[G.R. No. 129416.

November 25, 2004]

ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. TIGNO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ESTAFINO
AQUINO and FLORENTINA AQUINO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a single document, a deed of sale
involving interest over real property, notarized by a person of questionable capacity. The assailed ruling of
the Court of Appeals, which overturned the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on
the presumption of regularity attaching to notarized documents with respect to its due execution. We
conclude instead that the document has not been duly notarized and accordingly reverse the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are as follow:
On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina Aquino (the Aquinos) filed a
complaint for enforcement of contract and damages against Isidro Bustria (Bustria). [1] The complaint sought
to enforce an alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) square
meter fishpond located in Dasci, Pangasinan. The property was not registered either under the Land
Registration Act or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, though registrable under Act No. 3344. [2] The
conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978.
Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise agreement, whereby Bustria agreed to
recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to repurchase
the same property after the lapse of seven (7) years.
Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VII, approved and incorporated
the compromise agreement in a Decision which it rendered on 7 September 1981.
Bustria died in October of 1986.[3] On 1 December 1989, petitioner Zenaida B. Tigno (Tigno), in
substitution of her deceased father Isidro Bustria, [4] attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion
for Consignation. She deposited the amount of Two Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with
the trial court, now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55 at Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 18 December
1989, the Aquinos filed an opposition, arguing that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and
that Tigno had failed to make a tender of payment. In an Order dated 10 October 1999, the RTC denied
the Motion for Consignation.[5]
In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution, which was likewise opposed by the
Aquinos, and denied by the RTC. Then, on 6 September 1991, Tigno filed an action for Revival of
Judgment,[6] seeking the revival of the decision in Civil Case No. A-1257, so that it could be executed
accordingly.[7] The Aquinos filed an answer, wherein they alleged that Bustria had sold his right to
repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale dated 17 October 1985.[8]
Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia (De Francia), the
instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and former Judge Franklin Cario (Judge Cario), who notarized the
same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by
Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission as

their Exhibit No. 8, the deed of sale (Deed of Sale)[9] purportedly executed by Bustria. The admission of
the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false and fraudulent document which
had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that its existence was suspicious, considering that
it had been previously unknown, and not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed Tignos
previous Motion for Consignation.[10]
In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence.[11] A Motion for
Reconsideration praying for the admission of said exhibit was denied in an Orderdated 27 April 1994.[12]
Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor of Tigno. The RTC therein
expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies of De Francia
and Cario as conflicting.[13] The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there
any statement that it was acknowledged by Bustria; [14]that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or
represented by his counsel in connection with the preparation and execution of the deed of sale [15] or that
Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his previous Opposition to the Motion for Consignation.
[16]
The RTC then stressed that the previous Motion for Execution lodged by Tigno had to be denied since
more than five (5) years had elapsed from the date the judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257 had become
final and executory; but the judgment could be revived by action such as the instant complaint. Accordingly,
the RTC ordered the revival of the judgment dated 7 September 1981 in Civil Case No. A-1257.[17]
The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. [18] In the meantime, the RTC allowed the
execution pending appeal of its Decision.[19] On 23 December 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division
promulgated a Decision[20] reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision. The appellate court ratiocinated
that there were no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cario and De Francia
that would taint the document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and
substitution instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or
representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null and ineffective. [21] It was noted that a
notarized document carried in its favor the presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and
that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC erred in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale, and that
the document extinguished the right of Bustrias heirs to repurchase the property.
After the Court of Appeals denied Tignos Motion for Reconsideration,[22] the present petition was filed
before this Court. Tigno imputes grave abuse of discretion and misappreciation of facts to the Court of
Appeals when it admitted the Deed of Sale. He also argues that the appellate court should have declared
the Deed of Sale as a false, fraudulent and unreliable document not supported by any consideration at all.
The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually based. As such, they could normally
lead to the dismissal of this Petition for Review. However, while this Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts,
[23]
factual review may be warranted in instances when the findings of the trial court and the intermediate
appellate court are contrary to each other.[24] Moreover, petitioner raises a substantial argument regarding
the capacity of the notary public, Judge Cario, to notarize the document. The Court of Appeals was
unfortunately silent on that matter, but this Court will take it up with definitiveness.
The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.

MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both parties
known to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing instrument.
FRANKLIN CARIO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan
There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by way of
a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or
court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies
that the same was sworn before him. [25] Under Section 127 of the Land Registration Act,[26] which has been
replicated in Section 112 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, [27] the Deed of Sale should have been
acknowledged before a notary public.[28]
But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is determinative of this
petition. This pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cario to notarize the Deed of Sale.
It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale, was a sitting
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos.[29] Petitioners point out, citing Tabao v. Asis,[30] that
municipal judges may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts,
and other acts of conveyance which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges. [31] In
response, respondents claim that the prohibition imposed on municipal court judges from notarizing
documents took effect only in December of 1989, or four years after the Deed of Sale was notarized by
Cario.[32]
Respondents contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the functions of notaries public ex officiounder Section 76 of
Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the
Revised Administrative Code.[33] However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya,[34] the Court explicitly
declared that municipal court judges such as Cario may notarize only documents connected with the
exercise of their official duties.[35] The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties of Judge
Cario, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. Our observations as to the errant judge in Borre are
pertinent in this case, considering that Judge Cario identified himself in the Deed of Sale as ExOfficio Notary Public, Judge, MTC:
[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business.
In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize documents involving private transactions and
sign the document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City Judge" (p. 16, Rollo,
Annex D of Complaint). In doing so, he obliterated the distinction between a regular notary and a notary ex
officio.[36]

