Q1:

How did Allama Iqbal argue the need for a separate Muslim State?
Discuss in the light of Allahabad Address of 1930.
Philosopher, poet and political thinker, Allama Muhammad Iqbal posited a vision
of homeland for the Muslims of North India in his presidential address to the All
India Muslim League at Allahabad on 29 December 1930.
Most of us remember the 1930 Allahabad Address with the following famous
statement by the Allama:
Personally, I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier
Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Selfgovernment, within the British Empire, or without the British Empire,
the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State
appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of NorthWest India.
But there is indeed much more to understand from that address made by a man
of profound wisdom, with in-depth vision in the history and philosophy of Islam,
extensive study of contemporary issues, and active involvement in the political
process of his time. The address covers the philosophical, the historical, and the
futuristic prospects of the Muslims of the Subcontinent; in fact, it makes history
by submitting the true, eye-witness sentiments that ran between the Muslims,
the Hindus and the British at those sensitive times. Moreover, it gives us an
insight into how things gradually grew up to the demand of Pakistan, something
impossible even as an idea at the beginning.
The Muslims of the Subcontinent, 70 million at that time a Muslim community
bigger as compared with the number of Muslims living in any other Muslim state
of that time did not have a necessary idea of dividing their homeland, India, for
the solution of the miseries that had surrounded them. To this time and even
later, the Muslims were pushing only for separate electorates for Muslims
according to their population in any province, so that they would eventually form
governments in the Muslim majority provinces. In this background, Iqbal was a
thinker who could look beyond the canvas of time, and remind the Muslim how
they become a nation, and how being a distinct Muslim nation, it is their
prerogative to have a political identity in addition to the social and cultural one.
Iqbal calls the time of his address to be one of the most critical moments in the
history of Muslim political thought and activity in India. With the opening of his
address, he made it clear upon his audience that the secular ideal of a state
machine that works regardless of the belief of its people is not possible for
Muslims, he said:
It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a
certain kind of polity by which expression I mean a social structure
regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal
has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of
India.
He emphasized that unlike all other Islamic states that had wholesomely
converted into Islam, India presented a unique case where Muslims have proved
to be a separate and strongly integrated community within a swarm of different
and opposing communities, he said: Indeed it is not an exaggeration to say

that India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a
people-building force, has worked at its best.
Iqbal made it clear that the Secular ideal was an inevitable conclusion of
Christianity in Europe, as the Church functioned purely on an other-worldly basis;
the Church had remained separate from the affairs of governance, and the otherworldly, divine intrusion of the Church into the affairs of the people could not go
on forever. Therefore he said: In Europe, Christianity was understood to be
a purely monastic order, which gradually developed into a vast church
organization that there was no such polity (as is in Islam) associated
with Christianity If you begin with the conception of religion as
complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in
Europe is perfectly natural.
But in Islam, Iqbal reminds, the Mosque was the center of law and politics, from
the day one. Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an
irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter Man is not the citizen of a
profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit
situated elsewhere. To Islam, matter is spirit realising itself in space
and time. And that the nature of the Prophets religious experience,
as disclosed in the Quran is wholly different. It is not mere experience
in the sense of a purely biological event, happening inside the
experient and necessitating no reactions on its social environment. It is
individual experience creative of a social order.
Because Islam, as a belief system, regulates the social, economic and political
life of its people, the Muslim community has to necessarily act as a polity, and
therefore, it is not possible to take the Indian Muslim community as a mere
community among communities. For this precise reason, the Muslims of India
were struggling for the right of separate electorates from the beginning, and
were not compromising to be just another one of the numerous Indian
communities that had superficially merged in the homogeneity of Hindu India.
It is important to understand here that as per todays stats, India is home to two
major language families, the Indo-Aryan and the Dravidian, both of which have
hundreds of sub-categories, and thousands of ethnic groups reside in it. India is
also
home
to
all
major
religions
including
Hinduism,
Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism, Judaism, Zoroastrianism,
and
the Bah faith. India has the worlds largest Hindu, Sikh, Jain, Zoroastrian, and
Bah populations, and has the third-largest Muslim population and the largest
Muslim population for a non-Muslim majority country. If, for instance, the largest
communities of Sikhs or Jains live in India, then there is no reason why they
should not attain political or territorial rights, like any other people living on any
other part of the planet would. Even so, at that time, 70 million Muslims meant
the largest Muslim population of the world, that too a community far more
culturally homogenized and subjectively united then even the Hindus, who were
divided and subdivided into castes and gods of a thousand kinds. In such a case,
the perpetual insistence of the Hindus upon joint electorates and a unitary form
of government meant that they were not to tolerate a separate identity for the
Muslims in the future and wanted a complete power over India; this showed in
their political intrigues. Iqbal pointed out the divide within Indian communities
saying:
Experience, however, shows that the various caste units and religious
units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective
individualities in a larger whole Perhaps we suspect each others

intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other, outwardly

simulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded
as a caste or tribe And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim
mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that if the principle that the
Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his
own culture and tradition in his own Indian home-lands is recognized as
the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to
stake his all for the freedom of India.
Iqbal explained that India is a continent of human groups belonging to
different races, speaking different languages, and professing different
religions and that the problem of India is international and not
national.
Therefore he said, the creation of autonomous States, based on the unity
of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is
the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in
India.
Referring to the proceedings of the Round Table Conference, he said, Yet the
Prime Minister of England apparently refuses to see that the problem of India is
international and not national. He is reported to have said that his government
would find it difficult to submit to Parliament proposals for the maintenance of
separate electorates, since joint electorates were much more in accordance with
British democratic sentiments. Obviously he does not see that the model of
British democracy cannot be of any use in a land of many nations; and that a
system of separate electorates is only a poor substitute for a territorial solution
of the problem.
Iqbal had no doubts upon the intentions of the British and the Hindu to keep their
complete hold on power one way or the other; he kept analyzing their political
maneuverings and warned the Muslims not to give up their legitimate rights at
any cost. He said:
The pundits of India do not disturb the Central authority as it stands at
present. All that they desire is that this authority should become fully
responsible to the Central Legislature which they maintain intact and
where their majority will become further reinforced on the nominated
element ceasing to exist.
The pundits of England, on the other hand, realising that democracy in
the Centre tends to work contrary to their interests and is likely to
absorb the whole power now in their hands, have shifted the
experience of democracy from the Centre to the provinces yet their
evaluation of this principle is determined by considerations wholly
different to those which determine its value in the eyes of Muslim
India.
The Muslims demand federation because it is pre-eminently a solution
of Indias most difficult problem, i.e. the communal problem.
The Simon Report retains the present British dominance behind the
thin veneer of an unreal federation, partly because the British are
naturally unwilling to part with the power they have so long wielded
and partly because it is possible for them, in the absence of an intercommunal understanding in India, to make out a plausible case for the
retention of that power in their own hands.

