Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Other
ISSUES:
Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus, Mrs.
Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita
Lugue, the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action
for damages against Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco, the owners and
operators of the Franco Transportation Company.
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WON respondent appellate court may properly increase the award
of damages in favor of the private respondents Chuay and Lugue,
prevailing parties in the lower court, who did not appeal said
court's decision.
RULING:
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Holy Spirit
:
Tolentino
:
Taguiam
:
petitioner school
Petitioner school
Petitioner principal
Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the
FACTS:
HELD:
Yes.
At the outset, respondent cannot simply ignore the purpose of the
permit by resorting to assumptions. She could have requested the
mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least
called her up to obtain her conformity.
As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent
should have made sure that the children were protected from all
harm while in her company. Respondent should have known that
leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves
may result in an accident. A simple reminder "not to go to the
deepest part of the pool" was insufficient to cast away all the
serious dangers that the situation presented to the children,
especially when respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim.
Dismally, respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed
the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This is a clear
violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on
her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself.
This cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent.
CONTRA
ST.
MARYS
CARPITANOS
ACADEMY
vs
WILLIAM
Facts:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for
the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from
where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin
Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the
other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by
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Held:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin
under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where
it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a
minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany
the minor students in the jeep. However, for them
to be held liable, the act or omission to be
considered negligent must be the proximate cause
of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have
a causal connection to the accident. It must be
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the
victim failed to show such negligence on the part of
the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted
that the immediate cause of the accident was not
the reckless driving of James but the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore,
there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the
minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The
mechanical defect was an event over which the
school has no control hence they may not be held
liable for the death resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to 3 rd persons for injuries
caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.
HELD:
No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as
the ruling in the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL
Reyes dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton and
Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be
held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The
unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students
could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of
the students in the school premises to protect their students from
harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At
any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves
of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article
2180, Civil Code, by (proving) that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the light of the
factual findings of the lower courts decision, said defendants failed
to prove such exemption from liability. The SC reiterated that there
is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living
and boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads
and teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts
of their students.
PASCO vs CFI-BULACAN
FACTS:
AMADORA
vs
CA (COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS,
VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR.,
CELESTINO
DICON,
ANIANO
ABELLANA,
PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and
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cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-incharge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a
general authority over the students and not direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular
classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should
probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated
an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher
authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof
was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the
provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts
and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the
respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo
resulting to his death.
Petition was denied.
SALVOSA vs IAC
FACTS:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution of the
arts and trade. Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the
Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC)
Unit, which is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The ROTC Unit, by way of accommodation to the AFP,
the latter was provided by the BCF an office and an armory located
at the basement of its main building. Jimmy B. Abon, a commerce
student of BCF was appointed as armorer of the ROTC Unit by the
AFP receiving salary from the latter and under the orders of
Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant.
Around 8:00 in the evening, Jimmy B. Abon then shot Napoleon
Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed
firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of
the BCF and he was convicted crime of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP for the death of Castro.
Trial Court rendered a decision, sentencing defendants Jimmy B.
Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc.,
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jointly and severally, to pay private respondents Eduardo,
Diomedes, Virginia and Rodolfo Castro. On appeal, the decision
was affirmed stating that although Abon was not attending any
class or school function at the time of the shooting incident, which
was at about 8 o'clock in the evening; but considering that Abon
was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF
ROTC unit, he must have been attending night classes and
therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time
for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within the
"recess time".
ISSUE:
WON Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a
consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
HELD:
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."
The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains
in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent,
in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise
reasonable
supervision
over
the
conduct
of
the
[student]." 14 Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 'so long as
(the students) remain in their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time."
A student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess"
thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at
attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary
adjournment of school activities where the student still remains
within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school
premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted.
Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. 18Likewise, the
mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school
without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the
"protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
Hence, Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at
attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot
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HELD:
As held in Amadora vs CA, it is only the teacher and
not the head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students.
Where the school is academic rather than technical
or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher
in charge of such student, this is the general rule.
However, in case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall
be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable for
the acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as
principal cannot be held liable for the reason that
the school he heads is an academic school and he
did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his students
should make sure that the children are protected
from all harm. The excavation instructed clearly
exposed the students to risk and should not be
placed under the category of Work Education such
as school gardening, planting trees etc. Aquino
acted with fault and gross negligence where instead
Petitioner school
Petitioner principal
Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the
FACTS:
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respondent, among others. They also filed against
respondent a
criminal
complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
LA and NLRC:
declared that respondent was validly terminated for
gross neglect of duty.
He opined that Chiara Mae drowned because
respondent had left the pupils without any adult
supervision. He also noted that the absence of
adequate facilities should have alerted respondent
before allowing the pupils to use the swimming pool.
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other expenses incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed.
Hence, [Jayson] was constrained to file the complaint for damages.
[Petitioners], therefore, should likewise compensate [Jayson] for
litigation expenses, including attorney's fees.
