ST.

LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF,

Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 6010

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 28, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint
Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela
Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:

1) Gross Misconduct:

From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for
child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before
the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the
Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by
SLU for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money
supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty
before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of
salary by respondent.

2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:

In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and

3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on
31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W.
Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane
Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said
second marriage was subsequently annulled for being bigamous.

On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately

subscribed and notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to
1997, despite expiration of respondents notarial commission on 31 December
1987. A Certification[1] dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not
applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the
period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by
the following documents:

1.
Affidavit of Ownership[2] dated 8 March 1991, executed by
Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

2.
Affidavit[3] dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez
Atos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

3.
Affidavit[4] dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A.
Menos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

4.
Affidavit[5] dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V.
Abalos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

5.
Absolute Date of Sale[6] dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo
Gonzales in favor of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

6.
Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties[7] dated 5 March 1994,
executed by Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to
before Rolando Dela Cruz;

7.
Sworn Statement[8] dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B.
Rimorin, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

8.
Deed of Sale[9] dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow
Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

9.
Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties[10] dated 1 June 1994,
executed by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to
before Rolando Dela Cruz;

10.
Absolute Deed of Sale[11] dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor
D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

11.
Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 20 December 1996, executed by
Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

12.
Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties[13] dated 17 April 1996,
executed by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to
before Rolando Dela Cruz;

13.
Conditional Deed of Sale[14] dated 27 February 1997, executed by
Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela
Cruz;

14.
Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated 19 July 1996, executed by
JARCO represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction represented by
Mr. George Cham, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.

Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child

abuse, illegal deduction of salary and others which are still pending before the St.
Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the
Prosecutors Office. He did not discuss anything about the allegations of
immorality in contracting a second marriage and malpractice in notarizing
documents despite the expiration of his commission.

After the filing of comment, We referred[16] the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.

The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a

reiteration of their allegations in their complaint.

Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the former. He
also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period when his
notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered some extenuating
defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the
complained acts.

After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and
recommended that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that

respondent be administratively penalized for the following acts:

a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to
have the first marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of law
for one (1) year, and

b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration
of his notarial commission, he be suspended from the practice of law for another
one (1) year or for a total of two (2) years.[17]

On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the
recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering that Respondent contracted a second marriage
without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled, Atty.
Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year and for notarizing legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration
of his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for another one (1) year, for a total of two (2) years Suspension
from the practice of law.[18]

This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken,
except as to the penalty contained therein.

At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and
right to practice law only during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity
to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege
or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to
suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the

profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to
protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather
than to punish an attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty.
Cabanting,[19] that the Bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency
as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any
act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this
end, an attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of
his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad
enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity.

Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a
dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether
the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his
private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[20] Thus, not only his
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts,
may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.
[21]

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. Possession of such moral character as requirement
to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be continuous. Otherwise,
membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral conduct.[22]

In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera
contracted marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less
than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable differences without
seeking judicial recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their separation infact, respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost
all forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter, respondent became
attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of SLU-LHS.
There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary Jane
Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 68. Respondent
even admitted this fact. When the second marriage was entered into,
respondents prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action

having been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or
annulment of respondents prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous
second marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he
cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a second marriage
may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be
annulled by the appropriate court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4
October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after
respondent contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondents
second marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as
earlier emphasized, the annulment came after the respondents second bigamous
marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui
generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of
a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect
its course, then neither will the judgment of annulment of respondents second
marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as
the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary
proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.[23]

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a
ground for disbarment.

The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral
conduct, vis--vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is that conduct which
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community and what is
grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[24]

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as

to warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still in
place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[25]
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider
respondents act as grossly immoral. This finds support in the following
recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of
Governors, thus:

The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the
law and the high moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:

a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of
almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his
wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;

c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;

d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation
to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the
mother and child went to Australia;

f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[26]

In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27] respondent was disbarred because his moral
character was deeply flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz: he
convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void
ab initio and that she was legally single and free to marry him. When complainant
and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law
school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from
respondents parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten
complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support
and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely to a hospital.

In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28] respondent was also disbarred for his
grossly immoral acts such as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three
children; second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him; third, he
mispresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign
land; and fourth, he availed himself of complainants resources by securing a
plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters daughter. He

did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity
to assure complainant that everything is legal.

Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent
himself acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was
humble enough to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of his
commitment to his wife and child.

Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon
him to be unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court.
Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish
the end desired.[29] In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two
years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension
recommended by the IBP is too light and not commensurate to the act committed
by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during
the years 1988-1997 after his commission as notary public had expired,
respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite his
knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he
received no payment in notarizing said documents.

It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,

routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one
making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this
reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.[30]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be
treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of
notarizing documents without the requisite commission to do so as reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification
of public documents.[31]

The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is
done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization

or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or

one, performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the
lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by
making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath
similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By
acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer
likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold
at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer was suspended for one year
when he notarized five documents after his commission as Notary Public had
expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a
deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said case,
we find that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the circumstances.
Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents[33] without the
requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal
case for child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student
filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative
case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating
Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before
the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary
by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the proper
forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the
respondent.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral

conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another
two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission
or a total of four (4) years of suspension.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the
Court Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
recorded in the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 1512

January 29, 1993

VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,

vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, complainant
Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of respondent Transfiguracion Daarol,
** a member of the Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct.

After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved to refer the
case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation (Rollo,
p. 18).

As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the convenience of the
parties and their witnesses who were residing in the province of Zamboanga del
Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said province was authorized to conduct the
investigation and to submit a report, together with transcripts of stenographic
notes and exhibits submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).