Iqbal who was the preacher of Khudi, the highest state of ego that places man
face to face with his Creator, reminded the Muslims that Islam is an ever-living
destiny that does not fail man, only man has to merge his life into this living
force. He said:
To address this session of the All-India Muslim League you have
selected a man who is not despaired of Islam as a living force for
freeing the outlook of man from its geographical limitations, who
believes that religion is a power of the utmost importance in the life of
individuals as well as States, and finally who believes that Islam is
itself Destiny and will not suffer a destiny.
And India is a perfect proof of how Islam is a living force. Living for centuries
between Hindus, who are an aggregate of a diversity of innumerous ethnicities,
dialects, tribes and cultures that have increasingly vied against each other to
maintain their sub-identities, and whose basic beliefs can be so diverse that
Hinduism has seldom ever been given a concise definition that could describe it
as a religion at all; still, Islam has been able to give its convertees, living in such
surroundings, the sameness of character and legality, and a subjective oneness
that unites them beyond territory and race. He said:
We are 70 million, and far more homogeneous than any other people in
India. Indeed the Muslims of India are the only Indian people who can
fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word. The
Hindus, though ahead of us in almost all respects, have not yet been
able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a
nation, and which Islam has given you as a free gift. No doubt they are
anxious to become a nation, but the process of becoming a nation is a
kind of travail, and in the case of Hindu India involves a complete
overhauling of her social structure.
Yet, this Muslim people of India faced, at that time, a dire test of whether they
would be able to maintain their unique nationhood or would they fall down to the
enormous pressure of the Hindu majority and the British imperial that were
adamant to break their solidarity and to merge their fundamental identity within
their relative identities. Iqbal warned:
Never in our history has Islam had to stand a greater trial than the one
which confronts it today To base a constitution on the concept of a
homogeneous India, or to apply to India principles dictated by British
democratic sentiments, is unwittingly to prepare her for a civil war.
Iqbal warned the Muslims of India that an arduous task belies in front of them;
they must be vigilant, be able to assess the changing, intriguing plans of their
opponents, never at any cost decline from their inherent rights as a people, and
be prepared to go to any extent of a struggle to ensure it. He said:
Then will arrive the moment for independent and concerted political
action by the Muslims of India. If you are at all serious about your
ideals and aspirations, you must be ready for such an action. Our
leading men have done a good deal of political thinking, and their
thought has certainly made us, more or less, sensitive to the forces
which are now shaping the destinies of peoples in India and outside
India. But, I ask, has this thinking prepared us for the kind of action
demanded by the situation which may arise in the near future?

the present crisis in the history of India demands complete organisation and
unity of will and purpose in the Muslim community, both in your own interest as a
community, and in the interest of India as a whole.
He told his people that the destiny of the Indian Muslims will play its part in
devising the map of the future of the Muslims of the whole of Asia; therefore, the
Muslims should play their part today as an integral part of the Ummah, not
considering themselves just a local people. He said:
And since 70 millions of Muslims in a single country constitute a far
more valuable asset to Islam than all the countries of Muslim Asia put
together, we must look at the Indian problem not only from the Muslim
point of view, but also from the standpoint of the Indian Muslim as
such. Our duty towards Asia and India cannot be loyally performed
without an organised will fixed on a definite purpose. In your own
interest, as a political entity among other political entities of India,
such an equipment is an absolute necessity.
He told us to be one beyond races and sects, to put even our economic gains
and losses aside, and to realize the spirit of one Muslim brotherhood between us
that gives us the energy to set our goals on the larger than life perspective.
Rise above sectional interests and private ambitions, and learn to
determine the value of your individual and collective action, however
directed on material ends, in the light of the ideal which you are
supposed to represent. Pass from matter to spirit. Matter is diversity;
spirit is light, life and unity.
Iqbal tried to invoke in the Muslims a collective ego, beyond the ego of the self
that could enable a collection of men as large as 70 million to act as one, single
body, with a flux too big to be resisted and with a personality too strong to be
altered. He said:
One of the profoundest verses in the Holy Quran teaches us that the
birth and rebirth of the whole of humanity is like the birth and rebirth
of a single individual. Why cannot you who, as a people, can well claim
to be the first practical exponents of this superb conception of
humanity, live and move and have your being as a single individual?

Q2
Discuss and analyze the fundamental principles of Lahore Resolution.
The resolution for the establishment of a separate homeland for the Muslims of
British India passed in the annual session of the All India Muslim League held in
Lahore on 22-24 March 1940 is a landmark document of Pakistans history.
The passing of the resolution marked the transformation of the Muslim minority
in British India into a nation with its distinguishing socio-cultural and political
features, a sense of history and shared aspirations for the future within a
territory.

The Lahore Resolution, popularly described as the Pakistan Resolution, employs

modern political discourse for putting forward its demand rather than using a
religious idiom for creating a religious-Islamic state for protection of Islam from
the onslaught of other religions of India.
It made worldly demand keeping in view the peculiar problems of the Muslims of
British India, the political experience of the Muslim community and the prevailing
debate about the ways to protect Muslim identity, rights and interests against
the backdrop of the modern state system established by the British in India.
The Resolution addressed the Muslim question in the political and constitutional
context of British India and pointed out to the course of action the Muslim
League intended to adopt to secure the Muslim identity, rights and interests.
It emphasized the principles that were relevant to modern state system and the
political context of British India. It made five specific demands:
1. The Resolution rejected the federal system of government as envisaged in the
Government of India Act, 1935 because it was totally unsuited to and
unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether
unacceptable to Muslim India.
2. The Muslims would not accept any revised constitutional plan unless it was
framed with their consent and approval.
3. The adjacent territorial units should be demarcated into regions that may
involve some territorial adjustments in a manner that the areas in which the
Muslims are numerically in a majority as in north-western and eastern zones of
India become independent states in which the constituent units shall be
autonomous and sovereign.
4. The resolution offered adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards for
religious minorities in the Muslim majority units for the protection of their
religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and
interests in consultation with them. Similar rights will be given to the Muslims in
other parts of India. 5. The Muslim League Working Committee was asked to
formulate a constitutional scheme on the basis of the principles outlined in the
Resolution.
The Resolution thus offered a new course of action for the Muslims of British
India as compared to the Muslim League position adopted on constitutional and
political issues in the past.
The change was that of strategy but not of the goal.
The Muslim League goal since its inception in December 1906 was to protect and
advance Muslim socio-cultural identity, rights and interests in British Indias
socio-political and constitutional context.
Initially the Muslim League demanded separate electorate for the Muslims so
that they could elect their representatives.
Later, it sought adequate Muslim representation in the cabinets and state
services/jobs.
It also demanded constitutional safeguards and guarantees for the Muslims.
It supported federalism with autonomy for provinces, hoping that the Muslims
would be able to exercise power effectively in the Muslim majority provinces

