent University
The provision under Article 2180 NCC speaks only of Teachers or
heads and not school or university.
DISSENT (Melencio-Herrera):
Art2180 may be construed as the basis for liability of the school as
the employer for the failure of its teachers or school head to
perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents.
DISSENT (SARMIENTO, J.):
I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be construed as the basis
for the liability of the school as the employer for the failure of its
teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties
as substitute parents. Herrera, J. concurring.

AMADORA
vs
CA (COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS,
VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR.,
CELESTINO
DICON,
ANIANO
ABELLANA,
PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and

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natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR


GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his
guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was
mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the formers
death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence. The victims parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil
action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its
rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher
together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the
students were dropped.
Respondent Court absolved the
defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision for the
following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution
of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students
were not in the custody of the school since the semester has
already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun,
and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence
through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining
discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was
under school custody because he went to school to comply with a
requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).
ISSUE:
WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.
HELD:
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by
both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent
part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the
authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally
ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in
the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the
other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys

cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-incharge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a
general authority over the students and not direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular
classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should
probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated
an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher
authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof
was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the
provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts
and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the
respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo
resulting to his death.
Petition was denied.

SALVOSA vs IAC
FACTS:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution of the
arts and trade. Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the
Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC)
Unit, which is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The ROTC Unit, by way of accommodation to the AFP,
the latter was provided by the BCF an office and an armory located
at the basement of its main building. Jimmy B. Abon, a commerce
student of BCF was appointed as armorer of the ROTC Unit by the
AFP receiving salary from the latter and under the orders of
Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant.
Around 8:00 in the evening, Jimmy B. Abon then shot Napoleon
Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed
firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of
the BCF and he was convicted crime of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP for the death of Castro.
Trial Court rendered a decision, sentencing defendants Jimmy B.
Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc.,

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jointly and severally, to pay private respondents Eduardo,
Diomedes, Virginia and Rodolfo Castro. On appeal, the decision
was affirmed stating that although Abon was not attending any
class or school function at the time of the shooting incident, which
was at about 8 o'clock in the evening; but considering that Abon
was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF
ROTC unit, he must have been attending night classes and
therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time
for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within the
"recess time".
ISSUE:
WON Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a
consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
HELD:
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."
The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains
in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent,
in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise
reasonable
supervision
over
the
conduct
of
the
[student]." 14 Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 'so long as
(the students) remain in their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time."
A student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess"
thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at
attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary
adjournment of school activities where the student still remains
within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school
premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted.
Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. 18Likewise, the
mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school
without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the
"protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
Hence, Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at
attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot

Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art.


2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon
for damages resulting from his acts. Before the shooting incident,
Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed
Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory]
well guarded."

c. Liability of school where teacher/school


employee injures another student due to
negligence
YLARDE vs AQUINO
Facts:
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the
principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in
Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a
teacher therein. During that time, the school had
several concrete blocks which were remnants of the
old school shop destroyed in World War II.
Defendant decided to help clear the area so he
gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them
to dig beside a one ton concrete block in making a
hole where the stone can be buried. It was left
unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18
students including the Novelito Ylarde to complete
the excavation. Defendant left the children to level
the loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key
to the school workroom where he can get some
rope. It was alleged that before leaving, he told the
children not to touch the stone. After he left, the
children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly
the concrete block slide down. Unfortunately,
Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall causing
serious physical injuries which as a consequence led

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to his death, 3 days thereafter. The parents of the


victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for damages
against both Aquino and Soriano.
ISSUE: WON both Soriano and Aquino can be held
liable for damages.

of availing himself of adult manual laborers he


instead utilized his students. Furthermore, the
warning given is not sufficient to cast away all
serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to
the excavation would present to the children. He is
therefore ordered to pay damages to the
petitioners.

HELD:
As held in Amadora vs CA, it is only the teacher and
not the head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students.
Where the school is academic rather than technical
or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher
in charge of such student, this is the general rule.
However, in case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall
be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable for
the acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as
principal cannot be held liable for the reason that
the school he heads is an academic school and he
did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his students
should make sure that the children are protected
from all harm. The excavation instructed clearly
exposed the students to risk and should not be
placed under the category of Work Education such
as school gardening, planting trees etc. Aquino
acted with fault and gross negligence where instead

SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON


CITY and/or TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
TAGUIAM, respondent.
558 SCRA 223 (2008)
Holy Spirit
:
Tolentino
:
Taguiam
:
petitioner school

Petitioner school
Petitioner principal
Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the

FACTS:

Respondent Taguiam distributed parent/guardian permit


form to her students in connection with the year-end
celebration held at the school grounds (i.e., swimming
pool).

