Pineda vs Pinto, A.M. NO.

RTJ-04-1851 : October 13, 2004

(Case involving delay in transmission of records to the appellate court

for almost two years)

It is a fact, however, that respondent judge was burdened with a

heavy caseload and that the delay in the transmission of the records of
Civil Case No. 8759 is an isolated case. Further, the delay was not done
intentionally and not attended by any malice or corrupt motives. These serve
to mitigate the penalty that should be imposed against the respondent
judge.

While a judge and all court personnel are mandated to observe the
rules strictly, no one is perfect. While this Court has in the past imposed
sanctions on erring court employees, this Court has also, in some instances,
excused court officials and personnel for the delay in the transmittal of the
records to the Court of Appeals on justifiable grounds.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Judge Ofelia Tuazon Pinto of

Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City is hereby
REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a similar misconduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

Perfecto vs Esidera, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 [Formerly known as OCA

IPI No. 10-3466-RTJ], July 22, 2015

Facts:

Judge D married X, a chinese man, without a marriage license.

X did not want to have a church wedding. Thus, no marriage was

recognized by the church.
Judge D and X did not live together as husband and wife and she did
not use her Xs surname. (marriage was not consummated)
Judge D filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the first marriage.
Judge D fell in love with E and later married him through a purely
church wedding without the necessary formalities of a civil marriage
due to her fear that she would be living in sin had she lived with her
without the sacrament of marriage by the church.
Judge D wanted to wait for the decision declaring her first marriage
void but because she was beyond the age of thirty and due to the fact
that a pregnancy at that late stage will more likely be risky, she could
not wait to have a child any longer.
Judge D became pregnant and gave birth to a child and E filled up the
birth certificate in such a manner that it could be mistaken that he and
Judge D were married.
When a decree declaring their first marriage void was handed down,
Judge D and E celebrated a civil marriage.

Ruling:
Respondent judge's act of participating in the marriage ceremony as
governed only by the rules of her religion is not inconsistent with our law
against bigamy. What the law prohibits is not second marriage during a
subsisting marriage per se. What the law prohibits is a second marriage that
would have been valid had it not been for the subsisting marriage. Under our
law, respondent judge's marriage in 1990 was invalid because of the
solemnizing officer's lack of authority.
Marriages entered into in accordance with the law may or may not
include marriages recognized in certain religions. Religious marriages are
recognized in and may be governed by our laws only if they conform to legal
requirements. Religious marriages that lack some or all the requirements
under the law are invalid. They are not considered to have been entered
into. They do not enjoy the benefits, consequences, and incidents of
marriage provided under the law.
The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized respondent judge's
marriage in 1990 renders such marriage invalid. It is not recognized in our
law. Hence, no second marriage can be imputed against respondent judge
while her first marriage subsisted.

We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit

respondent judge's right to participate in religious and merely ceremonial
acts that are non-violative of other people's rights and with no legally
binding effect. The institution of marriage is not threatened when we
accommodate respondent judge's freedom to participate in such ceremonies
even if they have secular counterparts under our laws.
However, benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot
shield respondent judge from liability for misconduct under our laws.
Respondent judge knowingly entered into a civil marriage with her first
husband. She knew its effects under our laws. She had sexual relations with
her second husband while her first marriage was subsisting.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera
guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent Judge Desales-Esidera is SUSPENDED from judicial service for
one (1) month with a warning that repetition of a similar offense will be
dealt with more severely. She is STERNLY WARNED that repetition of the
same violations in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Miranda vs Carpio, A.C. No. 6281, September 26, 2011.
Facts:
Mr. Miranda, owner of a parcel of land, engaged the services of Atty.
Carpio for the registration of said piece of land for an acceptance fee of
P20,000 and the amount of P2,000 per hearing as appearance fee. During
the last hearing of the case, Atty. Carpio asked Mr. Miranda to pay the
amount of P10,000 for the preparation of a memorandum and 20% of the
total area in case they win the case. Mr. Miranda refused Atty. Carpios
request because it was contrary to their earlier agreement.
A decision was rendered by the Regional Trial Court and when Mr.
Miranda went to the Register of Deeds to get the owners duplicate OCT, he
was surprised that it was released already to his lawyer. Atty. Carpio insisted
that he has the right to retain the OCT until he receives the amount of
P10,000 and 20% of the total area of the property.
Ruling:
An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following
elements concur: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the
client's funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for
attorney's fees. x x x

As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any

agreement between the complainant and the respondent that the latter is
entitled to an additional professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area
covered by OCT No. 0-94. x x x
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with
the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's
fees sought is an alarming abuse by respondent of the exercise of an
attorney's retaining lien, which by no means is an absolute right, and cannot
at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his
client when due or upon demand.
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent
violated Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates
that a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. It is highly improper
for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which
were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his
services. At the outset, respondent should have informed the complainant of
all the fees or possible fees that he would charge before handling the case
and not towards the near conclusion of the case. x x x
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this
Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the complainant the owner's duplicate
of OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of this decision. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
Narag vs Narag, A.C. No. 3405, March 18, 2014.
Facts:
Atty. Dominador Narag, previously disbarred for leaving his wife and
children for another woman, filed a petition for readmission to the bar and in
support thereof claimed that:
1. He has expressed extreme repentance to his wife and their children
for his misgivings.
2. His wife and children have already forgiven him as proved by the
affidavit of one of his children with her.
3. He has been disbarred for 15 years already and he has been
punished enough.
4. He is already 80 years old and very weak due to arthritis