which would not only boost the Muslim community but also provide greater
opportunity for advancement of Muslim rights and interests.
The change of strategy was caused by the political experience of the Muslim elite
in their interaction with other communities, especially the Congress Party, and
the policies of the British government.
These strategies also manifested the growing desire of the Muslims to assert
their separate socio-political identity.
The Muslim League began to think about discarding the federal model in 1938,
when the Sindh Provincial Muslim League proposed that the All India Muslim
League needed to review its position on constitutional issues in view of the
experience of the Muslims under the Congress governments in some provinces
(1937-39).
What weakened Muslim Leagues confidence in the federal model for the whole
of India was the bitter experience of the Muslim educated classes and urban
population under the Congress ministries in the provinces.
The cultural and educational policies of these ministries alienated the Muslims.
The Muslim elite in these and non-Congress provinces came to the conclusion
that the Congress governments in the provinces were imposing Hindu ethos in
the name of Indian identity.
Further the Muslim leaders complained about the discriminatory policy for
recruitment of Muslims to government jobs and they maintained that the
Muslims suffered in the economic domain in the Congress-ruled provinces.
The experience of the Congress rule in the provinces was the triggering factor
that led the Muslim League leaders to explore a political alternative to a single
Indian federation.
Though the Lahore Resolution talked of a Muslim homeland, Quaid-i-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah did not wholly give up the idea of some political
accommodation within the framework of a loose federal model.
The Muslim League acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan (March -April 1946)
clearly showed that its leaders were willing to work within a loose federal model
that grouped the Muslim majority provinces into two political groups and nonMuslim majority provinces were put together as the third group.
These three groups were joined together under a weak federal order.
The provinces in each group could review their relationship with each other and
the federal government after ten years.
The Muslim League withdrew its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan when it
learnt that the Congress was only interested in getting into the constituent
assembly without giving any specific commitment that the future constitution
would be based on the provisions of the Cabinet Mission Plan.
The Lahore Resolution did not use the name Pakistan in the text and it did not
link up the demand with Islam.
The Resolution presented the Muslim demand in the context of British Indian
politics rather than giving a constitutional framework for a proposed Muslim
homeland.

The Muslim League used Islam and made Islam-based appeals for political
mobilization for the 1946 provincial elections.
A large number of people and rural-based Islamic clergy, pirs and
sajjadanasheens in the Punjab, Sindh and NWFP (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) joined
the Muslim League after 1940, especially during 1945-47.
Some of the rural clergy helped the Muslim League in its election campaign. Most
of them believed and advocated that Pakistan would have an Islam based
political system.
There is a territorial basis of the Lahore Resolution and its demand for a Muslim
homeland.
This demand became credible because of territorial contiguity of Muslim majority
provinces in Northwest and Eastern zone where Bengal and some of its adjoining
areas made it possible to put forward this demand.
Had the Muslim majority provinces been scattered the homeland demand would
not have worked.
The Muslim League leadership was invoking the imperatives of modern state that
included people, territory, government and sovereignty.
The Lahore Resolution has been a basis of three debates in the pre- and postindependence periods.
The first debate relates to the non-use of the name Pakistan in the demand.
The Hindu press and leaders were quick to describe the resolution as the
demand for the creation of Pakistan; some people began to call it the Pakistan
Resolution soon after the Lahore session of the Muslim League.
The second debate focuses on the use of certain terms in the Resolution.
These include independent states and that the constituent units will be
autonomous and sovereign.
Was the Lahore Resolution talking of one or more than one state for the Muslims
of British India?
These ambiguities can be addressed if a literalist approach is not adopted to
understand the Lahore Resolution.
Rather, it has to be viewed in the political context of British India in and around
1940 and the Muslim political experience over time.
In a federal system sovereignty is the prerogative of the federal government and
its constituent units cannot be both autonomous and sovereign at the same
time.
In the case of Pakistan, the British government transferred power and authority
to the state of Pakistan through its federal government established in Karachi.
Pakistani provinces got power from the federal state and the first Interim
Constitution.
Pakistans federal system was not created by the provinces deciding to set up a
federation.

Pakistans federation was built into the Indian Independence Act, passed in July
1947 by the British Parliament and the First Interim Constitution.
This envisaged a strong centre and weak provinces.
This legacy has haunted Pakistans political system from the early years.
The Pakistan movement developed gradually.
It did not stop with the passage of the Lahore Resolution.
Next seven years were important to understand the making of Pakistan.
The Muslim League demands became more specific and assertive in the post1940 period.
By 1942, the Muslim League focus shifted to a singular phrase of state.
In September 1944 Jinnah was very categorical in asserting that he was taking of
one state of Pakistan.
This issue was finally clarified by the convention of Pakistani parliamentarians
held in Delhi in April 1946.
The evolutionary process of the movement for the creation of Pakistan began
before March 1940 and ended with the attainment of independence in Pakistan in
1947.
The third political debate relates to the post-independence period.
Some regional-nationalist leaders in Sindh and Balochistan invoke the Lahore
Resolution for seeking maximum autonomy for provinces.
They demand that Pakistans federal model should be based on the Lahore
Resolution. Some leaders have talked of turning Pakistan into a confederation.
This is a literalist interpretation of the Lahore Resolution which can be described
as flawed.
The Lahore Resolution did not offer a framework for organizing the Pakistani
state, especially the distribution of powers between the federal government and
provinces.
It addressed the constitutional issues in an all-India framework and offered a
framework to settle the Hindu-Muslim question on a permanent basis.
The demand for greater autonomy can be raised by political parties and leaders
in Pakistan with reference to the Muslim Leagues political disposition on
federalism in the pre-independence period.
It favoured greater autonomy to the provinces but it turned in favour of a strong
and assertive centre in the post-independence period.
The 18th constitutional amendment marks the beginning of the era of greater
administrative and financial autonomy for provinces.
Provinces have more control over their finances and natural resources.
If democracy continues to function and the federal and provincial governments
improve their performance the confidence of people in the state system will
improve.

This will weaken the role of regionalist-nationalist leaders and they will find it
more difficult to invoke the Lahore Resolution for seeking more provincial
autonomy.

Q3:
Critically examine the Boundary Commission Report and critically
evaluate the role of Sir Cyril Radcliffe.
Analysis of the Boundary Commission Report

The Facts of the Award

The final boundary, known as the Radcliffe award, allotted some sixty-two
percent of the area of undivided Punjab to India, with fifty-five percent of the
population. The boundary ran from the border of Kashmir State south along the
Ujh River, leaving one tehsil of Gurdaspur District to Pakistan and allotting the
remainder to India. Where the Ujh met the Ravi River, the boundary followed the
Ravi southwest, until it met the existing administrative line dividing Amritsar
District from Lahore District. Radcliffe was careful to specify that the relevant
administrative boundaries, not the course of the Ujh or the Ravi, constituted the
new international boundary. The boundary then ran through Lahore District,
along tehsil and village boundaries, leaving the districts easternmost corner in
India. When the Radcliffe boundary met the Ferozepore District line, it turned to
follow the River Sutlej along the administrative boundary between Ferozepore
and Montgomery Districts. The Radcliffe line ended where it met the border of
Bahawalpur, a princely state whose ruler, like the Maharajah of Kashmir, had the
choice of acceding to Pakistan or India.
The primary feature of this line was that it divided Amritsar, now in India, from
Lahore, which went to Pakistan. By and large it followed major administrative
divisions, although it did meander between villages in the Kasur region southeast
of Lahore. The two most controversial elements of this line involved Gurdaspur
and Ferozepore. Pakistani critics interpreted Radcliffes decision to grant most of
Gurdaspur District to India as an attempt to provide India with a land link to
Kashmir. As one element of the beginnings of the Kashmir conflict, this allegation
remains controversial. It is worth noting that no all-weather road linked Kashmir
and India in 1947; when the first Indo-Pakistani war began in late 1947, India
airlifted troops and supplies into Kashmir rather than take an overland route. The

