PCGG vs.

DESIERTO

Facts:

The Office of the Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of

investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to
pass upon criminal complaints. However, such power is not absolute; it
cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.
This Court has the constitutional duty to reverse the ombudsman. The
present Petition is one such exception, involving serious allegations of
multimillion-dollar bribes and unlawful commissions. At the center of all
these is the non-performing, billion-dollar Bataan nuclear power plant -- a
virtual white elephant -- which our impoverished people are still paying for,
even if they have not benefited from it at all!
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) charged Disini
with bribing the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos as a means to induce
him to assist and favor individuals and corporate entities
The charge pertained to the negotiation, award, signing, amendment and
implementation of the main and related contracts for the Philippine Nuclear
Power Plant (PNPP) project of the National Power Corporation (NPC), as a
result of which the afore-mentioned public official accumulated and
benefited from unlawful acquisition of income or profits
Petition alleges that sometime in August 1973, then President Marcos
instructed the NPC to pursue, supervise and undertake the construction and
the eventual operation of the nuclear power plant in Morong, Bataan.
Because of its lack of expertise in designing and constructing commercial
nuclear power plants, the NPC needed a qualified engineering firm to act as
consultant to assist it in selecting a plant site, preparing equipment
specifications, soliciting bids, and evaluating proposals from prospective
contractors.
A number of companies, including Westinghouse Electric Corporation
(hereinafter, Westinghouse) and Burns & Roe, a New York-based company,
manifested their interest in the PNPP project.
The former was interested in the construction of the main PNPP project; and
the latter, in the architectural and engineering contract. Burns & Roe had
initially offered its services to be NPCs consultant; once so appointed, it
later used that position as a springboard to obtain the more lucrative
contracts of the nuclear power plant project.
Petitioner: that in early 1974, a Westinghouse representative approached
Disini to act as their go-between with Marcos. Disini was known to be the
late Presidents close personal associate, whose wife was then First Lady
Imelda R. Marcos first cousin and the Marcos familys personal physician.
Disini relayed his acceptance of the offer to Lea Sabol, the resident agent of
Westinghouse in the Philippines.

NPC General Manager Ramon Ravanzo informed Ebasco Services, Inc.

(hereinafter, Ebasco) that it had been chosen by the NPC Board as
consultant for the PNPP project
This move prompted Westinghouse and Burns & Roe to send Marcos,
through Disini, an Aide-Memoire strongly recommending that the consulting
contract given to Ebasco be awarded instead to Burns & Roe.
Westinghouse wanted Burns & Roe to get the consultancy contract, in order
to place the latter in a position to recommend that the main contract for the
construction of the PNPP project be awarded to the former.
The Petition further alleges that the foregoing development was discussed
by Samuel P. Hull Jr. and Kenneth E. Roe -- the international operations
director, and the chairman and chief executive officer, respectively, of Burns
and Roe. As a result, Hull enplaned for Manila and met with Disini at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. This
Disini not only assured Hull that he could influence Marcos to cause the
reversal of the Decision awarding the consulting contract to Ebasco, but he
also made a commitment to Hull that the former would obtain for
Westinghouse the prime contract for the entire nuclear power plant project
on a turn-key basis; and for Burns & Roe, the award of the main
architectural and engineering subcontract for the same project.
Hull agreed to grant Disini a commission based on a percentage of the
amounts paid to Burns & Roe under the architectural and engineering
contract and to pay up front $1 million dollars in four installments of
$250,000 each
Sent to Marcos was another Aide-Memoirefurther stressing the need for
awarding the consulting contract to Burns & Roe
February 22, 1974 - Mr. L. C. Saunders of Westinghouse also wrote him a
letter offering to submit a turn-key proposal for the nuclear power plant
project.
In a handwritten note, Marcos instructed then Executive Secretary Alejandro
Melchor and Ravanzo to wait for Westinghouses offer and, in the meantime,
enter into the contract for the consultant Burns and Roe.
NPC was constrained to rescind the letter of intent issued to Ebasco and to
award the consulting contract to Burns & Roe instead.
Petitioner also states that in the early part of March 1974, Disini departed for
San Francisco, California, USA, and met with six (6) officials of
Westinghouse. Convinced that Disini could surely influence Marcos to
award the PNPP prime contract to it, Westinghouse finally decided to retain
him formally as its special sales representative (SSR).
April 24, 1974 - Westinghouse sent Marcos, through Disini, a letter
containing its turn-key proposal. Upon receipt of the letter, Marcos informed
Melchor and Ravanzo of his preference for Westinghouse as shown by the
following handwritten notation
Disini furnished Westinghouse a copy of the letter containing Marcos
marginal note as proof that he could effectively persuade the late President

to directly intervene and to conform to its goal of finally getting the award of
the prime construction contract for the PNPP project.
May 7, 1974 - a delegation sent by Westinghouse and headed by James M.
Wallace, vice president and general manager of its Power Systems Projects
Division, briefed Marcos on its proposal.
Burns & Roe also succeeded in obtaining the main architectural and
engineering subcontract, when Marcos directed Westinghouse to hire it for
such purpose. However, in view of the apparent conflict of interest, Burns &
Roe gave up the consulting contract and retained only the architectural and
engineering contract, which it considered to be far more lucrative.
Thereafter, it worked for the termination of its consulting agreement with
NPC and was subsequently replaced by Ebasco.
Marcos categorically stated his choice of Westinghouse.
On the following day, he formally authorized Ravanzo to sign for and in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, the letter of commitment with
Westinghouse Electric Corporation to negotiate for and formulate a signed
and effective contract between the two parties for the supply, installation,
construction and start up of two 626-megawatt nuclear power plants
NPC negotiated with Westinghouse. A draft of the turn-key contract was
submitted by the latter sometime in November 1974. During the
negotiations, Westinghouse was apparently annoyed at Ebascos
consultancy role.
John F. Doyle, its commercial manager for the PNPP project, prepared
another Aide-Memoire, allegedly sent to Marcos through Disini, denouncing
the expansion of Ebascos influence and the possibility that the knowledge it
gained during said negotiations could be used against Westinghouse to
promote Ebascos own interest as a potential competitor and an ally of GE.
Marcos took prompt action by directing Ravanzo, Melchor and NPC
Chairman Manuel Barreto to leave the whole construction (civil and
erection) to Westinghouse since the concept is totally turn-key.
Marcos also ordered them to keep Ebasco strictly to its role as a consultant
Memorandum Report dated May 5, 1975, Ravanzo pointed out that many
provisions in the Westinghouse contract were extremely onerous,
unacceptable or inconsistent with the turn-key approach to project
implementation.
Melchor endorsed Ravanzos Report to Marcos, opining that the problems
being encountered with Westinghouse may be attributed to the absence of
competitive pressure and proposed that alternative suppliers be considered.
Marcos overruled their recommendations and directed the NPC to finalize
negotiations with Westinghouse and to submit to me for approval your
recommendations.
November 1975, the final draft of the Westinghouse contract was referred to
then Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for review. Noting that the
proposed contract was extremely onerous and unfavorable to the
government, he recommended that NPC should reject it

That contract was finally executed on February 9, 1976.

After Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino took over the Presidency of the Republic,
petitioner filed the previously mentioned charges against Disini before the
Office of the Ombudsman which, as already stated, dismissed the charges.

Issue: WON PCGG has submitted sufficient evidence to engender a well grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that Disini is probably guilty thereof?

Sufficiency of Evidence
o
As a general rule, the Office of the Ombudsman is endowed with
a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in
the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal complaints but
such authority is not absolute; it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously.
o
Court is to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government including the
Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsmans Grounds for Disinis Exoneration

o
The ombudsman decided in favor of Disini on the basis of the
following:

There was no testimonial evidence (a) that Disini was

interested in the proposal of Westinghouse to be its
special sales representative during negotiations for the
award of the PNPP project, or (b) that he intervened for
Burns and Roe to stop the hiring of Ebasco as NPC
consultant for the project.

There was neither documentary evidence nor

corroborating affidavit showing how Disini had actually
met with Hull to assure the latter that the former could
influence Marcos to overturn the award of the
consulting contract to Ebasco and to eventually award
the PNPP contracts to Westinghouse and to Burns &
Roe.

Neither the Aides-Memoire allegedly sent to Marcos

through Disini nor the telexes and the correspondences
between the officials of Westinghouse and Burns & Roe
indicated the author, the addressee, or the dates on
which they were drafted or sent.

All the negotiations for the unlawful commissions and

the actual payments thereof were based on
unauthenticated documents.

There was no testimonial evidence that the bank

transactions or the remittances questioned by the

PCGG had actually been sourced from commission

payments by Westinghouse and Burns & Roe.

There was insufficient supporting evidence for the fact

that certain corporations owned or headed by Disini -like PPI and ECCO-Asia -- were organized specifically
for the PNPP project, or that Marcos had business
interests in those corporations.
Meetings with Disini - the ombudsman found no evidence that
Disini had actually met with and assured Hull that the former
could influence Marcos to overturn the award of the consulting
contract to Ebasco and the eventual award of the PNPP project to
Westinghouse and Burns & Roe.
Aides-Memoire and Telexes - The PCGG presented AidesMemoire and telexes showing Disinis complicity in the crimes
charged. However, the ombudsman declared that these could not
stand, because the authors and the addressees as well as the
dates of drafting and sending had not been indicated. The PCGG
presented, as corroborative evidence of the questioned AidesMemoire and telexes between the officials of Westinghouse and
Burns and Roe, the Affidavits of Samuel Hull Jr. and Angelo
Manahan-- the executive vice president of Herdis Management
and Investment Corporation (HMIC), of which Disini was
chairman. The import of witness Manahans Affidavit dated
January 26, 1989, attached as Annex A to petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, is not to provide proof of commission payments
to respondent Herminio T. Disini but to explain how the Aide
Memoires were used by private respondents to perpetrate the
acts complained of constituting violation of the Revised Penal
Code and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Negotiations for and Actual Payments of Commissions =- The
ombudsman argued that none of the documents evidencing the
negotiations for and the actual payment of commissions had been
authenticated. While it may be true that the documents were not
signed (for telexes are not signed), they were nonetheless
identified and their sources authenticated. Often have we ruled
that the validity and the merits of a party's defense or accusation,
as well as the admissibility of testimonies and pieces of evidence,
are better ventilated during the trial than during the preliminary
investigation. Neither can the ombudsman rule on the presence or
the absence of the elements of the crime, for these are by nature
evidentiary and defense matters, the truth of which can be best
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation

is essentially inquisitorial.

It is often the only means of discovering the identities of

the persons who may be reasonably charged with a

crime, in order to enable the prosecutor to prepare the

complaint or information. Such investigation is not part
of the trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
other than to determine whether a crime has been
committed, and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof.

Furthermore, a preliminary investigation does not place

in jeopardy the persons who are subjected to it. It is not
the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of both
parties evidence, but for the presentation only of such
evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that
an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
Allegations of Hearsay - In a final attempt to shoot down the
evidence of the PCGG, the ombudsman also capriciously
dismissed some statements in the Affidavits of Hull as mere
hearsay and conjecture. We do not agree. Hull made clear and
categorical statements in his Affidavits regarding the
communications and negotiations, of which he absolutely had
personal knowledge.
All told, to arrive at the conclusion that there was no sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, it would be erroneous to take each piece of evidence
or sentence in a long affidavit singly or independently. It is clear
that the totality of the evidence presented in this case was more
than enough to sustain a finding that Disini was probably guilty of
the crime charged.
Finding of Probable Cause - Indeed, during the preliminary
investigation, the PCGG was not obliged to prove its cause
beyond reasonable doubt. It would be unfair to expect the
Commission to present the entire evidence needed to secure the
conviction of the accused prior to the filing of the information.
The reason lies in the nature and the purpose of a preliminary
investigation. At this stage, the prosecutor does not decide
whether the guilt of the person charged is backed by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt.
The former merely determines whether there is sufficient basis to
believe that a crime has been committed, and whether the latter is
guilty of it and should be held for trial.
The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
respective sets of evidence. It is for the presentation only of such
evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.

During the preliminary investigation, the main function of the

government prosecutor -- the ombudsman in this case -- is merely
to determine the existence of probable cause and, if it does exist,
to file the corresponding information.
Probable cause - existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite in a reasonable mind -- acting on the facts within the
prosecutors knowledge -- the belief that the person charged is
probably guilty of the crime for which he or she is being
prosecuted.
Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a
matter is or may be well-founded on such state of facts in the
prosecutors mind as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe -- or entertain an honest or strong suspicion
-- that it is so. It is enough that the act or the omission complained
of is believed to constitute the offense charged. Precisely, there is
a trial to allow the reception of evidence for the prosecution in
support of the charge
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the
average person weighs facts and circumstances without resorting
to the calibrations of technical rules of evidence, of which such
persons knowledge is nil. Rather, the lay person usually relies on
the calculus of common sense, of which all reasonable persons
have an abundance.
To our mind, the whole gamut of evidence presented is more than
sufficient to support a criminal complaint for the crimes of
corruption of public officials in relation to bribery, and violation of
the Anti-Graft Law. The evidence on record has engendered the
reasonable belief that Disini had offered, promised or actually
given to a public officer (Marcos) gifts or presents that made the
latter liable for bribery.
PCGG has sufficiently established probable cause to show that
Disini had capitalized, exploited and taken advantage of his close
personal relations with the former President, who was to decide
ultimately which corporation would undertake the PNPP project.
In so doing, Disini requested and received pecuniary
considerations from Westinghouse and Burns & Roe, which were
endeavoring to close the PNPP contract with the Philippine
government. All these things happened in violation of the Revised
Penal Code and/or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Should the appropriate information(s) be filed, nothing should
prevent the ombudsman from presenting other pieces of evidence
to buttress the prosecutions case and to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the offense(s) charged.
Indeed, the Bataan nuclear power plant is a monumental, billiondollar, non-performing white elephant, which our impoverished

people are still paying for even if they have not benefited from it at
all. Justice is long overdue. Let those who appear to be
responsible for this humongous mess be brought to account for
their participation. Let justice be done!
HELD: PETITION GRANTED
Baytan v. COMELEC 2003
Facts

Petitioners Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on

their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly
elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio in Barangay 18, Zone II of
Cavite City. Ignacio led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay
18.

When petitioners returned home, they discovered that their residence is

situated in Barangay 28, so they proceeded to Precinct No. 129-A of
Barangay 28 to register again.

They then sent a letter to COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio
O. Joson and furnished a copy to COMELEC Registrar Francisco Trias.
They requested for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. They
also explained the reason and circumstances of their second registration
and expressed their desire to redress the error.

The Election Officer of Cavite forwarded copies of petitioners Voters

Registration Records to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito
Ravanzo, for evaluation, who, in turn, endorsed it to the Regional Director
for prosecution, which then endorsed the case ro Ravanzo for resolution.
Ravanzo recommended filing an information for double registration against
petitioners. This was affirmed by the COMELEC in a minute resolution and
directed its Law Department to file the necessary information against
petitioners for violation of S261(y)(5), A22 of the Omnibus Election Code
(Any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an
application for cancellation of his previous registration.). They likewise
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioners then filed the
instant petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction.

Petitioners contend: They are innocent of any wrongdoing, because they did
not intend to perpetrate the act prohibited. They claim honest mistake and
good faith in registering twice. They made the first registration because of
the intervention and instigation of Ignacio.
o
They theorize that their letter to the election registrar of Cavity
City informing him of their lapse and asking for advice constitutes
substantial compliance with the Omnibus Election Codes
requirement of cancellation of prior registration.
o
They implore a liberal construction of the laws on election
offenses since almost 5 years have lapsed from the date of the
commission of the offense, so it is about to prescribe.

They fault the COMELEC en banc for assuming original

jurisdiction over the case in contravention of S3, A9-C of the
Constitution, which requires that election cases must first be
heard and decided by a division before assumption of jurisdiction
by the COMELEC en banc.

Issue 1: W/N the cases should be dismissed on the ground of lack of intent and
substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration
NO

The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the power to investigate

and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the COMELEC to
assure, the people of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
This grant is an adjunct to the COMELECs constitutional duty to enforce
and administer all election laws. Failure by the COMELEC to exercise this
power could result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make
an idle ceremony of the right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.

The assailed resolutions were issued in the preliminary investigation stage.

A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is only the means
to discover who may be charged with a crime, its function being merely to
determine probable cause. All that is required in the preliminary
investigation is the determination of probable cause to justify the holding of
petitioners for trial.

Probable cause is defined as a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor

as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does
not mean actual or positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for
the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and

in different precincts without canceling their previous registration. There
were also other circumstances found by the COMELEC to warrant the
finding of probable cause, such as the fact that they wrote down their
address as No. 709 T. Gomez Extension St., Barangay 18-Maya, Cavite
City in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18, but as No. 709 Magcawas St.,
Barangay 28-Taurus, Caridad, Cavite City in Precinct No. 129-A of
Barangay 28. There were also glaring inconsistencies in their affidavits as to
how Ignacio supposedly instigated them to register in the wrong barangay.

The COMELEC also pointed out that since double registration is malum
prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to violate the law is
inconsequential. Neither did the COMELEC consider petitioners letter as an
application to cancel their previous registration. The COMELEC explained
that this letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished

and after the election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of
double registration to a higher official.
All told, a reasonably prudent man would readily conclude that there exists
probable cause to hold petitioners for trial for the offense of double
registration.
Moreover, petitioners claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial
compliance with the Election Codes requirement of cancellation of previous
registration are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather
than at a preliminary investigation. The established rule is that a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties' evidence. It is for the presentation of evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
the accused is probably guilty thereof.
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of
election offenses rests in the COMELECs sound discretion. The COMELEC
exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices.
Petitioners plea for a liberal construction of the laws on the ground of
prescription also cannot be accepted. Prescription of the crime or offense is
the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to prosecute the offender after a
certain time. S267 of the Election Code gives a prescriptive period of 5
years. The offense occurred on June 22, 1997. Prescription was interrupted
when proceedings were instituted, even if merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation.

