1

EN BANC
G.R. No. 184836

December 23, 2009

SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the
three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160
(RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective
interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full
term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
The present petition1 seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for
the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007
term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he
then faced.This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed
performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B.
Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos
certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his
candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of
November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render
complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its October 7, 2008 Resolution;
hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the following ISSUES:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit
rule; and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section
43(b) of RA 7160
Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive suspension constituted an
interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
General Considerations

The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of the Constitution, but is the
first on the effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an elective officials term. To be sure, preventive
suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public official, has been mentioned as an example in
Borja v. Commission on Elections.2 Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not deal with
preventive suspension, but with the application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective official
acquired by succession.
a. The Three-term Limit Rule:
The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in wording does
not assume any significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials
stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8,
Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has
title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,3 a Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007,
succinctly discusses what a "term" connotes, as follows:
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that
an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office
may be held. Upon expiration of the officers term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties
and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural
frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was
elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].1avvphi1
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,4 reiterated that "[T]he term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another."
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative "no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms." This formulation no more than three consecutive terms is a
clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to
"serve. . . three consecutive terms" exactly connotes, the meaning is clear reference is to the term, not to the
service that a public official may render.1awphi1 In other words, the limitation refers to the term.
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the limitation
through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of
office "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected." This declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only
actual interruption of service that does not affect "continuity of service for a full term" for purposes of the threeterm limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full
term, but the phrase "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is not without significance in determining constitutional
intent.
The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up, abandon,
decline, or resign.5 It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the
outside. Read with the definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of the

constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title to
office. The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with "renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based
on the surenderees own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the
context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to
be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.
The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the term "voluntary
renunciation" shed further light on the extent of the term "voluntary renunciation":
MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? This term "voluntary
renunciation" does not appear in Section 3 [of Article VI]; it also appears in Section 6 [of Article VI].
MR DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could the Committee please
enlighten us exactly what "voluntary renunciation" mean? Is this akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely
resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term "voluntary renunciation" is more general than
abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.6
From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the term "voluntary renunciation,"
the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-term
limit rule, in the way that voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the
three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision, we note further that Commissioner
Davides view is consistent with the negative formulation of the first branch of the provision and the inflexible
interpretation that it suggests.
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding its
formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective
whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than
equal constitutional worth. We view preventive suspension vis--vis term limitation with this firm mindset.
b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the
Three-term Limit Rule
Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts within the provisions
contemplation, particularly on the "interruption in the continuity of service for the full term" that it speaks of.
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of
the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as
winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory
judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has
fully served three consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said:
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]

Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title, that
renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
Ong v. Alegre8 and Rivera v. COMELEC,9 like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of whether there had been a
completed term for purposes of the three-term limit disqualification. These cases, however, presented an
interesting twist, as their final judgments in the electoral contest came after the term of the contested office had
expired so that the elective officials in these cases were never effectively unseated.
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly elected), the Court
concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term
rule based on the following premises: (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the election was without
practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office had expired;
and (2) the official assumed and continuously exercised the functions of the office from the start to the end of
the term. The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view that the official
(referring to the winner in the election protest) would, under the three-term rule, be considered to have served a
term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served the term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. This factual variation led the Court to rule
differently fromLonzanida.
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost the election contest
was merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer." The Court obeserved that Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official fully served in the same position for
three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercised the powers and enjoyed the
perquisites of the office that enabled him "to stay on indefinitely."
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of what they directly
imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect to the three-term
limitation because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so
ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to
strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections10 dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term limit disqualification.
The case presented the question of whether the disqualification applies if the official lost in the regular election
for the supposed third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that term. The Court upheld the
COMELECs ruling that the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms. The Court reasoned out
that for nearly two years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted
by his defeat in the election for the third term.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections11 also tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit disqualification. Edward
Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run for a fourth term, he did not participate
in the election that immediately followed his third term. In this election, the petitioner Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates assumed the functions of the office,
recall proceedings were initiated against him, leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground
that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run
because of the three-term limit rule. We decided in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked
was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate
reelection" after three terms.
xxxx

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third
term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth
term.12
Latasa v. Commission on Elections13 presented the novel question of whether a municipal mayor who had fully
served for three consecutive terms could run as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the
municipality into a city. During the third term, the municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood charter
provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to exercise their
powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the conversion of
the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post
different from the office of the city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the
municipality; the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive
terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held power and authority as their
chief executive for nine years. The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples
freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To
allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should
he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred
by it.14
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-term limit
violation results if a rest period or break in the service between terms or tenure in a given elective post
intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective office for a few
months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as
private citizens for two years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the law
contemplates a complete break from office during which the local elective official steps down and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government
unit.
Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on Elections,15 where the
highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by operation of law. The question
posed when he subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of
his term as councilor that would place him outside the operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an
interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the
results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective official continued to hold public office and did not
become a private citizen during the interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest,
however, is that the elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor
by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption that effectively placed him
outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
c. Conclusion Based on Law and Jurisprudence
From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the threeterm limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must
have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This
has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit
an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary
renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of
service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to
exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption
of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office;
the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office,
and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office holders term when
he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term
"failure to serve" cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then
no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by structure and substance
fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible
rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision
should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the
exercise of the powers of the elective position. The "voluntary renunciation" it speaks of refers only to the
elective officials voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the
temporary "cessation of the exercise of power or authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive
suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:16
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and
ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local
government unit. [Emphasis supplied].
Preventive Suspension and the Three-Term Limit Rule
a. Nature of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code,17 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act,18 or the Ombudsman Act19 is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have
been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or
potential for eventual guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code "when the evidence of guilt is strong and
given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence." Under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information (that requires a finding of probable
cause) has been filed in court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the
Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of
his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of
office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and gives a
premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual office holder. Even then,
protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the
officials office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is
lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public
official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the exercise of all powers
and prerogative under the Constitution and the laws. The imposition of preventive suspension, however, is not
an unlimited power; there are limitations built into the laws20 themselves that the courts can enforce when these
limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of discretion is present. In light of this well-defined
parameters in the imposition of preventive suspension, we should not view preventive suspension from the

extreme situation that it can totally deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an
effective interruption of an election officials term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective officials service in
office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension involves protection of the
service and of the people being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of
his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in
office without any break. Its companion concept interruption of a term on the other hand, requires loss of
title to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this
common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this
point, they merely run parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a
temporary incapacity to render serviceduring an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption
of service occurs after there has been abreak in the term.
b. Preventive Suspension and the Intent of the Three-Term Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive
suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension
period.The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to
this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to
discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To
be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of them personal and some of them by operation
of law that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the
way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the
enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from
exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no
different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of
actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least
the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service
may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the
three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption
is.
c. Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on the part of
the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act that became
the basis of the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of
voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss
of title to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office
demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary
renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the
office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important consideration of how they
affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by
the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the
three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore
not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its
nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to
undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the

briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a
preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective
interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive
suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the
COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due
course to Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC
effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a
refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the
contemplation of law.21
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the assailed
COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce
to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

9
1

Filed under Rule 64, in relation with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

329 Phil. 409 (1996).

G.R. No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231, 240.

401 Phil. 77, 88 (2000).

Websters Third New International Dictionary (1993), p. 1922.

II RECORD, Constitutional Commission 591 (August 1, 1986).

G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602.

G.R. No. 163295, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473.

G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007, 523 SCRA 41.

10

426 Phil. 472 (2002).

11

440 Phil. 106 (2002).

12

Id. at 125-127.

13

G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601.

14

Id. at 312-313.

15

G.R. No. 180444, April 9, 2008, 551 SCRA 50.

16

Supra note 12.

17

RA 7160, Sections 63 and 64.

18

RA 3019, Section 13.

19

RA 6770, Sections 24 and 25.

20

See: Sec. 24, R.A. No. 6770; Sec. 63, R.A. No. 7160; Sec. 13, R.A. No. 3019.

21

Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility; Quintos v. Commission on Elections, 440 Phil. 1045, 1064
(2002), citingSahali v. Commission on Elections, 381 Phil. 505 (2002).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
I concur with the well-written ponencia of Honorable Justice Arturo D. Brion which holds that "preventive
suspension" is not equivalent to an "involuntary renunciation" of a public office for the purpose of applying

10

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. However, I wish to further elucidate my concurrence to the views of
Justice Brion and give my reflections on the implications of the outcome of the case for which an elective
public official is suspended pendente lite, which I believe is relevant to the issue on hand.
The aforementioned provision of Article X reads as follows:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The minority view considers "preventive suspension" as an "involuntary renunciation" of an elective public
officials term of office, such that even if he was elected thrice to serve for three (3) consecutive terms, he may
still run for a fourth term because his service was interrupted by his preventive suspension. However, according
to this view, his continuation in office for such fourth term will depend on his exoneration in the case where he
was preventively suspended. In other words, the suspended public official will be deemed disqualified to run for
a fourth term only upon his conviction which will retroact to the date when he filed his certificate of candidacy
for his fourth term. This means that even if he runs and wins a fourth term and thereafter is convicted in the case
in which he was previously preventively suspended, he will be deemed to have renounced voluntarily his fourth
term.
I concur with Justice Brions view that Borja v. Commission on Elections is not the controlling precedent on
preventive suspension because this matter was not squarely raised in the said case and that the consideration of
preventive suspension from the perspective of voluntary or involuntary renunciation is inappropriate.
Nonetheless, I would like to venture into the effect of the acquittal or conviction of the preventively suspended
public officer to further support my position that "preventive suspension" does not partake of the nature of
"involuntary renunciation" of an office.
The language of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution implies that an interruption in the continuity of the
service of elective officials is a valid ground for him to run for a fourth consecutive term. The same provision of
the Constitution is explicit and categorical in its declaration that "voluntary renunciation" of elective position
for any length of time is not to be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service of an elective
official. Conversely, "involuntary renunciation of office" can be deemed an interruption in the continuity of the
service of the elective official which would render him eligible to run for a fourth term.
In my opinion, preventive suspension cannot be considered as an "involuntary renunciation" of an elective
position. One who has been elected to a public office for three (3) consecutive terms is prohibited to run for the
same position for a fourth term, notwithstanding his preventive suspension during any of his first three (3)
consecutive terms. Since preventive suspension is not akin to involuntary renunciation, the rule should hold true
irrespective of his acquittal or conviction in the case in which an elective official was preventively suspended.
There is an inherent difference between "renunciation" and "preventive suspension" even if the former is
involuntary. The former connotes an act of abandonment or giving up of a position by a public officer which
would result in the termination of his service, whereas the latter means that a public officer is prevented by legal
compulsion, not by his own volition, from discharging the functions and duties of his office, but without being
removed or separated from his office. The term of office of a preventively suspended public officer subsists
because preventive suspension does not create a vacancy in his office. As Justice Brion puts it, he does not
become a private citizen while he is under preventive suspension. The continuity of the term of the suspended
official during the period of his preventive suspension, whether rendered administrative or court proceedings, is
recognized by law and jurisprudence, such that a public officer who is acquitted of the charges against him, is
entitled to receive the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during the period of his preventive
suspension (Section 64, Local Government Code of 1991, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160; Section 13, R.A.
3019, as amended; Tan v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 143289, Nov. 11, 2004, 442
SCRA 192, 202).
If the suspended public officer is convicted of the charges, still there is no interruption of service within the
three (3) consecutive terms, within the meaning of the Constitution which will warrant his running for a fourth
term. Here, it is not the preventive suspension but his having committed a wrongdoing, which gave ground for
his removal from office or for forfeiture of the remainder of his term which can be considered as voluntary

11

renunciation of his office. The commission of a crime or an administrative infraction which is a ground for the
removal from office of a public officer is akin to his "voluntary renunciation" of his office. He may be deemed,
by his willful wrongdoing, which betrayed public trust, to have thereby voluntarily renounced his office under
the provision of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
I beg to disagree with the proposition that the suspended public official should be allowed to run for a fourth
time and if convicted, he should be considered to have voluntarily renounced his fourth term. My reason is that
the crime was committed not during his fourth term but during his previous term. The renunciation should refer
to the term during which the crime was committed. The commission of the crime is tantamount to his voluntary
renunciation of the term he was then serving, and not any future term. Besides, the electorate should not be
placed in an uncertain situation wherein they will be allowed to vote for a fourth term a candidate who may later
on be convicted and removed from office by a judgment in a case where he was previously preventively
suspended.
In view of the foregoing, I reiterate my concurrence with the majority opinion that preventive suspension,
regardless of the outcome of the case in which an elective public officer has been preventively suspended,
should not be considered as an interruption of the service of the said public officer that would qualify him to run
for a fourth term.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

ABAD, J.:
I join the majority opinion and add a few thoughts of my own.
The Facts
Respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo won three consecutive elections as councilor of Lucena City, specifically from
1998 to 2001, from 2001 to 2004, and from 2004 to 2007. During his last term or on October 3, 2005, the
Sandiganbayan ordered him placed under preventive suspension for ninety days in connection with a crime of
which he had been charged. After about thirty-seven days, however, or on November 9, 2005, this Court lifted
the order of suspension and allowed Asilo to resume the duties of his office.
Believing that his brief preventive suspension interrupted his full service in office and allowed him to seek a
fourth term as councilor because of it, Asilo filed a certificate of candidacy for the same office in the 2007
elections. When this was questioned, both the Second Division of the Commission on Elections and its En
Banc ruled that the three-term limit did not apply to Asilos case since the Sandiganbayans order of preventive
suspension did not allow him to complete the third term for which he was elected in 2004.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not respondent Asilos preventive suspension during his third term as
councilor, which shortened the length of his normal service by thirty-seven days, allowed him to run for a fourth
consecutive term for the same office.
Discussion
The issue in this case revolves around Section 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution:

12

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
The first part states that no local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
The second, on the other hand, states that voluntary renunciation of office shall not be considered an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.1
That the first part is a prohibitory rule is not in question. This is quite clear. It says that no local official can
serve for more than three terms. Traditionally, politicians find ways of entrenching themselves in their offices
and the consensus is that this practice is not ideal for good government. Indeed, the Constitution expresses
through the three-term limit rule a determination to open public office to others and bring fresh ideas and
energies into government as a matter of policy. The mandate of this Court in this case is to enforce such
constitutionally established prohibition.
Actually, what creates the mischief is the statement in the second part of Section 8 that "voluntary renunciation"
of office shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which the
local official was elected. The dissenting opinion infers from this that "any service short of full service of three
consecutive terms, save for voluntary renunciation of office, does not bar an elective local official from running
again for the same local government post." In other words, elected politicians whose services are cut in the
course of any term by "involuntary renunciation" are eligible for a fourth term.
Relying on its above inference, the dissenting opinion claims that preventive suspension is, by default, an
"involuntary renunciation" of an elective officials term of office since he does not choose to be preventively
suspended. Preventive suspension cuts into the full term of the elected official and gives him justification for
seeking a fourth term.
But, there is in reality no such thing as "involuntary" renunciation. Renunciation is essentially "formal or
voluntary." It is the act, says Webster, "of renouncing; a giving up formally or voluntarily, often at a sacrifice, of
a right, claim, title, etc."2 If the dissenting opinion insists on using the term "involuntary renunciation," it could
only mean "coerced" renunciation, i.e., renunciation forced on the elected official. With this meaning, any
politician can simply arrange for someone to make him sign a resignation paper at gun point. This will justify
his running for a fourth term. But, surely, the law cannot be mocked in this way.
Parenthetically, there can be other causes for "involuntary renunciation," interruption of service that is not of the
elected officials making. For instance, through the fault of a truck driver, the elected officials car could fall
into a ditch and put the official in the hospital for a week, cutting his service in office against his will.
Temporary illness can also interrupt service. Natural calamities like floods and earthquakes could produce the
same result. Since these are "involuntary renunciations" or interruptions in the elective officials service, it
seems that he would, under the dissenting opinions theory, be exempt from the three-year rule. But surely,
Section 8 could not have intended this for it would overwhelm the constitutional ban against election for more
than three consecutive terms.
Actually, though, "voluntary renunciation," the term that the law uses simply means resignation from or
abandonment of office. The elected official who voluntarily resigns or abandons his duties freely renounces the
powers, rights, and privileges of his position. The opposite of "voluntary renunciation" in this context would be
"removal from office," a sanction imposed by some duly authorized person or body, not an initiative of or a
choice freely made by the elected official. Should "removal from office" be the test, therefore, for determining
interruption of service that will warrant an exception to the three-term limit rule?
Apparently not, since an elected official could be removed from office through recall (a judgment by the
electorates that he is unfit to continue serving in office),3 criminal conviction by final judgment,4 and
administrative dismissal.5 Surely, the Constitution could not have intended to reward those removed in this way
with the opportunity to skip the three-year bar.
The only interruption in the continuity of service of an elected official that does not amount to removal is
termination of his service by operation of law. This is exemplified in the case of Montebon v.
COMELEC,6 where this Court deemed the highest-ranking councilors third term as such "involuntarily"

13

interrupted when he succeeded as vice mayor by operation of law upon the latters retirement. This Court
considered the ranking councilor eligible to run again as councilor for the succeeding term.
But Montebon cannot be compared with Asilos case since Montebons term as councilor ended by operation of
law when the vice mayor retired and Montebon had to step into his shoes.7 Asilos term, on the other hand, did
not end when the Sandiganbayan placed him under preventive suspension. He did not vacate his office. It
merely enjoined him in the meantime from performing his duties and exercising his powers. His term ran the
full course; it was not cut.
It might be correct to say that the will of the electorates is for Asilo to serve the full term of his office. But,
given the presumption that the electorates knew of the law governing preventive suspension when they elected
him, it must be assumed that they elected him subject to the condition that he can be preventively suspended if
the occasion warrants. Such suspension cannot, therefore, be regarded as a desecration of the peoples will.
It does not matter that the preventive suspension imposed on the elected official may later on prove
unwarranted. The law provides the proper remedy for such error. Here, the Supreme Court supplied that remedy.
It set aside the preventive suspension imposed on Asilo by the Sandiganbayan. There is, on the other hand, no
law that allows an elected official to tack to his term of office the period of service he had lost by reason of
preventive suspension just so he can make up for the loss. The dissenting opinions position would create a rule
that will allow Asilo, who lost thirty-seven days of service because of that suspension, a right to be re-elected to
a fourth consecutive term of one thousand ninety-five days (365 days x 3).
In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC,8 this Court cited a hypothetical situation where B is elected Mayor and, during his
first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of one year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he
run for one more term in the next election? This Court answered in the affirmative, stating as reason that B
successfully served only two full terms.9
But such interpretation of the law wounds its very spirit for, in effect, it would reward the elected official for his
misconduct. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a recognized constitutionalist, is also not swayed by it. He points out
that when an elected official is suspended, he shortens neither his term nor his tenure. He is still seen as the
rightful holder of the office and, therefore, must be considered as having served a full term during the period of
suspension.10
ACCORDINGLY, I submit that preventive suspension did not interrupt Asilos term of office from 2004-2007
and it cannot be considered an exception to the three-term limit rule. Thus, Asilo is disqualified from running in
the 2007 elections for violation of that rule pursuant to Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. I vote to
GRANT the petition.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 121087

August 26, 1999

FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated December 14, 1994,
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding
petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, and (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, but increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Enrique "Ike" Lingan, from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.

14

The information against petitioner alleged

That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a
member of the Lucena Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where
authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in
the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim fell, by banging his head against the
concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock
which directly caused his death.
The evidence show that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike"
Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to
the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing the nude dancers. After the three had seated
themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act.
As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.2
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and
demanded to know why he took a picture.3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my
job."4 Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him.5 When Jalbuena
saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions.6
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policeman on duty,
including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his
companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Aonuevo, to report the incident.
In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.7
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen
minutes.8Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang
ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?"9 Petitioner Navarro then
pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin na kita?"10
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan pumarito kami para
magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate."11 Petitoner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa
kayo."12He then turned to Sgt. Aonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.13
This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan"14 Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay
ko."15The two then had a heated exchange.16 Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril
mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo."17 Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?"18
As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol above the left eyebrow.
Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist
blow on the forehead which floored him.19
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan and
naghamon."20 He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na
si Ike Lingan ang naghamon."21 He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his
name on the blotter.22 Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote
his name in print.23
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan
to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy, Casaada, arrived and, learning that
Lingan had been taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.24

15

Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the
deceased.25 The following is an excerpt from the tape recording:
Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.
Navarro: Who is that abusing?
Lingan: I'm here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. I'm out of the problem.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . .

Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare, Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just
came here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. I'm the number one loko sa media. I'm the
best media man. . . .
Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing
loko ka!
Lingan: I'm brave also.
Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho
lang ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko.
Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .
Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong
maganda. Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.
Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!
Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!
Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.
Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!
(Sounds of a scuffle)
Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko
daw ang baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo
kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe,
ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa
hospital yan.
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able
to duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the
concrete.26
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:

16

After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense,
this court finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to
create that moral certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally responsible.
The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the circumstance overturn the
strength of the prosecution's evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to
make false accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither
brought him harm or injury.
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the
detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the
defense that the head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's falling down on the
concrete pavement head first.
The Court of Appeals affirmed:
We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the
conflicting versions of the incident as presented by both parties, and we find the trial court's factual
conclusions to have better and stronger evidentiary support.
In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of appellant's aggression does not
impair the probative worth of his positive and logical account of the incident in question. In fact, far
from proving his innocence, appellant's unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense has
virtually admitted, clearly betrays his violent character or disposition and his capacity to harm others.
Apparently, the same motivation that led him into assailing Jalbuena must have provoked him into also
attacking Lingan who had interceded for Jalbuena and humiliated him and further challenged to a fist
fight.1wphi1.nt
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the other hand, appellant's explanation as how Lingan was injured is too tenuous and illogical to be
accepted. It is in fact contradicted by the number, nature and location of Lingan's injuries as shown in
thepost-mortem report (Exh. D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was
outbalanced in the course of boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his left
forehead, left eyebrow, between his left and right eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal region
of the head (Exh. E.). Certainly, these injuries could not have been resulted from Lingan's accidental fall.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS
CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION, SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE
INFERENCE IT MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON
RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.
The appeal is without merit.

17

First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a
biased witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of
the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable.27 Trial courts, which have the opportunity observe the facial
expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his
or her testimony should be given credence.28 In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial
court erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording had made. It may be asked whether the tape is
admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law
provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person
or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.29 Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a
witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.30 In the instant
case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording;31 that the tape played in the court was the
one he recorded;32 and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.33 A sufficient
foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2)
that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst
of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued the medical
certificate,34 dated February 5, 1990, containing the following findings:
Post Mortem Findings:
= Dried blood, forehead & face

18

= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth

= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral eyebrow, Left
= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right eyebrow
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left
= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes
CAUSE OF DEATH:
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
= BLOW ON THE HEAD
Dr. Yamamato testified:
Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings number one, which is oozing of blood
from the forehead?
A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.
Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1.?
A It is possible, sir.
Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete floor?
A Possible, sir.
FISCAL:
What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?
WITNESS:
It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.
Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?
A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun because the butt of a gun is small, sir.
Q How about this findings No. 4?
A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.
Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?
A Same cause, sir.
Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?
A Same thing sir.

19

Q How about the last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what could have caused it doctor?
WITNESS:
It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.
FISCAL:
In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral
concussion and Shock, will you explain it?
A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak" or jarring of the brain, sir.
Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?
A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.
Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?
A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.
Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?
A May be, sir.
FISCAL:
Which of these two more likely, to cause death?
WITNESS:
Shock, sir.
Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?
A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

FISCAL:
Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete floor have caused shock?
WITNESS:
Possible, sir.
How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?
A Possible, sir.35

20

The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle
of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist.
Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceding the act should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro.
Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting,
inciting or irritating anyone.36 The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.37 To
be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be
proportionate in gravity.38 And it must immediately precede the act so much so that there is no interval between
the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the accused.39
In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted
sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso,40 we appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the
accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence,
this mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro.
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after
the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this
mitigating circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should be imposed on
petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.41 In People v. Castro,42 the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are
engaged in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this
case was committed right in the police station where policemen were discharging their public functions.43
The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty
under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances
and one aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period.44 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum
of which is within the range of the penalty next lower degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which
is reclusion temporal in its minimum period.45
The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in accordance with the
current jurisprudence.46
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe
Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison terms of 18 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years
and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 154512

November 12, 2002

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto
Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim

21

Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy.
EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR. respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. 154683

November 12, 2002

VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
----------------------------G.R. Nos. 155083-84

November 12, 2002

MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO OLLAVE, SR., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari1 seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity) in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan.
The Antecedents
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa
convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly ("PRA" for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay
San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall2 of Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity) who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The
members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains,
as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 ("Recall Resolution" for brevity) which declared its
loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the
recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify
and deny due course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc3 promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates'
petition. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on
September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the calendar of
activities and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the
campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor
in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo ("Gilo" for brevity) filed a
petition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall
election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr.
("Ollave" for brevity) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn.

22

On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against
Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving the same issues. The petitions were all anchored
on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected
and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall
election for the same post." Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC's First Division4 dismissed for lack of merit
SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The
COMELEC also reset the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run
in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02010 (RC) which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7,
2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates
cites the following circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the
Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the
proof of service of notice was palpably and legally deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves
seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was
exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated
his and the public's constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 dated August 21, 2002
insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign
period. He prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and
that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to campaign.
In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the date of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed
the COMELEC to give the candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to
campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving the candidates
an additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall
election to September 24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions dated September 20, 2002 and
September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election. They likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of
the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorn's qualification to run
for mayor in the recall election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive
term for elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any
winning candidate in the recall election until further orders from the Court. Petitioners were required to post
aP20,000 bond.

23

On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking the
same reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Gilo and Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival
candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and
to allow him to assume office to give effect to the will of the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates' motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of
Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.
In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing a
campaign period of only 10 days has become moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 5708 granted an additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.
First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.
Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall
Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA
members. The COMELEC, however, found that
"On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of
the Local Government Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA.
Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said notices were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "G"
of Volumes II and III of the Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the
same were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "H". The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast
mass media in the dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of
provincial elective officials, print and broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional
and national officials, and DILG officials].
xxx
The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10 July 2002 certified that upon a
'thorough and careful verification of the signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all
members of the PRA concerned approved said resolution.' She likewise certified 'that not a single
member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and authenticity of their signatures.'
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his Indorsement dated 10 July 2002,
stated, 'upon proper review, all documents submitted are found in order.'
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted the following recommendations:
'This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient in form and substance.
That the PRA was validly constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved Resolution No. 0102 calling for the recall of Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.'

24

x x x ."
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise
of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC,5 which also dealt with
alleged defective service of notice to PRA members, we ruled that
"Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the
determination of the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious
inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC,
based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so,
in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same."
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC's findings of fact are patently
erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002
because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled
on July 15, 2002. This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted
the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay
members with no legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local
Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA
meeting and of even sending his representative and counsel who were present during the entire PRA
proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall Resolution, minutes of
the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and
authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all
these public records in the official custody of the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the
COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in Socrates' claim that respondents violated his
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the
Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.
Second Issue: Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor
in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which
states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected."
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local
official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count
in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from

25

office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked
was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate
reelection" after three terms. This is clear from the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO:6 We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the blackboard, and these
are Alternative No. I where there is no further election after a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2
where there is no immediate reelection after three successive terms."7
The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation on the term of elective local
officials:
"MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two
issues on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection
after a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms)."8
The framers of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection" question in voting for the term limits
of Senators9 and Representatives of the House.10
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third
term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth
term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by
the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent
election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year full term following
the three-term limit, then Senators should also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year
full term following their two-term limit. The constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded
exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:
"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected."11
In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the Constitutional Convention is
instructive:
"GASCON:12 I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow
the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
DAVIDE:13 That is correct.

26

GASCON: And the question that we left behind before - if the Gentleman will remember - was: How
long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six
years?
DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the
election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third or on the
sixth year thereafter, this particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of
hibernation for six years. That was the Committee's stand.
GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at the least."14 (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years15 following his
completion of two terms. The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the
immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent election, during the six-year period following the two term
limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend "the period of rest" of an elective official who has reached
his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate
reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek
reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his
three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code,
Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government
Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth
consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.16 Socrates ran and won
as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he
became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his
closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates.
During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the
continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from
September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as
mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall
term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30,
2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as
mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,17 the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this
manner:
"x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which he was elected." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation
of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years,
constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the
interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length of
time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local official's continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga,18 a unanimous Court reiterated the rule that an
interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office breaks the continuity of service of an elective local

27

official. In Adormeo, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. had served two consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena City. In
his third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, in the recall election of
May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001.
When Talaga ran again for mayor in the 2001 elections, Raymundo Adormeo, the other candidate for mayor,
petitioned for Talaga's disqualification on the ground that Talaga had already served three consecutive terms as
mayor.
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talaga's recall term was a continuation of his previous two terms so
that he was deemed to have already served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was
qualified to run in the 2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga
was out of office interrupted the continuity of his service as mayor. Talaga's recall term as mayor was not
consecutive to his previous two terms because of this interruption, there having been a break of almost two
years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his
service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two
consecutive terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office
interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless
continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant case
is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the
instant case, the interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents
were seeking election for a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after winning the recall
election. Talaga's recall term did not retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talaga's recall
term was made to so retroact, then he would have been disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he
would already have served three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a
recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior
to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service.
Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with
the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates.
Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to
retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider
Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his
recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or
successive terms of office which historically and factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the
freedom of the people to choose their leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in
derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be
construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people. As this Court aptly stated
in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
"Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of
the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as
they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by
Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no
further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of
Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the
succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against
'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose' as a result of the proposed absolute
disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions 'recognizing people's
power.'"19 (Emphasis supplied)
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the
interruption. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This
unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. This is clear from the
following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:

28

"SUAREZ:20 For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have
to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is
already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would
disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification,
Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired
portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the
Lower House."21
Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and Representatives of the House, the same
principle applies to a recall election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall
term can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full
terms. A local official who serves a recall term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although
less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of
Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor
which ended on June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to
September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June
30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive
term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate
to choose their leaders.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning
candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., in the result.
Mendoza, J., in the result, without to the filing of separate opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
Corona, J., no part - prior consultation.
Azcuna, J., joins the separate opinion of C.J. Davide.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
I concur with the opinion and conclusion of Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio in G.R. No. 154512 and G.R. No.
154683. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) committed no grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the Recall Resolution. Dismissal then of G.R. No. 154512 is inevitable. This notwithstanding, I still
hold on to my dissenting view in G.R. No. 111511 (Garcia, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., 227 SCRA 100, 121

29

[1993]) that the provision on the preparatory recall assembly in Section 70 of the Local Government Code of
1991 is unconstitutional.
Our issuance of the Resolution of 3 September 2002 in G.R. No. 154683 enjoining the COMELEC from
implementing its Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the recall election on 7 September 2002, and the
subsequent Resolution of the COMELEC giving the candidates an additional campaign period of fifteen days
from 7 September 2002 rendered moot and academic the principal issue in G.R. No. 154683. The dismissal of
the petition therein is also in order.
However, I regret I cannot concur with the argument and conclusion relative to G.R. Nos. 155083-84. I
respectfully submit that private respondent Edward S. Hagedorn is disqualified from running for the position of
Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election in question.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution expressly provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
Interruption In the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Paragraph (b), Section 43 of R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) restates this constitutional
restriction, thus: SEC. 43. Term of office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution was not found in the Report of the Committee on Local
Governments of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. It was introduced at the plenary session by
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. Commenting thereon in his book entitled "The Intent of 1986
Constitution Writers" (1995 ed., p. 699), Commissioner Joaquin Bernas states:
This provision was not found among the Committee's proposals but came as an amendment proposed by
Commissioner Davide. It was readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved.
Section 8 sets the duration of a term at three years, and prohibits elective local officials from serving for
more than three consecutive terms.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article XVIII (The Transitory Provision) of the
Constitution, and Executive Order No. 270, as amended by R.A. No. 6636, the first local election, that
is, the election for the first term under the Constitution for elective local officials, was on 18 January
1988. By express provision of Section 5 of R.A. No. 6636, in relation to Section 2 of Article XVIII of
the Constitution, that term expired at noon of 30 June 1992. The second election, i.e., the election for the
second term of elective local officials which expired at noon of 30 June 1995, for elective local officials,
was on the second Monday of May 1992 pursuant to R.A. No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized
National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms). The third election, i.e., for the third term which
expired at noon of 30 June 1998, was on the second Monday of May 1995, pursuant to Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7166. The fourth election, or for the fourth term which expired at noon of 30 June 2001, was on the
second Monday of May 1998. The fifth election, i.e., for the fifth term which would expire at noon of 30
June 2004, was on the second Monday of May 2001.Conformably with Section 8 of Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160, a local official elected in the first local election of 18
January 1988 may be reelected in the synchronized elections in May 1992 and in May 1995. He could
not seek another reelection in the May 1998 election because that would have been his fourth term.
Similarly, a local official who was elected in the May 1992 election could be reelected in the May 1995
and May 1998 elections.
Private respondent Hagedorn was first elected as City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the May 1992 election.
He was reelected in the May 1995 and May 1998 elections. His third term, by virtue of his election in the May
1998 election, expired on 30 June 2001. Therefore, he was constitutionally and statutorily barred from seeking
reelection In the May 2001 election, which would have been his fourth term.

30

The term of office covered by the May 2001 election is up to 30 June 2004. Section 8 of Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 are clear in what is prohibited, which is the fourth term.
Nothing can be clearer from the wordings thereof: "the term of office of elective local officials ... shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more that three consecutive terms." In short, an elective local official
who has served three consecutive terms, like Hagedorn, is disqualified from seeking re-election for the
succeeding fourth term. The provision bars the holding of four consecutive terms.
The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection for a fourth
term. But I disagree when it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection for
a fourth term because he was not a candidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. It forgets that what would
have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001 election was for the period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June
2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent confusion between term and election, the root cause of
which is the attempt to distinguish "voluntary renunciation" of office from "involuntary severance" from office
and the term of office to which it relates.
Let me first discuss the matter of whether the Constitutional Commission did approve the rule of "no Immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms." In support of its affirmative conclusion the ponencia quotes the
Manifestation of Commissioner Romulo as entered in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two
issues on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely: a) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after
a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms).
This is inaccurate. What actually happened was that the issue was originally for elective national and local
officials. However, the Commission decided to consider first the term of the members of Congress; and to defer
the discussion on the term of elective local officials until the Commission would consider the report of the
Committee on Local Governments. On this point I quote the pertinent portions of Volume Two, pages 238-245
of the Record of the Constitutional Commission of its proceedings on 25 July 1986:
THE PRESIDENT. Maybe it will be of help we Just remind ourselves that what we have before us now
is the report of the Committee on the Legislative. Therefore, maybe we should confine ourselves first to
what is covered by the report which is the term of office of the Senators and the Representatives.And
with respect to the local officials, let us await the report of the Committee on Local Governments as to
its recommendation on this matter.
MR. RODRIGO. As a matter of fact, I will go further than that, it is my belief, as regards local officials,
that we should leave this matter to the legislative.
THE PRESIDENT. So what is the pleasure now of the Acting Floor Leader or of the Chairman of the
Committee on the Legislative?
MR. RODRIGO. I wonder if the two proponents, Madam President, will agree that we first talk about
the term of office of the Representatives because we are now discussing the legislative department.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I will agree really that this matter should relate only to the term of office of the
Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT. But are we agreed on these two proposals - the one of Commissioner Garcia where
there is no further election after a total of three terms and the other where there is no Immediate
reelection after three successive terms?
MR. OPLE. Madam President, originally if I remember right, the Commission decided to consider the
synchronization of elections. And from that original commitment, we proceeded to fix the terms and
decided related questions within the context of synchronization. Are we now abandoning the original

31

task of synchronization which could only be fully settled in terms of delimitations on the proposed terms
of the President and the Vice-President, the Members of Congress and the local officials, or do we want
to postpone the synchronization task to a later time after we hear from the Committee on Local
Governments and the other concerned committees?
THE PRESIDENT. What does the Acting Floor Leader say to this particular question of Commissioner
Ople?
MR. ROMULO. In a way, Madam President, we have settled the synchronization task, because we have
decided on the officials' absolute terms. All we are really talking about now is whether or not they are
eligible for reelection, and I think those are separable issues.
MR. OPLE. If they are separable, and we have already settled the synchronization task, then I think that
is something to be thankful about. But considering the immediate business at hand, is it the wish of the
Acting Floor Leader that the election of the local officials should be eliminated from the consideration
of those two choices?
MR. ROMULO. Yes. I think the sense of the body now is to limit this choice to the Members of the
House of Representatives.
MR. OPLE. And do the manifestations of both Commissioners Garcia and Monsod still stand after the
elimination of the election of the local officials?
MR. ROMULO. Yes, I think so.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, as worded, It is a personal disqualification.
MR. ROMULO. We are now ready to vote, Madam President.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT. We are now ready to vote by ballot. Let us distribute the ballots. Anyway the voting
would take only about 10 minutes.
The session is suspended.
It was 3:40 p.m.
At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed, and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:50 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
MR. GASCON. Madam President, may I have a clarification before we count the ballots. The voting
now is just for Representatives. We are not speaking of the term of office of the Senators yet. Is that
correct?
THE PRESIDENT. The term of office of the Senators was disposed of this morning.
This voting now is only for Representatives.
MR. GASCON. I think the Issue of whether the Senators could run again for election after their two
consecutive terms or 12 years after a lapse of a period of time has not yet been finalized.