other controversy was over Ferozepores allocation to India; this decision came
as a surprise in the wake of early August leaks indicating that Radcliffe would
allocate a section of Ferozepore to Pakistan.
In accordance with Mountbatten, Nehru, and Jinnahs demands that he complete
his work before August 15, Radcliffe submitted his award on August 12. By this
time, Mountbatten had changed his mind (for reasons discussed below) and
asked Radcliffe to delay the award until after August 15. Radcliffe refused, but
Mountbatten had his way, choosing not to release the award until August 16,
when he discussed it with the Indian and Pakistani leaders at a meeting in New
Delhi. On August 17, the award was finally published.
Allegations of Bias
Throughout the difficult process of partition, accusations of official partiality
towards one group or another were leveled on all sides, not only in the popular
press but also by the leaders themselves. For example, Justice Munir of the
Punjab Commission accused Radcliffes top aide, Christopher Beaumont, of proHindus bias. Munir claimed that Beaumont intentionally misled Radcliffe in order
to achieve a result favorable to India. Beaumont rejects these charges as
ludicrous. The most contentious point was the Ferozepore border and the nearby
headworks. On August 8, Mountbattens private secretary, George Abell, sent a
letter with a preliminary description of the Punjab boundary to Evan Jenkins, the
provincial governor. This draft showed the Ferozepore area and its headworks
going to Pakistan. When the final award was released, Ferozepore was assigned
to India. Infuriated Pakistanis were sure that Nehru and Mountbatten had
pressured Radcliffe to change his line. After partition, each side leveled
accusations in the vernacular press that their opponents had successfully bribed
Radcliffe to take their part. Many were convinced that the Commissions were a
sham and that Mountbatten himself had simply dictated the new divisions. In his
final report as Viceroy, Mountbatten admitted, "I am afraid that there is still a
large section of public opinion in this country which is firmly convinced that I will
settle the matter finally." In 1992, Christopher Beaumont added his voice to the
chorus of accusations against Mountbatten. This circumstantial evidence
indicates that Mountbatten may well have influenced the final shape of the
boundary award.
I argue, however, that these allegations and angry resentments miss the point.
On the contrary, it would not be surprising if Mountbatten offered Radcliffe
advice, nor if Radcliffe took it. As one historian has noted, "Radcliffe was a
barrister following a brief"and Mountbatten was his client. Those who object to
Mountbattens interference are buying in to the myth that the partition was a
rational, objective process.
The Problem of "Other Factors"
One of the most difficult questions facing the Commissions was the respective
significance to assign to various "other factors." In his awards, Radcliffe himself
noted that "differences of opinion as to the significance of the term other
factors and as to the weight and value to be attached to these factors, made it
impossible to arrive at any agreed line." The Congress argued that the
unreliability of the 1941 census figures meant that "other factors" must be given
greater weight in the Punjab; the Muslim League maintained that the census

figures were valid and thus "other factors" could be all but ignored. Over the
years, observers have speculated on various factors that may have motivated
Radcliffe, including communal bias, pressure from Mountbatten, economic
considerations, prevailing administrative borders, defense needs, and existing
infrastructure.
Years later, Mountbatten offered this curious appraisal of Radcliffes reasoning:
"Ill tell you something ghastly. The reasons behind his award werent very deepseated at all. I am quite certain they were based on some rule of thumb about
the proportion of population." Given the fact the Mountbattens government gave
Radcliffe the mandate to focus on religious demographics, it seems odd that the
former Viceroy thought it "ghastly" that Radcliffe had not come up with "deeper"
reasons for drawing his lines. Mountbattens sentiment may indicate an
awareness among British officials that the categories they themselves had set up
were inadequate for the job at hand.
Even by Mountbattens standards, this statement about Radcliffes "rule of
thumb" is rather peculiar. Perhaps by the time Mountbatten gave this interview,
in the early 1970s, he had developed reservations about the partition process.
Until his death, Mountbatten staunchly defended his actions in 1947, making it
unlikely that he would openly question himself. However, Mountbatten had a
great capacity for remembering history differently than other observers,
invariably along lines most flattering to himself. Given Hodsons statement that it
was the viceroy himself who brought up the notion of "balance," one wonders
whether Mountbatten subconsciously transferred responsibility for his own idea
onto Radcliffes shoulders, before criticizing it. This speculation may seem rather
convoluted, but Mountbatten was a notably twisty individual. A colleague
famously told him, "Dickie, youre so crooked that if you swallowed a nail youd
shit a corkscrew!" Mountbattens biographer records that this was "a remark
which Mountbatten remembered and repeated, though characteristically
changing the recipient of the insult.
Some observers felt Radcliffe gave too much weight to economic considerations,
neglecting his mandate to determine the "contiguous majority areas" of religious
groups. For example, the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bengal were awarded to
Pakistan despite the fact that the Muslim population amounted to only three per
cent. When Nehru complained on August 16, Mountbatten explained Radcliffes
decision, emphasizing "the economic ties that bound Chit-tagong District and the
Hill Tracts together." Radcliffe apparently thought these economic necessities
more important than the overwhelmingly non-Muslim population.
Whenever possible, Radcliffe used existing administrative borders. The
commissions terms of reference directed it to draw its lines within the two
provinces of Bengal and Punjab, so the existing provincial administrative
boundaries were not an option. Within provinces, however, Radcliffe seems to
have preferred existing lines, using district, tehsil, thana, and even village
boundaries. His textual description of the boundary relies very little on "natural"
landmarks like crest or rivers. In the Punjab award, Radcliffe repeatedly notes
that although nearby rivers present apparently logical natural boundaries, the
new boundary must run along the existing district or tehsil borders.
Mountbatten recalled later that he had counseled Radcliffe "not to take defence
considerations under judgment in making the award." In a memo dated May 11,
1946, Field Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian

Armed Forces, discussed the repercussions of Partition for imperial and IndoPakistani defense. He concluded that without a united India, the British military
position in South Asia would be irreparably damaged. Furthermore, although he
considered the possibility of Indo-Pakistani conflict, he saw no way to define a
defensible frontier. Radcliffe himself seems to have consistently operated on the
assumption that India and Pakistan would have good relations after
independence. Other decision-makersand those impacted by the divisions
took this view as well. Radcliffe repeatedly expressed hope that India and
Pakistan could work together to solve some of the most difficult infrastructure
problems created by his boundary award. Mountbatten himself seemed
optimistic that inclusion in the Commonwealth would keep India and Pakistan on
mutually friendly terms, emphasizing that Dominion Status meant membership
in a community of cooperative nations.
Although the prominence of "other factors" in Radcliffes thinking remains
unclear, his awards demonstrate the importance of infrastructure considerations.
In both the Punjab and Bengal awards, Radcliffe discusses canals, headworks,
roads, railways, and ports before turning to population factors. In the Punjab
awards, he explicitly states that "there are factors such as the disruption of
railway communications and water systems that ought in this instance to
displace the primary claim of contiguous majorities." In the Bengal award, he
demonstrates a similar concern with maintaining "railway communications and
river systems," as well as preserving the relationship of the Nadia and Kulti river
systems with the port of Calcutta.
The irrigation systems and other infrastructure of Punjab and Bengal had been
built under a single administration. They were never intended to be divided. No
partition line Radcliffe could have concocted would have allowed Pakistan and
India to operate their infrastructure separately, without cross-border
interference. In the few weeks he had, Radcliffe seems to have tried to minimize
infrastructure disruptions, but he was well aware that his proposal was flawed. In
his attempt to draw the boundary near the Suleimanke headworks in Punjab, for
example, he emphasized that his intention was to award this equipment to
Pakistan and acknowledged that the reality of the terrain might necessitate that
"the boundary shall be adjusted accordingly." Several months later, the
Suleimanke headworks were "reallocated" in a clash between Indian and
Pakistani soldiers. In an optimistic moment, Radcliffe expressed the hope that "a
solution may be found by agreement between the two States for some joint
control of what has hitherto been a valuable common service." Events soon
proved this optimism unfounded.