Issue 2: W/N COMELEC en bancs assumption of original jurisdiction over the case
violated the Constitution NO

Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC

exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers.

The COMELECs administrative powers are found in S2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6),
(7), (8), and (9) of Article 9-C. The Constitution does not prescribe how the
COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in
division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELECs administrative
powers in the Commission on Elections, while providing that the
COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions. Clearly, the COMELEC en
banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers.

On the other hand, the COMELECs quasi-judicial powers are found in

S2(2) of Article 9-C, and is subject to S3, which expressly requires that all
election cases shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the
motion for reconsideration shall be decided en banc.

The COMELEC is empowered in S2(6), Article 9-C of the 1987 Constitution

to prosecute cases of violations of election laws. The prosecution of
election law violators involves the exercise of the COMELECs
administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can directly approve

the recommendation of its Law Department to file the criminal information

for double registration against petitioners in the instant case. There is no
constitutional requirement that the filing of the criminal information be first
decided by any of the divisions of the COMELEC.

counsel for the petitioner put in an additional motion praying that,

should his motion of August 14, 1940, be acted upon adversely
and the respondent Fiscals objection thereto be sustained, the
Court itself immediately conduct the investigation. provided in
section 4 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, directing the Clerk of
Court to attach to the record an abstract of the testimony of the
witnesses at said investigation.

respondent Fiscal filed an objection to the additional motion on

the ground, among others, that "there is no necessity for this
Honorable Court to conduct a preliminary investigation in this
case because the substitute therefor had already been performed
in accordance with law by the office of the fiscal of the City of
Manila."

counsel for the petitioner filed a rejoinder

On August 22, 1940, the respondent judge denied the various

motions of the petitioner on substantially the same grounds
advanced by the respondent fiscal in his objections thereto.

By another motion of August 26, 1940, counsel for the petitioner

asked that the warrant of arrest issued in the case be cancelled
and insisted that the court conduct the preliminary investigation
referred to in section 1, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

This motion was followed by an opposition of the respondent

fiscal, by petitioners reply to said opposition, by a rejoinder of the
respondent fiscal, and by petitioners reply to said rejoinder.

The petitioners motion of August 26, 1940, was again denied by

the respondent judge on September 6, 1940. A motion for
reconsideration of September 11, 1940, met with a like fate on
September 16, 1940.

The petitioner excepted to the orders of the respondent judge of

August 22, 1940, September 6, 1940, September 16, 1940 and
announced his intention to bring up the case to this Court
on certiorari and mandamus.

HELD: Petition dismissed.

3. Hashim v. Boncan
Facts:

On August 6, 1940, the petitioner, N. T. Hashim, was caught red-handed in

possession of counterfeit treasury certificates of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.

He was placed under arrest, without warrant, by the operatives of the

Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, but was released on
the same day upon filing a bond.

The case was docketed as criminal case NO. 61464 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. On the strength of the respondent fiscals sworn
statement that he had conducted a preliminary investigation and that he had
examined the witnesses under oath, according to law, Judge of First
Instance Sixto de la Costa issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner.
He was later admitted to bail.

Before the petitioner could be arraigned, the following incidents transpired in

the trial court:
o

counsel for the petitioner filed a motion under sections 11 and 13

of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, asking that the respondent
fiscal furnish the clerk of court with the testimony of the witnesses
who testified at the preliminary investigation, or an extract thereof,
as well as with the alleged 560 counterfeit treasury certificate.
respondent fiscal opposed the motion on the ground that the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on "Preliminary
Investigation" do not apply to preliminary investigations conducted
by the Fiscal for the City of Manila or any of his assistants, and
that the said motion is not well taken

ISSUE: whether, in a preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the City of
Manila, the accused is entitled to be informed of the substance of the testimony and of
the evidence presented against him. NO

Viewed in the light of fundamental principles, the right to a preliminary

investigation is statutory, not constitutional.

Its oft-repeated purpose is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious,

and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial,
and also to protect the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. The
new Rules were drafted in the light of the Courts experience with cases
where preliminary investigations had dragged on for weeks and even
months.

The Court had intended to remove this clog upon the judicial machinery and
to make a preliminary investigation as simple and as speedy as is
consistent with the substantial rights of the accused.

The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, to be followed by the trial

proper. The investigating judge or prosecuting officer acts upon probable
cause and reasonable belief, not upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. When all this is fulfilled, the accused will
not be permitted to cast about for fancied reasons to delay the proceedings;
the time to ask for more is at the trial.

The petitioners case is a good example. A preliminary investigation was

conducted by the respondent Fiscal at which evidence was adduced
warranting the filing of an information against the petitioner.

The information was filed in court, and the presiding judge, upon the
strength of the said preliminary investigation and sworn information, issued
a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner.

To ask for the abstract of testimony at this stage of the proceedings,

ostensibly for no other purpose than to scrutinize the same evidence which
convinced the respondent Fiscal and the presiding Judge that there was

probable ground to proceed against the petitioner, is, in effect, to ask for
another preliminary investigation.

Not this, however, but a trial upon the merits, is what section 4 of Rule 108
ordairs.

PEDRO TANDOC, ROGELIO ERCELLA, RUDY DIAZ, JUAN ROSARIO, AND FRED
MENOR v
THE HONORABLE RICARDO P. RESULTAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the City Court of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), ARNULFO PAYOPAY, MANUEL
CANCINO, and CONRADO PAYOPAY, SR.
Facts:

Petition for certiorari assailing the Orders of the City Court of San Carlos
City, Pangasinan,

On Oct. 19, 1980, a criminal complaint was lodged with the Office of the City
Fiscal of San Carlos City, with the charges of "Serious Physical Injuries", filed by
Bonifacio Menor against Arnulfo Payopay; "Slight Physical Injuries", filed by Fred
de la Vega against Beda Acosta, and "Trespass to Dwelling", filed by Pacita
Tandoc against Arnulfo, Beda, Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez and Arturo
Syloria

Pending the resolution of said complaint, Arnulfo and his father Conrado
Payopay, Sr., together with Manuel, also filed a complaint on Dec. 2 with the
Office of the City Fiscal, San Carlos City, against Pedro Tandoc, Pacita, Rudy
Diaz, Fred Menor, Rogelio Ercella, Juan Rosario and Fred, with the charges of
"Trespass to Dwelling", "Serious Oral Defamation", "Grave Threats" and
"Physical Injuries"

On Dec. 10, the investigating fiscal found reasonable ground to believe that
Arnulfo, Beda, Manuel, Nadong and Arturo committed the crimes charged. After
evaluating the evidence, he found the ff:
o
At about 6:35pm on Oct. 19, at the house of Pacita at Rizal
Avenue, San Carlos City, the accused entered her store and dinning room
without her permission. There was a sort of altercation between the Pacita
and Arnulfo regarding the stoning of her store and house. In the course of
their altercation, Arnulfo picked up stones and struck Pacita but instead, her
helper Bonifacio was hit and suffered physical injuries which according to
the medico-legal certificate will heal for more than 30 days. Further, Beda,
who was behind Arnulfo picked up a stone to strike her but it was her other
helper, Fred, was hit and suffered injuries which injury will heal in less than
90 days according to the medical certificate.
o
The matter was reported to the Brgy. Chairman of the place and
to the Office of the Station Commander. In support of the complaint are the
sworn statements of Bonifacio, Fred and Brgy. Chairman Hermogenes
Salangad. The case of Slight Physical Injuries committed by Beda has not
been referred to the Brgy. Chairman as the case will soon prescribe

From this resolution, private respondents filed a Motion for

Reconsideration. Consequently, the corresponding informations for "Slight
Physical Injuries", "Trespass to Dwelling" and "Serious Physical Injuries" were
filed with the City Court of San Carlos City

With respect to the criminal complaint filed by Arnulfo and Manuel,

the Office of the City Fiscal recommended the dropping of said charges on the
ground that they were found to be in the nature of a countercharge. However, as
to the charge of "Trespass to Dwelling" filed by Conrado Sr. against Pedro, a
prima facie case was found by the investigating fiscal. Thus, on Jan. 28, 1981, an
informations for "Trespass to Dwelling" was filed with the City Court of San
Carlos City,

On July 28, Arnulfo, Conrado Sr. and Manuel, directly lodged with
the City Court of San Carlos City the ff criminal complaints:
o
Criminal Case No. 2105, entitled "People v. Pedro Tandoc,
Rogelio Ercella, Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred Menor", for Serious
Physical Injuries, filed by Arnulfo as private complainant.
o
Criminal Case No. 2106, entitled "People vs. Rudy Diaz, Juan
Rosario and Fred Menor", for Trespass to Dwelling, filed by Conrado Sr. as
private complainant.
o
Criminal Case No. 2107, entitled "People vs. Pedro Tandoc, Rudy
Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred dela Vega", for Less Serious Physical Injuries,
filed by Manuel as private complainant.
o
Criminal Case No. 2108, entitled "People vs. Pedro Tandoc, Rudy
Diaz, Rogelio Ercella, Juan Rosario & Fred Menor", for Grave Threats to
Kill, with Arnulfo as private complainant.

On Aug. 13, the City Court of San Carlos City issued several
Orders, after conducting a preliminary examination of the 4 above cases, where it
found reasonable ground to believe that the offenses charged may have been
committed by the petitioners and that they were probably guilty thereof.

The issuance of warrants of arrest was ordered against

petitioners, although these warrants were later suspended upon their motion.
They filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. They moved for a reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of the City Fiscal, but this was denied.
They sought a reconsideration, but it was likewise denied. Hence this petition.
Issue: WoN the city court has the power and authority to conduct anew a preliminary
examination of charges, which were previously the subject of a preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the City Fiscal and thereafter dismissed by the
latter YES

A preliminary investigation is intended to protect the accused from the

inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless
the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly
summary proceeding by a competent officer. It is also intended to protect the
state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials.

There are 2 stages in a preliminary investigation:

First, the preliminary examination of the complainant and his

witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused to determine w/n there is ground
to issue a warrant of arrest
o
Second, preliminary investigation proper, wherein the accused,
after his arrest, is informed of the complaint filed against him and is given
access to the testimonies and evidence presented, and he is also permitted
to introduce evidence in his favor. The purpose of this stage is to determine
w/n the accused should be released or held before trial.
Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a
trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person
against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
Under Sec. 10, Rule 112, 1964 Revised Rules of CrimPro, in
cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court, as well as in
cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city courts or municipal courts with
CFI, the accused was not entitled to be heard in a preliminary investigation
proper.
o
Rationale: The loss of time entailed in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, with the consequent extension of deprivation of the accused's
liberty, in case he fails to post bail, which at times outlasts the period of the
penalty provided by law for the offense, besides the mental anguish suffered
in protracted litigations, are eliminated with the assurance of a speedy and
expeditious trial for the accused, upon his arraignment (without having to
undergo the second stage of the preliminary investigation), and of a prompt
verdict on his guilt or innocence
In the case at bar, the offenses charged against petitioners were
all within the jurisdiction of the City Court of San Carlos City. Under the
circumstances, the complaints could be filed directly with the City Court which is
empowered to conduct a preliminary examination for purposes of issuance of
warrants of arrest, and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the cases on the
merits. The preliminary investigation proper conducted by the Office of the City
Fiscal could have been dispensed with. Neither did the earlier order of dismissal
of the complaints by the investigating fiscal bar the filing of said complaints with
the city court on the ground of double jeopardy.
o
The result of a preliminary investigation can neither constitute nor
give rise to the defense of double jeopardy in any case, because such
preliminary investigation is not and does not in itself constitute a trial or even
any part thereof. In order that the defense of jeopardy may lie, there must be
a former judgment, either of acquittal or of conviction, rendered by a court
competent to render the same, not only by reason of the offense committed,
which must be the same or at least comprised within it, but also by reason of
the place where it was committed.
o

As long as the offense charged has not prescribed, the city court
has the power and authority to conduct a preliminary examination and proceed
with the trial of the case properly within its jurisdiction. The prescriptive period of
a crime depends upon the penalty imposed by law. The penalty of arresto mayor
is imposed by law for the crimes of "Trespass to Dwelling", "Grave Threats", and
"Less Serious Physical Injuries"; for "Serious Physical Injuries", the penalty is
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period. The prescriptive period of offenses punishable by arresto mayor is 5
years, while crimes punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in 10 years. 26
The incident at bar occurred on Oct. 19, 1980, while the complaints were filed
with the City Court 9 months from said occurrence or on July 28, 1981, thus, the
crimes charged had not yet prescribed under the given facts.
From the order of the City Court finding reasonable ground to
believe that a crime was committed and the accused probably guilty thereof,
petitioners cannot seek a re-investigation by the Office of the City Fiscal. The reinvestigation sought by petitioners applies only to instances where a case is
cognizable by the CFI, but filed with the City Court for purposes of preliminary
investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the latter on the ground that no
prima facie case exists.

Doromal v Sandiganbayan

Special Prosecution Officer II, Dionisio A. Caoili conducted a preliminary

investigation of the charge against Doromal, a former Commissioner of the
PCGG for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with
his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal
International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61
million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning
equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and
the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC)
With the approval of Special Prosecutor Raul Gonzales, Caoili filed the
information in the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 12766
Doromal filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court questioning
the jurisdiction of the "Tanodbayan" to file the information without the approval of
the Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
o
Thus, the court annulled the information in accordance with its
decision in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan where it ruled that the incumbent
Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and
who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the
Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman.
o
The special prosecutor is a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman
and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or
orders

The Office of the Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI

of the Constitution different from the Office of the Tanodbayan created under
PD 1607 although concededly some of the powers of the two offices are
identical or similar
Upon the annulment of the information against Doromal, the
Special Prosecutor sought clearance from the Ombudsman to refile it
o
The Ombudsman granted clearance in a memorandum, but
advised that some changes be made in the information
o
Complying with the memorandum, a new information in Criminal
Case 12893, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the
Sandiganbayan
Doromal filed a motion to quash the information for being invalid
because there had been no preliminary investigation and defective because the
facts alleged do not constitute the offense charged
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash
The Special Prosecutor filed a "Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite" pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019, thus the Sandiganbayan
ordered his suspension.
o
Doromal filed this motion for certiorari and prohibition in ordering
his suspension despite the fact that the President previously approved of his
indefinite leave of absence until the final decision in the case and denying
his motion to quash
o

W/N Doromal is entitled to a new preliminary investigation - YES

Doromals argument: since the preliminary investigation that was conducted

prior to the filing of the original information (Crim Case 12766) was nullified by
the court, another preliminary investigation should have been conducted before
the new information (Crim Case 12893) was filed against him
o
The denial of his right to such investigation allegedly violates his
right to due process and constitutes a ground to quash the information
Sandiganbayans argument: another preliminary investigation is
unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject
matter a violation of Section 3 (H) of R.A. No. 3019
o
Also, Doromal allegedly waived the second preliminary
investigation by his failure to comply with the Courts Order directing him to
submit a statement of new or additional facts, duly supported by photo
copies of documents which he would present should a new preliminary
investigation be ordered
SC: A new preliminary investigation of the charge against the
Doromal is in order not only because the first was a nullity (a dead limb on the
judicial tree which should be lopped off and wholly disregarded"), but also
because the accused demands it as his right
o
Also, the charge against him had been changed as directed by
the Ombudsman

The first information stated that DITC entered into a business

transaction or contract with the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and the National Manpower and Youth Council, ... which business,
contracts or transactions Doromal is prohibited by law and the constitution
from having any interest.
o
The second information stated that Doromal unlawfully
participate[d] in a business through the DITC, a family corporation of which
he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings
conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the
National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited
by law and the constitution.
Also, his right to a new preliminary investigation is secured by S7
and S3 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure where it states that
before a complaint or information shall be filed for an offense cognizable by the
RTC, a preliminary investigation must first be conducted; and when a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant, the person may ask for a preliminary
investigation before the filing of such complaint or information
That right of the accused is "a substantial one." Its denial over his
opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law"
The need to conduct a new preliminary investigation when the
defendant demands it and the allegations of the complaint have been amended
has been affirmed by the Court more than once
The Sol Gens argument that the right to a preliminary
investigation may be waived and was in fact waived by the petitioner, impliedly
admits that the right exists
o
Since the right belongs to the accused, he alone may waive it. If
he demands it, the State may not withhold it
o

W/N the information should be quashed NO

People vs. Abejuela: the court shall hold in abeyance all proceedings in the case
before it until after the outcome of such new preliminary investigation
COJUANGCO VS PCGG
Facts:

President Corazon Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all

persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to this, the
Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the
possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy
funds.
The SolGen filed 2 criminal complaints with respondent PCGG. Both
complaints were assigned to prosecutor Cesario del Rosario for preliminary
investigation, who then scheduled both cases for hearing.

Del Rosario prepared a subpoena setting the preliminary investigation on

January 16, 1990, 2pm as to respondents Lobregat, Eleazar, Duenas Jr.
and Escudero III; and January 31, 1990, 2pm as to Cojuangco Jr., de la
Cuesta, and Zayco.
Cojuangco appeared through counsel. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit,
as required in the subpoena, he filed 2 motions addressed to the PCGG:
o
Motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG; alternatively, a motion to
dismiss
o
Motion to have the PCGG itself hear or resolve the above motion

Prosecutor del Rosario denied both motions and declared the

proceedings closed and the cases submitted for resolution.
Thereafter, petitioner requested the PCGG to resolve directly his
aforesaid motions.