There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular No.
I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public
provided that certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the
exception applies.[37] The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Carios
improper notarial activity. There was no such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced,
we would be hard put to accept the veracity of its contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a
city,[38] was even then not an isolated backwater town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers.
There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cario, who ceased being a judge in 1986, for his
improper notarial activity. Perhaps though, formal sanction may no longer be appropriate considering
Judge Carios advanced age, assuming he is still alive. [39] However, this Decision should again serve as an
affirmation of the rule prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing documents not connected with the
exercise of their official duties, subject to the exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at all. The
validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary
public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should
be treated as unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to
parties in good faith relying on the proferred authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be
one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in
order that a lawyer may receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a document
by a duly appointed notary public will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer
engaged in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.[40] Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a
substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or
authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices
generally.[41]
On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized? True enough,
from a civil law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily
invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a
contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable property should be in a public document,
yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not render the transaction
invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity
or enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for convenience. [42] We have even affirmed that a
sale of real property though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and
binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate
produces legal effects between the parties.[43]
Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid notarization of the Deed of
Sale from the perspective of the law on evidence. After all, the case rests on the admissibility of the Deed
of Sale.
Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of Appeals no longer holds true since
the Deed of Sale is not a notarized document. Its proper probative value is governed by the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 states:

Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of public
documents; hence, it must be considered a private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted
notarization performed by Judge Cario is sufficient to exclude the document in question from the class of
public documents. Even assuming that the Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as
a private document, since it was not properly acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way
of jurat.
Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the requirement of proof under Section
20, Rule 132, which states:
Section 20. Proof of private document.Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which is claimed to be.
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos, who likewise insist that its
enforceability militates against Tignos claim. Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove
its authenticity and due execution. The Court of Appeals clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed of
Sale as a private document and in applying the presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly
notarized documents, as distinguished from private documents.
Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold that it did not. Section 20, Rule
132 provides ample discretion on the trier of fact before it may choose to receive the private document in
evidence. The RTC wisely refused to admit the Deed of Sale, taking great lengths as it did to explain its
doubts as to its veracity. The RTC was not convinced of the proffered proof by the Aquinos, and the
exercise of its sound discretion as the primary trier of fact warrants due respect.
The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for the very first time respondents
alleged the existence of the Deed of Sale when they filed their answer to petitioners current action to revive
judgment.[44] Prior to the initiation of the present action, Tigno had tried to operationalize and implement the
Compromise Agreement through two judicial means: consignation and execution of judgment. The Aquinos
duly opposed these prior attempts of the petitioner to exercise the right to repurchase, but they did not
raise then the claim that such right to repurchase was already extinguished by the Deed of Sale. Tigno

attempted to exercise the right to repurchase only a few years after the execution of the Deed of Sale to
which respondents themselves were signatories. Thus, it is incredulous that the Aquinos did not invoke
the Deed of Sale when they opposed in court petitioners successive attempts at consignation and
execution of judgment. The Deed of Sale, if in existence and valid, would have already precluded Tignos
causes of action for either consignation or execution of judgment. The only believable conclusion, as drawn
by the RTC, was that the Deed of Sale had yet to be created when petitioner moved in 1990 for
consignation and execution of judgmentan existential anomaly if we were to agree with the respondents
that such document had been signed and notarized back in 1985.
The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by the other observations of the RTC. It
also pointed to certain incredible aspects in the Aquinos tale of events. It noted that no receipts were ever
presented by the respondents to evidence actual payment of consideration by them to Bustria, despite the
allegation of the respondents that the amount was covered by seven (7) receipts. [45] The Aquinos claimed
that Bustria kept all the receipts, an assertion which the RTC found as unbelievable, citing ordinary human
nature to ask for receipts for significant amounts given and to keep the same. [46] In itself, the absence of
receipts, or any proof of consideration, would not be conclusive since consideration is always presumed.
However, given the totality of the circumstances surrounding this case, the absence of such proof further
militates against the claims of the Aquinos.
We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of Appeals that Bustria did not bother
to seek his lawyers assistance as regards the execution of the Deed of Sale, considering that the subject
property had previously been fiercely litigated. Although the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the
document would not be rendered null or ineffective due to the lack of assistance of counsel, the
implausibility of the scenario strikes as odd and therefore reinforces the version found by the RTC as
credible.
The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that affirm the doubts raised by the Court of
Appeals. Isidro Bustria, who would die in 1986, was already ninety-three (93) years old when he allegedly
signed the Deed of Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos asserted before the RTC that Bustria traveled
unaccompanied from his home in Dasol, Pangasinan, passing through two towns to Alaminos, to execute
the Deed of Sale. Without discrediting the accomplishments of nonagenarians capable of great physical
feats, it should be acknowledged as a matter of general assumption that persons of Bustrias age are
typically sedentary and rarely so foolhardy as to insist on traveling significant distances alone.
Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged signature of Bustria on
the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise appears on the judicial record. Bustrias signature in the
1981 Compromise Agreement is noticeably shaky which is not surprising, considering that it was
subscribed when Bustria was eighty-nine (89) years old. However, Bustrias signature on the Deed of Sale,
which if genuine was affixed when he was already ninety-three (93) years old, is remarkably steady in its
strokes. There are also other evident differences between Bustrias signature on the Deed of Sale and on
other documents on the record.
Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an appreciation of circumstantial evidence.
These have to be weighed against the findings of the Court of Appeals that the fact that Bustria signed
the Deed of Sale was established by the respective testimonies of witnesses De Francia and Judge Cario.
In its own appreciation of these testimonies, the RTC alluded to notable inconsistencies in their
testimonies. As a final measure of analysis, the Court shall now examine whether the appellate court was
in error in reversing the conclusion of the RTC on these testimonies.
The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified that Judge Cario himself prepared
and typed the Deed of Sale in his office, where the document was signed, [47]while Judge Cario testified that
he did not type the Deed of Sale since it was already prepared when the parties arrived at his office for the