Chiara Mae Federicos permit was unsigned.


Yet,
respondent allowed her to join the activity because she
assumed that Chiara Mae's mother has allowed her to join
it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed
lunch and swimsuit.

Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils


to avoid the deeper area. Respondent followed two pupils
who sneaked out, thus, majority of the pupils were left
unsupervised since she was the only adult present.
Unfortunately during that time, Chiara Mae drowned.

Petitioners, after due process, dismissed respondent on


the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of
trust and confidence. Meanwhile, Chiara Mae's parents
filed a P7 Million damage suit against petitioners and

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respondent, among others. They also filed against
respondent a
criminal
complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
LA and NLRC:
declared that respondent was validly terminated for
gross neglect of duty.
He opined that Chiara Mae drowned because
respondent had left the pupils without any adult
supervision. He also noted that the absence of
adequate facilities should have alerted respondent
before allowing the pupils to use the swimming pool.

CA reversed the ruling


The appellate court observed that there was
insufficient proof that respondent's negligence was
both gross and habitual
ISSUE:
Whether respondent had been grossly negligent amounting to loss
of trust and confidence which caused her dismissal
HELD:
Yes.
At the outset, respondent cannot simply ignore the purpose of the
permit by resorting to assumptions. She could have requested the
mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least
called her up to obtain her conformity.
As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent
should have made sure that the children were protected from all
harm while in her company. Respondent should have known that
leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves
may result in an accident. A simple reminder "not to go to the
deepest part of the pool" was insufficient to cast away all the
serious dangers that the situation presented to the children,
especially when respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim.
Dismally, respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed
the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This is a clear
violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on
her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself.
This cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent.

ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI


AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA TABUGOY
vs
JAYSON MIRANDA (represented by father
RODOLFO MIRANDA)
FACTS:
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St.
Joseph College's [SJC's] premises, the class to which [respondent
Jayson Val Miranda] belonged was conducting a science
experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under
the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher
and employee of SJC. The adviser of [Jayson's] class is . . .
Estefania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without
having adequately secured it from any untoward incident or
occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the
assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of
the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass.
The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who
moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance,
the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of
which hit [Jayson's] eye and the different parts of the bodies of
some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson's] eyes were
chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to
undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing
of this case [in] the lower court, [Jayson's] wound had not
completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances,
[Jayson's] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back
home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to
forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994,
in the amount of at least P40,000.00.
Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless nights,
mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due
to [petitioners'] fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and
diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be
held liable for moral damages. Also, [Jayson] sent a demand letter
to St. Joseph for the payment of his medical expenses as well as

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other expenses incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed.
Hence, [Jayson] was constrained to file the complaint for damages.
[Petitioners], therefore, should likewise compensate [Jayson] for
litigation expenses, including attorney's fees.
On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC,
and Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in
the school year 1994-1995. On November 17, 1994, at about 1:30
in the afternoon, the class to which [Jayson] belong[s] was
conducting a science experiment under the guidance and
supervision of Tabugo, the class science teacher, about fusion of
sulphur powder and iron fillings by combining these elements in a
test tube and heating the same. Before the science experiment
was conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given strict
instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and
not to look into the test tube until the heated compound had
cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of sufficient age and
discretion and completely capable of understanding the English
language and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for
the heated compound to cool off, as required in the written
procedure for the experiment and as repeatedly explained by the
teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass and
looked at the compound, which at that moment spurted out of the
test tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jayson's] eyes.
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and
thereafter transferred to St. Luke's Medical Center for treatment. At
the hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and
apologized to his teacher for violating her instructions not to look
into the test tube until the compound had cooled off.
After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge
and an eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or
affected. In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the
delay in [Jayson's] discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jayson's] father,
requested SJC to advance the amount of P26,176.35 representing
[Jayson's] hospital bill until his wife could arrive from abroad and
pay back the money. SJC acceded to the request.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through
counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all
the medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will
be incurred further arising from the accident caused by the science
experiment. In a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for
SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the

