QUASHAL (RULE 117)

Section 1. Time to move to quash.

At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information. (1)
Section 2. Form and contents.
The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the accused or his counsel and shall distinctly specify its factual and legal
grounds. The court shall consider no ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
(2a)
Section 3. Grounds.
The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)

That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information.

If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order that an amendment be made. (4a)
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. (n)
Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash.
If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed except as provided in
section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is
made or if having been made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court
may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody for another charge. (5a)
Section 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception.
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on
the grounds specified in section 3 (g) and (i) of this Rule. (6a)
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense
charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or
information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided
in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same
in the event of conviction for the graver offense. (7a)
Section 8. Provisional dismissal.
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both,
shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. (n)
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.
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The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because
he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections based
on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. (8)
CASES:
Generally:
Lopez vs. City Judge
Short facts:
Doctrines:
People vs. Nitafan
Short facts:
Doctrines:
People vs. Cadabis
Short facts:
Doctrines:
People vs. Dela Rosa
Short facts: Edery, a tourist in the Philippines, was found to have been smuggling gold bars by putting these in his vest pocket to avoid
paying tax through the Manila International Airport. Edery then filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts in the information did
not constitute offense charged. It was granted by the trial court. At the instance of the complainant, the case was reopened wherein
they were allowed to present additional evidence, but the MTQ still stood. On certiorari, the Court ruled in favor of Edery on the ground
that she has a non-immigrant status and was entitled to the privileges of EO 408 issued to further tourism in the country, which was
even admitted by the prosecutor prosecuting the case.
Doctrines:
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense
charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted.
Where in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the allegations of the information do not charge an offense,
facts have been brought out by evidence presented by both parties which destroy the prima facietruth accorded to the
allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the nature of the ground of the motion to quash,
it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the
case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction, and hold the accused to what would clearly appear to be a
merely vexatious and expensive trial, on her part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as well as of the
prosecution.
Senit vs. People
Short facts:
Doctrines:
Double Jeopardy:
US vs. Jenkins
Short facts: Jenkins was charged for refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces in violation of a US conscription statute.
District Court dismissed the case finding that the SC decision that government was basing the case on was not applicable. The
government appealed the dismissal. SC, in deciding the case held that there was double jeopardy in this case, the district court, having
relied on the precise circumstances of the defendants case in dismissing it based on merits. Having been decided on merits, double
jeopardy clause bars the appeal from acquittal.
Doctrines:
Double jeopardy bars an appeal of a decision where the defendant has been acquitted after trial based on the merits or when the
trier of facts has rendered a determination of guilt or innocence on the basis of facts adduced in the trial.
US vs. Scott
Short facts: Defendant in this case is a police officer in Michigan who was charged with a 3-count indictment for the distribution of
narcotics. He moved to dismiss the first two indictments for the being prejudiced due to pre-indictment delay. This was granted by the
district court before the end of the first presentation of evidence. The third count was submitted to the jury for decision for which he was
acquitted. The government questioned the dismissal of the first two indictments on appeal which was dismissed on the ground that any
further prosecution of the respondent would constitute a ground for double jeopardy. SC held that there was no double jeopardy in this
case because the respondent did not depend on the determination of guilt or innocence in dismissing the case and did so voluntarily.
Doctrines:
Double jeopardy bars an appeal from acquittal when the acquittal represents a resolution on some of the factual elements of the
offense charged and rests upon a resolution of a case against the defendant.
Double jeopardy does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice.
Lockhart vs. Nelson
Short facts: Respondent Nelson was found guilty of burglary. He was also previously been convicted of more than 4 other felonies.
Now, theres an Arkansas statute providing for enhanced term of imprisonment for habitual criminals. Under this statute, a person is
considered a habitual criminal if he had been convicted of at least 4 felonies. During the sentencing for the crime of burglary, State
presented 4 convictions of felonies against Nelson, not knowing one of this has been pardoned. The Arkansas statute was applied.
Writ of habeas corpus was filed. They question the application of the statute for being partly based on a pardoned conviction so the
District Court invalidated it. The State sought to resentence him using another prior conviction but this was not allowed because of
double jeopardy.
In deciding the case, SC held that there was no double jeopardy because when the reversal of a decision is based on ordinary trial
errors or incorrect reception of evidence has nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of the accused. Instead of barring retrial, district
court should have afforded the State an opportunity to produce additional evidence.
Doctrines:
In cases where conviction had to be set aside due to erroneous admission of evidence, where the evidence offered by the State and
admitted by the trial court -- whether erroneously or not -- would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not preclude retrial.
Retrial is not the evil sought to be prevented. In fact, it affords the defendant an opportunity to obtain a fair adjudication of his guilt.
Green vs. US doctrine
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Cudia vs. Court of Appeals