signing.[48] On this point, the Court of Appeals stated with utter nonchalance that a perusal of the record
revealed no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Judge Cario and De
Francia.
Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the inconsistency pointed out by the RTC as to
who prepared the Deed of Sale. If the only point of consideration was the due execution of the Deed of
Sale, then the Court of Appeals should have properly come out with its finding. Other variances aside,
there are no contradictions in the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia on the question of whether or
not Bustria signed the Deed of Sale.
However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private document. Thus, not only the due
execution of the document must be proven but also its authenticity. This factor was not duly considered by
the Court of Appeals. The testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia now become material not only to
establish due execution, but also the authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on this point, the inconsistencies
pointed out by the RTC become crucial.
The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the identity of the progenitor of this allimportant document is a material evidentiary point. It is disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the
respondent offered to prove the Deed of Sale, flatly contradict each other on the basis of their own
personal and sensory knowledge. Worse, the purported author of the Deed of Sale disavowed having
drafted the document, notwithstanding the contrary testimony grounded on personal knowledge by the
documentary witness.
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale would not ordinarily be necessary to
establish the validity of the transaction it covers. However, since it is the authenticity of the document itself
that is disputed, then the opposing testimonies on that point by the material witnesses properly raises
questions about the due execution of the document itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Judge
Cario and De Francia are irreconcilable. It is not possible to affirm the testimony of either without
denigrating the competence and credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge Cario was truthful in testifying
that he did not write the Deed of Sale, then doubt can be cast as to the reliability of the notarial witness De
Francia. It takes a leap of imagination, a high level of gumption, and perverse deliberation for one to
erroneously assert, under oath and with particularities, that a person drafted a particular document in his
presence.
However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of the notary public, Judge Cario,
would be obviously compromised. Assuming that Judge Cario had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it
would indeed be odd that he would not remember having written the document himself yet sufficiently recall
notarizing the same. If his testimony as to authorship of the document is deemed as dubious, then there is
all the reason to make a similar assumption as to his testimony on the notarization of the Deed of Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to indubitably establish the
author of the Deed of Sale. They are important because they cast doubt on the credibility of those
witnesses of the Aquinos, presented as they were to attest to the due execution and authenticity of
the Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals was clearly in error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of
the RTC.
As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute conclusive value to the testimonies
of de Francia and Judge Cario. The totality of the picture leads us to agree with the trial court that the Deed
of Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution. The Court deems as correct the refusal of the RTC
to admit the Deed of Sale, since its due execution and authenticity have not been proven. The evidence
pointing to the non-existence of such a transaction is so clear and convincing that it is sufficient even to

rebut the typical presumption of regularity arising from the due execution of notarial documents. However,
for the reasons stated earlier, the Deed of Sale is ineluctably an unnotarized document. And the lower court
had more than sufficient basis to conclude that it is a spurious document.
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed, Tignos right to repurchase was
not extinguished at the time of the filing of the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded by the
RTC. The Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded otherwise, the reinstatement of the
RTC Decision is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 23 December 1996
and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and
the Decision dated 18 August 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil
Case No. A-1918 is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 174759 September 7, 2011

DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F. MEDINA, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST
DIVISION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Found guilty of direct contempt by the First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA First Division), and
sanctioned with imprisonment for a period of ten days and a fine of P2,000.00, the petitioners have come to the Court
for relief through certiorari, claiming that the CTA First Divisions finding and sentence were made in grave abuse of
its discretion because the language they used in their motion for reconsideration as the attorneys for a party was
contumacious. Specifically, they assail the resolution dated May 16, 2006, [1] whereby the CTA First Division disposed
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Attorneys Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F.
Medina of the Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas Law Offices guilty of DIRECT CONTEMPT.
Each counsel is
hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a
period of ten (10) days.
SO ORDERED.[2]

and the resolution dated July 26, 2006, [3] whereby the CTA First Division denied their motion for reconsideration and
reiterated the penalties.
Antecedents
The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation (Surfield), which sought from the Office of the
City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City the refund of excess realty taxes paid from 1995 until 2000. [4] After the City
Government of Mandaluyong City denied its claim for refund, [5] Surfield initiated a special civil action
for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City, which was docketed as SCA No. MC03-2142
entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City, and Hon. City Assessor of
Mandaluyong City, and assigned to Branch 214.[6] Surfield later amended its petition to include its claim for refund of
the excess taxes paid from 2001 until 2003.[7]
On October 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the period to file the claim had
already prescribed and that Surfield had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC ruled that the grant of a
tax refund was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of mandamus.[8]
Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the CTA via petition for review (CTA AC No. 5
entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer and Hon. City Assessor, Mandaluyong City).[9] The
appeal was assigned to the First Division, composed of Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate Justice Lovell
R. Bautista and Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova.
In its decision dated January 5, 2006, [10] the CTA First Division denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction and
for failure to exhaust the remedies provided under Section 253 [11] and Section 226[12] of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code).
Undeterred, the petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield, [13] insisting that the CTA had jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282; [14] and arguing that the CTA First Division manifested its lack
of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis in not applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe (G.R. No.
117577, December 1, 1995, 250 SCRA 500), to the effect that there was no need to file an appeal before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160.
On March 15, 2006, the CTA First Division denied Surfields motion for reconsideration. On the issue of jurisdiction,
the CTA First Division explained that the jurisdiction conferred by Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 1125, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9282, referred to appeals from the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local
tax cases and did not include the real property tax, an ad valorem tax, the refund of excess payment of which Surfield
was claiming. Accordingly, the CTA First Division ruled that the jurisdiction of the CTA concerning real property tax
cases fell under a different section of Republic Act No. 9282 and under a separate book of Republic Act No. 7160.