On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Report and
Recommendation, viz.:

Evidence of the complainant:

. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of Bonifacio St.,
Dipolog City; that when she was still a teenager and first year in college she

came to know respondent Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to

their house being a friend of her sister Norma; that they also became friends, and
she knew the respondent as being single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog City;
that he was the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (ZANECO) and subsequently transferred his residence to the ZANECO
compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn,
September 30, 1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked her to be one
of the usherettes in the Mason's convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June
28 to 30, 1973 and, she told respondent to ask the permission of her parents,
which respondent did, and her father consented; that for three whole days she
served as usherette in the convention and respondent picked her up from her
residence every morning and took her home from the convention site at the end
of each day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house
and invited her for a joy ride with the permission of her mother who was a former
classmate of respondent; that respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and
then they strolled along the beach, and in the course of which respondent
proposed his love to her; that respondent told her that if she would accept him,
he would marry her within six (6) months from her acceptance; complainant told
respondent that she would think it over first; that from then on respondent used
to visit her in their house almost every night, and he kept on courting her and
pressed her to make her decision on respondent's proposal; that on July 7, 1973,
she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and respondent continued his
usual visitations almost every night thereafter; they agreed to get married in
December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her, with the consent
of her father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at 7:00 p.m. of that day
respondent fetched her from her house and went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119121, tsn, id); that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening they left the party at the
Lopez Skyroom, but before taking her home respondent invited her for a joy ride
and took her to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent parked the jeep
by the beach where there were no houses around; that in the course of their
conversation inside the jeep, respondent reiterated his promise to marry her and
then started caressing her downward and his hand kept on moving to her panty
and down to her private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then said: "What is
this Trans?", but he answered: "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you" and
reminded her also that "anyway, December is very near, the month we have
been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day, just give this to me,
do not be afraid" (ibid), and again reiterated his promise and assurances, at the
same time pulling down her panty; that she told him that she was afraid because
they were not yet married, but because she loved him she finally agreed to have
sexual intercourse with him at the back seat of the jeep; that after the
intercourse she wept and respondent again reiterated his promises and

assurances not to worry because anyway he would marry her; and at about 12:00
midnight they went home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat outside usually
at the Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about twice or three times a week,
after which he would take her to the airport where they would have sexual
intercourse; that they had this sexual intercourse from August to October 1973 at
the frequency of two or three times a week, and she consented to all these things
because she loved him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant noticed that her
menstruation which usually occurred during the second week of each month did
not come; she waited until the end of the month and still there was no
menstruation; she submitted to a pregnancy test and the result was positive; she
informed respondent and respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted but
she objected and respondent did not insist; respondent then told her not to worry
because they would get married within one month and he would talk to her
parents about their marriage (pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and talked to her
parents about their marriage; it was agreed that the marriage would be
celebrated in Manila so as not to create a scandal as complainant was already
pregnant; complainant and her mother left for Manila by boat on October 22,
1973 while respondent would follow by plane; and they agreed to meet in
Singalong, Manila, in the house of complainant's sister Delia who is married to
Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant and her mother
at Singalong, Manila, respondent told them that he could not marry complainant
because he was already married (p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad
and said: "Trans, so you fooled my daughter and why did you let us come here in
Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on, however, respondent reassured complainant
not to worry because respondent had been separated from his wife for 16 years
and he would work for the annulment of his marriage and, subsequently marry
complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent told complainant to deliver their child
in Manila and assured her of a monthly support of P250.00 (p. 140, tsn, id.);
respondent returned to Dipolog City and actually sent the promised support; he
came back to Manila in January 1974 and went to see complainant; when asked
about the annulment of his previous marriage, he told complainant that it would
soon be approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in February and in March
1974 and told complainant the same thing (p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote
her mother to come to Manila when she delivers the child, but her mother
answered her that she cannot come as nobody would be left in their house in
Dipolog and instead suggested that complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer;
complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and, her sister Norma took her to the
Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered a baby girl on June 14,

1974 at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was registered
as "Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City and tried to
contact respondent by phone and, thru her brother, but to no avail; as she was
ashamed she just stayed in their house; she got sick and her father sent her to
Zamboanga City for medical treatment; she came back after two weeks but still
respondent did not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a lawyer
and filed an administrative case against respondent with the National
Electrification Administration; the case was referred to the Zamboanga del Norte
Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was dismissed and thus she filed the
present administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent

The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and one exhibit,
the birth certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent declared substantially as
follows: that he was born on August 6, 1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that
he married Romualda Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20
years old; that because of incompatibility he had been estranged from his wife
for 16 years; that in 1953 he was baptized as a moslem and thereby embraced
the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's father since
1952 because he was his teacher; likewise he knew complainant's mother
because they were former classmates in high school; that he became acquainted
with complainant when he used to visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they
gradually became friends and often talked with each other, and even talked
about their personal problems; that he mentioned to her his being estranged
from his wife; that with the consent of her parents he invited her to be one of the
usherettes in the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City held on June 28-30,
1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that the arrangement was for him to fetch her from
her residence and take her home from the convention site; that it was during this
occasion that they became close to each other and after the convention, he
proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that (sic) a week of courtship, she
accepted his proposal and since then he used to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).

That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited complainant to be his
partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at
about 10:00 p.m. of that evening after the affair, complainant complained to him
of a headache, so he decided to take her home but once inside the jeep, she
wanted to have a joy ride, so he drove around the city and proceeded to the
airport; that when they were at the airport, only two of them, they started the
usual kisses and they were carried by their passion; they forgot themselves and
they made love; that before midnight he took her home; that thereafter they
indulged in sexual intercourse many times whenever they went on joy riding in

the evening and ended up in the airport which was the only place they could be
alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).