school cannot accede to the demand because "the accident


occurred by reason of [Jayson's] failure to comply with the written
procedure for the experiment and his teacher's repeated warnings
and instruction that no student must face, much less look into, the
opening of the test tube until the heated compound has cooled.
Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson's father,
on Jayson's behalf, sued petitioners for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not St. Joseph College as well as Rosalinda
Tabugoy as subject teacher of Jayson Miranda liable to the
injury that Jayson suffered?
HELD:
Yes.
In this case, petitioners failed to show that the negligence of Jayson
was the proximate cause of the latter's injury. We find that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of
[Jayson] when he curiously looked into the test tube when the
chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his injury, but the
sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals independent of
any intervening cause. Petitioners could have prevented the
mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, caution and
foresight.
"All of the petitioners are equally at fault and are liable for
negligence because all of them are responsible for exercising the
required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to
prevent or avoid injuries to the students. The individual petitioners
are persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over their
students as well as the supervision and ensuring of their wellbeing. Based on the facts presented before this Court, these
[petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the
degree of vigilance expected of them. Petitioner subject teacher
Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class
undertook the science experiment although Jayson insisted that
said petitioner left the classroom. No evidence, however, was
presented to establish that petitioner Tabugo was inside the
classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. It was
unnatural in the ordinary course of events that Jayson was brought
to the school clinic for immediate treatment not by petitioner
subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court

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is inclined to believe that petitioner subject teacher Tabugo was
not inside the classroom at the time the accident happened. The
Court is also perplexed why none of the other students (who were
eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in Court to corroborate the
story of the petitioners. The Court, however, understands that
these other students cannot testify for Jayson because Jayson is no
longer enrolled in said school and testifying for Jayson would incur
the ire of school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as
the subject adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised
control and supervision over petitioner Tabugo and the students
themselves. It was her obligation to insure that nothing would go
wrong and that the science experiment would be conducted safely
and without any harm or injury to the students. Petitioner Sr.
Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of
command responsibility because the other individual petitioners
were under her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts
of the other individual petitioners were done within the scope of
their assigned tasks.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Petitioners' negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree
of care and caution is demonstrated by the following:
1.

2.
3.
4.

Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert


damage and injury to its students although it had full
information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments conducted by the students during class;
Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect
the students who conduct experiments in class;
Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and
devices, specifically goggles, to shield students from
expected risks and dangers; and
Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole
time her class conducted the experiment, specifically,
when the accident involving Jayson occurred. In any
event, the size of the class fifty (50) students
conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor.

c. Liability of school where third parties


injure another student

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs COURT OF


APPEALS
FACTS:
Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High
School, wanted to join a school picnic. His parents, respondents
spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of
short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him
to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that
he should go back home after doing so. However, because of
persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the
beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was
apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand,
came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself
who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case
against petitioner and some of their teachers. Trial court found
teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the school.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.
RULING:
Petition granted.
RATIO:
4th paragraph Article 2180 of the Civil Code; When employer held
liable for the negligence of its employees; Rule.Before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee,
the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have
occurred while an employee was in the performance of his
assigned tasks.
The teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of
their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school
premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the
teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic.
It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while
some members of the I- C class of St. Francis High School were
having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the
school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is
not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extracurricular activity.Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the

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planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to the holding
of the same.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners. Petitioners
Connie Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand
belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the
students who joined the picnic. In fact, Connie invited copetitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E.
instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid
application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents witness,
Segundo Vinas, testified that the defendants (petitioners herein)
had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of
emergency. (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both
petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to
save the child.
Where no negligence was established no moral damages can be
recovered. Moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.

PHILIPPINE
SCHOOL
OF
BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.
PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO
SACRO, AND LT. M. SORIANO , petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZBENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA
R. BAUTISTA, and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA,
respondents.
FACTS:

August 30, 1985 Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce


student at the PSBA, was stabbed to death while on the
second-floor premises of the school. The assailants were
not members of the schools academic community but
were elements from outside the school.

The parents of Carlitos filed a civil action against the school


authorities, alleging them negligent, reckless and with
failure to take security precautions, means and methods
before, during and after the attack on the victim.
Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit
dismissed.
RTC denied their motion to dismiss.
CA affirmed TC order. CA decided in favor of the parents
of Carlitos, primarily anchoring its decision on the law of
quasi-delicts.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding


the case based on Article 2180 (in loco parentis)
HELD:
No.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule in in loco parentis. It had been stressed that
the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material
situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated,
the assailants of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts
the school could have been made liable. But it does not necessarily
follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a
contractual relation between PSBA and Carlitos, the rules on quasidelict do not really govern. However, the mere fact that a person is
bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extracontractual liability to such person. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the
contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Art. 21 of
the Civil Code comes to mind, so that should the act which
breaches a contract be done in bad faith and violative of Art. 21,
then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.