In addition, the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the petitioners employed in the motion for
reconsideration, required them to explain within five days from receipt why they should not be liable for indirect
contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. And insofar as the merits of the case are concerned let this Resolution be considered as the
final decision on the matter.
However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that it is gross ignorance of the law for
the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of
this Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this
Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case and this Court lacked the understanding and
respect for the doctrine of stare decisis as derogatory, offensive and disrespectful. Lawyers are
charged with the basic duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers; they vow solemnly to conduct themselves with all good fidelityto the courts. As a
matter of fact, the first canon of legal ethics enjoins them to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its superior importance. Therefore, petitioners counsel is hereby ORDERED to explain within five (5)
days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to
disciplinary action.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006, [16] in which they appeared to apologize but nonetheless
justified their language as, among others, necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness
of the error by calling a spade by spade. [17]
In its first assailed resolution, the CTA First Division found the petitioners apology wanting in sincerity and
humility, observing that they chose words that were so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity
for brazenly pointing to the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion, to wit:
In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels Denis B. Habawel and
Alexis F. Medina asked for apology. In fact, the counsels brazenly pointed the Courts alleged
ignorance and grave abuse of discretion. Their chosen words are so strong, which brings disrepute the
Courts honor and integrity. We quote:
a) Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing.
However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts
attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a
strong articulation of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the
substantial and transcendental issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for
alleged lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which requires that the Decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which the Decision was based (par. 3 of the Compliance; docket, p. 349);
b) Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5) and it totally ignored
Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings
of the Regional Trial Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the CTA, the undersigned counsel formed a perception that the Honorable
Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence, the
statements that it was gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that
it has not [sic] jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of

the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts
jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned
counsels perception that was influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable
Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction (par. 10 of the
Compliance; docket, p. 353);[18]
Accordingly, the CTA First Division adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court for
failing to uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect due to the courts, sentencing each to suffer
imprisonment of ten days and to pay P2,000.00 as fine.
Seeking reconsideration,[19] the petitioners submitted that they could not be held guilty of direct contempt because: (a)
the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its legal sense to describe the error of judgment and was not
directed to the character or competence of the decision makers; (b) there was no unfounded accusation or allegation,
or scandalous, offensive or menacing, intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening, or vile, rude and repulsive
statements or words contained in their motion for reconsideration; (c) there was no statement in their motion for
reconsideration that brought the authority of the CTA and the administration of the law into disrepute; and (d) they
had repeatedly offered their apology in their compliance. [20]
Their submissions did not convince and move the CTA First Division to reconsider, which declared through
its second assailed resolution that:
The tone of an irate lawyer would almost always reveal the sarcasm in the phrases used. The
scurrilous attacks made in the guise of pointing out errors of judgment almost always result to the
destruction of the high esteem and regard towards the Court. [21]
and disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Each
counsel is hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER
IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.
SO, ORDERED.[22]
Issues
Arguing that they were merely prompted by their (z)ealous advocacy and an appalling error committed by the CTA
First Division to frankly describe such error as gross ignorance of the law, the petitioners now attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the CTA First Division in finding that:
I
THE PETITIONERS LANGUAGE IN THE SUBJECT MOTION AND COMPLIANCE WAS
CONTUMACIOUS;
II
THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT SINCERE IN THEIR APOLOGY AND WERE ARROGANT;
III

THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT POWER WAS WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY THE SUPREME
COURT; AND
IV
THE PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF DIRECT
CONTEMPT.

The petitioners continue to posit that the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its strict legal sense to
emphasize the gravity of the error of law committed by the CTA First Division; and that the statements described by
the CTA First Division as abrasive, offensive, derogatory, offensive and disrespectful should be viewed within the
context of the general tone and language of their motion for reconsideration; that their overall language was tempered,
restrained and respectful and should not be construed as a display of contumacious attitude or as a flouting or arrogant
belligerence in defiance of the court to be penalized as direct contempt; that the CTA First Division did not appreciate
the sincerity of their apology; and that they merely pointed out the error in the decision of the CTA First Division.
For its part, the CTA First Division contends that a reading of the motion for reconsideration and the character of the
words used therein by the petitioners indicated that their statements reflected no humility, nor were they expressive of
a contrite heart; and that their submissions instead reflected arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the
opportunity to again deride the public respondent on the manner of how it wrote the decision. [23]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opines that submitting a pleading containing derogatory, offensive and
malicious statements to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt; and
that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion in finding the petitioners liable for direct contempt under
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[24]
Ruling
We dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion, least of all
gravely, in finding that the petitioners committed direct contempt of court.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys thus:
Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.

It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and their judges provided the criticism
is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. In that regard, we have long adhered to the sentiment
aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen:[25]

xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the courts actuation are thrown open to
public consumption.
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges.xxx
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. xxx
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action. (emphasis supplied)[26]

The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith,
and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Here, the petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following statements, to wit: (a) [i]t is gross ignorance
of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over the instant petition; [27] (b) [t]he
grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this
Honorable Courts jurisdiction;[28] and (c) the Honorable Courts lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine
of stare decisis.[29]
The CTA First Division held the statements to constitute direct contempt of court meriting prompt penalty.
We agree.
By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as attorneys,
and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court
or its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation, [30] and constitutes direct contempt of
court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written submissions
presented to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because they
are equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice.[31] This is true, even if the derogatory, offensive or malicious statements are not read in open

court.[32] Indeed, in Dantes v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa,[33] where the petitioners motion for clarification stated that the
respondent judges decision constituted gross negligence and ignorance of the rules, and was pure chicanery and
sophistry, the Court held that a pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements when submitted
before a court or judge in which the proceedings are pending is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. [34]
In his dissent, Justice Del Castillo, although conceding that the petitioners statements were strong, tactless and
hurtful,

[35]

regards the statements not contemptuous, or not necessarily assuming the level of contempt for being

explanations of their position in a case under consideration and because an unfavorable decision usually incites bitter
feelings.[36]
Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set aside, however, for the
characterization that the statements were strong, tactless and hurtful, although obviously correct, provides no ground
to be lenient towards the petitioners, even assuming that such strong, tactless and hurtful statements were used to
explain their clients position in the case. [37] The statements manifested a disrespect towards the CTA and the members
of its First Division approaching disdain. Nor was the offensiveness of their strong, tactless and hurtful language
minimized on the basis that snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos made by counsels are not considered contemptuous
considering that unfavorable decision usually incite bitter feelings. [38] By branding the CTA and the members of its
First Division as totally unaware or ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282, and making the other
equally harsh statements, the petitioners plainly assailed the legal learning of the members of the CTA First Division.
To hold such language as reflective of a very deliberate move on the part of the petitioners to denigrate the CTA and
the members of its First Division is not altogether unwarranted.
The petitioners disdain towards the members of the CTA First Division for ruling against their side found
firm confirmation in their compliance, in which they unrepentantly emphasized such disdain in the following telling
words:
3. Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not
endearing. However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly call the Honorable
Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy
needed a strong articulation of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the
substantial and transcendental issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for
alleged lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
requires that the Decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the
Decision was based.
xxx
10. Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5), and it totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to
perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court
concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA, the
undersigned counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or
ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence the statements that it was gross ignorance of
the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the
Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this
Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank articulation of

undersigned counsels perception that was influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable
Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied) [39]
We might have been more understanding of the milieu in which the petitioners made the statements had they
convinced us that the CTA First Division truly erred in holding itself bereft of jurisdiction over the appeal of their
client. But our review of the text of the legal provisions involved reveals that the error was committed by them, not by
the CTA First Division. This result became immediately evident from a reading of Section 7(a)(3) and Section 7(a)(5)
of Republic Act No. 9282, the former being the anchor for their claim that the CTA really had jurisdiction, to wit:
Section 7. Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
xxx
(3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction ;
(emphasis supplied)
xxx
(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided
by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals; (emphasis supplied)
xxx
As can be read and seen, Section 7(a)(3) covers only appeals of the (d)ecisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional
Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction. The provision is clearly limited to local tax disputes decided by the Regional Trial Courts. In contrast,
Section 7(a)(5) grants the CTA cognizance of appeals of the (d)ecisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally
decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals. In its resolution of March 15, 2006, therefore, the CTA
First Division forthrightly explained why, contrary to the petitioners urging, Section 7(a)(3) was not applicable by
clarifying that a real property tax, being an ad valorem tax, could not be treated as a local tax.[40]
It would have been ethically better for the petitioners to have then retreated and simply admitted their blatant
error upon being so informed by the CTA First Division about the untenability of their legal position on the matter, but
they still persisted by going on in their compliance dated March 27, 2006 to also blame the CTA First Division for
their perception about the CTA First Divisions being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3) due to the terseness of the
Decision dated 05 January 2006, viz:
12. Undersigned counsel regrets having bluntly argued that this Honorable Court was grossly
ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) because from the terseness of the Decision dated 05 January 2006,
the undersigned counsel perceived the Honorable Court as being totally oblivious of Section
7(a)(3). Had the reasons discussed in the Resolution dated 15 March 2006 been articulated in
the 05 January 2006 decision, there would have been no basis for undersigned counsels to have
formed the above-mentioned perception.[41] (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing circumstances do not give cause for the Court to excuse the petitioners contemptuous and offensive
language. No attorney, no matter his great fame or high prestige, should ever brand a court or judge as grossly
ignorant of the law, especially if there was no sincere or legitimate reason for doing so. Every attorney must use only

fair and temperate language in arguing a worthy position on the law, and must eschew harsh and intemperate language
that has no place in the educated ranks of the Legal Profession. Truly, the Bar should strive to win arguments through
civility and fairness, not by heated and acrimonious tone, as the Court aptly instructed in Slade Perkins v. Perkins,
[42]

to wit:
The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious tone of the
remarks of the counsel for appellant, in his brief, in speaking of the action of the trial judge. We
desire to express our opinion that excessive language weakens rather than strengthens the
persuasive force of legal reasoning. We have noticed a growing tendency to use language that
experience has shown not to be conducive to the orderly and proper administration of justice.
We therefore bespeak the attorneys of this court to desist from such practices, and to treat their
opposing attorneys, and the judges who have decided their cases in the lower court adversely to
their contentions with that courtesy all have a right to expect. (emphasis supplied)