32

THE PRESIDENT. I beg the Commissioner's pardon.

MR. GASCON. Is this voting just for Congressmen?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
The Secretary-General will now please proceed to count the votes.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the
counting.
Alternative No. 1 - no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//
Alternative No. 2 - no immediate reelection after three successive terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 17 votes for Alternative No. 1 and 26 votes for Alternative No. 2;
Alternative No. 2 is approved.
What does the Acting Floor Leader say?
MR. ROMULO. Alternative No. 2 has won, Madam President. It seems there are some doubts as to the
term of office of the Senators, so I propose that we similarly vote on that to end any doubt. It was my
understanding this morning that when we voted for the term of office of the Senators, they would not be
perpetually disqualified.
THE PRESIDENT. From the transcripts, it appears here that with respect to Senators, 22 votes went to
Scheme No. II; that is, with one reelection. This is already a majority. So, does the Acting Floor Leader
propose that we vote again?
MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not that will be perpetual, Madam President, or after resting
for six years they can run again. That is the question that is not answered. I am talking of the Senators.
THE PRESIDENT. This morning, Scheme No. I, without reelection, has 3 votes; Scheme No. II, with
one reelection - 22 votes; Scheme No. III, no limit on reelection - 17 votes.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. May we first clarify this from the Secretary-General?
MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not in voting for the term of six years with one reelection,
the Senator is perpetually disqualified, so that is a similar question to what we had posed with regard to
the House of Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT. In other words, after serving with one reelection, whether or not he is perpetually
disqualified after serving 12 years?
MR. ROMULO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. Or, if after one reelection, he is perpetually disqualified or he can hibernate - the very
word used - for six years and then run again for reelection but not consecutive, not immediate. In other
words, he is entitled to one immediate reelection.

33

REV. RIGOS. Another point, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO. And then, after that, if there is a gap, when he is not a Senator, then he can run for the
same office.
REV. RIGOS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rigos is recognized.
REV. RIGOS. In relation to that, if he will be allowed to run again as Senator after a period of
hibernation, we have to clarify how long that should be. It could be three years, because in the proposed
scheme, every three years we can elect the Senators.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, Madam President, it can be three years.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT. I will suspend the session again so as to allow the parties to compare with the Acting
Floor Leader so that we will know what we are going to vote on.
The session is suspended
It was 3:58 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 4:05 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the question of the Senators, and the
schemes are as follows: The first scheme is, no further election after two terms; the - second scheme is,
no immediate reelection after two successive terms.
Madam President, inasmuch as the principles applicable here are the same as those for the House of
Representatives, I move that we go directly to the voting and forego any further discussions.
THE PRESIDENT. Please distribute the ballots for this particular item for Senators.
Are we ready now?
The Secretary-General will please count the ballots.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. We have 43 ballots here, Madam President. We shall now begin to
count.
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I - /////-/////-//
Scheme No. II - /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 12 votes for Scheme No. I and 32 votes for Scheme No. II; Scheme
No. II approved.

34

All the results will be considered by the Committee on the Legislative in preparation of their report.
So can we leave this matter now?
The corresponding proposal on the three-term limit for elective local officials without immediate
reelection was taken up by the Constitutional Commission much later or specifically on 16 August 1986.
On this point, the pertinent portions of Vol. Three, pages 406-408, Record of the Constitutional
Commission, read as follows:
MR. RAMA. Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Madam President.
After Section 4, I propose to Insert a new section to be denominated later as Section 5. It
provides as follows: THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT
BARANGAY OFFICIALS, WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE
THREE YEARS AND NO SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE
CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY
LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE
CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
This is in accordance with the mandate of the Commission when we voted on the terms of
officials up to local officials, excluding the term of barangay officials which was a very specific
exception.
MR. NOLLEDO. One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office of
barangay officials as provided for?
MR. DAVIDE. As may be determined by law.
MR. NOLLEDO. As provided for in the Local Government Code.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. We accept the amendment. The Committee accepts the amendment.

THE PRESIDENT. May we have the reaction of the Committee?

MR. NOLLEDO. The Committee accepts the amendment, as amended, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any other comment?
MR. OPLE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Ople is recognized.'
MR. OPLE. May we ask the Committee to read the proposed amendment now.
MR. NOLLEDO. May we ask Commissioner Davide to read the new section.
MR. DAVIDE. THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT BARANGAY
OFFICIALS, WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND N
SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS.
VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE
CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL
TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.

35

THE PRESIDENT. Then let us vote first on the Davide amendment.

Is there any objection to this new section proposed by Commissioner Davide which has been read to the
body? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the proposed section is approved.
I wish to add that the Constitutional Commission debates on the issue of "no immediate reelection" after
three consecutive terms for members of Congress clearly indicated that the "no immediate reelection"
after the 3-term limit would equally apply to the elective local officials. This accounted for the
immediate acceptance by the Committee on Local Governments of the aforementioned Amendment of
Commissioner Davide, which is now Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. These debates clearly
showed the Intent of the Commission that the ban against an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms applies to thefourth term, i.e., the term immediately following the three consecutive
terms, to be filled up by the regular election for such fourth term. For one to be able to run again after
three consecutive terms, he has to restfor the entire immediately succeeding fourth term. On the next
fifth term he can run again to start a new series of three consecutive terms. We quote these pertinent
portions of the debates, recorded in Volume Two, pages 232-233 of the Record of the Constitutional
Commission:
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the following are the various alternatives:Scheme No. I is without
reelection; Scheme No. II is with one reelection; and Scheme No. III is reelection without limit. This is
for 'the Senators.
At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair asks the Chairman, Commissioner Davide, to please consolidate the
results of the voting for President and Vice-President.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we are ready. THE PRESIDENT. The SecretaryGeneral will please proceed.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I - ///
Scheme No. II - /////-/////-/////-/////-//
Scheme No. Ill - /////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 3 votes for Scheme No. I; 22 votes for Scheme No. II; and 17 votes
for Scheme No. III; Scheme No. II is approved.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the next position is for the House of Representatives, the
Congressmen. I would assume we can use the same choices. Does any one want any variation?
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. For the record, I would like to ask Commissioner Romulo some questions.
MR. ROMULO. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. Scheme No. II says "the Vice-President - with one reelection."
THE PRESIDENT. No, that is for Senators.'

36

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Guenon is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. May I suggest one more scheme - with two reelections for the Members of the
House of Representatives?
THE PRESIDENT. So, we shall distribute ballots again.
MR. ROMULO. While the ballots are being distributed, may I read the following four propositions for
Congressmen: '
Scheme No. I, without reelection.
Scheme No. II, with one reelection.
Scheme No. III, with two reelections.
Scheme No. IV, no limit on reelection. I
MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de los Reyes is recognized.
MR. DE LOS REYES. The term of the Members of the House of Representatives will be three years,
according to the first voting; the term of the Senators, if they are entitled to one reelection, will be 12
years. So, in order for a Member of the House of Representatives to have also 12 years, he must be
entitled to three reelections. I propose another scheme with three reelections to make it equal.
MR. RODRIGO. Will the Gentleman maintain the number there and add that as No. V. I filled up my
ballot already and if I erase, this might be disqualified as a marked ballot.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo may change his ballot.
MR. DE CASTRO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de Castro Is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. The situation stated by Commissioner de los Reyes is apparently covered by Scheme
No. II which we agreed upon earlier. The situation will not happen, because both the Senators and the
Congressmen will have five (5) years on the first election. So, the possibility that the Senators will have
a longer term than the Congressmen is remote.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, it occurred to us that the three alternatives are not really mutually
exclusive. Can we have only these three: without reelection, with reelection and with unlimited
reelection? We are asking here for plurality only, Madam President. Can we eliminate?
THE PRESIDENT. In other words, we shall have the same schemes as those for Senators; without
reelection, with one reelection and unlimited reelection.
REV. RIGOS. Madam President, besides we have already submitted our ballots.
MR. MONSOD. I withdraw my proposal, Madam President.

37

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I would suggest that the two schemes with the highest votes be voted
upon to get the key majority. For example, if the schemes with two reelections and no limit to election
get the highest number of votes, then we vote again to get the key majority.
THE PRESIDENT. We will do that. Are all the votes in?
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have 43 ballots.
THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary-General will please proceed. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
reading:
Scheme No. I - 0
Scheme No. II - //
Scheme No. III - /////-/////-/////-/////-/
Scheme No. IV - /////-/////-////
Scheme No. V - /////-/
THE PRESIDENT. The results show no vote for Scheme No. I; 2 votes for Scheme No. II; 21 votes for
Scheme No. III; 14 votes for Scheme No. IV; and 6 votes for Scheme No. V; Scheme No. III is
approved.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO.. I would like to ask a question for clarification.
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. If the Members of the Lower House can have two reelections, does this mean two
immediate reelections, or a term of nine consecutive years? Let us say that a Member of the Lower
House has been reelected twice; that means he will serve for nine years. Can he let three years elapse
and then run again?
THE PRESIDENT. We will ask the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative to answer the
question.
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct, Madam President, because two reelections mean two successive
reelections. So he cannot serve beyond nine consecutive years.
MR. RODRIGO. Consecutively?
MR. DAVIDE. Consecutively.
MR. RODRIGO. But after nine years he can let one
MR. DAVIDE. He can rest. He can hibernate for three years.
MR. RODRIGO. And run again.
MR. DAVIDE. He can run again.
MR. RODRIGO. And again have nine years as a maximum.

38

MR. DAVIDE. I do not know if that is also the thinking of Commissioner Garcia who is the main
proponent of this proposal on two reelections. I would seek the opinion of Commissioner Garcia for the
record. (underscoring supplied for emphasis.)
The dichotomy made in the ponencia between "voluntary renunciation of the office" as used in Section 8 of
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and "involuntary severance from office" is
unnecessary, if not misplaced. From the discussion in the ponencia, the latter is made to apply to the banned
term, i.e., the fourth term immediately following three consecutive terms. Speaking now of Hagedorn, he cannot
have suffered "involuntary severance from office" because there was nothing to be severed; he was not a holder
of an office either in a de jure or de facto capacity. He knew he was disqualified from seeking a third reelection
to office. Disqualification is, definitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance. Even if we concede that
involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the continuity of a term for purposes of applying the three-term
principle the rule laid down in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609), cited in the ponencia, page 17, is
not applicable in the case of Hagedorn. The involuntary severance referred to in that case was one that took
place during any of the three terms; hence, the term during which it occurred should be excluded in the
computation. In the case of Hagedorn, no such involuntary severance took place during any of his three terms
brought about by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and 1998.
More importantly, the voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 is one that takes place at any time during either the first, second, or third term of the
three consecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which
reads: "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected." The purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local official from voluntarily resigning
from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during which he resigned would
be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the provision excluded is intended to impose a
penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applying it in
the case of Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned on his third term, he would still be barred from seeking
reelection in the May 2001 election.
Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002)
because in that case Talaga did not win in his second reelection bid, or for a third term, in the May 1998
elections. He won in the recall election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier stated, fully served three
successive terms.
Neither can we allow Hagedorn to take refuge under the exchange between Commissioner Suarez and
Commissioner Davide found on page 592, Vol. II of the Record of the Constitutional Commission and quoted
on pages 19-20 of the ponencia:
SUAREZ: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would
have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of
the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus
one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on
disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of "term" And if there is a special election, he will serve only for the
unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the
Members of the Lower House.
On the contrary, it is clear from the views of Commissioners Suarez and Davide that the term of office of one
who is elected in a special election is considered one term for purposes of determining the three consecutive
terms.
A declaration that Hagedorn is qualified to seek reelection in a recall election to remove the Mayor who was
elected for a term for which Hagedorn was constitutionally and statutorily disqualified to be reelected to or, to
hold Is to subvert the rationale of the three-consecutive-term rule and make a mockery of it. Worse, it abets
destructive endless partisan politics and unsound governance. An elective local official who is disqualified to
seek a fourth term because of the three-term limit but obsessed to hold on to power would spend the first year of
the fourth term campaigning for the recall of the incumbent in the second year of said term. This would' not be a
problem If the disqualified official has a solid following and a strong political machinery. Interestingly, in this
case, as stated on page 3 of the ponencia, the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Puerto

39

Princesa City is oneMark David M. Hagedorn and he was designated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly as
interim Chairman.
I therefore vote to grant the petition in G.R. Nos. 155083-84, to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC
holding private respondent Edward Hagedorn a qualified candidate for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa
City in the recall election, and to declare him DISQUALIFIED from seeking reelection for a fourth term or
from being a candidate for Mayor in the recall election in question.

CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The correctness of the decision so ably written by Mr. Justice Carpio speaks for itself. Nonetheless, the complex
constitutional dimensions of the issue for resolution compels this humble concurring opinion. The issue is
whether private respondent Hagedorn is disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002 recall election for
mayor of Puerto Princesa City and from serving the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004 mayoralty term
considering that he has thrice been consecutively elected and has served three full terms as Puerto Princesa City
mayor from 1992-1998. In illuminating the gray interstices of this election case, prudence dictates that ". . .
where the sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct."1
Private respondent Hagedorn was elected mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in 1992, 1995 and 1998 and
served three full terms. In the May 14, 2001 national and local elections, he ran for governor for the Province of
Palawan and lost. Petitioner-intervenor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor of Puerto Princesa
City.
On July 2, 2002, three hundred twelve (312) out of five hundred twenty-eight (528) members of the Barangay
Officials of Puerto Princesa City convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall
of Mayor Socrates. On August 21, 2002, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing a calendar
of activities for the recall election. Two days after, Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in said
election.
On August 27, 2002, petitioners Adovo and Gilo sought for Hagedorn's immediate disqualification on the
ground that he had served three consecutive full terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa City immediately prior to
the recall election and was thus proscribed by the Constitution from running in said election. On August 30,
2002, petitioner Ollave, Sr. intervened to disqualify Hagedorn on the same ground.
The recall election was set on September 24, 2002. On September 20, 2002, public respondent COMELEC's
First Division denied the petitions for Hagedorn's disqualification. The following day, petitioners Adovo, Gilo
and Ollave, Sr. filed a motion for reconsideration imploring the COMELEC en banc to reverse the September
20 resolution. On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution of the First Division
holding Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
On September 24, 2002, petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave, Sr. sought recourse in this Court with a Very
Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order. On the same date, Mayor Socrates filed a petition-in-intervention to nullify the September 23 resolution
of the COMELEC.
The petitions before us raise the following issues:
"I.
THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT
HAGEDORN IS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING FOR THE POSITION OF MAYOR OF PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY IN THE SCHEDULED RECALL ELECTION, THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM
FOR LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS NOTWITHSTANDING.

40

II.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
PROCEEDED TO DIVIDE A SINGLE TERM OF OFFICE INTO TWO.
III.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE
INTENT AND PURPOSE FOR HOLDING THE SCHEDULED RECALL ELECTIONS FOR THE POSITION
OF MAYOR OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BAR
AGAINST A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT
RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING IN THE UPCOMING RECALL
ELECTIONS AS HIS INELIGIBILITY IS NOT APPARENT UNDER SECTIONS 65 AND 68 OF THE
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, SECTIONS 39 AND 40 OF RA 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE),
AND RULES 23 AND 25 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE.
V.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED
THAT RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS QUALIFIED TO RUN IN THE RECALL ELECTION EVEN IF HE
STANDS DISQUALIFIED FROM SERVING UNDER A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM AS SUCH IS
ALLEGEDLY NOT THE PROVINCE OF THE INSTANT DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS.
VI.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED A
DEFECTIVE AND CLEARLY VOID RESOLUTION."2
The foregoing issues may be reduced to the singular issue of whether or not private respondent Hagedorn is
disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002 recall election and serving as mayor of Puerto Princesa
City considering that he has been thrice consecutively elected and has served three full terms in that position
from 1992 to 2001.
I find the petitions devoid of merit.
Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides:
"Sec. 8: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected."
This constitutional provision is restated in the Local Government Code of 1991, to wit:
"Sec. 43. Term of Office. -. . . (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected."
We have not interpreted Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution in the recall election context of the cases at bar. It is
imperative to distill the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the people who ratified it.3 Mere reliance on
the surface meaning of the words of the above provision, however, will not suffice to capture this elusive intent.
Thus, we turn to the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) as an extrinsic aid to
interpretation.4 The Record of the Constitutional Commission shows that Art. X. Sec. 8 was readily accepted by
the Commissioners without much discussion;5 nonetheless, their debates on setting the term limit for
Representatives show that the rationale for the limit applies to both Representatives and elective local officials.
We quote at length the relevant portions of the debates, to wit:

41

"MR. GARCIA. I would like to advocate the proposition that no further election for local and legislative
officials be allowed after a total of three terms or nine years. I have four reasons why I would like to
advocate this proposal, which are as follows: (1) to prevent monopoly of political power; (2) to broaden
the choice of the people; (3) so that no one is indispensable in running the affairs of the country; (4) to
create a reserve of statesmen both in the national and local levels. May I explain briefly these four
reasons.
First: To prevent monopoly of political power - Our history has shown that prolonged stay in
public office can lead to the creation of entrenched preserves of political dynasties. In this regard,
I would also like to advocate that immediate members of the families of public officials be
barred from occupying the same position being vacated.
Second: To broaden the choice of the people - Although individuals have the right to present
themselves for public office, our times demand that we create structures that will enable more
aspirants to offer to serve and to provide the people a broader choice so that more and more
people can be enlisted to the cause of public service, not just limited only to those who may have
the reason or the advantage due to their position.
Third: No one is indispensable in running the affairs of the country After the official's more
than a decade or nearly a decade of occupying the same public office, I think we should try to
encourage a more team-oriented consensual approach to governance favored by a proposal that
will limit public servants to occupy the same office for three terms. And this would also favor not
relying on personalities no matter how heroic, some of whom, in fact, are now in our midst.
Lastly, the fact that we will not reelect people after three terms would also favor the creation of a
reserve of statesmen both in the national and local levels.
Turnovers in public office after nine years will ensure that new ideas and new approaches will be
welcome. Public office will no longer be a preserve of conservatism and tradition. At the same time, we
will create a reserve of statesmen, both in the national and local levels, since we will not deprive the
community of the wealth of experience and advice that could come from those who have served for nine
years in public office.
Finally, the concept of public service, if political dynasty symbolized by prolonged stay in particular
public offices is barred will have fuller meaning. It will not be limited only to those who directly hold
public office, but also to consultative bodies organized by the people, among whom could be counted
those who have served in public office with accomplishment and distinction, for public service must no
longer be limited only to public office.
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I asked to speak because in
this draft Constitution, we are recognizing people power. We have said that now there is a new
awareness, a new kind of voter, a new kind of Filipino. And yet at the same time, we are prescreening
candidates among whom they will choose. We are saying that this 48-member Constitutional
Commission has decreed that those who have served for a period of nine years are barred from running
for the same position.
The argument is that there may be other positions. But there are some people who are very
skilled and good at legislation, and yet are not of a national stature to be Senators. They may be
perfectly honest, perfectly competent and with integrity. They get voted into office at the age of
25, which is the age we provide for Congressmen. And at 34 years old we put them to pasture.
Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people. We are talking here only of
congressional or senatorial seats. We want to broaden the people's choice but we are making a
prejudgment today because we exclude a certain number of people. We are, in effect, putting an
additional qualification for office - that the officials must not have served a total of more than a
number of years in their lifetime.

42

Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a reserve of statesmen, but
the future participation of these statesmen is limited. Their skills may only be in some areas, but
we are saying that they are going to be barred from running for the same position.
Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on the day-to-day honing of his
skills and competence, in intellectual combat, in concern and contact with the people, and here we are
saying that he is going to be barred from the same kind of public service.
I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and momentous decision with
respect to many of our countrymen in the future who may have a lot more years ahead of them in the
service of their country.
If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up structures that will perpetuate them,
then let us give them this rest period of three years or whatever it is. Maybe during that time, we would
even agree that their fathers or mothers or relatives of the second degree should not run. But let us not
bar them for life after serving the public for a number of years.
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. OPLE. . . . The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a
perpetual disqualification on those who have served their terms in accordance with the limits on
consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary about the
Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who will already have
served their terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I think the Commission achieves its purpose
in establishing safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms.
We do put a gap on consecutive service - in the case of the President, six years; in the case of the VicePresident, unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In the case of the Members of
Congress, both from the legislative districts and from the party list and sectoral representation, this is
now under discussion and later on the policy concerning local officials will be taken up by the
Committee on Local Governments. The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent future
situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President
down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate
those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to
members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on
the continuity or unbroken service of all of these officials. But were we now (to) decide to put these
prospective servants of the people or politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual
disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the people, whereas we should
be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of choice.
I think the veterans of the Senate and of the House of Representatives here will say that simply getting
nominated on a party ticket is a very poor assurance that the people will return them to the Senate or to
the House of Representatives. There are many casualties along the way of those who want to return to
their office, and it is the people's decision that matters. They judge whether or not a Soc Rodrigo, a
Sumulong, a Padilla, an Alonto and a Rosales, after a first and second term, should go back to the
Senate. That is a prerogative of the people that we should not take away from them -the right to judge
those who have served. In any case, we already take away from the people the freedom to vote for the
third termers because we say that a Senator, say, Mr. Rodrigo, is only good for twelve years. But if he
wants to be like Cincinnatus, if he is called back by his people to serve again, let us say for a period of
six years which Commissioner Davide called a period of hibernation which is spent at his fishpond in
Bulacan, Bulacan - because there is a new situation in the country that fairly impels the people to
summon him back, like Cincinnatus in the past, then there will no longer be any Cincinnatus.
That is not perhaps a very important point, but I think we already have succeeded in striking a balance of
policies, so that the structures, about which Commissioner Garcia expressed a very legitimate concern,
could henceforth develop to redistribute opportunities, both in terms of political and economic power, to
the great majority of the people, because very soon, we will also discuss the multiparty system. We have
unshackled the Philippine politics from the two-party system, which really was the most critical support
for the perpetuation of political dynasties in the Philippines. That is quite a victory, but at the same time,
let us not despise the role of political parties. The strength of democracy will depend a lot on how strong

43

our democratic parties are, and a splintering of all these parties so that we fall back on, let us say,
nontraditional parties entirely will mean a great loss to the vitality and resiliency of our democracy...
xxx

xxx

xxx

BISHOP BACANI. . . . I think when we voted on the provision that the illiterate be allowed to vote and
when we proposed in this Constitutional Commission for initiative as a way also of empowering our
people to engage in the legislative exercise, we are really presupposing the political maturity of our
people. Why is it that that political maturity seems now to be denied by asking that we should put a
constitutional bar to a further election of any Representative after a term of three years? Why should we
not leave that to the premise accepted by practically everybody here that our people are politically
mature? Should we use this assumption only when it is convenient for us, and not when it may also lead
to a freedom of choice for the people and for politicians who may aspire to serve longer?
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. GARCIA. I would like to answer Commissioner Bacani. We put a constitutional bar to reelection of
any Representative basically because of the undue advantage of the incumbent. It is not because of lack
of trust in the people. We realize from history that Mexico fought a revolution simply because of the
issue of reelection. No reeleccion, sufragio universal. Basically, it is because of the undue advantage of
the incumbent that he accumulates power, money, party machine or patronage. As regards what
Commissioner Aquino has said, politics is not won by ideals alone; it is won by solid organizing work
by organizations that have the capacity to do so; and normally the incumbent has all the advantages. . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the
counting.
Alternative No. 1 - no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//
Alternative No. 2 - no immediate reelection after three successive
terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/"6 (emphasis supplied)
In several cases, this Court was guided by the proceedings of the ConCom in construing Art. X, Sec. 8
of the Constitution in relation to Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Different from
the issue presented by the cases at bar, however, the question in those cases was what constitutes a
"term" for purposes of counting the three consecutive terms allowed under Art. X, Sec. 8. It is apropos to
revisit these cases to aid us in extracting the intent behind said Constitutional provision and properly
apply it to the unique case of private respondent Hagedorn.
The maiden case was Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco7 which involved the 1998
mayoralty election in Pateros. In 1989, private respondent Capco became mayor by operation of law
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. In 1992, he was elected mayor for a term ending in 1995.
In 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending in June 1998. In March 1998, he
filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1998 mayoralty election of Pateros. Petitioner Borja, Jr.,
another candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the ground that by June 30, 1998, Capco
would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms and would therefore be ineligible to
serve for another term. The COMELEC en banc declared Capco eligible to run for mayor, thus Borja, Jr.
sought recourse in this Court. In dismissing the petition, we considered the historical background of Art.
X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, viz:
"a consideration of the historical background of Article X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive
terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they
adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred
from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third
consecutive term (2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 236-243 [Session of July

44

25, 1986] . . .). Monsod warned against 'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose' as
a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained
provisions 'recognizing people's power.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The
first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a
result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the
right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them be preserved. (emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected
to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can
be made clearer by considering the following cases or situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six
months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the
next election?
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office
before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the
term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is only
completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to
have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.
xxx

xxx

xxx

...the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive
times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is
considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the
fact remains that he has not been elected three times. . .
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two
conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he
qualified to run again in the next election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by
operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death, of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for
reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom
they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by
simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will
be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his
service of the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional
Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may
bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."8 (emphasis supplied)
We reiterated the Borja ruling in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, et al.9 which involved the election for
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Prior to the May 8, 1995 elections, petitioner Romeo Lonzanida served two
consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In the May 1995 elections, he ran for mayor,

45

was proclaimed winner, and assumed office. His proclamation was, however, contested by his opponent Juan
Alvez in an election protest filed before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales which rendered a decision
declaring a failure of elections. Upon appeal of the decision to the COMELEC, Alvez was declared the duly
elected mayor of San Antonio. In February 1998, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida
to vacate the post, and Alvez served the remainder of the term.
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1998 election for mayor of San Antonio. His
opponent Eufemio Muli filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Lonzanida on the ground that he had
already served three consecutive terms in the same office and was thus prohibited from running in the upcoming
election. On May 13, 1998, Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. COMELEC ruled that Lonzanida was
disqualified as his assumption to office in 1995, although he was unseated before the expiration of the term, was
considered one full term for purposes of counting the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.
On appeal to this Court, we ruled, viz:
"It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties
of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated
November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the
duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered
as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of voluntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and
revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost
in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as a winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a
void proclamation...
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be
deemed to have served one full term from May 1995- 1998 because he served the greater portion of that term
has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e.,
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his
assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the
three term limit."10 (emphasis supplied)
Finally, in the recent case of Adormeo v. COMELEC, et al.,11 we ruled that a mayor who assumed office via a
recall election and served the unexpired portion of the mayoralty term is not considered to have served a full
term for purposes of applying the three term limit. In this case, therein private respondent Ramon Talaga, Jr.
was elected mayor in May 1992 and served the full term. In 1995, he was reelected and again served the full
term. In 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. About two years later, a recall election was held where Talaga, Jr.
ran against Tagarao. He (Talaga, Jr.) won and served the remainder of Tagarao's term.
In view of the upcoming May 2001 mayoralty election, Talaga, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy. On March
2, 2001, therein petitioner Adormeo sought the cancellation of Talaga, Jr.'s certificate of candidacy and/or his
disqualification on the ground that he had been thrice elected and had served three consecutive terms as city
mayor. Talaga, Jr., however, was declared qualified for the position of city mayor. Adormeo thus sought
recourse before this Court.
Citing the Borja and Lonzanida rulings, we ruled that Talaga, Jr. was not disqualified as the two conditions for
disqualification, namely (1) the elective official concerned was elected for three consecutive terms in the same
post and (2) he has fully served three consecutive terms, were not met. We did not consider Talaga, Jr.'s service
of the unexpired portion of Tagarao's term as service of a full term for purposes of the three term limit. We also
ruled that he did not serve for three consecutive terms as there was a break in his service when he lost to
Tagarao in the 1998 elections. We held, viz:

46

"COMELEC's ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld.
For nearly two years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in
the 1998 elections.
Patently untenable is petitioner's contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the
May 1998 election violates Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. (footnote omitted) To bolster his case,
respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in
interpreting said provision that 'if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that
unexpired (term), no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of
successive terms allowed.'
As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas' comment is pertinent only to members of the House of
Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of
Congress. (Rollo, pp. 83-84)"12 (emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the ConCom and the ruling case law of Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo show that there are
two principal reasons for the three term limit for elective local officials: (1) to prevent political dynasties
perpetuated by the undue advantage of the incumbent and (2) to broaden the choice of the people by allowing
candidates other than the incumbent to serve the people. Likewise evident in the deliberations is the effort to
balance between two interests, namely, the prevention of political dynasties and broadening the choice of the
people on the one hand, and respecting the freedom of choice and voice of the people, on the other; thus, the
calibration between perpetual disqualification after three consecutive terms as proposed by Commissioner
Garcia, and setting a limit on immediate reelection and providing for a hibernation period.
In all three cases - Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo - we ruled that the "term" referred to in the three term limit is
service of a full term of three years for elective local officials. This ruling furthers the intent of the ConCom to
prevent political dynasties as it is the service of consecutive full terms that makes service continuous and which
opens the gates to political dynasties limiting the people's choice of leaders. In the words Of Commissioner
Ople, ". . . we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections,
officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions
and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts
to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the
continuity or unbroken service of all of these officials. (emphasis supplied)" Thus, ConCom set the limit on
consecutive full terms to no more than three. Otherwise stated, it is a fourth consecutive full term that is
prohibited.
In the cases at bar, however, private respondent Hagedorn will not serve a prohibited fourth consecutive full
term as he will be serving only the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004 mayoralty term. Similar to Talaga, Jr. in
the Adormeo case, Hagedorn's service as mayor will not be continuous from the third to a fourth consecutive
full term as it was broken when Socrates was elected in the 2001 regular mayoralty election and served for one
year. In the same vein that Talaga, Jr. was elected into office by recall election and his service of the unexpired
portion of the incumbent's term was not considered a consecutive full term for purposes of applying the three
term limit, Hagedorn's service of the unexpired portion of Socrates' term should not also be counted as a
prohibited fourth consecutive full term. It should not make a difference whether the recall election came after
the second consecutive full term as in the Adormeo case or after the third consecutive term as in the cases at bar
because the intent to create a hiatus in service is satisfied in both instances.
Even a textual analysis of Art. X, Sec. 8 will yield the interpretation that what is prohibited is the service of a
fourth consecutive full term. Petitioners are correct in foisting the view that "term" is a fixed and definite period
of time prescribed by law or the Constitution during which the public officer may claim to hold the office as a
right. It is a fixed and definite period of time to hold office, perform its functions, and enjoy its privileges and
emoluments until the expiration of the period.13 In ascertaining what "term" means for elective local officials,
the Constitution itself provides in Art. X, Sec. 8 that it means a fixed, definite, and full period of three years,
viz: "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years ..." Although one or more persons may discharge the duties of the office during this
fixed three-year period, the term is not divided into smaller terms by the number of incumbents who may fill the
office. It is one and indivisible, and term follows term in successive cycles of three years each. If the incumbent
or the one elected to the office fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of

47

his office, thereby creating a permanent vacancy,14 the term would remain unbroken until the recurring election
for the office.15
The provisions on voluntary renunciation under Art. X, Sec. 8 and other articles of the Constitution bolster the
interpretation that for purposes of applying the three term limit, service of a full term of three years is
contemplated, viz:
"Art. X, Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected."
"Art. VI, Sec. 4. . . . No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 7. . . . No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. VII, Sec. 4. . . . No Vice-President shall serve more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the
full term for which he was elected." (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides in Sec. 43(b), viz:
"Sec. 43(b) . . . No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected." (emphasis
supplied)
Likewise, because "term" is understood to be a fixed, definite, and full period, the Constitution, in Art. Vi, Sec.
9, uses the qualifier "unexpired term" to refer to only a portion of a term, viz:
"Art. VI, Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be
called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term." (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 uses the phrase "unexpired term" to mean the
remainder of the term, viz:
"Sec. 44(d). The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of his predecessors. . ."
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, when Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution states that "...no such (local elective) official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms," it consistently means that it allows service of a maximum of three consecutive
full terms and prohibits service of a minimum fourth consecutive full term.
In putting a cap on the number of consecutive full terms an elective local official can serve, the ConCom sought
to curb the undue advantage of the incumbent over other aspirants, which advantage makes it easier to found a
political dynasty. At the time of the September 24, 2002 recall election, however, Hagedorn was not the
incumbent favored with this feared "undue advantage of the incumbent." On the contrary, he ran against the
incumbent Mayor Socrates who alone could be the subject of recall election and who, by law, was automatically
a candidate in the election.16 Hagedorn did not run in the 2001 regular mayoralty election of Puerto Princesa
City which Socrates won, precisely because he was aware of the three term limit.