PCGG denied the motions and required petitioner, together with

all the respondents in the criminal complaints, to submit counteraffidavits within 5 days from receipt thereof.

Instead, Cojuangco filed for prohibition with prayer for a

temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction, alleging
that:
o
The PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation of the
complaints filed by the SolGen without violating his rights to due
process and equal protection of the law
o
The PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation

The SC, without giving due course to the petition, resolved to

require respondents to comment thereon within 10 days from
notice.

On the same day as the above SC pronouncement, the PCGG

resolved to submit the complaints against Cojuangco et al. for
resolution. Based on the evidence submitted as well as the
findings of the investigating prosecutor, the Commission found a
prima facie case against all the respondents, to warrant the filing
of an information for a violation of Sec. 3(1) in relation to Sec. 3(i)
thus making them liable under Sec. 3a of RA 3019 to be wellfounded.

The 2 informations were filed by the PCGG with the

Sandiganbayan.

Meanwhile, the SolGen filed with the PCGG several other

complaints against petitioner and several others bearing on the
misuse of the coconut levy funds. A panel of prosecutors
designated by the PCGG issued a subpoena to petitioner in order
to compel him to appear in the investigation of said cases.

Petitioner filed a supplemental petition informing the Court of the

filing of said informations and complaints. He also prayed for the
issuance of temporary restraining order with regard to the

o
o

continuance of the preliminary investigation, as well as other

actions with respect to the cases filed against him.
Petitioner filed a motion reiterating the above petition and in the
alternative, that the case be set for hearing.
The court admitted the supplemental pleading of the petitioner
and required respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of 10 days from notice; and issued a status quo
order prevailing at the time this petition was filed.
A consolidated comment was submitted by the respondents
attaching as annex thereto the letters of the Executive Secretary,
addressed to the Chairman, PCGG, conveying the instructions of
the President that the complaints involving coconut levy funds be
filed with the PCGG, to conduct the necessary investigation and if
warranted, to file and prosecute the cases before the
Sandiganbayan.
The petitioner filed a reply to the consolidated comment as
required by the Court. The SolGen was required to file a rejoinder.
The court granted a motion for hearing filed by petitioner. It was
directed that the Ombudsman be impleaded as party-respondent.
The Court required the Ombudsman to comment on the petition
within 10 days from notice. The case was set for hearing.
The Ombudsman submitted his comment and the court required
petitioner to file a reply to the same.
Lobregat and Eleazar filed a motion for leave to intervene and a
motion to admit petition to intervene wherein they ask that the
PCGG desist from further proceeding with the preliminary
investigation of the cases against them, including petitioner, on
the grounds that:
The PCGG has no authority to conduct a preliminary investigation
of the said cases
Assuming that they do, the same cannot be delegated to a
prosecutor or his assistants
The Court granted the motion for leave to intervene and admitted
the petition for intervention. The PCGG was required to comment
on said petition within 10 days from notice.
Respondents filed their rejoinder to the reply of petitioner to the
consolidated comments. The Ombudsman filed his comment to
the petition for intervention, while petitioner filed his reply to the
comment of the Ombudsman.
The hearing was held as scheduled. After hearing, the parties
were required to submit their simultaneous memoranda within 15
days from the date of the hearing.
The SolGen asked for an extension of time within which to file his
comment to the petition for intervention. He filed said comment
within the period of extension.

Issues:

The memoranda of all the parties having been submitted, the

petitions were deemed submitted for resolution.

WoN the PCGG has authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of the

criminal complaints filed against them by the SolGen- YES.
o
Upon the enactment of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and RA 1379 (covering unexplained wealth), the preliminary
investigation of cases involving anti-graft and corrupt practices
and unexplained wealth cases were vested on the officers
mentioned in Sec. 2, Rule 112 of the ROC.
o
However, PD 1630 was subsequently enacted, wherein the
Tanodbayan was vested with the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. Under PD 1486, the Sandiganbayan was created
and vested with exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed
by public officers enumerated therein. This was amended by
several other laws and EOs.
o
Under these provisions of law, particularly Sec. 2b and 3a of EO 1
and Secs. 1 and 2 of EO 14, it is clear that the PCGG has the
power to investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of
the former President, his relatives and associates, and graft and
corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the President to
the PCGG to be filed with the Sandiganbayan. This includes the
authority to investigate includes the authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation.
o
Thus, the Tanodbayan lost the exclusive authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation of these types of cases by the
promulgation of the said Executive Order Nos. 1 and 14 whereby
the PCGG was vested concurrent jurisdiction with the
Tanodbayan to conduct such preliminary investigation and to
prosecute said cases before the Sandiganbayan.
o
Sec. 13, Art. XI of the Constitution creating the Office of the
Ombudsman did not repeal or remove the power to investigate,
as well as the power to conduct a preliminary investigation from
the PCGG, because the foregoing provision does not show that
the power of investigation including preliminary investigation
vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive.
o
Sec. 15(I) of RA 6770 opened up the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan to all investigatory agencies of the government
duly authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation under Sec.
2, Rule 112 of the ROC with the only qualification that the
Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation in
the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.

o
o

Also, RA 6770 lists as a power of the Ombudsman the power to

investigate and to initiate the proper action for recovery of illgotten wealth and/or unexplained wealth amassed after Feb. 25,
1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. This is a
tacit recognition of the authority of the PCGG to conduct a
preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained
wealth amassed before February 25, 1986 is maintained.
However, this provision cannot dilute or diminish the primary
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over all such types of cases
committed by public officers of employees as provided in the
Constitution.
WoN the preliminary investigation by the PCGG of the aforesaid
complaints violates the right of petitioner to due process to equal
protection of law- YES.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the
innocent against hasty prosecution. It is the initial step towards
the criminal prosecution of a person. Such preliminary
investigation is required for offenses cognizable by the RTC and
the Sandiganbayan. It must undertaken in accordance with the
procedure provided in Sec. 3, Rule 112 od the ROC. This
procedure is to be observed in order to assure that a person
undergoing such preliminary investigation will be afforded due
process.
It is an indispensable requisite of due process that the person
who presides and decides over a proceeding, including a
preliminary investigation, must possess the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge.
Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not
intended to usurp the function of a trial court, it is not a casual
affair, being that it is a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding.
The PCGG had already found a prima facie case against the
petitioner and intervenors when, acting like a judge, it caused the
sequestration of the properties and the issuance of the freeze
order of the properties of the petitioner. Thereafter, acting as a law
enforcement enforcer, in collaboration with the SolGen, the PCGG
gathered the evidence and upon finding cogent basis therefor
filed the aforesaid civil complaint.
The law enforcer who conducted the criminal investigation,
gathered the evidence and thereafter filed the complaint for the
purpose of the preliminary investigation cannot be allowed to
conduct the preliminary investigation of his own complaint.
The PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation
of the criminal complaints with the cold neutrality of a judge, as it
has prejudged the matter. For lesser grounds this Court had
disqualified a fiscal or a judge from handling a case.

Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the

objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge should inhibit
voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from handling
the case. Judge must not only be impartial but must also appear
impartial as an assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just. The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating
officer conducting a preliminary investigation because his
authority is no less than that of a municipal judge or even a
regional trial court judge. While he is strictly speaking not a judge,
by the nature of his functions he is and must be considered to be
a quasi-judicial officer.

Ruling:

Petition granted.

WEBB vs. DE LEON

Facts:

June 19, 1994, - National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the
Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons, with the
crime of Rape with Homicide.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed
by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuo to conduct the
preliminary investigation of those charged with the rape and killing on June
30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde,
and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons,
St., BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not
commit the crime at bar as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991
and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992. His alibi was
corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina
Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela Francisco.
To further support his defense, he submitted documentary evidence that he
bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the United States on said
dates and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No.
A8818707 on June 14, 1991.
Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr.
Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records
tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San Francisco, California on
March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808.
On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding
probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an

Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and their corespondents
On the same date, it filed the corresponding Information against petitioners
and their co-accused with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258
presided by respondent judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, the
respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued
the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August 11, 1995, Judge
Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion
about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before his
appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided
by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against the
petitioners and their co-accused. On August 11, 1995, petitioner Webb
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr.,
in Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave
themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before us.
In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1) respondent Judges de Leon
and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a
preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them: (2)
the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide; (3) the
DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into
judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information
as an accused.

Issue: WON there was a proper finding of probable cause? YES

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist
that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak
and uncorroborated. They hammer on alleged material inconsistencies
between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They
assail her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair as semiblonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it
did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and
inconsistencies in the sworn statements of the witnesses for the NBI.

We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation.

Section 1 of Rule 112 provides that a preliminary investigation should
determine " . . . whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a wellgrounded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial." Section 3 of the same Rule outlines the procedure
in conducting a preliminary investigation, thus:

The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which
protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature . . ." An arrest

without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and

violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.
Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque concept in our
jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they are facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to
be arrested.
Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable cautio or the term
ordinarily prudent and cautious man. The terms are legally synonymous
and their reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a
prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the street.
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average
man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he
relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have
an abundance.
Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel
gravely abused its discretion when it found probable cause against the
petitioners. Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds:
(a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner Webb's hair as semiblond and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn
statement
We hold that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and was committed by the suspects.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put
in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than
"bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . .
conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to
stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a
finding of probable cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely
abuse its discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory
questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is
addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator
alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the
investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause
merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial
where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence

had been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was
unnecessary.
Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They decry
their alleged hasty and malicious prosecution by the NBI and the DOJ
Panel. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.
We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did
not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners
were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them.
The fairness of this opportunity is well stressed in the Consolidated
Comment of the Solicitor General
Petitioners were afforded all the opportunities to be heard. Petitioner
This notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court that the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten
(10) days from the termination of the preliminary investigation. The DOJ
Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf
and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. This directly
disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the resolution was done with
indecent haste in violation of the rights of the petitioners. During the period
of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and present
additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.
Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process
during the conduct of the preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ
Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and filed the Information in court
against them.
This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation
does not, however, negate its use by a person under investigation when
indispensable to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and property.
Preliminary investigation is not too early a stage to guard against any
significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a potential
accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary investigation is to
determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold that
the finding of a probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty
and property to real risk of loss or diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to
the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for they are charged with the
crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the evidence of
guilt is strong.
Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system
of preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type
of preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair
and impartial.
As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals - "the right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial
for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some

other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive

right."
A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so
that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected
from any material damage. We uphold the legal basis of the right of
petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the
April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their
preliminary investigation considering their exculpatory character, and hence,
unquestionable materiality to the issue of their probable guilt. The right is
rooted on the constitutional protection of due process which we rule to be
operational even during the preliminary investigation of a potential accused.
It is also implicit in section (3) (a) of Rule 112 which requires during the
preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn complaint, which shall ". . .
state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents . . ."

HELD: PETITIONS DISMISSED

Velasco v. Casaclang 1998
Facts

By virtue of an Assignment Order of the Commission on Audit (COA), COA

Audit Examiners Priscilla Cruz and Virginia Pantoja conducted a special
audit of selected transactions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
Logistics Command, covering the period from January 1988 to May 1989.

In their Memorandum Report to the COA Chairman, the examiners found

that the propriety of the procurement of 28,432 pieces of meat can
(stainless steel) amounting to P3,402,432 was of doubtful validity, as the
transaction cycle from the preparation of purchase orders to acceptance of
delivered items was completed in just one day. Furthermore, while the cans
were for bought distribution to CAGFU at P126/unit, previous orders of P5M
were for P89/can, intended for regular military units. The CAGFU expense
was more than P1M.
o
The public bidding held at Camp Aguinaldo had 9 bidders. The
bids were opened on December 21, 1988 and the date of the
Bidder Tender Sheets was December 27, 1988. The stamped
date showed that the bids were opened 6 days before the
submission of the bids.
o
4 suppliers had the same lowest bid for P126/unit, so the required
number of cans was divided among them. The fourth meat can
supplier was not registered with the SEC. One of them also had
only a capital of P500k, whereas the PO issued to it amounted to
P895,800.
o
The procurement was indicated to urgently needed, hence the
speedy processing of documents. However, records show that the

cans were issued to various Military Support Points only 4 months

after delivery, thus belying urgency.
The audit examiners then filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
a Joint Affidavit-Complaint deploring the transactions dubbed as
anomalous and highly irregular.
The respondent Deputy Ombudsman for the Military Manuel
Casaclang issued an Order in the case entitled COA v. BGen.
Buenaventura Tabo, et al., directing the petitioner to file her
counter-affidavits within 10 days, failure of which will be construed
as a waiver of her right to be heard, and the preliminary
investigation shall proceed accordingly.
Petitioner Laura Velasco filed a motion to direct the complainants
to particularize the offenses charged. The Deputy Ombudsman,
without a word from COA, issued an Order stating that petitioner
was being charged with a violation of S3(e) and (g), RA 3019.
Petitioner then interposed a Motion to Quash, theorizing that the
complaint did not charge an offense. The Deputy Ombudsman
denied the motion, ratiocinating that S4(d), AO No. 7 of the
Ombudsman does not allow such a motion. Her motion
reconsideration having been denied, Velasco filed the instant
petition.
Petitioner Velasco questioned the authority of the Deputy
Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation, arguing that
pursuant to S11(4)(a), RA 6770, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor is vested with the power and authority to conduct
preliminary investigation and to prosecute criminal offenses falling
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. S17, PD 1630
provides that the Office of Tanodbayan (now Office of the Special
Prosecutor) has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation in all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

Issue 1: W/N the Deputy Ombudsman has the authority to conduct preliminary
investigation YES

S2, R112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the following may
conduct preliminary investigation:
o
Provincial or city fiscals and their assistants;
o
Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
o
National and Regional state prosecutors; and
o
Such other officers as may be authorized by law.

S15(1), RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act) provides that the Office

of the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute
on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office, or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It

o
o
o
o
o

has a primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases.
In light of the above, it is evident that the Ombudsman and his
Deputies are within legal contemplation, other officers authorized
by law to conduct preliminary investigation.
As held in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman is
charged with the duty to investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient. Under the 1987 Constitution, the
Tanodbayan became the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It
continues to function and exercise its power as provided by law,
except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Inasmuch as the aforementioned duty to conduct preliminary
investigation is given to the Ombudsman, the Tanodbayan, now
Special Prosecutor, who retains powers not given to the
Ombudsman, is without authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. The
Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman,
and can investigate only upon the latters authority or order. Even
his original power to issue subpoena is now deemed transfer to
the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in the Special
Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to
investigate.
S3, AO No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman also provides those who may conduct preliminary
investigation:
Ombudsman Investigators
Special Prosecuting Officers
Deputized Prosecutors
Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary
investigation
Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the
Ombudsman
S17 of PD 1630, invoked by petitioner, was deemed abrogated by
S7, A11 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: The existing
Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
now and hereafter may be provided by law, except those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution.

In line with this, President Aquino signed EO 244 limiting the

Special Prosecutors authority as those not conferred upon the
Ombudsman under the Constitution.
S11(4)(c), RA 6770 likewise states that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall only have the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases under the supervision
and control and upon the authority of the Ombudsman.
Taken together, the exclusive authority of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor the conduct preliminary investigation is a thing of the
past, and the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and to conduct preliminary investigation.
With the vast powers vested in him by law, respondent Deputy
Ombudsman is definitely with authority and competence to look
into and find out motu proprio the nature of the accusation
embodied in the said Joint Affidavit-Complaint endorsed to him for
the indictment of the herein petitioner and her co-respondents
under RA 3019.
In accordance with S15(10) of RA 6770, the powers, functions
and duties of the Ombudsman may be delegated to his Deputies,
to ensure effective exercise of his powers. Embraced in the broad
powers of the Ombudsman is the discretionary power to define,
supervise and control the methodology and procedure his office
may adopt in connection with its investigative power. The
respondent Deputy Ombudsman therefore has the authority to
decide what offense/s to charge on the basis of the evidence
before him. He has direct supervision and control over the
preliminary investigation conducted by him. Absent any grave
abuse of discretion, his action is not subject to judicial review.
Taking into account the affidavit-complaint together with the
Memorandum Report, the respondent Deputy Ombudsman
cannot be faulted for conducting the requisite preliminary
investigation.
Lastly, the respondent Deputy Ombudsman erred not in denying
the motion to quash and motion for reconsideration interposed by
petitioner in the said case. He acted thereupon according to
applicable provisions of the Revised Rules of Court and AO No.
07 of the Ombudsman. S4(d) of said administrative order
disallows a motion to quash (or dismiss) except on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Here, no absence of jurisdiction is perceived.
Following S3 of R112, petitioner was ordered to submit her
counter-affidavit within 10 days from service of the subpoena
upon her.
Petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by the
simple expedient of sending her counter-affidavit.

HELD: Petition dismissed.

9. Balgos vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:

Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(c) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, as
amended, in an information that was filed with the Sandiganbayan on April
18, 1986 by the Special Prosecutor which was approved by the Deputy
Tanodbayan, after a preliminary investigation.
o
Information:
o
That on December 27, 1984, in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
Flaviano D. Balgos, Jr., a public officer, being the acting Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
and also the Ex-Officio provincial sheriff of the said province; and
the other accused Virgilio F. Dacayo, Jesus C. Sison and Leon C.
Cuaresma, all public officers, being Deputy Provincial Sheriffs of
said province, acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully enforce a Writ of
Execution against a Mustang car registered in the name of Leticia
Acosta-Ang, despite their knowledge that the registered owner is
not the judgment debtor in Civil Case No. 4047 of the Regional
Trial Court of Nueva Vizcaya which is the subject of the said writ
of execution, thereby causing undue injury to the said Leticia
Acosta-Ang (complainant) and giving unwarranted benefits to the
judgment creditor in said civil case.

