1

THIRD DIVISION
[CBD Case No. 176 . January 20, 1995.]
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO
M. MARTIJA, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; PRACTICE OF LAW; REPRESENTING CONFLICTING INTERESTS; NEGATED IN CASE
AT BENCH. In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally
Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and
unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or
satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in
these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address,
the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number, to wit: Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88. After hearing, the IBP Board of
Governors issued its Resolution with the following findings and recommendations: Among the several
documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374,
which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly
appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on said TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta
and her husband was registered and annotated in said title on February 7, 1989; whereas, that in favor of
Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her
husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and abetting a
scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain
against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE BY COUNSEL OF ANOTHER'S IBP RECEIPT NUMBER CONSTITUTES FALSEHOOD.
As to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the same
IBP No. "246722 dated 1-12-88," respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be suspended for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and
current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her
complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by
the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in
placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings
of Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant
consideration, for it is the bounden duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP
membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme
Court. Wherefore, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija. The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby dismissed for lack of evidence. (pp. 24,
Resolution). The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. Finding respondent Atty.
Pablito M. Castillo guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE ON THOSE WHO SHOW THAT THEY POSSESS AND
CONTINUE TO POSSESS THE QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY LAW. It is well to stress again that the practice
of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these
requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor
and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J p:

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In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta
charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical
conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or
satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. cdasia
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal
Case No. 7653-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action
Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a
piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No.
38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and
civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed Civil Case No. 58650 for collection of
a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel.
In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were
declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was
received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of
execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was levied
upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty.
Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt
number, to wit: Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 115-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.
Thus, complainant concluded that Civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of
the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might
obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:cdasia
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the
records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to
be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of
Encumbrances on said TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was
registered and annotated in said title on February 7, 1989; whereas, that in favor of Gregorio
Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and
her husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of
Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests
and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in
their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated 1-12-88," respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo
deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt
number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National
Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on
February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged
in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt
number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings of Atty. Castillo
and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant
consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he
pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as
required by the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his corespondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

3
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 24,
Resolution)
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of
these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has
the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty of committing a falsehood in violation
of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar
offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be
spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant. cdasia
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
||| (Bongalonta v. Castillo, CBD Case No. 176 (Resolution), [January 20, 1995], 310 PHIL 320-326)

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005.]
MARIA ELENA MORENO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and nonpayment of
debts.
The complaint, 1 dated 25 September 1972, was filed in this Court by Maria Elena Moreno on two causes of
action. The first cause of action involved Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 issued by the Land Registration
Commission in favor of Lira, Inc., and indorsed by Araneta, purportedly as president of the said corporation, to
Moreno, in consideration of the amount of P2,177. The complaint alleged that almost a year later, the warrant
was dishonored.
The second cause of action involved Araneta's nonpayment of debts in the amount of P11,000. Moreno alleged
that sometime in October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her, purportedly to show to his associates, with
the assurance that he would return the said amount within the shortest possible time. Again in May 1972,
Araneta borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose and with the same assurance. Thereafter, since he failed to
make good on both promises, Moreno sought repayment in the aggregate amount of P11,000. Araneta issued
two Bank of America checks in her favor, the first dated 30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15 July
1972 for P5,000. However, when Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored and returned to
her marked "Account Closed." She referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent Araneta a demand letter. Araneta,
however, ignored the same.
In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact Moreno who sought to borrow P2,500 from him. To accommodate
her, he allegedly endorsed to her the Treasury Warrant in question, worth P2,177, which he received from Lira,
Inc., as part of his attorney's fees, and gave her an additional P323 in cash. aATCDI
Araneta also denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He admitted that he issued the two undated checks in
her favor, but maintains that he had no intention of negotiating them. He avers that he gave them to Moreno,
allegedly upon her request, only so she could show the bank where she was working that she "had money
coming to her." Araneta further claims that he warned her that the checks belonged to the unused portion of a
closed account and could not be encashed. To protect himself, he asked the complainant to issue a check in the
amount of P11,000 to offset the two "borrowed" checks. The respondent offered this check in evidence.
Moreno, however, contended 2 that this check for P11,000 "belonged" to the Philippine Leasing Corporation,
which she managed when her father passed away. She claimed she signed the check in blank sometime in 1969
when she fell seriously ill and gave them to Araneta who was then helping her in the management of the
corporation. She concluded that Araneta falsely filled up the check "in a desperate bid to turn the tables on
her." 3
On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. 4
The case was first set for hearing on 22 January 1973 at nine o'clock in the morning, when the complainant and
her counsel appeared. Araneta was absent despite due notice. Upon motion, however, of Moreno, and to give
the respondent a chance to defend himself, the hearing was reset to 23 and 24 January 1973, both at nine
o'clock in the morning. Service of the notice for the new dates of hearing were effected to the respondent
through a certain Mely Magsipoc on 22 January 1973. 5 On 23 January 1973, Araneta once more did not appear,
so the case was called again the following day, 24 January 1973.
In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-parte hearing was conducted on 24 January 1973 with the
complainant, Moreno, taking the stand. 6 On 27 February 1973, Araneta appeared for the scheduled hearing,
only to ask for a postponement to prepare his defense. 7 No further hearings appear to have been conducted
thereafter. A hearing is shown to have been scheduled on 28 May 1973, however, on said date, Araneta filed a
joint motion for postponement with the conform of Moreno's lawyer, as he, Araneta, was "earnestly pursuing a
possible clarification of complainant's basic grievance."
Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent Araneta. On 14 September 1988, records of the case were
forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Two days later,
the Commission notified 8 both parties of a hearing to be held on 2 November 1988, on which date neither of
the parties nor the complainant's counsel appeared despite due notice. It appears that notice could not be

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served on Araneta, as he no longer resided in his indicated address, and his whereabouts were unknown. An
inquiry 9 made at his IBP chapter yielded negative results. The Commission reset the hearing to 18 November
1988 at two o'clock in the afternoon. 10 Again on this date, none of the parties appeared. Thus on the basis of
the evidence so far adduced, the case was submitted for resolution on such date. 11
On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner Concepcion Buencamino submitted her Report, 12 which reads in
part: cEaDTA
The evidence of the complainant was not formally offered in evidence. Be that as it may, it is
worthwhile considering. The "stop payment" of Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 was an act
of Lira, Inc. and not that of the respondent. There was a subpoena issued for the appearance
of Lilia Echaus, alleged President of Lira, Inc. and Simplicio Uy Seun, the alleged
Secretary/Treasurer of Lira, Inc. to explain about why the "stop payment" of the treasury
warrant was done but neither witness appeared (as evidenced by the records) before the
Office of the Solicitor General to testify. At the dorsal portion of Exh. "B," the photocopy of the
Treasury Warrant is a signature which complainant claims to be that of the respondent
beneath which is the word "President" and above the signature are the words Lira, Inc. but an
ocular examination of said signature in relation to the signature on the checks Exhibits "G" and
"H" do not show definitely that they were the signatures of one and the same person, so there
is no basis to form the conclusion that the respondent did sign the treasury warrant as
president of Lira, Inc. The testimony of the complainant was merely that [the] same treasury
warrant was given to her by Atty. Araneta, which she deposited [in] her account. There is no
evidence to prove that she saw him sign it.
There is no evidence of a letter of the complainant informing the respondent about the "stop
payment" or even any written demand by the complainant to the respondent that the
payment of the treasury warrant having been "stopped" he should reimburse her with what he
received as consideration for this check.
Same considered, there is no cause to fault the respondent for the first cause of action.
On the other hand, the respondent admits having issued the two checks, one for P5,000.00
and the other for P6,000.00 to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money
was coming her way, when in fact he is presumed to have been aware when he issued said
checks that his account with the bank against which [these] checks were drawn was already
closed, as was discovered from the fact that the checks were dishonored for said reason.
Even disregarding the complainant's evidence and considering the answer of the respondent,
the act of the respondent in issuing the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for
P6,000.00 which he gave to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was
coming her way, when there was none and the respondent knew such fact was an act of
connivance of the respondent with the complainant to make use of these useless commercial
documents to deceive the public. However beneficial it may have been to the complainant,
this act of the respondent as a lawyer is abhorrent and against the exacting standards of
morality and decency required of a member of the Bar.
The personal actuations of a member of the bar the like of which was, as in this case,
committed by the respondent, belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon
his integrity and morality. In the Bar, moral integrity as a virtue is a necessity which the
respondent lacks.
The above considered, it is respectfully recommended that as a lesson the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months arising from his irresponsible conduct
as a member of the bar to take effect upon notice by him of the decision of suspension. AICTcE
The IBP Board of Governors adopted 13 the above report, but increased its recommended period of suspension
from three months to six months.
Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted 14 the
records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. 15 On 8 July
2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report 16 regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further
made mention of a Resolution 17 from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been
convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. The Resolution, which was
attached to the report, states:
L-46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) Considering that the motion of
petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta for reconsideration of the resolution of September 16, 1977

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which denied the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 18553-R which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting
the said petitioner of the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document, was
denied in the resolution dated October 17, 1977 of the Second Division of this Court for lack of
merit, which denial is final, the Court Resolved: (a) to SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta
from the practice of law and (b) to require the said petitioner to SHOW CAUSE within ten days
from notice why he should not be disbarred.

Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar Confidant revealed that the above case had been archived on 20
November 1992.
It therefore appears that in the intervening time between herein respondent's last filed pleading dated 28 May
1973, when he sought a postponement of the scheduled hearing on this case to settle matters amicably
between himself and Moreno, and the present, Araneta had been found guilty and convicted by final judgment
of a crime involving moral turpitude, and indefinitely suspended.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Buencamino. However, we disagree with the penalty
sought to be imposed.
Whether or not the complainant sufficiently proved that Araneta failed to pay his debts is irrelevant, because by
his own admission, the respondent issued two checks in favor of Moreno knowing fully well that the same were
drawn against a closed account. And though Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 had not yet been passed at that time, the
IBP correctly found this act "abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a
member of the Bar," which "belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and
morality."
Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 18 as
the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also
an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on
his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of
right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals." 19
Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she
does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. 20
In Co v. Bernardino 21 and Lao v. Medel, 22 we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one year's suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial
payment of the obligation. 23
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time, apparently been found guilty by
final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which
he has been indefinitely suspended. AIECSD
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 24 It
involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 25
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves
moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty.
In fact, we have long held 26 that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N.
Jaramillo, 27 "[t]he review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has
become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of
the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent
has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice." 28
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the

7
Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio Morales, J., is on leave.
||| (Moreno v. Araneta, A.C. No. 1109, [April 27, 2005], 496 PHIL 788-798)

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 7332. June 18, 2013.]
EDUARDO A. ABELLA, complainant, vs. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Eduardo A. Abella
(complainant) against Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. (respondent) based on the latter's violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03,
Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
The Facts
On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation (PT&T) before the Cebu City Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), docketed as RAB-VII-01-0128-99. Finding merit in the complaint, Labor Arbiter (LA) Ernesto
F. Carreon, through a Decision dated May 13, 1999, 2 ordered PT&T to pay complainant P113,100.00 as
separation pay and P73,608.00 as backwages. Dissatisfied, PT&T appealed the LA's Decision to the NLRC.
In a Decision dated September 12, 2001, 3 the NLRC set aside LA Carreon's ruling and instead ordered PT&T to
reinstate complainant to his former position and pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay, including moral damages and attorney's fees. On reconsideration, it modified the amounts
of the aforesaid monetary awards but still maintained that complainant was illegally dismissed. 4 Consequently,
PT&T filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA Decision), 5 the CA affirmed the NLRC's ruling with modification,
ordering PT&T to pay complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Complainant moved for partial
reconsideration, claiming that all his years of service were not taken into account in the computation of his
separation pay and backwages. The CA granted the motion and thus, remanded the case to the LA for the same
purpose. 6 On July 19, 2004, the CA Decision became final and executory. 7
Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Cebu City RAB on
October 25, 2004. At this point, the case had already been assigned to the new LA, herein respondent. After the
lapse of five (5) months, complainant's motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for
Execution on March 3, 2005. Eight (8) months thereafter, still, there was no action on complainant's motion.
Thus, on November 4, 2005, complainant proceeded to respondent's office to personally follow-up the matter. In
the process, complainant and respondent exchanged notes on how much the former's monetary awards should
be; however, their computations differed. To complainant's surprise, respondent told him that the matter could
be "easily fixed" and thereafter, asked "how much is mine?"Despite his shock, complainant offered the amount
of P20,000.00, but respondent replied: "make it P30,000.00." By force of circumstance, complainant acceded on
the condition that respondent would have to wait until he had already collected from PT&T. Before complainant
could leave, respondent asked him for some cash, compelling him to give the latter P1,500.00. 8
On November 7, 2005, respondent issued a writ of execution, 9 directing the sheriff to proceed to the premises
of PT&T and collect the amount of P1,470,082.60, inclusive of execution and deposit fees. PT&T moved to
quash 10 the said writ which was, however, denied through an Order dated November 22, 2005. 11 Unfazed,
PT&T filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash dated December 2, 2005, 12 the contents of which were virtually
identical to the one respondent earlier denied. During the hearing of the said supplemental motion on December
9, 2005, respondent rendered an Order 13 in open court, recalling the first writ of execution he issued on
November 7, 2005. He confirmed the December 9, 2005 Order through a Certification dated December 14,
2005 14 and eventually, issued a new writ of execution 15 wherein complainant's monetary awards were
reduced from P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.
Aggrieved, complainant filed on December 16, 2005 a Petition for Injunction before the NLRC. In a Resolution
dated March 14, 2006, 16 the NLRC annulled respondent's December 9, 2005 Order, stating that respondent
had no authority to modify the CA Decision which was already final and executory. 17
Aside from instituting a criminal case before the Office of the Ombudsman, 18 complainant filed the instant
disbarment complaint 19 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a favorable
resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and advantage to PT&T.
In his Comment, 20 respondent denied the abovementioned accusations, maintaining that he merely
implemented the CA Decision which did not provide for the payment of backwages. He also claimed that he

9
never demanded a single centavo from complainant as it was in fact the latter who offered him the amount of
P50,000.00.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 2008, 21 IBP Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco
(Commissioner Limpingco) found that respondent tried to twist the meaning of the CA Decision out of all logical,
reasonable and grammatical context in order to favor PT&T. 22 He further observed that the confluence of
events in this case shows that respondent deliberately left complainant's efforts to execute the CA Decision
unacted upon until the latter agreed to give him a portion of the monetary award thereof. Notwithstanding their
agreement, immoral and illegal as it was, respondent later went as far as turning the proceedings into some
bidding war which eventually resulted into a resolution in favor of PT&T. In this regard, respondent was found to
be guilty of gross immorality and therefore, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that he be disbarred. 23
On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-345 (IBP Resolution), 24 adopting
and approving Commissioner Limpingco's recommendation, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent's violation
of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Atty.
Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED. 25
Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01 and
1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco as adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors.
The pertinent provisions of the Code provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
CANON 6 THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyer's responsibility to
society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or
delaying any man's cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to
lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one's public position to: (1) promote private interests;
(2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. 26 It is well to note
that a lawyer who holds a government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his
misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. 27
In this light, a lawyer's compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned rules should be taken into
consideration in determining his moral fitness to continue in the practice of law.
To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession." 28 This proceeds from the