We do not hesitate to punish the petitioners for the direct contempt of court. They threw out self-restraint and
courtesy, traits that in the most trying occasions equate to rare virtues that all members of the Legal Profession should
possess and cherish. They shunted aside the nobility of their profession. They wittingly banished the ideal that even
the highest degree of zealousness in defending the causes of clients did not permit them to cross the line between
liberty and license.[43] Indeed, the Court has not lacked in frequently reminding the Bar that language, though forceful,
must still be dignified; and though emphatic, must remain respectful as befitting advocates and in keeping with the
dignity of the Legal Profession. [44] It is always worthwhile to bear in mind, too, that the language vehicle did not run
short of expressions that were emphatic, yet respectful; convincing, yet not derogatory; and illuminating, yet not
offensive.[45] No attorney worthy of the title should forget that his first and foremost status as an officer of the Court
calls upon him to be respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or its judge. Clearly, the petitioners criticism
of the CTA First Division was not bona fide or done in good faith, and spilled over the walls of propriety.
The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only
occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power to punish contempt of court in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. [46] We reiterate that the sanction the CTA First Division
has visited upon the petitioners was preservative, for the sanction maintained and promoted the proper respect that
attorneys and their clients should bear towards the courts of justice.
Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners tone of apology was probably feigned, for they did
not relent but continued to justify their contemptuous language, they do not merit any leniency. Nonetheless, the
penalty of imprisonment for ten days and a fine of P2,000.00 is excessive punishment of the direct contempt of court
for using contemptuous and offensive language and verges on the vindictive. The Court foregoes the imprisonment.
The Courts treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by counsel in pleadings and other written
submissions to the courts of law, including this Court, has not been uniform. The treatment has dealt with
contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt of court or administrative or ethical misconduct, or as both.

The sanction has ranged from a warning (to be more circumspect), a reprimand with stern warning against a repetition
of the misconduct, a fine of P2,000.00, a fine of P5,000.00, and even indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive language is viewed as contempt of
court or as ethical misconduct. In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, [47] the errant lawyer
who made baseless accusations of manipulation in his letters and compliance to this Court was indefinitely suspended
from the practice of law. Although he was further declared guilty of contempt of court, the Court prescribed no
separate penalty on him, notwithstanding that he evinced no remorse and did not apologize for his actions that
resulted from cases that were decided against his clients for valid reasons. In Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles,[48] the complaining State Prosecutor, despite his strong statements to support his position not being
considered as direct contempt of court, was warned to be more circumspect in language. In contrast, Judge Angeles
was reprimanded and handed a stern warning for the disrespectful language she used in her pleadings filed in this
Court, which declared such language to be below the standard expected of a judicial officer. In Nuez v. Atty. Arturo B.
Astorga,[49] Atty. Astorga was meted a P2,000.00 fine for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for hurling insulting
language against the opposing counsel. Obviously, the language was dealt with administratively, not as contempt of
court. In Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar,[50] the Court prescribed a higher fine of P5,000.00 coupled with a stern warning
against Atty. Alar who, in his motion for reconsideration and to inhibit, cast insults and diatribes against the NLRC
First Division and its members. Yet again, the fine was a disciplinary sanction.
Despite having earlier directed the petitioners through its resolution of March 15, 2006 that they should explain within
five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why (they) should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to
disciplinary action,[51] the CTA First Division was content with punishing them for direct contempt under Section 1,
[52]

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, and did not anymore pursue the disciplinary aspect. The Court concurs with the

offended courts treatment of the offensive language as direct contempt. Thus, we impose on each of them a fine
of P2,000.00, the maximum imposable fine under Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into consideration the fact that the CTA
is a superior court of the same level as the Court of Appeals, the second highest court of the land. The penalty of
imprisonment, as earlier clarified, is deleted. Yet, they are warned against using offensive or intemperate language
towards a court or its judge in the future, for they may not be as lightly treated as they now are.
ACCORDINGLY, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari; UPHOLD the resolutions dated May 16, 2006 and July
26, 2006; and MODIFY the penalty imposed on Attorney Denis B. Habawel and Attorney Alexis F. Medina by
deleting the penalty of imprisonment and sentencing them only to pay the fine of P2,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 179878 December 24, 2008

NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOPA), Petitioner, vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE
OF RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 52, BACOLOD CITY, and ANICETO MANOJOCAMPOS,
Respondents.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Whats sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Resolutions [1] of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 May 2007 and 16 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651 outrightly dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA) against private respondent
Aniceto Manojo Campos (Campos).
On 17 March 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 99-10773, against NOPA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. According
to the Complaint, Campos and NOPA entered into two separate contracts denominated as Molasses Sales
Agreement.Campos allegedly paid the consideration of the Molasses Sales Agreement in full, but was only able to
receive a partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement as to the quality of the products being delivered.
On 17 August 2005, more than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct filing fee. According to NOPA, Campos deliberately
concealed in his Complaint the exact amount of actual damages by opting to estimate the value of the unwithdrawn
molasses in order to escape the payment of the proper docket fees.
On 30 June 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. NOPA received this Order on 17
July 2006.
On 1 August 2006, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 June 2006 Order. On 5 January 2007,
the RTC issued an Order denying NOPAs Motion for Reconsideration.
On 2 April 2007, NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of the
RTC dated 30 June 2006 and 5 January 2007.
On 23 May 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari on the following grounds:
1. Failure of the Petitioner to state in its Verification that the allegations in the petition are
based on authentic records, in violation of Section 4, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC (May 1, 2000), which provides:
x x x - A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on