The Boundary Announcement Delayed

Radcliffe had prepared his decision by August 12, as the various parties,
including Mountbatten, had insisted. As the transfer of power approached,
however, Mountbatten chose to delay the boundary announcement until after
the independence ceremonies. In public statements, Mountbatten insisted that

he simply wished to avoid spoiling the joyous celebration of independence by

announcing news that would undoubtedly distress all parties. However, in private
government communications and in the minutes of the Staff Meeting at which
the decision was taken, it becomes clear that Mountbattens primary motivation
was avoiding the appearance of British responsibility for the disorder that
inevitably would follow the announcement.
It is difficult to see how these concerns, either for Indian or Pakistani national joy
or for the evasion of British national responsibility, could outweigh the potential
benefit of making administrative, military, and constabulary arrangements
before the actual transfer of power took place. Governor Jenkins of the Punjab
had begged Mountbatten repeatedly for advance notice of the award. On July 30,
Jenkins told the Viceroy that "even a few hours would be better than none." As it
was, in some border regions whose destiny was uncertain, both Indian and
Pakistani flags were raised. In some cases Pakistani officials set to work in
territories that later became Indian. As August 15 drew closer, many
administrators joined the last-minute flow of refugees themselves, disrupting
administrative access across India by leaving their posts empty. In short, the
Punjab found itself in administrative chaos, ill prepared to deal with the impact of
partition.
When Mountbatten released the award to the Indian and Pakistani leaders on
August 16, both sides objected furiously to various aspects of the boundary. In
the end, they agreed to issue the decision as it stood, with no public statement
of their disappointment. When the award was finally announced, on 17 August,
the border forces in place were inadequate to stop the communal massacres.
Violence was particularly severe along the new border areas, although there was
serious bloodshed in Delhi as well. The first Indo-Pakistani war broke out in late
1947; both Pakistan and India sent troops into Kashmir, where they remain today.
Subsequent wars in 1965 and 1971 made it clear that Radcliffes boundaries
were not neat lines but raw and restless divisions.
Boundary Commission Format and Procedure and the role of Radcliffe
It was not until the summer of 1947 that British and South Asian leaders began
serious discussions about the format and procedure of a boundary commission.
All in all, however, the central parties agreed on all aspects of the Boundary
Commission arrangements with surprisingly little wrangling. There would be two
commissions, one for Bengal, in northeast India, and one for Punjab, in the
northwest. The same man, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, would chair both commissions.
Radcliffe was widely respected for his intellectual abilities, but he had never been
to India. Paradoxically, this fact made him a more attractive candidate, on the
theory that ignorance of India would equal impartiality. Each commission would
consist of four South Asian judges, two selected by Congress and two by the
League. In the end, this two-versus-two format and the judges strong political
biases produced deadlock, leaving Radcliffe the responsibility to make all the
most difficult decisions himself. The commissions terms of reference directed it
to "demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of
ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing
so, it will also take into account other factors." These terms, with their vague

reference to "other factors," allowed the Chairman enormous leeway. However,

after the final boundary decision, known as the "Radcliffe Award," was
announced, all sides complained that Radcliffe had not taken the right "other
factors" into account.
This structure limited the commissions effectiveness, but the most serious flaw
was the extremely tight timetable that the British Government, Congress, and
League imposed on the entire partition effort. Radcliffe arrived in India on July 8
and met with Mountbatten and the nationalist leaders soon thereafter. It was at
this meeting that Radcliffe learned, apparently for the first time, that the
boundary must be completed by August 15. He protested, but Mountbatten,
Nehru, and Jinnah stood firm. Despite warnings that the time restriction could
wreck the end result, they wanted the line finished by August 15.
Radcliffes efforts were further hampered by the fact that he was almost
completely ignorant of the information and procedures necessary to draw a
boundary, procedures that were well established by 1947. Moreover, he lacked
any advisors versed in even the basics of boundary-making, and only his private
secretary, Christopher Beaumont, was familiar with the realities of administration
and everyday life in the Punjab. Radcliffes South Asian colleagues, all legal
experts like himself, were as ignorant as their Chairman of boundary-making
requirements.
However, Radcliffe was not as unbiased, nor as ignorant, as the Indian leaders
assumed. On the contrary, his wartime experience as director-general of the
British Ministry of Information, along with his sound Establishment background,
left him intimately familiar with the goals and interests of His Majestys
Government. There is no evidence that Radcliffe was biased against Hindus,
Muslims, or Sikhs, but he was certainly biased in favor of preserving British
interests. As far as its undeclared political ends were concerned, then, the
Radcliffe Commission was well arranged. Unfortunately, the forces that shaped
the commission to fulfill political needs also prevented it from following wellestablished boundary-making procedures.
The commissions membership, composed entirely of legal experts, hampered its
boundary-making effort but added a valuable veneer of justice and legitimacy to
what was, in reality, a chaotic jumble of events. Its composition of equal
numbers of Congress and League nominees paved the way to deadlock but
created an appearance of political balance. The presence of these political
nominees came at the expense of the use of the necessary geographical experts,
but satisfied the demands of Congress, League, and of course the British
Government to have their own men on the commission. The absence of outside
participantsfor example, from the United Nationsalso satisfied the British
Governments urgent desire to save face by avoiding the appearance that it
required outside help to governor stop governingits own empire. The
Commissions extremely tight timetable made it impossible to gather the survey
and other information vital to a well-informed decision, but speedily provided all
parties with the international boundary that was a prerequisite for the transfer of
power.