10
lawyer's duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's
integrity. 29 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or private
activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to
warrant suspension or disbarment. 30
In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to re-compute the monetary awards due to the
complainant who sought to execute the CA Decision which had already been final and executory. When
complainant moved for execution twice at that respondent slept on the same for more than a year. It was
only when complainant paid respondent a personal visit on November 4, 2005 that the latter speedily issued a
writ of execution three (3) days after, or on November 7, 2005. Based on these incidents, the Court observes
that the sudden dispatch in respondent's action soon after the aforesaid visit casts serious doubt on the
legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that he did not extort money from the complainant.
The incredulity of respondent's claims is further bolstered by his complete turnaround on the quashal of the
November 7, 2005 writ of execution.
To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied PT&T's initial motion to quash through an Order dated
November 22, 2005 but later reversed such order in open court on the basis of PT&T's supplemental motion to
quash which was a mere rehash of the first motion that was earlier denied. As a result, respondent recalled his
earlier orders and issued a new writ of execution, reducing complainant's monetary awards from P1,470,082.60
to P114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.
To justify the same, respondent contends that he was merely implementing the CA Decision which did not
provide for the payment of backwages. A plain and cursory reading, however, of the said decision belies the
truthfulness of the foregoing assertion. On point, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION, ordering petitioner PT&T to pay private respondent
Eduardo A. Abella separation pay (as computed by the Labor Arbiter) in lieu of
reinstatement. 31
Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC's rulings dated September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002
which both explicitly awarded backwages and other unpaid monetary benefits to complainant. 32 The
only modification was with respect to the order of reinstatement as pronounced in both NLRC's rulings which
was changed by the CA to separation pay in view of the strained relations between the parties as well as the
supervening removal of complainant's previous position. 33 In other words, the portion of the NLRC's rulings
which awarded backwages and other monetary benefits subsisted and the modification pertained only to the
CA's award of separation pay in lieu of the NLRC's previous order of reinstatement. This conclusion, palpable as
it is, can be easily deduced from the records.
Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its decision, propounding
that the CA's award of separation pay denied complainant's entitlement to any backwages and other
consequential benefits altogether. In his Verified Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Resolution, 34 respondent
stated:
From the above quoted final conclusions, the Court is very clear and categorical in directing
PT&T to pay complainant his separation pay ONLY in lieu of reinstatement. Clearly, the Court
did not direct the PT&T to pay him his backwages, and other consequential benefits that were
directed by the NLRC because he could no longer be reinstated to his previous position on the
ground of strained relationship and his previous position had already gone, and no equivalent
position that the PT&T could offer. . . . .
Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate and distinct from separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement and are awarded conjunctively to an employee who has been illegally
dismissed. 35 There is nothing in the records that could confound the finding that complainant was illegally
dismissed as LA Carreon, the NLRC, and the CA were all unanimous in decreeing the same. Being a labor arbiter,
it is hardly believable that respondent could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to backwages in
view of the standing pronouncement of illegal dismissal. In this regard, respondent's defense deserves scant
consideration.
Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule otherwise, the Court gives credence and upholds Commissioner
Limpingco's and the IBP Board of Governor's pronouncement of respondent's gross immorality. Likewise, the
Court observes that his infractions constitute gross misconduct.
Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show
a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. 36It treads the

11
line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community's sense of decency. 37 On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper or wrong
conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment." 38
In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross
immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred:
SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission
to practice, or for a willfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, as respondent's violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct, his disbarment
should come as a matter of course. However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been
disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., 39 which therefore
precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it proper
to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of P40,000.00 40 in order to penalize respondent's transgressions as
discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or similar acts in the future.
As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice of law is a privilege 41 accorded
only to those who continue to meet its exacting qualifications. Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity which
the profession brings lies the greater responsibility to uphold its integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it is
quintessential that its members continuously and unwaveringly exhibit, preserve and protect moral uprightness
in their activities, both in their legal practice as well as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the Bar holds no
place for the deceitful, immoral and corrupt.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and gross
misconduct in violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P40,000.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Leonen, JJ., concur.

||| (Abella v. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 7332, [June 18, 2013])

12

EN BANC
[B.M. No. 553 . June 17, 1993.]
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW, MEANING AND EXTENT OF. Practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or
may not be pending in a court. In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in
three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and
authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer,
he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes
a practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it,
is, to that extent, practicing law.
2. ID.; ID.; LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES IN CASE AT BAR CONSTITUTE PRACTICE OF LAW. The practice of law,
therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case
at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the
activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law." The contention of respondent that it merely
offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit: . . . While some of the services being
offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation
of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably
clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such
function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example,
about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoptation, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if
it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since
law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal
research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by
an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star,
entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales: . . .
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARALEGAL OR LEGAL ASSISTANT; CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES. Paralegals in the United
States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer
studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. As the concept of the
"paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect
the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association
which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even
been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their
own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT IN THE PHILIPPINES. In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and
limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not
duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefor. (Illustrations: . . .)

13
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL POLICY ON PARALEGAL. We have to necessarily and definitely reject
respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law
profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this
should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. . . .
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration
of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the
practice of law. That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal
rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW IN CASE AT BAR CANNOT BE PERFORMED BY PARALEGALS; REASON.
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. . . .
7. ID.; ADVERTISEMENT BY LAWYER; RULE. Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements,
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of
the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not
resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been
or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance
of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARACTER AND CONDUCT AS BEST ADVERTISEMENT. We repeat, the canons of the profession
tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial
stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISEMENT OF TALENT OR SKILL. The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. . . .
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names
of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date
and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
memberships and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." . . . The use of an ordinary simple professional
card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office
address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed
in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR LAW LIST. The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish
his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may
a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession.

14
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged
by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION IN BATES, ET AL. vs. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA (433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d
810, 97 S Ct. 2691) AS TO PUBLICATION OF LEGAL FEES, NOT APPLICABLE; REASONS. The ruling in the case of
Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved
in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to
publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule
of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated
therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." This
goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as
in the case at bar. It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly with respect to these characteristics of lawyers: . . . Secondly, it is our
firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating
public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if
unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach,
and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J p:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or
of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities
from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law." cdrep
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res.
& Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

15
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted. cdphil
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association
(PLA), (4) U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and
(6) Federation International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy
and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable
services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of. cdphil
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to
present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas,
constitute practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed 4 .
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the
very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic

16
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In
addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being
represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to
law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize a Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the
Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce, is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading,
but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice. LibLex
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in
Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just
Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the
inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license. LLpr
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous
marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

17
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of
the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also
submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of
the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in
general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled
but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the
Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted
time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission
to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using
a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in
skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and
more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession
may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of, illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but
only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the
public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may
be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which
are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required
to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable
of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which
course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of
the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services. cdrep
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed
to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule
or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also,
law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:

18
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the
realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Perkinson
to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes
drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal
rights and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court
(See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1948 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out
itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice
against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have
been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its
business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to
another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are, to
wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the
Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the
Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's
Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside the court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages,
absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration
problems; the Investment Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid laws, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advises based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

19
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given
to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified
persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top
of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar
examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid to the administration
of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would
qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the
opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at
present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may
decide to take measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may
be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to
do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may
be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited
under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the
instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey
to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services." 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters, will be given to them if they avail of its services. The
Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any
medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose
of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it
is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements
such as are the subject matter of this petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by
whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such as act
could become justifiable. LLphil
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and
divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

20
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce,
where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the
public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals
should not be done. LLjur
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by
an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion International de Abogadas:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not
unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of
the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
". . . Of necessity, no one . . . acting as a consultant can render effective
service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not
to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of
law . . .. It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most
men have considerable acquaintance with the broad features of the law . . .. Our
knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when
we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers
and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their
particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be
familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
"But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that
it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are
they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental
to a major non-legal problem.
"It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
"If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a
lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like,
then an architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be
trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at
the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body
of industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions
and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matters, and
without regard to legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendant have tendered to the smaller employers the same service that the larger
employers get from their own specialized staff.

"The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for

which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be
very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily

21
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given
by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
"In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work
for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be
the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's
primary efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building
the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give,
does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a
minor feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.
"Another branch of defendant's work is the representation of the employer in
the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator.
This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the
person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of
the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a
question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers.
But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of
the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the
opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant
should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs. cdphil
"Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National
Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before
such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such
determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to
appear `in person, or by counsel, or by other representative.' Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. `Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and
`other representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may
lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal."
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the
bar;
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succinctly states the rule of conduct:
"Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting
as a lawyer or in another capacity."
1.10. In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A",
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and

22
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if
the problem is as complicated as that described in Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services, then it is
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B", Petition). Purely giving informational materials
may not constitute practice of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the
customer buys materials on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
"It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say
what the law is amounts to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his
problem does not affect this. . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled
out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many
approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no
personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that
relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS
IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer
general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on
a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport `to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation
in the publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitute the
unlawful practice of law . . .. There being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant
maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings
relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of
the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing
his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the
charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of
personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation
and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of
other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed."
(State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.)
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory."
It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling,"
such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits
that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which
is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

23
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for a proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law"
has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general
principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into
account. LLjur
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or
may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman,
and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life,
liberty, and property according to law, inorder to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks
the later to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the
legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent,
practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test
to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law."
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)."
This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),
stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of, such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation

24
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation
to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can
be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.],
pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144)."
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive
use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation
like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other
countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they
can avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts, and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services." 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law
offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of

25
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends
to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of
the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into
the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are "specialists" in various fields, can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "When they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms, and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists."
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These
The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of
sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital, the
residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or
diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which require more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich realtive who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos
of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes
and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state
for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly
trained to deal with that problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relative's
will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation
in court, and gather evidence to support the case." 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is
that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it
within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published
and are now assailed in this proceeding. prcd
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish
that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a
client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice
law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

26
The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction where from respondent would wish to draw support for
his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements
for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of
law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by
statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of
the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters
by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of
paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be
its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative
action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards, or guidelines was developed
by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals
in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered, as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are
limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration
of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the
practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal
rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort
to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged
or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. 37 The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of
Religious Affairs vs. Estanislao R. Bavot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved
in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent
of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public.
Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as
a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the

27
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . .
is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.)