48

It is my respectful submission that the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 proscribe a local
official who has been thrice consecutively elected in regular elections and has served three full terms in the
same position, from running in the regular election succeeding his third consecutive term. It is this situation that
is prohibited because it makes possible service of more than three consecutive and continuous full terms, i.e.,
service of a fourth consecutive full term. We cannot overstress that it is this continuousness that the ConCom
feared would open the gates to the two evils sought to be avoided: the incumbent's use of his undue advantage
to put up a political dynasty and limiting the people's choice of leaders. It is in this context of regular elections
that our obiter dictum in the Lonzanida case, which petitioners harp on, should be understood. In that case, we
opined that "[a]s finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred
from running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again
run for the same office."17 Indeed, insofar as regular local elections are concerned, which were the elections
involved in that case, there should be a hiatus of at least one full term of three years.
On the other hand, in the case of a local official who assumes office through a recall election - whether after his
first, second, or third consecutive term- there is a break in his service caused by the election of the incumbent
who was recalled. Even in the case of a local official who initially assumes office via recall election, then wins
the two succeeding regular elections and serves two full terms in the same post, he is not prohibited from
seeking another reelection and serving another full term. This is so because his service of the remainder of the
incumbent's term via recall election is not, in reality and in law, a full term continuing on to his three succeeding
full terms. Local officials who assume office via recall election serve only the unexpired portion of the
incumbent's term and this service is not counted as a full term, despite the Constitutional mandate that the term
of office of elective local officials is three years. Such is the design because Art. XVIII, Secs. 2 and 5 of the
Constitution also prescribe synchronization of regular national and local elections beginning on the second
Monday of May 1992,18 which is accomplished if the local official who assumes office through recall election
serves only the incumbent's unexpired term.
It is only in the case of Representatives (and Senators) that "if one is elected Representative to serve the
unexpired term of another, that unexpired term will be considered one term for purposes of computing the
number of successive terms allowed."19 The election herein contemplated is a special election thus this
Constitutional intent does not apply to a recall election which involves only elective local officials. The Record
bear this out, viz:
"MR. SUAREZ. . . May we ask a clarificatory question regarding the interpretation of the provisions in
Sections 3 and 6 in relation to Section 9 regarding the disqualification on the part of the Senator to run
for two consecutive terms, and in the case of the Members of the House of Representatives, for three
consecutive terms. For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected
would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired
portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct
statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of
this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, because we speak of "term" and if there is a special election, he will serve only for
the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two terms for the
Members of the Lower House."20
As we ruled in the Adormeo case, service of an unexpired term is considered service of a full term only with
respect to Representatives (and Senators) because unlike local government officials, Representatives cannot be
recalled. It is continuous prolonged stay in office that breeds political dynasties. Understandably therefore,
insofar as Representatives who cannot be recalled are concerned, service of an unexpired term is strictly
counted as service of a full term because the purpose of the ConCom was to limit the right to run and be elected
in Congress.21
In allowing Hagedorn to participate in the September 24 recall election, we are not unmindful of the intent of
the ConCom to broaden the people's choice of leaders. The three term limit was adopted to allow the electorate
to choose from other candidates in the regular election succeeding the incumbent's third consecutive term. This
is clear in the Commissioners' alternatives for voting on the term limit for Representatives and the outcome of
their voting where 17 voted for "no further election after a total of three terms" and 26 voted for "no immediate
reelection after three successive terms." A reelection is immediate if a local official wins in the election
succeeding the third consecutive term.22 This is not the case with Hagedorn who did not run in the 2001 regular

49

mayoralty election and left that political arena to other contenders, thereby upholding the intent of the ConCom
to broaden the choice of the electorate.
The intent of the ConCom to create a hiatus in the service of elective local officials after three consecutive full
terms cannot be undermined through abuse of the power of recall. The Local Government Code of 1991
provides limitations on recall in Section 74, viz:
"Section 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only
once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election." (emphasis supplied)
Thus, an elective local official cannot perpetually hold on to his office through the mechanism of recall as at the
very least, there will be a hiatus of one year after an unbroken service of three terms. He could not simply
create, in the words of Commissioner Monsod, "structures that will perpetuate him (them)" in power with the
assurance that they will not be exposed because after serving three consecutive full terms, he will certainly be
replaced. Within the one-year period under Sec. 74, his successor could discover and begin to dismantle these
manipulative structures. This one year period also provides a reasonable basis for the electorate to judge the
performance of the incumbent successor, thus obviating fear of political maneuvering through initiation of recall
proceedings by a Preparatory Recall Assembly dominated by minions of the previous local official.23 In Claudio
v. COMELEC, et al.,24 we held, viz:
"In the Bower case (in re Bower 41 I11. 777, 242 N.E. 2d 252 [1968]) cited by this Court in Angobung v.
COMELEC (269 SCRA 245, 256 [1997]), it was held that 'The only logical reason which we can ascribe for
requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for recall election is to prevent premature action on
their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the
soundness of his policies and decisions.'"25
If, after one year in office, the incumbent proves himself to be worthy of his position, then his constituents will
confirm this should a recall election be called, as in the case of Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City. If,
on the other hand, the incumbent turns out to be an ineffective leader, there is no reason why the electorate
should not be allowed to make a Cincinnatus of their past leader.
The imagined fear of abuse of the power of recall does not suffice to disqualify private respondent Hagedorn
and should not prevail over the resounding voice of the people of Puerto Princesa City. They have spoken and
there is no mistaking that Hagedorn is their overwhelming choice. We cannot subscribe to the petitioners'
position and allow an overly literal reading of the law to mute the electorate's cry and curtail their freedom to
choose their leaders. This freedom was as much a concern of the ConCom as was the prevention of political
dynasties and broadening the choice of the people. This Court has not just once admonished against a too literal
reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of the
authors.26
In sum, private respondent Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002 recall election
as the disqualification under Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution applies to the regular mayoralty election
succeeding the third consecutive term served. Nor is he precluded from serving the unexpired portion of the
2001-2004 mayoralty term as this is not service of a prohibited fourth consecutive full term.
I vote to deny the petition, giving due consideration to the tenet of representative democracy that the people
should be allowed to choose whom they wish to govern them.27 In the end, ". . . more than judgments of courts
of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people is final for 'sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.'"28
EN BANC
G.R. No. 177736

October 6, 2008

MELANIE P. MONTUERTO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE MAYOR ROLANDO E. TY and THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN, represented by

50

HONORABLE VICE-MAYOR RICHARD D. JAGUROS, all of the Municipality of Almeria,

Biliran, respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated October 31, 2006 and Resolution3 dated March 29,
2007, which affirmed in toto the Resolution of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated June 7, 2005.
The antecedents, as found by the CA, are as follows:
On March 17, 1992, petitioner was issued an appointment as Municipal Budget Officer by the then Mayor
Supremo T. Sabitsana of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran. On March 24, 1992, her appointment was
approved as permanent by Gerardo Corder, Acting Civil Service Commission Field Officer.
On January 14, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan of Almeria, Biliran passed Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Resolution
No. 01-S-2002 entitled "A Resolution Requesting the Civil Service Commission Regional Office, to Revoke the
Appointment of Mrs. Melanie P. Montuerto, Municipal Budget Officer of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran
for Failure to Secure the Required Concurrence from the Sangguniang Bayan."
Consequently, the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran submitted the 201 file of petitioner to Civil Service
Commission Regional Office No. VIII (CSCRO No. VIII) which showed that petitioner's appointment lacked
the required concurrence of the local sanggunian. On the other hand, petitioner submitted to the same office a
Joint-Affidavit4executed on March 6, 2002, by the majority of the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Almeria, Biliran, the pertinent portion of which reads:
4. Since the regular session focused on the deliberations regarding the municipal budget, the
concurrence on the appointment of Municipal Budget Officer Melanie P. Montuerto was not highlighted
and the concurrence was inadvertently omitted in the Minutes of the Regular Session for 2 March 1992.
But, we can still fully recall that there was really a verbal concurrence on the appointment of Municipal
Budget Officer Melanie P. Montuerto x x x.
On March 11, 2002, CSCRO No. VIII issued an Order decreeing:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the approval on the appointment of Melanie P.
Montuerto as Municipal Budget Officer of LGU-Almeria, Leyte xxx is hereby RECALLED on the
ground that it lacks the required concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of LGU-Almeria, Biliran.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Before resolving the motion, CSCRO No. VIII invited Marcelo C.
Maceda, Jr., incumbent SB Secretary, to appear and bring with him any document showing that petitioner's
appointment as Municipal Budget Officer had been submitted to the SB for concurrence. In reply, Maceda
issued a Certification on June 10, 2002, which reads:
This is to certify that as per records kept on file by this office, there is no record that would show that the
appointment of Mrs. Melanie P. Montuerto, as Municipal Budget Officer of Almeria, Biliran was
submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for concurrence from June 1992 up to the present.
However, the SB minutes of the March 2, 1992 regular session pointed out the presence of a budget
officer who explained fully the details of the 1992 Municipal Annual Budget of Almeria, Biliran.
Likewise, Maceda submitted a copy of the SB Minutes of the regular session held on March 2, 1992.
On July 9, 2002, CSCRO No. VIII denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner
appealed to the CSC Central Office. After due consideration of the pleadings and documents presented, the
latter issued CSC Resolution No. 040728 dated July 1, 2004, disposing of petitioner's appeal in this wise:

51

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of Melanie P. Montuerto is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
appealed Order dated March 11, 2002 of the Civil Service Commission-Regional Office No. VIII, Palo,
Leyte, recalling the initial approval of the appointment of Montuerto as Municipal Budget Officer of
Almeria, Biliran, for lack of the required concurrence by the majority of all the members of
Sangguniang Bayan, is herebyAFFIRMED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in CSC Resolution No. 050756 dated June 7,
2005. Meanwhile, on July 30, 2004, the Municipal Mayor of Almeria, Biliran issued Office Order No. 15 which
directed the indefinite detail of the petitioner to the Cooperative Development Project. In the same office order,
the commutable representation and transportation allowance of petitioner was removed. On July 11, 2005, the
Municipal Mayor issued a Memorandum terminating the services of petitioner as Municipal Budget Officer
pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 050756.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA, which
denied it for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant Petition raising the sole issue of whether the appointment of petitioner as Municipal Budget
Officer, without the written concurrence of the Sanggunian, but duly approved by the CSC and after the
appointee had served as such for almost ten years without interruption, can still be revoked by the Commission.
We resolve to deny the Petition.
The law is clear. Under Section 443(a) and (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 71605 or the Local Government
Code, the head of a department or office in the municipal government, such as the Municipal Budget Officer,
shall be appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang
Bayan members6 subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. Per records, the appointment of petitioner
was never submitted to theSangguniang Bayan for its concurrence or, even if so submitted, no such concurrence
was obtained. Such factual finding of quasi-judicial agencies, especially if adopted and affirmed by the CA, is
deemed final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court. This Court is not a trier of facts
and generally, does not weigh anew evidence already passed upon by the CA. Absent a showing that this case
falls under any of the exceptions to this general rule, this Court will refrain from disturbing the findings of fact
of the tribunals below.
Moreover, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the verbal concurrence allegedly given by the Sanggunian, as
postulated by the petitioner, is not the concurrence required and envisioned under R.A. No. 7160.
TheSanggunian, as a body, acts through a resolution or an ordinance. Absent such resolution of concurrence, the
appointment of petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 443(a) and (d) of R.A.
No. 7160. Without a valid appointment, petitioner acquired no legal title to the Office of Municipal Budget
Officer, even if she had served as such for ten years.
Accordingly, the CSC has the authority to recall the appointment of the petitioner.7
All told, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

52

Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

*RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
EN BANC
G.R. No. 207851

July 8, 2014

ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:

53

A politician thinks of the next election

a statesman of the next generation.
- James Freeman Clarke, American preacher and author
The Case
A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three consecutive terms. But then, the
Court is now called upon to resolve the following questions. First.What are the consequences to the provincial
board members eligibility to run for the same elective position if the legislative district, which brought him
orher to office to serve the first two consecutive terms, be reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 town
constituencies are carved out and renamed as another district? Second. Is the provincial board members
election to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in representation ofthe renamed district, a
violation of the three-term limit rule?
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorariwith an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction1 filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail the following
resolutions of the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC):
(a) Resolution2 (first assailed resolution) issued by the Second Division on March 5, 2013, in SPA No. 13-166
(DC), granting the petition filed by Nelson B. Julia (Julia), seeking to cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy3 (COC) as Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawiganof Camarines Sur (Sanggunian) of Angel G.
Naval (Naval), who is allegedly violating the three-term limit imposed upon elective local officials as provided
for in Article X, Section 84 of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 43(b)5 of the Local Government Code (LGC);
and
(b) En BancResolution6 (second assailed resolution) issued on June 5, 2013, denying Navals Motion for
Reconsideration7 to the Resolution dated March 5, 2013.
Antecedents
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the Sanggunian,
Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716,8 which reapportioned the
legislative districts in Camarines Sur in the following manner:
[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/207851.pdf]]

District

1st

Before the Enactment of

After the Enactment of

R.A. No. 9716

R.A. No. 9716

Libmanan, Minalabac,

Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi,

Pamplona, Pasacao, San

Sipocot, Cabusao

Fernando, Del Gallego,

Ragay, Lupi, Sipocot,
Cabusao

2nd

Naga City, Pili, Ocampo,

Libmanan, Minalabac,

54

Camaligan, Canaman,
Magarao, Bombon,

Pamplona, Pasacao, San

Calabanga,9 Gainza,

Fernando, Gainza, Milaor

Milaor

3rd

4th

Caramoan, Garchitorena,

Naga City, Pili, Ocampo,

Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion,

Camaligan, Canaman,

Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon,

Magarao, Bombon,

Tinambac, Siruma

Calabanga

Iriga City, Baao, Balatan,

Caramoan, Garchitorena,

Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua

Goa, Lagonoy,
Presentacion, Sangay, San
Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac,
Siruma

5th

Iriga City, Baao, Balatan,

Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua

Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District. The
present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns
from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He
served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.
Julia was likewise a SanggunianMember candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. On October
29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed beforethe COMELEC a
Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy11 of Naval. Julia posited that
Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the
Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit rules application is more
with reference to the same local elective post, and not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial
jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunianmember for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible
three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.12
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
In the first assailed resolution issued on March 5, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division cancelled Navals
COC on grounds stated below:

55

[W]hen a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the elective posts he seeks, while,
in reality, he knowingly lacks the necessary requirements for eligibility, he commits a false material
misrepresentation cognizable under Section 78 of the [OEC].
xxxx
The Supreme Court[,] in the case of Lonzanida v. [COMELEC][,] detailed the important components of[Article
X, Section 8 of the Constitution]:
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms.It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has servedthree consecutive terms in an elective local office[;]
he must also have been electedto the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply. x x x
x x x The first requisite does not only describe a candidate who has been elected for public office for three
consecutive terms. The candidate must have been elected in the samelocal government post. This connotes that
the candidate must have been inthe same elective position serving the same constituency who elected him to
office for three consecutive terms.
xxxx
The three-term limit rule was designed by the framers of the Constitution to prevent the monopoly of power
centered only on a chosen few. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of
massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his
tenure in office. The framers also considered the necessityof the enhancement of the freedom of choice of the
electorate by broadening the selection of would-be elective public officers. By rendering ineligible for public
office those who have been elected and served for three consecutive terms in the same public elective post, the
prohibition seeks to infuse new blood in the political arena.
xxxx
x x x [T]he new Third District where [Naval] was elected and has served is composed of the same
municipalities comprising the previous Second District, absent the towns Gainza and [Milaor]. The territorial
jurisdiction [Naval] seeks to serve for the term 2013-2016 is the same as the territorial jurisdiction he previously
served. The electorate who voted for him in 2004, 2007 and 2010 isthe same electorate who shall vote for him
come May 13, 2013 Elections. They are the same group of voters who elected him into office for three
consecutive terms.
The resolution of this Commission in the case of Bandillo, et al[.] v. Hernandez (SPA No. 10-078)13 cannot be
applied inthe case at bar. Hernandez who then hailed from Libmanan belonged to the First District of Camarines
Sur. With RepublicAct 9716, Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San Fernando, all originally
belonging to the First District, were merged with Gainza and Milaor to form the Second District. With the
addition of the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor, it cannot be said that the previous First District became the
Second District only by name. The voters of Gainza and Milaoradded to the electorate of the new Second
District formed a different electorate, different from the one which voted for Hernandez in the 2001, 2004 and
2007 elections. In the case at bar, the municipalities comprising the new Third District are the same
municipalities that consisted of the previous Second [District], absent Milaor and Gainza.
The Supreme Court, in Latasav. [COMELEC], ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not
convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city
mayor[.]
x x x x14 (Citations omitted)

56

The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc

In the second assailed resolution issued on June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en bancdenied Navals Motion for
Reconsideration to the above. The COMELEC pointed out thatabsent the verification required under Section 3,
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Navals motion was instantly dismissible. Nonetheless, the
COMELEC proceeded to discuss the demerits of Navals motion, viz:
The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the instant case as the records
clearly establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time for the same government post. To put things in a proper
perspective, it is imperative to review and discuss the salient points in the case of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The
case involves the question of whether or not a municipal mayor, having been elected and had already served for
three (3) consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light of the conversion of the municipality to a city. In
applying the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the conversion of the municipality into a city did
not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city
mayor. The Court took into account the following circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city
was the same as that of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the
municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters
[over] whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
Anchoring from the said case, it is therefore clear that the position to which [Naval] has filed his candidacy for
the 13 May 2013 x x x Elections is the same position for which he had been elected and had served for the past
nine (9) years.
xxxx
x x x The following circumstances establish that the subject posts are one and the same: First, the territorial
jurisdictions of the two (2) districts are the same except for the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor which were
excluded by R.A. No. 9716; Second, the inhabitants of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur, where [Naval] is
presently running as member of the [Sanggunian], are the same voters who elected him for the past three (3)
consecutive terms; and Lastly, the inhabitants of the [3rd ] District are the same group of voters whom [Naval]
had served as member of the [Sanggunian] representing the 2nd District.
x x x The enactment of R.A. No. 9716 did not convert [Navals] post [into one] different from [w]hat he
[previously had]. As correctly ruled by the Commission (Second Division), [Naval] ha[d] already been elected
and ha[d] already served inthe same government post for three consecutive terms, x x x[.]
x x x x.15 (Citations omitted)
Unperturbed, Naval is now before the Court raising the issues of whether or not the COMELEC gravely erred
and ruled contrary to law and jurisprudence:
I. IN FINDING THAT NAVAL HAD ALREADY SERVED FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS IN THE
SAME GOVERNMENT POST;16
II. IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS ARE ELECTED BY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS;17 and
III. WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PROHIBITION CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 8, ARTICLE X OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 43(B) OF THE LGC APPLIES TO NAVAL.18
The Arguments of the Contending Parties
In support of the instant petition, Naval alleges that the First, Second and Third Legislative Districts of
Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of new sets of municipalities. With the separation of
Gainza and Milaor from the other eight towns which used to comprise the Second District, the voters from the
Third Legislative District are no longer the same ones as those who had elected him to office in the 2004 and
2007 elections.
Naval further invokes Article 9419 of Administrative Order No. 270 prescribing the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the LGC to argue that Sanggunianmembers are elected by districts. Thus, the right to choose

57

representatives in the Sanggunianpertains to each of the districts. Naval was elected as Sanggunian member in
2004 and 2007 by the Second District. In 2010 and 2013, it was the Third District, which brought him to office.
Essentially then, Navals election in 2013 is merely his second term as Sanggunianmember for the Third
District.
Naval likewise cites Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC20 to point out that for the disqualification on the ground of the
three-term limit to apply, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, but it is also required that he or she had been elected to the same position for the same number of
times.21
Naval also assails as erroneous the COMELECs interpretations of the rulings in Latasa v. COMELEC22 and
Bandillo, et al. v. Hernandez.23 In Latasa, the Court applied the three-term prohibition only because
notwithstanding the conversion of the Municipality of Digos into a city, the mayor was to serve the same
territorialjurisdiction and constituents. Naval asserts that the same does not hold true in his case. Naval further
avers that in Bandillo, which finds more application in the instant petition, the COMELEC ruled that the threeterm limit cannot be invoked in a situation where the legislative districts have been altered. An extraction or an
addition both yields a change inthe composition of the voters.
Naval further emphasizes that he garnered the majority of the votes from his constituents, whose will and
mandate should be upheld. Besides, Julias counsel already withdrew his appearance, indicating no less than his
clients lack of interest in still pursuing Navals ouster from office.24
In its Comment,25 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the denial of the instant petition. The OSG
contends that Naval had been elected and had fully served the same local elective post for three consecutive
terms. Naval thus violatedSection 78 of the OEC when he filed his COC despite knowledge of his ineligibility.
Navals reliance on Bandillo is also misplaced since in the said case, two towns were instead added to form a
new district. Apparently then, in Bandillo, there was a new set of voters. The OSG also alleges that Naval is not
entitled to the issuance of injunctive reliefs by this Court. No clear and unmistakable right pertains to Naval and
it is his eligibility to be elected as Sanggunianmember for the Third District which is the issue at hand.
Ruling of the Court
The Court denies the petition.
As the issues are interrelated, they shall be discussed jointly.
The case before this Court is one of first impression. While the contending parties cite Latasa, Lonzanida v.
COMELEC,26 Borja,Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,27 and Bandillo, which all involve the application of the threeterm limit rule, the factual and legal circumstances in those cases are different and the doctrinal values therein
do not directly address the issues now at hand.
In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of a municipality into a city. The then municipal mayor
attempted to evade the application upon him of the three-term limit rule by arguing that the position of a city
mayor was not the same as the one he previously held. The Court was not convinced and, thus, declared that
there was no interruption of the incumbent mayors continuity of service.
In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won in three consecutive elections. While serving his
third term, his opponent filed an election protest. Months before the expiration of the mayors third term, he was
ousted from office. He ran again for the same post in the immediately succeeding election. A petition was
thereafter filed assailing his eligibility to run as mayor on the ground of violation of the three-term limit rule.
The Court ruled that the mayor could not beconsidered as having served a full third term. An interruption for
any length of time, if due to an involuntary cause, is enough to break the elected officials continuity of service.
In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in office by the vice mayor. In the two immediately
succeeding elections, the latter vied for and won the mayoralty post. When he ran for the same position for the
third time, his disqualification was sought for alleged violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that
whenhe assumed the position of mayor by virtue of succession, his service should not be treated as one full
term. For the disqualification to apply, the candidate should have been thrice elected for and had served the
same post consecutively. In Aldovino, preventive suspension was imposed upon an elected municipal councilor.
The Court ruled that the said suspension did not interrupt the elective officials term. Although hewas barred

58

from exercising the functions of the position during the period of suspension, his continued stay and entitlement
tothe office remain unaffected.
In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five of the ten towns, which
used to comprise Camarines Surs old First District, to form the new Second District. The COMELEC declined
to apply the three-term limit rule against the elected Provincial Board member on the ground that the addition of
Gainza and Milaor distinctively created a new district, with an altered territory and constituency.
In the case before this Court, the task is to determine the application of the three-term limit rule upon local
elective officials in renamed and/or reapportioned districts. In the process of doing so, it is inevitable to discuss
the role of elections and the nature of public office in a democratic and republican state like ours.
The Role of Elections in our
Democratic and Republican State,
and the Restraints Imposed Upon
Those Who Hold Public Office
The Court begins with general and undeniable principles.
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.28
Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character of a republican state and a public office, viz: A
republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy
where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the
selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on
their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their
principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsiblegovernment whose officials hold and discharge
their position as a public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, at all times be accountable to the people
they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion
of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.29 (Emphasis ours and italics in the
original)
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,30 Justice Puno likewise characterized the role of the electoral process in the
following wise:
The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican framework because it isthrough the
act of voting that government by consent is secured. Through the ballot, people express their will on the
defining issues of the day and they are able to choose their leaders in accordance with the fundamental principle
of representative democracy that the people should elect whom they please to govern them. Voting has an
important instrumental value in preserving the viability of constitutional democracy. It has traditionally been
taken as a prime indicator of democratic participation.31 (Citations omitted and italics ours)
The importance of elections cannottherefore be over emphasized. Thus,
True, election is the expression ofthe sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. x x
x.32(Italics ours)
Hence, while it is settled that in elections, the first consideration of every democratic polity is to give effect to
the expressed will of the majority, there are limitations tobeing elected to a public office.33 Our Constitution and
statutes are explicit anent the existence of term limits, the nature of public office, and the guarantee from the
State that citizens shall have equal access to public service.34 Section 8, Article X of our Constitution, on term
limits, is significantly reiterated by Section 43(b) of the LGC. Moreover, the Court has time and again declared
that a public office is a public trust and not a vested property right.35

59

The Deliberations of the Members

of the Constitutional Commission
on the Three-Term Limits
Application to Local Elective
Officials
Following are entries in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission regarding the exchanges of the members
on the subject of the three-term limit rule imposed on local elective officials: VOTING ON THE TERMS OF
LOCAL OFFICIALS
With respect to local officials, Mr. Nolledo, informed that the Committee on Local Governments had not
decided on the term of office for local officials and suggested that the Body decide on the matter.
xxxx
On Mr. Bacanis inquiry regarding localofficials, Mr. Davide explained that local officials would includethe
governor, vice-governor and the members of the provincial board; the city mayor, city vice-mayor and members
of the city board; and the municipal mayor, municipal vice mayor and members of the municipal council. He
stated that barangay officials would be governed by speciallaw, to which Mr. Nolledo agreed.
xxxx
MOTION TO VOTE ON THE PROPOSALS RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE NO. 3
In reply to Mr. Guingonas query onwhether the Committee had decided on the interpretation of "two
reelections", Mr. Davide suggested that the matter be submitted to a vote.
Thereupon, Mr. Romulo moved for a vote on whether Alternative No. 3 as proposed by Mr. Garcia, would allow
a local official three terms, after which he would not be allowed to seek any reelection; or whether, as
interpreted by Mr. Davide, it would mean that after two successive reelections or a consecutive periodof nine
years, he could run for reelection after the lapse of three years.
xxxx
RESTATEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS
Mr. Garcia reiterated that the local officials could be reelected twice, after which, they would be barred from
ever runningfor reelection.
On the other proposal, Mr. Davide, on behalf ofthe Committee, stated that local officials after two reelections
would be allowed to run for reelection after the lapse of three years.
xxxx
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulomanifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two
issues on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection
after a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms).
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. GARCIA ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 1
Mr. Garcia stated that he was advocating Alternative No. 1 on four grounds: 1) to prevent monopoly of political
power because the countrys history showed that prolonged stay in public office could lead to the creation of
entrenched preservesof political dynasties; 2) to broaden the choiceso that more people could be enlisted to the
cause of public service; 3) no one is indispensable in running the affairs of the countryand that reliance on

60

personalities would be avoided; and 4) the disqualification from running for reelection after three terms would
create a reserve of statesmen both in the local and national levels.
He added that the turnover in public office after nine years would ensure the introduction of new ideas and
approaches. He stressed that public office would no longer be a preserve of conservatism and tradition, and that
public service would no longer be limited to those directly holding public office, but would also include
consultative bodiesorganized by the people. INQUIRY OF MR. REGALADO
In reply to Mr. Regalados query whether the three terms need not be served consecutively, Mr. Garcia answered
in the affirmative.
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. MONSOD ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 2
Mr. Monsod stated that while the new Constitution would recognize people power because of a new awareness,
a new kind of voter and a new kind of Filipino, at the same time, it pre-screens the candidates among whom the
people would choose by barring those who would have served for nine years from being reelected. He opined
that this would actually require an additional qualification for office to a certain number of people.
He stressed that, while the stand of the Commission is to create a reserve of statesmen, their future participation
is actually limited to some areas and only for a certain periodof time. He added thatit is not for the Commission
to decide on the future of our countrymen who may have more years ahead of them to serve the country.
xxxx
INQUIRY OF MR. OPLE
xxxx
Thereupon, speaking in support of Mr. Monsods manifestation, Mr. Ople expressed apprehension over the
Bodys exercise of some sort of omnipotent power in disqualifying those who will have served their tasks. He
opined that the Commission had already taken steps to prevent the accumulation of powers and prequisites that
would permit officials to stay on indefinitely and to transfer them to members of their families. He opined,
however, that perpetual disqualification would deprive the people of their freedom of choice.He stated that the
Body had already succeeded in striking a balance onpolicies which could ensure a redistribution of
opportunities to the people both in terms of political and economic power. He stated that Philippine politics had
been unshackled from the two-party system, which he said was the most critical support for the perpetuation of
political dynasties. Considering that such achievement is already a victory, Mr. Ople stated that the role of
political parties should not be despised because the strength of democracy depends on how strong political
parties are, that a splintering thereof will mean a great loss to the vitality and resiliency of democracy.
Mr. Ople reiterated that he was against perpetual disqualification from office.
x x x x.
MR. GARCIAS RESPONSE TOMR. OPLES STATEMENTS
Mr. Garcia stated that there are two principles involved in Alternative No. 1: 1) the recognition of the
ambivalent nature of political power, and 2) the recognition of alternative forms of public service. He stated that
it is important to remember the lessons learned from the recent past; that public service is service to the people
and not an opportunity to accumulate political power, and that a prolonged stay in public office brings about
political dynasties or vested interests. Regarding political parties, he stated that it will encourage the constant
renewal of blood in party leadership, approach, style and ideas. He opined that this is very healthy for a pluralist
and multi-party democracy.
On the recognition of alternative forms of public service, Mr. Garcia stressed that public service could be
limited to public office since many good leaders who were in the streets and in jail fought against the
dictatorship. He stressed that public service would also mean belonging to consultative bodies or peoples
councils which brought about new forms of service and leadership.
REMARKS OF MR. ABUBAKAR

61

Mr. Abubakar stated that in any democracy the voice of the people is the voice of God.He stated that if the
people want to elect a representative to serve them continuously, the Commission should not arrogate unto itself
the right to decide what the people want. He stated that in the United States, a Senator had served for 30 years.
xxxx
REMARKS OF MS. AQUINO
Ms. Aquino stated that she differs from the views advanced by Mr. Garcia and Ms. Tan, although she stated that
they spoke of the same premises. She stated that she agrees with them that leaders need not be projected and
developed publicly in an election as leaders are better tempered and tested in the various forms of mass
struggles and organized work. She stated that if the people are to be encouraged to have their own sense of
responsibility in national leadership, what ultimately matters is the political determination of the citizenry to
chart their own national destiny. She opined that the Body should allow the people to exercise their own sense
of proportion and imbibe the salutary effects of their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself.
She stressed that in the final analysis,the Commission cannot legislate into the Constitution the essence of new
politics as it is a chastening experience of learning and unlearning. Adverting to Mr. Garcias statement that
politics is an imperfect art, she stated that the Commission could correct politics with all its imperfections and
flaws by a constitutional provision. She opined that perpetual disqualification cannot provide the cure. She
maintained that perpetual disqualification is, at best, a palliative which could also be counter-productive, in the
sense that it could effectively foil the possibilities of realpublic service.
REMARKS OF MR. BACANI
Mr. Bacani stated that when the Body granted the illiterates the right to vote and that proposals were made to
empower the people to engage in the legislative process,the Body presupposed the political maturity of the
people. He observed that in this instance, political maturity is denied with the constitutional bar for
reelection.He opined that the Body should stick to the premise that the people are politically mature.
REJOINDER OF MR. GARCIA
By way of rejoinder to Mr. Bacanis statements,Mr. Garcia stated that the proposal was basically premisedon the
undue advantage of the incumbent in accumulating power, money, party machine and patronage and not on lack
of trust in the people.
Mr. Garcia stated that politics isnot won by ideals alone but by solid organized work by organizations. He stated
that with three terms, an official would have served the people long enough.
xxxx
VOTING ON THE TWO ALTERNATIVES
Thereafter, the Body proceeded to vote by ballot on the two alternatives.
xxxx
RESULT OF THE VOTING
The result of the voting was as follows:
Alternative No. 1 (no further election after three successive terms) 17 votes
Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms) 26 votes
With 17 votes in favor of Alternative No. 1 and 26 in favor of Alternative No. 2, the Chair declared Alternative
No. 2 approved by the Body.36 (Emphasis and italics ours)
The Constitution mandates the
strict implementation of the

62

three-term limit rule.

The Court notes that in the process of drafting the Constitution, the framers thereof had not discussed with
specifity the subject of the three-term limit rules application on reapportioned districts.
From the above-cited deliberations, however, the divergent stances of the members of the Constitutional
Commission on the general application of the three-term limit rule show. On one side were those who espoused
the stern view that perpetual disqualification to hold public office after three consecutive terms would ensure
that new blood would be infused into our political system. More choices for the voters would give fuller
meaning to our democratic institutions. On the other side of the fence were those who believed that the
imposition of termlimits would be tantamount to squandering the experience of seasoned public servants and a
curtailment of the power of the citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in office.
In the end, 26 members of the Commission cast their votes in favor of the proposal that no immediate reelection after three successive terms shall be allowed. On the other hand, 17 members stood pat on their view
that there should be no further reelection after three successive terms.
Clearly, the drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible attendant evils if there would be no
limit to re-election. Notwithstanding their conflicting preferences on whether the term limit would disqualify
the elected official perpetually or temporarily, they decided that only three consecutive elections tothe same
position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public official can once again vie for the same post provided there be
a gap of at least one term from his or her last election. The rule answers the need to prevent the consolidation of
political power in the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the people the freedom to call back to
public service those who are worthy to be called statesmen.
The compromise agreed upon by the drafters of our Constitution was a result of exhaustive deliberations. The
required gap after three consecutive elections is significant. Thus, the rulecannot be taken with a grain of salt.
Nothing less than its strict application is called for.
Ratio legis est anima.37
"A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration.Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose."38 In
Aldovino, the Court describes the three-term limit rule as inflexible.
In Aldovino, a local elective official pleaded exemption from the application of the three-term limit on the
ground that there was an interruption in his service after the penalty of suspension was imposed upon him.
Although not in all four withNavals case, there are principles enunciated therein which undeniably hold true,
viz:
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials
stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8,
Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has
title to office and can serve. x x x[.]
xxxx
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative"no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms." This formulationno more than three consecutive termsis a
clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. x x x.
xxxx

63

This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding its
formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective
whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than
equal constitutional worth. x x x.
xxxx
x x x [T]he Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach usto
strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.
xxxx
[In] Latasa v. Commission on Electionsx x x[,] [t]he Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples
freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. x x x.
xxxx
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article Xboth by structure and substance
fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible
rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. x x
x.39 (Citations omitted, italics and emphasis in the original and underscoring ours)
Reapportionment and its Basis
Reapportionment is "the realignment orchange in legislative districts brought about by changes in population
and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation."40 The aim of legislative
apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts.41 The basis for districting shall be the
number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered voters therein.42
R.A. No. 9716 and the Reapportioned Districts of Camarines Sur
Sections 1 to 3 of R.A. No. 9716 provide:
Section 1. The composition of the current First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur is hereby reapportioned in order to create an additional legislative districtto commence in the
next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Section 2. In furtherance of the reapportionment mandated by this Act, the municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San Fernando of the current First (1st) Legislative District are hereby
consolidated with the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor of the current Second (2nd) Legislative District, to
comprise the new legislative district authorized under this Act.
Section 3. The result of the reapportionment described in this Act are summarized as follows:
a) First District The remaining municipalities in the current First (1st) Legislative District shall continue to be
designated as the First (1st) Legislative District, composed of the following municipalities: Del Gallego, Ragay,
Lupi, Sipicot and Cabusao;
b) Second District This new legislative districtshall be composed of the municipalities enumerated in Section
2 hereof;
c) Third District The current Second (2nd) Legislative District shall be renamedas the Third (3rd) Legislative
District, composed of the following: Naga City and the municipalities of Pili, Ocampo, Camaligan, Canaman,
Magarao, Bombon and Calabanga;

64

d) Fourth District The current Third (3rd) Legislative District, without any change in its composition, shall be
renamedas the Fourth (4th) Legislative District, composed of the following municipalities: Caramoan,
Garchitorena, Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion, Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac and Siruma; and
e) Fifth District The current Fourth (4th) Legislative District, without any change inits composition, shall be
renamedas the Fifth (5th) Legislative District, composed of the following: Iriga City and the municipalities of
Baao, Balatan, Bato, Buhi, Bula and Nabua. (Italics and emphasis ours)
As a result of the reapportionment made by R.A. No. 9716, the old Second District of Camarines Sur, minus
only the two towns of Gainza and Milaor, is renamed as the Third District and now configured as follows:43
[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/207851.pdf]]

Before the Enactment of

After the Enactment of

RA 9716

RA 9716

3rd District

nd

Population: 439,043

District

Naga

Population: 474,899

Pili

Gainza

Ocampo

Milaor

Canaman

Naga

Camaligan

Pili

Magarao

Ocampo

Bombon

Canaman

Calabanga

Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

R.A. No. 9716 created a new Second

District, but it merely renamed the
other four.
The Court notes that after the reapportionment of the districts in Camarines Sur, the current Third District,
which brought Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a population of 35,856 less than that of the old Second
District, which elected him in 2004 and 2007. However, the wordings of R.A. No. 9716 indicate the intent of
the lawmakers to create a single new Second District from the merger of the towns from the old First District

65

with Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 9716 used the word "rename."
Although the qualifier "without a change in its composition" was not found in Section 3(c), unlike in Sections
3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive isthe clear intent to create a sole new district in that of the Second, while
merely renaming the rest.
The following statutory construction rules surface:
First, the general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that, in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning; the words should
be read and considered intheir natural, ordinary, commonly accepted usage, and without resorting to forced or
subtle construction. Words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common
use and acceptation. Second, a word of general significance ina statute is to be taken in its ordinary and
comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning;
what is generally spoken shall be generally understood and general words shall be understood in a general
sense.44 (Citations omitted)
The Court looks to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning.45
In Navals case, the words of R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to be created, but the
Third Districtis to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be
construed compels acceptanceand negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers mean what they say.46
The verb createmeans to "make or produce something new."47 On the other hand, the verb renamemeans to
"give a new name to someone or something."48 A complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical
conclusion other than that the lawmakers intended the old Second District to be merely renamed as the current
Third District.
It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District from that of the
current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This numericalfact renders the
new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval
is correct in his argument that Sanggunianmembers are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the
district which elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and
2007.
The application upon Naval of the
three-term limit rule does not
undermine the constitutional
requirement to achieve equality of
representation among districts.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality ofrepresentation
among the districts.49 It is with this mindset that the Court should consider Navals argument anent having a new
set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.
Navals ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right
toequal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District,
which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.
The presumed competence of the
COMELEC to resolve matters
falling within its jurisdiction is
upheld.