That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that complainant told him
of her pregnancy; that they agreed that the child be delivered in Manila to avoid
scandal and respondent would take care of expenses; that during respondent's
talk with the parents of complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he told him
he was married but estranged from his wife; that when complainant was already
in Manila, she asked him if he was willing to marry her, he answered he could not
marry again, otherwise, he would be charged with bigamy but he promised to file
an annulment of his marriage as he had been separated from his wife for 16
years; that complainant consented to have sexual intercourse with him because
of her love to him and he did not resort to force, trickery, deceit or cajolery; and
that the present case was filed against him by complainant because of his failure
to give the money to support complainant while in Cebu waiting for the delivery
of the child and, also to meet complainant's medical expenses when she went to
Zamboanga City for medical check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).

FINDING OF FACTS

From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are not disputed:

1.
That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student, and
was about 20 years and 7 months old during the time (July-October 1975) of her
relationship with respondent, having been born on December 23, 1952; while
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married, General Manager of Zamboanga
del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the time of the said
relationship, having been born on August 6, 1932;

2.
That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom be has a
son; that the marriage ceremony was solemnized on September 24, 1955 at
Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish
Priest thereat; and that said respondent had been separated from his wife for
about 16 years at the time of his relationship with complainant;

3.
That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quite
sometime, having been a former student of complainant's father in 1952 and, a

former classmate of complainant's mother at the Andres Bonifacio College in

Dipolog City; that he became acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in
1963 and eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy,
as he used to visit Norma at her residence; that he also befriended complainant
and who became a close friend when he invited her, with her parents' consent, to
be one of the usherettes during the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City
from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence in the
morning and took her home from the convention site after each day's activities;

4.
That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship,
complainant accepted respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the evening of
August 20, 1973, complainant with her parents' permission was respondent's
partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the
Dipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the place but
before going home, they went to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked
the jeep at the beach, where there were no houses around; that after the usual
preliminaries, they consummated the sexual act and at about midnight they went
home; that after the first sexual act, respondent used to have joy ride with
complainant which usually ended at the airport where they used to make love
twice or three times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations,
complainant became pregnant;

5.
That after a conference among respondent, complainant and complainant's
parents, it was agreed that complainant would deliver her child in Manila, where
she went with her mother on October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the
25th and, stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila;
that respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973,
and again in February and March 1974; that later on complainant decided to
deliver the child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went
there in April 1974 and her sister took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at
Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl at the
Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that
about the last week of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that during her
stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed some of her
expenses; that she filed an administrative case against respondent with the
National Electrification Administration; which complaint, however, was dismissed;
and then she instituted the present disbarment proceedings against respondent.

xxx

xxx

xxx

In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after

hearing, respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp.
28-51).

After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full accord with the
findings and recommendation of the Solicitor General.

From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never informed by
respondent attorney of his real status as a married individual. The fact of his
previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant
became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being
eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and
dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the
annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that
respondent never bothered to annul said marriage. More importantly, respondent
knew all along that the mere fact of separation alone is not a ground for
annulment of marriage and does not vest him legal capacity to contract another
marriage.

Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though his son, who
was also studying in Dipolog City, lived separately from him. He never introduced
his son and went around with friends as though he was never married much less
had a child in the same locality. This circumstance alone belies respondent's
claim that complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at the
very start of his courtship. The Court is therefore inclined to believe that
respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the
expense of the gullible complainant. It is not in accordance with the nature of the
educated, cultured and respectable, which complainant's family is, her father
being the Assistant Principal of the local public high school, to allow a daughter to
have an affair with a married man.

But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of respondent's
moral values when he said that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship
despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209, January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse,
he even suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's moral sense is so seriously
impaired that we cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos
(107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:

(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive
and their marriage still valid and existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency

and morality. Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred

institution demanding respect and dignity.

Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert
and as such, could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into the
possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo, p. 15). As records indicate, however,
his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence
save that of his self-serving testimony. In this regard, we need only to quote the
finding of the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:

When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he could not because
he was already married and would open him to a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn,
January 13, 1977). If he were a moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is
now claiming, why did he not marry complainant? The answer is supplied by
respondent himself. He said while he was a moslem, but, having been married in
a civil ceremony, he could no longer validly enter into another civil ceremony
without committing bigamy because the complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn,
January 13, 1977). Consequently, if respondent knew, that notwithstanding his
being a moslem convert, he cannot marry complainant, then it was grossly
immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with complainant because he knew
the existence of a legal impediment. Respondent may not, therefore, escape
responsibility thru his dubious claim that he has embraced the Islam religion.
(Rollo,
p. 49).

By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires,
respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his
removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good
moral character is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule
138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. It is a
continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda, 181
SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a
lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.

As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang,
206 SCRA 395 [1992]):

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good character is not only a

condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession

is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case
No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice George A.
Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to
show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney,
the court retains the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).

Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this Court against
a lawyer who convinced a woman that her prior marriage to another man was
null and void ab initio and she was still legally single and free to marry him (the
lawyer), married her, was supported by her in his studies, begot a child with her,
abandoned her and the child, and married another woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm.
Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).

Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love
and marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did
not have the required legal capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having carnal
relations with complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion,
breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the child.
Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the
exacting standards of mental and moral fitness. Respondent having exhibited
debased morality, the Court is constrained to impose upon him the most severe
disciplinary action disbarment.

The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest
standard of morality. The members are, in fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the
Bar against the admission of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient
either moral character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs.
Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]).

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead a life in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically,
a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave
himself in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21,

26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7
SCRA 859 [1963]).

In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should not be
allowed continued membership in the ancient and learned profession of law
(Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).

ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly

immoral conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar and is hereby ordered
DISBARRED and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this
Resolution be furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of
respondent Daarol.

SO ORDERED.

DAHLIA S. GACIAS,
Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. ALEXANDER BULAUITAN,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 7280

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

November 16, 2006

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment instituted by the herein

complainant Dahlia S. Gacias against Atty. Alexander Bulauitan on grounds of
dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Herein respondent Atty. Alexander Bulauitan used to own a parcel of land with an
area of 1,242 square meters located at Tuguegarao City and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-79190. Sometime in February 1996, complainant and
respondent entered into an agreement for the purchase, on installment basis, of
a 92-square meter portion of the 1,242-square meter lot at a unit price of
P3,500.00 per square meter. Out of the total consideration of P322,000.00,
complainant initially paid respondent, as down payment, US$3,100.00, or its
equivalent of P82,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt dated February 28, 1996.
Subsequent installment payments were remitted, as mutually agreed upon, to
the Bank of Philippine Islands, Kamuning Branch, under the account of
respondents daughter, Joan Christine. All told, complainant had, as of November
1996, paid the respondent, in cash and in kind, the peso equivalent of
US$6,950.00, which, per complainants computation, using the $1:P43 dollar-peso
rate of exchange, amounted to P300,000.00.

As complainant would also allege in her affidavit-complaint dated April 23, 2001,
[1] as amended,[2] she asked for the copy of the title over the 92-square meter
portion upon learning about the mortgage the respondent constituted over his
Tuguegarao property. According to complainant, respondents inability to produce
the desired title impelled her not to complete payment anymore and to request
the return of the amount she had already paid the respondent. Complainant
further alleged that the respondent agreed, but has not made good his

undertaking, to make reimbursement. Her request for assistance from the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) proved futile, too. Meanwhile, the
mortgagee bank, China Bank, foreclosed the mortgage constituted on the
respondents property, then consolidated the title over it in its name.

In his answer in compliance with an order from the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, respondent admitted entering into a land purchase agreement with
the complainant, but stressed the private nature of the transaction between
them. He described as premature the complainants demand for delivery of title
inasmuch as the aforementioned agreement was not consummated for
complainants failure to pay in full the purchase price of the 92-square meter
portion. Respondent admitted, though, that he undertook to pay back the amount
of P300,000.00 as a measure to avoid scandal, given what to him was
complainants penchant to make a scene whenever the opportunity presented
itself.

To the answer, complainant countered with a reply, to which respondent filed a

rejoinder.

In the meantime, complainant, upon the facts above narrated, filed a criminal
complaint for estafa against the respondent before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cagayan.

Following several failed preliminary conferences and hearings, IBP Bar Discipline
Hearing Commissioner Wilfredo E.J. E. Reyes issued, on July 22, 2005, an order[3]
declaring the case as submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and
position papers submitted by the parties, with their attachments.

In its report dated November 8, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommends that respondent be adjudged guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct and meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years.
The recommendation to suspend and the findings holding it together commend
themselves for concurrence.

The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer from engaging in

unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.[4] The complementing Rule 7.03 of the
Code, on the other hand, provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that

adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Another complementing provision

is found in the Rules of Court providing that a member of the bar may be
suspended or even removed from office as an attorney for any deceit,
malpractice, or misconduct in office.[5] And when the Code or the Rules speaks of
conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited
in connection with the performance of the lawyers professional duties, but also
covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his
profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law invest him with. To borrow from Orbe v.
Adaza.[6] [T]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court
are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct, including
dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.

Like Atty. Adaza in Orbe, respondent Atty. Bulauitan also refused without
justifiable reason to comply with his just obligation under a contract he entered
into with the complainant. There can be no quibbling as to the complainant
having paid respondent the amount of P300,000.00 out of the total contract cost
of P322,000.00. In other words, there had been substantial contract compliance
on the part of the complainant. A reciprocal effort towards complying with his
part of the bargain would have been becoming of respondent, as a man of
goodwill. It would appear, however, that this kind of gesture was alas too much to
hope for from the respondent. For, instead of going through the motion of
delivering the portion of his property to its buyer after his receipt of almost the
entire purchase price therefor, the respondent mortgaged the whole property
without so much as informing the complainant about it. Like the IBP investigating
commissioner, the Court finds the respondents act of giving the property in
question in mortgage bordering on the fraudulent and surely dishonest. The
Court, to be sure, takes stock of respondents attempt to make amends by
promising to return the amount of P300,000.00. But this promise strikes the
Court, as it did the IBP investigating commissioner, as a mere ploy by the
respondent to evade criminal prosecution for estafa, what with the fact that he
has yet to make good his commitment to return.

Respondent had shown, through his dealing with the complainant involving a tiny
parcel of land, a want of professional honesty. Such misdeed reflects on the moral
stuff which he is made of. His fitness to continue in the advocacy of law and
manage the legal affairs of others are thus put in serious doubt too. The private
nature of the transaction or the fact that the same was concluded without the
respondent taking advantage of his legal profession is really of little moment. For,
a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him wanting in honesty, probity or good
demeanor.[7]

While the Court agrees with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline respecting the
guilt of respondent and the propriety of a suspension, it is not, however, inclined
to impose the severe recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, herein respondent, ATTY. ALEXANDER BULAUITAN, is found guilty of

gross misconduct and dishonesty and ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt hereof. Let copies of this
decision be spread on his record in the Bar Confidants Office and furnished the
IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.

AILEEN A. FERANCULLO, A.C. No. 7214

Complainant,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
- versus - QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
ATTY. SANCHO M. FERANCULLO, CALLEJO, SR.,
JR., AZCUNA,
Respondent. TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
November 30, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

TINGA, J.