We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken.
The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading
and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction;
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices
in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of
listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For
that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or
to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being
taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services
rendered, we find and so hold that the time definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes
the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact
that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition
against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific
services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such
as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for
such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar. LLpr
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion
dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

28
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by
media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is
beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49Considering
that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic,
Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into
an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined,
albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a
corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like
the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly
rendering the alleged support services. llcd
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof.
That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary
under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano,
Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

Padilla,

Bidin,

Grio-Aquino,

Davide,

||| (Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553 (Resolution), [June 17, 1993])

Jr.,

Romero,

Nocon,

Bellosillo,

29

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6622. July 10, 2012.]
MANUEL G. VILLATUYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office of the Bar Confidant, complainant
Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos (respondent) with unlawful solicitation of
cases, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross
immorality for marrying two other women while respondent's first marriage was subsisting. 1
In a Resolution 2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file a
Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005. 3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record. 4
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a Notice 5 setting the
mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference, complainant
appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be
resolved by the Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees
to complainant,
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice. 6 IcaEDC
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent filed his
verified Position Paper, 7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005. 8
Complainant's Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial consultant to assist
the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter's numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed
with different courts. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to
P50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent
(10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able
to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant
also claimed that he was entitled to the amount of P900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a
result of his work with respondent, and a total of P4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients. 9 Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and
solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of
Incorporation of Jesi and Jane, 10 letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates 11 and
proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients. 12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy
for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated
13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that
Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano,
which took place in Dasmarias, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion
in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita,
Manila. 13 cHDEaC
Respondent's Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not an employee
of his law firm Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office 14 but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the
former is a major stockholder. 15 Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in
performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the latter's dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they
presented in their court cases. 16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them

30
regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents
showing that the salary of complainant had been paid. 17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his law firm had
an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the
corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case' such as the
preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support this contention, respondent attached
to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and
Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.; 18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena,
Vice-President for Operations of the said company. 19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a dismissed
messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the
affiant himself. 20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous
marriages with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts. 21 To the said Motion,
he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the
NSO. 22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the contracting parties
indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered into by respondent. The first
marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in
Dasmarias, Cavite, on 15 July 1980. 23 The second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma.
Rowena G. Pion, and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September
1987. 24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and
it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent
was described as single under the entry for civil status. TcHEaI
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming
that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or submitted during the hearing of the
case. 25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those documents. 26 He
disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null
and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna, where it
was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270. 27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271. 28 In both
petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the
NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He
prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20
November 2007. 29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not attend the
hearing, 30 respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of
the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna,
seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name. 31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two (2)
Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos." 32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the
marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still
valid. 33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having committed
bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still
subsisting. 34 Each of the Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as
accused in the criminal cases. 35 cCaEDA
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding, the
Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions for nullification
he had filed with the RTC-Laguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be
submitted for resolution. 36
IBP's Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the specific
charges against respondent. 37 The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the
fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the
proper courts since it was only empowered to determine respondent's administrative liability. On this matter,
complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent. 38 On the second charge, the Commission

31
found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services
and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to
point out exactly the specific provision he violated. 39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules
1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It
found that complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy
twice by marrying two other women while the latter's first marriage was subsisting. 40 Due to the gravity of the
acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the
roll of attorneys. 41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that
the Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending the resolution of the separate
cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into those
contracts with other women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that
the latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent
moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment
of Marriage Contracts. 43 SEAHcT
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their
Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondent's disbarment. 44
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP's dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the rationale
behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former's share in the fees, if
proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 45 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered
with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to share with
complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however,
failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David 46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees
collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined
for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant's allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP
correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services through various
business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc. and
Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latter's legal
services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that
respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that
was breached. aADSIc
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the report to
solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases.
Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 47 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting
cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though,
when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer's
duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to
the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect

32
solicitation on the lawyer's behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law. 48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which
purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure
professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C" 49 of the Complaint is a
letterhead of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services.
The letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would render
legal services related to the former's loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is considered objectionable
and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc.,
and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.08 50 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law.
The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in
one and not in the other. 51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is
offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent,
we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate this
allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent
with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these documents, claiming that they
were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity
to controvert them. 52 We are not persuaded by his argument. TEcCHD
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a
lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we
explained in Garrido v. Garrido: 53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to
depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire
into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory
proof. 54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into
two marriages while the latter's first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the
second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not
dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He
submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the
other in Calamba to declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void. 55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or
impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to
prove the former's marriages to two other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment
proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence
proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents
were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage
and death of a person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any
competent evidence to rebut those documents. cTCaEA

33
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil actions to
annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations
therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special
contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in
the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondent's regard for
marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or
his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil
Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first
marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only
as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyer's professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who
cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in
his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to
be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the
court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the
courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He
made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. 57 His acts of committing
bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court. 58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral
conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. aHTEIA
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes and PerlasBernabe, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part relationship to a party.
Bersamin and Abad, JJ., are on leave.
||| (Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, [July 10, 2012], 690 PHIL 381-399)

34

February 10, 2009

[B.M. No. 2012]
PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR PRACTICING LAWYERS
RESOLUTION
Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C. Corona re: Comment of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines on our Suggested Revisions to the Proposed Rule of Mandatory Legal Aid
Service for Practicing Lawyers, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following publication of the said Rule and its
implementing regulations in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE
SECTION 1. Title. This Rule shall be known as "The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service". ITSCED
SECTION 2. Purpose. This Rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to society as agents of social
change and to the courts as officers thereof by helping improve access to justice by the less privileged
members of society and expedite the resolution of cases involving them. Mandatory free legal service by
members of the bar and their active support thereof will aid the efficient and effective administration of
justice especially in cases involving indigent and pauper litigants.
SECTION 3. Scope. This Rule shall govern the mandatory requirement for practicing lawyers to
render free legal aid services in all cases (whether civil, criminal or administrative) involving indigent and
pauper litigants where the assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall also govern the duty of other members
of the legal profession to support the legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule:
(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of
parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies, including but not limited to the
National Labor Relations Commission, National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
Department of Labor and Employment Regional Offices, Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board and National Commission for Indigenous Peoples. The term
"practicing lawyers" shall exclude:
(i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to
practice;
(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;
(iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited
legal clinics of law schools and lawyers of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and peoples' organizations (POs) like the Free Legal Assistance Group
who by the nature of their work already render free legal aid to indigent and
pauper litigants; and
(iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those who are
employed in the private sector but do not appear for and in behalf of parties in
courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.
(b) Indigent and pauper litigants are those defined under Rule 141, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court and Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga (G.R. No. 150135,
30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);
(c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes, and controversies that are criminal, civil and
administrative in nature in whatever stage wherein indigent and pauper litigants need
legal representation; TaDAIS
(d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in court or quasi-judicial body for and in behalf
of an indigent or pauper litigant and the preparation of pleadings or motions. It shall
also cover assistance by a practicing lawyer to indigent or poor litigants in courtannexed mediation and in other modes of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
Services rendered when a practicing lawyer is appointed counselde oficio shall also be
considered as free legal aid services and credited as compliance under this Rule;