Short facts: An information of illegal possession of firearms was filed against petitioner Cudia by City Prosecutor of Pampanga. He was
arraigned wherein he pleaded not guilty. Later on, a case for the same offense was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not
knowing that there had already been a case filed and in fact is already being heard. City Prosecutor withdrew the (first) case because of
duplication. Trial court allowed. Now the petitioner alleges that, having already been arraigned in the first case, the prosecution under
second information placed him under double jeopardy.
In deciding the case, the SC held that there was no double jeopardy. Double jeopardy did not attach to the first case because the City
Prosecutor did not have the authority to file the information on which it was based due to lack of jurisdiction, the crime being committed
in Mabalacat. In this case, even though there was an internal agreement within the court that Branch 56, instead of 60 shall hear the
case, thus the arraignment made there was valid.
Doctrines:
In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof.
Requisites for the attachment of jeopardy
Court of competent jurisdiction
Valid complaint or information
Arraignment
Valid plea
Acquittal, conviction, dismissal without the consent of the accused.
People vs. Alvarez
Short facts: Alvarez was convicted of estafa for selling his car to another without duly informing him that the same has been mortgaged.
On appeal, he argued that the conviction of estafa under the RPC is barred by double jeopardy on the ground that he had been
previously convicted for the same act under a different law (Act. 1508 mortgagor cannot sell mortgaged property without consent of
mortgagee)
In deciding the case, the SC held that there was no double jeopardy on the ground that the acts penalized by both laws are essentially
different. While an act is a common to both offense that the selling of a mortgaged property yet it does not in itself constitute either
one of these offenses. That is RPC - even if he informs the mortgagee, as long as he does not inform the buyer, Act 1508 - baliktad
Doctrines:
Test for determining whether or not a prosecution for one crime constitutes an obstacle to a subsequent action for another distinct
crime upon the same facts, is to inquire whether the facts alleged in the second information, if proven, would have been
sufficient to support the former information, of which the accused may have been acquitted or convicted. The gist of the
question is whether or not the same evidence supports the two actions. lawphil.net
People vs. Relova
Short facts: Electrical wiring devices and contraptions were found to have been illegally installed in a building owned by Opulencia. He
was charged with violation of Batangas City Ordinance. He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action has prescribed and
also that the civil indemnity sought to be recovered is beyond the jurisdiction of Batagas City Court. This was granted. Another
information was filed against him, this time for theft of electric power under Art. 308 of the RPC. He filed a motion to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy.
In deciding the case, SC held that the action for theft of electric power has been barred by double jeopardy. The charges filed against
Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the
same act.
Doctrines:
Our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy.
"no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
One may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the
offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include, the crime charged in the other case.
If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation
of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other.
People vs. del Carmen
Short facts:
Doctrines:
People vs. Gloria
Short facts:
Doctrines:
Esmea vs. Pogoy
Short facts:
Doctrines:
People vs. Adil
Short facts:
Doctrines:
People vs. Velasco
Short facts:
Doctrines:
People vs. Osbania
Short facts:
Doctrines:
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Green vs. US
Short facts:
Doctrines:
The Double Jeopardy Clause is "designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction
more than once for an alleged offense."
Ashe vs. Swenson
Short facts:
Doctrines:
Alonto vs. People
Short facts:
Doctrines:
Castro vs. People
Short facts:
Doctrines:
Cerezo vs. People
Short facts:
Doctrines:

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