On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC,
and Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in
the school year 1994-1995. On November 17, 1994, at about 1:30
in the afternoon, the class to which [Jayson] belong[s] was
conducting a science experiment under the guidance and
supervision of Tabugo, the class science teacher, about fusion of
sulphur powder and iron fillings by combining these elements in a
test tube and heating the same. Before the science experiment
was conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given strict
instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and
not to look into the test tube until the heated compound had
cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of sufficient age and
discretion and completely capable of understanding the English
language and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for
the heated compound to cool off, as required in the written
procedure for the experiment and as repeatedly explained by the
teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass and
looked at the compound, which at that moment spurted out of the
test tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jayson's] eyes.
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and
thereafter transferred to St. Luke's Medical Center for treatment. At
the hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and
apologized to his teacher for violating her instructions not to look
into the test tube until the compound had cooled off.
After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge
and an eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or
affected. In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the
delay in [Jayson's] discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jayson's] father,
requested SJC to advance the amount of P26,176.35 representing
[Jayson's] hospital bill until his wife could arrive from abroad and
pay back the money. SJC acceded to the request.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through
counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all
the medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will
be incurred further arising from the accident caused by the science
experiment. In a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for
SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the
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is inclined to believe that petitioner subject teacher Tabugo was
not inside the classroom at the time the accident happened. The
Court is also perplexed why none of the other students (who were
eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in Court to corroborate the
story of the petitioners. The Court, however, understands that
these other students cannot testify for Jayson because Jayson is no
longer enrolled in said school and testifying for Jayson would incur
the ire of school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as
the subject adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised
control and supervision over petitioner Tabugo and the students
themselves. It was her obligation to insure that nothing would go
wrong and that the science experiment would be conducted safely
and without any harm or injury to the students. Petitioner Sr.
Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of
command responsibility because the other individual petitioners
were under her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts
of the other individual petitioners were done within the scope of
their assigned tasks.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Petitioners' negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree
of care and caution is demonstrated by the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
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planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to the holding
of the same.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners. Petitioners
Connie Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand
belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the
students who joined the picnic. In fact, Connie invited copetitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E.
instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid
application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents witness,
Segundo Vinas, testified that the defendants (petitioners herein)
had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of
emergency. (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both
petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to
save the child.
Where no negligence was established no moral damages can be
recovered. Moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
PHILIPPINE
SCHOOL
OF
BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.
PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO
SACRO, AND LT. M. SORIANO , petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZBENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA
R. BAUTISTA, and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA,
respondents.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
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In the present case, there is no finding that the contract between
the school and Carlitos had been breached thru the formers
negligence in providing proper security measures.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The Court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered
to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court.
Costs against the petitioners.
SOLIMAN vs TUAZON
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
3
As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no
hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or
watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the
duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be
demanded from the client whose premises or property are
protected by the security guards. Similarly the 7 th par. Of the same
article is not available in imposing liability since clearly Security
Guard Solomon is not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
The school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.
School is liable on the basis of its contractual obligation.
In the case of PSBA vs. CA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the
Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by
one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not
exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same time,
however, the Court stressed that
an implied contract may be held to be established between a
school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand,
and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which
contract results in obligations for both parties.
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RTC held FEU and De Jesus solidarily liable for
damages, Galaxy and its president to indemnify
FEU for the awarded damages, and dismissed the
4th party complaint for lack of cause of action.
CA set aside the ruling, and dismissed Saludagas
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FEU and De Jesus are solidarily liable for the
shooting by the employee of Galaxy
HELD:
YES
It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law
student in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a
contractual obligation between the two parties. On petitioner's
part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of
the school. On the other hand, respondent FEU, as a learning
institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students
with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take
adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the campus.
When petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security
guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises,
there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply
with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its
students. Respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving
that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning
environment for their students. They failed to prove that they
ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the
requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed,
certain documents about Galaxy were presented during trial;
however, no evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a
security guard for the university was offered.
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to
ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them
actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service
Agreement. It was not proven that they examined the clearances,
psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents
enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the
security agency about these matters or failure to check the papers
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3.3.
OTHER
INDIVIDUALS
LIABILITY TORTS)
(CF.
STRICT
3.3.1.
REGISTERED/ACTUAL
CARRIER/MOTOR VEHICLE
OWNER
OF
FILCAR TRANSPORT
ESPINAS
SERVICES
vs
JOSE
Facts:
Jose was driving his car along Leon Guinto St. in
Manila, near President Qurino Ave. He stopped at
the intersection because of the red light, and
proceeded when the green light went on.
However, in the middle of the street, he was hit by
a vehicle coming from the direction of Quirino Ave,
and going to Roxas Blvd.,; the latter vehicle
however did not stop, and instead, run away from
the scene of the accident. Jose, however, was able
to take a good look at the plate number of the
fleeing vehicle, and after verification with the
Land Transportation Office, was able to a certain
that it is registered in the name of the company,
Filcar. After several demand letters to the
company for reimbursement of expenses incurred
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and
3.3.2. MANUFACTURERS
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks,
toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries
caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.
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was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and
administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was
discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due
to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the
child died. The cause of death was certified as Bronchopneumonia.
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the
Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog
that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected
the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased
Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case
no one had witnessed it bite Theness.
Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint
Court of Appeals: It found that the Vestils were in possession of the
house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183
of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that
the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes
independent thereof as submitted by the appellees.
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is
not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his
estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the
property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister
living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog
simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Vestil is liable for Dog bite?
HELD:
Yes. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that
admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the
ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same
is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.
Vestil is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of
Vicente Miranda's estate. She and her husband were its possessors
at the time of the incident in question. There is evidence showing
that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice
weekly and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her
own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when she
was bitten by the dog. The dog remained in the house even after
the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the
incident in question occurred. Also, the Vestils offered to assist the
Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she
knew them only casually. The contention that Broncho-pneumonia
is not related to the dog bite is belied by the statement of the
doctors that it is a complication which may arise from rabies.
Theness showed signs of hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies. Lastly,
the court ruled that for 2183 applies not only to wild and vicious
animals but also tame.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of
the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed
lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social
interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or
service must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause.
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(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if
not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of
infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the
place. (1908)
Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles
should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in
article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only
against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with
said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part
thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or
falling from the same.
GOTESCO vs CHATTO
FACTS:
Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E.
Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I
theater, owned by Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought
balcony tickets but were unable to find seats considering the
number of people patronizing the movie. After 10 minutes, the
ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into
darkness and pandemonium ensued. The Chattos crawled under
the fallen ceiling. They were confined and treated for one (1) day
at the FEU Hospital.
Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, gloria
went to Illinois, USA for further treatment. She was treated at the
Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for
about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the
Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times.
Gotesco tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the
ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained
that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction
defect.
The trial court ordered Gotesco to pay Lina moral damages and
Gloria actual and consequential damages, moral damages and
attorney's fees, plus the cost of the suit. CA affirmed in toto the
RTC decision.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling was due to force
majeure
2 Whether or not Gotesco was grossly negligent in failing to
cause proper and adequate inspection maintenance and
upkeep of the building
HELD:
1 No.
Gotescos claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's
balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts
because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong. He is not an engineer,
and an architect who had not even passed the government's
examination. He admitted that "he could not give any reason why
the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the
burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force
majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong
could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.
There was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial
civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the
theater's ceiling.
Bouvier defines force majeure as Any accident due to natural
cause, directly exclusively without human intervention, such as
could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and
care reasonably to have been expected.
2
Yes.
The trial court found that the collapse was due to construction
defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding.
The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the
accident in question. Such defects could have been easily
discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in
keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the
testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the
premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the
leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates
of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That the
structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by
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the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of
occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no
defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever
inspected at all.
It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of public
amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and
amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are
designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or
qualification than that he does not contract against unknown
defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a
patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured,
and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under
the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened
if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a
presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of
the defendant.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that the cause of
the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be
liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court
denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and
Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from
any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he
should not have been guilty of negligence.
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Upon his return to the Philippines, Fernando sent a letter to CAI
demanding for a refund. Continental Micronesia denied Fernandos
request and advised him that he may take the subject tickets to
any Continental ticketing location for the re-issuance of new tickets
within two years from the date they were issued. Continental
Micronesia informed Fernando that the subject tickets may be used
as a form of payment for the purchase of another Continental
ticket, albeit with a re-issuance fee.
Fernando went to Continentals ticketing office at Makati City to
have the subject tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket to
Los Angeles, California under his name. Therein, he was informed
that Lourdes ticket was non-transferable. He was also informed
that a round trip ticket to Los Angeles was US$1,867.40 so he
would have to pay what will not be covered by the value of his San
Diego to Newark round trip ticket.
Spouses Viloria filed a complaint praying that CAI be ordered to
refund the money they used in the purchase of the subject tickets
with legal interest. CAIs defenses were the conditions attached to
their contract of carriage is the non-transferability and nonrefundability of the subject tickets.
RTC ruled holding that Spouses Viloria are entitled to a refund.
Citing Articles 1868 and 1869 of the Civil Code, the RTC ruled that
Mager is CAIs agent, hence, bound by her bad faith and
misrepresentation.
CA reversed the RTC holding that CAI cannot be held liable for
Magers act in the absence of any proof that a principal-agent
relationship existed between CAI and Holiday Travel.
ISSUES:
Does a principal-agent relationship exist between CAI and Holiday
Travel?
Assuming that an agency relationship exists between CAI and
Holiday Travel, is CAI bound by the acts of Holiday Travels agents
and employees such as Mager?
RULING:
1 Yes,a principal-agent relationship exists between CAI and
Holiday Travel.
DAY EIGHT
Therefore, it was incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI
was equally at fault.
However, the records are devoid of any evidence by which CAIs
alleged liability can be substantiated. Apart from their claim that
CAI must be held liable for Magers supposed fraud because
Holiday Travel is CAIs agent, Spouses Viloria did not present
evidence that CAI was a party or had contributed to Magers
complained act either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel
and Mager to issue the said misrepresentation.