GERMAN MGMT SERVICES INC VS CA

FACTS:
Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are
owners of the land situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses
Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner
German Management Services to develop their property. They
have already acquired the proper permits to do so but they
discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20
other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmers
Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the last
twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and
they already have their crops all over the property. In short, they
are in actual possession of the land.
Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish
and bulldoze their crops and property. The respondents filed in CFI
because they were deprived of their property without due process
of law by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and
property situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA
reversed the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in
CA but were denied thus this appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible
entry case against petitioner?
RULING:
YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private
respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time
they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have
a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the
legality or illegality of possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a
forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in

issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never

determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only
actual possession. It is undisputed that private respondents were
in possession of the property and not the petitioners nor the
spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid claim over
ownership this does not in any way justify their act of forcible
entry. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of
the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus,
a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself.Whatever may be the
character of his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time,
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self
help, which the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are
not applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at the
time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the
case at bar (in fact they are the ones who are threatening to
remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536
basically tells us that the owner or a person who has a better right
over the land must resort to judicial means to recover the
property from another person who possesses the land.
When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to
judicial process for the recovery of property. As clearly stated in
Article 536- In no case may possession be acquired through
force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects
thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive
another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
ANDREA TABUSO and RENATO BISMORTE, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF ESTEBAN
ABADrepresented by Nemesio Abad and Ana Abad Paghubasan,
This case involves declaration of ownership. Andrea Tabuso claims
to be the owner of a parcel land which she inherited by

her mother evidence by tax declaration. However, the property

has been in the possession of the heirs of Esteban Abad, although
thehouse standing thereon appears to have been constructed by
Marcelo Tabuso, father of Andrea Tabuso. Heirs allegation that
theproperty was sold to Esteban by Isabel elaban evidence bby
tax dec. TRIAL: declared the defendant the lawful owners of the
land inquestion that even if tabuso had built a house thereon,
such action was only tolerated by the heirs, who had originally
allowed oneMarcelo Tabuso to construct a house on the same lot.
Besides, Tabuso is not a compulsory heir of Ignacio Montes, from
whom sheclaims to have inherited the lot, subject of this
litigation. In addition, the tax declaration in his name has long
been revised. CA:affirmed. Hence this petition.
Ownership of the Property
: Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law
and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers
certain rights to the owner, one of which is the rightto dispose of
the thing by way of sale. possession is defined as the holding of a
thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, topossess means to
actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.
Possession may be had in one of two ways:possession in the
concept of an owner and possession of a holder. Possessors in the
concept of owners may be the ownersthemselves or those who
claim to be so. On the other hand, those who possess as mere
holders acknowledge in another a superior right which he believes
to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong."In this case,
the evidence shows that the occupation of the property by
petitioners is not in the concept of owners, because their stay is
merely tolerated. This finding is bolstered by the fact that
Petitioner Andrea Tabuso is the daughter of Marcelo Tabuso,
whowas merely allowed by the previous owner, Esteban Abad, to
construct a small house on the lot. Lastly, the claim of petitioners
thatprivate respondents are not in actual possession of the land is
unsubstantiated. Besides, it is not necessary that the latter
actuallystay on the property in order to prove ownership of the
same. As found by both the trial and the appellate courts, since
theacquisition of the subject property by private respondents,
they had religiously paid the taxes due thereon. Further, one of

the co-owners executed a lease contract over it in favor of a

tenant. These acts are clearly consistent with ownership.
BISHOP OF BALANGA V. CA
- The parties do not dispute that the Roman Catholic
Archbishop [sic] of Manila was the owner of a parcel of land
covered by OCT No. 14379
- With respect to its rights over its properties in Bataan
(inclusive of Lot No. 1272), the said church was succeeded
by the Roman Catholic Bishop of San Fernando, Pampanga
which was, likewise, succeeded by . . . Catholic Bishop of
Balanga registered as a corporation on 15 December 1975
- Prior thereto, or on 23 August 1936 the then parish priest
and administrator of all the properties of the said church in
the Municipality of Balanga Bataan, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili,
executed an Escritura De Donacion donating an area of Lot
No. 1272 to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs, as a reward for
her long and satisfactory service to the church
- Her acceptance of the donation, as well as her possession of
the subject property, is indicated in the deed of donation,
which deed, for unknown reasons, was refused registration
by the Register of Deeds
o In 1939, Ana died
- Nevertheless, before her death, she had given the subject
property to her nephew who had been living with her, the
herein defendant-appellant [private respondent] who
immediately took possession of the property in concept of
owner
- Herein petitioner filed the instant complaint against him
after more than 49 years after the deed of donation was
executed
o Alleged that the respondent, w/o knowledge and
consent of the petitioner and its predecessors-ininterest, entered and occupied the subject property and
that defendant refused to vacate the premises
- As his defense, defendant-appellant [private respondent]
maintains that by virtue of the deed of donation of 23 August
1936 executed in favor of his predecessor-in-interest, he is