66

"Time and again, the Court has held that a petition for certiorariagainst actions of the COMELEC is confined
only to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process, because
the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its domain."50
"In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden rests on the petitioner to prove not merelyreversible error, but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing
the impugned order, decision or resolution."51 "Grave abuse of discretion arises when a court or tribunal violates
the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."52
In the case at bar, the Court finds the COMELECs disquisitions to be amply supported by the Constitution,law
and jurisprudence.
Conclusion
In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the Court to declare
otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of our Constitution and of R.A.
No. 9716. Considering that the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a result of a compromise
among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application
is to be allowed. Aldovinoaffirms this interpretation. Further, sustaining Navals arguments would practically
allow him to hold the same office for 15 years. These are the circumstances the Constitution explicitly intends
to avert.
Certainly, the Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real sovereign, soto speak.
However, let all the candidates for public office be reminded that as citizens, we have a commitment to be
bound by our Constitution and laws. Side by side our privileges as citizens are restrictions too.
Einer Elhauge, a faculty member from Harvard Law School, wrote an article entitled "What Term Limits Do
That Ordinary Voting Cannot."53 In the article, Greek mythology was tapped to make a tempting analogy. The
gist of the story follows.
In Odyssey Book XII, the goddess Circe warned Odysseus of the Sirens who seduce all men approaching them
with their voices. Those who fell into the Sirens trap never returnedhome to their wives and children. A clever
strategy was thus hatched to secure safe passage for Odysseus and his men. The men were to plug their ears
with wax to muffle the songs of the Sirens. Odysseus, on the other hand, was to be tied to the mast of the ship so
he could still listen to the songs, which may contain clues on how they can get home. When the wind died
down,Odysseus heard beautiful voices calling out to them. The voices were incomparable to anything he had
ever heard before. Even whenOdysseus knew that the irresistible voices were coming from the Sirens, he
struggled with all his strength to free himself from the ropes, but was unable to do so. The voices became fainter
as the men continued to row. When the voices can no longer be heard, Odysseus realized how he had nearly
been beguiled. They had made it through safely and Odysseus was untied. It was their clever plan which kept
them all alive.54
The same lesson holds true in the case before this Court. The drafters of the Constitution recognized the
propensity of public officers to perpetuate themselves in power, hence, the adoption of term limits and a
guarantee of every citizen's equal access to public service. These are the restrictions statesmen should observe
for they are intended to help ensure the continued vitality of our republican institutions.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated March 5,
2013 and June 5, 2013 of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 13-166 (DC) are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

67

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
EN BANC
G.R. No. 154512

November 12, 2002

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto
Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim
Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy.
EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR. respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. 154683

November 12, 2002

VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
----------------------------G.R. Nos. 155083-84

November 12, 2002

MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO OLLAVE, SR., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

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Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari1 seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity) in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan.
The Antecedents
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa
convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly ("PRA" for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay
San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall2 of Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity) who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The
members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains,
as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 ("Recall Resolution" for brevity) which declared its
loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the
recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify
and deny due course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc3 promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates'
petition. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on
September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the calendar of
activities and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the
campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor
in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo ("Gilo" for brevity) filed a
petition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall
election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr.
("Ollave" for brevity) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn.
On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against
Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving the same issues. The petitions were all anchored
on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected
and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall
election for the same post." Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC's First Division4 dismissed for lack of merit
SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The
COMELEC also reset the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run
in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02010 (RC) which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7,
2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates
cites the following circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the
Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the

69

proof of service of notice was palpably and legally deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves
seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was
exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated
his and the public's constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 dated August 21, 2002
insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign
period. He prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and
that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to campaign.
In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the date of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed
the COMELEC to give the candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to
campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving the candidates
an additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall
election to September 24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions dated September 20, 2002 and
September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election. They likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of
the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorn's qualification to run
for mayor in the recall election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive
term for elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any
winning candidate in the recall election until further orders from the Court. Petitioners were required to post
aP20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking the
same reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Gilo and Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival
candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and
to allow him to assume office to give effect to the will of the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates' motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of
Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.
In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing a
campaign period of only 10 days has become moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 5708 granted an additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.

70

First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.

Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall
Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA
members. The COMELEC, however, found that
"On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of
the Local Government Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA.
Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said notices were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "G"
of Volumes II and III of the Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the
same were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "H". The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast
mass media in the dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of
provincial elective officials, print and broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional
and national officials, and DILG officials].
xxx
The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10 July 2002 certified that upon a
'thorough and careful verification of the signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all
members of the PRA concerned approved said resolution.' She likewise certified 'that not a single
member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and authenticity of their signatures.'
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his Indorsement dated 10 July 2002,
stated, 'upon proper review, all documents submitted are found in order.'
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted the following recommendations:
'This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient in form and substance.
That the PRA was validly constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved Resolution No. 0102 calling for the recall of Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.'
x x x ."
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise
of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC,5 which also dealt with
alleged defective service of notice to PRA members, we ruled that
"Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the
determination of the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious
inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC,
based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so,
in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same."
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC's findings of fact are patently
erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002
because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled
on July 15, 2002. This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted
the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay
members with no legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local
Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA

71

meeting and of even sending his representative and counsel who were present during the entire PRA
proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall Resolution, minutes of
the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and
authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all
these public records in the official custody of the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the
COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in Socrates' claim that respondents violated his
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the
Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.
Second Issue: Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor
in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which
states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected."
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local
official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count
in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked
was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate
reelection" after three terms. This is clear from the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO:6 We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the blackboard, and these
are Alternative No. I where there is no further election after a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2
where there is no immediate reelection after three successive terms."7
The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation on the term of elective local
officials:
"MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO

72

Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two
issues on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection
after a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms)."8
The framers of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection" question in voting for the term limits
of Senators9 and Representatives of the House.10
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third
term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth
term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by
the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent
election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year full term following
the three-term limit, then Senators should also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year
full term following their two-term limit. The constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded
exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:
"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected."11
In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the Constitutional Convention is
instructive:
"GASCON:12 I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow
the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
DAVIDE:13 That is correct.
GASCON: And the question that we left behind before - if the Gentleman will remember - was: How
long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six
years?
DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the
election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third or on the
sixth year thereafter, this particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of
hibernation for six years. That was the Committee's stand.
GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at the least."14 (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years15 following his
completion of two terms. The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the
immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent election, during the six-year period following the two term
limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend "the period of rest" of an elective official who has reached
his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate
reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek
reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his
three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code,

73

Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government
Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth
consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.16 Socrates ran and won
as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he
became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his
closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates.
During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the
continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from
September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as
mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall
term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30,
2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as
mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,17 the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this
manner:
"x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which he was elected." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation
of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years,
constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the
interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length of
time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local official's continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga,18 a unanimous Court reiterated the rule that an
interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office breaks the continuity of service of an elective local
official. In Adormeo, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. had served two consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena City. In
his third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, in the recall election of
May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001.
When Talaga ran again for mayor in the 2001 elections, Raymundo Adormeo, the other candidate for mayor,
petitioned for Talaga's disqualification on the ground that Talaga had already served three consecutive terms as
mayor.
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talaga's recall term was a continuation of his previous two terms so
that he was deemed to have already served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was
qualified to run in the 2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga
was out of office interrupted the continuity of his service as mayor. Talaga's recall term as mayor was not
consecutive to his previous two terms because of this interruption, there having been a break of almost two
years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his
service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two
consecutive terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office
interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless
continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant case
is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the
instant case, the interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents
were seeking election for a fourth term.

74

In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after winning the recall
election. Talaga's recall term did not retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talaga's recall
term was made to so retroact, then he would have been disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he
would already have served three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a
recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior
to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service.
Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with
the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates.
Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to
retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider
Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his
recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or
successive terms of office which historically and factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the
freedom of the people to choose their leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in
derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be
construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people. As this Court aptly stated
in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
"Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of
the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as
they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by
Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no
further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of
Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the
succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against
'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose' as a result of the proposed absolute
disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions 'recognizing people's
power.'"19 (Emphasis supplied)
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the
interruption. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This
unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. This is clear from the
following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:
"SUAREZ:20 For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have
to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is
already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would
disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification,
Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired
portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the
Lower House."21
Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and Representatives of the House, the same
principle applies to a recall election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall
term can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full
terms. A local official who serves a recall term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although
less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of
Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor
which ended on June 30, 2001;

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2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to
September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June
30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive
term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate
to choose their leaders.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning
candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., in the result.
Mendoza, J., in the result, without to the filing of separate opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
Corona, J., no part - prior consultation.
Azcuna, J., joins the separate opinion of C.J. Davide.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
I concur with the opinion and conclusion of Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio in G.R. No. 154512 and G.R. No.
154683. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) committed no grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the Recall Resolution. Dismissal then of G.R. No. 154512 is inevitable. This notwithstanding, I still
hold on to my dissenting view in G.R. No. 111511 (Garcia, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., 227 SCRA 100, 121
[1993]) that the provision on the preparatory recall assembly in Section 70 of the Local Government Code of
1991 is unconstitutional.
Our issuance of the Resolution of 3 September 2002 in G.R. No. 154683 enjoining the COMELEC from
implementing its Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the recall election on 7 September 2002, and the
subsequent Resolution of the COMELEC giving the candidates an additional campaign period of fifteen days
from 7 September 2002 rendered moot and academic the principal issue in G.R. No. 154683. The dismissal of
the petition therein is also in order.
However, I regret I cannot concur with the argument and conclusion relative to G.R. Nos. 155083-84. I
respectfully submit that private respondent Edward S. Hagedorn is disqualified from running for the position of
Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election in question.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution expressly provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
Interruption In the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Paragraph (b), Section 43 of R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) restates this constitutional
restriction, thus: SEC. 43. Term of office.

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(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution was not found in the Report of the Committee on Local
Governments of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. It was introduced at the plenary session by
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. Commenting thereon in his book entitled "The Intent of 1986
Constitution Writers" (1995 ed., p. 699), Commissioner Joaquin Bernas states:
This provision was not found among the Committee's proposals but came as an amendment proposed by
Commissioner Davide. It was readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved.
Section 8 sets the duration of a term at three years, and prohibits elective local officials from serving for
more than three consecutive terms.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article XVIII (The Transitory Provision) of the
Constitution, and Executive Order No. 270, as amended by R.A. No. 6636, the first local election, that
is, the election for the first term under the Constitution for elective local officials, was on 18 January
1988. By express provision of Section 5 of R.A. No. 6636, in relation to Section 2 of Article XVIII of
the Constitution, that term expired at noon of 30 June 1992. The second election, i.e., the election for the
second term of elective local officials which expired at noon of 30 June 1995, for elective local officials,
was on the second Monday of May 1992 pursuant to R.A. No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized
National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms). The third election, i.e., for the third term which
expired at noon of 30 June 1998, was on the second Monday of May 1995, pursuant to Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7166. The fourth election, or for the fourth term which expired at noon of 30 June 2001, was on the
second Monday of May 1998. The fifth election, i.e., for the fifth term which would expire at noon of 30
June 2004, was on the second Monday of May 2001.Conformably with Section 8 of Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160, a local official elected in the first local election of 18
January 1988 may be reelected in the synchronized elections in May 1992 and in May 1995. He could
not seek another reelection in the May 1998 election because that would have been his fourth term.
Similarly, a local official who was elected in the May 1992 election could be reelected in the May 1995
and May 1998 elections.
Private respondent Hagedorn was first elected as City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the May 1992 election.
He was reelected in the May 1995 and May 1998 elections. His third term, by virtue of his election in the May
1998 election, expired on 30 June 2001. Therefore, he was constitutionally and statutorily barred from seeking
reelection In the May 2001 election, which would have been his fourth term.
The term of office covered by the May 2001 election is up to 30 June 2004. Section 8 of Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 are clear in what is prohibited, which is the fourth term.
Nothing can be clearer from the wordings thereof: "the term of office of elective local officials ... shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more that three consecutive terms." In short, an elective local official
who has served three consecutive terms, like Hagedorn, is disqualified from seeking re-election for the
succeeding fourth term. The provision bars the holding of four consecutive terms.
The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection for a fourth
term. But I disagree when it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection for
a fourth term because he was not a candidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. It forgets that what would
have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001 election was for the period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June
2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent confusion between term and election, the root cause of
which is the attempt to distinguish "voluntary renunciation" of office from "involuntary severance" from office
and the term of office to which it relates.
Let me first discuss the matter of whether the Constitutional Commission did approve the rule of "no Immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms." In support of its affirmative conclusion the ponencia quotes the
Manifestation of Commissioner Romulo as entered in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO

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Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two
issues on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely: a) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after
a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms).
This is inaccurate. What actually happened was that the issue was originally for elective national and local
officials. However, the Commission decided to consider first the term of the members of Congress; and to defer
the discussion on the term of elective local officials until the Commission would consider the report of the
Committee on Local Governments. On this point I quote the pertinent portions of Volume Two, pages 238-245
of the Record of the Constitutional Commission of its proceedings on 25 July 1986:
THE PRESIDENT. Maybe it will be of help we Just remind ourselves that what we have before us now
is the report of the Committee on the Legislative. Therefore, maybe we should confine ourselves first to
what is covered by the report which is the term of office of the Senators and the Representatives.And
with respect to the local officials, let us await the report of the Committee on Local Governments as to
its recommendation on this matter.
MR. RODRIGO. As a matter of fact, I will go further than that, it is my belief, as regards local officials,
that we should leave this matter to the legislative.
THE PRESIDENT. So what is the pleasure now of the Acting Floor Leader or of the Chairman of the
Committee on the Legislative?
MR. RODRIGO. I wonder if the two proponents, Madam President, will agree that we first talk about
the term of office of the Representatives because we are now discussing the legislative department.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I will agree really that this matter should relate only to the term of office of the
Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT. But are we agreed on these two proposals - the one of Commissioner Garcia where
there is no further election after a total of three terms and the other where there is no Immediate
reelection after three successive terms?
MR. OPLE. Madam President, originally if I remember right, the Commission decided to consider the
synchronization of elections. And from that original commitment, we proceeded to fix the terms and
decided related questions within the context of synchronization. Are we now abandoning the original
task of synchronization which could only be fully settled in terms of delimitations on the proposed terms
of the President and the Vice-President, the Members of Congress and the local officials, or do we want
to postpone the synchronization task to a later time after we hear from the Committee on Local
Governments and the other concerned committees?
THE PRESIDENT. What does the Acting Floor Leader say to this particular question of Commissioner
Ople?
MR. ROMULO. In a way, Madam President, we have settled the synchronization task, because we have
decided on the officials' absolute terms. All we are really talking about now is whether or not they are
eligible for reelection, and I think those are separable issues.
MR. OPLE. If they are separable, and we have already settled the synchronization task, then I think that
is something to be thankful about. But considering the immediate business at hand, is it the wish of the
Acting Floor Leader that the election of the local officials should be eliminated from the consideration
of those two choices?
MR. ROMULO. Yes. I think the sense of the body now is to limit this choice to the Members of the
House of Representatives.

78

MR. OPLE. And do the manifestations of both Commissioners Garcia and Monsod still stand after the
elimination of the election of the local officials?
MR. ROMULO. Yes, I think so.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, as worded, It is a personal disqualification.
MR. ROMULO. We are now ready to vote, Madam President.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT. We are now ready to vote by ballot. Let us distribute the ballots. Anyway the voting
would take only about 10 minutes.
The session is suspended.
It was 3:40 p.m.
At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed, and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:50 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
MR. GASCON. Madam President, may I have a clarification before we count the ballots. The voting
now is just for Representatives. We are not speaking of the term of office of the Senators yet. Is that
correct?
THE PRESIDENT. The term of office of the Senators was disposed of this morning.
This voting now is only for Representatives.
MR. GASCON. I think the Issue of whether the Senators could run again for election after their two
consecutive terms or 12 years after a lapse of a period of time has not yet been finalized.
THE PRESIDENT. I beg the Commissioner's pardon.
MR. GASCON. Is this voting just for Congressmen?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
The Secretary-General will now please proceed to count the votes.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the
counting.
Alternative No. 1 - no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//
Alternative No. 2 - no immediate reelection after three successive terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 17 votes for Alternative No. 1 and 26 votes for Alternative No. 2;
Alternative No. 2 is approved.

79

What does the Acting Floor Leader say?

MR. ROMULO. Alternative No. 2 has won, Madam President. It seems there are some doubts as to the
term of office of the Senators, so I propose that we similarly vote on that to end any doubt. It was my
understanding this morning that when we voted for the term of office of the Senators, they would not be
perpetually disqualified.
THE PRESIDENT. From the transcripts, it appears here that with respect to Senators, 22 votes went to
Scheme No. II; that is, with one reelection. This is already a majority. So, does the Acting Floor Leader
propose that we vote again?
MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not that will be perpetual, Madam President, or after resting
for six years they can run again. That is the question that is not answered. I am talking of the Senators.
THE PRESIDENT. This morning, Scheme No. I, without reelection, has 3 votes; Scheme No. II, with
one reelection - 22 votes; Scheme No. III, no limit on reelection - 17 votes.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. May we first clarify this from the Secretary-General?
MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not in voting for the term of six years with one reelection,
the Senator is perpetually disqualified, so that is a similar question to what we had posed with regard to
the House of Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT. In other words, after serving with one reelection, whether or not he is perpetually
disqualified after serving 12 years?
MR. ROMULO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. Or, if after one reelection, he is perpetually disqualified or he can hibernate - the very
word used - for six years and then run again for reelection but not consecutive, not immediate. In other
words, he is entitled to one immediate reelection.
REV. RIGOS. Another point, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. And then, after that, if there is a gap, when he is not a Senator, then he can run for the
same office.
REV. RIGOS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rigos is recognized.
REV. RIGOS. In relation to that, if he will be allowed to run again as Senator after a period of
hibernation, we have to clarify how long that should be. It could be three years, because in the proposed
scheme, every three years we can elect the Senators.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, Madam President, it can be three years.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT. I will suspend the session again so as to allow the parties to compare with the Acting
Floor Leader so that we will know what we are going to vote on.

80

The session is suspended

It was 3:58 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 4:05 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the question of the Senators, and the
schemes are as follows: The first scheme is, no further election after two terms; the - second scheme is,
no immediate reelection after two successive terms.
Madam President, inasmuch as the principles applicable here are the same as those for the House of
Representatives, I move that we go directly to the voting and forego any further discussions.
THE PRESIDENT. Please distribute the ballots for this particular item for Senators.
Are we ready now?
The Secretary-General will please count the ballots.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. We have 43 ballots here, Madam President. We shall now begin to
count.
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I - /////-/////-//
Scheme No. II - /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 12 votes for Scheme No. I and 32 votes for Scheme No. II; Scheme
No. II approved.
All the results will be considered by the Committee on the Legislative in preparation of their report.
So can we leave this matter now?
The corresponding proposal on the three-term limit for elective local officials without immediate
reelection was taken up by the Constitutional Commission much later or specifically on 16 August 1986.
On this point, the pertinent portions of Vol. Three, pages 406-408, Record of the Constitutional
Commission, read as follows:
MR. RAMA. Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Madam President.
After Section 4, I propose to Insert a new section to be denominated later as Section 5. It
provides as follows: THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT
BARANGAY OFFICIALS, WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE
THREE YEARS AND NO SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE

81

CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY

LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE
CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
This is in accordance with the mandate of the Commission when we voted on the terms of
officials up to local officials, excluding the term of barangay officials which was a very specific
exception.
MR. NOLLEDO. One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office of
barangay officials as provided for?
MR. DAVIDE. As may be determined by law.
MR. NOLLEDO. As provided for in the Local Government Code.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. We accept the amendment. The Committee accepts the amendment.

THE PRESIDENT. May we have the reaction of the Committee?

MR. NOLLEDO. The Committee accepts the amendment, as amended, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any other comment?
MR. OPLE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Ople is recognized.'
MR. OPLE. May we ask the Committee to read the proposed amendment now.
MR. NOLLEDO. May we ask Commissioner Davide to read the new section.
MR. DAVIDE. THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT BARANGAY
OFFICIALS, WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND N
SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS.
VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE
CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL
TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.

THE PRESIDENT. Then let us vote first on the Davide amendment.

Is there any objection to this new section proposed by Commissioner Davide which has been read to the
body? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the proposed section is approved.
I wish to add that the Constitutional Commission debates on the issue of "no immediate reelection" after
three consecutive terms for members of Congress clearly indicated that the "no immediate reelection"
after the 3-term limit would equally apply to the elective local officials. This accounted for the
immediate acceptance by the Committee on Local Governments of the aforementioned Amendment of
Commissioner Davide, which is now Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. These debates clearly
showed the Intent of the Commission that the ban against an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms applies to thefourth term, i.e., the term immediately following the three consecutive
terms, to be filled up by the regular election for such fourth term. For one to be able to run again after
three consecutive terms, he has to restfor the entire immediately succeeding fourth term. On the next
fifth term he can run again to start a new series of three consecutive terms. We quote these pertinent
portions of the debates, recorded in Volume Two, pages 232-233 of the Record of the Constitutional
Commission:

82

MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the following are the various alternatives:Scheme No. I is without
reelection; Scheme No. II is with one reelection; and Scheme No. III is reelection without limit. This is
for 'the Senators.
At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair asks the Chairman, Commissioner Davide, to please consolidate the
results of the voting for President and Vice-President.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we are ready. THE PRESIDENT. The SecretaryGeneral will please proceed.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I - ///
Scheme No. II - /////-/////-/////-/////-//
Scheme No. Ill - /////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 3 votes for Scheme No. I; 22 votes for Scheme No. II; and 17 votes
for Scheme No. III; Scheme No. II is approved.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the next position is for the House of Representatives, the
Congressmen. I would assume we can use the same choices. Does any one want any variation?
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. For the record, I would like to ask Commissioner Romulo some questions.
MR. ROMULO. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. Scheme No. II says "the Vice-President - with one reelection."
THE PRESIDENT. No, that is for Senators.'
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Guenon is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. May I suggest one more scheme - with two reelections for the Members of the
House of Representatives?
THE PRESIDENT. So, we shall distribute ballots again.
MR. ROMULO. While the ballots are being distributed, may I read the following four propositions for
Congressmen: '
Scheme No. I, without reelection.
Scheme No. II, with one reelection.
Scheme No. III, with two reelections.
Scheme No. IV, no limit on reelection. I

83

MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de los Reyes is recognized.
MR. DE LOS REYES. The term of the Members of the House of Representatives will be three years,
according to the first voting; the term of the Senators, if they are entitled to one reelection, will be 12
years. So, in order for a Member of the House of Representatives to have also 12 years, he must be
entitled to three reelections. I propose another scheme with three reelections to make it equal.
MR. RODRIGO. Will the Gentleman maintain the number there and add that as No. V. I filled up my
ballot already and if I erase, this might be disqualified as a marked ballot.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo may change his ballot.
MR. DE CASTRO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de Castro Is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. The situation stated by Commissioner de los Reyes is apparently covered by Scheme
No. II which we agreed upon earlier. The situation will not happen, because both the Senators and the
Congressmen will have five (5) years on the first election. So, the possibility that the Senators will have
a longer term than the Congressmen is remote.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, it occurred to us that the three alternatives are not really mutually
exclusive. Can we have only these three: without reelection, with reelection and with unlimited
reelection? We are asking here for plurality only, Madam President. Can we eliminate?
THE PRESIDENT. In other words, we shall have the same schemes as those for Senators; without
reelection, with one reelection and unlimited reelection.
REV. RIGOS. Madam President, besides we have already submitted our ballots.
MR. MONSOD. I withdraw my proposal, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I would suggest that the two schemes with the highest votes be voted
upon to get the key majority. For example, if the schemes with two reelections and no limit to election
get the highest number of votes, then we vote again to get the key majority.
THE PRESIDENT. We will do that. Are all the votes in?
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have 43 ballots.
THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary-General will please proceed. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
reading:
Scheme No. I - 0
Scheme No. II - //
Scheme No. III - /////-/////-/////-/////-/
Scheme No. IV - /////-/////-////
Scheme No. V - /////-/

84

THE PRESIDENT. The results show no vote for Scheme No. I; 2 votes for Scheme No. II; 21 votes for
Scheme No. III; 14 votes for Scheme No. IV; and 6 votes for Scheme No. V; Scheme No. III is
approved.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO.. I would like to ask a question for clarification.
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. If the Members of the Lower House can have two reelections, does this mean two
immediate reelections, or a term of nine consecutive years? Let us say that a Member of the Lower
House has been reelected twice; that means he will serve for nine years. Can he let three years elapse
and then run again?
THE PRESIDENT. We will ask the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative to answer the
question.
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct, Madam President, because two reelections mean two successive
reelections. So he cannot serve beyond nine consecutive years.
MR. RODRIGO. Consecutively?
MR. DAVIDE. Consecutively.
MR. RODRIGO. But after nine years he can let one
MR. DAVIDE. He can rest. He can hibernate for three years.
MR. RODRIGO. And run again.
MR. DAVIDE. He can run again.
MR. RODRIGO. And again have nine years as a maximum.
MR. DAVIDE. I do not know if that is also the thinking of Commissioner Garcia who is the main
proponent of this proposal on two reelections. I would seek the opinion of Commissioner Garcia for the
record. (underscoring supplied for emphasis.)
The dichotomy made in the ponencia between "voluntary renunciation of the office" as used in Section 8 of
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and "involuntary severance from office" is
unnecessary, if not misplaced. From the discussion in the ponencia, the latter is made to apply to the banned
term, i.e., the fourth term immediately following three consecutive terms. Speaking now of Hagedorn, he cannot
have suffered "involuntary severance from office" because there was nothing to be severed; he was not a holder
of an office either in a de jure or de facto capacity. He knew he was disqualified from seeking a third reelection
to office. Disqualification is, definitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance. Even if we concede that
involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the continuity of a term for purposes of applying the three-term
principle the rule laid down in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609), cited in the ponencia, page 17, is
not applicable in the case of Hagedorn. The involuntary severance referred to in that case was one that took
place during any of the three terms; hence, the term during which it occurred should be excluded in the
computation. In the case of Hagedorn, no such involuntary severance took place during any of his three terms
brought about by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and 1998.
More importantly, the voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 is one that takes place at any time during either the first, second, or third term of the
three consecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which
reads: "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected." The purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local official from voluntarily resigning

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from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during which he resigned would
be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the provision excluded is intended to impose a
penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applying it in
the case of Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned on his third term, he would still be barred from seeking
reelection in the May 2001 election.
Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002)
because in that case Talaga did not win in his second reelection bid, or for a third term, in the May 1998
elections. He won in the recall election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier stated, fully served three
successive terms.
Neither can we allow Hagedorn to take refuge under the exchange between Commissioner Suarez and
Commissioner Davide found on page 592, Vol. II of the Record of the Constitutional Commission and quoted
on pages 19-20 of the ponencia:
SUAREZ: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would
have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of
the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus
one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on
disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of "term" And if there is a special election, he will serve only for the
unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the
Members of the Lower House.
On the contrary, it is clear from the views of Commissioners Suarez and Davide that the term of office of one
who is elected in a special election is considered one term for purposes of determining the three consecutive
terms.
A declaration that Hagedorn is qualified to seek reelection in a recall election to remove the Mayor who was
elected for a term for which Hagedorn was constitutionally and statutorily disqualified to be reelected to or, to
hold Is to subvert the rationale of the three-consecutive-term rule and make a mockery of it. Worse, it abets
destructive endless partisan politics and unsound governance. An elective local official who is disqualified to
seek a fourth term because of the three-term limit but obsessed to hold on to power would spend the first year of
the fourth term campaigning for the recall of the incumbent in the second year of said term. This would' not be a
problem If the disqualified official has a solid following and a strong political machinery. Interestingly, in this
case, as stated on page 3 of the ponencia, the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Puerto
Princesa City is oneMark David M. Hagedorn and he was designated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly as
interim Chairman.
I therefore vote to grant the petition in G.R. Nos. 155083-84, to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC
holding private respondent Edward Hagedorn a qualified candidate for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa
City in the recall election, and to declare him DISQUALIFIED from seeking reelection for a fourth term or
from being a candidate for Mayor in the recall election in question.

CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The correctness of the decision so ably written by Mr. Justice Carpio speaks for itself. Nonetheless, the complex
constitutional dimensions of the issue for resolution compels this humble concurring opinion. The issue is
whether private respondent Hagedorn is disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002 recall election for
mayor of Puerto Princesa City and from serving the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004 mayoralty term
considering that he has thrice been consecutively elected and has served three full terms as Puerto Princesa City
mayor from 1992-1998. In illuminating the gray interstices of this election case, prudence dictates that ". . .
where the sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct."1

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Private respondent Hagedorn was elected mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in 1992, 1995 and 1998 and
served three full terms. In the May 14, 2001 national and local elections, he ran for governor for the Province of
Palawan and lost. Petitioner-intervenor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor of Puerto Princesa
City.
On July 2, 2002, three hundred twelve (312) out of five hundred twenty-eight (528) members of the Barangay
Officials of Puerto Princesa City convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall
of Mayor Socrates. On August 21, 2002, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing a calendar
of activities for the recall election. Two days after, Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in said
election.
On August 27, 2002, petitioners Adovo and Gilo sought for Hagedorn's immediate disqualification on the
ground that he had served three consecutive full terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa City immediately prior to
the recall election and was thus proscribed by the Constitution from running in said election. On August 30,
2002, petitioner Ollave, Sr. intervened to disqualify Hagedorn on the same ground.
The recall election was set on September 24, 2002. On September 20, 2002, public respondent COMELEC's
First Division denied the petitions for Hagedorn's disqualification. The following day, petitioners Adovo, Gilo
and Ollave, Sr. filed a motion for reconsideration imploring the COMELEC en banc to reverse the September
20 resolution. On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution of the First Division
holding Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
On September 24, 2002, petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave, Sr. sought recourse in this Court with a Very
Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order. On the same date, Mayor Socrates filed a petition-in-intervention to nullify the September 23 resolution
of the COMELEC.
The petitions before us raise the following issues:
"I.
THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT
HAGEDORN IS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING FOR THE POSITION OF MAYOR OF PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY IN THE SCHEDULED RECALL ELECTION, THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM
FOR LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS NOTWITHSTANDING.
II.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
PROCEEDED TO DIVIDE A SINGLE TERM OF OFFICE INTO TWO.
III.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE
INTENT AND PURPOSE FOR HOLDING THE SCHEDULED RECALL ELECTIONS FOR THE POSITION
OF MAYOR OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BAR
AGAINST A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT
RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING IN THE UPCOMING RECALL
ELECTIONS AS HIS INELIGIBILITY IS NOT APPARENT UNDER SECTIONS 65 AND 68 OF THE
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, SECTIONS 39 AND 40 OF RA 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE),
AND RULES 23 AND 25 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE.
V.

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THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED

THAT RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS QUALIFIED TO RUN IN THE RECALL ELECTION EVEN IF HE
STANDS DISQUALIFIED FROM SERVING UNDER A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM AS SUCH IS
ALLEGEDLY NOT THE PROVINCE OF THE INSTANT DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS.
VI.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED A
DEFECTIVE AND CLEARLY VOID RESOLUTION."2
The foregoing issues may be reduced to the singular issue of whether or not private respondent Hagedorn is
disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002 recall election and serving as mayor of Puerto Princesa
City considering that he has been thrice consecutively elected and has served three full terms in that position
from 1992 to 2001.
I find the petitions devoid of merit.
Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides:
"Sec. 8: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected."
This constitutional provision is restated in the Local Government Code of 1991, to wit:
"Sec. 43. Term of Office. -. . . (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected."
We have not interpreted Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution in the recall election context of the cases at bar. It is
imperative to distill the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the people who ratified it.3 Mere reliance on
the surface meaning of the words of the above provision, however, will not suffice to capture this elusive intent.
Thus, we turn to the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) as an extrinsic aid to
interpretation.4 The Record of the Constitutional Commission shows that Art. X. Sec. 8 was readily accepted by
the Commissioners without much discussion;5 nonetheless, their debates on setting the term limit for
Representatives show that the rationale for the limit applies to both Representatives and elective local officials.
We quote at length the relevant portions of the debates, to wit:
"MR. GARCIA. I would like to advocate the proposition that no further election for local and legislative
officials be allowed after a total of three terms or nine years. I have four reasons why I would like to
advocate this proposal, which are as follows: (1) to prevent monopoly of political power; (2) to broaden
the choice of the people; (3) so that no one is indispensable in running the affairs of the country; (4) to
create a reserve of statesmen both in the national and local levels. May I explain briefly these four
reasons.
First: To prevent monopoly of political power - Our history has shown that prolonged stay in
public office can lead to the creation of entrenched preserves of political dynasties. In this regard,
I would also like to advocate that immediate members of the families of public officials be
barred from occupying the same position being vacated.
Second: To broaden the choice of the people - Although individuals have the right to present
themselves for public office, our times demand that we create structures that will enable more
aspirants to offer to serve and to provide the people a broader choice so that more and more
people can be enlisted to the cause of public service, not just limited only to those who may have
the reason or the advantage due to their position.
Third: No one is indispensable in running the affairs of the country After the official's more
than a decade or nearly a decade of occupying the same public office, I think we should try to
encourage a more team-oriented consensual approach to governance favored by a proposal that

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will limit public servants to occupy the same office for three terms. And this would also favor not
relying on personalities no matter how heroic, some of whom, in fact, are now in our midst.
Lastly, the fact that we will not reelect people after three terms would also favor the creation of a
reserve of statesmen both in the national and local levels.
Turnovers in public office after nine years will ensure that new ideas and new approaches will be
welcome. Public office will no longer be a preserve of conservatism and tradition. At the same time, we
will create a reserve of statesmen, both in the national and local levels, since we will not deprive the
community of the wealth of experience and advice that could come from those who have served for nine
years in public office.
Finally, the concept of public service, if political dynasty symbolized by prolonged stay in particular
public offices is barred will have fuller meaning. It will not be limited only to those who directly hold
public office, but also to consultative bodies organized by the people, among whom could be counted
those who have served in public office with accomplishment and distinction, for public service must no
longer be limited only to public office.
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I asked to speak because in
this draft Constitution, we are recognizing people power. We have said that now there is a new
awareness, a new kind of voter, a new kind of Filipino. And yet at the same time, we are prescreening
candidates among whom they will choose. We are saying that this 48-member Constitutional
Commission has decreed that those who have served for a period of nine years are barred from running
for the same position.
The argument is that there may be other positions. But there are some people who are very
skilled and good at legislation, and yet are not of a national stature to be Senators. They may be
perfectly honest, perfectly competent and with integrity. They get voted into office at the age of
25, which is the age we provide for Congressmen. And at 34 years old we put them to pasture.
Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people. We are talking here only of
congressional or senatorial seats. We want to broaden the people's choice but we are making a
prejudgment today because we exclude a certain number of people. We are, in effect, putting an
additional qualification for office - that the officials must not have served a total of more than a
number of years in their lifetime.
Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a reserve of statesmen, but
the future participation of these statesmen is limited. Their skills may only be in some areas, but
we are saying that they are going to be barred from running for the same position.
Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on the day-to-day honing of his
skills and competence, in intellectual combat, in concern and contact with the people, and here we are
saying that he is going to be barred from the same kind of public service.
I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and momentous decision with
respect to many of our countrymen in the future who may have a lot more years ahead of them in the
service of their country.
If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up structures that will perpetuate them,
then let us give them this rest period of three years or whatever it is. Maybe during that time, we would
even agree that their fathers or mothers or relatives of the second degree should not run. But let us not
bar them for life after serving the public for a number of years.
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. OPLE. . . . The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a
perpetual disqualification on those who have served their terms in accordance with the limits on
consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary about the

89

Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who will already have
served their terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I think the Commission achieves its purpose
in establishing safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms.
We do put a gap on consecutive service - in the case of the President, six years; in the case of the VicePresident, unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In the case of the Members of
Congress, both from the legislative districts and from the party list and sectoral representation, this is
now under discussion and later on the policy concerning local officials will be taken up by the
Committee on Local Governments. The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent future
situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President
down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate
those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to
members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on
the continuity or unbroken service of all of these officials. But were we now (to) decide to put these
prospective servants of the people or politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual
disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the people, whereas we should
be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of choice.
I think the veterans of the Senate and of the House of Representatives here will say that simply getting
nominated on a party ticket is a very poor assurance that the people will return them to the Senate or to
the House of Representatives. There are many casualties along the way of those who want to return to
their office, and it is the people's decision that matters. They judge whether or not a Soc Rodrigo, a
Sumulong, a Padilla, an Alonto and a Rosales, after a first and second term, should go back to the
Senate. That is a prerogative of the people that we should not take away from them -the right to judge
those who have served. In any case, we already take away from the people the freedom to vote for the
third termers because we say that a Senator, say, Mr. Rodrigo, is only good for twelve years. But if he
wants to be like Cincinnatus, if he is called back by his people to serve again, let us say for a period of
six years which Commissioner Davide called a period of hibernation which is spent at his fishpond in
Bulacan, Bulacan - because there is a new situation in the country that fairly impels the people to
summon him back, like Cincinnatus in the past, then there will no longer be any Cincinnatus.
That is not perhaps a very important point, but I think we already have succeeded in striking a balance of
policies, so that the structures, about which Commissioner Garcia expressed a very legitimate concern,
could henceforth develop to redistribute opportunities, both in terms of political and economic power, to
the great majority of the people, because very soon, we will also discuss the multiparty system. We have
unshackled the Philippine politics from the two-party system, which really was the most critical support
for the perpetuation of political dynasties in the Philippines. That is quite a victory, but at the same time,
let us not despise the role of political parties. The strength of democracy will depend a lot on how strong
our democratic parties are, and a splintering of all these parties so that we fall back on, let us say,
nontraditional parties entirely will mean a great loss to the vitality and resiliency of our democracy...
xxx

xxx

xxx

BISHOP BACANI. . . . I think when we voted on the provision that the illiterate be allowed to vote and
when we proposed in this Constitutional Commission for initiative as a way also of empowering our
people to engage in the legislative exercise, we are really presupposing the political maturity of our
people. Why is it that that political maturity seems now to be denied by asking that we should put a
constitutional bar to a further election of any Representative after a term of three years? Why should we
not leave that to the premise accepted by practically everybody here that our people are politically
mature? Should we use this assumption only when it is convenient for us, and not when it may also lead
to a freedom of choice for the people and for politicians who may aspire to serve longer?
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. GARCIA. I would like to answer Commissioner Bacani. We put a constitutional bar to reelection of
any Representative basically because of the undue advantage of the incumbent. It is not because of lack
of trust in the people. We realize from history that Mexico fought a revolution simply because of the
issue of reelection. No reeleccion, sufragio universal. Basically, it is because of the undue advantage of
the incumbent that he accumulates power, money, party machine or patronage. As regards what
Commissioner Aquino has said, politics is not won by ideals alone; it is won by solid organizing work
by organizations that have the capacity to do so; and normally the incumbent has all the advantages. . .

