Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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*FIRST DIVISION.
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Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, 595 SCRA 149 (2009), the doctrine
of immutability of a nal judgment as follows: No other procedural law
principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment becomes nal, it
is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal, except only
for correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is void.
The underlying reason for the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus make orderly the discharge of judicial
business, and (2) to put judicial controversies to an end, at the risk of
occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on
indenitely and the rights and obligation of every litigant must not hang in
suspense for an indenite period of time.
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the said [petitioners] have paid her co-heirs as appearing in the Deed of Sale
with Declaration of Heirship, Annex B.4
legal share and participation therefrom, shall have been ordered delivered to
her;
5.Ordering the [petitioners] to pay the [respondent] the sum of
P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fee and to pay the costs of this suit;
6.[Respondent] further prays for such other reliefs as may be deemed
just and equitable in the premises.5
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and Basilia Tabile one eleventh (1/11) share and ten eleventh (10/11) share
in the name of [herein petitioner] Tobias Selga married to Ceferina
Garancho and further orders the following:
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6Id., at p. 13.
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1.For the relocation survey of Lot No. 1138-A to establish the denite
location of the respective share of the parties, the expenses to be borne by
them proportionately to their share;
2.The Register of Deeds of the Province of Negros Occidental is
hereby directed to cancel Transfer Certicate of Title No. T-134408 and in
lieu thereof issue a new transfer certicate of title in the name of Tobias
Selga consisting of an area of Thirty[-]Seven Thousand Seven Hundred
Seventy[-]Eight (37,778) square meters and another new transfer certicate
of title in the name of Sony Entierro Brar consisting of an area of One
Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety[-]Nine (1,799) square meters upon
submission of an approved subdivision plan;
3.For the [petitioners] to account to [respondent] her share in the
produce of the land from May 15, 1985 up to the time that [respondents]
possession of her share of Lot No. 1138-A is restored to her; and, nally,
4.For the [petitioners] to pay [respondent] the sum of P50,000.00 as
attorneys fee and to pay the costs of suit.7
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that the nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action. There is, therefore, identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action between the two (2) cases.
Since the decision in Civil Case No. 276 was silent on the issue of legal
redemption, it can be inferred therefrom that the court did not see it t to
grant the same. Plaintiff should have moved for the reconsideration thereof
or should have appealed to the Court of Appeals raising this particular issue.
It did not do so. Thus, the decision had become nal and executory.
The ling of the present action constitutes forum shopping. The ling of
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment amounts to forum shopping. Only when the successive ling of
the suits as part of an appeal, or a special civil action, will there be no forum
shopping because the party no longer availed of different fora but, rather,
through a review of a lower tribunals decision or order. (Quinsay v. CA, et
al., G.R. No. 127058, Aug. 31, 2000.)10
Respondents appeal of the aforementioned judgment of RTCBranch 56 was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 72987 before the
Court of Appeals.
On May 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 72987, which reversed and set aside the assailed
July 27, 2001 Decision of RTC-Branch 56 in Civil Case No. 573.
The Court of Appeals held that respondent had validly exercised
her right to redemption of the subject property:
As a rule, co-heir/s or co-owner/s of undivided property are required to
notify in writing the other co-heir/s or co-owner/s of the actual sale of the
formers share in the co-ownership. And, within one (1) month or 30 days
from the said notice, a co-heir or co-owner who wish to redeem such
property must make a claim for the reconveyance of the same by either
consignation in court or offer to repurchase by tendering the vendor
payment of the redemption money.
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10CA Rollo, pp. 37-39.
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The appellate court further ruled that Civil Case No. 573 before
RTC-Branch 56 was not barred by the nal judgment in Civil Case
No. 276 of RTC-Branch 55:
What had became nal and conclusive in Civil Case No. 276 is only
with respect to the liation of [herein respondent] and [her] right to inherit,
but not as to [respondents] right to redeem the property sold by her coheirs.
We disagree with the court a quos holding which provides, to wit:
Since the decision in Civil Case No. 276 was silent on the issue of legal
redemption, it can be inferred therefrom that the court did not see it t to
grant the same.
Right of legal redemption is a statutory right provided by lawas long
as the redemptioner possesses all the essential requisites and comply with
the requirements, such right need not be judicially declared in order for it to
be enforced. The role of the court is only to ascertain whether the essential
requisites and requirements are properly complied with. As the right of
redemption is inherent to every co-heir or co-owner, denial of the said right
must be explicitly and expressly provided and justied by the court and not
by mere silence only. Silence of the decision in Civil Case No. 276 on the
issue of [respondents] right of redemption does not mean that the same was
denied. Only the issues of liation and the validity of the Deed of Sale with
Declaration of Heirship were judicially deter_______________
11Rollo, p. 26.
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mined by the lower court on the said case. Hence, in the instant case, this
Court may rule upon the issue of redemption.12
[Respondent] is hereby given thirty (30) days from the nality of this
Decision within which to exercise his right of redemption over Lot No.