Antonio Uy Lim, the plaintiff and prevailing party in the complaint

filed for rescission of the sale of the car by Juanito Ang to private
respondent Leticia Acosta-Ang for being allegedly in fraud of
creditors. (CIVIL CASE 5703)

petitioners filed a motion for reinvestigation in the Tanodbayan.

o
Tanodbayan resolved after the reinvestigation

Set aside the previous resolution

Dismiss the case

Withdraw the information filed

So, the Tanodbayan filed with the sandiganbayan a motion to

withdeaw the information against the petitioners

This was denied

The petitioners the filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the

criminal case against them on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 5307.

This was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan on

October 24,1988

WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the said
motions? - NO

Crespo vs. Mogul, - this Court laid down the ground rules and the
parameters pertaining to the direction and control of the prosecution of a
criminal action by the fiscal or government prosecutor as provided for in the
rules in relation to the jurisdiction of the competent courts over such cases.
We ruled that while the public prosecutor has the sole direction and control
in the prosecution of offenses, once the complaint or information is filed in
court, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case and all
subsequent actions that may be taken by the public prosecutor in relation to
the disposition of the case must be subject to the approval of the said court.

In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted

by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be
secured. And if after such reinvestigation the prosecution finds a cogent
basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the
case, such proposed course of action must be addressed to the sound
discretion of the court.

It is the court that has now the final say on any subsequent disposition or
action once the case is brought before it.

In this case, the petitioners are public officers charged with having violated
Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for evident bad faith
and manifest partiality in enforcing the writ of execution in Civil Case No.
4047 against a Mustang car registered in the name of Leticia Acosta-Ang
(complainant) who is not the judgment debtor thereby causing undue injury
to said complainant and giving unwarranted benefits to the judgment
creditor in said case.

In denying said motion the public respondent Sandiganbayan stated in its

resolution dated June 29, 1988 that the issue in the criminal case was not
so much whether the car was owned by Juanita Ang or Leticia Ang but
whether it was rightly seized, that is, whether or not it was attended with
partiality as to extend unwarranted benefits to the judgment creditor

Although at the reinvestigation, the Tanodbayan was persuaded that in fact

the sale of the car to Leticia Ang was fraudulent, this did not necessarily
clear petitioners of the aforesaid Anti-Graft charge against them. Still the
burden is on the petitioners to establish that they acted in good faith in
proceeding with the execution on the car even they were presented
evidence tending to show it did not belong to Juanito Ang anymore.
No prejudicial question. In this case, as correctly held by public respondent, the
pending civil case for the annulment of the sale of the car to Leticia Ang (Civil Case
No. 5307) is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners for the acts
allegedly committed by them in seizing the car. Even if in the civil action it is ultimately
resolved that the sale was null and void, it does not necessarily follow that the seizure
of the car was rightfully undertaken. The car was registered in the name of Leticia Ang
six (6) months before the seizure. Until the nullity of the sale is declared by the courts,
the same is presumptively valid. Thus, petitioners must demonstrate that the seizure

was not attended by manifest bad faith in order to clear themselves of the charge in
the criminal action.
ATTY. MIGUEL P. PADERANGA v HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HON. SILVESTRE
H. BELLO III, ATTY. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, HELEN B. CANOY and REBECCA B.
TAN
Facts:

Special civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction/ restraining order

On Oct. 16, 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the RTC
Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo,
Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on May 1,
1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II.

Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative

Matter No. 87-2-244.

Only Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the
accused remained at large. Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has
not been apprehended since then.

In an amended information filed on Oct. 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely

Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas
retained Atty. Miguel Paderanga as his counsel.

As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion

to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment. The
trial court denied this omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor to conduct
another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused
all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense.

In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit,

Roxas implicated Paderanga in the commission of the crime charged.

The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further
conducting the preliminary investigation against Paderanga at the instance of the
Paderangas counsel. In his first indorsement to the DOJ, the city prosecutor
requested the DOJ to designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary
investigation against herein petitioner.

In a resolution, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was designated,

directed the amendment of the previously amended information to include and
implead Paderanga as one of the accused therein. Paderanga moved for
reconsideration, contending that the preliminary investigation was not yet
completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived of
his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence
crucial to the determination of his alleged linkage to the crime charged. The
motion was denied by Gingoyon

Paderanga filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ. Thereafter, he

submitted a Supplemental Petition with Memorandum, and then a Supplemental
Memorandum with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed,

attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated June 20, 1990 and purporting to be
a retraction of his affidavit of March 30, 1990 wherein he implicated herein
petitioner.

On Aug. 10, 1990, the DOJ, through USec. Silvestre H. Bello III, issued
Resolution No. 6487 dismissing the petition for review. His motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this petition
Issue: WoN the preliminary investigation as to Paderanga was not complete YES
Issue: WoN there exists prima facie evidence or probable cause to justify Paderangas
inclusion in the second amended information YES

The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the
fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine w/n a criminal case
should be filed in court. Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be
granted to restrain a criminal prosecution. The case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et
al. cites several exceptions to the rule, as follows:
o
To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
o
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
o
When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
o
When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
o
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
o
When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
o
Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
o
Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
o
Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust
for vengeance; and
o
When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however,
will readily show that the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid
exceptions.

Paderanga had already filed his counter-affidavit, pursuant to the 1 st

subpoena issued to him, wherein he controverted the charge against him and
dismissed it as a malicious design of his political opponents and enemies to link
him to the crime. This is sufficient compliance with the procedural requirement of
Sec. 3(b), Rule 112, RoC. He also failed to show that the 2 nd subpoena issued to
him involved a separate complaint charging an offense different and distinct from
that charged in the complaint attached to the 1st subpoena

With regard to the veracity and credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies, these are matters of defense best addressed to the trial court for its
appreciation and evaluation.

The right of Paderanga to ask clarificatory questions is not absolute. The

fiscal has the discretion to determine w/n he will propound these questions to the

parties or witnesses concerned. This is clearly provided for under Sec. 3(e), Rule
112, RoC
The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should
be ventilated is the CFI. It could even be waived. These are matters to be
inquired into by the trail court not an appellate court.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well
founded belief that a crime cognizable by the RTC has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The
quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence
sufficient to engender a well founded belief as to the fact of the commission of a
crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is
for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a wen grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
o
In the present case, the state prosecutor correctly found that there
exists prima facie evidence of Paderangas involvement in the commission
of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and
the facts obtaining therein
Paderangas argument that the testimonies of Galarion and
Hanopol are inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of
cross-examination is without merit. It is a fundamental principle that the accused
in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which
the complainant may present. Sec. 3, Rule 112, RoC expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing
to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or crossexamine. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be
ventilated before the trial court during the trial proper and not in the preliminary
investigation. Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the
fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. In addition, considering that under Sec. 8 [now 7], Rule 112, RoC,
the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the
case in the RTC, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be
admitted by the trial court if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal.
And, even if the prosecution does present such testimonies, Paderanga can
always object thereto and the trial court can rule on the admissibility thereof; or
he can, during the trial, petition said court to compel the presentation of Galarion
and Hanopol for purposes of cross-examination.

Rodil v Garcia

A warrant of arrest was issued against Rodil because of the charge of

murder against him, thus his counsel insisted that the witness for the prosecution

should be recalled to enable him to cross-examine them on clarificatory and

amplificatory matters
Judge Garcia denied his request, this this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction praying for the nullification of Judge
Garcias denial of his request and that bail be granted to Rodil
The Sol Gen sought for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
right to cross-examine in a preliminary investigation is not a right granted an
accused and Judge Garcia has the option to exercise his discretion considering
the evidence of record sufficed to justify denial of the application for bail
The record shows that the jurisdictional issue here arises from the failure to
accord Rodil a hearing on his application for bail
o
A resolution of that question depends on whether Rodils counsel
could recall witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of asking
clarificatory questions to prove if the evidence of guilt is strong

There are an infinite number of things which a party may not in

strict law do or cause to be done but which may be permitted by the court in the
exercise of its discretion and in the interest of justice. This is especially true in
matters affecting the conduct of the trial and the calling, recalling and
examination of witnesses.

ALLADO VS DIOKNO

W/N the application for bail was rightfully denied NO

Judge Garcia denied the application for bail on the basis of Rodils motion
that he be granted the right to bail and the opposition filed by the prosecutor, but
without conducting any hearing on the motion
o
Garcia has a mistaken belief that the presentation of evidence by
the prosecution for the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the
preliminary examination proper, suffices for the denial of the plea for bail
o
The accused must be given his day in court even if the motion to
bail is of summary nature while the guilt or innocence of the accused is
not to be determined, the quantity and character of the proof on this point
are for bail must be considered

W/N Judge Garcia erred in refusing to allow Rodils counsel to recall prosecution
witnesses, so that he may cross-examine them on "clarificatory and amplificatory
matters." NO

An accused is not entitled to cross-examine the witnesses presented

against him in the preliminary investigation before his arrest - this being a matter
that depends on the sound discretion of the Judge or investigating officer
concerned
o
The judge has the discretion to request the witnesses to be
recalled
o
They should likewise exercise their discretion in such a way that
the purpose of a preliminary investigation (the avoidance of groundless or
vindictive prosecutions) could be attained in as fair and objective manner as
possible
In being deprived confrontation of the prosecution witnesses,
Rodil was not deprived of any right but was merely refused the exercise of a
privilege

Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto Mendoza have been accused
of the crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge.
This came as a result of the testimony given by Security Guard Escolastico
Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine Constabulary, implicating them as the
brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of one Eugen Alexander
Van Twest, a German national.
Umbal claimed:
o
He and his companions were met by petitioners at Silahis Hotel
and in exchange for P2.5M the former undertook to apprehend
Van Twest who allegedly had an international warrant of arrest
against him
o
After placing him under surveillance for nearly a month, Umbal
ans several other people abducted Van Twest.
o
They blocked his blue Nissan Pathfinder under the Alabang
overpass and forced him into their car. They brought him to a
"safe house" just behind the New Bilibid Prison.
o
Bato faked the interrogation of Van Twest, pretending it was
official, and then made him sign certain documents. The following
day, one of his companions shot Van Twest in the chest with a
baby armalite, after which another one of them stabbed Van
Twest repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later burned his
cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline and rubber tires.
o
He does not remember the exact date when this happened, but
he was certain that it was around last year.

This extrajudicial confession as their basis, operatives of the

PACC, armed with a search warrant, separately raided the 2
dwellings of Santiago (another one of their co-accused).

The raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted

firearms and ammunition and placed Santiago and his aide, under
arrest. Also arrested later that day were the other companions
implicated by Umbal, who were found to have in their possession
several firearms and ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier
sunglasses.

The PACC Task Force Habagat referred the case to the

Department of Justice for the institution of criminal proceedings

several individuals, including Allado and Mendoza, for illegal

possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping
for ransom with murder, and usurpation of authority.
Senior State Prosecutor Abesamis issued a subpoena to
petitioners informing them that a complaint was filed against
them, directing them to appear before Department of Justice and
to submit their counter-affidavits. Attached to the subpoena were
copies of the affidavits executed by Umbal and members of the
team who raided the dwellings of Santiago.
Not satisfied merely with the affidavits attached to the subpoena,
petitioner Mendoza moved for the production of other documents
for examination and copying to enable him to fully prepare for his
defense and to submit an intelligible counter-affidavit.
Petitioners likewise sought the inhibition of the members of the
panel of prosecutors, which was created to conduct the
preliminary investigation, on the ground that they were members
of the legal staff assigned to PACC and thus could not act with
impartiality.
The motion was granted and a new panel was constituted.
Thereafter, the new panel granted the prayer of Mendoza for the
production of additional documents used or intended to be used
against him. Task Force Habagat, however, submitted incomplete
documents. Petitioners nevertheless submitted their respective
counter-affidavits denying the accusations against them.
Before the case could be deemed submitted for resolution, one of
the accused (SPO2 Bato) filed a manifestation stating that he was
reconsidering the earlier waiver of his right to file counter-affidavit.
He moved for the admission of his 2 counter-affidavits, where he
admitted to his participation in the abduction and slaying of Van
Twest and implicating Allado and Mendoza. Before petitioners
could refute these claims, Bato moved to suppress it on the
ground that it was extracted through intimidation and duress.
The panel issued a resolution finding a prima facie case against
them. The information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and raffled off to Branch 62 presided by respondent Judge
Roberto C. Diokno.
Petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the DOJ Secretary seeking
review and reversal of the undated resolution of the panel of
prosecutors, which appeal was adopted by Mendoza.
Allado moved to defer the proceedings pending the resolution of
his appeal before the DOJ. However, respondent judge still issued
the assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order. The
prayer for TRO was granted.

o
o

Petitioners principally contend that respondent erred in:

Finding that there is probable cause against petitioners without
determining the admissibility of evidence against the petitioners
and without even stating the basis of his findings.
Relying on the resolution of the panel and their certification that
probable cause exists when the certification is flawed.
Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors bias and impartiality.
Solicitor General argues that:
The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge wjo
is merely required to personally appreciate certain facts to
convince him that the accused probably committed the crime
charged.

Issue:

WoN the respondent judge erred in finding that there is probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest against petitionerso
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested. It is the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent,
strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belied that he
has lawful grounds for arresting the accused.
o
We are unable to see how respondent judge arrived at such
ruling. A perusal of the records shows that there is no support for
such conclusion. On the contrary, there are a number of reasons
why the evidence submitted is insufficient for a finding of probable
cause against petitioners:
1. PACC relied heavily on the sworn statement of
Umbal. However, his story improbable, if not ridiculous.
There were also several inconsistencies in his
testimony. Moreover, there is no corpus delicti, since
Van Twests body or remains were never found. Hence,
his death has never been established.
2. While the whole investigation was supposedly
triggered by Umbals confession, the application for
search warrant to be served in the 2 dwellings of
Santiago was filed in the RTC a day before Umbal
executed his sworn statement.
3. More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied
for a warrant to search the dwellings of Santiago never
implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that
according to Umbal, it was Satiago, and not petitioners,
who masterminded the whole affair.

4. While there may be bits of evidence against

petitioners'
co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the
dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least prove
petitioners' complicity in the crime charged.
Moreover, respondent judge did not personally examine the evidence nor
did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their
accounts. He merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that
probable cause existed.
The court reiterated the guidelines for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as
per jurisprudence:
o
The judge shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest
o
If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard
the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the
existence of probable cause.
o
The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it
is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the
judge and the judge alone makes this determination.
o
The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the
judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of
probable cause.

Probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a

trial judge subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his
action. Good faith is not enough because the probable cause test
is an objective one.

It appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly

abused their discretion. From the gathering of evidence until the
termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that the
state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a
warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and their
consequent detention.

Ruling:

Petition granted.

DIMATALAC vs. VILLON

Facts:

3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence
in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.
5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol in Macabebe, Pampanga,
by SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masantol Police Station against private
respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino
David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo
Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3
Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a certain Danny, and
a certain Koyang/Arding.
After conducting a preliminary examination in the form of searching
questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate
Serafin B. David of the MCTC issued warrants for the arrest of the accused
and directed them to file their counter-affidavits.
Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco
Yambao were arrested; while only Francisco Yambao submitted his counter
affidavit.
1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a
Resolution finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder
had been committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof.
That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the leadership of
Mayor Santiago Docsay Yabut, including two John Does identified only as
Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, went to Masantol, Pampanga for the
purpose of looking for a certain PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac.
At first, the accused, riding on [sic] a truck, went to the Municipal Hall of
Masantol, Pampanga inquiring about PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Thereafter,
they went to the house of Mayor Lacap for the purpose of inquiring [about]
the [the location of the] house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, until finally, they
were able to reach the house of said Virgilio Dimatulac at San Nicolas,
Masantol, Pampanga.
Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the accused
were all riding, stopped and parked in front of the house of said PO3 Virgilio
Dimatulac, some of the accused descended from the truck and positioned
themselves around the house while others stood by the truck and the Mayor
stayed [in] the truck with a bodyguard.
Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut and Francisco Yambao went inside the
house of Virgilio Dimatulac [and] were even offered coffee.
[A]ccused Yabut brothers (Kati and Billy) strongly suggested to Virgilio
Dimatulac to go down to see the Mayor outside in front of his house to say
sorry.
[W]hen Virgilio Dimatulac went down from his house, suddenly [a] gun shot
was heard and then, the son of Virgilio Dimatulac, Peter Paul, started to
shout the following words: What did you do to my father?!

