PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65; NATURE :

THE PROPRIETY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OUTRIGHT

DISMISSAL OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BASED ON
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS.
In the case of Lucita Tiorosio-Espinosa VS. Hon. Presiding
Judge Virgia Hofilea-Europa, GR .No. 185746, January 20,
2016. The Supreme Court held that,
Under Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, the CA has the
prerogative to dismiss the case outright for failure to comply with the
formal requirements of an action filed under Rule 65. The formal
requirements include, among others, a statement by the petitioner
indicating the material dates when the order or resolution subject of
the petition was received. The CA identified Spouses Espinosas failure
to comply with this requirement as the primary ground for dismissing
the petition outright.
An examination of the petition for certiorari filed with the CA
shows that the CA is technically correct with respect to its finding that
Spouses Espinosa failed to indicate the exact date of receipt of the
assailed RTC order. However, the CA should have considered Spouses
Espinosas explanation regarding this omission, which was apparent on
the face of the petition. Spouses Espinosa stated:
On 18 September 2007, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Davao City, has released for mailing to petitioners former counsel,
Atty. Eufracio Dayaday, the Order dated 14 September 2007, denying
their "Motion To Stay Execution Pending Appeal and to Approve/Fix
Supersedeas Bond" The records surrendered by Atty. Eufracio
Dayaday to petitioners after he withdrew his appearance, as counsel
for the latter does not bear the Order dated 14 September 2007. Upon
verification made by petitioners, the records of the said case with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, do not have the Postal
Registry Return Card for the mailing of the Order dated 14 September
2007. Nevertheless, petitioners herein undertake to submit a certified
photocopy of the postal registry return card, as soon as the same be
made available in the records of the case.
Spouses Espinosa likewise executed a "Joint-Affidavit of Material
Dates," which was attached to the petition for certiorari filed with the
CA, attesting to the fact that the September 14, 2007 order was not
among the documents turned over to them by their former counsel,
and that the registry return card had not been returned to the RTC.

It is therefore apparent that Spouses Espinosa attempted to

comply with the material date requirement. Unfortunately, they
themselves could not ascertain when the subject order was received
by their former counsel and thereby make an accurate statement as to
such fact. Moreover, the best evidence to prove receipt of the RTC
order, i.e., the registry return card, was not yet available when they
elevated the case to the CA. But, as a sign of good faith, Spouses
Espinosa undertook to submit the return card as soon as it was
availablewhich they subsequently did on January 30, 2008. Given the
foregoing circumstances, it may be deduced that the basic reason why
no precise date of receipt was given by Spouses Espinosa is because
they did not want to misrepresent the date in their petition. In fine, we
find Spouses Espinosas failure to indicate the date of receipt
excusable; the CAs outright dismissal of their petition is not
commensurate with the degree of their non- compliance with the
prescribed procedure. In any case, the return card showed that the
order was received on October 4, 2007, which means that when
Spouses Espinosa filed the petition for certiorari on November 19,
2007, they did so well within the sixty (60) day reglementary period.
Although it is true that procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice, this is not
an inflexible tenet. After all, rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application especially on technical matters, which tends to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided.
In relation to such, the Supreme Court held that
A petition for certiorari before a higher court will generally not
prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This is
because a motion for reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law alluded to in Section 1,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for
reconsideration is required in order to grant the lower court an
opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by
the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
Contrary to the CAs findings, however, Spouses Espinosa already
complied with this requirement. Their motion to stay execution is, in
fact, a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order dated April 12, 2007
which granted Joveros motion for execution pending appeal.

Although not captioned as a "motion for reconsideration,"

Spouses Espinosas motion to stay execution directly challenged the
RTCs order of execution pending appeal insofar as it allowed the
inclusion of the awards for moral and exemplary damages.33 Thus,
when the RTC denied Spouses Espinosas motion to stay execution on
September 14, 2007, it was already the second time the trial court had
passed upon the issue of execution pending appeal. Both the April 12,
2007 and September 14, 2007 orders dealt with the same issue, i.e.,
the propriety of execution pending appeal. In the first instance, the RTC
allowed the execution pending appeal; in the latter, it denied Spouses
Espinosa's motion to stay execution and, thus, sustained its earlier
ruling. On both occasions, the parties had been accorded ample
opportunity to squarely argue their positions and the RTC more than
enough opportunity to study the matter and to deliberate upon the
issues raised by the parties. Under these circumstances, the filing of a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the stay of execution
pending appeal by Spouses Espinosa could not be considered a plain
and adequate remedy but a mere superfluity.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65; NATURE :
THE PETITIONER QUESTIONS THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC) ORDER, ADVISING THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
TARLAC TO AWAIT ITS RESOLUTION OF THE CASE BEFORE
IMPLEMENTING THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES (MTCC)

In the case of Rolando P. Tolentino VS. COMELEC, GR. No.,

218536, January, 26, 2016. The Supreme Court held that
Certiorari is available when a court or other tribunal exercising
quasi-judicial powers acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It is an extraordinary remedy of last resort designed to correct
errors of jurisdiction. There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the
issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;
where power is exercised arbitrarily or in a despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice; or where action is impelled by personal hostility
amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.

After evaluating the facts, this Court fails to see any action on
the part of the Commission that constitutes grave abuse of discretion
or absence of jurisdiction. Based on the following grounds.
First, the assailed Order dated May 25, 2015, was directed to City
Election Officer IV Atty. Guiao-Garcia. As an agent of the Commission,
an election officer is under the Commissions direct and immediate
control and supervision. The Commission clearly has the power and
jurisdiction to issue orders to its employees to carry out its mandate. It
is even clothed with the power to discipline or relieve any officer or
employee who fails to comply with its instructions
Second, The Commission is authorized to enforce its directives
and orders that, by law, enjoy precedence over that of the MTCC.
Third, The MTCCs writ of execution pending appeal cannot be
enforced because it was issued after the MTCC had already lost its
residual jurisdiction.
And lastly, certiorari is a remedy of last resort. It is not available
if a party still has another speedy and adequate remedy available.
The petition is premature because petitioner could still have moved for
reconsideration. He sought relief from everywhere (particularly, from
the MTCC, the local COMELEC office) except from the proper body that
had jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65; NATURE:
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY THE NLRC.
In the case of Cebu Peoples Multipurpose Cooperative and
Macario G. Quevedo VS. Nicereto E. Carbonilla Jr., GR.No.
212070, January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court held that
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial
authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse
of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.

In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to

the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion.75chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the
CA committed reversible error in granting Carbonilla, Jr.'s certiorari
petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling
that he was validly dismissed from employment as CPMPC was able to
prove, through substantial evidence, the existence of just causes
warranting the same
Basic is the rule that an employer may validly terminate the
services of an employee for any of the just causes enumerated under
Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code, namely:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
As may be gathered from the tenor of CPMPC's Notice of
Dismissal, it is apparent that Carbonilla, Jr.'s employment was
terminated on the grounds of, among others, serious misconduct and
loss of trust and confidence.

ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER UNDER RULE

70; NATURE:

In the case of Fairland Knitcraft Corporation VS. Arturo Lo

Poo, GR.No. 217696, January 27, 2016 the Supreme Court held
that,
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the
requirements for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:
Section 1. - Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the
provision of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (l) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
Stated differently, unlawful detainer is a summary action for the
recovery of possession of real property. This action may be filed by a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person from whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied. The possession of the defendant was originally
legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an
express or implied contract between them. The defendant's
possession, however, became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that
the defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the
defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer
must be instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of
possession.22
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of the
property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property, and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4)
within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.