Tell the truth and shame the Devil

Shakespeare-Henry IV, Part I, III-1

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Aileen

Ferancullo (petitioner) against Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. (respondent)
grounded on his alleged commission of estafa, bigamy and violation of the
lawyers oath. Both parties have starkly contrasting stories to tell. Hence, the
necessity of presenting both versions.

In a verified complaint dated December 17, 2004,[1] complainant narrated how

respondent allegedly took advantage of their attorney-client relationship to extort
money from her in consideration of the out-of-court settlement of her criminal
cases and deceived her into marrying him by concealing his previous marriage.

Her complaint-affidavit narrated that sometime in February 2004, a certain SPO1

Lino Taytay referred her to respondent as she was in need of legal aid concerning
a string of complaints for estafa filed against her. They allegedly agreed to a

monthly retainer fee of P10,000.00 in consideration for respondents legal

services; the first payment thereof made in the same month of February at her
residence in Central Park Condominium, Pasay City. Respondent purportedly
advised complainant to stay for the meantime at his office located at GF-7, Elenel
Apt., 2243 Luna corner Mabolo Sts., Pasay City, to avoid arrest and to keep her
safe from the people suing and threatening her. He allegedly went to the extent
of sending his cousin, Felix Reyes, to fetch complainant from her residence. At
night, complainant and respondent, together with the latters office staff, went out
for dining and relaxation.[2]

Complainant recounted further that respondent prodded her to move into a more
secure location, the Youth and Student Travel Association of the Philippines in
Paraaque.[3] That allegedly became the start of his courtship. Complainant
averred that respondent would send her breakfast and flowers. When asked
about his personal circumstances, respondent supposedly told complainant that
he was still single although he had a child out of wedlock. Complainant also
maintained that she saw no apparent indications suggesting that respondent was
married.[4]

As indicative of their romantic relationship, respondent and complainant allegedly

traveled to different places. According to complainant, respondent took her to
Antipolo to meet his relatives and to Mindoro to attend the birthday celebration of
his mother. They also purportedly went to Cebu City to meet complainants eldest
child.[5]

Complainant claimed that in the beginning, respondent diligently attended to her

cases and advised her not to appear at the hearings before the Office of the
Prosecutor, assuring her that he would attempt at a compromise agreement with
the adverse parties. For this purpose, between February and July 2004,
complainant purportedly entrusted to respondent varying amounts of money
totaling Four Hundred Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P431,000.00) based on his
assurance that her cases merely involved money claims which can be settled
amicably. Complainant claimed that she had to ask this amount from her parents.
Complainant did not ask from respondent for any receipt evidencing the
transaction.[6]

Complainant further alleged that she and respondent moved to a unit at Parrison
Tower at F.B. Harrison, Pasay City sometime in April 2004, where they started
living together as husband and wife. The unit was purportedly owned by a client
of respondent who agreed to offset the amount of rental with the legal fees due
him.[7]

To corroborate her allegation that they lived together as husband and wife,
complainant annexed to her complaint-affidavit five (5) photographs, three of
which show intimate poses of complainant and respondent.[8] Complainant also
recounted that during respondents birthday celebration held on May 28, 2004 at
the rooftop of the Parrison Tower, he supposedly introduced complainant as his
wife to his guests.[9] Complainant attached a VCD copy documenting the event
to her reply to respondents answer.[10] As averred, at the start of the video,
complainant can be seen entertaining the guests and overseeing the food
preparation. Early in the party, complainants three children arrived. While
respondent was walking around and entertaining the guests, complainant stood
behind the buffet table supervising last minute preparation before the food was
served. As the guests started to get food from the buffet table, complainant
approached respondent. Respondent placed his hand on the hips of complainant
while the latter whispered at him. All throughout the video, complainant was
either standing behind the buffet table or conversing with respondent and the
guests.

Complainant found out that she was pregnant sometime in June 2004. On August
4, 2004, complainant and respondent allegedly wed in a rite solemnized in Kawit,
Cavite.[11] In support of this averment, complainant annexed to the complaint a
photocopy of the marriage certificate.[12]

Two (2) months thereafter, in a casual conversation with a certain Teresita Santos,
another client of respondent, Santos told complainant that respondent was
already married to a certain Marlin M. Maranan. Complainant then confronted
respondent who allegedly admitted that he was married but assured complainant
that he was ready to leave his wife so that they can be together. The relationship
between complainant and respondent turned sour eventually leading to their
separation.[13]

Complainant sought assistance from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). In
a letter dated 14 October 2006, Atty. Romarico Ayson sent a demand letter to
respondent, urging the latter to shoulder complainants hospitalization until her
delivery and provide monthly support for the child in the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) thereafter.[14]

Complainant averred that since their separation, respondent and his agents had
been threatening her with arrest and lawsuits. She also discovered that the
criminal complaints remained pending filed against her with the Office of the
Prosecutor. She claimed that respondent himself had been exerting efforts so that
the criminal complaints against her would proceed.[15]

In compliance with the IBP Order dated 6 January 2005, respondent filed an
answer,[16] denying the allegations that he committed estafa, maintained an
illicit relationship and contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant. While
admitting that complainant sought his legal services in connection with the
latters cases for estafa and illegal recruitment pending before the Office of the
Prosecutor, respondent insisted that his relationship with complainant was purely
professional. In particular, he claimed that the purpose of his visits to
complainants residence was to show her court orders issued in relation to her
cases. He also averred that it was complainant who sought refuge in his office
and invited him and his legal staff for dinners to discuss her cases.[17]