One of the men of Mayor Docsay Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac, and as a
consequence, he died; and before he expired, he left a dying declaration
pointing to the group of Mayor Docsay Yabut as the one responsible.
That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused Docsay Yabut ordered
his men to go on board the truck and immediately left away leaving Virgilio
Dimatulac bleeding and asking for help.
On their way home to Minalin, accused Santiago Docsay Yabut gave money
to accused John Doe Dan/Danny and Francisco Boy Yambao was asked to
bring the accused John Doe to Nueva Ecija which he did.
Further, accused Santiago Docsay Yabut told his group to deny that they
ever went to Masantol.
In a sworn statement, petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac narrated that Mayor
Santiago Yabut, accompanied by a number of bodyguards, went to the
residence of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac to talk about a problem between the
Mayor and Peter Pauls uncle, Jun Dimatulac. Virgilio warmly welcomed the
group and even prepared coffee for them. Servillano and Martin Yabut told
Virgilio to come down from his house and apologize to the Mayor, but hardly
had Virgilio descended when Peter Paul heard a gunshot. While Peter Paul
did not see who fired the shot, he was sure it was one of Mayor Yabuts
companions. Peter Paul opined that his father was killed because the latter
spoke to the people of Minalin, Pampanga, against the Mayor. Peter Paul
added in a supplemental statement (Susog na Salaysay) that he heard
Mayor Yabut order Virgilio killed.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Police Officer Leopoldo Soriano of the
Masantol Municipal Police Station in Masantol, Pampanga, declared that on
3 November 1995, between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m., while he was at the police
station, three men approached him and asked for directions to the house of
Mayor Epifanio Lacap. Soriano recognized one of the men as SPO1 Labet
Malabanan of Minalin, Pampanga. The group left after Soriano gave them
directions, but one of the three returned to ask whether PO3 Virgilio
Dimatulac was on duty, to which Soriano replied that Dimatulac was at
home. The group left on board a military truck headed for San Nicolas,
Masantol, Pampanga. Later that day, SPO2 Michael Viray received a
telephone call at the police station reporting that someone had shot Virgilio
Dimatulac.
Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. AlfonsoFlores conducted a reinvestigation. However, it is not clear from the record
whether she conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of private
respondents Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut (hereafter
YABUTs). All of the accused who had not submitted their counter-affidavits
before the MCTC, except accused Danny and Koyang/Arding, submitted
their counter-affidavits to Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso Flores.
Flores found that the YABUTs and the assailant Danny, to the exclusion of
the other accused, were in conspiracy with one another, but that the offense
committed was only homicide, not murder.

Issue: WON reinvestigation was valid? NO

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was furnished with a

copy of the Appeal.

On 26 February 1996, Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang issued a

Resolution ordering the release of accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap,
Juan Magat and Arturo Naguit (who were then detained) in view of the
aforementioned resolution of Alfonso-Flores, which, as stated in the order,
the Provincial Prosecutor approved on February 7, 1996.

On 28 February 1996, an Information for Homicide, signed by Assistant

Provincial Prosecutor Flores and Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang,
was filed before Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Macabebe,
Pampanga, against the YABUTs and John Doe alias Danny Manalili and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).

Petitioners argue that in light of Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, respondent

Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in proceeding with private
respondents' arraignment for homicide and denying petitioners' motion to
set aside arraignment.

Moreover, although respondent Judge Villon was not the respondent in CAG.R. SP No. 40393, he should have deferred the proceedings just the same
as the very issue in said case was whether or not the RTC could proceed
with the arraignment despite the pending review of the case by respondent
Secretary of Justice.

Judge Villon unjustly invoked private respondents right to a speedy trial,

after a lapse of barely three (3) months from the filing of the information on
23 February 1996; overlooked that private respondents were estopped from
invoking said right as they went into hiding after the killing, only to resurface
when the charge was reduced to homicide; and failed to detect the
Provincial Prosecutor's bias in favor of private respondents. Judge Villon
should have been more circumspect as he knew that by proceeding with the
arraignment, the appeal with the DOJ would be rendered technically
nugatory.

Petitioners submit that the DOJ rule prohibiting appeals from resolutions of
prosecutors to the Secretary of Justice once the accused had already been
arraigned applies only to instances where the appellants are the accused,
since by submitting to arraignment, they voluntarily abandon their appeal.

It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the
resolution of Alfonso-Flores. The last paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court provides: If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary
of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state
prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding
information without conducting another preliminary investigation or to
dismiss or move for the dismissal of the complaint or information.

It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred to therein could be
either the offended party or the accused.

More importantly, an appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of the Secretarys

power of control over prosecutors. Thus, in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,
we emphatically held: Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to
appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative
Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said
prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of both the
offended parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions in preliminary
investigations or reinvestigations, as provided for in Section 1 and Section
4, respectively. Section 1 thereof provides, thus:
Anent the third issue, it was certainly grave error for the DOJ to reconsider
its 7 June 1996 resolution, holding that murder was committed and directing
the Provincial Prosecutor to accordingly amend the information, solely on
the basis of the information that the YABUTs had already been arraigned. In
so doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the
Provincial Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of
Pampanga; and meekly surrendered to the latters inappropriate conduct or
even hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect of duty or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as well as to the undue haste
of Judge Roura and Villon in respect of the arraignment of the YABUTs. The
sins of omission or commission of said prosecutors and judges resulted, in
light of the finding of the DOJ that the crime committed was murder, in
unwarranted benefit to the YABUTs and gross prejudice to the State and the
offended parties. The DOJ should have courageously exercised its power of
control by taking bolder steps to rectify the shocking mistakes so far
committed and, in the final analysis, to prevent further injustice and fully
serve the ends of justice.
The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set
aside arraignment. Further, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers over its
personnel, the DOJ could have directed the public prosecutors concerned to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for
neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in
not, inter alia, even asking the trial court to defer arraignment in view of the
pendency of the appeal, informing the DOJ, from time to time, of the status
of the case, and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was concerned, in disallowing
the private prosecutor from further participating in the case.
Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the
case below to determine the regularity of arraignment, considering that the
appeal was received by the DOJ as early as 23 February 1996.
We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio reconsideration of the 7
June 1996 resolution of the DOJ was attended with grave abuse of
discretion.
It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case
by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the
acquittal of the accusedor the dismissal of the case is void, hence double
jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those cases, so

must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this
case as above discussed.
HELD: PETITION GRANTED
Crespo v. Mogul 1987
Doctrine: Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case
as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to
do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
Facts

Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala, with the approval of the Provincial

Fiscal, filed an information for estafa against Mario F.L. Crespo in the Circuit
Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment, the accused field a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed
with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal for the filing of the information. The presiding judge, Hon. Leodegario
L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied, but the arraignment was deferred to afford time for the petitioner to
elevate the matter to the appellate court.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
was filed by Crespo in the CA. The CA then restrained Judge Mogul from
proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the
court. The Solicitor-General (OSG) recommended that the petition be given
due course. The CA then granted the writ and perpetually restrained the
judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in
the case until the Department of Justice shall have resolved the petition for
review.
Undersecretary of Justice Catalino Macaraig, Jr. then resolved the petition
for review and reversed the resolution of the Provincial Fiscal, directing the
fiscal to move for the immediate dismissal of the information filed against
the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was then filed
by the Provincial Fiscal.
The motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Mogul, who set the
arraignment. Crespo then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition
and/or TRO with the CA. The CA issued a restraining order against the

threatened act of arraignment, and eventually dismissed the petition and

lifted the TRO. A motion for reconsideration filed by Crespo was denied.
Hence, this petition for review, whereby Crespo prays that the decision be
set aside and for Judge Mogul to be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his
threat to proceed with his arraignment and trial.
Issue 1: W/N Judge Mogul should be enjoined from continuing with Crespos
arraignment and trial NO

It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by

complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. The institution of the criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or
information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party,
according to whether the evidence in his opinion is sufficient or not to
establish the guilty of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for
placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal
is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.

Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have
the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the
evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime
committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the legal
duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced
that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal

determines the existence of a puma facie case that would warrant the
prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even
permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding
originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence
relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. Neither has the Court any
power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain
period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and
control of criminal prosecutions. In a clash of views between the judge who
did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the
offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally
prevail.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or
control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or
the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for
review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or
reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently, the Secretary of
Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action.

The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority
to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by

the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of
the information in the proper court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case at that stage, the permission of the Court must
be secured. After such reinvestigation, the finding and recommendations of
the fiscal should be submitted to the court for appropriate action.
While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case has
already been brought to Court, whatever disposition the fiscal should be
proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of
the Court.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to
a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice
whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the
trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
It does not matter if the fiscal does not agree with the determination of the
court, as it is the role of the fiscal to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused. Thus, in spite of
his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable to Court
to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should
be convicted or acquitted. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue
to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of
the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction in control.
To avoid a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint
or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.

HELD: Petition dismissed.

15. Roberts v CA (REALLY FUCKED UP CASE 100% ABOUT THE PROCDURE)
Facts:

Several thousand holders of 349 Pepsi crowns in connection with the Pepsi
Cola Products Phils., Inc.s (pepsis) Number Fever Promotion filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City complaints against the
petitioners in their respective capacities as Presidents or Chief Executive
Officers, Chairman of the Board, Vice-Chairman of the Board, and Directors
of PEPSI, and also against other officials of PEPSI. The complaints
respectively accuse the petitioners and the other PEPSI officials of the
following crimes:

o
o
o
o

o
o
o

(a) estafa;
(b) violation of R.A. No. 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer
Act of the Philippines;
(c) violation of E.O. No. 913; and
(d) violation of Act No. 2333, entitled An Act Relative to Untrue,
Deceptive and Misleading Advertisements, as amended by Act
No. 3740.
After appropriate proceedings, the investigating prosecutor,
Ramon M. Gerona, released on 23 March 1993 a Joint Resolution
where he recommended the filing of an information against the
petitioners and others for the violation of Article 3 18 of the
Revised Penal Code and the dismissal of the complaints for the
violation of Article 315, 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code; R.A. No.
7394; Act No. 2333, as amended by Act No. 3740; and E.O. No.
913.
City Prosecutor Candido V. Rivera approved the recommendation
with the modification that Rosemarie Vera, Quintin Gomez, Jr.,
and Chito Gonzales be excluded from the charge on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence
The petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor a
motion for the reconsideration of the Joint Resolution alleging
therein that
(a) there was neither fraud in the Number Fever Promotion nor
deviation from or modification of the promotional rules approved
by the Department of Trade and industry (DTI), for from the start
of the promotion, it had always been clearly explained to the
public that for one to be entitled to the cash prize his crown must
bear both the winning number and the correct security code as
they appear in the DTI list;
(b) the complainants failed to allege, much less prove with prima
facie evidence, the specific overt criminal acts or omissions
purportedly committed by each of the petitioners;
(c) the compromise agreement entered into by PEPSI is not an
admission of guilt; and
(d) the evidence establishes that the promo was carried out with
utmost good faith and without malicious intent.
The petitioners filed with the DOJ a Petition for Review + Motion
to suspend and hold in abeyance the issuance of arrest warrants
on the ground that they had filed a petition for review
Acting on the Petition for Review, Chief State Prosecutor Zenon L.
De Guia issued a 1st Indorsement
Directing the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to inform the DOJ
whether the petitioners have already been arraigned, and if not, to
move in court for the deferment of further proceedings in the case
and to elevate to the DOJ the entire records of the case, for the

case is being treated as an exception pursuant to Section 4 of

Department Circular No. 7 dated 25 January 1990
Private prosecutor Julio Contreras filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest.
In the afternoon of that same day, petitioner Paul Roberts, Jr.,
filed a Supplemental Urgent Motion to hold in Abeyance Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest and to Suspend Proceedings.
He stressed that the DOJ had taken cognizance of the Petition
for Review by directing the City Prosecutor to elevate the records
of I.S. No. P-4401 and its related cases and asserted that the
petition for review was an essential part of the petitioners right to
a preliminary investigation.
The next day, respondent Judge Asuncion, Presiding Judge of
Branch 104 of the RTC of Quezon City, issued an order advising
the parties that his court would be guided by the doctrine laid
down by the Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151
SCRA 462 and not by the resolution of the Department of Justice
on the petition for review undertaken by the accused.
Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero filed with the trial court
a Motion to Defer Arraignment wherein he also prayed that further
proceedings be held in abeyance pending final disposition by the
Department of Justice.
Gavero filed an Amended Information
The amendments merely consist in the statement that the
complainants therein were only among others who were
defrauded by the accused and that the damage or prejudice
caused amounted to several billions of pesos, representing the
amounts due them from their winning 349 crowns/caps. The trial
court admitted the amended information on the same date.
The attorneys for the different private complainants filed,
respectively, an Opposition to Motion to Defer Arraignment and
Objection and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Proceedings and
to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest.
The petitioners filed a Memorandum in support of their Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of
the Warrants of Arrest.
Respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1)
denying the petitioners Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to
Hold In Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and the public
prosecutors Motion to Defer Arraignment and (2) directing the
issuance of the warrants of arrest after 21 June 1993 and setting
the arraignment on 28 June 1993.
It is averred that there is a pending petition for review with the
Department of Justice filed by the accused and the Office of the
City Prosecutor was directed, among other things, to cause for

the deferment of further proceedings pending final disposition of

said petition by the Department of Justice.

Postponing indefinitely the arraignment of the petitioners which

was earlier scheduled on that date

The motions filed by the accused and the Trial Prosecutor are
hereby DENIED.

This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow

whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter
would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court.
This Court is still capable of administering justice.

The Court of Appeals heard the petitioners application for a writ of

preliminary injunction, granted the motion for leave to intervene
filed by J. Roberto Delgado, and directed the Branch Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Quezon City to elevate the original records of
the case

It ruled that the Joint Resolution was sufficient in itself to have

been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself that
probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest; and that the mere silence of the
records or the absence of any express declaration in the
questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise
to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his
favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
official duty.

The public respondents filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 31226 a motion

to dismiss the petition on the ground that it has become moot and
academic in view of the dismissal by the DOJ of the petitioners
petition to review the Joint Resolution.

Crespo vs. Mogul: In order therefor to avoid such a situation

whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of
the Court.

The petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with application for a temporary
restraining order

They contended therein that respondent Judge Asuncion had

acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion

CA on the motion to dismiss: dismissing the petition because it

had been mooted with the release by the Department of Justice of
its decision

I. RESPONDENT JUDGE FAILED TO EXAMINE THE

RECORD OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BEFORE
ORDERING THE ARREST OF PETITIONERS.

II. THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD

PETITIONERS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR ESTAFA,
OTHER DECEITS, OR ANY OTHER OFFENSE.

Dismissing petitioners petition for review by inerrantly upholding

the criminal courts exclusive and unsupplantable authority to
control the entire course of the case brought against petitioners,
reiterating with approval the dictum laid down in the Crespo case

The petitioners filed a motion to reconsider the dojs dismissal of

the petition citing therein its resolutions in other similar cases
which were favorable to the petitioners and adverse to other 349
Pepsi crowns holders.

DOJ, through its 349 Committee, denied the motion and stated:
The instant petition is different from the other petitions resolved by
this Department in similar cases from the provinces. In the latter
petitions, the complaints against herein respondents [sic] [42]were
dismissed inasmuch as the informations have not yet been filed or
even if already filed in court, the proceedings have been
suspended by the courts to await the outcome of the appeal with
this Department.

III. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN

SUSPENDED TO AWAIT THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICES
RESOLUTION OF PETITIONERS APPEAL, AND

IV. THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND

ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF
LAW.

CA: issued a temporary restraining order to maintain the status

quo.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. CA denied this.

HENCE THIS PETITION (FINALLY but not really)

IN SUMMARY: This is a petition to set aside the ff

Decision of the CA wc dismissed the petition on the ground that it
was already mooted by the decision of the DOJ dismissing the
petitioners petition for review
The resolution of the said court of 9 February 1994 denying the
petitioners motion to reconsider the decision
The order of 17 May 1993 of respondent Judge Maximiano C.
Asuncion of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 denying petitioners
motion to suspend proceedings and to hold in abeyance the
issuance of the warrants of arrest and the public prosecutors
motion to defer arraignment;
The resolution of 23 July 1993 and 3 February 1994 of the
Department of Justice, (DOJ) dismissing petitioners petition for
the review of the Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor
of Quezon City and denying the motion to reconsider the
dismissal, respectively.
Petitioners argue the ff:
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
ordered the arrest of the petitioners without examining the record
of the preliminary investigation and in determining for himself on
the basis thereof the existence of probable cause.
The Department of Justice 349 Committee acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it refused to review the City Prosecutors
Joint Resolution and dismissed petitioners appeal therefrom.

o
o

The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it

upheld the subject order directing the issuance of the warrants of
arrest without assessing for itself whether based on such records
there is probable cause against petitioners.
The facts on record do not establish prima facie probable cause
and Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 should have been dismissed.
The First Division of this Court denied due course to this petition
in its resolution of 19 September 1994.
Petitioners filed a motion to reconsider. Later, the petitioners filed
a supplemental motion for reconsideration and a motion to refer
this case to the Court en banc. In its resolution of 14 November
1994, the First Division granted the latter motion and required the
respondents to comment on the supplemental motion for
reconsideration
The Court en banc accepted the referral.

ISSUE (there are 5):

1.

Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse

of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the
motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance
of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition
for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved. YES

There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking
cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an
accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the
investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court.

In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals: Nothing in the said ruling forecloses

the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions
of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only
enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or
information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to
dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice
reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the
court.

Crespo could not have intended otherwise without doing violence to,
or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which recognizes the authority of the Secretary of Justice to
reverse the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor upon petition by a proper party.
o

The Secretary of Justice had promulgated the rules on

appeals from resolutions in preliminary investigation. At the
time the petitioners filed their petition for the review of the
Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the
governing rule was Circular No. 7, dated 25 January 1990.
Section 2 thereof provided that only resolutions dismissing
a criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of
Justice.

Its Section 4, however, provided an exception, thus

allowing, upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse
of discretion, appeals from resolutions finding probable
cause, provided that the accused has not been arraigned.

The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity

of this court is not the filing of the aforementioned motions
at that stage of the proceedings but the filing of a motion to
dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a
resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint
Resolution of the investigating prosecutor.
However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the
information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not
out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in
faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
Martinez vs. Court of Appeals: Whether to approve or
disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the
exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial
judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no
sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion
can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence
in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively
required was the trial judges own assessment of such
evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper
exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the
prosecutions word for its supposed insufficiency.

2.

Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse

of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without
examining the records of the preliminary investigation.YES

Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no

search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce.

Judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and

investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts. It must be emphasized that judges
must not rely solely on the report or resolution of the fiscal (now prosecutor);
they must evaluate the report and the supporting documents. In this sense,
the aforementioned requirement has modified paragraph 4(a) of Circular
No. 12 issued by this Court on 30 June 1987 prescribing the Guidelines on
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which provided in part as follows:
o

4. In satisfying himself of the existence of a probable cause

for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge, following
established doctrine and procedure, may either:

(a) Rely upon the fiscals certification of the existence of

probable cause whether or not the case is cognizable only
by the Regional Trial Court and on the basis thereof, issue
a warrant of arrest. X x x

This requirement of evaluation not only of the report or

certification of the fiscal but also of the supporting
documents

People vs. Inting: where this Court specified what the

documents may consist of, viz., the affidavits, the
transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting documents behind the Prosecutors certification
which are material in assisting the Judge to
make his determination of probable cause.

First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the

Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor the
Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge
alone makes this determination.

Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not

bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of
probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the
Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutors certification
of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
documents behind the Prosecutors certification which are material
in assisting the Judge to make his determination.

The extent of the Judges personal examination of the report

and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each
case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or
exhaustive the Judges examination should be. The Judge
has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It
can be as brief as or detailed as the circumstances of each
case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the
Prosecutors certification and investigation report whenever,
necessary. He should call for the complainant and
witnesses themselves to answer the courts probing
questions when the circumstances of the case so require

This Court then set aside for being null and void the
challenged order of respondent Judge Felix directing the
issuance of the warrants of arrest against petitioners
Lim, et al., solely on the basis of the prosecutors

certification in the informations that there existed probable

cause without having before him any other basis for his
personal determination of the existence of a probable
cause.

3.

In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial

court its 26-page report, the two (2) sworn statements of
Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and
Lolita Birrer as well as the counter- affidavits of the
petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis
of the parties evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report
satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue
warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we stress that
before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine
personally the probability, not the certainty of the guilt of an
accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They
just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported
by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review
process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes
and hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few
hours to review and affirm the Probable cause
determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made
no personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the
records of the case.

The DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion when it executed on 23

July 1993 a unilateral volte-face, which was even unprovoked by a
formal pleading to accomplish the same end, by dismissing the
petition for review. It dismissed the petition simply because it thought
that a review of the Joint Resolution would be an exercise in futility in
that any further action on the part of the Department would depend on
the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the latters denial of the
motion to defer arraignment filed at the instance of the DOJ was
clearly an exercise of that discretion or was, in effect, a signal to the
Department that the determination of the case is within the courts
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. This infirmity becomes more
pronounced because the reason adduced by the respondent Judge
for his denial of the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in
abeyance issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment
finds, as yet, no support in Crespo.

4.

Whether public respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse

of discretion (a) in denying the motion for a writ of preliminary
injunction solely on the ground that public respondent Asuncion had
already before him the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor
when he ordered the issuance of the warrants of arrest, and (b) in
ultimately dismissing the petition on the ground of mootness since the
DOJ has dismissed the petition for review. YES

We are unable to agree with this disquisition, for it merely assumes at

least two things: (1) that respondent Judge Asuncion had read and
relied on the Joint Resolution and (2) he was convinced that probable
cause exists for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. Nothing in the records provides reasonable basis for these
assumptions. In his assailed order, the respondent Judge made no
mention of the Joint Resolution, which was attached to the records of
Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 on 22 April 1993. Neither did he state
that he found probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
And, for an undivinable reason, he directed the issuance of warrants
of arrest only after June 21, 1993. If he did read the Joint Resolution
and, in so reading, found probable cause, there was absolutely no
reason at all to delay for more than one month the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The most probable explanation for such delay
could be that the respondent Judge had actually wanted to wait for a
little while for the DOJ to resolve the petition for review.

It is, nevertheless, contended in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice

Reynato S. Puno that whatever doubts may have lingered on the
issue of probable cause was dissolved when no less than the Court of
Appeals sustained the finding of probable cause made by the
respondent Judge after an evaluation of the Joint Resolution. We are
not persuaded with that opinion. It is anchored on erroneous

The
teachings
then
of Soliven,
Inting,
Lim,
Allado, and Webb reject
the
proposition
that
the
investigating prosecutors certification in an information or
his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the
information, or both, would suffice in the judicial
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since
the respondent Judges had before them not only the 26page resolution of the investigating panel but also the
affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and even the
counter-affidavits of the respondents, they (judges) made
personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records
of the case

Whether the DOJ, through its 349 Committee, gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing the petition for review on the following bases:
(a) the resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals denying the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and (b) of public
respondent Asuncions denial of the abovementioned motions. YES

premises. In its 1 July 1993 resolution, the Court of Appeals does not
at all state that it either sustained respondent Judge Asuncions finding
of probable cause, or found by itself probable cause. As discussed
above, it merely presumed that Judge Asuncion might have read the
Joint Resolution and found probable cause from a reading thereof.
Then too, that statement in the dissenting opinion erroneously
assumes that the Joint Resolution can validly serve as sufficient basis
for determining probable cause.
5.

Whether this Court may determine in this proceedings the existence

of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa.NO

There can be no doubt that, in light of the several thousand private

complainants in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 and several
thousands more in different parts of the country who are similarly
situated as the former for being holders of 349 Pepsi crowns, any
affirmative holding of probable cause in the said case may cause or
provoke, as justly feared by the petitioners, the filing of several
thousand cases in various courts throughout the country. Inevitably,
the petitioners would be exposed to the harassments of warrants of
arrest issued by such courts and to huge expenditures for premiums
on bailbonds and for travels from one court to another throughout the
length and breadth of the archipelago for their arraignments and trials
in such cases. Worse, the filing of these staggering number of cases
would necessarily affect the trial calendar of our overburdened judges
and take much of their attention, time, and energy, which they could
devote to other equally, if not more, important cases. Such a frightful
scenario would seriously affect the orderly administration of justice, or
cause oppression or multiplicity of actions - a situation already long
conceded by this Court to be an exception to the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction.

PUNO DISSENT

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION; A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE NEEDS ONLY
TO REST ON EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT MORE LIKELY THAN
NOT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED AND WAS COMMITTED BY
THE SUSPECTS. -The concept of probable cause is not a high level
legal abstraction to be the subject of warring thoughts. It is well
established that a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely
not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

JUAN LOPEZ DUNGOG v THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, PROVINCIAL FISCAL ENRIQUE B. INTING OF BOHOL,
and PANTALEON U. DEL ROSARIO

We shall not, however, reevaluate the evidence to determine if indeed

there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
o

For, as earlier stated, the respondent Judge did not, in fact,

find that probable cause exists, and if he did he did not
have the basis therefor as mandated by Soliven, Inting,
Lim, Allado, and even Webb.

NOTES:

There is a dissent by PUNO; separate opinion by NARVASA;

Important stuff according to the syllabi

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION; RULING IN CRESPO VS. MOGUL MERELY
ADVISED THE DOJ TO, AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE, REFRAIN
FROM ENTERTAINING A PETITION FOR REVIEW OR APPEAL
FROM THE ACTION OF THE FISCAL, WHEN THE COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION HAS ALREADY BEEN FILED IN COURT. - There is
nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking
cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an
accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the
investigation prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. More specifically, it stated: In order
therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far
as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.

Facts:

Petition For Review of the decision of the CA

On Oct. 9, 1985, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bohol Angel S. Ucat, Jr.
issued a resolution finding a prima facie case for the filing of an information for
estafa against Pantaleon del Rosario, finding that the case stemmed from an
alleged misappropriation by the del Rosario, with grave abuse of confidence, of

the proceeds of the sale of 24 heads of Heifer cattle, under a contract of agency.
This resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal of Bohol, Enrique B. Inting

On Oct. 15, an information charging del Rosaio with estafa was filed with
the RTC Bohol, entitled, The People of the Philippines versus Capt. Pantaleon
V. del Rosario. The information was approved by Inting

On the last week of Oct. and after the information had already been filed in
court, del Rosio filed a Motion For Reinvestigation with the Inting to which Juan
Lopez Dungog submitted his Opposition And/Or Comment

On Nov. 9, acting on the said Motion for Reinvestigation, Inting, reversing

himself and Ucat, found no prima facie case against del Rosario. On the same
date, Inting filed an Omnibus Motion For Postponement Of Arraignment And To
Allow Withdrawal Of Information. Dungog, del Rosario, and Inting filed their
respective Comments, Manifestations, and Rejoinders

On Dec. 4, the Presiding Judge of the DTC Bohol resolved to deny Intings
Motion to Withdraw Information. From the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration, two petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction were filed by Inting and del Rosario before the CA

On Oct. 30,1986, the CA promulgated its Decision in favor of Inting and del
Rosario, setting aside the orders of the trial court, granting the Motion to
Withdraw Information filed by Inting, and enjoining the Presiding Judge from
proceeding with the trial of the criminal aspect of the criminal case, among
others. Dungogs Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.
Issue: WoN a trial court may deny a motion submitted by the Provincial Fiscal to
dismiss an information previously filed by him and insist on trial on the merits of the
case YES

Once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case

as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court, he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. For while it is true that the fiscal has the
quasi-judicial discretion to determine w/n a criminal case should be filed in court,
once the case had already been brought to court, whatever disposition the fiscal
may deem proper thereafter should be addressed to the court for its
consideration and approval.

Also, it was erroneous for CA not to take cognizance of the Comment filed
by the private prosecutor on the ground that he has no personality to appear in
the proceeding, ostensibly because the offended party has no right to appeal
even from an order of dismissal upon motion of the fiscal. In all petitions under
Rule 65, RoC questioning the official orders of judges, including the justices of
CA, the latter are only formal parties. The burden of defending their challenged
action falls on del Rosario as provided under Sec. 5, Rule 65, RoC. The CA need
not file any separate pleading or comment distinct from that of del Rosario who is
obligated to appear and defend the court or judge concerned, unless the
summons or order to comment specifically and expressly requires the court or
the judge himself to comply with the directive of the superior court. Judges who

are made respondents are mere formal parties and are not to be distracted from
their main function of trying and adjudicating cases in their own courts.
Velasquez v Undersecretary of Justice

Edgardo Avila was a Cash and Business Development Consultant of the

Techtrade Management International Corporation, authorized to follow-up
business transactions, including loan applications submitted to the company
o
Avila informed Techtrade that he had a borrower (whom he did
not identify) for P200,000 with interest of 3%/month for a 30-day term from
September 29 to October 29, 1988 Techtrade approved the loan
Instead of returning the borrowed amount on due date or giving a
satisfactory explanation for the supposed borrower's failure to pay the loan
despite written demands, Avila resigned from the company on December 17
promising that he shall set aside 100k for Techtrade and is asking for the P100k
balance as his separation and compulsory benefit
Velasquez, EVP of Techtrade, filed a complaint for estafa against
Avila
o
Assistant Fiscal Lopez dismissed the complaint, but upon review
by the Chief Investigation Division of the City Fiscal's Office, the latter set
aside Fiscal Lopez' resolution and ordered the filing of an information for
estafa against Avila
Avila twice sought a reconsideration of that resolution, but both
motions were denied by the City Fiscal
Before his arraignment, Avila filed a petition for review in the DOJ
which Velasquez opposed
o
Justice Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III denied the petition for
review
o
A motion for reconsideration of the denial didnt prosper as well
Avila filed a second motion for reconsideration which the
Undersecretary of Justice, Honorable Artemio Tuquero granted
o
Thus, he directed the City Fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation of
this case to afford respondent to properly present evidence that he was
duly authorized to pay the subject creditors and for complainant to rebut the
same with controverting evidence, and thereafter to resolve the case anew
on the basis of all the evidence adduced
Velasquez filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution, but
it was denied hence this petition for certiorari!

W/N Undersecretary Tuquero gravely abused his discretion in granting the 2 nd motion
for reconsideration and ordering a reinvestigation of the case YES

This case is governed by the Courts decision in Crespo v Mogul where it

held that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires complete
jurisdiction over it.

Thus, a motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had

acquired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to
him alone
o
Neither the Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor the
Fiscal may interfere with the judge's disposition of the case, much less
impose upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the
accused, for the court is the sole judge of that
Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court
o
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court
The Undersecretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in
ordering the re-investigation of the criminal case against Avila after it had been
filed in court
o

The purpose of the reinvestigation can also be achieved at the

trial in the lower court where that piece of evidence may be presented by
the accused as part of his defense.

PEOPLE VS BERIALES
Facts:

Appellants Ricardo Beriales, Benedicto Custodio, and Pablito Custodio were

charged with the murder of Saturnina Porcadilla through an information filed
by the City Fiscal of Ormoc.
At the hearing, their counsel moved for a reinvestigation of the case, along
with 2 other related cases, which the court granted.
The court postponed the hearing to Dec. 17 and 18, 1974 in view of the City
Fiscals motion for deferment of the hearing until such time the
reinvestigation shall have been terminated.
However, the court motu proprio cancelled the aforesaid hearings on
November 17 and 18 and instead, reset the arraignment and trial of the
case to December 10 and 11, 1974.
During the Dec. 10 hearing, appellants counsel manifested to the court that
the reinvestigation for Dec. 12 had already been set and that the
corresponding subpoena to secure the attendance of the witnesses had
already been secured. Nevertheless, the court still set the hearing to the
next day.
During this hearing, the appellants counsel reiterated his manifestation.
However, the trial court, relying on the Constitutional provision guaranteeing
the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases, rescheduled
the hearing to Dec. 13, 1974. Immediately thereafter, Special Counsel

Issues:

Rosario R. Polines, in representation of the City Fiscal, manifested that the

private prosecutor, Atty. Procadilla, be authorized to conduct the case for the
prosecution.
During the Dec. 13 hearing, counsel for appellants asked the court to wait
for the City Fiscal to appear since the reinvestigation of the case had
already been terminated, and if given the chance, might be able to report on
the said investigation. The court, however, insisted on arraigning the
appellants. When arraigned, the 3 declined to plead, saying that they refuse
to answer because the Fiscal is not yet around. The court then entered a
plea of not guilty for each of them.
Thereafter, appellants counsel again manifested that the City Fiscal was
absent and that they could not go to trial without the fiscal and his report on
the reinvestigation. Nonetheless, the court ordered the presentation of the
evidence by the private prosecutor.
At the direct examination of the witnesses presented by the private
prosecutor, the court asked the appellants counsel if he wanted to crossexamine the witnesses. He however reiterated his manifestation that they
would not go to trial until the City Fiscal shall have submitted the result of
the reinvestigation to the court. The court considered such as a waiver of
the appellants to cross-examine the witnesses.
The prosecution rested its case. The court called for the evidence of the
defense. Once again, the appellants counsel reiterated the above. The
court considered the case submitted for decision.
On Dec. 17, the case was called for promulgation. Counsel for the
appellants manifested that the accused were not in conformity with such on
the ground that they did not agree to the trial of the case. The court still
promulgated its judgment on the same day.
Hence, the present appeal where appellants contend that they were denied
due process of law.
WoN the appellants were denied due process of law given the
aforementioned facts- YES.
o
After the trial court granted their motion for reinvestigation, it
became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the
arraignment and trial of the case until the Fiscal shall have
conducted and made his report on the result of such
reinvestigation.
o
This is especially important since appellants were charged with
the serious crime of murder. Also, since the ground for the
reinvestigation was that it was the husband of the deceased who
was the aggressor, it was entirely possible for the City Fiscal to
change his conclusion after such reinvestigation.
o
It is also deplorable that the City Fiscal and any of his assistants
or special counsel were totally absent wen the appellants were

arraigned and when the prosecution presented its evidence.

While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in
criminal cases which denies the right of the fiscal, in the exercise
of a sound discretion, to turn over the active conduct of the trial to
a private prosecutor, 32 nevertheless, his duty to direct and control
the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be present
during the proceedings.
It follows that the evidence presented by the private prosecutor at
said hearing could not be considered as evidence for the plaintiff,
the People of the Philippines. There was, therefore, no evidence
at all to speak of which could have been the basis of the decision
of the trial court.

Ruling:

Decision appealed from set aside; case remanded to the trial court for
another arraignment and trial.

PRIMICIAS vs. PANGASINAN

Facts:

On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusta B. Primacias plaintiff appellee, was

driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a member of
Urdaneta's Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told, upon stopping,
that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, "and more
particularly, for overtaking a truck."
The policeman then asked for plaintiff's license which he surrendered, and a
temporary operator's permit was issued to him. This incident took place
about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio Nancamaliran,
Urdaneta.
Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta
against Primicias for violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964. Due to
the institution of the criminal case, plaintiff Primicias initiated an action for
the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of
Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman
Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge
Soriano was enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal case.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered the questioned decision
holding that the ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by
Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code.

Issue: WON Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, enacted on March 13,1964 by the
Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which was declared null and void by the

Court of First Instance of Lingayen, Pangasinan, in its decision dated June 29, 1966 is
valid? NO

The ordinance in question provides:

o
SECTION 1 - That the following speed limits for vehicular traffic
along the National Highway and the Provincial Roads within the
territorial limits of Urdaneta shall be as follows:
a. Thru crowded streets approaching intersections at 'blind
corners, passing school zones or thickly populated areas,
duly marked with sign posts, the maximum speed limit
allowable shall be 20 kph.
o
SECTION 2 - That any person or persons caught driving any
motor vehicle violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be
fined P10.00 for the first offense; P20.00 for the second offense;
and P30.00 for the third and succeeding offenses, the Municipal
Judge shall recommend the cancellation of the license of the
offender to the Motor Vehicle's Office (MVO); or failure to pay the
fine imposed, he shall suffer a subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with law.

Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being "patterned

after and based on Section 53, par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as
amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law)."

In so arguing, appellants fail to note that Act No. 3992 has been
superseded by Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation
and 'Traffic Code, which became effective on June 20, 1964,
about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved
by Urdaneta's Municipal Council. The explicit repeal of the
aforesaid Act is embodied in Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136

Act Numbered thirty-nine hundred ninety-two (3992) as amended,

and all laws, executive orders, ordinance, resolutions, regulations
or paints thereof in conflict with the provisions of this Act are
repealed.

By this express repeal, and the general rule that a later law
prevails over an earlier law, appellants are in error in contending
that "a later enactment of the law relating to the same subject
matter as that of an earlier statute is not sufficient to cause an
implied repeal of the original law." Pursuant to Section 63,
Republic Act No. 4136, the ordinance at bar is thus placed within
the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not Act No. 3992. The
validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, must therefore be
determined vis-a-vis Republic Act No. 4136, the "mother statute"
so to speak, which was in force at the time the criminal case was
brought against Primicias for the violation of the said ordinance.

An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that

is "must not contravene . . . the statute," for it is a "fundamental

principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and

subordinate to the laws of the state." Following this general rule,
whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute,
the ordinance "must give way.
Since the Ordinance is aimed at regulating traffic, Chapter IV
Traffic Rules), Article I (Speed Limits and Keeping to the Right),
consisting of sections 35, to 38 of Republic Act No. 4136,
particularly Sections 35, 36, 38 contain the provisions material to
its validity. Section 35 (b), Republic Act No. 4136, which took the
place of Section 53, par. (4), Act No. 3992,
A look at the aforecited section and Section 1, par. (a) of the
Ordinance shows that the latter is more or less a restatement only
of number (4), par. (b), Section 35. As observed by the trial court,
the Ordinance "refers to only one of the four classifications
mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35." 10 limiting the rates of
speed forvehicular traffic along the national highway and The
provincial roads within the territorial limits of Urdaneta to 20
kilometers per hour without regard to whether the road is an open
country roads (six), or through streets or boulevards, or city or
municipal streets with light traffic.
As also found correctly by the lower court, the Municipal Council
of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its thoroughfares,
contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38,
Republic Act No. 4136
Under this section, a local legislative body intending to control
traffic in public highways is supposed to classify, first, and then
mark them with proper signs, all to be approved by the Land
Transportation Commissioner. To hold that the provisions of
Section 38 are mandatory is sanctioned by a ruling thatstatutes
which confer upon a public body or officer . . . power to perform
acts which concern the public interests or rights of individuals, are
generally, regarded as mandatory although the language is
permissive only since the are construed as imposing duties rather
than conferring privileges.
The classifications which must be based on Section 35 are
necessary in view of Section 36 which states that "no provincial,
city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or
resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those
provided in this Act." In this case, however, there is no showing
that the marking of the streets and areas falling under Section 1,
par. (a), Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, was done with the
approval of the Land Transportation Commissioner. Thus, on this
very ground alone, the Ordinance becomes invalid. Since it lacks
the requirement imposed by Section 38, the provincial, city, or
municipal board or council is enjoined under Section 62 of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code from "enacting or enforcing

o
o
o
o
o

any ordinance or resolution in conflict with the provisions of this

Act."
Regarding the contention that the lower court erred in holding that
said "Ordinance is not clear and definite in its terms." We agree
with the Court a quo that when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta
used the phrase "vehicular traffic" (Section 1, Ordinance) it "did
not distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and
motor trucks and buses." 14 This conclusion is bolstered by the
fact that nowhere in the Ordinance is "vehicular traffic" defined.
Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness,
definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that "an
average man should be able with due care, after reading it,, to
understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for
particular acts or courses of conduct." 15 In comparison, Section
35(b), Republic Act No. 4136 on which Section 1 of the Ordinance
must be based, stated that the rates of speed enumerated therein
refer to motor vehicle, 16 specifying the speed for each kind of
vehicle. At the same time, to avoid vagueness, Art. 11, Section 3
defines what a motor vehicle is and passenger automobiles are.
On the issue of whether a writ of injunction can restrain the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3140, the general rule is that
"ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court
prohibition or injunction."
Exceptions however are allowed in the following instances:
for the orderly administration of justice;
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive
and vindictive manner;
to avoid multiplicity of actions;
to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights;
in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was held invalid. 18
The local statute or ordinance at bar being invalid, the exception
just cited obtains in this case. Hence, the lower court did not err in
issuing the writ of injunction against defendants. Moreover,
considering that "our law on municipal corporations is in principle
patterned after that of the United States, " 19 it would not be amiss
for Us to adopt in this instance the ruling that to enjoin the
enforcement of a void ordinance, "injunction has frequently been
sustained in order to prevent a multiplicity of prosecutions under
it."

HELD: APPEALED DECISION AFFIRMED

Hernandez v. Albano 1967
Facts

Respondent Delfin Albano, former Congressman for the lone district of

Isabela, filed a complaint against petitioner Jaime Hernandez, then
Secretary of Finance and Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of the
Central Bank, for violation of A216 RPC, Commonwealth Act 626 or RA 265.
The complaint revolves around Hernandezs shareholdings in the University
of the East, Bicol Electric Company, Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG,
Inc., and University of Nueva Caceres. Albano claimed that said
corporations obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the
Monetary Board, during Hernandezs incumbency as presiding officer
thereof.
At the joint investigation of the charges before the respondent fiscal Carlos
Gonzales, Albano moved to exclude therefrom the alleged violation of A216
RPC, because the applicability of the statute was in issue of Solidum v.
Hernandez, at the time pending before the SC, but has since been resolved
adversely to Hernandez. Fiscal Gonzales granted the motion.
Hernandez sought the dismissal of the remaining charges, averring that the
violation of S11(2), A7 of the Constitution, punishable under CA 626, should
be prosecuted at the domicile of the private enterprises affected thereby,
and that violation of S13, RA 265 is not criminal in nature. Dismissal was
denied and so was reconsideration.
To restrain the fiscals from continuing the investigation, Hernandez went to
the CFI of Manila on certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for preliminary
injunction. This was dismissed, hence this appeal.

Issue 1: W/N the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila should be restrained from
proceeding with the investigation of the charges against Hernandez NO

By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants
are empowered to investigate crimes committed within the citys territorial
jurisdiction. It is the sword duty of a fiscal to conduct an investigation of a
criminal charge filed with his office. The power to investigate postulates the
other obligation on the part of the fiscal to investigate promptly and file the
case of as speedily. Public interest so demands.

Pursuant to this, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be
blocked by court prohibition or injunction. If at every turn, investigation of a
crime will be halted by a court order, the administration of criminal justice
will meet with an undue setback. The investigative power of the fiscal may
suffer such a tremendous shrinkage that it may end up in hollow sound
rather than as part and parcel of the machinery of criminal justice.

There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule, as when it is necessary:

o
for the orderly administration of justice;
o
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive
and vindictive manner;
o
to avoid multiplicity of actions;
o
to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and

in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is

unconstitutional, or was held invalid."
S11(2), A7 of the Constitution reads: The heads of departments
and chiefs of bureaus or offices and their assistants shall not,
during their continuance in office, engage in the practice of any
profession, or intervene, directly or indirectly, in the management
or control of any private enterprise which in any way may be
affected by the functions of their office; nor shall they directly or
indirectly, be financially interested in any contract with the
Government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. CA
626 provides a penal sanction for its violation, i.e., a fine of not
more than P5k or imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or both.
Under S14, R110 ROC, all criminal prosecutions must be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province
wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.
Petitioner seeks to bar the fiscals from investigating the
constitutional violation charged on the ground that Manila fiscals
are powerless to investigate him, as he is domiciled in Naga City
(for the shareholdings in Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University
of Nueva Caceres and Bicol Electric Company) and in
Mandaluyong, Rizal (for DMG, Inc.), and thus the crime is to be
prosecuted in the situs of such shares.
He relies on Black Eagle Mining Company v. Conroy, where it
was held that shares of stock are a peculiar kind of personal
property, and are unlike other classes of personal property in that
the property right of shares of stock can only be exercised or
enforced where the corporation is organized and has its place of
business and can exist only as an incident to and connected with
the corporation, and this class of property is inseparable from the
domicile of the corporation itself.
This case is not germane to this petition, as it speaks of property
right to shares of stock which can only be enforced in the
corporations domicile. In the case at bar, the charges are not
directed against the corporations not mere ownership of or title
to shares is involved. Possession of prohibited interests is but one
of the essential components of the offense. A necessary
ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner was the Secretary of
Finance, and that while he was the head of a department, he was
allegedly financially interested in the corporations which secured
the dollar allocations. He had to act officially, in his dual capacity,
not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his office. The
Manila fiscals have therefore the jurisdiction to investigate the
violation complained of.
As for the violation of S13, RA 265, petitioner contends that it is
not criminal in nature. The statute reads: Withdrawal of persons

having a personal interest. Whenever any person attending a

meeting of the Monetary Board has a personal interest of any sort
in the discussion or resolution of any given matter, or any of his
business associates or any of his relatives within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or second degree of aff inity has such an
interest, said person may not participate in the discussion or
resolution of the matter and must retire from the meeting during
the deliberations thereon. The minutes of the meeting shall note
the withdrawals of the member concerned. He contends that
pursuant to S15 of the same law, only a civil sanction and not a
criminal sanction is imposed.
This is non-sequitur. S34 of the law provides that the punishment
shall be a fine of not more than P20k and imprisonment of not
more than 5 years.
Petitioner contends that S13 and S15 fall under Article II
Monetary Board of Chapter I Establishment and Organization of
the Central Bank of the Philippines whereas S34 comes under
B. Department Supervision and Examination of Article IV
Departments of the Central Bank. As such, S34 should be
restricted to the matters of supervision of banking institutions.
This is untenable. The entire statute should be construed as a
whole. One refers to the civil liability at the same time that the
other specifies a separate criminal liability. Moreover, the
provisions were arranged in such a way that the liabilities were
grouped together.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the congressional deliberations on
House Bill 1704, which later became RA 265, reveal that
Congress intended to foreclose criminal action. However, the
amendment he referred to was not submitted for the reason that
S34 was found to be broad enough to cover any person who
violates the act.

Court failed to consider that the petitioners entered in the records and books
of the Nation Savings and Loan Association only P305,821.92 out of his
deposits in the amounts of P1,145,546.20, P15,531.94 and $75,000 and
that they admitted that they did not deliver the difference when they
assumed in their personal capacities the obligation to pay him. He argues
that the petitioners committed estafa through misappropriation.chanrobles
law library

On the other hand, the petitioners contend that the decision had already
become final because the Solicitor General did not file any motion for
reconsideration; that David cannot adopt a theory which is inconsistent with
his original theory; that his claim is clearly civil, not criminal; that his claim
has been novated, and that prohibition is proper to stop a void proceeding,
to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of lawful authority and to
provide a just and orderly administration of justice.

The petitioners filed this prohibition action because their obligation is

allegedly civil in character and because of the adverse publicity supposedly
instigated by David.

HELD:

the City Fiscal has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. It has
not been finished. The filing of this petition is premature. The case does not
fall within any of the exceptions when prohibition lies to stop the preliminary
investigation

As a general rule, an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal

prosecution" (People v. Mencias, 124 Phil. 1436, 1441). With more reason
will injunction not lie when the case is still at the preliminary investigation
stage. This Court should not usurp the primary function of the City Fiscal to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the estafa charge and of the
petitioners countercharge for perjury, which was consolidated with the
estafa charge

The City Fiscals office should be allowed to finish its investigation and
make its factual findings. This Court should not conduct the preliminary
investigation. It is not a trier of facts. *

The instant case is primarily a litigation between David and the petitioners.
The fact that the Solicitor General, as counsel of the public respondents, did
not file a motion for reconsideration does not estop David from continuing

HELD: CFI affirmed.

21. Guingona vs. City Fiscal (heavy on civil law, onlu made notes on the crimpro
related topics)
RESOLUTION
Facts:

Respondent Clement David filed a motion for the reconsideration of this

Courts decision dated April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577. He contends that this

with the prosecution of the petitioners. In the present posture of the case,
the City Fiscal occupies the analogous position of judge. He has to maintain
an attitude of neutrality, not that of partiality.
NOTE:
Concepcion JR, Separate statement
Revolva, Concurring
Alampay, J., I share the same view expressed by Justice Relova in this case.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring:
TEhhankee Dissent

It cannot be overemphasized that the issues in this case were joined

between petitioners and public and private respondents, and were resolved
in the original decision of April 4, 1984 on the question of whether there
existed any criminal liability on the part of petitioners that would warrant the
continuation of the fiscals preliminary investigation. This issue of lack of
criminal liability was fully discussed by all parties at the hearing and in their
extensive memoranda. The Solicitor General accepted the finality on April
23, 1984 of the Courts negative verdict of April 4, 1984. The city fiscals
office remains permanently enjoined by this Courts final judgment, and
such finality which is now res judicata cannot be set aside under the guise
of acting on Davids motion for reconsideration which should be regarded
as a mere scrap of paper because of his lack of legal personality and
standing. Any continuation of the fiscals preliminary investigation has been
rendered moot and academic by this Courts judgment of lack of any
criminal liability which became final and executory on April 23, 1984 with
the acceptance thereof by public respondents headed by the Solicitor
General. If "the instant case is primarily a litigation between David and the
petitioners", as stated in the Resolution (at page 6), such litigation is purely
civil in nature and has to be pursued and settled in the various pending civil
cases of the parties as a private matter between them.

Makasiar Dissent

More on the civil aspect

Ladlad, et. al. v Velasco, et. al.

Facts:

Consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari

Petitioners Crispin B. Beltran, Liza L. Maza, Joel G. Virador, Saturnino C.

Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casio, and Rafael V. Mariano are members of the House of
Representatives representing various party-list groups. The other petitioners are
private individuals.
Beltran Petition

Following the issuance by President GMA of Proclamation No. 1017 on Feb.

24, 2006 declaring a State of National Emergency, police officers arrested
Beltran on Feb. 25, without a warrant, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan,
and detained him in Camp Crame. He was not informed of the crime for which he
was arrested. That evening, he was subjected to an inquest at the QC Hall of
Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Art. 142, RPC based on a speech he
allegedly gave during a rally in QC on Feb. 24, on the occasion of the 20 th
anniversary of EDSA I. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltrans
arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally. The inquest
prosecutor indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding Information with the
MeTC of QC

The authorities brought Beltran back to Camp Crame. On Feb. 27, he was
subjected to a second inquest with 1 st Lt. Lawrence San Juan for Rebellion. A
panel of State prosecutors from the DOJ conducted this inquest. The inquest was
based on two letters of Yolanda Tanigue and of Rodolfo Mendoza. Tanigue is the
Acting Executive Officer of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG), PNP while Mendoza is the Acting Deputy Director of the CIDG. The
letters were the results of the CIDGs investigation implicating Beltran, San Juan,
and several others as leaders and promoters of an alleged foiled plot to
overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly
by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the
Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP). The DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a
Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan as
leaders/promoters of Rebellion. The panel then filed a corresponding Information
with the RTC Makati. The Information was raffled to Branch 137 under Presiding
Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino

Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of probable

cause against him. However, Judge Delorino recused herself from the case
which was re-raffled to Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-Moya. In its
Order, Branch 146 sustained the finding of probable cause against Beltran.
Beltran sought reconsideration, but Judge Moya also inhibited herself. Judge
Elmo M. Alameda of Branch 150, to whom the case was re-raffled, issued an
Order denying Beltrans motion.

Hence, the petition to set aside the said Orders and to enjoin Beltrans
prosecution.

In his Comment to the petition, the SolGen claims that Beltrans inquest for
Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to
try Beltran for such felony
Issue: WoN the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid NO

Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully
arrested without warrant. Sec. 5, Rule 113, RoC provides the instances when
such warrantless arrest may be effected

The joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers states that the officers
arrested Beltran, without a warrant, for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion.
Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted as he did conduct an
inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group
of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion,
they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of the
arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion.
Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran
had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he
had committed Rebellion.

Under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated Sept. 21 1993, the initial duty of the
inquest officer is to determine if the arrest of the detained person was made in
accordance with the provisions of pars. (a) and (b), Sec. 5, Rule 113. If the arrest
was not properly effected, the inquest officer should proceed under Sec. 9 of this
Circular:
Where Arrest Not Properly Effected. Should the Inquest Officer find that the
arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
a)
recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b)
note down the disposition on the referral document;
c)
prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken;
and
d)
forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or
Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved
by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the
conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the order of release shall be
served on the officer having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said
officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary
investigation, together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit
or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting
evidence.