35
(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official national organization of lawyers in the
country;
(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically
tasked with handling legal aid cases;
(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked
with disciplining members of the Bar;
(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines located in the
different geographical areas of the country as defined in Rule 139-A; and
(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the court where the practicing lawyer rendered free
legal aid services. In the case of quasi-judicial bodies, it refers to an officer holding an
equivalent or similar position.
The term shall also include an officer holding a similar position in agencies exercising quasi-judicial
functions, or a responsible officer of an accredited PO or NGO, or an accredited mediator who conducted the
court-annexed mediation proceeding.
SECTION 5. Requirements.
(a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of sixty (60) hours of free legal aid
services to indigent litigants in a year. Said 60 hours shall be spread within a period of
twelve (12) months, with a minimum of five (5) hours of free legal aid services each
month. However, where it is necessary for the practicing lawyer to render legal aid
service for more than five (5) hours in one month, the excess hours may be credited to
the said lawyer for the succeeding periods.
For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall coordinate with the Clerk of Court for cases where
he may render free legal aid service. He may also coordinate with the IBP Legal Aid
Chairperson of the IBP Chapter to inquire about cases where he may render free legal
aid service. In this connection, the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter shall
regularly and actively coordinate with the Clerk of Court. cHSTEA
The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement within ten (10) days of the
last month of each quarter of the year.
(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a certificate from the Clerk of
Court attesting to the number of hours spent rendering free legal aid services in a
case. The certificate shall contain the following information:
(i) The case or cases where the legal aid service was rendered, the party or parties in
the said case(s) for whom the service was rendered, the docket number of the
said case(s) and the date(s) the service was rendered.
(ii) The number of hours actually spent attending a hearing or conducting trial on a
particular case in the court or quasi-judicial body.
(iii) The number of hours actually spent attending mediation, conciliation or any other
mode of ADR on a particular case.
(iv) A motion (except a motion for extension of time to file a pleading or for
postponement of hearing or conference) or pleading filed on a particular case
shall be considered as one (1) hour of service.
The Clerk of Court shall issue the certificate in triplicate, one (1) copy to be retained
by the practicing lawyer, one (1) copy to be retained by the Clerk of Court and
one (1) copy to be attached to the lawyer's compliance report. DSEIcT
(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter
within the court's jurisdiction. The Legal Aid Chairperson shall then be tasked with
immediately verifying the contents of the certificate with the issuing Clerk of Court by
comparing the copy of the certificate attached to the compliance report with the copy
retained by the Clerk of Court.
(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance certificate to the concerned
lawyer. The IBP Chapter shall also submit the compliance reports to the IBP's NCLA for

36
recording and documentation. The submission shall be made within forty-five (45)
days after the mandatory submission of compliance reports by the practicing lawyers.
(e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies the number and date of issue of their certificate of compliance for the
immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information
would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records. cDTSHE
(f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4 (a) (i)
and (ii), shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year,
they are employed with the government or incumbent elective officials not allowed by
law to practice or lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court. The form
shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together with
the payment of an annual contribution of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000). Said
contribution shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid
program.
(g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4 (a)
(iii) shall secure a certification from the director of the legal clinic or of the concerned
NGO or PO to the effect that, during that year, they have served as supervising
lawyers in a legal clinic or actively participated in the NGO's or PO's free legal aid
activities. The certification shall be submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office.
(h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4 (a)
(iv) shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they
are neither practicing lawyers nor covered by Section (4) (a) (i) to (iii). The form shall
be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together with the
payment of an annual contribution of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) by way of support
for the efforts of practicing lawyers who render mandatory free legal aid services. Said
contribution shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid
program.

(i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall subject the lawyer to a penalty of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000) for that year which amount shall also accrue to the special fund for the
legal aid program of the IBP.
SECTION 6. NCLA.
(a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various legal aid committees of the IBP local chapters
for the proper handling and accounting of legal aid cases which practicing lawyers can
represent. CSDAIa
(b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the Chapter of the Legal Aid Office with respect to
the coordination with Clerks of Court on legal aid cases and the collation of certificates
submitted by practicing lawyers.
(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository of records in compliance with this Rule.
(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms: certificate to be issued by the Clerk of Court
and forms mentioned in Section 5 (e) and (g). CEDHTa
(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and utilize the contributions and penalties that will be
paid by lawyers pursuant to this Rule to effectively carry out the provisions of this
Rule. For this purpose, it shall annually submit an accounting to the IBP Board of
Governors. The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its report to the Supreme
Court in connection with its request for the release of the subsidy for its legal aid
program.
SECTION 7. Penalties.
(a) At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who fails to meet the minimum
prescribed 60 hours of legal aid service each year shall be required by the IBP, through
the NCLA, to explain why he was unable to render the minimum prescribed number of
hours. If no explanation has been given or if the NCLA finds the explanation
unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall make a report and recommendation to the IBP Board of

37
Governors that the erring lawyer be declared a member of the IBP who is not in good
standing. Upon approval of the NCLA's recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors
shall declare the erring lawyer as a member not in good standing. Notice thereof shall
be furnished the erring lawyer and the IBP Chapter which submitted the lawyer's
compliance report or the IBP Chapter where the lawyer is registered, in case he did not
submit a compliance report. The notice to the lawyer shall include a directive to pay
Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) penalty which shall accrue to the special fund for the
legal aid program of the IBP.
(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall be effective for a period of three (3) months
from the receipt of the erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of Governors.
During the said period, the lawyer cannot appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as
counsel. Provided, however, that the "not in good standing" status shall subsist even
after the lapse of the three-month period until and unless the penalty shall have been
paid.
(c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule for at least three (3)
consecutive years shall be the subject of disciplinary proceedings to be
instituted motu proprio by the CBD. The said proceedings shall afford the erring lawyer
due process in accordance with the rules of the CBD and Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court. If found administratively liable, the penalty of suspension in the practice of law
for one (1) year shall be imposed upon him. TCcDaE
(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any form required to be submitted under this Rule
or any contents thereof shall be administratively charged with falsification and
dishonesty and shall be subject to disciplinary action by the CBD. This is without
prejudice to the filing of criminal charges against the lawyer.
(e) The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by any
Chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP local chapter where the case is
pending or by the Director of a legal clinic or responsible officer of an NGO or PO shall
be a ground for an administrative case against the said Clerk of Court or Chairperson.
This is without prejudice to the filing of the criminal and administrative charges
against the malfeasor.
SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). A lawyer who renders
mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year for the three year-period covered by
a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: two (2) credit units for legal
ethics, two (2) credit units for trial and pretrial skills, two (2) credit units for alternative dispute resolution,
four (4) credit units for legal writing and oral advocacy, four (4) credit units for substantive and procedural
laws and jurisprudence and six (6) credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
Committee under Section 2 (g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year for at
least two consecutive years within the three year-period covered by a compliance period under the Rules on
MCLE shall be credited the following: one (1) credit unit for legal ethics, one (1) credit unit for trial and
pretrial skills, one (1) credit unit for alternative dispute resolution, two (2) credit units for legal writing and
oral advocacy, two (2) credit units for substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and three (3)
credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under Section 2 (g), Rule 2 of
the Rules on MCLE. 1uplaw09
SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. The IBP, through the NCLA, is hereby given authority to
recommend implementing regulations in determining who are "practicing lawyers", what constitute "legal
aid cases" and what administrative procedures and financial safeguards which may be necessary and proper
in the implementation of this rule may be prescribed. It shall coordinate with the various legal chapters in
the crafting of the proposed implementing regulations and, upon approval by the IBP Board of Governors,
the said implementing regulations shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final approval.
SECTION 10. Effectivity. This Rule and its implementing rules shall take effect on July 1, 2009 after
they have been published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. IESAac
Published in The Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 14, 2009.
||| (Proposed Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, B.M. No. 2012, [February 10, 2009])