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xxx

xxx

xxx

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the
counting.
Alternative No. 1 - no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//
Alternative No. 2 - no immediate reelection after three successive
terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/"6 (emphasis supplied)
In several cases, this Court was guided by the proceedings of the ConCom in construing Art. X, Sec. 8
of the Constitution in relation to Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Different from
the issue presented by the cases at bar, however, the question in those cases was what constitutes a
"term" for purposes of counting the three consecutive terms allowed under Art. X, Sec. 8. It is apropos to
revisit these cases to aid us in extracting the intent behind said Constitutional provision and properly
apply it to the unique case of private respondent Hagedorn.
The maiden case was Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco7 which involved the 1998
mayoralty election in Pateros. In 1989, private respondent Capco became mayor by operation of law
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. In 1992, he was elected mayor for a term ending in 1995.
In 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending in June 1998. In March 1998, he
filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1998 mayoralty election of Pateros. Petitioner Borja, Jr.,
another candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the ground that by June 30, 1998, Capco
would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms and would therefore be ineligible to
serve for another term. The COMELEC en banc declared Capco eligible to run for mayor, thus Borja, Jr.
sought recourse in this Court. In dismissing the petition, we considered the historical background of Art.
X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, viz:
"a consideration of the historical background of Article X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive
terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they
adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred
from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third
consecutive term (2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 236-243 [Session of July
25, 1986] . . .). Monsod warned against 'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose' as
a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained
provisions 'recognizing people's power.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The
first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a
result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the
right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them be preserved. (emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected
to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can
be made clearer by considering the following cases or situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six
months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the
next election?

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Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office
before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the
term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is only
completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to
have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.
xxx

xxx

xxx

...the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive
times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is
considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the
fact remains that he has not been elected three times. . .
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two
conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he
qualified to run again in the next election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by
operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death, of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for
reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom
they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by
simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will
be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his
service of the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional
Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may
bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."8 (emphasis supplied)
We reiterated the Borja ruling in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, et al.9 which involved the election for
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Prior to the May 8, 1995 elections, petitioner Romeo Lonzanida served two
consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In the May 1995 elections, he ran for mayor,
was proclaimed winner, and assumed office. His proclamation was, however, contested by his opponent Juan
Alvez in an election protest filed before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales which rendered a decision
declaring a failure of elections. Upon appeal of the decision to the COMELEC, Alvez was declared the duly
elected mayor of San Antonio. In February 1998, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida
to vacate the post, and Alvez served the remainder of the term.
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1998 election for mayor of San Antonio. His
opponent Eufemio Muli filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Lonzanida on the ground that he had
already served three consecutive terms in the same office and was thus prohibited from running in the upcoming
election. On May 13, 1998, Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. COMELEC ruled that Lonzanida was
disqualified as his assumption to office in 1995, although he was unseated before the expiration of the term, was
considered one full term for purposes of counting the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.
On appeal to this Court, we ruled, viz:
"It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties
of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated
November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the
duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

92

The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered
as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of voluntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and
revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost
in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as a winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a
void proclamation...
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be
deemed to have served one full term from May 1995- 1998 because he served the greater portion of that term
has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e.,
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his
assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the
three term limit."10 (emphasis supplied)
Finally, in the recent case of Adormeo v. COMELEC, et al.,11 we ruled that a mayor who assumed office via a
recall election and served the unexpired portion of the mayoralty term is not considered to have served a full
term for purposes of applying the three term limit. In this case, therein private respondent Ramon Talaga, Jr.
was elected mayor in May 1992 and served the full term. In 1995, he was reelected and again served the full
term. In 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. About two years later, a recall election was held where Talaga, Jr.
ran against Tagarao. He (Talaga, Jr.) won and served the remainder of Tagarao's term.
In view of the upcoming May 2001 mayoralty election, Talaga, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy. On March
2, 2001, therein petitioner Adormeo sought the cancellation of Talaga, Jr.'s certificate of candidacy and/or his
disqualification on the ground that he had been thrice elected and had served three consecutive terms as city
mayor. Talaga, Jr., however, was declared qualified for the position of city mayor. Adormeo thus sought
recourse before this Court.
Citing the Borja and Lonzanida rulings, we ruled that Talaga, Jr. was not disqualified as the two conditions for
disqualification, namely (1) the elective official concerned was elected for three consecutive terms in the same
post and (2) he has fully served three consecutive terms, were not met. We did not consider Talaga, Jr.'s service
of the unexpired portion of Tagarao's term as service of a full term for purposes of the three term limit. We also
ruled that he did not serve for three consecutive terms as there was a break in his service when he lost to
Tagarao in the 1998 elections. We held, viz:
"COMELEC's ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld.
For nearly two years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in
the 1998 elections.
Patently untenable is petitioner's contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the
May 1998 election violates Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. (footnote omitted) To bolster his case,
respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in
interpreting said provision that 'if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that
unexpired (term), no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of
successive terms allowed.'
As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas' comment is pertinent only to members of the House of
Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of
Congress. (Rollo, pp. 83-84)"12 (emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the ConCom and the ruling case law of Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo show that there are
two principal reasons for the three term limit for elective local officials: (1) to prevent political dynasties
perpetuated by the undue advantage of the incumbent and (2) to broaden the choice of the people by allowing
candidates other than the incumbent to serve the people. Likewise evident in the deliberations is the effort to
balance between two interests, namely, the prevention of political dynasties and broadening the choice of the
people on the one hand, and respecting the freedom of choice and voice of the people, on the other; thus, the

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calibration between perpetual disqualification after three consecutive terms as proposed by Commissioner
Garcia, and setting a limit on immediate reelection and providing for a hibernation period.
In all three cases - Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo - we ruled that the "term" referred to in the three term limit is
service of a full term of three years for elective local officials. This ruling furthers the intent of the ConCom to
prevent political dynasties as it is the service of consecutive full terms that makes service continuous and which
opens the gates to political dynasties limiting the people's choice of leaders. In the words Of Commissioner
Ople, ". . . we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections,
officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions
and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts
to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the
continuity or unbroken service of all of these officials. (emphasis supplied)" Thus, ConCom set the limit on
consecutive full terms to no more than three. Otherwise stated, it is a fourth consecutive full term that is
prohibited.
In the cases at bar, however, private respondent Hagedorn will not serve a prohibited fourth consecutive full
term as he will be serving only the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004 mayoralty term. Similar to Talaga, Jr. in
the Adormeo case, Hagedorn's service as mayor will not be continuous from the third to a fourth consecutive
full term as it was broken when Socrates was elected in the 2001 regular mayoralty election and served for one
year. In the same vein that Talaga, Jr. was elected into office by recall election and his service of the unexpired
portion of the incumbent's term was not considered a consecutive full term for purposes of applying the three
term limit, Hagedorn's service of the unexpired portion of Socrates' term should not also be counted as a
prohibited fourth consecutive full term. It should not make a difference whether the recall election came after
the second consecutive full term as in the Adormeo case or after the third consecutive term as in the cases at bar
because the intent to create a hiatus in service is satisfied in both instances.
Even a textual analysis of Art. X, Sec. 8 will yield the interpretation that what is prohibited is the service of a
fourth consecutive full term. Petitioners are correct in foisting the view that "term" is a fixed and definite period
of time prescribed by law or the Constitution during which the public officer may claim to hold the office as a
right. It is a fixed and definite period of time to hold office, perform its functions, and enjoy its privileges and
emoluments until the expiration of the period.13 In ascertaining what "term" means for elective local officials,
the Constitution itself provides in Art. X, Sec. 8 that it means a fixed, definite, and full period of three years,
viz: "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years ..." Although one or more persons may discharge the duties of the office during this
fixed three-year period, the term is not divided into smaller terms by the number of incumbents who may fill the
office. It is one and indivisible, and term follows term in successive cycles of three years each. If the incumbent
or the one elected to the office fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office, thereby creating a permanent vacancy,14 the term would remain unbroken until the recurring election
for the office.15
The provisions on voluntary renunciation under Art. X, Sec. 8 and other articles of the Constitution bolster the
interpretation that for purposes of applying the three term limit, service of a full term of three years is
contemplated, viz:
"Art. X, Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected."
"Art. VI, Sec. 4. . . . No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 7. . . . No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

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xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. VII, Sec. 4. . . . No Vice-President shall serve more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the
full term for which he was elected." (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides in Sec. 43(b), viz:
"Sec. 43(b) . . . No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected." (emphasis
supplied)
Likewise, because "term" is understood to be a fixed, definite, and full period, the Constitution, in Art. Vi, Sec.
9, uses the qualifier "unexpired term" to refer to only a portion of a term, viz:
"Art. VI, Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be
called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term." (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 uses the phrase "unexpired term" to mean the
remainder of the term, viz:
"Sec. 44(d). The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of his predecessors. . ."
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, when Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution states that "...no such (local elective) official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms," it consistently means that it allows service of a maximum of three consecutive
full terms and prohibits service of a minimum fourth consecutive full term.
In putting a cap on the number of consecutive full terms an elective local official can serve, the ConCom sought
to curb the undue advantage of the incumbent over other aspirants, which advantage makes it easier to found a
political dynasty. At the time of the September 24, 2002 recall election, however, Hagedorn was not the
incumbent favored with this feared "undue advantage of the incumbent." On the contrary, he ran against the
incumbent Mayor Socrates who alone could be the subject of recall election and who, by law, was automatically
a candidate in the election.16 Hagedorn did not run in the 2001 regular mayoralty election of Puerto Princesa
City which Socrates won, precisely because he was aware of the three term limit.
It is my respectful submission that the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 proscribe a local
official who has been thrice consecutively elected in regular elections and has served three full terms in the
same position, from running in the regular election succeeding his third consecutive term. It is this situation that
is prohibited because it makes possible service of more than three consecutive and continuous full terms, i.e.,
service of a fourth consecutive full term. We cannot overstress that it is this continuousness that the ConCom
feared would open the gates to the two evils sought to be avoided: the incumbent's use of his undue advantage
to put up a political dynasty and limiting the people's choice of leaders. It is in this context of regular elections
that our obiter dictum in the Lonzanida case, which petitioners harp on, should be understood. In that case, we
opined that "[a]s finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred
from running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again
run for the same office."17 Indeed, insofar as regular local elections are concerned, which were the elections
involved in that case, there should be a hiatus of at least one full term of three years.
On the other hand, in the case of a local official who assumes office through a recall election - whether after his
first, second, or third consecutive term- there is a break in his service caused by the election of the incumbent
who was recalled. Even in the case of a local official who initially assumes office via recall election, then wins
the two succeeding regular elections and serves two full terms in the same post, he is not prohibited from
seeking another reelection and serving another full term. This is so because his service of the remainder of the
incumbent's term via recall election is not, in reality and in law, a full term continuing on to his three succeeding
full terms. Local officials who assume office via recall election serve only the unexpired portion of the
incumbent's term and this service is not counted as a full term, despite the Constitutional mandate that the term
of office of elective local officials is three years. Such is the design because Art. XVIII, Secs. 2 and 5 of the

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Constitution also prescribe synchronization of regular national and local elections beginning on the second
Monday of May 1992,18 which is accomplished if the local official who assumes office through recall election
serves only the incumbent's unexpired term.
It is only in the case of Representatives (and Senators) that "if one is elected Representative to serve the
unexpired term of another, that unexpired term will be considered one term for purposes of computing the
number of successive terms allowed."19 The election herein contemplated is a special election thus this
Constitutional intent does not apply to a recall election which involves only elective local officials. The Record
bear this out, viz:
"MR. SUAREZ. . . May we ask a clarificatory question regarding the interpretation of the provisions in
Sections 3 and 6 in relation to Section 9 regarding the disqualification on the part of the Senator to run
for two consecutive terms, and in the case of the Members of the House of Representatives, for three
consecutive terms. For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected
would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired
portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct
statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of
this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, because we speak of "term" and if there is a special election, he will serve only for
the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two terms for the
Members of the Lower House."20
As we ruled in the Adormeo case, service of an unexpired term is considered service of a full term only with
respect to Representatives (and Senators) because unlike local government officials, Representatives cannot be
recalled. It is continuous prolonged stay in office that breeds political dynasties. Understandably therefore,
insofar as Representatives who cannot be recalled are concerned, service of an unexpired term is strictly
counted as service of a full term because the purpose of the ConCom was to limit the right to run and be elected
in Congress.21
In allowing Hagedorn to participate in the September 24 recall election, we are not unmindful of the intent of
the ConCom to broaden the people's choice of leaders. The three term limit was adopted to allow the electorate
to choose from other candidates in the regular election succeeding the incumbent's third consecutive term. This
is clear in the Commissioners' alternatives for voting on the term limit for Representatives and the outcome of
their voting where 17 voted for "no further election after a total of three terms" and 26 voted for "no immediate
reelection after three successive terms." A reelection is immediate if a local official wins in the election
succeeding the third consecutive term.22 This is not the case with Hagedorn who did not run in the 2001 regular
mayoralty election and left that political arena to other contenders, thereby upholding the intent of the ConCom
to broaden the choice of the electorate.
The intent of the ConCom to create a hiatus in the service of elective local officials after three consecutive full
terms cannot be undermined through abuse of the power of recall. The Local Government Code of 1991
provides limitations on recall in Section 74, viz:
"Section 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only
once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election." (emphasis supplied)
Thus, an elective local official cannot perpetually hold on to his office through the mechanism of recall as at the
very least, there will be a hiatus of one year after an unbroken service of three terms. He could not simply
create, in the words of Commissioner Monsod, "structures that will perpetuate him (them)" in power with the
assurance that they will not be exposed because after serving three consecutive full terms, he will certainly be
replaced. Within the one-year period under Sec. 74, his successor could discover and begin to dismantle these
manipulative structures. This one year period also provides a reasonable basis for the electorate to judge the
performance of the incumbent successor, thus obviating fear of political maneuvering through initiation of recall
proceedings by a Preparatory Recall Assembly dominated by minions of the previous local official.23 In Claudio
v. COMELEC, et al.,24 we held, viz:

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"In the Bower case (in re Bower 41 I11. 777, 242 N.E. 2d 252 [1968]) cited by this Court in Angobung v.
COMELEC (269 SCRA 245, 256 [1997]), it was held that 'The only logical reason which we can ascribe for
requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for recall election is to prevent premature action on
their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the
soundness of his policies and decisions.'"25
If, after one year in office, the incumbent proves himself to be worthy of his position, then his constituents will
confirm this should a recall election be called, as in the case of Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City. If,
on the other hand, the incumbent turns out to be an ineffective leader, there is no reason why the electorate
should not be allowed to make a Cincinnatus of their past leader.
The imagined fear of abuse of the power of recall does not suffice to disqualify private respondent Hagedorn
and should not prevail over the resounding voice of the people of Puerto Princesa City. They have spoken and
there is no mistaking that Hagedorn is their overwhelming choice. We cannot subscribe to the petitioners'
position and allow an overly literal reading of the law to mute the electorate's cry and curtail their freedom to
choose their leaders. This freedom was as much a concern of the ConCom as was the prevention of political
dynasties and broadening the choice of the people. This Court has not just once admonished against a too literal
reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of the
authors.26
In sum, private respondent Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002 recall election
as the disqualification under Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution applies to the regular mayoralty election
succeeding the third consecutive term served. Nor is he precluded from serving the unexpired portion of the
2001-2004 mayoralty term as this is not service of a prohibited fourth consecutive full term.
I vote to deny the petition, giving due consideration to the tenet of representative democracy that the people
should be allowed to choose whom they wish to govern them.27 In the end, ". . . more than judgments of courts
of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people is final for 'sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.'"28
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006
URBANO M. MORENO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NORMA L. MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition 1 dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the Resolution 2 of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June 1, 2005, affirming the Resolution 3 of the Comelec First Division dated
November 15, 2002 which, in turn, disqualified him from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections.
The following are the undisputed facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground
that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted
probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, 4 the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment,
as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the
Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine

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imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored
to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the
July 15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for preliminary hearing.
After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running for
Punong Barangay.
The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration filed with the
Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed. According to the Comelec en banc, Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. 5 Since Moreno was released
from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years
thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his
disqualification from running for an elective local office.
Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take precedence over the
case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law because it is a much later enactment and a
special law setting forth the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to those
who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence.
The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a
special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent
election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
In its Comment 6 dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the Solicitor General argues
that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec 7 definitively settled a similar controversy by ruling that conviction for
an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted probation. The disqualification
under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the
grant of probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment 8 dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and pointing out material
differences between his case and Dela Torre v. Comelec which allegedly warrant a conclusion favorable to him.
According to Moreno, Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a conviction for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an
offense involving moral turpitude covered by the first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela
Torre, the petitioner in that case, applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction and only after
appealing his conviction, such that he could not have been eligible for probation under the law.
In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period specified therefor.
He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code does not apply to him.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase "within two (2) years after
serving sentence" found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which reads:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]
....
We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary Detention, the crime of
which Moreno was convicted by final judgment, involves moral turpitude falling under the first part of the
above-quoted provision. The question of whether Arbitrary Detention is a crime involving moral turpitude was
never raised in the petition for disqualification because the ground relied upon by Mejes, and which the
Comelec used in its assailed resolutions, is his alleged disqualification from running for a local elective office
within two (2) years from his discharge from probation after having been convicted by final judgment for an

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offense punishable by Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months. Besides, a
determination that the crime of Arbitrary Detention involves moral turpitude is not decisive of this case, the
crucial issue being whether Morenos sentence was in fact served.
In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our pronouncement therein that the grant of
probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code was based
primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude, a
circumstance which does not obtain in this case. At any rate, the phrase "within two (2) years after serving
sentence" should have been interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the provision
means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
The Courts declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, we should add,
ought to be considered an obiter in view of the fact that Dela Torre was not even entitled to probation because
he appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court which, however, affirmed his conviction. It has been held
that the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law,
the purpose of which is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already
eligible, did not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. 9
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The phrase "service of
sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means the confinement of a convicted
person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. 10 This seemingly clear and unambiguous
provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Courts attention because the Comelec, in the
assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did not
serve a day of their sentence because they were granted probation.
Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been disqualified because he did not serve the
adjudged sentence having been granted probation and finally discharged by the trial court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is
rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph
which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage,
attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period 11 imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a
public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of
the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence
adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution
of the sentence. During the period of probation, 12 the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him
by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. 13
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in this case. They focused on
the fact that Morenos judgment of conviction attained finality upon his application for probation instead of the
question of whether his sentence had been served.
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the letter. Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by final judgment for
an offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.

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This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of
probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be
disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of
the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil
rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as
to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts
finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for
public office.
Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which gives room for
judicial interpretation, 14 our conclusion will remain the same.
It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no clue as to the intended
meaning of the phrase "service of sentence," i.e., whether the legislature also meant to disqualify those who
have been granted probation. The Courts function, in the face of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret and
harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est
optimus interpretandi.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred
by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty
imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted. 15 Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent
standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall
not be extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
convicted of any offense against the security of the State; those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine
of not less than P200.00; those who have been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence at
the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became applicable. 16
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In
spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office.
This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a
distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was enacted in 1991, some seven (7)
years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature approved the enumerated disqualifications
under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of our ruling in Baclayon v.
Mutia on the effect of probation on the disqualification from holding public office. That it chose not to include
probationers within the purview of the provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to disqualify
probationers.
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local
Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly
repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. 17
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope of the disqualification
to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error which we here correct. We rule that Moreno was
not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of his conviction of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from the people of Barangay Cabugao, Daram,
Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief

100

Justice Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec 18 where he said that "it would be far better to err in favor of
popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc dated June
1, 2005 and the Resolution of its First Division dated November 15, 2002, as well as all other actions and orders
issued pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to proceed
in accordance with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
EN BANC

101

G.R. No. 180363

April 28, 2009

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution is whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was convicted in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan1 involved moral turpitude.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental
during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to
disqualify2petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h),
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or
financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from
running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.4 The case was docketed as SPA No. 07-242
and assigned to the COMELECs First Division.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of
member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc which was denied in its assailed
October 9, 2007 Resolution for being moot, thus:
It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the position of
member of the House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant
Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 28 May 2007 filed by
respondent Edgar Y. Teves challenging the Resolution of this Commission (First Division) promulgated on 11
May 2007 is hereby DENIED for having been rendered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,
WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC DEMURRED IN RESOLVING THE MAIN ISSUE RAISED IN
PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WHETHER PETITIONER IS DISQUALIFIED TO
RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.
II.
THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS THE RESOLUTION THEREOF
WILL DETERMINE PETITIONERS QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR OTHER PUBLIC POSITIONS IN
FUTURE ELECTIONS.
III.

102

THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,

WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC IN EFFECT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION
WHICH RULED THAT PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(H) OF R.A. 3019
AND THE IMPOSITION OF FINE IS A CONVICTION FOR A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
A.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE SHOULD BE RESOLVED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINDINGS OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.
B.
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS
OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE COMELEC, THAT BASED ON THE "TOTALITY OF FACTS"
DOCTRINE, PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. 7
The petition is impressed with merit.
The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14, 2007 elections did not effectively moot the
issue of whether he was disqualified from running for public office on the ground that the crime he was
convicted of involved moral turpitude. It is still a justiciable issue which the COMELEC should have resolved
instead of merely declaring that the disqualification case has become moot in view of petitioners defeat.
Further, there is no basis in the COMELECs findings that petitioner is eligible to run again in the 2010
elections because his disqualification shall be deemed removed after the expiration of a period of five years
from service of the sentence. Assuming that the elections would be held on May 14, 2010, the records show that
it was only on May 24, 2005 when petitioner paid the fine of P10,000.00 he was sentenced to pay in Teves v.
Sandignbayan.8Such being the reckoning point, thus, the five-year disqualification period will end only on May
25, 2010. Therefore he would still be ineligible to run for public office during the May 14, 2010 elections.
Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A.
No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.1avvphi1
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he
has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.lawphil.net
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis
supplied)
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general.9
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxxx

103

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he
has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a)
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having
such interest by the Constitution or by law.10
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest
in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the
public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an
interest by the Constitution or by law.11
In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or financial
interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Court
held therein:
However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia,
Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26
September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal
application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any
evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be
presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature. His
affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the management of the
cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the
said entity due to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the
cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being
the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would
have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to
each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal
partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the
conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the
Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government
official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit. [Emphasis
supplied].
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is
possession of a prohibited interest.13
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral
turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered.
Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in
their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that:
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves
moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided

104

by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not,
the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:
"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or
not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act
itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include
such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited."
This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in "International Rice Research
Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does
not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are
mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are
mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
(Emphasis supplied)1awphi1
Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding petitioners conviction and
found that the same does not involve moral turpitude.
First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELECs finding that petitioner used his official capacity in
connection with his interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the management to his wife,
in violation of the trust reposed on him by the people.
The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioners conviction involved moral turpitude,
misunderstood or misapplied our ruling in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According to the COMELEC:
In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted may per se not involve moral turpitude,
still the totality of facts evinces [his] moral turpitude. The prohibition was intended to avoid any conflict of
interest or any instance wherein the public official would favor his own interest at the expense of the public
interest. The [petitioner] knew of the prohibition but he attempted to circumvent the same by holding out that
the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is to be owned by a certain Daniel Teves. Later on, he would aver
that he already divested himself of any interest of the cockpit in favor of his wife. But the Supreme Court saw
through the ruse and declared that what he divested was only the management of the cockpit but not the
ownership. And even if the ownership is transferred to his wife, the respondent would nevertheless have an
interest thereon because it would still belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, of which the [petitioner] is the
other half.
[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He has the duty to divest himself but he
did not and instead employed means to hide his interests. He knew that it was prohibited he nevertheless
concealed his interest thereon. The facts that he hid his interest denotes his malicious intent to favor self-interest
at the expense of the public. Only a man with a malevolent, decadent, corrupt and selfish motive would cling on
and conceal his interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly shows his moral depravity and
proclivity to put primacy on his self interest over that of his fellowmen. Being a public official, his act is also a
betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the people. Clearly, the totality of his acts is contrary to the accepted
rules of right and duty, honesty and good morals. The crime, as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves
moral turpitude.15
On the contrary, the Courts ruling states:
The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business permit
or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-founded." This it based, and
rightly so, on the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the
Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1
January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the
municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not
so anymore and is not even a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have
intervened or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time, as
alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.16

105

Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary
or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by
transferring the management thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity
of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.
As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:
As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31 December
1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was before the
effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he transferred the management of the cockpit to his
wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter applied for the renewal of the cockpit
registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for renewal of the registration of the cockpit in question dated 28
January 1990 and 18 February 1991, she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the
said cockpit. In her renewal application dated 6 January 1992, she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of
the cockpit. Likewise in the separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 1992,
which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992, respectively, in compliance with the
requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the cockpit registration, she signed her
name as Operator/Licensee.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit
is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof
necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the old
LGC, mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions.
Thus, in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that:
x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions
enumerated in Section 41 thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of the
LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in
connection with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden
appearance of the prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although
ignorance thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter
penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.18 (Italics supplied)
The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum
to twelve years as maximum to a lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioners
violation was not intentionally done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals but due to his lack of
awareness or ignorance of the prohibition.
Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public morality as it tends to bring
forth idlers and gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves moral turpitude.
Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our
culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation.19 While it is a form of gambling, the morality
thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
it was held that:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing
or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the
activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or
allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it
may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horseracing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to
review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.
That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality,
or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and
executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive.
Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents
who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

106

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated
May 11, 2007 and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for the position of
Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is
entered declaring that the crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not
involve moral turpitude.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

488 Phil. 311 (2004).

Rollo, pp. 130-134.

Supra, note 1.

Rollo, pp. 131, 133 & 134.

Id. at 45-46.

107
6

Id. at 49.

Id. at 12-13.

Rollo, p. 145.

Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 1, 9.

10

Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149175, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 203, 215.

11

Id.

12

Supra note 4.

13

Id. at 329-330.

14

327 Phil. 1144, 1150-1151 (1996).

15

Rollo, pp. 44-45.

16

Teves v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 1 at 327-328.

17

Id. at 335.

18

Supra note 4 at 333-334.

19

Tan v. Perea G.R. No. 149743, February 18, 2005, 452 SCRA 53, 69.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I fully concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. I add these
views to further explore the term "moral turpitude" a term that, while carrying far-reaching effects, embodies
a concept that to date has not been given much jurisprudential focus.
I. Historical Roots
The term "moral turpitude" first took root under the United States (U.S.) immigration laws.1 Its history can be
traced back as far as the 17th century when the States of Virginia and Pennsylvania enacted the earliest
immigration resolutions excluding criminals from America, in response to the British governments policy of
sending convicts to the colonies. State legislators at that time strongly suspected that Europe was deliberately
exporting its human liabilities.2 In the U.S., the term "moral turpitude" first appeared in the Immigration Act of
March 3, 1891, which directed the exclusion of persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; this marked the first time the U.S. Congress used the term
"moral turpitude" in immigration laws.3 Since then, the presence of moral turpitude has been used as a test in a
variety of situations, including legislation governing the disbarment of attorneys and the revocation of medical
licenses. Moral turpitude also has been judicially used as a criterion in disqualifying and impeaching witnesses,
in determining the measure of contribution between joint tortfeasors, and in deciding whether a certain language
is slanderous.4
In 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the term "moral turpitude" in Jordan v. De
George.5 The case presented only one question: whether conspiracy to defraud the U.S. of taxes on distilled
spirits is a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of Section 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1919
(Immigration Act). Sam De George, an Italian immigrant was convicted twice of conspiracy to defraud the U.S.

108

government of taxes on distilled spirits. Subsequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered De Georges
deportation on the basis of the Immigration Act provision that allows the deportation of aliens who commit
multiple crimes involving moral turpitude. De George argued that he should not be deported because his tax
evasion crimes did not involve moral turpitude. The U.S. Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Vinzon,
disagreed, finding that "under an unbroken course of judicial decisions, the crime of conspiring to defraud the
U.S. is a crime involving moral turpitude."6 Notably, the Court determined that fraudulent conduct involved
moral turpitude without exception:
Whatever the phrase "involving moral turpitude" may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain
that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.xxx Fraud
is the touchstone by which this case should be judged.xxx We therefore decide that Congress sufficiently
forewarned respondent that the statutory consequence of twice conspiring to defraud the United States is
deportation. 7
Significantly, the U.S. Congress has never exactly defined what amounts to a "crime involving moral turpitude."
The legislative history of statutes containing the moral turpitude standard indicates that Congress left the
interpretation of the term to U.S. courts and administrative agencies.8 In the absence of legislative history as
interpretative aid, American courts have resorted to the dictionary definition "the last resort of the baffled
judge."9 The most common definition of moral turpitude is similar to one found in the early editions of Blacks
Law Dictionary:
[An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.
xxx Act or behavior that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of community and is a
morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offenses as distinguished from others. xxx The
quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from
statutory mala prohibita.10
In the Philippines, the term moral turpitude was first introduced in 1901 in Act No. 190, otherwise known as the
Code of Civil Actions and Special Proceedings.11 The Act provided that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as lawyer by the Supreme Court upon conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude.12Subsequently, the term "moral turpitude" has been employed in statutes governing disqualifications
of notaries public,13 priests and ministers in solemnizing marriages,14 registration to military
service,15 exclusion16 and naturalization of aliens,17 discharge of the accused to be a state witness,18 admission to
the bar,19 suspension and removal of elective local officials,20 and disqualification of persons from running for
any elective local position.21
In Re Basa,22 a 1920 case, provided the first instance for the Court to define the term moral turpitude in the
context of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the disbarment of a lawyer for conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Carlos S. Basa, a lawyer, was convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. The
sole question presented was whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446 of the
Penal Code of 1887, involved moral turpitude. The Court, finding no exact definition in the statutes, turned to
Bouviers Law Dictionary for guidance and held:
"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which
has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude.
The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct.
Thus, early on, the Philippines followed the American lead and adopted a general dictionary definition, opening
the way for a case-to-case approach in determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude.
II. Problems with the Definition of Moral Turpitude
Through the years, the Court has never significantly deviated from the Blacks Law Dictionary definition of
moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."23 This definition is more specific
than that used in In re Vinzon24 where the term moral turpitude was considered as encompassing "everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."25

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In the U.S., these same definitions have been highly criticized for their vagueness and ambiguity.26 In Jordan,
Justice Jackson noted that "except for the Courts [majority opinion], there appears to be a universal recognition
that we have here an undefined and undefinable standard."27 Thus, the phrase "crimes involving moral
turpitude" has been described as "vague," "nebulous," "most unfortunate," and even "bewildering." 28
Criticisms of moral turpitude as an inexactly defined concept are not unwarranted. First, the current definition
of the term is broad. It can be stretched to include most kinds of wrongs in society -- a result that the Legislature
could not have intended. This Court itself concluded in IRRI v. NLRC29 that moral turpitude "is somewhat a
vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as
the cases are reached" once again confirming, as late as 1993 in IRRI, our case-by-case approach in
determining the crimes involving moral turpitude.
Second, the definition also assumes the existence of a universally recognized code for socially acceptable
behavior -- the "private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general"; moral
turpitude is an act violating these duties. The problem is that the definition does not state what these duties are,
or provide examples of acts which violate them. Instead, it provides terms such as "baseness," "vileness," and
"depravity," which better describe moral reactions to an act than the act itself. In essence, they are "conclusory
but non-descriptive."30 To be sure, the use of morality as a norm cannot be avoided, as the term "moral
turpitude" contains the word "moral" and its direct connotation of right and wrong. "Turpitude," on the other
hand, directly means "depravity" which cannot be appreciated without considering an acts degree of being right
or wrong. Thus, the law, in adopting the term "moral turpitude," necessarily adopted a concept involving notions
of morality standards that involve a good measure of subjective consideration and, in terms of certainty and
fixity, are far from the usual measures used in law.31
Third, as a legal standard, moral turpitude fails to inform anyone of what it requires.32 It has been said that the
loose terminology of moral turpitude hampers uniformity since [i]t is hardly to be expected that a word
which baffle judges will be more easily interpreted by laymen.33 This led Justice Jackson to conclude in Jordan
that "moral turpitude offered judges no clearer guideline than their own consciences, inviting them to condemn
all that we personally disapprove and for no better reason than that we disapprove it."34 This trait, however,
cannot be taken lightly, given that the consequences of committing a crime involving moral turpitude can be
severe.
Crimes Categorized as Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude35
Since the early 1920 case of In re Basa,36 the Court has maintained its case-by-case categorization of crimes on
the basis of moral turpitude and has labeled specific crimes as necessarily involving moral turpitude. The
following is a list, not necessarily complete, of the crimes adjudged to involve moral turpitude:
1. Abduction with consent37
2. Bigamy38
3. Concubinage39
4. Smuggling40
5. Rape41
6. Estafa through falsification of a document42
7. Attempted Bribery43
8. Profiteering44
9. Robbery45
10. Murder, whether consummated or attempted46
11. Estafa47

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12. Theft48
13. Illicit Sexual Relations with a Fellow Worker49
14. Violation of BP Bldg. 2250
15. Falsification of Document51
16. Intriguing against Honor52
17. Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law53
18. Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Drug-pushing)54
19. Perjury55
20. Forgery56
21. Direct Bribery57
22. Frustrated Homicide58
Zari v. Flores59 is one case that has provided jurisprudence its own list of crimes involving moral turpitude,
namely: adultery, concubinage, rape, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery,
criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent
proof of loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses
against pension laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage, estafa, falsification of public document,
and estafa thru falsification of public document.60
Crimes Categorized as Crimes Not Involving Moral Turpitude61
The Court, on the other hand, has also had the occasion to categorically rule that certain crimes do not involve
moral turpitude, namely:
1. Minor transgressions of the law (i.e., conviction for speeding)62
2. Illegal recruitment63
3. Slight physical injuries and carrying of deadly weapon (Illegal possession of firearms)64
4. Indirect Contempt65
III. Approaches and Standards.
Even a cursory examination of the above lists readily reveals that while the concept of "moral turpitude" does
not have one specific definition that lends itself to easy and ready application, the Court has been fairly
consistent in its understanding and application of the term and has not significantly deviated from what it laid
down in In re Basa. The key element, directly derived from the word "turpitude," is the standard of depravity
viewed from a scale of right and wrong.
The application of this depravity standard can be made from at least three perspectives or approaches, namely:
from the objective perspective of the act itself, irrespective of whether or not the act is a crime; from the
perspective of the crime itself, as defined through its elements; and from the subjective perspective that takes
into account the perpetrators level of depravity when he committed the crime.
The Court best expressed the first approach in Zari v. Flores66 where the Court saw the involvement of moral
turpitude where an act is intrinsically immoral, regardless of whether it is punishable by law or not. The Court
emphasized that moral turpitude goes beyond being merely mala prohibita; the act itself must be inherently
immoral. Thus, this approach requires that the committed act itself be examined, divorced from its
characterization as a crime.

