The Limits of U.S.

Diplomacy in
Kashmir
Dhruva Jaishankar and Anit MukherjeeThursday, January 15, 2009
e Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan has once again received international attention following Novembers terrorist attacks on Mumbai. Given the
longstanding nature of the dispute, the series of wars fought over the territory, and the possession of nuclear weapons by both parties, the inaction by the U.S.
government over the last few years is often a cause for lament in foreign policy circles. Reports that the next administration plans on appointing a special envoy for the
region have raised hopes that this policy would be remedied. Unfortunately, renewed U.S. engagement on Kashmir especially if it were led by a high-profile envoy
is likely to prove counterproductive, a setback for U.S. foreign policy, for the India-Pakistan peace process and, ironically, for Kashmir itself.
Over the last four years, an India-Pakistan peace process has made steady steps towards a mutually acceptable settlement. The so-called composite dialogue between
the two states, reinforced by back-channel talks between representatives of both countries leaders, made significant, albeit slow-moving, progress before it was
derailed by domestic political turbulence in Pakistan and recurring terrorist attacks in India, Mumbai being but the latest and most high profile example.
Despite these setbacks, most Indian and Pakistani policymakers still believe that their two countries have reached a mutually hurting stalemate, which cannot end
without a lasting bilateral settlement. Indian strategists have made sustained calls for a grand bargain with Pakistan, and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has
followed Pervez Musharraf in making conciliatory statements regarding India. The two countries have moved towards lowering trade barriers (including in Kashmir)
and greater regional cooperation. Yet for four reasons, active American engagement on Kashmir by the incoming administration risks reversing such positive
developments.
First, both Islamabad and New Delhi view Washington as favoring the other side. Pakistan increasingly views the United States as preferential to India, an impression
reinforced by Washington having brokered a civilian nuclear agreement with New Delhi. Indian policy elites, meanwhile, are worried that the United States will
pressure India to make concessions in order to ensure continued Pakistani support in fighting the Taliban.
Second, the biggest remaining hurdle to a lasting Kashmir agreement is the inability of the two governments to sell it domestically, something American intervention
can do little to alter. Indias raucous domestic politics will not tolerate any overt U.S. pressure on a Kashmir resolution, even if it matches Indias objectives. In
Pakistan, an agreement on Kashmir will have to be accepted by the army leadership, on whom Washington has historically failed to exert much influence.
Third, unlike the disputes in Northern Ireland and the Middle East, both sides have not requested American mediation. Any attempt will face a similar fate to the
efforts of a proactive Kennedy administration in 1963, which succeeded only in stoking both countries resentment of the United States.
Finally, American engagement would embolden Kashmiri separatists to raise their demands, thus complicating the ongoing bilateral negotiations. Political groups
favoring independence for Indian-administered Kashmir were quick to welcome Obamas stated intention of American engagement in the run-up to his election.
American involvement will also unintentionally justify the use of terrorism by organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group ostensibly behind the Mumbai assault, for
political objectives.
A public decision by the next president and his national security team to engage the two regional rivals on a Kashmir settlement therefore looks certain to be a disaster.
At the very least, such a move will embarrass the new administration and set back relations with New Delhi. At worst, it could prove counterproductive to what
remains of the India-Pakistan peace process, and destabilizing for the region as a whole.
Instead, the two sides should be left to themselves to minimize the damage to the peace process caused by the Mumbai attacks. A real effort by Pakistan at
permanently dismantling the terrorist infrastructure and bringing to justice the perpetrators of the Mumbai massacre should be the first step. India, in turn, should
consider a phrased withdrawal of troops from counterinsurgency duties in the Kashmir valley commensurate with a decrease in violence. Peaceful state-level elections
in Kashmir in the immediate aftermath of the Mumbai attacks provide a good enough reason for such a move by New Delhi. Taken together, these steps offer the best
hope for reviving the peace process in the region.
Undoubtedly, inaction might not appeal to the incoming Obama administration bent on renewing American engagement with the rest of the world. While wellintended, the idea that a focused American effort on settling the Kashmir dispute will dramatically stabilize the region to the benefit of American strategic goals is farfetched and simplistic. Instead, the American role in this process should remain what it has been over the past four years: supportive, but from a distance.