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In the present case, there is no finding that the contract between
the school and Carlitos had been breached thru the formers
negligence in providing proper security measures.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The Court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered
to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court.
Costs against the petitioners.

SOLIMAN vs TUAZON
Facts:
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

Security guard JIMMY SOLOMON, who was on duty at the


time of the incident in the Republic Central Colleges, shot
petitioner Maximino on the abdomen. Maximino was
treated at the Angeles Medical Center and as per doctors
opinion, he may not be able to attend to his regular classes
and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual
work for a duration of three to four months.
Petitioner Maximino filed a civil complaint for damages
against Republic Central Colleges and Jimmy Solomon.
3.Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss
stating that the complaint stated no cause of action
against it. a. It was not the employer of the security guard.
b. Art. 2180 does not apply to it because said par. Holds
teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices while security guard Jimmy was not a pupil,
student or apprentice of the school.
Lower court granted the MTD.
Hence this petition. It is contended that the trial judge
committed GAD when he refused to apply the provisions of
Article 2180 as well as 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Colleges is liable.


HELD: YES
The first par. Of 2180 offers no basis for the liability of the Colleges
for the alleged wrongful acts of the security guard because it is not
the employer of the said security guard. Liability for illegal or
harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the
employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such
agency.

3
As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no
hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or
watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the
duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be
demanded from the client whose premises or property are
protected by the security guards. Similarly the 7 th par. Of the same
article is not available in imposing liability since clearly Security
Guard Solomon is not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
The school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.
School is liable on the basis of its contractual obligation.
In the case of PSBA vs. CA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the
Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by
one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not
exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same time,
however, the Court stressed that
an implied contract may be held to be established between a
school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand,
and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which
contract results in obligations for both parties.

Saludaga vs FEU, De Jesus (President of


FEU)
FACTS:

A sophomore student of FEU, Saludaga, was shot inside the


FEU premises by its security guard on duty, Rosete. Rosete
avers that the shooting was accidental.

Saludaga was rushed to the hospital and sustained


numerous injuries.

Rosete was taken to the precinct, but was released


because no formal complaint was filed against him.

Saludaga filed a complaint for damages against FEU and its


president De Jesus, alleging that FEU breached its
obligation to provide students with a safe and secure
environment, and an atmosphere conducive to learning.
o FEU filed a 3rd party complaint against Galaxy, its
security agency, for indemnification of whatever
would be adjudged in favour of Saludaga.
o Galaxy filed a 4th party complaint against AFP
General Insurance.

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RTC held FEU and De Jesus solidarily liable for
damages, Galaxy and its president to indemnify
FEU for the awarded damages, and dismissed the
4th party complaint for lack of cause of action.
CA set aside the ruling, and dismissed Saludagas
complaint.

stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of


respondents. A learning institution should not be allowed to
completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises
to the security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting
away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment
for its students.

ISSUE:
Whether or not FEU and De Jesus are solidarily liable for the
shooting by the employee of Galaxy

Due to this negligence, they cannot claim the defense of caso


fortuito. One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God
in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing
that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury
was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When
the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's participation
- whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act - the
whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.

HELD:
YES
It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law
student in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a
contractual obligation between the two parties. On petitioner's
part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of
the school. On the other hand, respondent FEU, as a learning
institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students
with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take
adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the campus.
When petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security
guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises,
there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply
with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its
students. Respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving
that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning
environment for their students. They failed to prove that they
ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the
requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed,
certain documents about Galaxy were presented during trial;
however, no evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a
security guard for the university was offered.
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to
ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them
actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service
Agreement. It was not proven that they examined the clearances,
psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents
enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the
security agency about these matters or failure to check the papers

DE Jesus cannot be deemed to be solidarily liable. The breach of


the obligation was due to the omission of the university as a
corporate entity, and hence it has a personality separate and
distinct from the officers. Furthermore there was no showing that it
falls within the exceptions under the Corporation Code. He cannot
also be held liable under NCC 2180, since Rosete is not his
employee, but is the employee of Galaxy.
Galaxy should indemnify FEU for whatever damages it might pay.
Thus Galaxy is held solidarily liable with FEU. In contrast, the
president of Galaxy, Imperial, is held solidarily liable for being
grossly negligent in directing the affairs of his security agency.
Evidence duly supports the findings of the trial court that Galaxy is
negligent not only in the selection of its employees but also in their
supervision. Indeed, no administrative sanction was imposed
against Rosete despite the shooting incident; moreover, he was
even allowed to go on leave of absence which led eventually to his
disappearance. Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioner's condition
or extend the necessary assistance, other than the P5,000.00
initially given to petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to make
good their pledge to reimburse petitioner's medical expenses.

DAY EIGHT

3.3.
OTHER
INDIVIDUALS
LIABILITY TORTS)

(CF.

STRICT

3.3.1.
REGISTERED/ACTUAL
CARRIER/MOTOR VEHICLE

OWNER

OF

Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily


liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could
have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It
is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at
least twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article
2180 are applicable. (n)

FILCAR TRANSPORT
ESPINAS

SERVICES

vs

JOSE

Facts:
Jose was driving his car along Leon Guinto St. in
Manila, near President Qurino Ave. He stopped at
the intersection because of the red light, and
proceeded when the green light went on.
However, in the middle of the street, he was hit by
a vehicle coming from the direction of Quirino Ave,
and going to Roxas Blvd.,; the latter vehicle
however did not stop, and instead, run away from
the scene of the accident. Jose, however, was able
to take a good look at the plate number of the
fleeing vehicle, and after verification with the
Land Transportation Office, was able to a certain
that it is registered in the name of the company,
Filcar. After several demand letters to the
company for reimbursement of expenses incurred

by him for the repair of the vehicle went


unheeded, Jose filed a case for damages against
the company.
In its defense, the company argued that it cannot
be held liable for damages incurred by Jose
because, while the car is indeed registered in the
name of the company, it is issued in the name of
the Corporate Secretary of the corporation, and at
the time of the accident, was driven by Timoteo,
the Corporate Secretarys personal driver, hence
there is no employer-employee relation between it
and the personal driver as to make it liable under
Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code.
May the registered owner of the vehicle liable for
damages caused by its driver, even if the latter is
not an employee of the registered owner?
Of course. According to the Supreme Court, it is
liable for damages, for the following reasons:
1. We cannot agree. It is well settled that in case
of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of
the motor vehicle is considered as the employer
of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily
liable for the tort committed by the latter under
Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the
Civil Code.
In Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, we
ruled that in so far as third persons are concerned,

DAY EIGHT

the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the


employer of the negligent driver, and the actual
employer is considered merely as an agent of
such owner.
2. Thus, whether the driver of the motor vehicle,
Floresca, is an employee of Filcar is irrelevant in
arriving at the conclusion that Filcar is primarily
and directly liable for the damages sustained by
Espinas. While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code does not contain
any provision on the liability of registered owners
in case of motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in
relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code
imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as registered
owner, to answer for the damages caused to
Espinas car. This interpretation is consistent with
the strong public policy of maintaining road
safety, thereby reinforcing the aim of the State to
promote the responsible operation of motor
vehicles by its citizens.
This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left
without any recourse against the actual employer
of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil
law principle of unjust enrichment, the registered
owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be
indemnified by the actual employer of the driver
of the amount that he may be required to pay as
damages for the injury caused to another.

The set-up may be inconvenient for the registered


owner of the motor vehicle, but the inconvenience
cannot outweigh the more important public policy
being advanced by the law in this case which is
the protection of innocent persons who may be
victims of reckless drivers and irresponsible motor
vehicle owners.
CRIX METRO LEASING
vs
Minors DENNIS, MULENE, MELANIE,
MARYKRIS MANGALINAO Y DIZON
(MISSING)

and

3.3.2. MANUFACTURERS
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks,
toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries
caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.

R.A. 7394 (Consumer Act of the Philippines)


Section 92-107 (Chapter 1) ---

3.3.3. POSSESSOR/USER OF ANIMAL


VESTIL
vs
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
On July 29, 1975, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was
playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late
Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in
Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she

DAY EIGHT
was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and
administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was
discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due
to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the
child died. The cause of death was certified as Bronchopneumonia.
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the
Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog
that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected
the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased
Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case
no one had witnessed it bite Theness.
Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint
Court of Appeals: It found that the Vestils were in possession of the
house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183
of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that
the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes
independent thereof as submitted by the appellees.
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is
not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his
estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the
property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister
living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog
simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Vestil is liable for Dog bite?

HELD:
Yes. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that
admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the
ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same
is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the

damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.
Vestil is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of
Vicente Miranda's estate. She and her husband were its possessors
at the time of the incident in question. There is evidence showing
that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice
weekly and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her
own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when she
was bitten by the dog. The dog remained in the house even after
the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the
incident in question occurred. Also, the Vestils offered to assist the
Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she
knew them only casually. The contention that Broncho-pneumonia
is not related to the dog bite is belied by the statement of the
doctors that it is a complication which may arise from rabies.
Theness showed signs of hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies. Lastly,
the court ruled that for 2183 applies not only to wild and vicious
animals but also tame.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of
the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed
lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social
interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or
service must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause.

3.3.4. PROPRIETOR OF BUILDING/THING


Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages
caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of
with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances
which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or
property;

DAY EIGHT
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if
not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of
infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the
place. (1908)
Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles
should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in
article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only
against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with
said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part
thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or
falling from the same.

GOTESCO vs CHATTO
FACTS:
Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E.
Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I
theater, owned by Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought
balcony tickets but were unable to find seats considering the
number of people patronizing the movie. After 10 minutes, the
ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into
darkness and pandemonium ensued. The Chattos crawled under
the fallen ceiling. They were confined and treated for one (1) day
at the FEU Hospital.
Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, gloria
went to Illinois, USA for further treatment. She was treated at the
Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for
about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the
Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times.
Gotesco tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the
ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained
that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction
defect.
The trial court ordered Gotesco to pay Lina moral damages and
Gloria actual and consequential damages, moral damages and

attorney's fees, plus the cost of the suit. CA affirmed in toto the
RTC decision.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling was due to force
majeure
2 Whether or not Gotesco was grossly negligent in failing to
cause proper and adequate inspection maintenance and
upkeep of the building
HELD:
1 No.
Gotescos claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's
balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts
because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong. He is not an engineer,
and an architect who had not even passed the government's
examination. He admitted that "he could not give any reason why
the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the
burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force
majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong
could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.
There was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial
civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the
theater's ceiling.
Bouvier defines force majeure as Any accident due to natural
cause, directly exclusively without human intervention, such as
could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and
care reasonably to have been expected.
2

Yes.

The trial court found that the collapse was due to construction
defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding.
The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the
accident in question. Such defects could have been easily
discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in
keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the
testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the
premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the
leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates
of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That the
structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by

DAY EIGHT
the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of
occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no
defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever
inspected at all.
It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of public
amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and
amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are
designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or
qualification than that he does not contract against unknown
defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a
patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured,
and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under
the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened
if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a
presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of
the defendant.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that the cause of
the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be
liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court
denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and
Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from
any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he
should not have been guilty of negligence.

SPOUSES BENJAMIN AND SONIA MAMARIL


vs
BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, AIB
SECURITY
Vicarious liablity lies with the true employer and
not the employers client.
Liablity for illegal or harmful acts commited by
the security guards attaches to the employer

agency, and not to the clients or customers of


such agency.
Facts: Spouses Benjamin Mamaril and Sonia P.
Mamaril are jeepney operators. They would park
their six passenger jeepneys every night at the
Boy Scout of the Philippines compound for a fee of
P300.00 per month for each unit. However, one of
the vehicles went missing and was never
recovered. BSP had contracted with AIB for its
security and protection. Cesario Pea and Vicente
Gaddi wereassigned by AIB Security to secure the
BSP compound. One night a male person who has
the key of the vehicle took the lost jeepney out of
the compound and iot was never recovered.The
Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint for damges against
BSP,
AIB
and
the
two
security
guards.Issue:Whether or not the Boy Scout of the
Philippines is not liable for the lost vehicle owned
by the Spouses due to the negligence of
thesecurity guards assigned by AIB to BSP under
the Guard Service Contract?Ruling:It is undisputed
that the proxi
mate cause of the loss of the Sps. Mamarils
vehicle was the negligent act of the secu
rity guards inallowing unidentified person to take
the vehicle but there is nothing that point
negligence on the part of BSP for it to be
liable.The two security guards are employees of
AIB and where thus assigned by AIB to BSP in
pursuant of the Guard Service Contractbetween
them. There is no employer-employee relationship
between the security guard and BSP. The
negligence of the securityguard cannot be

DAY EIGHT

attributed to BSP but rather to its true employer


AIB.Liablity for illegal or harmful acts commited by
the security guards attaches to the employer
agency, and not to the clients orcustomers of such
agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of
a secuirty agency has no hand in selecting who
among thepool of security guards or watchmen
employed by the agency shall be assigned to it;
the duty to observe the diligence of a goodfather
of a family in the selection of the guards cannot,
in ordinary course of events, be demanded from a
client company whosepremises or property are
protected by the security guards. The fact that a
client company may give instruction or direction
to thesecurity guards assigned to it, does not, by
it self render the client responsible as an
employer of the secuirty guards concerned
andlaible for their wrongful acts or omission.
In this case, it is undisputed that the proximate
cause of the loss of Sps. Mamarils vehicle was the
negligent act of security guards Pea and Gaddi in
allowing an unidentified person to drive out the
subject vehicle. Proximate cause has been defined
as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury or loss, and without
which the result would not have occurred.1
Moreover, Pea and Gaddi failed to refute Sps.
Mamarils contention2 that they readily admitted
being at fault during the investigation that
ensued.

On the other hand, the records are bereft of any


finding of negligence on the part of BSP. Hence, no
reversible error was committed by the CA in
absolving it from any liability for the loss of the
subject vehicle based on fault or negligence.
Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer
under Article 21803 of the Civil Code apply in this
case. It is uncontested that Pea and Gaddi were
assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP
pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. Clearly,
therefore, no employer-employee relationship
existed between BSP and the security guards
assigned in its premises. Consequently, the
latters negligence cannot be imputed against BSP
but should be attributed to AIB, the true employer
of Pea and Gaddi.4
In the case of Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,5 the Court
enunciated thus:
It is settled that where the security agency, as
here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its
watchmen or security guards, the agency is the
employer of such guards and watchmen. Liability
for illegal or harmful acts committed by the
security guards attaches to the employer agency,
and not to the clients or customers of such
agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of
a security agency has no hand in selecting who
among the pool of security guards or watchmen
employed by the agency shall be assigned to it;
the duty to observe the diligence of a good father

DAY EIGHT

of a family in the selection of the guards cannot,


in the ordinary course of events, be demanded
from the client whose premises or property are
protected by the security guards. The fact that a
client company may give instructions or directions
to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by
itself, render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned and
liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those
instructions or directions are ordinarily no more
than requests commonly envisaged in the
contract for services entered into with the security
agency.6
Nor can it be said that a principal-agent
relationship existed between BSP and the security
guards Pea and Gaddi as to make the former
liable for the latters complained act. Article 1868
of the Civil Code states that [b]y the contract of
agency, a person binds himself to render some
service or to do something in representation or on
behalf of another, with the consent or authority of
the latter.
The basis for agency therefore is representation,7
which element is absent in the instant case.
Records show that BSP merely hired the services
of AIB, which, in turn, assigned security guards,
solely for the protection of its properties and
premises. Nowhere can it be inferred in the Guard
Service Contract that AIB was appointed as an
agent of BSP. Instead, what the parties intended
was a pure principal-client relationship whereby

for a consideration, AIB rendered its security


services to BSP.
3.3.5. AGENT OF A PRINCIPAL
SPOUSES FERNANDO AND LOURDES VILORIA
vs
CONTINENTAL AIRWAYS
FACTS:
Fernando purchased for himself and his wife, Lourdes, two round
trip airline tickets from San Diego, California to Newark, New Jersey
with Continental Airlines. He purchased the tickets from "Holiday
Travel" and was attended to by travel agent Margaret Mager.
Fernando initially wanted to travel via AMTRAK, an intercity
passenger train service provider in the United States. But they just
agreed to buy the said tickets after Mager informed them that
there were no available seats at Amtrak.
Later, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their flight to an
earlier date. Mager informed him that flights to Newark via
Continental Airlines were already fully booked and offered the
alternative of a round trip flight via Frontier Air. Because of
Frontiers higher rates, Fernando just opted to request for a refund
but according to Mager the subject tickets are non-refundable and
the only option that Continental Airlines can offer is the re-issuance
of new tickets within one year from the date the subject tickets
were issued. Thereafter, Fernando decided to reserve two seats
with Frontier Air.
At Greyhound Station, Fernando made inquiries at Amtrak and
discovered that seats available and may travel anytime and any
day he pleased. Fernando then purchased two tickets for
Washington, D.C. From Amtrak, Fernando went to Holiday Travel
and confronted Mager telling her that she had misled them into
buying the Continental Airlines tickets by misrepresenting that
Amtrak was already fully booked. Fernando reiterated his demand
for a refund but was told that the subject tickets are nonrefundable.