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A ruling that exemplifies this approach is that made in the U.S. case In The Matter of G---67 where, in
considering gambling, it was held that:
Gambling has been in existence since time immemorial. Card playing for small stakes is a common
accompaniment of social life; small bets on horse racing and the "policy or numbers games" are diversions of
the masses. That such enterprises exist surreptitiously is a matter of common knowledge. Many countries permit
it under a license system. In ancient times laws were enacted to discourage people from gambling on the theory
that the State had first claim upon their time and energy, and at later dates antigambling laws were aimed
especially at the activity as practiced by the working classes. Present-day movements to suppress gambling are
also tinged with other considerations. In urban communities in the past few decades the purely religious
opposition to gambling has tended to become less violent because certain activities, highly reputable according
to prevailing social standards, have come more and more to resemble it. Prohibition against gambling has had
something of a police rather than a truly penal character. At all times an important fact in arousing antagonism
in gambling has been the association, almost inevitable, with sharp practice. In established societies more or
less serious attempts are everywhere made, however, to prohibit or to regulate gambling in its more notorious
forms.
It would appear that statutes permitting gambling, such as those under discussion, rest primarily on the theory
that they are in the interest of public policy: that is to regulate and restrict any possible abuse, to obviate
cheating and other corrupt practices that may result if uncontrolled.
From this discussion, the Court went on to conclude that gambling is a malum prohibitum that is not
intrinsically evil and, thus, is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
With the same approach, but with a different result, is Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado,68 a case
involving drug possession. Librado, a Deputy Sheriff in MTCC Iligan City was convicted of possession of
"shabu," a prohibited drug. The Office of the Court Administrator commenced an administrative case against
him and he was subsequently suspended from office. In his subsequent plea for reinstatement, the Court
strongly denounced drug possession as an "especially vicious crime, one of the most pernicious evils that has
ever crept into our society For those who become addicted to it not only slide into the ranks of the living
dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law abiding members of society." The Court,
apparently drawing on what society deems important, held that the use of drugs amounted to an act so
inherently evil that no law was needed to deem it as such; it is an evil without need for a law to call it evil69 "an immoral act in itself regardless of whether it is punishable or not."70
In People v. Yambot,71 the Court categorically ruled that the possession of a deadly weapon does not involve
moral turpitude since the act of carrying a weapon by itself is not inherently wrong in the absence of a law
punishing it. Likewise, the Court acknowledged in Court Administrator v. San Andres72 that illegal recruitment
does not involve moral turpitude since it is not in itself an evil act being ordinarily an act in the ordinary
course of business in the absence of the a law prohibiting it.
The second approach is to look at the act committed through its elements as a crime. In Paras v. Vailoces,73 the
Court recognized that as a "general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving
moral turpitude." This is the same conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court made in Jordan, i.e., that crimes
requiring fraud or intent to defraud always involve moral turpitude.74
Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections75 is a case in point that uses the second approach and is one case where
the Court even dispensed with the review of facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime
since Dela Torre did not assail his conviction. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Comelec from running as
Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna on the basis of his conviction for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612,
otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law. Dela Torre appealed to this Court to overturn his disqualification on
the ground that the crime of fencing is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court ruled that moral
turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received
is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the
robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.
To be sure, the elements of the crime can be a critical factor in determining moral turpitude if the second
approach is used in the crimes listed above as involving moral turpitude. In Villaber v. Commission on
Elections,76 the Court, by analyzing the elements alone of the offense under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, held that
the "presence of the second element manifest moral turpitude" in that "a drawer who issues an unfunded check

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deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted
and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals." The same conclusion was reached by the
Court in Magno v. Commission on Elections,77 when it ruled that direct bribery involves moral turpitude, thus:
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or
gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some
favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his
fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a
betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right
and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
[Emphasis supplied]
The third approach, the subjective approach, essentially takes the offender and his acts into account in light of
the attendant circumstances of the crime: was he motivated by ill will indicating depravity? The Court
apparently used this approach in Ao Lin v. Republic,78 a 1964 case, when it held "that the use of a meter stick
without the corresponding seal of the Internal Revenue Office by one who has been engaged in business for a
long time, involves moral turpitude because it involves a fraudulent use of a meter stick, not necessarily because
the Government is cheated of the revenue involved in the sealing of the meter stick, but because it manifests an
evil intent on the part of the petitioner to defraud customers purchasing from him in respect to the measurement
of the goods purchased."
In IRRI v. NLRC,79 the International Rice Research Institute terminated the employment contract of Nestor
Micosa on the ground that he has been convicted of the crime of homicide a a crime involving moral
turpitude. The Court refused to characterize the crime of homicide as one of moral turpitude in light of the
circumstances of its commission. The Court ruled:
These facts show that Micosas intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total
absence of any aggravating circumstances demonstrate that Micosas character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust. [italics supllied].
The Court stressed, too, not only the subjective element, but the need for the appreciation of facts in considering
whether moral turpitude exists an unavoidable step under the third approach. Thus, the Court explained:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. [Emphasis supplied]
In contrast, while IRRI refused to characterize the crime of homicide as one of moral turpitude, the recent case
of Soriano v. Dizon80 held that based on the circumstances, the crime of frustrated homicide committed by the
respondent involved moral turpitude. In Soriano, complainant Soriano filed a disbarment case against
respondent Atty. Manuel Dizon alleging that the crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude under the
circumstances surrounding its commission, and was a sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Court after noting the factual antecedents of IRRI held that
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral
turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he
pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will
not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances,
those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of
respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the
impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of
Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of
his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape
punishment for his crime.

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The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who
deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced
vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity
with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged,
but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge. 81 [Emphasis supplied]
Laguitan v. Tinio,82 expressed in terms of the protection of the sanctity of marriage,83 also necessarily looked at
the subjective element because the offenders concubinage involved an assault on the basic social institution of
marriage. Another subjective element case, in terms of looking at the damage wrought by the offenders act, is
People v. Jamero84 where the Court disregarded the appellants argument that the trial court erred in ordering the
discharge of Inocencio Retirado from the Information in order to make him a state witness, since he has been
previously convicted of the crime of malicious mischief a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court said:
In the absence of any evidence to show the gravity and the nature of the malicious mischief committed, We are
not in a position to say whether or not the previous conviction of malicious mischief proves that accused had
displayed the baseness, the vileness and the depravity which constitute moral turpitude. And considering that
under paragraph 3 of Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, any deliberate act (not constituting arson or other
crimes involving destruction) causing damage in the property of another, may constitute the crime of malicious
mischief, We should not make haste in declaring that such crime involves moral turpitude without determining,
at least, the value of the property destroyed and/or the circumstances under which the act of destroying was
committed.85[Emphasis supplied]
Thus, again, the need for a factual determination was considered necessary.
In sum, a survey of jurisprudence from the earliest case of In Re Basa86 to the recent case of Soriano v.
Dizon 87shows that the Court has used varying approaches, but used the same standard or measure the degree
of attendant depravity. The safest approach to avoid being misled in ones conclusion is to apply all three
approaches, if possible, and to evaluate the results from each of the approaches. A useful caveat in the
evaluation is to resolve any doubt in favor of the perpetrator, as a conclusion of moral turpitude invariably
signifies a worse consequence for him or her.
IV. The Approaches Applied to TEVES
The Objective Approach
The crime for which petitioner Teves was convicted (possession of pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit)
is, at its core, related to gambling an act that by contemporary community standards is not per se immoral.
Other than the ruling heretofore cited on this point,88 judicial notice can be taken of state-sponsored gambling
activities in the country that, although not without controversy, is generally regarded to be within acceptable
moral limits. The ponencia correctly noted that prior to the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991,
mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not expressly prohibited. This bit of
history alone is an indicator that, objectively, no essential depravity is involved even from the standards of a
holder of a public office. This reasoning led the ponencia to conclude that "its illegality does not mean that
violation thereof . . . makes such possession of interest inherently immoral."89
From the Perspective of the Elements of the Crime
Under this approach, we determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude based solely on our analysis of the
elements of the crime alone.
The essential elements of the offense of possession of prohibited interest (Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law)
for which the petitioner was convicted are:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.

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From the perspective of moral turpitude, the third element is the critical element. This element shows that the
holding of interest that the law covers is not a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty,
justice, honesty and good morals; it is illegal solely because of the prohibition that exists in law or in the
Constitution. Thus, no depravity immediately leaps up or suggests itself based on the elements of the crime
committed.
The Subjective Approach
This approach is largely the ponencias approach, as it expressly stated that "a determination of all surrounding
circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered."90 In doing this, the ponencia firstly considered
that the petitioner did not use his official capacity in connection with the interest in the cockpit, not that he hid
this interest by transferring it to his wife, as the transfer took effect before the effectivity of the law prohibiting
the possession of interest. The ponencia significantly noted, too, that the violation was not intentionally
committed in a manner contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals, but due simply to Teves lack of awareness
or ignorance of the prohibition. This, in my view, is the clinching argument that no moral turpitude can be
involved as no depravity can be gleaned where intent is clearly absent.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, all three approaches point to the conclusion that no moral turpitude was involved in the crime
Teves committed, with the predominant reasons being the first (or objective) and the third (or subjective)
approaches. Analysis in this manner, with one approach reinforcing another, results in clear and easily
appreciated conclusions.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
EN BANC
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON
CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988,
and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter
(hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity,
filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on
the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983.
In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but
pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself
against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival
against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned
to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the
challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed
within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.

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Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on
Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion
for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a
petition forcertiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against
the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the
respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American
citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was
therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the
Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being
null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered as one for quo
warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in
September 1988 that they received proof of his naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a
proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could
nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a
citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an
alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the
electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus
Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the
proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's
incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American
citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49
A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it
had been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated himself before the
1988 elections because the Special Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had
not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be
a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had
divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine
citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to disqualify him for being timebarred under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to resolve it
directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit
only after a, long delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the
vital principles of public office to be here applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective
provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by the
COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We
assume this stance was taken by him after consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It
therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to
interpret the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as having been filed in
accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the
COMELEC.

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The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the
time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this
petition are merely secondary to this basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials
and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in
Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen
of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines,
this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born"
citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows,
however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from
the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P.
Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915, was
naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization No.
11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)

ARACELI V. BAREN
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer.
Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from
the persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States.

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The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into
embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result
of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of
them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have
been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of
allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I
absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen,"
meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the
impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine
citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective
nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article
5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be
treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in
matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its
territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and
principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the
circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for
and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II.
Many members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala,
which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on
the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its
citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a
national of Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the
nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at
bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole
question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own
laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our
own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State
to determine under its law who are its nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas
in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the
petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively

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participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship

under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is
between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he
did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.
At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that
he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the
Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the
lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious Such a
conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have
renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their
adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply
filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine
citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine
citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not
yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was
done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If,
say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission
acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge
to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered
only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people
of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that
the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of
great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly
restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and
possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if
repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the
renewal of his loyalty and love.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby

declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and
surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision
becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.
Cortes J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher interests of
the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural infinities which may
affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a
person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of
Governor of any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest
whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional. 1
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation
should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election results. 2 The purpose of
the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain
and definite time within which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to
provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes. 3 The Rules of Court allow the
Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who
performs an act which works a forfeiture of his office. 4 However, where the Solicitor General or
the President feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, 5 the
Court should allow a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an
elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. 6Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds
for ineligibility, 7 I believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for
the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any
serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am
constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.

Separate Opinions

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GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher interests of
the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural infinities which may
affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a
person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of
Governor of any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest
whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional. 1
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation
should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election results. 2 The purpose of
the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain
and definite time within which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to
provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes. 3 The Rules of Court allow the
Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who
performs an act which works a forfeiture of his office. 4 However, where the Solicitor General or
the President feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, 5 the
Court should allow a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an
elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. 6Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds
for ineligibility, 7 I believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for
the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any
serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am
constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156052

March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.

TUMBOKON,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao
and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila,
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
The antecedents are as follows.
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.2 Respondent
mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001.3 It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its
publication.4
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle
described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the

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order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof
which state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general
welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions
of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south,
Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area,
Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The
area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street,
are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted
under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this
Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence,
disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the
area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of
the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil companies
agreed to perform the following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this
MOU, undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the
immediate removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres
and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan
Terminals. xxx
Section 2. Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish
joint operations and management, including the operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities,
consistent with international and domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic considerations and
standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be
limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering the commercial and
operational terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which
shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be
the sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate action with the view
of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the
OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area
resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES compliance with the provisions
of this MOU.

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Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety buffer and green
zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal
settlers and other unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the same resolution,
the Sangguniandeclared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25,
2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil
companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor
Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the
oil companies.11
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No.
8027.12
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160),13 to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the
resolutions.14However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each
other and that the latter has not amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full force
and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains
that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed
to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative
duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.17
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over
which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite,
not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to
implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will
not issue.18
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner
SJS states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It
claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are
allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a
public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws
are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest.19 Besides, as residents of
Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent never
questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief

123

executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by
theSanggunian or annulled by the courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction
of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.23

The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondents duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of
the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the
Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Asscociate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 189793

April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

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This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as
public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716,
entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment."
Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any
issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821,2distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
District
1st District

2nd District

3rd District

4th District

Municipalities/Cities
Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando

Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo

Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

Population
417,304

474,899

372,548

429,070

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following
table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
District
1st District

2nd District

3rd District (formerly 2nd District)

Municipalities/Cities
Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

Population
176,383

Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao

San Fernando
Gainza
Milaor

276,777

Naga

Camaligan

439,043

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Pili
Ocampo
Canaman

Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

4th District (formerly 3rd District)

Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

372,548

5th District (formerly 4th District)

Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

429,070

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill
that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote
of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on
the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional
district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors
of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district.4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His copetitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local
executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the
creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard.6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory.Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly
created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at
least 250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and
severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On
the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace
of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with
the minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats.9 The
petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the

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House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national population of fifty
five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200
district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative.11 Thus, the 250,000
population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the
population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the creation of a
province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the
Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur
failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided
in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI,
Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present
petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects:
first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the
remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no
locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces
drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000
population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the
same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000
minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of
districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district
within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.

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The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition, the
petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in
implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were
they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated through a petition for
declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents,
therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by reason of
constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural rules,14 as well as
relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching
significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v.
PAGCOR,17this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took
original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper
and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules
of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18 Tatad v.
Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just
to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused
when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court
held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the
standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on
Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The beaten path
must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.24Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing
that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a
violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the
presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25

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There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and
the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a
representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of
interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that
converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854
created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that
case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati
had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the
validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section
5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district
may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.28(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its
initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to
have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city,
should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such
be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial
seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by
virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local
Government Code states:

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Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices
and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition
to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the
words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be
gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of
Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is
captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS
OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES
AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population
benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and
Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province,
city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had
to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum
for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district
within the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been
apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole,though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country into two
hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats
were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the
seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000;30 second, the
remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance
with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide,
who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark32 for
the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn,
apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The
population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This
projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each
city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted
one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are
the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga.
Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and
cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
(Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the determination
of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the
records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:

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Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was more
affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that
the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether population was the only
factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in Section 5 of
the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the
provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the northern
towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the apportionment,
its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000
for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in
fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are
more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron
are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in
politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He requested that
the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that District I
has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total
population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order
to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns
comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City
to the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District
would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment and
districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the importance of the
towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee for
the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one district.
He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the
summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its

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own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide,
however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the year, but
the transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and
professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to
speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be
isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated
that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should
have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the
fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier
approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a
vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have two
seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan,
Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall
comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the distribution
of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable
and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration "fosters common interests in line
with the standard of compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were
"political stability and common interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and
disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was
mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu,
Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution,
however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by
the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an additional
provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the
Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support.
And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself,
refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an
additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.

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Translated in the terms of the present case:

1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the
formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition to
the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this
point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an
additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No.
9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against
strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first
and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new
legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as
insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the
reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One
and Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of the
erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of
discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative
districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be
considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the
spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this
petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

133

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

ROBERTO A. ABAD*
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent. The majority opinion wreaks havoc on the bedrock principle of our "democratic and republican
State"1that all votes are equal. Instead, the majority opinion introduces the Orwellian concept that some votes
are more equal than others. The majority opinion allows, for the first time under the 1987 Constitution, voters in
a legislative district created by Congress to send one representative to Congress even if the district has a
population of only 176,383. In sharp contrast, all other legislative districts created by Congress send one
representative each because they all meet the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
The assailed Republic Act No. 9716 (RA 9716) is unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to the clear and
precise "standards" prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for the creation of legislative
districts. Section 5(4)2 of Article VI mandates that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards" fixed in Section 5. These constitutional standards, as far as population is
concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district; (3)
progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in
apportionment of legislative districts "in provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." The assailed RA
9716 grossly violates these constitutional standards.
Legislators Represent People, Not Provinces or Cities
There was never any debate3 in the design of our government that the members of the House of Representatives,
just like the members of the Senate, represent people not provinces, cities, or any other political unit.4 The
only difference is that the members of the Senate represent the people at large while the members of the House
represent the people in legislative districts. Thus, population or the number of inhabitants in a district is the
essential measure of representation in the House of Representatives.5 Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, just like in the previous Constitutions,6 could not be any clearer:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)

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Evidently, the idea of the people, as individuals, electing their representatives under the principle of "one
person, one vote,"7 is the cardinal feature of any polity, like ours, claiming to be a "democratic and republican
State."8 A democracy in its pure state is one where the majority of the people, under the principle of "one
person, one vote," directly run the government.9 A republic is one which has no monarch, royalty or
nobility,10 ruled by a representative government elected by the majority of the people under the principle of "one
person, one vote," where all citizens are equally subject to the laws.11 A republic is also known as a
representative democracy. The democratic and republican ideals are intertwined, and converge on the common
principle of equality -- equality in voting power, and equality under the law.
The constitutional standard of proportional representation is rooted in equality in voting power -- that each vote
is worth the same as any other vote,
not more or less. Regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, occupation, poverty, wealth or literacy, voters have
an equal vote. Translated in terms of legislative redistricting, this means equal representation for equal numbers
of people12 or equal voting weight per legislative district. In constitutional parlance, this means representation
for every legislative district "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio" 13 or proportional representation. Thus, the principle of "one person, one vote" or
equality in voting power is inherent in proportional representation.
It was in obedience to the rule on proportional representation that this Court unanimously struck down an
apportionment law which:
(a) x x x gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) x x x
gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c) [gave] Pangasinan with
less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato x x x more than both, five members having been assigned to it;
(d) [gave] Samar (with 871,857) four members while Davao with 903,224 got three only; (e) [gave] Bulacan
with 557,691 x x x two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three, and (f) [gave] Misamis
Oriental with 387,839 x x x one member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two.14 x x x x
for being repugnant to the constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution that the Members of the House of
Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number
of their respective inhabitants."15
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is even more precise by providing that the Members of the
House "shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x." The phrase "as nearly as
may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants" in the 1935 Constitution has been changed in
the 1987 Constitution to the more precise "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x." The addition of the phrase "on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" was meant to stress that the rule on proportional representation shall apply uniformly in the
apportionment of every legislative district.
The phrase "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants," which precedes the phrase
"provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area," means that legislative districts in provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area shall be apportioned according to proportional representation or equal representation
for equal numbers of people. Thus, there shall be one legislative district for every given number of people,
whether inhabiting in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area.
The phrase "on the basis of a uniform x x x ratio" means that the ratio of one legislative district for every given
number of people shall be applied uniformly in all apportionments, whether in provinces, cities or the
Metropolitan Manila area. Section 5(3) of Article VI mandates that "[e]ach city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand x x x shall have at least one representative." Consequently, a population of 250,000
serves as the default minimum population applicable to every legislative district following the rule on
uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or in the Metropolitan
Manila area.

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The phrase "progressive ratio" means that the number of legislative districts shall increase as the number of the
population increases, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area. Thus, a province shall have
one
legislative district if it has a population of 250,000, and two legislative districts if it has 500,000. This insures
that proportional representation is maintained if there are increases in the population of a province, city, or the
Metropolitan Manila area. This is what is meant by a "progressive ratio" in the apportionment of legislative
districts, a ratio that must also be uniformly applied.
Obviously, the 1987 Constitution has laid down clear and precise standards in the apportionment of legislative
districts compared to the 1935 Constitution. What is inescapable is that the 1987 Constitution has strengthened
and tightened the requirement of uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts, whether in provinces,
cities or the Metropolitan Manila area.
To now declare, as the majority opinion holds, that apportionment in provinces can disregard the minimum
population requirement because the Constitution speaks of a minimum population only in cities is logically
flawed, constitutionally repulsive, and fatally corrosive of the bedrock notion that this country is a "democratic
and republican State."16 This ruling of the majority strikes a debilitating blow at the heart of our democratic and
republican system of government.
Under the majoritys ruling, Congress can create legislative districts in provinces without regard to any
minimum population. Such legislative districts can have a population of 150,000, 100,000, 50,000 or even 100,
thus throwing out of the window the constitutional standards of proportional representation and uniformity in
the creation of legislative districts. To disregard the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in provincial
legislative districts while
maintaining it in city legislative districts is to disregard, as a necessary consequence, the constitutional
standards of proportional representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative districts in "provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." This means that legislative districts in provinces can have a minimum
population of anywhere from 100 (or even less) to 250,000, while legislative districts in cities will always have
a minimum population of 250,000. This will spell the end of our democratic and republican system of
government as we know it and as envisioned in the 1987 Constitution.
Constitutional Standards for Reapportionment:
Population and Territory
The Constitution itself provides the "standards" against which reapportionment laws like RA 9716 will be
tested, following its command that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standardsprovided in this section,"17 referring to Section 5, Article VI. These standards relate to first,
population, and second, territory. Section 5 admits of no other standards.
On population, the standards of the 1987 Constitution have four elements. First is the rule on proportional
representation, which is the universal standard in direct representation in legislatures. Second is the rule on a
minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district, which was not present in our previous Constitutions.
Third is the rule on progressive ratio, which means that the number of legislative districts shall increase as the
number of the population increases in accordance with the rule on proportional representation. Fourth is the rule
on uniformity, which requires that the first three rules shall apply uniformly in all apportionments in provinces,
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area.
The Constitution18 and the Ordinance19 appended to the 1987 Constitution fixes the minimum population of a
legislative district at 250,000. Although textually relating to cities, this minimum population requirement
applies equally to legislative districts apportioned in provinces and the Metropolitan Manila area because of the
constitutional command that "legislative districts [shall be] apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio." To reiterate, the Constitution commands that this rule on uniformity shall apply
to legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." Otherwise, districts apportioned
in provinces, if freed from the minimum population requirement, will have constituencies two, four, ten times
lower than in districts apportioned in cities, violating the constitutional command that apportionment shall be
based on a uniform ratio in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area."

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In short, the constitutional "standards" in the apportionment of legislative districts under Section 5 of Article VI,
as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) a minimum "population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand" per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the
population base increases; and (4) uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts in "provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area."
For territory, the Constitution prescribes the "standards" that a legislative district must be, "as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent."
To repeat, other than population and territory, there are no other standards prescribed in Section 5 of Article VI.
This Court cannot add other standards not found in Section 5.
The Malapportionment of RA 9716 Flouts
the Constitutional Standards on Population
RA 9716 grossly malapportions Camarines Surs proposed five legislative districts by flouting the standards of
proportional representation among legislative districts and the minimum population per legislative district.
Based on the 2007 census, the proposed First District under RA 9716 will have a population of only 176,383,
which is 29% below the constitutional minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district. In contrast, the
remaining four proposed districts have populations way above the minimum with the highest at 439,043
(proposed Third District), lowest at 276,777 (proposed Second District) and an average of 379,359. Indeed, the
disparity is so high that three of the proposed districts (Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts) have populations more
than double that of the proposed First District.20 This results in wide variances among the districts populations.
Still using the 2007 census, the ideal per district population for Camarines Sur is 338,764.21 The populations of
the proposed districts swing from this ideal by a high of positive 29.6% (Third
District) to a low of negative 47.9% (First District).22 This means that the smallest proposed district (First
District) is underpopulated by nearly 50% of the ideal and the biggest proposed district (Third District) is
overpopulated by nearly 30% of the ideal.
The resulting vote undervaluation (for voters in the disfavored districts) and vote overvaluation (for voters in
the First District) fails even the most liberal application of the constitutional standards. Votes in the proposed
First District are overvalued by more than 200% compared to votes from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts
and by more than 60% compared to votes in the Second District. Conversely, votes from the Third, Fourth, and
Fifth Districts are undervalued by more than 200% compared to votes in the First District while those in the
Second District suffer more than 60% undervaluation.
Proportional representation in redistricting does not mean exact numbers of population, to the last digit, for
every legislative district. However, under the assailed RA 9716, the variances swing from negative 47.9% to
positive 29.6%. Under any redistricting yardstick, such variances are grossly anomalous and destructive of the
concept of proportional representation. In the United States, the Supreme Court there ruled that a variance of
even less than 1% is unconstitutional in the absence of proof of a good faith effort to achieve a mathematically
exact apportionment.23
Significantly, petitioner Senator Aquinos attempt to redraw districting lines to make all five proposed districts
compliant with the minimum population requirement (and thus lessen the wide variances in population among
the districts) was thwarted chiefly for political expediency: his colleagues in the Senate deemed the existing
districts in Camarines Sur "untouchable" because "[a Congressman] is king [in his district]."24 This shows a
stark absence of a good faith effort to
achieve a more precise proportional representation in the redistricting under the assailed RA 9716. Clearly, RA
9716 tinkers with vote valuation, and consequently with the constitutional standard of proportional
representation, based solely on the whims of incumbent Congressmen, an invalid standard for redistricting
under Section 5 of Article VI.
Equally important, RA 9716 violates the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in creating the proposed
First District, which will have a population of only 176,383. The minimum population of 250,000 per legislative
district admits of no variance and must be complied with to the last digit. The Constitution mandates a

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population of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" for a legislative district in a city, and under the principle of
"uniform and progressive ratio," for every legislative district in provinces and in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Entitlement of "Each Province" to "at Least One Representative"
No Basis to Ignore Standard of Uniform Population Ratio
The directive in Section 5(3) of Article VI that "each province, shall have at least one representative" means
only that when a province is created, a legislative district must also be created with it.25 Can this district have a
population below 250,000? To answer in the affirmative is to ignore the constitutional mandate that districts in
provinces be apportioned "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio." That the Constitution never meant to exclude provinces from the requirement of
proportional representation is evident in the opening provision of Section 5(1), which states:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x." (Boldfacing
and underscoring supplied)
In short, the Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of legislative districts in provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area must comply with proportional representation, on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio.26
Apportionment in the Ordinance Appended to the 1987 Constitution
Distinct from Legislative Reapportionments
It will not do to hoist the apportionment under the Ordinance appended to the Constitution or Mariano v.
COMELEC27 and Bagabuyo v. COMELEC28 as normative props to shore up the hollow proposition that
reapportionment in provinces can dispense with the minimum population of 250,000 as prescribed in Section 5
of Article VI. In the first place, the Constitutional Commission, exercising constituent powers, enjoyed absolute
discretion to relax the standards it textualized in Section 5, Article VI, in the interest of creating legislative
districts en masse cognizant of legitimate concerns.29 Only the people, through the instrument of ratification,
possessed the greater sovereign power to overrule the Constitutional Commission. By overwhelmingly ratifying
the 1987 Constitution, the people in the exercise of their sovereign power sanctioned the Constitutional
Commissions discretionary judgments.
In contrast, Congress enacted RA 9716 in the exercise of its legislative powers under the 1987 Constitution and
subject to the reapportionment standards in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. Congress is strictly bound
by the reapportionment standards in Section 5, unlike the Constitutional Commission which could create onetime exceptions subject to ratification by the sovereign people. Until it enacted RA 9716, Congress never
deviated from the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in creating a legislative district. Thus, in
Republic Act No. 7854 (RA 7854) which doubled the legislative districts in Makati City, the Court in Mariano v.
COMELEC took note of the certification by the National Statistics Office that at the time of the enactment of
RA 7854, the population of Makati City was 508,174, entitling it to two representatives.30
Footnote 13 in Mariano v. COMELEC states: "As per the certificate issued by Administrator Tomas Africa of
the National Census and Statistics Office, the population of Makati as of 1994 stood at 508,174; August 4, 1994,
Senate Deliberations on House Bill No. 12240 (converting Makati into a highly urbanized city) x x x."
Similarly, in Republic Act No. 9371 (RA 9371) which also doubled the legislative districts in Cagayan de Oro
City, the two districts created complied with the minimum population of 250,000 (254,644 and 299,322,
respectively), as the Court noted in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC.31 Contrary to the assertion of the majority opinion,
neither Mariano v. COMELEC nor Bagabuyo v. COMELEC supports the claim that Congress can create a
legislative district with a population of less than 250,000. On the contrary, these cases confirm that every
legislative district must have a minimum population of 250,000. Only very recently, this Court in Aldaba v.
COMELEC32 struck down a law creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos, which has a population just
short of the 250,000 minimum requirement.
RA 9716 Harbinger for Wave of Malapportionments

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More than 20 years after the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress has yet to comply with the Constitutions
mandate that "[w]ithin three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section."33 Instead, Congress has
contented itself with enacting piecemeal reapportionment laws for individual areas, either for this sole
purpose34or ancillary to the conversion35 or creation36 of a local government unit, at the behest of legislators
representing the area. As movements
of district lines spell doom or salvation for entrenched political interests, this process subjects Congress to
intense pressure to keep off certain districts.
Until RA 9716 came along, Congress was able to balance political exigency with constitutional imperatives. RA
9716 marks a tectonic shift by tilting the balance in favor of entrenched interests, sacrificing the Constitution
and ultimately, the ideals of representative democracy, at the altar of political expediency. If left unchecked,
laws like RA 9716 will fill the House of Representatives with two breeds of legislators, one, representing
districts two, four, ten times more populous than other favored districts, elected by voters holding "mickey
mouse votes" and another, representing small, favored districts, elected by voters holding "premium votes" two,
four, ten times more valuable than the votes in disfavored districts.
Our oath of office as Justices of this Court forbids us from legitimizing this constitutionally abhorrent scheme, a
scheme that for the first time under the 1987 Constitution creates a new politically privileged class of legislators
in what is supposed to be a "democratic and republican State."37 To uphold RA 9716 is to uphold the blatant
violation of the constitutional standards requiring proportional representation and a minimum population in the
creation of legislative districts. This will derail our one person, one vote representative democracy from the
tracks clearly and precisely laid down in the 1987 Constitution.
And for what end -- to create a special class of legislative districts represented by a new political elite exercising
more legislative power than their votes command? Such a grant of privileged political status is the modern day
equivalent of a royalty or nobility title, which is banned under the 1987 Constitution. History will not be kind to
those who embark on a grotesquely anomalous constitutional revision that is repulsive to our ideals of a
"democratic and republican State."
The ruling of the majority today could sound the death knell for the principle of "one person, one vote" that
insures equality in voting power. All votes are equal, and there is no vote more equal than others. This equality
in voting power is the essence of our democracy. This Court is supposed to be the last bulwark of our
democracy. Sadly, here the Court, in ruling that there are some votes more equal than others, has failed in its
primordial constitutional duty to protect the essence of our democracy.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act No. 9716
for grossly violating the standards of proportional representation and minimum population in the creation of
legislative districts as prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
I concur with the ponencias discussion on the procedural issue.
"Transcendental importance" doctrine aside, petitioners have the requisite locus standi. Petitioners are suing not
only as lawmakers but as taxpayers and citizens as well. At the initiative of a taxpayer, a statute may be
nullified, on the supposition that expenditure of public funds for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.1 Republic Act No. 9716 (R.A. 9716) mandates
the creation of another legislative district and indubitably involves the expenditure of public funds.

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I DISSENT, however, on the ponencias conclusion, on the substantive issue, that a population of 250,000 is not
an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
Contrary to the ponencias assertion, petitioners do not merely rely on Article VI, Section 5 (3) but also on
Section 5 (1) of the same Article. 2 Both provisions must be read together in light of the constitutional
requirements of population and contiguity.
Section 5 (3) of Article VI disregards the 250,000 population requirement only with respect to existing
provinces whose population does not exceed 250,000 or to newly created provinces under the Local
Government Code (as long as the income and territory requirements are met).
The ponencia misinterprets Mariano v. Comelec.3 The actual population of the City of Makati during the Senate
deliberations in 1994 on House Bill (H.B.) No. 4264 that was to be enacted into R.A. No. 7854
was 508,174.4 That is why the Court in Mariano declared:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section
5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district
may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.5 (emphasis in the original)
Nothing in Mariano reflects that the Court disregarded the 250,000 population requirement as it merely stated
that Makatis legislative district may still be increased as long as the minimum population requirement is met.
The permissive declaration at that time presupposes that Makati must still meet the constitutional requirements
before it can have another congressional district.
The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section 461 thereof tackles the creation of a province
and not the reapportioning of a legislative district based on increasing population. There is thus no point in
asserting that population is merely an alternative addition to the income requirement.
The ponencia likewise misinterprets Bagabuyo v. Comelec.6 Notably, the ponencia spliced that portion of the
decision in Bagabuyo which it cited to suit its argument. Thus the ponencia quotes:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution,
however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. x x x To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by
the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (emphasis and underscoring in the
original by the ponente)
It omitted that portion which specified the respective total population of the two districts as above 250,000.
Thus the full text of the pertinent portion of the decision reads:
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of Cagayan de Oro City.
However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National Statistics
Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oros first district have a total population
of 254,644while the second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the
population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid
equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The two legislative districts of Cagayan de Oro subject of Bagabuyo met the minimum population requirement
at the time of reappportionment. The ponencias construal of the disparity in population sizes of the districts
involved in Bagabuyo clearly differs from the disparity of population in the present case.