the lawful owner of the subject property and the complaint

states no cause of action as it was filed only to harass him
After 10 months, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the instant action is barred
by the statute of limitations
Petitioner opposed alleging that the defense of prescription
was not raised in a timely filed motion to dismiss
LC rendered judgment
o Defendant-appellant [private respondent] failed to
present the necessary power of attorney executed by
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila giving Rev. Fr.
Mariano Sarili the authority to execute the deed of
donation
o The first 2 paragraphs of the Excritura de Donacion
indicates that the parish priest . . . was only the
administrator of all, hence, had no authority to dispose
in whatever manner any of the properties of the Roman
Catholic Church of Balanga, Bataan
o Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili was not authorized to, and could
not validly, donate the subject lot
o Thus, the deed of donation he executed is
unenforceable under Art. 1403 of the New Civil Code
and defendant-appellant [private respondent], as well
as
his
predecessor-in-interest,
never
acquired
ownership over the subject property
CA ruled in favor of respondent
o Private respondent could not have acquired ownership
over the subject property through acquisitive
prescription because the same having been duly
registered under the Torrens system
o Nonetheless, respondent Court of Appeals ultimately
ruled that under the doctrine of laches, the
consequence of petitioner's inaction for 49 years since
the execution of the deed of donation, despite its
apparently
undeniable
knowledge
of
private
respondent's adverse, peaceful and continuous
possession of the subject property in the concept of an
owner from 1936 to the institution of the recovery suit

in 1985, is that it has lost its rights to the subject

property and can no longer recover the same
- Hence this petition
o Laches means the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier
The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is
that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim
or demand has become "stale", or who has
acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time
o Elements of laches
Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
complained of
Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had
knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he
has an opportunity to sue
Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the
right on which he bases his suit
Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant
- Petition is DISMISSED

JPOTGabrito v. CA167 SCRA 771

DOCTRINE:Pending final adjudication of ownership by the Bureau
of Lands, the Court hasjurisdiction to determine in the meantime
the right of possession over the land.
FACTS:The spouses Roberto Tan and Benita Ching-Tan filed a
complaint in the Municipal Trial Courtagainst defendants Maximo
Gabrito, et al., alleging that they are the possessors and
legalowners of the property situated at No. 107 Gordon Ave., New
Kalalake, Olongapo City asevidenced by Tax Declaration No. 4-

2046. The defendants are leasing portions of this parcel ofland,

each paying the corresponding monthly rentals due thereon. The
Tans found it fit for themto make said lot a residential house for
them instead. They furnished requests to Gabrito andothers
stating their reasons and three months later they (Gabrito, et al.)
were still being stubbornin keeping with the operations of
their commercial spaces. On November 22, 1985,
theMunicipal Trial Court ruled and the dispositive portion of which
readsxxx
(preview only) :{
ART 559
Heirs of Albina G. Ampil v. Teresa Manahan and Mario
Manahan| 11 October 2012| J. Mendoza

Short Version: Exequiel Ampil, as a representative of the heirs of

the late Albina Ampil, filed a complaint for ejectment against the
Manahans. Manahans allege that they were in open and
continuous possession of the property since time immemorial.
One of the issues brought was that if Exequiel alone can file the
complaint considering that not all of the co-owners (heirs of
Ampil) were included as parties to the case. SC ruled in favour of
the Ampils, holding that any one of the co-owners may bring a
suit for ejectment on behalf of the others. It also found that the
occupation of the Manahans was merely by tolerance of the
Ampils and thus the Ampils were entitled to the possession of the
property.