Respondent maintained that complainant insisted on skipping the scheduled

hearings before the Office of the Prosecutor. He also denied receiving
P431,000.00 from complainant, arguing that on the alleged dates of payments,
he was out for court appearances.[18] He admitted going to Cebu City upon the
behest of complainant who shouldered all his expenses, but the visit was only for
the purpose of discussing the cases with complainants parents.[19] Respondent
denied meeting complainants eldest child in Cebu City and all the other alleged
trips they took together.[20]

Respondent likewise denied courting complainant asserting that the latter had
already known since February 2004 that he was married.[21] He claimed to be
happily married to his legal wife. He denied living in together with complainant or
providing a residence for complainant. According to him, complainant vacated
her residence at Central Park Condominium, Pasay City because her lease
application was denied.[22] While he admitted that the unit at Parrison Tower at
F.B. Harrison, Pasay City belonged to his client, respondent insisted that his
relatives had been occupying the same since March 2004, thus making it
impossible for complainant to have transferred to said unit in April 2004.[23]

Respondent described as contrary to human experience the allegation of

complainant that he introduced her as his wife during his birthday celebration on
28 May 2004, where his brothers and sisters were also present. To support this
claim, he submitted the affidavits of fifteen guests in his party, stating that
respondent did not introduce complainant as his wife.[24]

Respondent also denied that a marriage celebration between him and

complainant took place on 4 August 2004 or that he signed the marriage
certificate and or that he got her pregnant. He had already instituted
corresponding criminal complaints against complainant for the alleged
falsification of his signature in the marriage certificate. Respondent claimed that
complainant was extorting money from him, hence the filing of the administrative
complaint.[25]

Complainant submitted a Reply[26] to respondents answer to rebut his

allegations. Annexed to her reply were receipts of payments on utilities to prove
that she actually lived at Parrison Tower and a VCD copy showing the video clip of
respondents birthday celebration held on 28 May 2004. Complainant and
respondent also filed their respective position papers. In addition, complainant
filed a Manifestation and Reply with the following annexes: (1) a blue polo barong
and pants allegedly worn by respondent during his birthday celebration on 28
May 2004; (2) the original bank statement reciting the deposits made by
complainants parents of the amount of P431,000.00;[27] (3) the original
passbook in the names of complainant
and respondent;[28] and (4) the certified xerox copy from the original of their
marriage contract.[29]

In response thereto, respondent moved to expunge from the records the annexes
to complainants Manifestation and Reply[30] on the ground that he was not
furnished a copy of said annexes and that the Manifestation and Reply was an
unsigned pleading. Complainant filed an opposition thereto.[31]

On 20 January 2006, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines (IBP) issued its Report and Recommendation to dismiss the
complaint against respondent for lack of merit. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution[32]
dated 20 March 2006, finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the
complaint lacked merit. The IBP believed that the complainant failed to present a
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof to warrant the disbarment or suspension

of respondent. The IBP also ruled that the pictures and VCD not having been duly
authenticated could not be received in evidence.

As is usual in cases of this nature, the adverse parties presented conflicting

versions. The duty to examine the claims and counterclaims and the evidence to
support them ideally lies with the IBP, but in the instant case, its evaluation
leaves much to be desired.

Despite the numerous factual allegations presented by both parties and the
affidavits and documents to support them, the IBP made only a general
conclusion that complainant must be motivated by greed in filing the instant
administrative complaint. Thus, the Court reviewed the records.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by

substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has
been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[33] For the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently
held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.[34]

Contrary to the IBPs opinion, there is a preponderance of evidence that

respondent maintained an illicit relationship with complainant who was not his
legal wife. It also appears that respondent contracted a second marriage with
complainant as evidenced by their marriage certificate.

The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract.[35]
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof.

The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents.[36] The marriage
certificate plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between respondent
and complainant on 4 August 2004, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents. The marriage certificate should prevail over
respondents claim that the marriage certificate or his signature therein was
falsified. The rule is that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity.[37]

Respondent contends that the certified true copy of the marriage contract should
be expunged from the records because he was not furnished a copy thereof and
the Manifestation and Reply to which it was annexed was an unsigned pleading.
The records show otherwise. A copy of said marriage certificate, denominated as
Annex G, accompanied the initiatory complaint filed before the IBP and furnished
to respondent. In fact, respondent admitted in paragraph 61 of his answer that he
received a copy of the marriage contract.[38] A copy of complainants
Manifestation and Reply, to which a certified true copy of the questioned
marriage certificate was annexed, was also sent by registered mail to the IBP.

The proscription against unsigned pleadings laid down in Section 3, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court is not applicable in the instant case. In view of its nature,
administrative proceedings against lawyers are not strictly governed by the Rules
of Court. As we held in In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is
neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court
into the conduct of its officers.[39] Hence, an administrative proceeding
continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant
to prosecute the same.[40] Moreover, no defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or
in the proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be considered as substantial
unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that
such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice.[41] That the
copy of the Manifestation and Reply furnished to respondent was not signed by
either complainant or her counsel is merely an innocuous error. In any case, the
copy thereof forming part of the IBP records was signed by complainant.

All told, the Court finds that complainants version is more credible, with the
caveat that the Court is not accepting hook line and sinker every allegation of

complainant. There is substantial evidence suggesting that more than a business

or professional relationship existed between complainant and respondent.
Complainant presented certain evidence either proving her claim or
demonstrating as incredible respondents defense that complainant was merely
extorting money from him. For instance, to prove her allegation that she and
respondent lived together, complainant presented the original of the retainer
agreement between respondent and the owner of the condominium building
where they allegedly lived together. Complainant also attached to her reply
copies of receipts of payments on utilities and the original passbook of an
account in the names of both complainant and respondent. These pieces of
evidence were supposed to be under the control or custody of respondent, but
the latter offered no explanation as to how complainant was able to produce
them. If respondents claim is to be believed, complainant must have gone to
great lengths just to fabricate or steal these pieces of evidence, a theory that is
not even suggested by respondent. Incidentally, vis--vis complainants
overwhelming allegations, respondent offered only denials which are effectively
self-serving and weak under the law on evidence. Other than his general claim
that complainant only wanted money from him, respondent did not even bother
to create his own version of the supposed extortion.