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The Record of the Constitutional Commission itself declares that the 250,000 benchmark was used in
apportioning the legislative districts in the country. The sponsorship speech of Commissioner Hilario Davide,
Jr.7 reflects so.
x x x x. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory.Each city or each province with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one
Representative. This is Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative. x x x x The ordinance fixes at 200 the number
of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among the provinces and cities with a population of at least
250,000 and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official
enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million.
Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250,000 inhabitants and each province shall have at
least one representative, we at first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces; and one each for all cities with
a population of at least 250,000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo,
Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we
then proceeded to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance
with number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. x x x x. (capitalization,
emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended to apply the minimum population requirement of 250,000 to both
cities and provinces in the initial apportionment, in proportion to the countrys total population at that time (56
million).
Yet the ponencia asserts that the 250,000 benchmark was used only for the purpose of the 1986 initial
apportionment of the legislative districts, and now disregards the benchmarks application in the present
petition. It is eerily silent, however, on what the present population yardstick is. If the present estimated
population of 90 million is to be the dividend,8 then there would roughly be one legislative district
representative for every 450,000.
Following the constitutional mandate, the population requirement cannot fall below 250,000. This is the average
"uniform and progressive ratio" that should prevail. Thus, using the present population figure, the benchmark
should be anywhere between 250,000-450,000 persons per district. Using anything less than 250,000 is
illogical, for it would operate to allow more than 360 representatives of legislative districts alone on some
capricious basis other than the variable of population.
A case in point is the congressional reapportionment done in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat and Zamboanga
Sibugay effected through Republic Act No. 93579 and Republic Act No. 9360,10 respectively. At the time of the
congressional deliberations and effectivity of these laws, the population count in these provinces more than met
the basic standard. Sultan Kudarat already had a population of 522,187 during the 1995 census year,11 while
Zamboanga Sibugay met the population threshold in 2001 with an estimated 503,700 headcount.12
The ponencia sweepingly declares that "population was explicitly removed as a factor."13 Far from
it. Population remains the controlling factor. From the discussions in the initial apportionment and districting
of Puerto Princesa, Baguio, Cavite, Laguna, Maguindanao and Cebu in 1986, it is clear that population and
contiguity were the primary considerations, and the extraneous factors considered were circumspectly
subsumed thereto.
The ponencia harps on petitioners admission that Camarines Sur is actually entitled to SIX legislative districts,
given its population of 1,693,821, to justify its conclusion that there is nothing wrong in the creation of another
legislative district in the province. This is a wrong premise. It bears noting that petitioners raised the legislative
entitlement to underscore the GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION committed in the enactment of R.A. 9716.
R.A. 9716 created one legislative district by reconfiguring the first and second districts. It did not, however,
touch the third and fourth districts which, when properly reapportioned, can easily form another district. No
reasons were offered except Senator Joker Arroyos during the Senate Plenary Debates on H.B. No. 4264, viz:
"When it comes to their district, congressmen are kings. We cannot touch them. He [referring to Rep.
Villafuerte] does not also want it [referring to the district of Rep. Villafuerte] touched... even if they have a
pregnant populace or inhabitants, he does not want it touched."14

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The resulting population distribution in the present case violates the uniform and progressive ratio
prescribed in the Constitution.
Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9716, the tally of population percentage per district in Camarines Sur based
on its population of 1,693,821 was as follows:
District 1: 24.6%
District 2: 28.03%
District 3: 21.99%
District 4: 25.33%
Compare now the population percentage per district after the passage of R.A. 9716:
District 1: 10.4%
District 2: 16.34%
District 3: 25.9%
District 4: 21.99% (former District 3)
District 5: 25.33% (former District 4)
Remarkably, before R.A. No. 9716, the first district met the 250,000 minimum. After R.A. No. 9716, it suffered
a very significant drop in its population from 416,680 to 176,157.
The extraneous factors15 cited by the ponencia do not suffice to justify the redistricting, particularly the
inclusion of the municipality of Libmanan in the second district. Linguistic difference is a weak basis to
segregate the municipalities in the redistricting. To sanction that as basis would see a wholesale redistricting of
the entire country, given the hundreds of dialects being spoken. Imagine Binondo being segregated from the
Tagalog-speaking district of Tondo or Sta. Cruz in Manila on the ground that Fookien is largely spoken in
Binondo.
The former first district supposedly occupied 40% of the total land area of Camarines Sur. But the former fourth
district (which is now the fifth) comprises the same percentage of land area, if not bigger. If land area was a
factor, then the former fourth district should have been re-districted also since it is endowed with a big area like
the former first district.
The municipality of Libmanan is supposedly isolated by a body of water from the first district. But so is the
municipality of Cabusao which is situated northeast of Libmanan and which is bordered by the same body of
water. Yet Cabusao is part of the new first district. Considering the similar geographical location of the two
municipalities, there is no compelling reason to segregate Libmanan from the first district and tack it to the
newly created second district.
The seminal case of Reynolds v. Sims16 had already ruled that these factors cannot be permissively considered
in legislative reapportionment.
x x x Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for judgment in
legislative apportionment controversies. x x x [We] hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, [equal
protection] requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a
population basis. Simply stated, an individuals right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired
when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of
the [State].
xxxx

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[Equal protection] requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both
houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable. We realize that it is a practical
impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of residents, citizens, or
voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement. So long as the
divergences from a strict population principle are constitutionally permissible, but neither history alone, nor
economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from
population-based representation. Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area
alone provide an insufficient justification for deviations from the equal-population principle. Again, people, not
land or trees or pastures, vote. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Undoubtedly, Camarines Surs malapportionment largely partakes of gerrymandering.17
A final word. By pronouncing that "other factors," aside from population, should be considered in the
composition of additional districts, thereby adding other requisites despite the Constitutions clear limitation to
population and contiguity, the ponencia effectively opens the floodgates to opportunistic lawmakers to
reconfigure their own principalia and bantam districts. Leaving open Section 5 of Article VI to arbitrary factors,
such as economic, political, socio-cultural, racial and even religious ones, is an invitation to a free-for-all.
In light of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition and DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic
Act No. 9716.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
EN BANC
G.R. No. 163072

April 2, 2009

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF PASAY, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PASAY, CITY MAYOR OF PASAY, CITY
TREASURER OF PASAY, and CITY ASSESSOR OF PASAY, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Decision2 dated 30 October 2002 and the Resolution dated 19
March 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67416.
The Facts
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates and administers the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex under Executive Order No. 903 (EO 903),3 otherwise known as the
Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport Authority. EO 903 was issued on 21 July 1983 by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Under Sections 34 and 225 of EO 903, approximately 600 hectares of land,
including the runways, the airport tower, and other airport buildings, were transferred to MIAA. The NAIA
Complex is located along the border between Pasay City and Paraaque City.
On 28 August 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real Property Tax Delinquency from the City of Pasay for
the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real property tax delinquency for its real properties located in NAIA
Complex, Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City (NAIA Pasay properties) is tabulated as follows:
TAX DECLA-RATION

TAXABLE YEAR

TAX DUE

PENALTY

TOTAL

A7-183-08346

1997-2001

243,522,855.00

123,351,728.18

366,874,583.18

A7-183-05224

1992-2001

113,582,466.00

71,159,414.98

184,741,880.98

A7-191-00843

1992-2001

54,454,800.00

34,115,932.20

88,570,732.20

143

A7-191-00140

1992-2001

1,632,960.00

1,023,049.44

2,656,009.44

A7-191-00139

1992-2001

6,068,448.00

3,801,882.85

9,870,330.85

A7-183-05409

1992-2001

59,129,520.00

37,044,644.28

96,174,164.28

A7-183-05410

1992-2001

20,619,720.00

12,918,254.58

33,537,974.58

A7-183-05413

1992-2001

7,908,240.00

4,954,512.36

12,862,752.36

A7-183-05412

1992-2001

18,441,981.20

11,553,901.13

29,995,882.33

A7-183-05411

1992-2001

109,946,736.00

68,881,630.13

178,828,366.13

A7-183-05245

1992-2001

7,440,000.00

4,661,160.00

12,101,160.00

P642,747,726.20

P373,466,110.13

P1,016,213,836.33

GRAND TOTAL

On 24 August 2001, the City of Pasay, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy for
the NAIA Pasay properties. MIAA received the notices and warrants of levy on 28 August 2001. Thereafter, the
City Mayor of Pasay threatened to sell at public auction the NAIA Pasay properties if the delinquent real
property taxes remain unpaid.
On 29 October 2001, MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and injunction with prayer
for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to enjoin the City of Pasay from
imposing real property taxes on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the NAIA Pasay properties.
On 30 October 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and upheld the power of the City of Pasay to
impose and collect realty taxes on the NAIA Pasay properties. MIAA filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the Court of Appeals denied. Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals held that Sections 193 and 234 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code,
which took effect on 1 January 1992, withdrew the exemption from payment of real property taxes granted to
natural or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water
districts, cooperatives duly registered under Republic Act No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions. Since MIAA is a government-owned corporation, it follows that its tax exemption
under Section 21 of EO 903 has been withdrawn upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code.
The Issue
The issue raised in this petition is whether the NAIA Pasay properties of MIAA are exempt from real property
tax.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In ruling that MIAA is not exempt from paying real property tax, the Court of Appeals cited Sections 193 and
234 of the Local Government Code which read:
SECTION 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under
R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the
effectivity of this Code.
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the real
property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except
when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise to a taxable person;

144

(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit or
religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable or educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local water districts
and government owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or
generation and transmission of electric power;
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No. 6938; and
(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environment protection.
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently
enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all government-owned or controlled corporations
are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
The Court of Appeals held that as a government-owned corporation, MIAAs tax exemption under Section 21 of
EO 903 has already been withdrawn upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code in 1992.
In Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals6 (2006 MIAA case), this Court already resolved
the issue of whether the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from tax under existing laws. The
2006 MIAA case originated from a petition for prohibition and injunction which MIAA filed with the Court of
Appeals, seeking to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real property tax on, levying against, and
auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings located in Paraaque City. The only difference
between the 2006 MIAA case and this case is that the 2006 MIAA case involved airport lands and buildings
located in Paraaque City while this case involved airport lands and buildings located in Pasay City. The 2006
MIAA case and this case raised the same threshold issue: whether the local government can impose real
property tax on the airport lands, consisting mostly of the runways, as well as the airport buildings, of MIAA. In
the 2006 MIAA case, this Court held:
To summarize, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation under Section 2(13) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code because it is not organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation. Neither is MIAA a government-owned or controlled corporation under Section 16, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution because MIAA is not required to meet the test of economic viability. MIAA is a
government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing essential public services pursuant to
Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. As a government instrumentality,
MIAA is not subject to any kind of tax by local governments under Section 133(o) of the Local Government
Code. The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) does not apply to MIAA because MIAA is not a taxable
entity under the Local Government Code. Such exception applies only if the beneficial use of real property
owned by the Republic is given to a taxable entity.
Finally, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to public use and thus are properties
of public dominion. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the Republic. Article 420 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridgesconstructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
The term "ports x x x constructed by the State" includes airports and seaports. The Airport Lands and Buildings
of MIAA are intended for public use, and at the very least intended for public service. Whether intended for
public use or public service, the Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion. As properties of
public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic and thus exempt from real estate
tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code.7 (Emphasis in the original)

145

The definition of "instrumentality" under Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code of 1987 uses the phrase "includes x x x government-owned or controlled corporations" which means that a
government "instrumentality" may or may not be a "government-owned or controlled corporation." Obviously,
the term government "instrumentality" is broader than the term "government-owned or controlled corporation."
Section 2(10) provides:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the national Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.
The term "government-owned or controlled corporation" has a separate definition under Section 2(13)8 of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the
case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That
government-owned or controlled corporations may further be categorized by the department of Budget, the
Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for the purpose of the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.
The fact that two terms have separate definitions means that while a government "instrumentality" may include
a "government-owned or controlled corporation," there may be a government "instrumentality" that will not
qualify as a "government-owned or controlled corporation."
A close scrutiny of the definition of "government-owned or controlled corporation" in Section 2(13) will show
that MIAA would not fall under such definition. MIAA is a government "instrumentality" that does not
qualify as a "government-owned or controlled corporation." As explained in the 2006 MIAA case:
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be "organized as a stock or non-stock corporation." MIAA
is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital
stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. x x x
Section 3 of the Corporation Code defines a stock corporation as one whose "capital stock is divided into shares
and x x x authorized to distribute to the holders of such shares dividends x x x." MIAA has capital but it is not
divided into shares of stock. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. Hence, MIAA is not a stock
corporation.
xxx
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. Section 87 of the Corporation Code
defines a non-stock corporation as "one where no part of its income is distributable as dividends to its members,
trustees or officers." A non-stock corporation must have members. Even if we assume that the Government is
considered as the sole member of MIAA, this will not make MIAA a non-stock corporation. Non-stock
corporations cannot distribute any part of their income to their members. Section 11 of the MIAA Charter
mandates MIAA to remit 20% of its annual gross operating income to the National Treasury. This prevents
MIAA from qualifying as a non-stock corporation.
Section 88 of the Corporation Code provides that non-stock corporations are "organized for charitable,
religious, educational, professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service, or
similar purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and like chambers." MIAA is not organized for any of these
purposes. MIAA, a public utility, is organized to operate an international and domestic airport for public use.
Since MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation, MIAA does not qualify as a government-owned or
controlled corporation. What then is the legal status of MIAA within the National Government?

146

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with
corporate powers. x x x
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a
corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains
a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA
exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At
the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these
powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order."9
Thus, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but a government instrumentality which is
exempt from any kind of tax from the local governments. Indeed, the exercise of the taxing power of local
government units is subject to the limitations enumerated in Section 133 of the Local Government
Code.10 Under Section 133(o)11of the Local Government Code, local government units have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the national government like the MIAA. Hence, MIAA is not liable to pay real property tax
for the NAIA Pasay properties.
Furthermore, the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are properties of public dominion intended for public use,
and as such are exempt from real property tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code. However,
under the same provision, if MIAA leases its real property to a taxable person, the specific property leased
becomes subject to real property tax.12 In this case, only those portions of the NAIA Pasay properties which are
leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real property tax by the City of Pasay.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 30 October 2002 and the
Resolution dated 19 March 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67416. We DECLARE the NAIA
Pasay properties of the Manila International Airport Authority EXEMPT from real property tax imposed by the
City of Pasay. We declare VOID all the real property tax assessments, including the final notices of real
property tax delinquencies, issued by the City of Pasay on the NAIA Pasay properties of the Manila
International Airport Authority, except for the portions that the Manila International Airport Authority has
leased to private parties.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

147

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155491

July 21, 2009

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented herein by its Mayor Hon. RODRIGO DUTERTE, and the
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD OF DAVAO CITY, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) of the
Decision2 of the Court dated September 16, 2008, denying its appeal of the Decision and Order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, dated July 19, 2002 and September 26, 2002, respectively.
Briefly, the factual antecedents are as follows:
On February 18, 2002, Smart filed a special civil action for declaratory relief3 for the ascertainment of its rights
and obligations under the Tax Code of the City of Davao, which imposes a franchise tax on businesses enjoying
a franchise within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao. Smart avers that its telecenter in Davao City is exempt
from payment of franchise tax to the City.
On July 19, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition. Smart filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated September 26, 2002. Smart filed an appeal before this
Court, but the same was denied in a decision dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant motion for
reconsideration raising the following grounds: (1) the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smarts franchise, Republic
Act No. 7294 (RA 7294), covers local taxes; the rule of strict construction against tax exemptions is not
applicable; (2) the "in lieu of all taxes" clause is not rendered ineffective by the Expanded VAT Law; (3) Section
23 of Republic Act No. 79254 (RA 7925) includes a tax exemption; and (4) the imposition of a local franchise
tax on Smart would violate the constitutional prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts.
Section 9 of RA 7294 and Section 23 of RA 7925 are once again put in issue. Section 9 of Smarts legislative
franchise contains the contentious "in lieu of all taxes" clause. The Section reads:
Section 9. Tax provisions. The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their
real estate buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations which
are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition thereto, the grantee, its successors or assigns
shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the business transacted under
this franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this
franchise or earnings thereof: Provided, That the grantee, its successors or assigns shall continue to be liable for
income taxes payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code pursuant to Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 72 unless the latter enactment is amended or repealed, in which case the amendment or repeal shall
be applicable thereto.
xxx5

148

Section 23 of RA 7925, otherwise known as the most favored treatment clause or equality clause, contains the
word "exemption," viz.:
SEC. 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry Any advantage, favor, privilege,
exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become
part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises: Provided, however, That the foregoing shall neither apply to
nor affect provisions of telecommunications franchises concerning territory covered by the franchise, the life
span of the franchise, or the type of the service authorized by the franchise.6
A review of the recent decisions of the Court on the matter of exemptions from local franchise tax and the
interpretation of the word "exemption" found in Section 23 of RA 7925 is imperative in order to resolve this
issue once and for all.
In Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) v. Province of Pangasinan,7 Digitel used as an
argument the "in lieu of all taxes" clauses/provisos found in the legislative franchises of Globe,8 Smart and
Bell,9 vis--visSection 23 of RA 7925, in order to claim exemption from the payment of local franchise tax.
Digitel claimed, just like the petitioner in this case, that it was exempt from the payment of any other taxes
except the national franchise and income taxes. Digitel alleged that Smart was exempted from the payment of
local franchise tax.
However, it failed to substantiate its allegation, and, thus, the Court denied Digitels claim for exemption from
provincial franchise tax. Cited was the ruling of the Court in PLDT v. City of Davao,10 wherein the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, held that in approving Section 23 of RA No. 7925, Congress
did not intend it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Section 23 cannot be
considered as having amended PLDTs franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local
franchise taxes. The Court further held that tax exemptions are highly disfavored and that a tax exemption must
be expressed in the statute in clear language that leaves no doubt of the intention of the legislature to grant such
exemption. And, even in the instances when it is granted, the exemption must be interpreted in strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
The Court also clarified the meaning of the word "exemption" in Section 23 of RA 7925: that the word
"exemption" as used in the statute refers or pertains merely to an exemption from regulatory or reporting
requirements of the Department of Transportation and Communication or the National Transmission
Corporation and not to an exemption from the grantees tax liability.
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) v. Province of Laguna,11 PLDT was a holder of a
legislative franchise under Act No. 3436, as amended. On August 24, 1991, the terms and conditions of its
franchise were consolidated under Republic Act No. 7082, Section 12 of which embodies the so-called "in-lieuof-all taxes" clause. Under the said Section, PLDT shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of
all its gross receipts, which franchise tax shall be "in lieu of all taxes." The issue that the Court had to resolve
was whether PLDT was liable to pay franchise tax to the Province of Laguna in view of the "in lieu of all taxes"
clause in its franchise and Section 23 of RA 7925.lawph!l
Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts are resolved in
favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, the Court held
that Section 23 of RA 7925 could not be considered as having amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to
exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes.
In ruling against the claim of PLDT, the Court cited the previous decisions in PLDT v. City of Davao12 and
PLDT v. City of Bacolod,13 in denying the claim for exemption from the payment of local franchise tax.
In sum, the aforecited jurisprudence suggests that aside from the national franchise tax, the franchisee is still
liable to pay the local franchise tax, unless it is expressly and unequivocally exempted from the payment thereof
under its legislative franchise. The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in a legislative franchise should categorically
state that the exemption applies to both local and national taxes; otherwise, the exemption claimed should be
strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the "Expanded VAT Law," did not remove or abolish the payment
of local franchise tax. It merely replaced the national franchise tax that was previously paid by

149

telecommunications franchise holders and in its stead imposed a ten percent (10%) VAT in accordance with
Section 108 of the Tax Code. VAT replaced the national franchise tax, but it did not prohibit nor abolish the
imposition of local franchise tax by cities or municipaties.
The power to tax by local government units emanates from Section 5, Article X of the Constitution which
empowers them to create their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide. The imposition of local franchise tax is not inconsistent
with the advent of the VAT, which renders functus officio the franchise tax paid to the national government.
VAT inures to the benefit of the national government, while a local franchise tax is a revenue of the local
government unit.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED, and this denial is final.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
JOEPHIL C. BIEN,

G.R. No. 179333

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD and

150

MENDOZA, JJ.
PEDRO B. BO,

Promulgated:
August 3, 2010

Respondent.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals (CA) decision in CA-G.R SP
No. 92874[1] which affirmed in toto the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-L-A-04-0488-H
finding petitioner administratively liable for Abuse of Authority.[2]

The factual antecedents, summarized by the CA, follow:

[Respondent Pedro B. Bo], since 1993, has applied with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO)
Legazpi City for the lease of a 10,000 square meter foreshore lot in Palale Beach, Bgy. San
Isidro, Ilawod. Pending his application, he introduced improvements in the area necessary in
putting up and in running a beach resort, secured DENR approval of his survey plan, obtained a
barangay permit to operate his business, and paid the corresponding yearly occupation fees over
the public land. The DENR in the meantime conducted an appraisal report on the status of the
foreshore lot.
But a month before the DENR released its approval in April 2003 for the bidding of the lease
covering the public land Col. Bo was applying for, his cottage and his coconut trees were
destroyed. He had this occurrence entered in the police blotter in the Malilipot Municipal Police
Station, and named Bgy. Captain Bello and Kgd. Bisona as those who led in the removal of his
improvements to give way for the construction of twenty-two cottages, and that this was done in
defiance of the directive of the DENR representative not to push through with this plan because
they had no right to do so.
The bidding that was scheduled for June 2003 for the lease of the foreshore land never took place
because the Sangguniang Barangay of San Isidro, Ilawod opposed Col. Bos lease application
before the DENR, reasoning that the land should be used instead for barangay projects and not to
benefit private individuals.
The protest was then referred to the DENR-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) for resolution. Land Management Officer (LMO) Santiago Olfindo took hold of
the dispute and on October 21, 2003 conducted an ocular inspection on the public land. He noted
in his findings the list of improvements as of that time and the owners of the cottages located
therein:
At the time of the ocular inspection, the actual improvements found on the area
are reflected on a matrix hereto attached. Some of the owners of the cottages
constructed on the area covered by the application of Applicant-Respondent [Bo]
were not present during the inspection but were identified by the Barangay
Officials who were present on the premises. From the attached matrix it must be
noted that almost all of the Barangay Officials had their own cottages and that the
total cost of all improvements on the area subject of this case amounts to Four
Hundred Seventy Nine (sic) (P479,000.00) Pesos.

151

During the field inspection, the improvements made by the Applicant-Respondent

[Bo] as reflected in the Appraisal Report was not anymore around. The area
occupied by his improvement, (Cottage) is already occupied by a certain Carmelo
Tuyo and Jimeno Balana.
xxx xxx xxx
The matrix referred to by LMO Olfindo included [petitioner] Joephil Bien as one of the
owners of the cottages built on Palale Beach on March 2003, and said report of LMO Olfindo
became the DENR Regional Directors basis for denying the Sangguniang Barangays protest,
finding that the cottages found therein were privately owned and illegally constructed, i.e.,
without securing the DENRs permit. Thus, the bidding for the public lease of a portion
of Palale Beach was upheld.
As regards Col. Bos complaint before the Ombudsman, he pinpointed not only the barangay
officials of San Isidro, Ilawod as the culprits responsible for the destruction of his cottage and
plantation but also [petitioner] Joephil Bien. Col. Bo stressed that all of them connived in doing
this injustice to him in order that respondents [including herein petitioner] may be able to
construct their own private cottages for their own benefit.
Defending himself separately from his co-respondents, [petitioner] Joephil Bien maintained his
innocence and vehemently denied ownership of the cottage. To prove the latter, he averred that it
is not he who owns the cottage but a certain Renaldo Belir. He affixed as evidence in his position
paper the affidavit of Renaldo Belir affirming that it is he and not Bgy. Captain Bien who
constructed the cottage. As his additional proof, he included an official receipt issued to Belir as
payment for the barangay permit.[3]
As previously adverted to, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found all respondents therein, including herein
petitioner Bien, administratively liable for Abuse of Authority, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby respectfully recommended that
respondents JULIO BELLO, JOEL BISONA, ROLANDO VOLANTE, MARTINEZ BEA,
RICARDO BILAN, RENATO BARIAS, HERBES BOTIS, MILAGROS BALANA, and
JOEPHIL BIEN, be meted out the penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay for
Abuse of Authority.
SO RESOLVED.[4]
Objecting to the penalty meted out by the Deputy Obmudsman, petitioner appealed to the CA which ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The September 5, 2005
Decision and November 23, 2005 Order of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon anent OMB-L-A04-0488-H are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. [5]
Hence, this appeal by petitioner hinging on the singular issue of whether he is liable for abuse of authority.

Petitioner seeks to evade liability on the following grounds:

1. Respondent failed to prove petitioners participation in the destruction of the improvements introduced by the
former on the subject property;

2. Corollary thereto, respondent failed to establish petitioners ownership of one of the twenty-two (22) cottages
on the subject property found by the DENR to have been illegally erected; and

152

3. Petitioner is not a barangay official of San Isidro Ilawod; thus, he has no authority and jurisdiction over the
subject property.

We are in complete accord with the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzons and the appellate courts uniform
rulings.

Petitioners participation in the destruction of the improvements on the subject property introduced by the
respondent, as well as petitioners ownership of one of the cottages subsequently erected therein, were supported
by substantial evidence.

In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [6] In the case at bar, substantial
evidence consisted in the findings of the DENR-PENRO identifying petitioner as one of the owners of the
twenty-two (22) cottages illegally erected on the subject property covered by a lease application of respondent.
The Final Report of the DENR-PENRO narrates the circumstances surrounding the conflict between respondent
and the barangay officials of San Isidro Ilawod, concerning respondents application for lease of the subject
property:
On May 11, 1993, Applicant-Respondent filed with the DENR-CENRO, Legazpi a foreshore
lease application and designated as F.L.A. No. 050509-01. After six (6) years of follow-up by
Applicant-Respondent on the actions taken on his application, it was on April 28, 2003 that the
Notice to Lease Public Land was ultimately released for posting in the barangay where the
applied area is located. Instead of having it posted by the Barangay Officials of San Isidro
Ilawod, Malilipot, Albay, they refused its posting and consequently filed their opposition on June
4, 2003, just five (5) days before the scheduled bidding of the applied area.[7]

Moreover, the DENR Regional Executive Director categorically found that the barangay officials, respondents
in the proceedings before the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, including herein petitioner Bien, illegally erected
cottages on the subject property:
The Sangguniang Barangay of San Isidro Ilawod, cannot, in the guise of resolutions assume the
authority and task that pertain solely to the DENR as regards the administration and management
of the subject foreshore land. The introduction of improvements on the premises without the
necessary permit from the DENR is illegal which we cannot countenance.[8]

More importantly, the CA found that the evidence presented by respondent buttressed his positive and consistent
claim that petitioner connived with the barangay officials of San Isidro Ilawod to destroy the improvements he
introduced on the subject property so that these officials could construct their own cottages thereon.
Specifically, the appellate court proclaimed, thus:

153

The result of the DENRs field inspection that revealed petitioner as one who owned one of the
22 cottages that dislodged Col. Bos cottage and coconut trees is what Bgy. Capt. Bien is
pouncing on, for a confirmation in this administrative case of his alleged ownership of the
cottage in PalaleBeach will buttress Col. Bos positive and consistent claim, as inferred from all
his pleadings before the Ombudsman, that there was connivance among the[rein] respondents in
removing his improvements so that they may put up their own cottages.
xxxx. Renaldo Belir declared in his affidavit that he constructed his cottage in Palale Beach in
May 2003, but the subject here concerns the 22 cottages that were built immediately after the
destruction of Col. Bos cottage and coconut plantations. As against that of LMO Olfindos report
which listed those 22 cottages built in March 2003 [showing] that one of these cottages is
ostensibly owned by petitioner, the information which was gathered from the barangay officers
themselves of San Isidro Ilawod who accompanied LMO Olfindo during the ocular inspection,
the proof that petitioner submitted to substantiate his defense that another person owns the
cottage is weak.[9]

From the foregoing separate factual findings, respondent has sufficiently established that petitioner Bien was
one of the barangayofficials, albeit from a different barangay, who participated in the destruction of
respondents cottage and coconut trees built and planted on the subject property.

Petitioner further makes capital of the fact that he is not a barangay official of San Isidro Ilawod; necessarily,
for him to be liable for abuse of authority, the exercise of power should have been done in the discharge of his
office.

As the CA did, we likewise do not agree. Suffice it to say that petitioners status as ABC President is not
disputed. We concur with the CAs following disquisition:
His line of reasoning may be convincing had this been the only circumstance. But it must be
taken into consideration that he is the ABC President to whom the barangay officials show
deference to. Also, as correctly held by the Ombudsman, he is the ex-officio member of the
Sangguniang Bayan which is significantly mentioned to be the legislative body with the power to
review barangay ordinances and with the authority to discipline barangay officials. The presence
of his cottage as well as that of the other barangay officials in San Isidro Ilawod
in Palale Beach showed an apparent connivance among them. It then follows that his
participation as a higher authority had put a semblance of legality over the removal of
complainants improvements in order that they may protect their personal interests over the
foreshore lot. In this sense, there shows his misdemeanor as a public officer, an abuse of his
authority.[10]

With the foregoing discussion, we see no need to dispose of the peripheral issues raised by petitioner.

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R SP No. 92874 and the Decision and Order of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-L-A-04-0488-H
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

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Chief Justice
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201643

March 12, 2014

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE T. CAPULONG, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 119071, and the Resolution3 dated April 12, 2012, denying the Office of the
Ombudsman's (Ombudsman) Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The case arose from the Complaint-Affidavit4 for violation of Section 85 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 67136,
Perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and serious dishonesty and grave misconduct under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service7, filed on July 27, 2009, before the Ombudsman,
docketed as OMB-C-C-09-0560-J (LSC) and OMB-C-A-09-0570-J (LSC), by Joselito P. Fangon, Acting
Director of the General Investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman, against respondent Jose T. Capulong
(Capulong), Customs Operation Officer V of the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
These charges were based on two particular acts: first, for failure to file the required Statements of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for calendar years 1987, 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1998; and second, for failure
to disclose in his SALNs for calendar years 1999 to 2004 his wifes business interest in two corporations,
namely, SYJ Realty Corporation and Radsy Production, Inc. Accordingly, the Ombudsman issued an
Order8 dated December 7, 2009 directing Capulong to file a counter-affidavit.
In his Counter-Affidavit9 filed on February 24, 2010, Capulong denied all the allegations against him, asserting
that he had been diligently filing his SALNs since his assumption of office. He claimed that since he had never
received any order from their head office requiring him to submit his SALNs for the aforesaid periods as stated
under Section 310 of the Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 060231, a presumption exists that he had
faithfully complied with the annual filing of the SALN. He further asserted that he was not informed by his wife
that she was made an incorporator of the aforementioned corporations; hence there was no willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood on his part. Besides, the registration of both corporations had already been revoked by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as of March 15, 2004.
On March 17, 2010, Capulong filed a Rejoinder11 arguing that: (1) the submission of photocopies of his SALNs
for calendar years 1991 and 1998 to a responsive pleading is a matter of ordinary procedure; (2) he had filed his
SALNs in accordance with the regular procedure practiced in the Manila International Container Port (MICP)
of the BOC; (3) his 1991 and 1998 SALNs are contained in the records of the BOC, as evidenced by the MICPBOC Certification dated March 15, 2010; (4) the complaint against him is barred by prescription; (5) no legal
and factual basis exists to support the complaint; and (6) criminal rules should be strictly construed.
Capulong filed a motion to set the case for hearing for the presentation of certified true copies of his SALNs for
calendar years 1991 and 1998. He also filed, on July 30, 2010, a motion for early resolution of the complaint
considering that the parties have already filed their respective pleadings. However, the Ombudsman did not act
on the said motions.
On March 30, 2011, Capulong received an undated Order12 issued by the Ombudsman placing him under
preventive suspension without pay which shall continue until the case is terminated but shall not exceed six
months effective from receipt of the Order.

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Capulong filed an Urgent Motion to Lift/Reconsider Order of Preventive Suspension with Motion to
Resolve13contending that his preventive suspension was not warranted because his continued stay in office will
not prejudice the investigation of the case against him.14
Questioning the preventive suspension and wary of the threatening and coercive nature of the Ombudsmans
order, Capulong, on April 19, 2011, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
119071, with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction.15The CA granted the petition and issued a TRO dated April 26, 2011, enjoining and prohibiting the
Ombudsman and any person representing them or acting under their authority from implementing the
preventive suspension order of the Ombudsman until further orders from the court.16
Meanwhile, the Ombudsman issued an Order17 dated May 13, 2011 lifting Capulongs preventive suspension.
On the same date, in the scheduled hearing, the Ombudsmans representative manifested in open court that the
assailed order of preventive suspension had already been lifted, thus the CA held in abeyance the application for
preliminary injunction.18
On May 18, 2011, Capulong filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File and Admit Memorandum
asking the CA to rule on the merits of the petition. On the other hand, the Ombudsman filed a manifestation on
June 9, 2011 declaring that the lifting of Capulongs preventive suspension had rendered the case moot and
academic; hence the petition should be dismissed.
On July 29, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,19 which granted Capulongs petition and
dismissed the criminal charge docketed as OMB-C-C-09-0560-J (LSC). According to the CA, the petition is not
rendered moot and academic by the subsequent lifting of Capulongs preventive suspension. Thus:
It must be noted that the Petition likewise prays for "other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." This is
sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which states that the aggrieved person, that is Petitioner
herein, may, among others, pray for "such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require." Hence, as long as
there is, as can be gleaned from the evidence presented, an indicia of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Respondent, even in the absence of a specified prayer in the petition, a ruling on the merits is nevertheless
imperative. x x x. Moreover, it bears emphasis that the prayers in a petition are not determinative of what legal
principles will operate based on the factual allegations thereof.20 (Citations omitted)
The CA further held that: (a) the Ombudsman has lost its right to prosecute Capulong for non-filing of SALNs
because it had already prescribed in accordance with Act No. 3326;21 and (b) the simple allegation of nondisclosure of Capulongs spouses business interest does not constitute gross misconduct and serious dishonesty
since the complaint-affidavit failed to allege that the said non-disclosure were deliberately done. Hence, there
was absolutely no basis to warrant Capulongs preventive suspension as it is evident on the face of the
complaint that there was nothing to support the same.
The Ombudsman sought reconsideration22 thereto but the same was denied.23 Aggrieved by the foregoing
disquisition of the CA, the Ombudsman assails the same before this Court via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari.24
The Issue
Essentially, the issue presented to the Court for resolution is whether the CA has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and can grant reliefs, whether primary or incidental, after the Ombudsman has lifted the subject order of
preventive suspension.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
As a rule, it is the consistent and general policy of the Court not to interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of
its investigatory and prosecutory powers. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. It is within the
context of this well-entrenched policy that the Court proceeds to pass upon the validity of the preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman.25

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While it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of justice should respect the findings of fact
of said administrative agencies, the courts may not be bound by such findings of fact when there is absolutely
no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial; and when there
is a clear showing that the administrative agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or in a
capricious and whimsical manner, such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.26 These
exceptions exist in this case and compel the appellate court to review the findings of fact of the Ombudsman.
In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order against Capulong does not render
the petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the courts from passing upon the validity of a preventive
suspension order, it being a manifestation of its constitutionally mandated power and authority to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on the merits of the case. The
aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts through a petition for certiorari under Section 1,27 Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. While it is true that the primary relief prayed for by Capulong in his petition has
already been voluntarily corrected by the Ombudsman by the issuance of the order lifting his preventive
suspension, we must not lose sight of the fact that Capulong likewise prayed for other remedies. There being a
finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to
grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65.
The decision of the appellate court to proceed with the merits of the case is included in Capulongs prayer for
such "other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the premises." Such a prayer in the petition justifies the
grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for.28 More importantly, we have ruled that it is the allegations
in the pleading which determine the nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the
allegations and proof even if no such relief is prayed for.29
Significantly, the power of adjudication, vested in the CA is not restricted to the specific relief claimed by the
parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary and expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or preventing further disputes, provided
said matter for determination has been established by competent evidence during the hearing. The CA is not
bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that all disputes and other issues will be
adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.1wphi1
The requisites for the Ombudsman to issue a preventive suspension order are clearly contained in Section
2430 of R.A. No. 6770.31 The rule is that whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. In the very words of Section 24, the Ombudsman
may preventively suspend a public official pending investigation if "in his judgment" the evidence presented
before him tends to show that the officials guilt is strong and if the further requisites enumerated in Section 24
are present.32 The Court, however, can substitute its own judgment for that of the Ombudsman on this matter,
with a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
Undoubtedly, in this case, the CA aptly ruled that the Ombudsman abused its discretion because it failed to
sufficiently establish any basis to issue the order of preventive suspension. Capulongs non-disclosure of his
wifes business interest does not constitute serious dishonesty or grave misconduct. Nothing in the records
reveals that Capulong deliberately placed "N/A" in his SALN despite knowledge about his wifes business
interest. As explained by Capulong, the SEC already revoked the registration of the corporations where his wife
was an incorporator; hence, he deemed it not necessary to indicate it in his SALN.
Ineluctably, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution
for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint. The Court finds no cogent
reason to depart from this rule. However, the crime of perjury for which Capulong was charged, requires a
willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood in a statement under oath or in an affidavit, and the statement or
affidavit in question here is Capulong's SALNs. It then becomes necessary to consider the administrative charge
against Capulong to determine whether or not he has committed perjury. Therefore, with the dismissal of
Capulong's administrative case, the CA correctly dismissed its criminal counterpart since the crime of perjury
which stemmed from misrepresentations in his SALNs will no longer have a leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated July 29, 2011 and Resolution
dated April 12, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119071 are AFFIRMED.

158

SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203974

April 22, 2014

AURELIO M. UMALI, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT
OF CABANATUAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204371
J.V. BAUTISTA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before the Court is the consolidated case for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for injunctive
relief, docket as G.R. No. 203974, assailing Minute Resolution No. 12-07971 and Minute Resolution No. 1209252 dated September 11, 2012 and October 16, 2012, respectively, both promulgated by public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and Petition for Mandamus, docketed G.R. No. 204371, seeking to
compel public respondent to implement the same.
The Facts
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-2011,
requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of
Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in
a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of
1991."