Q4:
Discuss the role of Quaid-e-Azam in Indian politics till his fourteen
points.
Muhammad Ali Jinnah started his political career under the tutelage of
Pherozeshah Mehta and Gokhale. In 1900 joined the Bombay Presidency
Association, a party which cut across communal boundaries and had stalwarts
such as Dadbhai Naroji and Pherozshah Mehta at its helm.
In 1906, Jinnah joined the All India National Congress. He was a proud
Congressman and a radical patriot. Being of a constitutional frame of mind, he
abhorred violence and anti-constitutional measures as a means to achieve
political objectives and he chose to tread path of statesmen like Dadabhai
Naoroji, Gokhale and Banerjee. Even though Jinnah was amongst the
Moderates bloc of the Congress after their split in 1906, he had great regards
for Tilak, a member of the Extremist bloc of the Congress and even fought a case
of sedition lodged against him in 1908. The cooperation between the two led to
the re-unification of the Congress. In 1910, Jinnah was elected to the Imperial
Legislative Council where he raised the demand for self-government and served
on committees formulating schemes for constitutional reforms. Jinnah was a
polished debater, effective leaders and was even referred to as one of the last
Victorians of his age.
JINNAH: A DEVOTED NATIONALIST
I am a nationalist first, a nationalist second, and a nationalist last-Jinnah
Jinnah joined the Indian National Congress as it became a symbol of Indian
Nationalism and in his early years there were attributes of a leader present in
him as his patriotic spirit, courage and independence were unmatched. Jinnah
was a staunch supporter of liberalism and believed in achieving self-governance
by peaceful, legitimate and constitutional means. He must have been amongst
the few nationalist leaders never to have been arrested on any account. He
abhorred violence and bloodshed and chose to be with the Moderates of the
Congress. He upheld the ideals of his leader, Gokhale, and is said to have desired
to be a Muslim Gokhale of sorts.
It is believed that under the guidance of his mentor, Gokhale, he joined the
Muslim League in 1913. In his statement to justify whether his loyalties had
shifted, the Quaid has made his position clear by stating:
Loyalty to Muslim League and Muslim interest would in no way and at no time
imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which I was
dedicated
He was strong supporter of the activities of the Congress those days and
considered Congress to be the solution to the troubles of India. His aim was to
change the pro-British stance of the League and to garner acceptance for
Congress amongst the Muslims of India. His work at the All India Congress
continued irrespective of his association with the League, and he presided over
the Bombay Provincial Political Congress Conference at Ahmedabad which
resulted in the re-unification of the Congress and an end to the extremistmoderate divide present in the party.
However, his legacy as a Congressman is more known because of the Lucknow
Pact of 1916 between the All India Congress and Muslim League, Jinnah being the
moving spirit and architect of the pact. The repudiation of the same Pact later on

by the Congress on the basis of fear of a deadlock in legislature or latent Hindu

communalism, as was perceived by the Muslims was a major reason for the split
in the two parties, two communities, ideology of Jinnah and one of the basis for
the creation of a new nation.
The pact provided for 1/3rd representation in central government and separate
electorates for communities unless they demanded joint electorate.
The pact incorporated the demands of both the parties with regards to the
colonial government as it called for elected members to be in majority (4/5th )
over nominated members (1/5th). The pact was a significant move for both the
parties and its perception as merely being a concession to Muslim demands is a
biased view of the same. Jinnah played a dominating role in politics in this time
period, as he prepared the draft constitution for India and ensure its adoption by
both parties. He even joined the Home Rule League and became the President of
the Bombay Branch of the same with an intention to mobilise the masses and
not restrict the freedom movement to a few elites. He mobilized masses in order
to awaken and arouse them but his main aim being to ensure that the
government conceded his demands. Jinnah, unlike Gandhi, did not wholeheartedly support the British during the war and criticised the heavy recruitment
of Indian men in the army. Jinnah commented upon the British activities by
stating that:
We cannot ask our young men to fight for principles, the application of which is
denied to their own country.
He along with Tilak even dared to raise awareness amongst British public and
other Home Rulers in England to win over the approval of Indian demands. India
for Indians used to be Jinnahs basic argument in every debate on any issue in
the Legislative Council. He protested vehemently against the Rowlatt Bills
labelling them Black Bills, calling British uncivilized for enforcing such laws
and resigned in protest from the Legislative Council against the same when they
were enforced as he chose not to compromise his office for any post or office.
The Jalliawala Bagh massacre had left a scar on Jinnah and he condemned the
actions of the government. He considered that peace celebrations organised by
the British were a mockery of the lives lost in Punjab and refused the invitation of
the All India Khilafat Conference to participate in peace celebrations at a time
when the grievances of the people in Punjab were still unhealed. Jinnah
disagreed with the non-cooperation movement launched by Gandhi as he chose
not to depart from his principles of constitutionalism and liberalism. He was not
the only Nationalist to raise his voice against the Non-cooperation movement as
Tagore also saw the campaign as the danger of mental despotism.
His aversion to Gandhian politics cannot be construed as a deviance from the
national cause but rather a stand for freedom in a different manner. This resulted
in him parting ways from the Congress in 1920 but parting from the Congress
cannot be construed as his departure from the principles of secularism and
nationalism which he chose to upheld as a party member. Even after his election
victory in 1923 as an independent candidate for the Central Legislative
Assembly, he closely worked with the Swarajist bloc, a party led by Motilal Nehru
who were against boycott of legislature, and continued to pursue the
constitutional way to bring reforms in India. His parting of the ways with
Congress in no manner meant his departure from the duties he owed to the
nation. As has been stated by Shiva Rao, No Muslim leader was more genuine in
endorsing the national demand than Jinnah was in the twenties. He even
advocated for the Indianization of the British Indian Army and his advocacy for

the Steel Industry (Protection) Bill, which was to give bounty to Tata Iron and
Steel Works in Jamshedpur, to ensure a well-established steel industry are clear
examples of his patriotism.
Jinnah was a liberalist in every aspect and fought for the meagre rights provided
in the colonial set up. He defended Indian revolutionaries with whom he
disagreed on ideological grounds. It is evidenced by his statements in favour of
B.G. Horniman, editor of the Bombay Chronicle, who was deported by stating
that
The liberty of man is the dearest thing in the law of any constitution and should
not be taken away in any fashion
Jinnah was not averse to the Congress even after his departure from the same
and was part of an initiative in 1924 which called to unite all political parties. He
even made efforts to unite parties and provide a new orientation in 1925 but the
prejudice amongst the leaders could not ensure the success of such an initiative.
Despite failures to unite political parties, he continued to be part of national
politics as an uncompromised nationalist and was vociferous in his arguments
against the Simon Commission. His stance against the Commission even led to
the division in the Muslim League and thus to the formation of a bloc of Muslim
leaders lead by Mohammed Shafi who chose to cooperate with the Commission.
In an attempt to unite both Congress and Muslim League, Jinnah attended the All
Parties Conference to do away with the perception present in Muslim mind with
regard to the fear of Hindu dominance but his views were not shared by his
contemporaries.
Jinnah supported the participation in the Round Table Conference convened by
the Imperial government and saw it as his duty and opportunity to advocate his
viewpoint to the British, a dream to achieve self-rule by constitutional means,
i.e., negotiated settlement. On the failure of the Round Table Conferences Jinnah
decided to quit Indian politics and practice law at London. In in his return to
politics three years later, there is a shift in his politics and he became a critic of
the Congress, labelling them as communal Hindu organisation. There was still
scope for reconciliation between the two parties as was clearly evidenced by his
statements in early 1939 where he said:
Real victory for the Congress will be when you will stretch your hand across and
remove the barrier between this party and that party
The Congress questioned the representative character of Jinnah and instead of
accepting the nationalist and his views for a united India, they pushed him into
the lap of the separatist. His demand was to be recognised as the sole
spokesperson of the Muslims and he took offence to the election of Maulana
Azad by the Congress as its President. His goals throughout his life were meant
to liberate his nation and till the end days of his life, he considered himself to be
a nationalist.
AMBASSADOR OF HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY
He has the true stuff in him and that freedom from all sectarian prejudice which
will make him the best ambassador of the Hindu-Muslim unity-Gokhale
The efforts of Jinnah to establish communal harmony and provide a common
venture for the two major political parties resulted in the form of the Lucknow
Pact of 1916. Jinnah followed the principles of his mentors, Gokhale and
Dadabhai, and laid stress on Hindu-Muslim unity. His belief was that the

