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What is LOGIC
a (1) : a science that deals with the principles and criteria of
validity of inference and demonstration : the science of the
formal principles of reasoning (2) : a branch or variety of logic
<modal logic> <Boolean logic> (3) : a branch of semiotics;
especially : syntactics (4) : the formal principles of a branch of
knowledge
b (1) : a particular mode of reasoning viewed as valid or faulty
(2) : relevance, propriety
c : interrelation or sequence of facts or events when seen as
inevitable or predictable
Logic (from the Greek "logos", which has a variety of meanings
including word, thought, idea, argument, account, reason or
principle) is the study of reasoning, or the study of the
principles and criteria of valid inference and demonstration.
It attempts to distinguish good reasoning from bad reasoning.
Aristotle defined logic as "new and necessary reasoning",
"new" because it allows us to learn what we do not know, and
"necessary" because its conclusions are inescapable. It asks
questions like "What is correct reasoning?", "What distinguishes
a good argument from a bad one?", "How can we detect a fallacy
in reasoning?"
Logic investigates and classifies the structure of statements
and arguments, both through the study of formal systems of
inference and through the study of arguments in natural
language. It deals only with propositions (declarative
sentences, used to make an assertion, as opposed to questions,
commands or sentences expressing wishes) that are capable of
being true and false. It is not concerned with the
psychological processes connected with thought, or with
emotions, images and the like. It covers core topics such as the
study of fallacies and paradoxes, as well as specialized
analysis of reasoning using probability and arguments involving
causality and argumentation theory.
2. What is the significance of LOGIC in law and legal practice?
Thereisgoodreasontoremainskepticalofoverlyrationalisticaccountsoflaw
andjudicialpractice.Theweaveofhistoricaldoctrine,legalprinciple,andfactual
nuancesthatgoesintoeachjudicialdecisionisfartoointricatetopermitcritical
appraisalunderanysingleevaluativemethod,includingtheprinciplesoflogic.So
we are rightfully apprehensive when we recollect the formalistic visions of
nineteenthcenturyjuristsvisionswhichfoundtheessenceofadjudicationin
thelogicalderivationofconclusionsnecessarilyrequiredbypredeterminedlegal
principles.

Yet it is somewhere between strict formalistic jurisprudence and an outright


disregardforlogicandargumentativeformwherethelawandjudicialpractice
reallyfindrepose.ThoughallthatistypicallyrepeatedofJusticeHolmesviewis
the pithy remark quoted above, his jurisprudential writings together with his
judicialopinionsshowclearlythatheneverintendedtosuggestthatlogicisnota
centralaspectoflaworjudicialdecisionmaking.He,aswellasthelegalrealists
andothercriticsoflegalformalism,wellrecognizedthatevaluatingandcreating
argumentslieattheheartofthecraftsoflawyeringandjudging.
Itisthusworthwhileforpractitionersandstudentsofthelawaliketopossessan
understanding of the basic principles of logic that are used regularly in legal
reasoningandjudicialdecisionmaking.Thisunderstandingrequires,inimportant
part,skillinnavigatingtheprocessesofinductivereasoningthemethodsof
analogyandinductivegeneralizationbywhichinferencesaredrawnonthe
basisofpastexperienceandempiricalobservation.Thecommonlawmethodof
caselawdevelopment,aswellasthegeneralprescriptoftenreferredtoasthe
RuleofLawthatlikecasesbedecidedalikearegroundedlogicallyin
inductivereasoning.
Equallyimportantisasecondbasiccategoryofargumentationdeductivelogic,
especiallythedeductiveargumentformsknownassyllogisms.Thesearethe
classic forms of deductive argument consisting of a major premise, a minor
premise,andaconclusion.Itwasthisaspectoflogicthatacenturyagostirred
suchvirulentoppositiontoformalism.Anditisthisaspectoflogicwhichwasso
severelydownplayedthroughoutthetwentiethcentury.Yetevenarudimentary
understandingofdeductivelogicgiveslawyers,judges,andstudentsofthelawa
valuabletoolfordeterminingwhetheranargumentinalegalopinionorbriefis
validorfallacious.
In essence, the domain of the law and, within that domain, perhaps most
especially the practice of judicial decision making are exercises in practical
reasoning.Law,tobesure,involvesmorethanlogic.Yetthemyriadoffactors
thatcontributetogoodlawyeringandfairjudgingsuggestthatthelifeofthe
law,whilenotlogicalone,isamanifoldofactivitiesthatalluseanddepend
uponreasoninspecializedways.Theprecisionofdetailrequiredinthedraftingof
contracts,wills,trusts,andotherlegaldocumentsisarationalprecision;thecare
in planning and strategizing demanded of trial attorneys in deciding how to
presenttheircasesisarationalcare;theskillinwrittenandoralargumentation
required for appellate practice is, quite obviously, a rational skill; the talent
expectedofadministrativelawjudgesincraftingcoherentfindingsoffactand
conclusionsoflawisarationaltalent;andtheabilityoftrialandappellatecourt
judgestoseparate,dispassionatelyandwithoutbias,thekernelofargumentfrom
the rhetorical and emotive chaff of adversarial presentation, so as to render
judgmentsthatarejustifiedunderthelaw,isarationalability.
Whileitistruethatmanyotherfactorsfromselfinteresttomoralvalues,from
psychologytoscienceenterintothedecisionmakingoflawyersandjudges,all
suchfactorsbeartheeverpresenttinctureofreasonandlogic.Trialattorneysmay

appeal to the psychology or sentiments of the jury, but only so far as they
reasonablyexpecttoinfluencethejurytodrawrationalinferencesintheirclients
favor.Selfinterestmaybethesoledrivingmotiveforeachpartyinthedraftingof
a contract, yet the recognition, grounded in reason, that insisting on onerous
provisions will likely undermine the entire contractual arrangement has the
tendency to hold everyones selfinterest in check. And while adjudicative
practicecallsforagooddealofvaluejudgmentinthechoice,interpretation,
and application of legal principles, such value judgments are not free of the
constraintsofreason.Asstatedbyoneappellatecourt,[E]verylegalanalysis
shouldbeginatthepointofreason,continuealongapathoflogicandarriveata
fundamentally fair result. (Sunrise Lumber v. Johnson, Appeal No. 165). To
criticize,reverse,oroverruleanadministrativeorjudicialdecisionasarbitrary,
capricious,unsupportedbylaw,orcontrarytoprecedentistosaynothing
more,butnothingless,thanthatthedecisionisdeficientinlogicandreason.
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