Moreover, the VCD documenting respondents birthday celebration on 28 May

2004 belied respondents claim that he acted as complainants legal counsel only
and the concomitant assumption that she was there herself as a guest only. In
said party, complainant entertained the guests and supervised the food
preparation. Obviously, these are not the usual actuations of a client or a guest
merely invited to a party.

Respondent would have this Court disregard the contents of the VCD and of the
intimate photos of respondent and complainant on the ground that under the
rules of evidence, the person who took the pictures or videotaped the birthday
party should identify and authenticate the picture and VCD.

Respondents objection will be sustained in civil or criminal litigation, but not in an

administrative proceeding as in the instant case. In administrative proceedings,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative
due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.[42]

The Court, however, finds no sufficient evidence indicating that respondent

falsely promised the settlement of complainants criminal cases in consideration
of the amount of P431,000.00. The bank statements showing the deposits made
by complainants parents are not conclusive of said claim because they do not
prove that said amounts were received by respondent.

For what ethical breaches then may respondent be held liable?

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

On several occasions, the Court has held that an illicit relation is considered
disgraceful and immoral conduct which is subject to disciplinary action.[43] In
Tucay v. Atty. Tucay,[44] it was held:

x x x x indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married

woman, grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard
for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. The
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, including
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice
of law, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case

without authority to do so, are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad
enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or
commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer at no time must
be wanting in probity and moral fiber which not only are conditions precedent to
his entrance to, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership
in, a great and noble profession.[45]

In Dantes v. Dantes,[46] the Court ordered the disbarment of a lawyer, describing

as grossly immoral his conduct of engaging in illicit relationships and abandoning
his family. The Court exhorted lawyers to refrain from scandalous behavior, thus:

In Barrientos vs. Daarol, we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but
must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain
an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives,
accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three
ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public
image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth:
to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[47]

Respondents intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife shows his
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community.[48] It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession
is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.[49] However, the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be

decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could

accomplish the end desired.[50]

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or

disbarment, depending on the circumstances of the case. In case of suspension,
the period would range from one year[51] to indefinite suspension, as in the case
of Cordova v. Cordova,[52] where the lawyer was found to have maintained an
adulterous relationship for two years and refused to support his family.

In Dantes v. Atty. Dantes,[53] disbarment was imposed as a penalty on the lawyer

who maintained illicit relationships with at least two women during the
subsistence of his marriage. And so was the case in Toledo v. Toledo[54] and
Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,[55] where the lawyers subject of disciplinary actions were
found to have abandoned their legal wives and cohabited with other women.

The exacerbating circumstances present in the cited cases are absent in this
case. Moreover, complainant failed to prove that respondent misappropriated her
money. Thus, the Court finds that suspension from the practice of law is adequate
to penalize respondent for his grossly immoral conduct.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. is found GUILTY of gross immorality

and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe
penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense
hereafter.

SO ORDERED.

JOSELANO GUEVARRA,
Complainant,

versus

ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL

EALA,
Respondent.

A.C. No. 7136

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:

August 1, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on
Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
(respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyers oath.

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee
Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to
Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had three
children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from
January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls,
as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at
Megamall.

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or
early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from
work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her
parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on

two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene
abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at

which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of

embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following

that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing
the words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene,
reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I
will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness
but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it
again? Or is it because theres a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done
everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I
make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on
you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life.
But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are
together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to
last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in
my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS
ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY

TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]

Eternally yours,

NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No.
71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April
2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends
saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on
which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS

RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or
about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the
Wine All You Can promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM
Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and
Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: Irene with
Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.[4]
(Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their
adulterous relationship supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4.
Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of
the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as

the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his apparent
abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral
depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He
flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece of paper.
Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainants bride on the
very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her until we are together
again, as now they are.[6] (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the

Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate
gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the
bar, the reason being that Respondents relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his
wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary
Anne is aware of Respondents special friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of
marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage
between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to
the formality of the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the
laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is
the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the
laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit
love for the complainants wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed
his own family, broke up the complainants marriage, commits adultery with his
wife, and degrades the legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the

Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent
with respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene
is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,[12] alleging that Irene gave

birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the
girls father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy of a
Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent as
the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February
14, 2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.

Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS[14] dated

January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having personal knowledge
of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants Reply.[15]
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case
filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal
complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants Complaint-Affidavit

and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.[16]
Respondents counsel did not cross-examine complainant.[17]

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a

12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26, 2004, found the
charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring
supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed
the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE,
the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the
DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis
in the original)

Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant
to Section 12 (c), Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave
no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of

complainant, that there is no evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As
the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and the
news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not
sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support
the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through
counsel made the following statements to wit: Respondent specifically denies
having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their
relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances

the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount
to grossly immoral conduct . . .

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is

indeed a special relationship between him and complainants wife, Irene, [which]
taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje
(Annex H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship
between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child Samantha.
In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainants
wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child.
Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene
there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation
regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has
not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous

relationship with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised
Penal Code as that committed by any married woman who shall have sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be
subsequently declared void.[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is
having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and
known only to the immediate members of their respective families.