information and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
2. Failure of the petitioner to append to the petition relevant pleadings and documents, which
would aid in the resolution of the instant petition, in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, such as:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Ex-parte Motion to Set the Case for Pre-Trial dated July 27, 1999;
Notice of Pre-Trial;
Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint;
Orders dated July 31, 2000, March 20 2001, November 17, 2004, and May 17, 2005,
respectively;
e.
Motion to Suspend the Proceedings dated August 10, 2003;
f.
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute; and
g.
Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated May 12, 2005.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided
in the paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
3. Failure of petitioners counsel to indicate in the petition his current IBP Official Receipt
Number, in violation of Bar Matter No. 1132 and/or A.M. No. 287, which reads as follows:
The Court resolved, upon recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to GRANT the request of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippinesand the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte to require all
lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorneys Number in all papers or pleadings
submitted to the various judicial or quasi-judicial bodies in addition to the
requirement of indicating the current Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and the IBP
Official Receipt or Lifetime Member Number.[2]
On 22 June 2007, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution, attaching thereto an
Amended Petition for Certiorari in compliance with the requirements of the Court of Appeals deemed to have been
violated by NOPA. The Court of Appeals denied the said Motion in the second assailed Resolution dated 16 August
2007.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, where NOPA raises the following issue and arguments:
ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR

WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS WHEN PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN ITS
VERIFICATION THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF HIS
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND FAILURE TO
ATTACH THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ON ITS PLEADINGS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION
1, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[3]
ARGUMENTS
1. The requirement that a pleading be verified is merely formal and not jurisdictional. The
court may give due course to an unverified pleading where the material facts alleged are a matter of
record and the questions raised are mainly of law such as in a petition for certiorari. [4]
2. Petitioner had attached to its Petition for Certiorari clearly legible and duplicate original or
a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution of the court a quo and the requisite
number of plain copies thereof and such material portions of the record as would support the petition.
[5]

3. Substantial compliance of the rules, which was further supplied by the petitioners
subsequent full compliance demonstrates its good faith to abide by the procedural requirements. [6]
4. The resolution of the important jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioner before the
PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA would justify a relaxation of the rules.[7]

The original Verification in the original Petition for Certiorari filed by NOPA states as follows:
1. That I am the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Negros Oriental
Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA), the petitioner in this case, a domestic corporation duly organized
under Philippine Laws, with principal place of business at Central Bais, Bais City, Philippines; that I
am duly authorized by the Board of NOPA (Secretarys Certificate attached as Annex A) to cause the
preparation of the foregoing petition; and that I hereby affirm and confirm that all the allegations
contained herein are true and correct to my own knowledge and belief; [8]
NOPA claims that this Court has in several cases allowed pleadings with a Verification that contains the
allegation to the best of my knowledge and the allegation are true and correct, without the words of his own
knowledge, citing Decano v. Edu,[9] and Quimpo v. De la Victoria.[10] NOPA claims that the allegations in these cases
constitute substantial compliance with the Rules of Court, and should likewise apply to the case at bar.
NOPA is mistaken. NOPA cited cases promulgated before 1 May 2000, when Section 4 of Rule 7 was
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10. Before the amendment, said Section 4 stated:
SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.

As amended, said Section 4 now states:

SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings

need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
Clearly, the amendment was introduced in order to make the verification requirement stricter, such that the
party cannot now merely state under oath that he believes the statements made in the pleading. He cannot even merely
state under oath that he has knowledge that such statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically
alleged under oath to be either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records.
Unlike, however, the requirement for a Certification against Forum Shopping in Section 5, wherein failure to
comply with the requirements is not curable by amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading, [11] Section 4
of Rule 7, as amended, states that the effect of the failure to properly verify a pleading is that the pleading shall be
treated as unsigned:
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on information and
belief, or upon knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated
as an unsigned pleading.

Unsigned pleadings are discussed in the immediately preceding section of Rule 7:

SEC. 3. Signature and address. x x x.
xxxx
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion,
allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence
and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading
in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report
to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (5a)

A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the partys knowledge and belief produces
no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied. In the case at bar, the
Court of Appeals, in the exercise of this discretion, refused to allow the deficiency in the Verification to be remedied,
by denying NOPAs Motion for Reconsideration with attached Amended Petition for Certiorari.
May an appellate court reverse the exercise of discretion by a lower court? The old case of Lino Luna v.
Arcenas states that it can, but only in exceptional cases when there is grave abuse of this discretion or adverse effect
on the substantial rights of a litigant:
[12]

Discretionary power is generally exercised by trial judges in furtherance of the convenience of

the courts and the litigants, the expedition of business, and in the decision of interlocutory matters on
conflicting facts where one tribunal could not easily prescribe to another the appropriate rule of
procedure.
The general rule, therefore, and indeed one of the fundamental principles of appellate
procedure is that decisions of a trial court which "lie in discretion" will not be reviewed on
appeal, whether the case be civil or criminal at law or in equity.