foundation of the Congress party were on the basis of equal treatment of all
communities and no reservation shall be made for any community. He opposed
the partition of Bengal and thought the division of the province would lead to
further strife between the communities. He vehemently opposed communal
electorate and was against its inclusion in Morley-Minto reforms. His strong ties
within the Congress and his fight for Muslims Wakfs (Trust) Bill in 1913 through
the Viceroys council won him widespread praise.
The Quaid was staunchly against the British and their divisive politics and the
happenings in other Muslim countries aroused the Indian Muslims and the
attitude of both the communities with regards to the British were moving
towards a common goal. The English were trying to take the League away from
the Congress but the daunting leader sought to bring them closer. With regard to
the fear of Hindu dominance, he stated that:
This is a bogey which is put before you by your enemies to frighten you, to
scare you away from the cooperation with the Hindus which is essential for the
establishment of self-government.
He is said to have reiterated that the key to progress in India lay in goodwill,
concord, harmony and cooperation between the two sister-communities in order
to produce a force which no power on earth can resist. The separate electorate
was construed as being disrespectful to the Muslim community as well as
demoralising for the State and emphasized upon them to rise above being at the
mercy of the British and learn to have self-respect. The five years of association
between Jinnah and the League, their proximity with the English was replaced
with a new-found friendship with the Congress.
For Jinnah, unity must exist amongst the two communities for the growth of the
nation but disagreed with the Gandhian way of seeking unity and salvation and
thus, opposed the Khilafat Movement. The involvement of religion into politics
and the spiritualizaion of the freedom movement by Gandhi was feared by
Jinnah. During the years of Gandhis retirement from national politics, after the
failure of the Khilafat and the Non-cooperation movement, there was a rise in the
number of religiously guided political parties and use of religious symbols in the
movement. Movements such as the shuddhi and the tabligh created further rift
between the two communities and the efforts of leaders such as Tilak, Dadabhai,
Gokhale and Jinnah were all in vain. The support of Gandhi for the Khilafat
movement was looked down upon by Jinnah as the issue of Khilafat had nothing
to do with the struggle for Swaraj and in his view the mingling of religion and
politics was a lethal combination.
The period after 1922 saw the rise of Hindu Mahasabha as a national party and
further division between the two communities. During this period, rioting was on
the rise and literature was published by communal forces on each side to further
disrupt the harmony within the communities. Communal atmosphere gave rise to
the politics of murder. In these troubling times, Jinnah declared a call for peace
and abhorred those who in the name of Islam committed such heinous crimes.
He even put forth the Delhi Proposal which called for a separation of Sindh
province from Bombay in return for Muslims accepting joint electorate but
maintaining their demand for 33 % representation at the Central Legislature. His
proposals were viewed as an attempt to revive Pan-Islamism by many but he
reiterated his stance as a nationalist and his loyalty to India as a foremost
priority. He believed in the ideals of liberalism and maintained throughout his life
that religious freedom should never be compromised at any cost. His demand for

a Sindhs separation was based on demographics. Muslims in India formed 23%

of the population and 23% of the population of Sindh was Hindus.
His view of Sindh as a miniature India and the toleration present in the land on
account of the proximity between Sufiism and Hindu Vendanta provided for an
opportunity to set an example for Hindu-Muslim unity. He thought of mobilising
the Muslims in Sindh to improve the Muslim Leagues footing in India and by
providing an example for unity between the two communities under his party
rule. Jinnahs policies and the Delhi proposals were heavily criticised by the
Muslims as well as many of them feared that the joint electorates were the
essence of their representation in a nation where they were in a minority and
denounced him for coming to an understanding with the Congress. A Punjab
daily, Muslim Outlook, carried many editorials which characterised the Delhi
proposals as a disastrous step.
In August 1928, a committee appointed by the All Parties Conference put forward
the Nehru Report, as it was headed by Motilal Nehru, to determine the principles
of the Constitution of India. The committee report heavily criticised the Lucknow
Pact and stated that separate electorates were bad for the national spirit:
A minority must remain a minority whether any seats are reserved for it or not.
The report rejected fears of Muslims being dominated by a Hindu majority and
considered it to be illogical. Jinnah suggested a few amendments to the
committee report such as the demand for one-third representation at Central
Legislature, residuary power of provinces over centre and Muslim representation
in Bengal and Punjab should be on population basis. Jinnah hoped for the
Congress to concede to his few demands for the greater good of the nationalist
struggle but the rise of religion in politics had taken over even the best of men.
His suggestions were rejected and his reaction to the same was stated in one
sentence:
This is the parting of the ways.
He drafted his own 14-point constitution which talked about India as a federation
with provinces having residuary powers. In his 14 point constitution he made a
case for federation in order to attract provincial support and at the same time
mentioned adequate representation for the minorities be it Hindus or Muslims in
the provinces. He wished to reduce the dominance of Muslim politics by Bengalis
and Punjabis by arguing for 3 new Muslim provinces to reduce their power and
vociferously supported religious liberty unconditionally. The 14-point constitution
can be seen as an attempt by Jinnah to regain favour amongst his community
members as he feared that there was no sense of security for the Muslims and
was dejected by the apathy of the other national parties. This 14-point
constitution was an answer by Jinnah to his critics in the Muslim community and
was an attempt to unite Muslims of India under one umbrella and to free them
from their differences on the basis of sect. The 14 points can be seen as a stick
to encourage Congress to grant Jinnahs more conservative political goals as the
document contained many demands not especially important to Jinnah such as
his demand for Muslim representation in cabinets all over India which he would
concede easily without damaging his support base in the Muslim community.

Q5:
Critically examine the proposals of Cabinet Mission Plan. Why did the
Muslim League first agree and then reject the plan?
Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India on February 19, 1946,
announced in Parliament that a special mission consisting of three Cabinet
ministers, in association with the Viceroy, would proceed to India, in order to hold
discussions with the Indian leaders. The three Cabinet ministers would be Pethick
Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander.
Cripps told the press conference on landing at Karachi on March 23 that the
purpose of the mission was "to get machinery set up for framing the
constitutional structure in which the Indians will have full control of their destiny
and the formation of a new interim government." The Mission arrived in Delhi on
March 24 and left on June 29.
Jinnah faced extreme difficulties in the three-month-long grueling negotiations
with the Cabinet Mission. The first of these was the continued delicate state of
his health. At a critical stage of the negotiations, he went down with bronchitis
and ran temperature for ten days. But he never gave up the fight and battled till
the end of the negotiations.
Secondly, the Congress was still much stronger than the Muslim League as a
party. "They have the best organized -- in fact the only well-organized -- political
machine; and they command almost unlimited financial support they can always
raise mob passion and mob support and could undoubtedly bring about a very
serious revolt against British rule."-- Mountbatten's "Report on the Last
Viceroyalty".
Thirdly, The Congress had several powerful spokesmen, while for the League
Jinnah had to carry the entire burden of advocacy single-handedly.
Fourthly, the Mission was biased heavily in favor of the Congress. Secretary of
State Pethick-Lawrence and Cripps, the sharpest brains among them, made no
secret of their personal friendship for the Congress leaders.
Wavell was much perturbed by Pethick-Lawrence's and Cripps's private contacts
with the Congress leaders and the deference they showed to Gandhi.
Finally, Jinnah suffered from the disadvantage that it was the Muslim League, a
minority party, which alone demanded Pakistan. The Congress, the smaller
minorities and the British Government including the comparatively fair-minded
Wavell with whom the final decision lay, were all strongly opposed to the
partition of British India.
Quaid-i-Azam the constitutionalist took appropriate steps to strengthen his hand
as the spokesman of the Muslim League. He convened a meeting of the Muslim
League Working Committee at Delhi (4-6 April 1946) which passed a resolution
that "the President alone should meet the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy.
This was immediately followed by an All India Muslim Legislator's Convention.
Nearly 500 members of the Provincial and Central Legislatures who had recently
been elected on the Muslim League ticket from all parts of India attended it. It
was the first gathering of its kind in the history of Indian politics and was called
by some "the Muslim Constituent Assembly". In his presidential address, Jinnah

said that the Convention would lay down "once and for all in equivocal terms
what we stand for".
A resolution passed unanimously by the Convention (the "Delhi Resolution")
stated that no formula devised by the British Government for transferring power
to the peoples of India would be acceptable to the Muslim nations unless it
conformed to the following principles:
That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-East and the Punjab,
North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the North-West of India,
namely Pakistan, zones where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be
constituted into a sovereign independent State and that an unequivocal
undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay.
The two separate constitution-making bodies be set up by the people of Pakistan
and Hindustan for the purpose of framing their respective Constitutions.
That the acceptance of the Muslim League demand of Pakistan and its
implementation without delay are the sine qua non for Muslim League
cooperation and participation in the formation of an Interim Government at the
Center.
That any attempt to impose a Constitution on a united-India basis or to force any
interim arrangement at the Center contrary to the Muslim League demand will
leave the Muslims no alternative but to resist any such imposition by all possible
means for their survival and national existence.
This impressive show of strength, staged in the very city where the members of
the Cabinet Mission were quartered, demonstrated to the Mission and to all the
others that the 100 million Muslims of India were solidly behind the demand for
Pakistan and further that the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was their
undisputed supreme leader.
The Mission began their talks by first informing themselves of the views of the
different leaders and parties. When they found the view-points of the League and
the Congress irreconcilable, they gave a chance to the parties to come to an
agreement between themselves. This included a Conference at Simla (5-12 May),
popularly known as the Second Simla Conference, to which the Congress and the
League were each asked to nominate four delegates for discussions with one
another as well as with the Mission. When it became clear that the parties would
not be able to reach a concord, the Mission on May 16, 1946, put forward their
own proposals in the form of a Statement.
Azad, the president of the Congress, conferred with the Mission on April 3 and
stated that the picture that the Congress had of the form of government in future
was that of a Federal Government with fully autonomous provinces with
residuary powers vested in the units. Gandhi met the Mission later on the same
day. He called Jinnah's Pakistan "a sin" which he, Gandhi, would not commit.
At the outset of his interview with the Mission on April 4 the Quaid was asked to
give his reason why he thought Pakistan a must for the future of India. He replied
that never in long history these was "any Government of India in the sense of a
single government". He went on to explain the irreconcilable social and cultural
differences between the Hindus and the Muslims and argued, "You cannot make
a nation unless there are essential uniting forces. How are you to put 100 million
Muslims together with 250 million people whose way of life is so different? No

government can ever work on such a basis and if this is forced upon India it must
lead us on to disaster."
The Second Simla Conference having failed to produce an agreed solution, on
May 16, the Mission issued its own statement.
The Cabinet Mission broadcast its plan worldwide from New Delhi on Thursday
night, May 16, 1946. It was a last hope for a single Indian union to emerge
peacefully in the wake of the British raj. The statement reviewed the "fully
independent sovereign state of Pakistan" option, rejecting it for various reasons,
among which were that it "would not solve the communal minority problem" but
only raise more such problems. The basic form of the constitution recommended
was a three-tier scheme with a minimal central union at the top for only foreign
affairs, defense and communication, and Provinces at the bottom, which "should
be free to form Groups with executive and legislatures," with each group being
empowered to "determine the Provincial subjects to be taken in common". After
ten years any Province could, by simple majority vote, "call for a reconsideration
of the terms of the constitution". Details of the new constitution were to be
worked out by an assembly representing "as broad based and accurate" a cross
section of the population of India as possible. An elaborate method of assuring
representation of all the communities in power structure was outlined with due
consideration given to the representation of states as well as provinces.
The Quaid replied on the 19th , asking the Viceroy if the proposals were final or
whether they were subject to change or modification, and he also sought some
other clarification. The Viceroy promptly furnished the necessary explanations. It
seemed as if the Quaid would accept the Viceroy's proposals. The Congress
Working Committee met in Delhi on June 25 and by a resolution rejected the
proposals, as "Congressmen can never give up the national character of the
Congress or accept an artificial and unjust party, or agree to the veto of a
communal group." Azad sent a copy of the resolution to the Viceroy and in his
covering letter protested against the non-inclusion of a Muslim-Congressman
from the Congress quota.
After the Congress stand had become known, the Working Committee of the
Muslim League resolved to join the Interim Government, in accordance with the
statement of the Viceroy dated 16th June. The interpretation of the Quaid-i-Azam
was that if the Congress rejected the proposals, the League accepted them, or
vice versa, the Viceroy would go ahead and form the interim Government
without including the representatives of the party that decided to stand out. But
the interpretation of the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission was different from that
of the Quaid-i-Azam.
It became clear that the protracted negotiations carried out for about three
months by the Cabinet Mission did not materialize in a League-Congress
understanding, or in the formation of an interim Government. Towards the end of
June, the Cabinet Mission left for England, their task unfulfilled.
It had, however not been a complete failure. It was clear to the Indians that the
acceptance of the demand for Pakistan would be an integral part of any future
settlement of the Indian problem. In the meantime the League and the Congress
were getting ready for elections to the Constituent Assembly.
Cabinet Mission was the final effort by British to end the deadlock among
political parties of India. Cabinet Mission Plan suggested for about three
proposals. After the rejection of first two suggestions the third idea was accepted
by both Congress and Muslim League. This proposal said that partition of India

would be based on communal lines i.e. Hindu majority areas for Hindus and the
vice-versa. Though it rejected the idea of Pakistan still it was a good sign that the
Muslim rights were protected against Hindu majority and they were allowed to
live independent at least from Hindus.
Another important provision Cabinet Mission carried was its suggestion that
territory of each community would be at freedom to retain complete autonomy
and authority. In this way it fulfilled the British promise they had with Indians
during WWII to grant self-rule. These autonomous territories were also allowed to
frame out their own constitution. Such a regional independence in dealing local
affairs had never been granted before.