Facts
Exequiel Ampil as representative of the heirs of the late Albina
Ambil, filed a complaint for ejectment against the spouses

Perfecto and Virginia Manahan and all persons claiming rights

under them. It was alleged that Albina was the owner of two
adjoining residential lots in Sto. Nio, Paombong, Bulacan, with an
area of 16 sam and another lot with an area of 382 sqm. They
asserted that during her lifetime, Albina allowed Perfecto and his
family to occupy a portion of the said properties on the condition
that they would vacate the same should the need to use it arise.

After Albinas death in 1986, her heirs requested Perfecto and

family to vacate the property in question but the latter refused.
The matter was then brought before the Lupong Tagapamayapa in
Barangay Sto. Nio, Paombong, Bulacan, which issued a
Certification to File an Action for failure of the parties to amicably
settle their dispute.

12 Dec. 2002: petitioners sent a demand letter to the Manahans

to surrender possession of the lands in question but to no avail.
Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment before
the Municipal Trial Court, Paombong, Bulacan.

Respondents through their answer averred that the lots they had
been occupying belonged to them, their predecessor-in-interest
having been in peaceful and continuous possession thereof in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial and that Albina was
never the owner of the property.

MTC rendered judgment in favour of petitioners, relying on the 2

tax declarations and the certification from the Municipal Treasurer
showing that Albina had been paying the real property taxes on
the lands in question. It stressed that the issue in ejectment cases

is not the ownership of the property, but the material possession

thereof.

RTC affirmed MTC.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
case for unlawful detainer, ruling that tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive proof of ownership or right of
possession over a piece of land and it only becomes strong
evidence of ownership when accompanied by proof of actual
possession. CA denied MR.

Issue: Who has the better right to the physical possession of the
disputed property? Petitioners

Ruling:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The .July 11, 2006

Decision and the December 13, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91568, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The February 23, 2004 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court,
affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court, is ordered
REINSTATED.

Ratio

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that anyone of the coowners may bring an action for ejectment without joining the
others. The action is not limited to ejectment cases but includes

all kinds of suits for recovery of possession because the suit is

presumed to have been instituted for the benefit of all.

Celino v. Heirs of Santiago: As co-owner of the properties, each of

the heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible
entry, or any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the
subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action,
even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs,
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
However, if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such
that he claims the possession for himself and not for the coownership, the action will not prosper.
Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman: co-owner was not even a
necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief
could be afforded even in his absence.
Applying the following to the present case, only one of the coowners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery
of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The
other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even
necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit
even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to
have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.

The complaint clearly stated that the disputed property was held
in common by the petitioners; and that the action was brought to
recover possession of the lots from respondents for the benefit of
all the heirs of Albina. Hence, Exequiel, a co-owner, may bring the
action for unlawful detainer even without the special power of
attorney of his co-heirs, for a complete relief can be accorded in
the suit even without their participation because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all the co-owners.

*** [End of relevant topic] ***

CIVIL PROCEDURE: IF THE PROPERTY IS UNDER THE STATE

OF CO-OWNERSHIP, CAN A SUIT FOR EJECTMENT BE
BROUGHT WITHOUT IMPLEADING THE OTHER CO-OWNERS?
MOREOVER, IN THE SAME SUIT, ARE THE CO-OWNERS
CONSIDERED INDISPENSABLE PARTIES?
In an unlawful detainer case, the physical or material possession
of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership
by any of the parties, is the sole issue for resolution. But where
the issue of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon said
issue in order to determine who has the right to possess the
property. This adjudication, however, is only an initial
determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of
possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked
thereto. As such, the lower courts adjudication of ownership in
the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.

Records show that respondents occupation of the lot in question

was by mere tolerance. To prove ownership over the property, the
petitioners presented the tax declarations covering the properties
and a certification issued by the Municipality of Paombong,
Bulacan, showing that their mother, Albina, had been paying the
corresponding real property taxes thereon. Petitioners also
submitted a survey plan, dated August 5, 1968, prepared by

Geodetic Engineer Roberto H. Dimailig, in support of Albinas

application for land registration over the disputed lots. In fact, on
December 14, 2006, the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan issued
Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-13627, conferring title over
Lot 742 in the names of the heirs of Albina.