38

39

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003.]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003.]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
For advertising himself in several leading newspapers as an "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo was charged for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services. Respondent admitted the act
imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts.
The practice of law is not a business but a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Although solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed, to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession, made in a modest and decorous manner that wood bring no
injury to the lawyer and the bar. Here, for advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist, Atty.
Simbillo undermined not only the stability but also the sanctity of marriage. Thus, for violation of Rules 2.03 and
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, Atty. Simbillo was
suspended from the practice of law for one year, with stern warning against repetition of the same or similar
offense.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; PROHIBITION AGAINST SOLICITATION OF LEGAL
BUSINESS. Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read: Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not
do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use
or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
2. ID.; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS BY THE SUPREME COURT, GROUNDS THEREFOR. Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
3. ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW AS A PROFESSION, NOT A BUSINESS; ELUCIDATED. It has been repeatedly stressed
that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not
a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The
duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who
must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The following elements distinguish
the legal profession from a business: 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in
which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money; 2. A relation as an "officer of the
court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; 3. A relation to clients
in the highest degree of fiduciary; 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.
4. ID.; LAWYER ADVERTISING HIMSELF AS MARRIAGE ANNULMENT SPECIALIST UNDERMINES THE STABILITY AND
SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE. What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a selfstyled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the
stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four
to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise
been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
5. ID.; SOLICITATION OF LEGAL BUSINESS; PROPER MANNER THEREOF. The solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal

40
profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.
Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and
fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT' OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/5212667." 1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the
published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed
that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court
decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children.
Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of
filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000
issue of The Philippine Star. 2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the
Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per
se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that
the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should
be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy
and public order as long as it is dignified. 4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. 5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002306, 6finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the
warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this
Court on November 11, 2002. 7 HESIcT
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, 8 which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002 9
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator
and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the
Court's Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. 10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25,
2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its
early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a
Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP's Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

41
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications
or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. 12 It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 13 The gaining of a livelihood should
be a secondary consideration. 14 The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. 15 The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to
resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice,
or dealing directly with their clients. 16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Court's indulgence, his
contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer,
he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. 17 Ten
months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy &
Sell. 18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court's authority. TSHEIc
What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of
Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from
the time of the filing of the case, 19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined
and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper,
it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it
would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. 20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names
of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable. 21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed
by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal
Clinic, Inc.: 22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended

42
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and,
with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a
mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list
the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm
name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He
may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED. aDHScI
Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., abroad, on official business.
||| (Khan, Jr. v. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, 157053, [August 19, 2003], 456 PHIL 560-568)

43

October 2, 2001
EN BANC
BAR MATTER 850 MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial
Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court
hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following Revised Rules for proper implementation:
RULE 1
Purpose
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
RULE 2
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules
by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall commence the
implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these
Rules.
SECTION 2. Requirements of Completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7
shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities
approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit
units. cHSIAC
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4)
credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five
(5) credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws,
and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to
four (4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international
conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the
MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.
RULE 3
Compliance Period
SECTION 1. Initial Compliance Period. The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three
(3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted
or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36)
months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period. TECcHA
SECTION 2. Compliance Groups. Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement shall
be divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:

44
(a) Compliance group 1. Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are
assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group
2.
(c) Compliance group 3. Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance
Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may be available
to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.
SECTION 3. Compliance Period of Members Admitted or Readmitted After Establishment of the
Program. Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be
assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission
or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of the month
of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same
Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for
the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of
approved continuing legal education activities equal to the number of months
remaining in the compliance period in which the member is admitted or readmitted.
Such member shall be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal
ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance period.
Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number.
RULE 4
Computation of Credit Units (CU)
SECTION 1. Guidelines. CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS
measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyer's
participation in the MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines for computing credit units and the
supporting documents required therefor:

PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY

1.

CREDIT UNITS

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS,

DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED
RULES

1.1

PARTICIPANT/ATTENDEE

1 CU PER HOUR OF
ATTENDANCE

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE
WITH NUMBER OF HOURS

1.2

1.3

LECTURER

FULL CU FOR THE SUBJECT

PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR

RESOURCE SPEAKER

PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD

SPONSOR'S CERTIFICATION

PANELIST/REACTOR

1/2 OF CU FOR THE

CERTIFICATION FROM

45

COMMENTATOR/

SUBJECT PER

MODERATOR/

COMPLIANCE PERIOD

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

COORDINATOR/
FACILITATOR

2.

AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

LAW BOOK OF NOT

FULL CU FOR THE SUBJECT

PUBLISHED BOOK

LESS THAN 100 PAGES

PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD

BOOK EDITOR

1/2 OF THE CU OF

PUBLISHED BOOK WITH PROOF AS

AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY

EDITOR

RESEARCH PAPER

1/2 OF CU FOR THE

DULY CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED

INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/

SUBJECT PER

TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER

CREATIVE PROJECT

COMPLIANCE PERIOD

LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT

1/2 OF CU FOR THE

LEAST TEN (10) PAGES

SUBJECT PER

PUBLISHED ARTICLE

COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.5

LEGAL NEWSLETTER/

1 CU PER ISSUE

LAW JOURNAL EDITOR

2.6

PUBLISHED
NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL

PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/

FULL CU FOR THE SUBJECT

CERTIFICATION OF LAW DEAN OR

BAR REVIEW LECTURE

PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD

BAR REVIEW DIRECTOR

LAW TEACHING/

RULE 5
Categories of Credit Units
SECTION 1. Classes of Credit Units. Credit units are either participatory or nonparticipatory. AHCETa
SECTION 2. Claim for Participatory Credit Units. Participatory credit units may be claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia,
in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource
speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.

46
SECTION 3. Claim for Non-Participatory Credit Units. Non-participatory credit units may be claimed
per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for
publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which
contribute to the legal education of the author member, which were not prepared in
the ordinary course of the member's practice or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

RULE 6
Computation of Credit Hours (CH)
SECTION 1. Computation of Credit Hours. Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent
in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
RULE 7
Exemptions
SECTION 1. Parties Exempted from the MCLE. The following members of the Bar are exempt from
the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and
Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired
members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and
incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of
continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at
least ten (10) years in accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial
Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SECTION 2. Other Parties Exempted from the MCLE. The following members of the Bar are
likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of
Governors. AHCaES
SECTION 3. Good Cause for Exemption from or Modification of Requirement. A member may file a
verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post graduate
study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the

47
requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be
established by the MCLE Committee.
SECTION 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in
which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day
as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.

SECTION 5. Proof of Exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE
requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.
RULE 8
Standards for Approval of Education Activities
SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE Program. Subject to the implementing regulations that may be
adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted approval in either of
two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the activity meets
the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically mandated by law to provide
continuing legal education.
SECTION 2. Standards for All Education Activities. All continuing legal education activities must
meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and
the legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or
medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as
subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must
be distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the
time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free
from interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.
RULE 9
Accreditation of Providers
SECTION 1. Accreditation of Providers. Accreditation of providers shall be done by the MCLE
Committee. CSIDEc
SECTION 2. Requirements for Accreditation of Providers. Any person or group may
be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written application. All
providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to
be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SECTION 3. Requirements of All Providers. All approved accredited providers shall agree to the
following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the
provider for at least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include
the member on the official record of attendance only if the member's signature was
obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance
shall contain the member's name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall
identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education activity. A
copy of such record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.

48
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of _______
hours of which _______ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to
the content of the activity;aTEACS
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed
by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE
COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date,
location, subject matter and length of the activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education
activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or
designees of the Committee and IBP Staff Board for purposes of monitoring
compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time
devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available
to each participant a copy of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity
Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period
of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues a
spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate
sanctions.
SECTION 4. Renewal of Provider Accreditation. The accreditation of a provider may be renewed
every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these
Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.
SECTION 5. Revocation of Provider Accreditation. The accreditation of any provider referred to in
Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good
cause.
RULE 10
Fee for Approval of Activity and Accreditation of Provider
SECTION 1. Payment of Fees. Application for approval of an education activity or accreditation as
a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.
RULE 11
General Compliance Procedures
SECTION 1. Compliance Card. Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance
Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he
has complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption.
Such Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not later than the day after the end of the
member's compliance period. ScaAET
SECTION 2. Member Record Keeping Requirement. Each member shall maintain sufficient record
of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to the
members by the provider pursuant to Section 3(c) of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of attendance at a
participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as
referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.
RULE 12
Non-Compliance Procedures
SECTION 1. What Constitutes Non-Compliance. The following shall constitute non-compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;

49
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt
status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within
sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or
evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
SECTION 2. Non-compliance Notice and 60-day Period to Attain Compliance. Members failing to
comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days
from the date of notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance
with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language near the beginning of the notice in
capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY
(INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT
MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period to
attain the adequate number of credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during this
period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement
unless units in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. DCAEcS
RULE 13
Consequences of Non-Compliance
SECTION 1. Non-compliance Fee. A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the
end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
SECTION 2. Listing as Delinquent Member. A member who fails to comply with the requirements
after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall
be conducted by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
SECTION 3. Accrual of Membership Fee. Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the active
rate against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.
RULE 14
Reinstatement
SECTION 1. Process. The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the
member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee.
A member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance
during the period the member is on inactive status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting
the current compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in
excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward
meeting the current compliance period requirement.
SECTION 2. Termination of Delinquent Listing is an Administrative Process. The termination of
listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee.
RULE 15
Committee on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely, a
retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively nominated by the IBP, the
Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools
and/or law professors.