In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the
averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication
of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged
with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[27] (Citations
omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge of

Irenes daughter Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said
certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father.
And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired information on DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage Certificate[29] shows that they
were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the
Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of
the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in his
January 29, 2003 Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared
that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the childs
father is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a lawyer.[31]

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has
been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that
evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that
of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other[32] which is
the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or
suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required.[33] (Emphasis
supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction

of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent

court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also
been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.[34]

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or

suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous
circumstances. Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with
a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual

intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends
on the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a relationship
between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following
pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extramarital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We
disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction
for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[37] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did
contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this
administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner,
as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been
carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession.
This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.[39]
(Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to
practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the

Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the

Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
[40]

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the

case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on March 22, 2005
informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition for nullity of his (complainants)
marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional

Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against
respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case,
which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainants

Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the
petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that
notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the
same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed
resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis
supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared
void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the
marriage was declared null and void.[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be
aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.[44] In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ,
respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December
23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the
Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In
reversing the City Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong
held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair

estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the
offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent
Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent
Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent

phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed
Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never
denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he
(Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual
abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more
confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving
both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Mojes subsequent
relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few
blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with
complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since
Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself admits that
she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he
held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje
had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of
a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for
that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from
complainant. It was both respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit affair
that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a
girl at the nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of
the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all
too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the
respondents. Complainants supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate
is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha
Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted

de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants motion to
withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be
acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court,
the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to
these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x

criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an

entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal
case[47] (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on

January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral

conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the
records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6622

July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the
Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde
S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the
('ode or Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and
gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondents first marriage
was subsisting.1

In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court

required respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.3 The
Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
the record.4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission)

issued a Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on
05 July 2005. During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his
counsel and respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be
resolved by the Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by

nonpayment of fees to complainant

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married

thrice.6

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position
Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while
complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005.8

Complainants Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as

a financial consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the
latters numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts.
Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be
entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they
would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients.
He alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in
millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on
together. Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount of P
900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with
respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.9
Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the
computation of the fees he believes are due him.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in

violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly
respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management,
Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his
legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by
attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10
letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of
payment made to the latter by their clients.12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of

committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his
first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO)
certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage
thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas,
Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion in
the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin
Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.13

Respondents Defense

In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that
complainant was not an employee of his law firm Tabalingcos and Associates

Law Office14 but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and
incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the
latters dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court
cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between
them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by
his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had
been paid.17

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He

contended that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management,
Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate
rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the
case such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court.
To support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint
Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and
Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit
executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of the said
company.19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by

William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as
having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.20
Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged
bigamous marriages with two other women.

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage

Contracts.21 To the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the
Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.22 The
appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the
contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the
three marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract
submitted was a marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M.
Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The second marriage contract
was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion, and it took place at the
Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987.24 The third
Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E.
Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second
and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry
for civil status.

On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit

filed by complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the
mandatory conference or submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus,
respondent was supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those
documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him
by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent
further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and
Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bian, Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed
another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano
at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both
petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage
Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed
with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their
annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled

a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to
the Commission that he would not attend the hearing,30 respondent manifested
his willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the
administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed
with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he
discovered to be bearing his name.31

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate

original copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against
respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32
The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy
for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion while
his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having committed
bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting.34 Each of the Informations
recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused
in the criminal cases.35

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the

same proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings
pending the outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTC
Laguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the administrative case against him
be submitted for resolution.36

IBPs Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.37 The first
charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was
dismissed for lack of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have
been filed with the proper courts since it was only empowered to determine
respondents administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to prove
dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission
found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having
advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that
he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly the
specific provision he violated.39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross
immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that
complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence that respondent
committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latters first
marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the
Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken
off the roll of attorneys.41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature.
He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the
annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into
those contracts with other women. He further contends that the evidence
proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was not
substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for
the reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive
the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he
separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage
Contracts.43

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for
Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending
respondents disbarment.44

The Courts Ruling

The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees

While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do
not concur with the rationale behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the
formers share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is
violative of Rule 9.0245 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services
rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients
that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to
proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a
layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null
and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct.
Considering that complainants allegations in this case had not been proven, the
IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second Charge:

Unlawful solicitation of clients

Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising
legal services through various business entities. Complainant submitted
documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel
Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the
latters legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the
truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was
breached.

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities
mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services,
purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts
of the case, he violated Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from
soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.

Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted
in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of
the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend
itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can
be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi &
Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was
indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional
employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"49 of the
Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane

Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal

services. The letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the
proposed fees, respondent would render legal services related to the formers
loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is considered objectionable and
violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi
& Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.

Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the
client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is
a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that
certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be
operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client
if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence
of this practice by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the
latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.

Third Charge:

Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious
accusation. To substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified
copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3)
different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these documents,
claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been
submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them.52
We are not persuaded by his argument.

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on
the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and
not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido
v. Garrido:53

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the
filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.
We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.
First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of
justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.
The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment
of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of
the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the

complainant.1wphi1 For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory
proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove
that respondent entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage was
still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third
marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.
He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he
contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions
he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the other in
Calamba to declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and
void.55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not

disputed the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified
copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the formers
marriages to two other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this
disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed
bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The
documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil
registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person. Having
been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case,
respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those
documents.

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third
marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the
attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated
the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than
as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage,
prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondents regard for marriage
contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the
sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to
take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into
marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In BustamanteAlejandro v. Alejandro,56 we held thus:

We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found

guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character
required of them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar
but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been
made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He
is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who
cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected
to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional
honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty
and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer
plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of

intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may
rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him

as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice
constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order
that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly

immoral conduct.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from
the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.