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Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the plebiscite for
the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents
of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.
The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), citing
conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu
City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were allowed to vote in the
corresponding plebiscite.
In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration,
maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of
Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a
new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the
local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in
their rights and responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then
be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in
the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various
adverse effects of the Cabanatuan Citys conversion and how it will cause material change not only in the
political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.
To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayor of Cabanatuan,
interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions, which is the meat of
the matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the
qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite. Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when
Santiago City was converted in 1994 from a municipality to an independent component city pursuant to
Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of
Santiago.
Following a hearing conducted on October 4, 2012,3 the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012, in E.M No.
12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-24 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute Resolution
12-0925. The dispositive portion reads:
The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels including the Reply-memorandum of
Oppositor, after due deliberation, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:
1) To DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Governor Aurelio M. Umali; and
2) To SCHEDULE the conduct of Plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city
into highly-urbanized city with registered residents only of Cabanatuan City to participate in said
plebiscite.
Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, on
substantially the same arguments earlier taken by petitioner Umali before the poll body. On the other hand,
public respondent COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintained in its Comment that
Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component city into an HUC and that the political unit
directly affected by the conversion will only be the city itself. It argues that in this instance, no political unit will
be created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that no boundaries will be altered.
The conversion would merely reinforce the powers and prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with
the political units probable elevation to that of an HUC as demanded by its compliance with the criteria
established under the LGC. Thus, the participation of the voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not
be necessary.

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Private respondent will later manifest that it is adopting the Comment of the COMELEC.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 2012, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9543, which adopted a
calendar of activities and periods of prohibited acts in connection with the conversion of Cabanatuan City into
an HUC. The Resolution set the conduct of the plebiscite on December 1, 2012. Thereafter, a certain Dr.
Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 40 in Palayan City. In the said case, Punzalan prayed that Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 be
declared unconstitutional, that the trial court decree that all qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be
included in the plebiscite, and that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining public respondent
from implementing the questioned resolution. On October 19, 2012, the RTC granted the prayer for a TRO.
On November 6, 2012, public respondent through Minute Resolution No. 12-0989 suspended the preparations
for the event in view of the TRO issued by the RTC. On November 27, 2012, the plebiscite was once again
rescheduled to give way to the May 13, 2013 national, local and ARMM regional elections as per Resolution
No. 9563.
After this development, petitioner J.V. Bautista, on December 3, 2012, filed a case before this Court for
Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, praying that public respondent be ordered to schedule the plebiscite
either on December 15 or 22, 2012. Petitioner Bautista argued that since the TRO issued by the RTC has already
expired, the duty of the public respondent to hold the plebiscite has become mandatory and ministerial.
Petitioner Bautista also alleged that the delay in holding the plebiscite is inexcusable given the requirement that
it should be held within a period of 120 days form the date of the Presidents declaration.
In its Comment to the Bautista petition, public respondent justified its position by arguing that mandamus will
not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute. With all the legal conflicts surrounding the case, it
cannot be said that there is a clear showing of petitioner Bautistas entitlement to the relief sought. Respondent
COMELEC likewise relied on Sec. 5 of the Omnibus Election Code to justify the postponements, citing
incidents of violence that ensued in the locality during the plebiscite period.
After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public respondent issued Resolution No. 1353 scheduling the
plebiscite to January 25, 2014. However, a TRO was issued by this Court on January 15, 2014 in G.R. No.
203974 to suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for Cabanatuan Citys conversion. Given the intertwining
factual milieu of the two petitions before the Court, both cases were consolidated on March 18, 2014.
The Issue
The bone of contention in the present controversy boils down to whether the qualified registered voters of the
entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the
conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
Resolving the Petition for Certiorari either way will necessarily render the Petition for Mandamus moot and
academic for ultimately, the public respondent will be ordered to hold the plebiscite. The only variation will be
as regards its participants.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition for Certiorari is meritorious.
Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for determining the
qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. (emphasis supplied)

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Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses not only
Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the province are
qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their claim that only the City of
Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as
highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the
immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as referring only to the registered voters in
the city being converted, excluding in the process the voters in the remaining towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.
Before proceeding to unravel the seeming conflict between the two provisions, it is but proper that we ascertain
first the relationship between Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC.
First of all, we have to restate the general principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. Nonetheless, the
general rule barring delegation is subject to certain exceptions allowed in the Constitution, namely:
(1) Delegation by Congress to the President of the power to fix "tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government" under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; and
(2) Delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President "to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy" in times of war and other national emergency under
Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities
or barangays, which is pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially legislative in nature.5 The framers of the
Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation of such power in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as
long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the creation, division, merger, abolition or the
substantial alteration of the boundaries is subject to the approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.
True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod to
create barangays pursuant to Sec. 6 of the LGC, which provides:
Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a
province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang
panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial
jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code." (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been outlined by the various LGC provisions
detailing the requirements for the creation of barangays6, municipalities7, cities8, and provinces9. Moreover,
compliance with the plebiscite requirement under the Constitution has also been directed by the LGC under its
Sec. 10, which reads:
Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected." (emphasis supplied)
With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to LGUs of the power to create, divide,
merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries has become a recognized exception to the doctrine of nondelegation of legislative powers.
Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of the LGC quoted earlier, which
states:

162

Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as
highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the
immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein.
In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether or not the
requirements under Sec. 45210 of the LGC are complied with. The provision makes it ministerial for the
President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly urbanized once the minimum
requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The
mandatory language "shall" used in the provision leaves the President with no room for discretion.
In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for purposes of conversions
once the requirements are met. No further legislation is necessary before the city proposed to be converted
becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, as the basis for the delegation of the legislative
authority is the very LGC.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the source of the delegation of power to the
LGUs under Sec. 6 of the LGC and to the President under Sec. 453 of the same code is none other than Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution.
Respondents, however, posit that Sec. 453 of the LGC is actually outside the ambit of Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution, considering that the conversion of a component city to an HUC is not "creation, division, merge,
abolition or substantial alternation of boundaries" encompassed by the said constitutional provision.
This proposition is bereft of merit.
First, the Courts pronouncement in Miranda vs. Aguirre11 is apropos and may be applied by analogy. While
Miranda involves the downgrading, instead of upgrading, as here, of an independent component city into a
component city, its application to the case at bar is nonetheless material in ascertaining the proper treatment of
conversions. In that seminal case, the Court held that the downgrading of an independent component city into a
component city comes within the purview of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
In Miranda, the rationale behind the afore-quoted constitutional provision and its application to cases of
conversion were discussed thusly:
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator - - - material
change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people
therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political
units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987
Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people
for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the
undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on
the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the
local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of
legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It
is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct
democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru peoples representatives. This plebiscite requirement is
also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.12
It was determined in the case that the changes that will result from the conversion are too substantial that there
is a necessity for the plurality of those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the enumerated acts in the
constitutional provision, conversions were found to result in material changes in the economic and political
rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given the far-reaching ramifications of converting the status of a city,
we held that the plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally apply to conversions as
well. Thus, RA 852813 was declared unconstitutional in Miranda on the ground that the law downgraded
Santiago City in Isabela without submitting it for ratification in a plebiscite, in contravention of Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution.

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Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we
nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of
boundaries.
As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a change in the
geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase "boundaries" should not be
limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political
boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between political subdivisions, where the
LGUs exercise of corporate power ends and that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be
"substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the constitutional provision.
Pertinent is Art. 12(c) of the LGCs Implementing Rules and Regulations, which reads:
Art. 12. Conversion of a Component City into a Highly Urbanized City.
xxxx
(c) Effect of Conversion The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make it
independent of the province where it is geographically located. (emphasis added)
Verily, the upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a
steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding
decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan Citys gain of independence. With the citys newfound
autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial
jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the
province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with
Cabanatuan Citys severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva
Ecijas 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be "substantial."
Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow Cabanatuan Citys conversion in the
same way that creations, divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take place without entailing the
alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not mutually exclusive, and more often than not, a combination of
these acts attends the reconfiguration of LGUs.
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an HUC is substantial alternation of
boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec.
453 of the LGC.
Moreover, the rules of statutory construction dictate that a particular provision should be interpreted with the
other relevant provisions in the law The Court finds that it is actually Sec. 10 of the LGC which is undeniably
the applicable provision on the conduct of plebiscites. The title of the provision itself, "Plebiscite Requirement",
makes this obvious. It requires a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political
unit or units directly affected. On the other hand, Sec. 453 of the LGC, entitled "Duty to Declare Highly
Urbanized Status", is only on the duty to declare a city as highly urbanized. It mandates the Office of the
President to make the declaration after the city has met the requirements under Sec. 452, and upon proper
application and ratification in a plebiscite. The conduct of a plebiscite is then a requirement before a declaration
can be made. Thus, the Court finds that Sec. 10 of the LGC prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC on the plebiscite
requirement.
We now take the bull by the horns and resolve the issue whether Sec. 453 of the LGC trenches on Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution.
Hornbook doctrine is that neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary has the power to act beyond the
Constitutions mandate. The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power beyond what is circumscribed by
the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity. As elucidated by former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in
Fernandez v. Cuerva:14
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the Constitution, it is
null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." Administrative or executive acts, orders and

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regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. The above provision
of the civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not
a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. x x x
Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the
Constitution.15 In a long line of cases, the cardinal principle of construction established is that a statute should
be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or
prescription.16 If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are
obscure or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constitution, that interpretation which will avoid
the effect of unconstitutionality will be adopted, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard
the more usual or apparent import of the language used.17
Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should be
construed in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning of the phrase
in relation to the declaration by the President that a city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of the LGC will clash with
the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the "political units directly affected" shall
participate in the plebiscite. Such construction should be avoided in view of the supremacy of the Constitution.
Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not
only in the city proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by
such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
The Court finds that respondents are mistaken in construing Sec. 453 in a vacuum. Their interpretation of Sec.
453 of the LGC runs afoul of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which explicitly requires that all residents in
the "political units directly affected" should be made to vote.
Respondents make much of the plebiscites conducted in connection with the conversion of Puerto Princesa City,
Tacloban City and Lapu-Lapu City where the ratification was made by the registered voters in said cities alone.
It is clear, however, that the issue of who are entitled to vote in said plebiscites was not properly raised or
brought up in an actual controversy. The issue on who will vote in a plebiscite involving a conversion into an
HUC is a novel issue, and this is the first time that the Court is asked to resolve the question. As such, the past
plebiscites in the aforementioned cities have no materiality or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say
that conversion of said cities prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any manner
following the operative fact doctrinethat the actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.18
The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directly
affected by Cabanatuan Citys conversion
After the Court has resolved the seeming irreconcilability of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of
the LGC, it is now time to elucidate the meaning of the phrase "political units directly affected" under Sec. 10,
Art. X.
a. "Political units directly affected" defined
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be
determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by the change.
To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC19 and Padilla v. COMELEC20 are worth revisiting.
We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of the new province of
Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are
entitled to participate in the plebiscite. As held:
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained
"the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is
created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to
conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially
altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of
Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected.

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The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province
to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.21
xxxx
To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be
subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately
2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will be consequently
substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects of the division of the parent province
necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province
of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably
affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will
be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution
which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.22 (emphasis added)
Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution, as invoked in Tan, states:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (emphasis added)
Despite the change in phraseology compared to what is now Sec. 10, Art. X, we affirmed our ruling in Tan in
the latter case of Padilla. As held, the removal of the phrase "unit or" only served to sustain the earlier finding
that what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the plurality of political units which
would participate in the plebiscite. As reflected in the journal of the Constitutional Commission:23
Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the
Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words used are actually
"political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will be
no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about this.
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the part of the two
Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the plebiscite to
be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is
affected. It would mean a loss of a territory. (emphasis added)
The same sentiment was shared by the Senate during its deliberations on Senate Bill No. 155the predecessor
of the LGCthus:
Senator Guingona. Can we make that clearer by example? Let us assume that a province has municipalities and
there is a merger of two municipalities. Would this therefore mean that the plebiscite will be conducted within
the two merged municipalities and not in the eight other municipalities?
Senator Pimentel. The whole province, Mr. President, will be affected, and that is the reason we probably have
to involve the entire province.
Senator Guingona. So the plebiscite will not be held only in the two municipalities which are being merged, but
the entire province will now have to undergo.
Senator Pimentel. I suppose that was the ruling in the Negros del Norte case.
Senator Guingona. Supposing it refers to barangays, will the entire municipality have to vote? There are two
barangays being merged, say, out of 100 barangays. Would the entire municipality have to participate in the
plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, because the municipality is affected directly by the merger of two of its
barangay.

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Senator Guingona. And, if, out of 100 barangay, 51 are being merged, abolished, whatever, would the rest of the
municipality not participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Do all the 51 barangay that the Gentleman mentioned, Mr. President, belong to one
municipality?
Senator Guingona. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. Then it will only involve the municipality where the 51 barangays belong.
Senator Guingona. Yes. So, the entire municipality will now have to undergo a plebiscite.
Senator Pimentel. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. In the earlier example, if it is only a merger of two municipalities, let us say, in a province
with 10 municipalities the entire province will the other municipalities although not affected also have to
participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes. The reason is that the municipalities are within the territorial boundaries of the province
itself, it will have to be altered as a result of the two municipalities that the Gentleman mentioned.24
In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation in Tan and Padilla was modified to include not only
changes in economic but also political rights in the criteria for determining whether or not an LGU shall be
considered "directly affected." Nevertheless, the requirement that the plebiscite be participated in by the
plurality of political units directly affected remained.
b. Impact on Economic Rights
To recall, it was held in Miranda that the changes that will result in the downgrading of an LGU from an
independent component city to a component city cannot be categorized as insubstantial, thereby necessitating
the conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification. In a similar fashion, herein petitioner Umali itemized the adverse
effects of Cabanatuan Citys conversion to the province of Nueva Ecija to justify the provinces participation in
the plebiscite to be conducted.
Often raised is that Cabanatuan Citys conversion into an HUC and its severance from Nueva Ecija will result in
the reduction of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285 of the LGC. The law
states:
Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of local government units in the internal
revenue allotment shall be collected in the following manner:
(a) Provinces - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(b) Cities - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities - Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays - Twenty percent (20%)
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on the basis of
the following formula:
(a) Population - Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)
In our earlier disquisitions, we have explained that the conversion into an HUC carries the accessory of
substantial alteration of boundaries and that the province of Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt, suffer a

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reduction in territory because of the severance of Cabanatuan City. The residents of the city will cease to be
political constituencies of the province, effectively reducing the latters population. Taking this decrease in
territory and population in connection with the above formula, it is conceded that Nueva Ecija will indeed suffer
a reduction in IRA given the decrease of its multipliers values. As assessed by the Regional Director of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for Region III:25
Basis for IRA
Computation

Province of
Nueva Ecija

Cabanatuan
City

Province of
Nueva Ecija Net
of Cabanatuan
City

1,843,853

259,267

259,267

Land Area
(sq. km.)

5,751.33

282.75

5,468.58

IRA Share of
Nueva Ecija

Actual IRA
Share

Estimated IRA
share excluding
Cabanatuan
City

Reduction

Based on
Population

P800,772,618.45

P688,174,751.66

P112,597,866.79

Based on Land
Area

P263,470,472.62

P250,517,594.56

P 12,952,878.06

No. of Population
CY 2007 Census

Total

P125,550,744.85

Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction of its share in IRA once
Cabanatuan City attains autonomy. In view of the economic impact of Cabanatuan Citys conversion, petitioner
Umalis contention, that its effect on the province is not only direct but also adverse, deserves merit.
Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes imposed in Cabanatuan City is wellfounded. This is based on Sec. 151 of the LGC, which states:
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy the
taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes,
fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to
them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code. (emphasis added)
Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to this, the province enjoys the
prerogative to impose and collect taxes such as those on sand, gravel and other quarry resources,26 professional
taxes,27 and amusement taxes28 over the component city. While, it may be argued that this is not a derogation of
the provinces taxing power because it is in no way deprived of its right to collect the mentioned taxes from the
rest of its territory, the conversion will still reduce the provinces taxing jurisdiction, and corollary to this, it will
experience a corresponding decrease in shares in local tax collections. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction
and shares poses a material and substantial change to the provinces economic rights, warranting its
participation in the plebiscite.
To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs. 452(a) and 461(a) of the LGC is in order,
viz:
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.
(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office, and within the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos

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(P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as
highly urbanized cities.
Section 461. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or
units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
A component citys conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy from the province is a threat to the
latters economic viability. Noteworthy is that the income criterion for a component city to be converted into an
HUC is higher than the income requirement for the creation of a province. The ensuing reduction in income
upon separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on the provinces operations as there would be less
funding to finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead costs. Moreover, the quality of services being
offered by the province may suffer because of looming austerity measures. These are but a few of the social
costs of the decline in the provinces economic performance, which Nueva Ecija is bound to experience once its
most progressive city of Cabanatuan attains independence.
c. Impact on Political Rights
Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of Nueva Ecija and those of its residents will
also be affected by Cabanatuans conversion into an HUC. Notably, the administrative supervision of the
province over the city will effectively be revoked upon conversion. Secs. 4 and 12, Art. X of the Constitution
read:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces
with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit
their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of
component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their
right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to Cabanatuan City if it is converted into an
HUC. This includes the right to be outside the general supervision of the province and be under the direct
supervision of the President. An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight because the complex and varied
problems in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater economic activity require greater autonomy.29 The
provincial government stands to lose the power to ensure that the local government officials of Cabanatuan City
act within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions,30 to review executive orders issued by the city
mayor, and to approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council.31 The province will also be
divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the elected city officials of the new HUC, and the
appeal process for administrative case decisions against barangay officials of the city will also be modified
accordingly.32 Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for and be voted upon
as provincial officials.33
In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of Nueva Ecija, the city will be
separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the province, as earlier explained. The provincial government will
no longer be responsible for delivering basic services for the city residents benefit. Ordinances and resolutions
passed by the provincial council will no longer cover the city. Projects queued by the provincial government to

169

be executed in the city will also be suspended if not scrapped to prevent the LGU from performing functions
outside the bounds of its territorial jurisdiction, and from expending its limited resources for ventures that do
not cater to its constituents.1wphi1
In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province of Nueva Ecija and its residents,
the entire province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an HUC.
Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija should then be
allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.
Respondents apprehension that requiring the entire province to participate in the plebiscite will set a dangerous
precedent leading to the failure of cities to convert is unfounded. Their fear that provinces will always be
expected to oppose the conversion in order to retain the citys dependence is speculative at best. In any event,
any vote of disapproval cast by those directly affected by the conversion is a valid exercise of their right to
suffrage, and our democratic processes are designed to uphold the decision of the majority, regardless of the
motive behind the vote. It is unfathomable how the province can be deprived of the opportunity to exercise the
right of suffrage in a matter that is potentially deleterious to its economic viability and could diminish the rights
of its constituents. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the
province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they
demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, is hereby
GRANTED. COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and Minute Resolution No.
12-0925 dated October 16, 2012 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Public respondent COMELEC is hereby
enjoined from implementing the said Resolutions. Additionally, COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a
plebiscite for the purpose of converting Cabanatuan City into a Highly Urbanized City to be participated in by
the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecij a within 120 days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition
for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
I join Dissent of J. Leonen
MA. LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

Took no part.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

I join the Dissent of J. Leonen

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Leonen

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

170

I dissent. See Separate Opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MA. LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176947

February 19, 2009

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting (Tambunting) of an
election offense for violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc dismissed Cordoras complaint in a Resolution1 dated 18
August 2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August 2006 Resolution as well as the
Resolution2 dated 20 February 2007 of the COMELEC En Banc which denied Cordoras motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted that Tambunting made
false assertions in the following items:
That Annex A [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and Annex B [Tambuntings
Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state, among others, as follows, particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12
thereof:
1. No. 6 I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
2. No. 9 No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;
3. No. 12 I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected.3 (Boldface and capitalization in the
original)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the
required citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a certification from
the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American:
upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001.

171

According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through
naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000. Cordora concluded:
That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC): [sic] Re: CONTENTS OF
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY: which requires the declarant/affiant to state, among others, under oath, that
he is a Filipino (No. 6), No. 9- residence requirement which he lost when [he was] naturalized as
an American Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic] Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and
willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the above basic requirements under No. 12 that he is
indeed eligible for the office to which he seeks to be elected, when in truth and in fact, the contrary is
indubitably established by his own statements before the Philippine Bureau of Immigration x x x.4 (Emphases
in the original)
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of
candidacy. To refute Cordoras claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a
copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father.
Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship
conferred by the US government after Tambuntings father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for
Relative) merely confirmed Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings possession of an
American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of
allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting has imbibed the
Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting
maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of
Paraaque.
To refute Cordoras claim that the number of years of residency stated in Tambuntings certificates of candidacy
is false because Tambunting lost his residency because of his naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting
contended that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordoras complaint against Tambunting
because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordoras reliance on the certification of
the Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to prove that
Tambunting is an American citizen.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law Department. The
COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by
sufficient and convincing evidence.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence
to establish probable cause.
SO ORDERED.5
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate opinion which concurred with
the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be
considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed
his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the same arguments in his
complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordoras
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

172

The Issue
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support probable cause that may warrant the
prosecution of Tambunting for an election offense.
Cordoras petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of Tambuntings failure to meet citizenship
and residency requirements. Neither is the present petition an action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a
non-resident. The present petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in
his certificates of candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.
Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed an Election Offense
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Bancs ruling that there is no sufficient and
convincing evidence to support a finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for trial for violation of Section
74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed. Determining probable cause is an intellectual activity
premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or testimonial proofs either
confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint.6
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:
Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; x x x the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that
the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxx
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a statement in
duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that violation of Section 74, among
other sections in the Code, shall constitute an election offense.
Tambuntings Dual Citizenship
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither does he deny
that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his fathers
citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and
American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of
the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process
to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American
citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which
Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting
possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact
that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.7

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Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein we ruled that dual
citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of
a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers
country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a
citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on
citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of
an individuals volition.
xxx
[I]n including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizensper se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20
must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive
members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us
because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino
mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our
control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel
clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual
citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President,
someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the
Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect
or give up Philippine citizenship.

174

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father
and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a
local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to
run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of
the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the
world.1avvphi1
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election
for him of his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the
Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to
claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example, if he does
not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the
first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only
one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always
have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.8 (Emphasis supplied)
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v. Manzano,9 Valles v.
COMELEC,10 and AASJS v. Datumanong.11 Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the present
case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth.
Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was
born to an Australian mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that
dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office,
by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus,
like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to
file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the
other hand, is brought about by the individuals active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states
that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain
his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of
taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizens foreign citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted years after the
promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the
status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization.12 Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship
and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.

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The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,13 Velasco v.
COMELEC,14 and Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became
naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present
case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country.
Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Tambuntings residency
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of Tambuntings
naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized American.
Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a
fixed place and the intention to return there permanently,16 and is not dependent upon citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully made false
entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved his innocence of the
charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the
citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections En
Bancdated 18 August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO*
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

(On official leave)

DANTE O. TINGA**
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.***
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

176

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159310

February 24, 2009

CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in the country as
against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were registered under the Torrens
system?
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his employer,
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to
Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he met respondent
Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel.
Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of additional income to
support her children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in Antoniettas residence at a squatters area in
Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue
City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City.
In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 19851 and March 10, 19862 covering the properties, Jambrich and
respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 19873 was likewise
issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the
Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrichs name was erased from the document. But it
could be noted that his signature remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondents signature as
buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties were issued in respondents name alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN,4 and per Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988.5
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich
began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondents sons for only two months
after the break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate
business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some
accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To
pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as
evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment."6 On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the
deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent,
and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985
and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which
identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since
respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich

177

alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of
the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in his favor.
In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On
the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the
purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or
own real property in the Philippines.
At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed property
with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and
documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still employed by the
Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under
litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not
only supported by documentary evidence but also by the admission made by the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla.
So that, Jambrichs financial capacity to acquire and purchase the properties . . . is not disputed.7
xxx
On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter part of
1984, she was only working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of P1,000.00 a month and
was . . . renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at Gorordo Ave., Cebu City; that
Jambrich took pity of her and the situation of her children that he offered her a better life which she readily
accepted. In fact, this miserable financial situation of hers and her two children . . . are all stated and reflected in
the Child Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts she supplied to the Social
Worker who prepared the same when she was personally interviewed by her in connection with the adoption of
her two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if such facts were not true because these are now denied by her .
. . and if it was also true that during this time she was already earning as much as P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 as
profit per month from her copra business, it would be highly unbelievable and impossible for her to be living
only in such a miserable condition since it is the observation of this Court that she is not only an extravagant but
also an expensive person and not thrifty as she wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big saving as
clearly shown by her actuation when she was already cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her .
. . the allowance given . . . by him in the amount of $500.00 a month is not enough to maintain the education
and maintenance of her children.8
This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the properties under litigation
or could contribute any amount for their acquisition which according to her is worth more than P700,000.00
when while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning P1,000.00 a month as salary and tips of
more or less P2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of her family so much so that it is safe
to conclude that she was really in financial distress when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come
and live with him because that was a big financial opportunity for her and her children who were already
abandoned by her husband.9
xxx
The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell dated
November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] as
buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and exploitive woman, she has taken
advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good
attitude shown by her to him since he could still very well provide for everything she needs, he being earning
(sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation
was at the time when their relationship was still going smoothly and harmoniously.10 [Emphasis supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

178

WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Antoniet[t]a
Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the residential house of strong materials and three
parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and
24792 issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in the name of defendant
Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in the
name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F.
Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I," "K" and "L" as avoided insofar as they appear to
convey rights and interests over the properties in question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar;
5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the amount of P25,000.00 and litigation
expenses in the amount of P10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs.11
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002,12 the appellate court reversed
the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower courts conclusion. The circumstances involved in the case cited by the lower court
and similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of the subsequent
Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the title to the subject
property has been issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et al., vs. Fong Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA
223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phils. 461; United Church Board for World Ministries
vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido
vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich
but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title
thereto.13
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENTS
JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING JAMBRICHS
PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JAMBRICH HAS
NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT THEREFORE TRANSFER AND
ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELLREASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST
HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).14
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich possesses
the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 1985
to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company. He was

179

earning an estimated monthly salary of P50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one year
where his monthly salary was approximately P90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of not more
than P1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by her
during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business were unsubstantiated. The
supposed copra business was actually the business of her mother and their family, with ten siblings. She has no
license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return. All the motorized bancas of her mother were lost
to fire, and the last one left standing was already scrap. Further, the Child Study Report15 submitted by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondents two sons
by Jambrich disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz
Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no problem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritz are
(sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more foreigners coming
because of the situation in the Philippines at that time. Her financial problem started then. She was even renting
a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was during her time of great financial distress
that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered her a decent place for herself and her children.16
The DSWD Home Study Report17 further disclosed that:
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses of
the said Restaurants. He made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the] English language.
Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need of additional income to support [her] 2 young children
who were abandoned by their father. Their session was agreed to be scheduled every afternoon at the residence
of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of
the family particularly the children who were malnourished. After a few months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered
to transfer the family into a decent place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good for the children.
Antonietta who was miserable and financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of the
children.18
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to purchase the
three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct examination and during the
proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in
question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints.
Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated checks issued by
Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank. Receipts of the installment
payments were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for ten months, where
she was completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject properties
to respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject properties
to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are accorded
great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the instant case, we
find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court did not controvert the
factual findings of the trial court. They differed only in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation also does not help
respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not

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apply.19 In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived
together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each
of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay
claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.20
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone. Having found
that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of
registration of the properties in the name of respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.21 It is only a means of confirming the fact of
its existence with notice to the world at large.22 Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has
the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that
the title is quiet,23and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.24 However, there are well-defined exceptions
to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a
valuable consideration.25 This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo
in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings.
She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution,26 which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution,27and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.28 The capacity to acquire private land is
dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may be transferred only
to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only Filipino citizens or
corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made
by a former natural-born citizen.29
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who
is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to
petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court
reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World
Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void
ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the
acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original
transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the
name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong materials and
three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to
issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial court likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner P25,000
as attorneys fees and P10,000 as litigation expenses, as well as the costs of suit.
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The rationale behind the Courts ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent
cases,32 is this since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nations land for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino
citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is
already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be
protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

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IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No.
42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127240

March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of
Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment
and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at
the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in
2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the law, stated
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction
No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed
as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special
Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that
processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was suspended;

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During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his
testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being
asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he
remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense
that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our
part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of
the Philippines.And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the
testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he
is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3)
failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in
violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient
or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.4
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with
the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 in which petitioner stated that in addition to
his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner,
however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition
must fail.6The state also annexed income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show
that his net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that,
although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953,
and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from
1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract,
if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract8 and a JointAffidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona
Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil
Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without
the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in
1953, they had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, 10 petitioner resided at
"J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial
court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization
cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the
first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this
present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the
petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This
is a mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come
forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application
for citizenship.

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Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly resided in
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the
applicant to state in his petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is
mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the
Court, the reason for the provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the
government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their
objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the
public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with
his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that
the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as required by the
Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines
by naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses,
commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return "because
he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is not only that the person
having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses
as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to
work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in
their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their
children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are
contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN
BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN
HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO
CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely
been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial
court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper
devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that

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These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance
when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and
convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first
time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that
decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final
favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving
him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his
objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the
alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by
the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the
Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a
typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was
annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the Special
Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner
offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's
marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns are all
public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed
to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these
documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues
raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in
his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization.
Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such
publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication effectively
satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the
government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information
regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or
another.21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in
favor of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides
that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of
residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's

185

argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this
ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 178831-32

July 30, 2009

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F.
VILLANDO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179120

July 30, 2009

LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines, and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 179132-33

July 30, 2009

OLIVIA P. PARAS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON.
ROBERTO NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives; HON.
RHODORA SEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House of
Representatives; THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY
LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 179240-41

July 30, 2009

RENALD F. VILLANDO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant motion with prayer for oral argument filed by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120,
seeks a reconsideration of the Courts April 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichongs
petition forcertiorari in G.R. Nos. 178831-32. The Court dismissed all the other petitions, including Biraogos
petition, and reversed the Joint Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division
dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a
congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.

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Biraogo prefaced his motion by stating that justice and constitutionalism must remain entrenched in Philippine
case law. To achieve this end, he maintained that the Court should reconsider its April 1, 2009 Decision. He also
prayed for an oral argument, which he posited, would help the Court in the just and proper disposition of the
pending incident.
After an assiduous review of the motion for reconsideration, we resolve that the same should be denied for lack
of merit.
Most of the arguments advanced by Biraogo are a mere rehash of his previous arguments, which we have all
considered and found without merit in the Decision dated April 1, 2009. Nonetheless, in order to lay to rest once
and for all Biraogo's misgivings, we shall discuss only the relevant issues and revalidate our Decision by ruling
on his motion as follows:
The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and
assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of
the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the
citizenship requirement in Section 6,1 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was
voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed
as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of
Representatives.
Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens.2 With this principle in mind, we have said in Aquino v.
COMELEC3 that if one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives is lacking, then not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. Hence assuming, time constraints notwithstanding, and
after proper proceedings before the proper tribunal be had, that Limkaichong would prove to be an alien, the
court of justice would tilt against her favor and would not sanction such an imperfection in her qualification to
hold office. But, first things first.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her
parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the
naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
In our Decision, We held that:
However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section
18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:
Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by
the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may
cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:
1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;
2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization
certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence
there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his native
country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be
considered asprima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:
3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;
4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or
private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of
the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school
curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring
them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate
shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President] and
the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];

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5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of
the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use
or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and not in the
proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had
already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural
infirmities, the Court held that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were
tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of
the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the
procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5),
Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore
quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or
by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably
after previous investigation in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may
question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizens descendant.
Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a
natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper
proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's
disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed, for
in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of Representative but
her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The
obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by
final judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention to misapply
their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they
would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.4lavvphil
These precepts, notwithstanding, Biraogo remained firm in his belief that this Court erred in its Decision and
that the COMELEC Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying Limkaichong should have been
affirmed. He even went to a great extent of giving a dichotomy of the said Joint Resolution by stating that it was
composed of two parts, the first part of which is the substantive part, and the second, pertains to the injunctive
part. For this purpose, the dispositive portion of the said COMELEC Joint Resolution is reproduced below:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED
from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directed to strike out
the name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for the said position, and the
concerned Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN SYLIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if any, until this decision has become final.
SO ORDERED.5
Biraogo maintained that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Limkaichong suspended only the execution of
the substantive relief or the first part of the above-quoted COMELEC Joint Resolution. However, it did not
suspend the execution of the injunctive part and, accordingly, the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC
should not have proceeded with Limkaichong's proclamation as the winning candidate in the elections.
His argument has no leg to stand on. We cannot take a decision or resolution on a piece-meal basis and apply
only that part which is seemingly beneficial to one's cause and discard the prejudicial part which, obviously,
would just be a hindrance in advancing one's stance or interests. Besides, the COMELEC Joint Resolution
which Biraogo dichotomized was effectively suspended when Limkaichong timely filed her Motion for

188

Reconsideration pursuant to Section 13(c),6 Rule 18 and Section 2,7 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Hence, it cannot as yet be implemented for not having attained its finality.
Nevertheless, events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its Joint Resolution.
Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she
was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009
Decision that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should
now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases. Pertinently, we held:
x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
andassumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins.8 It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction
over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should
now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and
decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns
and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section
2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests
relating to its members.10
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
xxxx
Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that Limkaichongs
proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.
The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with
irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.11 The Court has shed light on this in the case
of Vinzons-Chato,12 to the effect that:
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of
office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly
ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato
essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These
are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the
allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his
oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The
reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate.
Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against respondent Unico would
be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.
In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming
jurisdiction over all matters essential to a members qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.
The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition
for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day
prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because

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qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.13 Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that
Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but
during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it
may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.lavvphi1
In fine, we hold that Biraogo had not successfully convinced us to reconsider our Decision and grant his motion
for reconsideration.
In a last-ditched attempt to muddle the issues, Biraogo observed that the Decision dated April 1, 2009 is a
complete turn-around from the ruling embodied in the Decision written by Justice Ruben T. Reyes which,
although unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by fourteen (14) Associate Justices and approved by the Court
en banc on July 15, 2008. He decried the absence of an explanation in the Decision dated April 1, 2009 for the
said departure or turn-around.
Such a position deserves scant consideration.
The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections,14 held that a decision must not only be signed by the Justices
who took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a Decision, to wit:
[A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that
decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a
member of the Court after the deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has
to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice
casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes,
wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they
may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and
deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and
conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices,
binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining what
the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the decision of the Court,
but inno way is that decision binding unless and until signed and promulgated.
We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the ponente. Indeed, if any
member of the court who may have already signed it so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and
register a qualification or dissent as long as the decision has not yet been promulgated. A promulgation
signifies that on the date it was made the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it.
Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the confidential internal
deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public. A decision becomes binding only after it is
validly promulgated.15 Until such operative act occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all
of the Justices have already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of
signing until the promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had signed the
decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action.
In sum, we hold that Biraogos Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument must be denied. This
Court did not err in ruling that the proper remedy of those who may assail Limkaichong's disqualification based
on citizenship is to file before the HRET the proper petition at any time during her incumbency.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument filed by petitioner Louis C.
Biraogo in G.R. No. 179120 is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

On Official Leave
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
EN BANC
G.R. No. 195649

July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G.
BALUA. RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013 and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has already
ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought
can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the
validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Courts Decision dated
April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be stressed, however,
that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the

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Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the
question before this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the
effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009
and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the
rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit
of Renunciation repudiates this claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1 which must be presented as public documents2 of a
foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof."3 Mere reference to a foreign law in a
pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States "providing that a person
who is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American
citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."4
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code calls
for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he
was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this
law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run for any local elective
position.
With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act."5 This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section
5(2)6 requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to
renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code7 which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local
position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign
passport which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the
Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual
citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country
which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person
named therein as its national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to
the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his
American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American citizenship
when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and
unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty
of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use

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of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It
devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country".1wphi1 On the contrary,
this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is
not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are
not supported by substantial evidence.8 They are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are
binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or
misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been
properly appreciated.9
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at
least six times after he renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc,
which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed with Arnados claim that he
only used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The
COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on
the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4
June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using
his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is USA-American. Adding
these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also
presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon
departure on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use."10 This conclusion, however, is not supported by the
facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he
continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnados travel
records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March
2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of the U.S.
passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S.
passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.
It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos are
qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their
foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for
these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby
DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.

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Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Brion.
Brion, J., I dissent.