For the failure of Beltrans panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Sec.
7, Rule 112 in relation to Sec. 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, Beltrans
inquest void. Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had
he not asked the trial court to make a judicial determination of probable cause,
which effectively took the place of such proceeding.
Issue: WoN there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion NO

Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would

excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of

the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted
Rebellion is defined under Art. 134, RPC. By its nature, rebellion is a crime
of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a
political end.
The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of
Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents attached to
the CIDG letters. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which
were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military and
some civilians. Except for two affidavits, none of the affidavits mentions Beltran.
In his affidavit, Ruel Escala recounted that in the afternoon of Feb. 20, he saw
Beltran, Ocampo, Casio, Maza, Mariano, Virador, and other individuals on board
a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and
that after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual who
looked like San Juan. For his part, Raul Cachuela stated that he was a former
member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPPs 10th Plenum (1992)
where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he
and the other CPP members used were purchased partly from contributions by
Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list groups affiliated
with the CPP.
o
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to
indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the
government. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific
acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion. None of the affidavits
alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltrans alleged presence
during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a
rebellion.
o
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran
does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute
rebellion.
o
As for the alleged funding of the CPPs military equipment from
Beltrans congressional funds, Cachuelas affidavit merely contained a
general conclusion without any specific act showing such funding
In his Comment, the SolGen points to Fuentes affidavit as basis
for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in
his statement regarding meetings Beltran and the other petitioners attended in
2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were
allegedly discussed, among others. The claim is untenable. Fuentes affidavit
was not part of the attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ. Thus, the panel of
inquest prosecutors did not have Fuentes affidavit in their possession when they
conducted the Rebellion inquest against Beltran on that day.
Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect by
motu proprio submitting to Branch 137 Fuentes affidavit as part of their
Comment to Beltrans motion for judicial determination of probable cause. Such
belated submission, a tacit admission of the dearth of evidence against Beltran
during the inquest, does not improve the prosecutions case. Assuming them to

be true, what the allegations in Fuentes affidavit make out is a case for
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Art. 136, RPC not Rebellion
under Art. 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring
down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting
Rebellion. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since the felony charged in
the Information against Beltran and San Juan is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion
and not Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and
others conspired to form a tactical alliance to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC
Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for
Rebellion based on the evidence before it.
Nowhere in the minutes of the Feb. 20 alleged meeting in
Batangas between members of MKP and CPP was Beltran implicated. While the
minutes state that a certain Cris attended the alleged meeting, there is no other
evidence on record indicating that Cris is Beltran. San Juan, from whom the flash
drive containing the so-called minutes was allegedly taken, denies knowing
Beltran
Even assuming that the Information validly charges Beltran for
taking part in a Rebellion, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is
no allegation in the Information that he is a leader or promoter of the Rebellion.
However, the Information in fact merely charges Beltran for conspiring and
confederating with others in forming a tactical alliance to commit rebellion. As
worded, the Information does not charge Beltran with Rebellion but with
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, a bailable offense.

The Maza and Ladlad Petitions

Based on Tanigue and Mendozas letters, the DOJ sent subpoenas to

petitioners on March 6, 2006 requiring them to appear at the DOJ Office on
March 13 to get copies of the complaint and its attachment. Prior to this,
petitioners had quartered themselves inside the House of Representatives
building for fear of being subjected to warrantless arrest.

During the preliminary investigation on March 13, the counsel for the CIDG
presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be
an eyewitness against petitioners. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before
prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to media
members present during the proceedings. The panel of prosecutors gave
petitioners 10 days within which to file their counter-affidavits. Petitioners were
furnished the complete copies of documents only on March 17

Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel
for lack of impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under
which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the
Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners case, and the
manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation.
The DOJ panel of prosecutors denied petitioners motion. Petitioners sought
reconsideration and additionally prayed for the dismissal of the cases. Again, the
panel of prosecutors denied petitioners motions

Petitioners now seek the nullification of the two DOJ Orders.

Acting on petitioners prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ, the SC

issued a status quo order on June 5. Prior to this, however, the panel of
prosecutors, issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioners
and 46 others with Rebellion. The prosecutors filed the corresponding
Information with Branch 57, RTC Makati, charging petitioners and their coaccused as principals, masterminds, or heads of a Rebellion. Thus, the
petitioners filed a supplemental petition to enjoin the prosecution of the criminal
case

In his Comment to the Maza petition, the SolGen. submits that the
preliminary investigation of petitioners was not tainted with irregularities. He also
claims that the filing of criminal has mooted the Maza petition.
Issue: WoN respondent prosecutors should be enjoined from continuing with the
prosecution YES

The preliminary investigation was tainted with irregularities. The procedure

for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by at least 4 years, 2 months
and 1 day is outlined in Sec. 3, Rule 112, RoC.

Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and

Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached
to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public
without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was
unavailable as required by Sec. 3(a), Rule 112, RoC. By peremptorily issuing the
subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainants antics during the
investigation, and distributing copies of a witness affidavit to members of the
media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the
charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the
investigation but also lent credence to petitioners claim that the entire proceeding
was a sham.

There is also a violation of Sec. 3(b), Rule 112, RoC. Here, after receiving
the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to
petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office to secure copies of the
complaints and its attachments. During the investigation, respondent prosecutors
allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit
before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of
Fuentes affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media
who covered the proceedings. Respondent prosecutors then required petitioners
to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was only four days later that
petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG letters.

A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system

which spells for an individual the difference between months if not years of
agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and
liberty, on the other hand. Thus, the right to a preliminary investigation is not a
mere formal or technical right but a substantive one, forming part of due process
in criminal justice. This especially holds true here where the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and may be non-bailable for those accused as
principals.

Contrary to the submission of the SolGen, respondent prosecutors filing of

the Information against petitioners does not moot the petitions. The SCs power
to enjoin prosecutions cannot be frustrated by the simple filing of the Information
with the trial court.

There is merit in petitioners doubt on respondent prosecutors impartiality.

Respondent Secretary of Justice, who exercises supervision and control over the
panel of prosecutors, stated in an interview on March 13, 2006, the day of the
preliminary investigation, that, We [the DOJ] will just declare probable cause,
then its up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x.[42] Petitioners raised this issue in their
petition, but respondents never disputed the veracity of this statement. This
clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to file the Information even in the
absence of probable cause.

Go v CA

July 2: Eldon Maguan was driving his car along one-way Wilson St. where
Go entered it and started travelling in the wrong direction, thus their cars nearly
bumped each other
Go alighted from his car, walked over, and shot Maguan inside his car, then
drove away
A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down Gos plate
number
o
The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene and was able to
retrieve an empty shell and one round of the gun
o
Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car
was registered to one Elsa Ang Go
The following day, the police were able to determine that Go ate
at Cravings Bake Shop before the shooting and obtained a facsimile or
impression of the credit card used by Go
o
The security guard of the bake shop was shown Gos picture and
he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan
Thus, having established that Go was the assailant, the police
launched a manhunt for him
July 8: Go presented himself before the San Juan Police Station
to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police, thus the latter
detained him
o
An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified Go as the gunman
o
On the same day, the police filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide against Go
o
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Ignacio (Prosecutor)
informed Go, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of

his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
o
Go refused to execute any waiver
July 9: While the complaint was still with Prosecutor and before
an information could be filed in court, Maguan died from his wounds, thus
Prosecutor - instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an
information for murder.
o
At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not
execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.
o
No bail was recommended
July 11: Gos lawyer filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion
for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation alleging that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation
had been conducted before the information was filed
o
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus
motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no
objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of
P100,000.
July 12: Go then filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle
to expedite action on the Prosecutors bail recommendation
o
The case was raffled to Judge Pelayo who approved of the cash
bond and ordered his release he was released on the same day
July 16: the Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation with the RTC and prayed that in the meantime all
proceedings in the court be suspended
o
He stated that Go filed an omnibus motion for immediate release
and preliminary investigation which was granted by Provincial Proescutor
Castro who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100k
o
Judge Pelayo granted the leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until
after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation
July 17: Judge Pelayo motu proprio issued an Order stating that
the order which granted bail was recalled and Go was given 48 hours from
receipt of the Order to surrender himself
o
The 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to
conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled
o
Gos omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for
hearing on 23 July
July 19: Go filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the SC assailing Judge Pelayos July 17 Order - contending
that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had
been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process

He also moved to suspend proceedings in the case pending

resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition
July 23: Go surrendered to the police
August 16: Judge Pelayo issued an order in open court setting the
arraignment of petitioner on 23 August
August 19: Go filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain
his arraignment
August 23: Judge Pelayo issued a Commitment Order directing
the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal
Provincial Jail
o
On the same day, Go was arraigned, but in view of his refusal to
enter a plea, the TC entered a plea of not guilty for him
o
The TC sent the criminal case for continuous hearings
August 27: Go filed a petition for habeas corpus in the CA alleging
that because of Judge Pelays failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari
earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his
detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus
August 30: the CA issued the writ of habeas corpus
o
Thus, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the
one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were
subsequently consolidated in the CA
On Sept 23: the CA rendered a decision which held that: Gos
warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and
charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through
investigation.
o
Also, his act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity
attending his arrest.
o
He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it
properly and seasonably under the Rules.
o
Since there was a valid information for murder against him and a
valid commitment order, the habeas corpus cannot be granted
Thus, this present petition for review on certiorari is filed
o

W/N a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected against Go NO

Sol Gen: he was validly arrested without a warrant since Gos identity as the
gunman had been sufficiently established. Also, S6, Rule 112 is applicable
because Go had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC, thus
the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for murder even
without preliminary investigation
Go: he wasnt lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the
police station 6 days after the shooting which he allegedly done
o
Thus, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he
was arrested and none of the police officers who arrested him had been an

eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the

"personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest
o
Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. S6, Rule 112
which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation,
could not apply in respect of petitioner
SC: No, the warrantless arrest do not fall within the terms of S5,
A113 because his arrest took place 6 days after the shooting and the arresting
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning S5(a) at the time Go shot
Maguan
o
Neither could the "arrest" be reasonably regarded as effected
"when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of
S5(b) and none of the arresting officers had any "personal knowledge" of
facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan the
information that they gathered from the security guard, etc. does not
constitute personal knowledge
Thus, since there was no lawful warrantless arrest, S6 of Rule
112 does not apply.
o
Go wasnt arrested at all because he actually surrendered himself
but did not say so to avoid implicating himself
When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the
Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging Go in
court for the killing of Maguan
o
Instead, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition
that S6 of Rule 112 was applicable and required Go to waive the provisions
of A125, RPC as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation
o
This was a substantive error for Go was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any
conditions
Moreover, since Go had not been arrested, with or without a
warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his
appearing at the preliminary investigation.

W/N he effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation NO

On the same date the information was filed, Go filed an omnibus motion for
release and preliminary investigation
Although the Sol Gen contends that that the omnibus motion should have
been filed with the TC and not with the Prosecutor, and that the Go should
accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation, the
waiver of Gos statutory right to a preliminary investigation shouldnt be based on
such slim basis
o
The PI was to be conducted by the Prosecutor and not the RTC

Also, even if the information for murder had already been filed
with the RTC at the time he filed his omnibus motion, there is no evidence
that Go was aware of this fact
Even though Crespo v Mogul states that once the information is
filed, only the court can allow a reinvestigation, in Gos case, he is asking for a
preliminary investigation and not a reinvestigation
o
Also, since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on
the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation, it can be concluded that GOs omnibus
motion was in effect filed with the TC
What was clear was that Go did ask for a preliminary investigation
on the very day that the information was filed without such PI, and that the trial
court was 5 days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary
investigation.
Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for
leave to conduct preliminary investigation
o
Thus, even on the supposition that S6, R112 applies, the 5 day
reglementary period in S6 has been substantially complied with
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before
being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
substantive right.
o
The accused in a criminal trial is exposed to prolonged anxiety,
aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity
to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals,
is a valuable right.
o
To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be
to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process.
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived
when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment
o
Go insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his
arraignment and even before Judge Pelayo approved of the cash bond
posted by him thus, he didnt waive his right to PI when he posted bail as
well
However, the failure to conduct a PI did not impair the validity of
the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court
o

How does the commencement of the trial and the prosecutor already having
presented 4 witnesses on Gos right to PI and bail?

Go remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits

has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance
and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to GO.

The Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have
on hand, conclude that probable cause exist or reach the conclusion that the
evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause.
In any event, the constitutional point is that Go was not accorded what he
was entitled to by way of procedural due process.
o
He was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial
without preliminary investigation
With respect to bail, GO remains entitled to be released on bail as
a matter of right
o

Should the evidence already of record concerning Gos guilt be, in

the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in
the trial court for cancellation of Gos bail.

LARRANAGA VS CA
Facts:

Petitioner Juan Larranaga is charged with 2 counts of kidnapping and

serious illegal detention pending before the RTC Branch 7 of Cebu City. He
is presently detained in a rehabilitation center.
Petitioner, represented by his mother Margarita, filed with the court a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with writs of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction. He alleged that he was denied the
right to preliminary investigation and sought to annul the informations as
well as the warrant of arrest issued in consequence thereof. Alternatively, he
prays that a preliminary investigation be conducted and that he be released
from detention pending investigation. He also filed a supplemental petition
for habeas corpus or bail/
The SolGen filed a manifestation and motion in lieu of comment agreeing
with the petitioner.
The SC issued a resolution finding for the petitioners claims and ordering:
o
To set aside the inquest of petitioner and to order the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary
investigation
o
To annul the order for detention
o
To immediately release the accused pending preliminary
investigation
o
To desist from petitioners arraignment and trial

Petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu an urgent ex parte motion

praying for his immediate release pursuant to the above
resolution.

The following day, the judge issued an order deferring the

resolution of petitioners motion since the trial court has not yet
received an original copy of the SCs resolution and that such has

o
o
o
o
o
o

Issues:

not yet attained finality. Also, petitioner has already been

arraigned and waived his right to preliminary investigation.
The judge filed a letter complaint with the SC alleging that
petitioners counsels deliberately withheld from this court the
omnibus order, supplemental order, and order of arraignment in
connection with petitioners case and that by withholding said
orders, they unwittingly misled the court in its resolution.
The counsels for the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration of the SC resolution raising the ff. arguments:
Petitioner is charged with a continuing offense , hence, his arrest
and detention about 2 months after the abduction of the victims
was lawful
Since petitioner was arrested without a warrant, his case comes
within the purview of Sec. 7, Rule 112, not Sec. 3 thereof
The filing of the informations in court and the issuance of the
corresponding warrants cured whatever defect there was in
petitioners arrest and detention
Petitioner was validly arraigned
Sanchez vs Demetriou applies squarely to the case
Petitioner is no longer a minor pursuant to RA 6809
SolGen filed a comment changing his stance; considering that
petitioner was arraigned, he should be kept in detention without
prejudice to his right to preliminary investigation.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to transfer the venue of the
preliminary investigation from Cebu City to Manila and to replace
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu with the Office of the
State Prosecutor, DOJ, as the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation because of the extensive coverage of the
proceedings by the Cebu media which allegedly influenced the
peoples perception of petitioners character and guilty.

WoN petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation- YES.

o
Prosecutors: Petitioner is entitled only to an inquest under Sec. 7,
Rule 112 since he was lawfully arrested without warrant under
Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the ROC.
o
Sec. 7, Rule 112 applies only to persons lawfully arrested without
a warrant. Petitioner was not arrested either by a peace officer or
a private person. When petitioner was about to be arrested
without a warrant, he resisted the arrest and immediately sought
the aid of a lawyer. Over the phone, his lawyer dissuaded the
police officers from carrying out the warrantless arrest and
proposed to meet them at the CIG HQ. The police officers
yielded. At the HQ, the lawyer questioned the legality of the

o
o

o
o

warrantless arrest. The policemen then decided to stop the arrest

and allowed the petitioner to go home.
The foregoing facts show no restraint upon the person of
petitioner. Neither do they show that petitioner was deprived of his
own will and liberty.
To be sure, even if petitioner were arrested by the PNP CIG
personnel, such arrest would still be illegal because of the
absence of a warrant, and his arrest does not fall under the
grounds for such provided in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the ROC.
The argument that petitioner was actually committing a crime at
the time of the arrest since kidnapping with serious illegal
detention is a continuing crime is incorrect. Such offense is only a
continuing one if the deprivation of liberty is persistent and
continuing from one place to another. There is no showing that at
the time of the arrest, petitioner was still detaining the victim.
Petitioners failure to appear for his preliminary investigation
cannot be construed as a waiver of his right to such, considering
that petitioner has been vigorously invoking his right to a regular
preliminary investigation since the start of the proceedings before
the City Prosecutor. A waiver, whether express or implied, must
be made in a clear and unequivocal manner.
Also, the petitioner and his counsel cannot be blamed for their
failure to appear for the preliminary investigation. They appeared
before the Prosecutor demanding a regular preliminary
investigation, but the prosecutor insisted that petitioner was
entitled only to an inquest. They refused as it might be construed
as a waiver of petitioners right to a regular preliminary
investigation.
The fact that petitioner was arraigned is of no moment. The rule is
that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively and
consistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation even
before he was charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a
plea during the arraignment because there was a pending case in
this Court regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary
investigation.
WoN petitioner should be released from detention pending the
investigation- NO.
The absence of a preliminary investigation will not justify
petitioners release because such defect did not nullify the
information and the warrant of arrest against him.
The absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the
courts jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of
the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were
no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering

their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the
court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct it or
remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary
investigation may be conducted.
WoN the venue and authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation should be changed- NO.
This has no jurisdiction to rule on this issue. The holding of a
preliminary investigation is a function of the Executive Department
and not of the Judiciary. Petitioner should therefore address their
plea to the Department of Justice that has control and supervision
over the conduct of preliminary investigations.
Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the motion should still be
denied because it failed to allege and prove that the City
Prosecutor of Cebu has been actually affected by the publicity.

o
o

WoN the petitioners counsels deliberately withheld information

from this court- NO.
Complaint dismissed for lack of concrete evidence to prove that
said lawyers deliberately withheld from the Court the orders he
issued with intent to mislead the Court.
WoN the case should be dismissed for being filed by an improper
party- NO.
Prosecutors argue that Larranaga is no longer a minor, so his
mother is no longer a proper party to file the petition as his
representative.
It appears that there was also a supplemental petition for habeas
corpus. Such petitioner may be filed by the party for whose relief it
is intended or by some person on his behalf.