We have seen that where such rulings have to do with minor matters, not affecting the
substantial rights of the parties, the prohibition of review in appellate proceedings is made absolute by
the express terms of the statute; but it would be a monstrous travesty on justice to declare that
where the exercise of discretionary power by an inferior court affects adversely the substantial
legal rights of a litigant, it is not subject to review on appeal in any case wherein a clear and
affirmative showing is made of an abuse of discretion, or of a total lack of its exercise, or of
conduct amounting to an abuse of discretion, such as its improper exercise under a
misapprehension of the law applicable to the facts upon which the ruling is based.
In its very nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the trial judge over the proceedings
had before him implies the absence of any hard-and-fast rule by which it is to be exercised, and in
accordance with which it may be reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the courts is not a
willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion. It is a sound, judicial discretion which
should always be exercised with due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of
equity and justice. As was said in the case of The Styria vs. Morgan (186 U. S., 1, 9): "The
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action would be the end of discretion, and yet discretion
should not be a word for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action." So in the case of Goodwin vs. Prime
(92 Me., 355), it was said that "discretion implies that in the absence of positive law or fixed rule the
judge is to decide by his view of expediency or by the demands of equity and justice."
There being no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide the judge in the court below in such
cases, there is no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide a court of appeal in reviewing his action in the
premises, and such courts will not therefore attempt to control the exercise of discretion by the court
below unless it plainly appears that there was "inconsiderate action" or the exercise of mere "arbitrary
will," or in other words that his action in the premises amounted to "an abuse of discretion." But the
right of an appellate court to review judicial acts which lie in the discretion of inferior courts may
properly be invoked upon a showing of a strong and clear case of abuse of power to the prejudice of
the appellant, or that the ruling objected to rested on an erroneous principle of law not vested in
discretion.[13]

The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on the substantial rights of a
litigant. NOPAs Petition for Certiorari is seeking the reversal of the Orders of the RTC denying NOPAs Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of failure to pay the proper docket fees. The alleged deficiency in the payment of docket fees
by Campos, if there is any, would not inure to the benefit of NOPA.
There is therefore no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of Appeals exercise of discretion
in the case at bar. While the payment of docket fees is jurisdictional, it is nevertheless unmistakably also a
technicality. Ironically, in seeking the leniency of this Court on the basis of substantial justice, NOPA is ultimately
praying for a Writ of Certiorari enjoining the action for breach of contract from being decided on the merits. Whats
sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. A party cannot expect its opponent to comply with the technical rules of
procedure while, at the same time, hoping for the relaxation of the technicalities in its favor.
There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals warranting this Courts
reversal of the exercise of discretion by the former. However, even if we decide to brush aside the lapses in
technicalities on the part of NOPA in its Petition for Certiorari, we nevertheless find that such Petition would still fail.
NOPA seeks in its Petition for Certiorari for the application of this Courts ruling in Manchester Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[14] wherein we ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest

jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading.
In denying[15] NOPAs Motion to Dismiss, the RTC cited Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,
[16]
wherein we modified our ruling in Manchester and decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was made on the justification
that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) demonstrated his willingness
to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. NOPA claims that Sun is not applicable to the case
at bar, since Campos deliberately concealed his claim for damages in the prayer.
In United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Ros,[17] we discussed how Manchester was not
applicable to said case in view of the lack of deliberate intent to defraud manifested in the latter:
This Court wonders how the petitioner could possibly arrive at the conclusion that the private
respondent was moved by fraudulent intent in omitting the amount of damages claimed in its Second
Amended Complaint, thus placing itself on the same footing as the complainant in Manchester, when
it is clear that the factual milieu of the instant case is far from that of Manchester.
First, the complainant in Manchester paid the docket fee only in the amount of P410.00,
notwithstanding its claim for damages in the amount of P78,750,000.00, while in the present
case, the private respondent paid P42,000.00 as docket fees upon filing of the original
complaint.
Second, complainant's counsel in Manchester claimed, in the body of the complaint, damages
in the amount of P78,750.00 but omitted the same in its prayer in order to evade the payment of
docket fees. Such fraud-defining circumstance is absent in the instant petition.
Finally, when the court took cognizance of the issue of non-payment of docket fees
in Manchester, the complainant therein filed an amended complaint, this time omitting all
mention of the amount of damages being claimed in the body of the complaint; and when
directed by the court to specify the amount of damages in such amended complaint, it reduced
the same from P78,750,000.00 to P10,000,000.00, obviously to avoid payment of the required
docket fee. Again, this patent fraudulent scheme is wanting in the case at bar.
This Court is not inclined to adopt the petitioner's piecemeal construction of our rulings
in Manchester and Sun Insurance. Its attempt to strip the said landmark cases of one or two lines and
use them to bolster its arguments and clothe its position with jurisprudential blessing must be struck
down by this Court.
All told, the rule is clear and simple. In case where the party does not deliberately intend
to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the
rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine
enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the strict regulations set in Manchester will apply.
In the case at bar, Campos filed an amount of P54,898.50 as docket fee, based on the amounts
of P10,000,000.00 representing the value of unwithdrawn molasses, P100,00.00 as storage fee, P200,00.00 as moral
damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as attorneys fees. The total amount considered in
computing the docket fee was P10,900,000.00. NOPA alleges that Campos deliberately omitted a claim for unrealized
profit of P100,000.00 and an excess amount of storage fee in the amount of P502,875.98 in its prayer and, hence, the
amount that should have been considered in the payment of docket fees is P11,502,875.98. The amount allegedly
deliberately omitted was therefore only P602,875.98 out of P11,502,875.98, or merely 5.2% of said alleged

total. Camposs pleadings furthermore evince his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees
when required by the Court.
Since the circumstances of this case clearly show that there was no deliberate intent to defraud the Court in
the payment of docket fees, the case of Sun should be applied, and the Motion to Dismiss by NOPA should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2007 and 16 August 2007,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651, outrightly dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros
Oriental Planters Association, Inc. against private respondent Aniceto Manojo Campos, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.