50
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by
the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be determined
by the Court.
SECTION 2. Duty of Committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such
implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in
consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the
Supreme Court.
SECTION 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the MCLE
Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting,
approval and other necessary functions. AacSTE
SECTION 4. Submission of Annual Budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme
Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.
||| (Revised Rules on the Continuing Legal Education for IBP Members, BAR MATTER 850, [October 2, 2001])

51

June 3, 2008
[B.M. No. 1922]
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008
"Bar Matter No. 1922. Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption. The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing the
Court of the diminishing interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education
and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the
courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period.Failure to
disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings
from the records.
The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation". Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave. (adv216a)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Clerk of Court
Supreme Court of the Philippines
||| (Requirement to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance
or Exemption, B.M. No. 1922, [June 3, 2008])

52

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 191837. September 19, 2012.]
MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARILYN LIM and
GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF VALENZUELA CITY, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated October 15, 2009 1 and March 11,
2010 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265.
The facts leading to the filing of this petition are undisputed.
Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4.4 hectares and located at
Bignay, Valenzuela City. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-73892, registered in
the names of George and Marilyn Lim (Spouses Lim).
On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed before the Office of the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV-A a petition to be recognized as a tenant of a property
located at Bignay, Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato (Deato). At that time, the property, which has an
approximate area of 4.4 hectares, was covered by TCT No. 24759 under Deato's name. During the pendency of
the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim. The sale was registered on December 21, 2004 leading to
the issuance of TCT No. V-73892 in favor of Spouses Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion filed a
motion on March 3, 2005 to implead Spouses Lim as respondents. 3
The petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-0012-04, was granted by Regional Adjudicator
Conchita C. Mias (RA Mias) in a Decision 4 dated December 2, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring that petitioner is the tenant of the subject landholding by succession from her
deceased father;
2) Declaring respondents spouses George and Marilyn Lim to have subrogated to the rights
and substituted to the obligation of spouses Danilo and Divina Deato;
3) Ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to maintain petitioner
in peaceful possession and cultivation of the agricultural land subject hereof;
4) Declaring petitioner to have the right to exercise the right of redemption of the subject
parcel of agricultural land pursuant to Section 12 of RA 3844 as [a]mended; and
5) Dismissing the petition against Louie Cruz, Fire Force Agency and Danny Boy Rivera for
having no proximate tenurial relationship with the petitioner hence beyond the
jurisdictional ambit of this Office. aEACcS
SO ORDERED. 5
On July 7, 2006, the foregoing decision became final. 6
Upon Consolacion's motion for execution filed on January 7, 2008, RA Mias issued a writ of execution on January
8, 2008. 7
On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and the Registrar of Deeds of Valenzuela
City praying for the issuance of an order directing Spouses Lim to accept the amount of P10,000,000.00 which
she undertook to tender during the initial hearing, declaring the property redeemed, and cancelling TCT No. V73892. 8 Consolacion consigned with the RARAD the amount of P10,000,000.00 on March 3, 2008. 9
Consolacion's petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-001-08, was given due course by RA
Mias in a Decision 10 dated June 2, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. As prayed for, declaring that the landholding subject of the petition as lawfully
redeemed;

53
2. Ordering respondent spouses to accept and withdraw the amount of the redemption
price consigned with this Office which was deposited for safekeeping indicated
in Manager's Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name of
Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A in
the amount of ten (10) million pesos;
3. Upon acceptance and the withdrawal of the redemption price as ordered in
paragraph 2 hereof, ordering respondent spouses to execute a Deed of
Redemption in favor of petitioner;
4. In case of refusal and/or failure of respondent spouses to execute the Deed of
Redemption as ordered above, the Regional Clerk of the Board is hereby
ordered to execute a Deed of Redemption in the name of the petitioner; and
5. Directing the Register of Deeds for Valenzuela City to cause the cancellation of TCT
No. V-73892 registered in the name of respondent spouses Marilyn and George
Lim and a new one issued in the name of petitioner upon presentment of the
Deed of Redemption.
SO ORDERED. 11
On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a Decision 12 on February
18, 2009 reversing RA Mias Decision dated June 2, 2008. Specifically:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated 02 June 2008 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the landholding to be not lawfully redeemed;
2. DECLARING petitioner-appellee not a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding;
3. DECLARING that petitioner-appellee cannot redeem the subject parcel registered in
the names of the respondents-appellants;
4. ORDERING the respondents-appellants to be maintained in peaceful possession of
the subject landholding[; and]
5. DIRECTING the Clerk of the Board of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of
Region IV-A to return the Manager's Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied
Bank in the name of Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication
Board Region IV-A in the amount of Ten Million pesos to herein petitionerappellee. IcHTAa
SO ORDERED. 13
On April 13, 2009, Consolacion moved for reconsideration, 14 which the DARAB denied in a Resolution 15 dated
June 8, 2009 for being filed out of time.
SECTION 12 Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules provides that a Motion for Reconsideration shall
be filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the order, resolution, or decision of
the Board or Adjudicator. Records show that both the petitioner-appellee and her counsel
received a copy of the Decision dated 18 February 2009 on 27 February 2009 and that Legal
Officer Nancy Geocada[,] the alleged new counsel of the herein petitioner[-]appellee[,] filed
the Motion for Reconsideration only on 13 April 2009, clearly the Motion for Reconsideration
was filed beyond the fifteen (15) days (sic) reglementary period thus the herein Decision has
already become final and executory. . . . 16
On June 25, 2009, Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA. 17
On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacion's counsel to submit within five (5) days from notice his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or Exemption and an amended
Verification and Certification Against Non-Forum-Shopping. 18 Apparently, Consolacion's counsel failed to
indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number as required under Bar Matter
No. 1922. Also, the jurat of Consolacion's verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to
indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion's identity apart from her community tax certificate.
Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA issued a Resolution 19 on October 15,
2009 dismissing the petition.

54
On July 7, 2009, the counsel for the petitioner received the above-mentioned Resolution.
However, the counsel for the petitioner failed to comply with the said Resolution which was
due on July 19, 2009.
For failure of the counsel for the petitioner to comply with the Resolution dated July 1, 2009,
despite receipt of the notice thereof, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 20
Consolacion moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in a Resolution 21 dated March 11, 2010.
Consolacion is, before this Court, claiming that the CA's summary dismissal of her petition on technical grounds
is unwarranted. Consolacion invoked substantial justice against the CA's strict application of the rule requiring
her counsel to note his MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and the rule rendering the jurat of
her verification and certification on non-forum-shopping defective in the absence of the details of any one of her
current identification document issued by an official agency bearing her photograph and signature. That there
was merit in her petition and that she complied, albeit belatedly as her counsel's MCLE Compliance Certificate
Number was indicated and a verification and certificate on non-forum-shopping with a proper jurat was attached
to her motion for reconsideration, should have sufficed for the CA to reverse the dismissal of her petition and
decide the same on its merits. Consolacion alleged that procedural rules or technicalities are designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice and their rigid application should be avoided if this would frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice.
The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing
Consolacion's petition before it on the ground of petitioner's unexplained failure to comply with basic procedural
requirements attendant to the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Notably,
Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the opportunity afforded to them by the CA to rectify
their lapses. While there was compliance, this took place, however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of
Consolacion's petition and without reasonable cause proffered to justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her
counsel claimed inadvertence and negligence but they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid
and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to
be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of the
rules. Neither does this Court see any.
The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally construed. However, in these
cases, outright dismissal is rendered unjust by the presence of a satisfactory and persuasive explanation. The
parties therein who prayed for liberal interpretation were able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they
deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court's intent "to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity." 22
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the duty of every member of the
bar to comply with these rules. They are not at liberty to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules
and rationalize their omission by harking on liberal construction. While it is the negligence of Consolacion's
counsel that led to this unfortunate result, she is bound by such. cDTCIA
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated October 15, 2009 and
March 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion * and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
||| (Rivera-Pascual v. Spouses Lim, G.R. No. 191837 (Resolution), [September 19, 2012], 695 PHIL 543-550)

55

May 26, 2014

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 79-14

TO

SUBJEC
:
T

The Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan Court of Tax Appeals, Regional

Trial Courts, Shari'a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, Shari'a Circuit Courts, the Office of the State Prosecutor, Public
Attorney's Office and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Bar Matter No. 1922 (Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education [MCLE] Board to Indicate in All Pleadings
Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption)

In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated January 14, 2014 in the above-cited administrative
matter, the Court RESOLVED, upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to:
(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from
the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject
the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action"; and
(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure of current MCLE compliance/exemption
number in the pleadings:
(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of P2,000.00 for the first offense, P3,000.00 for
the second offense and P4,000.00 for the third offense;
(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a delinquent member of the Bar
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of Bar Matter No. 850 and its implementing
rules and regulations; and aSTcCE
(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged from the case and the client/s shall
be allowed to secure the services of a new counsel with the concomitant right
to demand the return of fees already paid to the non-compliant lawyer.
This revokes OCA Circular No. 66-2008 dated July 22, 2008, and any prior circular from the Office of
the Court Administrator on this matter which is contrary to the foregoing is hereby superseded.
For your information, guidance and strict compliance.
JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ
Court Administrator
||| (Bar Matter No. 1922, OCA Circular No. 079-14, [May 26, 2014])

56

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005.]
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON
GOOD
GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO
TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE,
MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by
TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN,
CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO,
ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T.
ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE
CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS,
INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC.,
MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS & RESORT CORP.,
NORTHERN
TOBACCO
REDRYING
PLANT,
PROGRESSIVE
FARMS,
INC.,
SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT
CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of
the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of
government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with the Central Bank. 1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved
various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was
classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible. 2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency
loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million. 3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover
from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public,
and ordering its liquidation. 4 A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977,
wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. 5Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the
court in GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President
Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos,
Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio
N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo,
Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking
Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,
Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris
Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels
and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading
Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. 6 In
connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the
above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President
Marcos. HaIESC
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to
nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. 7 After the filing of the parties' comments,
this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil

57
Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 8 and 0096-0099. 9The
motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General 10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively
intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and
became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK
by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, headvised the Central Bank's officials
on the procedure to bring about GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in
connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions
to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service."
On April 22, 1991, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG's motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. 11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of
an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. 12 It further ruled that
respondent Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited
period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The
said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from
public office. 13 The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling. 14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan's Second Division to the
Fifth Division. 15 In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the
other PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. 16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated
April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in
Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution
dated December 5, 2001. 17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that
Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza's appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4)
the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicatadoes not apply. 19
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our
way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza.
Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."
I.A.
The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other
parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not
detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and
fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at

58
times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty
to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had
broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from
those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to
govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such
regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The
American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had
the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive
standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal,
positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and
reasonable fees. 20
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century,
American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly
influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise
statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At
the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were
working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in
unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of midnineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of
colonial regulations e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions persisted in some states.
Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of
agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started
to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus,
all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the
colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a
comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their
discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics. 21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their
practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by
lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century.
Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the
oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official
imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that
states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence
of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they
disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again,
picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the
Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive
standards of conduct for their members. 22
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887
Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states' codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar
Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. 23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure
of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted
as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their
concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government
service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information,
contacts, and influence garnered in government service." 25 These concerns were classified as "adverseinterest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which
the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are
adverse. 26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers
and apply primarily to former government lawyers. 27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and
update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA

59
amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. 28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government
lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruentinterest representation conflicts." 29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the
government lawyer's largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on
behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private
practice clients. 30Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of
which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity. TDcAaH
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after
his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in
1933 and 1937, respectively. 31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics. 32
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to
study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons
needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and
the proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise
observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of
lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. 33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. 34 In the case
of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b) 35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated
the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of
Delegates approved the Model Code. 36
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards
set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the
ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format,"
where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was
intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the
black letter Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on
narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the
black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to
conflicts of interests. 37 In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the
concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm's indefinite nature. 38
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect
the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this
Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility. 39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the
word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruentinterest conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later
as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before

60
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict"
sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B.
The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and,
second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter."
The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well
as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party,and not merely an act of
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza
while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting
the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz: 40
The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)
in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that
Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by
advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. TaCDAH
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain
key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then
Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C.
Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Assistant to the
Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference
with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the
liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he
advised that the following procedure should be taken:
1) Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that
studies and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank
as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized
or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with
safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.
2) If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of
the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation
plan.
3) The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the
foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by
the Monetary Board.
4) The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting
the proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court
in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where
it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to
GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank's
liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

61
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank
dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector,
to the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on
the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co.,
dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank,
to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to
Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a report on
the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor
General for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in
the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the
case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule
6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of the
appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the
condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions,
it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance
in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the
department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts,
and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the
institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank
or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take
charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets
and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for
these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the
name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
xxx xxx xxx
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or nonbank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public
interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of
First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of
the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do
all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation
plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who
shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under
this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking
institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or
sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary
in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution. ICTDEa
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and

62
executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by
the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of
the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff
files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in
favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or
injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a
bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice
the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages
which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.
The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due
in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the
inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a
receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision
of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72,
1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is
clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
"matter" and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls
within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent
Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved
in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had
nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing
Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812,
therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096 . Civil
Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the
alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it
involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are illgotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by
the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other
words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that
Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene"
means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur,
fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of
hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where
the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .) 41
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

63
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests
of others. 42
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation,
"intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little
influence. 43 Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power
to influence the subject proceedings. 44 We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the
word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils
sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be
considered as innocuous such as ". . . drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law." HTCAED
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which
he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the
phrase "which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government
lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter
in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules
further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client
in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or
employee."
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has
to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in
slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note
that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role
of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against
the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank
in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of
the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar
efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United
States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took
account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will
achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already
difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government
will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government
may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that
can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. 45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the
sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent
them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the
firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. 46 Indeed, "to make government service more
difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter." 47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing
counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused
to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
noted "the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing
party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so
prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary." 48 Even
the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals' description of disqualification
motions as "a dangerous game." 49 In the case at bar, the new attemptto disqualify respondent Mendoza is
difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated
after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent
Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four

64
years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were
subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. 50 At the very least,
the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as
highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to
lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The
client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. 52 The
effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in
denial of due process. SIHCDA
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the
security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work
vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by
superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom." 53 He
adds: "Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on
the ability to quit inhibits official independence." 54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General,
the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor
General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the
Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to
refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue diminution of the independence of the
Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to
exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer
may extend to all members of his law firm. 55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming
the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well
observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best 56 which can lead
to untoward results. 57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former
government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the governmentclient and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect. 58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has
been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 59 and some courts have abandoned per
se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation
of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who
"switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the
case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure
how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al.,
respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly
defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied
Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to
the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no
switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. 61The
example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he
or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. 62In the cautionary
words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment
conduct may well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration
of government policies." 63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive." 64 He
opines ". . . it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal
to his or her last client the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the

65
'best' government lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous
advocates." 65 But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against
respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending
respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and
respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of
former officials" or their "clout." 66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains
the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee's influence may actually be the
power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from
government . . ." 67 More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To
quote him further: ". . . The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather
than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a
lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the
possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of
favoritism." 68
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that
the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the
fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and
approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time
whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the
unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is
legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of
Court. TaEIAS
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.
Carpio Morales, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., please see my dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, J., took no part. I was former PCGG chairman.
Tinga, J., please see separate opinion.
Chico-Nazario, J., took no part.
||| (Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, [April 12, 2005], 495
PHIL 485-619)