DAY EIGHT
Upon his return to the Philippines, Fernando sent a letter to CAI
demanding for a refund. Continental Micronesia denied Fernandos
request and advised him that he may take the subject tickets to
any Continental ticketing location for the re-issuance of new tickets
within two years from the date they were issued. Continental
Micronesia informed Fernando that the subject tickets may be used
as a form of payment for the purchase of another Continental
ticket, albeit with a re-issuance fee.
Fernando went to Continentals ticketing office at Makati City to
have the subject tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket to
Los Angeles, California under his name. Therein, he was informed
that Lourdes ticket was non-transferable. He was also informed
that a round trip ticket to Los Angeles was US$1,867.40 so he
would have to pay what will not be covered by the value of his San
Diego to Newark round trip ticket.
Spouses Viloria filed a complaint praying that CAI be ordered to
refund the money they used in the purchase of the subject tickets
with legal interest. CAIs defenses were the conditions attached to
their contract of carriage is the non-transferability and nonrefundability of the subject tickets.
RTC ruled holding that Spouses Viloria are entitled to a refund.
Citing Articles 1868 and 1869 of the Civil Code, the RTC ruled that
Mager is CAIs agent, hence, bound by her bad faith and
misrepresentation.
CA reversed the RTC holding that CAI cannot be held liable for
Magers act in the absence of any proof that a principal-agent
relationship existed between CAI and Holiday Travel.
ISSUES:
Does a principal-agent relationship exist between CAI and Holiday
Travel?
Assuming that an agency relationship exists between CAI and
Holiday Travel, is CAI bound by the acts of Holiday Travels agents
and employees such as Mager?
RULING:
1 Yes,a principal-agent relationship exists between CAI and
Holiday Travel.

The CA failed to consider undisputed facts, discrediting CAIs denial


that Holiday Travel is one of its agents. Furthermore, in erroneously
characterizing the contractual relationship between CAI and
Holiday Travel as a contract of sale, the CA failed to apply the
fundamental civil law principles governing agency and
differentiating it from sale.
The essential elements of agency are: (1) there is consent, express
or implied of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object
is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3)
the agent acts as a representative and not for himself, and (4) the
agent acts within the scope of his authority.
The first and second elements are present as CAI does not deny
that it concluded an agreement with Holiday Travel, whereby
Holiday Travel would enter into contracts of carriage with third
persons on CAIs behalf. The third element is also present as it is
undisputed that Holiday Travel merely acted in a representative
capacity and it is CAI and not Holiday Travel who is bound by the
contracts of carriage entered into by Holiday Travel on its behalf.
The fourth element is also present considering that CAI has not
made any allegation that Holiday Travel exceeded the authority
that was granted to it. In fact, CAI consistently maintains the
validity of the contracts of carriage that Holiday Travel executed
with Spouses Viloria and that Mager was not guilty of any
fraudulent misrepresentation. That CAI admits the authority of
Holiday Travel to enter into contracts of carriage on its behalf is
easily discernible from its February 24, 1998 and March 24, 1998
letters, where it impliedly recognized the validity of the contracts
entered into by Holiday Travel with Spouses Viloria. When Fernando
informed CAI that it was Holiday Travel who issued to them the
subject tickets, CAI did not deny that Holiday Travel is its
authorized agent.
2. In actions based on quasi-delict, a principal can only be held
liable for the tort committed by its agents employees if it has been
established by preponderance of evidence that the principal was
also at fault or negligent or that the principal exercise control and
supervision over them.
Spouses Vilorias cause of action on the basis of Magers alleged
fraudulent misrepresentation is clearly one of tort or quasi-delict,
there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between them.

DAY EIGHT
Therefore, it was incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI
was equally at fault.
However, the records are devoid of any evidence by which CAIs
alleged liability can be substantiated. Apart from their claim that
CAI must be held liable for Magers supposed fraud because
Holiday Travel is CAIs agent, Spouses Viloria did not present
evidence that CAI was a party or had contributed to Magers
complained act either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel
and Mager to issue the said misrepresentation.

It is incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI exercised


control or supervision over Mager by preponderant evidence.
Therefore, without a modicum of evidence that CAI exercised
control over Holiday Travels employees or that CAI was equally at
fault, no liability can be imposed on CAI for Magers supposed
misrepresentation.

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