1138-A by reimbursing [petitioners] the price of the sale in the amount of
P120,000.00 plus the total value of the improvements, if any, on the subject
lot based on the current fair market value.
Failure of [respondent] to redeem the property within the period herein
provided shall vest [petitioners] absolute right over subject property.13
Petitioners now come before this Court via the instant Petition
for Review, insisting that respondents right to redemption of the
subject property from petitioners was among the causes of action
already litigated in Civil Case No. 276 before RTC-Branch 55; and
the very same cause of action between the same parties involving
the same subject matter was merely duplicated in Civil Case No. 573
before RTC-Branch 56. Thus, the prior nal judgment rendered in
Civil Case No. 276 already barred Civil Case No. 573.
Respondent counters that Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch
56 involving her legal right to redeem the subject property from
petitioners cannot be deemed barred by the nal judgment in Civil
Case No. 276 rendered by RTC-Branch 55 because said issue was
not explicitly ruled upon in the latter case.
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12Id., at pp. 28-29.
13Id., at p. 29.
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the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause
nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary
doctrine would subject public peace and quiet to the will and neglect
of individuals and prefer the gratication of the litigious disposition
on the part of suitors to the preservation of public tranquility and
happiness.15
Res judicata has two concepts. The rst is bar by prior judgment
under Rule 39, Section 47(b), and the second is conclusiveness of
judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c).16
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14Pentacapital Investment Corp. v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 171736, July 5, 2010, 623
SCRA 284, 307.
15La Campana Development Corp. v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 146157, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 137, 158-159.
16Co v. People, G.R. No. 160265, July 13, 2009, 592 SCRA 381, 393.
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but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered
for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in
that case. In contrast, res judicata under the second concept or
estoppel by judgment exists when there is identity of parties and
subject matter but the causes of action are completely distinct. The
rst judgment is conclusive only as to
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It is not disputed that the Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTCBranch 55 in Civil Case No. 276 had become nal and executory.
Petitioners no longer appealed the said decision, while respondent
withdrew her appeal of the same before the Court of Appeals.
There is also no question that RTC-Branch 55 had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and parties in Civil Case No. 276, and that its
Decision dated May 8, 1996 was a judgment on the merits, i.e., one
rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations
submitted by the parties at the trial of the case.19
Controversy herein arises from the fourth requirement: the
identity of parties, subject matter and, particularly, the causes of
action between Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573.
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17Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 194 Phil. 624, 642-643; 108 SCRA 1, 17 (1981).
18Del Rosario v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 150134, October
31, 2007, 537 SCRA 571, 584.
19Dayot v. Shell Chemical Company (Phils.), Inc., G.R. No. 156542, June 26,
2007, 525 SCRA 535, 546.
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There is identity of parties. Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case
No. 573 were both instituted by respondent against petitioners.
There is also identity of subject matter. Civil Case No. 276 and
Civil Case No. 573 both involved respondents rights and interests
over the subject property as Franciscos legitimate child and
compulsory heir.
Finally, there is identity of causes of action.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court denes a cause of action
as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
The cause of action in Civil Case No. 273 and Civil Case No. 576 is
the sale of the entire subject property by Basilia, et al., to petitioners
without respondents knowledge and consent, hence, depriving
respondent of her rights and interests over her pro-indiviso share in
the subject property as a co-heir and co-owner. The annulment of the
sale of respondents share in the subject property, the legal
redemption by respondent of her co-heirs share sold to petitioners,
and the claim for damages should not be mistaken to be the causes
of action, but they were the remedies and reliefs prayed for by the
respondent to redress the wrong allegedly committed against her.
The allegations in respondents Complaint in Civil Case No. 573
initially give the impression that the cause of action therein was
petitioners refusal to heed respondents demand to redeem
petitioners ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject property. But a
closer study of said Complaint, as well as the trial proceedings
before RTC-Branch 56, reveal that respondents right to redeem
petitioners ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject property also
arose from the sale of the said subject property to petitioners by
respondents co-heirs and co-owners, alleged to be without
respondents knowledge or consentthe very same cause of action
at the crux of Civil Case No. 276.
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ing reason for the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of
justice and thus make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and (2) to
put judicial controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional errors,
inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indenitely and the
rights and obligation of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an
indenite period of time. As the Court declared in Yau v. Silverio:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and
it is essential to an effective and efcient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become nal, the winning party be, not
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
Indeed, just as a losing party has the right to le an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy
the nality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of
the judgment. Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing
litigant his right to savor the fruit of his victory must immediately be struck
down. Thus, in Heirs of Wenceslao Samper v. Reciproco-Noble, we had
occasion to emphasize the signicance of this rule, to wit:
It is an important fundamental principle in our Judicial system
that every litigation must come to an end x x x Access to the courts is
guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto. Once a litigants rights
have been adjudicated in a valid nal judgment of a competent court,
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