Also, in 1982, one of the petitioners verbally demanded that the

respondents vacate the property and when the latter refused,
they filed a complaint before the Barangay Lupon. From the
minutes of the meeting in the Barangay Lupon, Perfecto admitted
that in 1952, Albina allowed them temporary use of the lots and
that they could not leave the premises because they had nowhere
else to go.

On the other hand, respondents could not present proof that they
and their predecessors-in-interest had openly and continuously
possessed the subject land since time immemorial. Granting that
respondents or their predecessors-in-interests had been in
possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial,
none of them declared the disputed lots for taxation purposes
and, thus, never paid taxes thereon. Respondents' allegation that
they were in peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the
lots in question, unsupported by any evidence, is not substantial
to establish their interest over the property.

Well established is the rule that ownership over the land cannot
be acquired by mere occupation. While it is true that tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they,
nevertheless, constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim
of title over the property. It strengthens one's bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.

When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article

487 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides that any one of
the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
The Supreme Court however clarified in Vencilao v.
Camarenta that the term action in ejectment includes a suit
for
forcible
entry (detentacion) or
unlawful
detainer (desahucio). In Sering
v.
Plazo and Estreller
v.
Ysmael,it also noted that the term action in ejectment
includes, an accion publiciana(recovery of possession) or accion
reinvidicatoria (recovery of ownership). And, in Plasabas v.
Court of Appeals G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009, it
empathically stated that Article 487 of the Civil Code covers all
kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including
an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action.
Thus, a co-owner may file suit without necessarily
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the
court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but
if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights
of the unimpleaded co-owners.
Put differently, the Supreme Court in several
occasion, has upheld theright of a co-owner to file a suit without
impleading other co-owners, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil
Code.
Be that as it may, in order to clarify this issue, the
Supreme Court in MARMO vs. ANACAY, G.R. No. 182585,
November 27, 2009, invariably stated:
We made this ruling in Vencilao, where the amended complaint
for forcible entry and detainer specified that the plaintiff is one
of
the
heirs
who
co-owns
the
disputed
properties.
In Sering, and Resuena v. Court of Appeals, the co-owners
who filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the
exclusive owners of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo
and Teresa Santiago, the complaint for quieting of title was

brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned

in common. In Plasabas, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint
for recovery of title to property (accion reivindicatoria) that they
are the sole owners of the property in litigation, but
acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned with
other parties, and the plaintiffs have been authorized by the coowners to pursue the case on the latters behalf (emphasis
supplied).
Proceeding from such premise, the Supreme Court
clarified
that
the
foregoing cases
should
be
distinguished from Baloloy
v.
Hular 481
Phil.
398
(2004) and Adlawan v. Adlawan G.R. No. 161916, January 20,
2006, 479 SCRA 275, where the actions for quieting of title and
unlawful detainer, respectively, were brought for the benefit of
the plaintiff alone who claimed to be the sole owner. The High
Court held that the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff
impleaded the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
Thus, in these cases, the absence of an indispensable party
rendered all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.
However, in order to put things in its proper
perspective, the Supreme Court stated that we have to read the
aforementioned cases to collectively mean that where the suit
is brought by a co-owner, without repudiating the coownership, then the suit is presumed to be filed for the benefit
of the other co-owners and may proceed without impleading the
other co-owners.
On the other hand, where the co-owner repudiates
the co-ownership by claiming sole ownership of the
property or where the suit is brought against a coowner, his co-owners are indispensable parties and must be
impleaded as party-defendants, as the suit affects the rights and
interests of these other co-owners.

Otherwise stated, if the co-owner of a property who

brought the action does not repudiate the co-ownership, then the
other co-owner are not considered as indispensable parties to the
resolution of the case.
As the Supreme Court aptly pointed out in Carandang
v. Heirs of De Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006,
508 SCRA 469, 487-488, in cases like this, the co-owners are not
even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in
the suit even without their participation, since the suit is
presumed to be filed for the benefit of all. (MARMO vs. ANACAY,
G.R. No. 182585, November 27, 2009, Second Division, Brion, J.).