5. He is a member of the Philippine Air Force Reserve Command and

enlisted in various missions.
6. He has executed his last will and testament to distribute his
properties to his wife and children
7. He is a concerned father and a loving husband and he would bring
his wife to all important religious, civic, cultural and social events,
and would also bring his wife regularly on vacations, as testified to
by Archbishop Talamayan of his province.
Ruling:
x x x The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar,
satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper
person to practice law. x x x
The respondents pleas, however, are mere words that are hollow and
bereft of any substance. The Court, in deciding whether the respondent
should indeed be readmitted to the practice of law, must be convinced that
he had indeed been reformed; that he had already rid himself of any grossly
immoral act which would make him inept for the practice of law. However, it
appears that the respondent, while still legally married to Julieta, is still
living with his paramour the woman for whose sake he abandoned his
family. This only proves to show that the respondent has not yet learned
from his prior misgivings.
That he was supposedly forgiven by his wife and their children would
likewise not be sufficient ground to grant respondents plea. It is noted that
only his son, Dominador, Jr., signed the affidavit which was supposed to
evidence the forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard
to Julieta and the six other children of the respondent, the claim that they
had likewise forgiven the respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the family
of the respondent had forgiven him does not discount the fact that he is still
committing a grossly immoral conduct; he is still living with a woman other
than his wife.
Likewise, that the respondent executed
bequeaths all his properties to his wife and
and would not be demonstrative that he
Verily, nothing would stop the respondent
last will and testament of a different tenor
the legal profession.

a holographic will wherein he

their children is quite immaterial
had indeed changed his ways.
from later on executing another
once he had been readmitted to

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition for

Reinstatement to the Bar filed by Dominador M. Narag is hereby DENIED.

Sps. Cruz vs Jacinto, A.C. No. 5235, March 22, 2000.

Ruling:
In the instant case, there was a clear yet unrebutted allegation in the
complaint that the Respondent had ordered his secretary and housemaid to
falsify the signatures of the notary public and the Deputy Register of Deeds
respectively to make it appear that the real estate mortgage contract was
duly registered and thus binding.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business
transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith.
However, the measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise
in his dealings with this client is a much higher standard than is required in
business dealings where the parties trade at arms length. Business
transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and
discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these
transactions to be sure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his
client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an
attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability
of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor (Nakpit vs. Valdes, 286
SCRA 758 [1998]). Further, his fidelity to the cause of his client requires him
to be evermindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the resolution of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and orders respondent
Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely
Espina vs Chavez, A.C. No. 7250, April 20, 2015
Ruling:
Atty. Espina contends that Atty. Chavez violated the above-quoted
provisions when he indispensably participated in the filing of the falsification
complaint against him, his wife and his parents. The falsification case was
filed, according to Atty. Espina, solely for the purpose of gaining an improper
advantage and leverage in the ejectment case.

Two elements are indispensable before a lawyer can be deemed to

have violated this rule: (i) the filing or threat of filing a patently frivolous
and meritless action or appeal and (ii) the filing or threat of filing the action
is intended to gain improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
The facts of the present case differed from the above-cited
cases. We note that Atty. Espina did not only fail to substantiate his
allegation that Atty. Chavez masterminded the filing of the criminal
complaint for falsification; he also failed to show that the criminal complaint
was patently frivolous, meritless and groundless, and that it was filed to gain
improper advantage in favor of his client.
As a final point, we note with concern the excessive antagonism
between Atty. Espina and Atty. Chavez. It appears that this case is no longer
about the alleged violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility but a
protracted and bitter fight between brothers in the legal profession. Both
claim that the other party is arrogant and ignorant of the law. The pleadings
contained serious attacks on the professional competence and personal
integrity of one another. These are acts that this Court should not allow to
pass without comments.
We take this occasion to remind lawyers of their duties to their
professional colleagues. Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is clear: a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Although we dismiss the present complaint because of lack of
merit, we strongly warn both counsels that any future infraction of
the Code of Professional Responsibility may warrant actual penalty.
Judge Madrid vs Atty. Dealca, A.C. No. 7474, September 9,
2014.
Ruling:
The right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge
who does not appear to be wholly free and disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latters sacred
duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon
Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias
and prejudice in order to disqualify judge Madrid from participating in a
particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel. The
latters bare allegations of Judge Madrids partiality or hostility did not

suffice, because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his
noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence without fear
or favour should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as
expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 14.
On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first
administrative complaint to be ever brought against Atty. Dealca. In Montano
v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, we reprimanded him for violating Canon
22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
warned him that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more
severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring
lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03, and Canon 11, Rule 11.04 of the
Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca from the practice of law
for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES
respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03
and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective from notice of
this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely.