SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT V MAGSALIN

GR No. 172303, June 6, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL is a duly
registered union and the certified bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees of Hyatt Regency Manila Inc. Hyatts General Manager, David C.
Pacey, issued a Memorandum informing all hotel employees that hotel security
have been instructed to conduct a thorough bag inspection and body frisking in
every entrance and exit of the hotel. He enjoined employees to comply
therewith.
On February 3, 2001, Angelito Caragdag, a waiter at the hotels Cafe Al Fresco
restaurant and a director of the union, refused to be frisked by the security
personnel on two occasions. After finding his explanation to be
unsatisfactory, HRD imposed on him penalty of reprimand and suspended him
for three days, in accordance with the hotels Code of Discipline.
On another occasion, he was held liable for Offenses Subject to Disciplinary
Action (OSDA) 3.01 of the hotels Code of Discipline, i.e., threatening,
intimidating, coercing, and provoking to a fight your superior for reasons
directly connected with his discharge of official duty. He was suspended for 7
days.
Still later, on March 2, 2001, Caragdag committed another infraction and was
held liable for violating OSDA 3.07, i.e., leaving work assignment during official
working hours without prior permission from the department head or
immediate superior, and suspended him for three days.
Because of the succession of infractions he committed, the HRD also required
Caragdag to explain. However, despite notice of the scheduled hearing, both
Caragdag and the Union President failed to attend. Thereafter, the investigating
board resolved on the said date to dismiss Caragdag for breach of company
rules and regulations.
Caragdags dismissal was questioned by petitioner, and the dispute was
referred to voluntary arbitration upon agreement of the parties.
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that the dismissal was valid. However,
due to humanitarian considerations, it ordered financial assistance. Petitioner
assailed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator before the CA in a petition
for certiorari which was dismissed outright for being the wrong remedy.

The CA explained that Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
explicitly provides that the proper mode of appeal from judgments, final
orders or resolution of voluntary arbitrators is through a Petition for Review
which should be filed within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of notice of
judgment, order or resolution of the voluntary arbitrator. Considering that
petitioner intended the petition to be a Petition for Certiorari, the Court
hereby resolves to dismiss the petition outright for being an improper mode
of appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy for assailing the decision of Voluntary
Arbitrator is a petition for certiorari.
RULING:
No. Decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via
petition for review under Rule 43. Hence, upon receipt of the Voluntary
Arbitrators Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration,
petitioner should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day
reglementary period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cogent
reason in this case to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules of procedure
exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal
construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be
disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the
convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of
substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they
help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard
following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our
system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the
parties of the procedural rules.
PANAY RAILWAYS INC VS HEVA MANAGEMENT and DEVELOPMENT
Facts: Panay railways contracted real estate mortgage covering several
parcels of land to Trade Royal Bank (TRB) for 20 million pesos. Subsequently
Panay railways failed to pay the amount mentioned and thus the mortgage
was extra judicially foreclosed by the TRB. Subsequently a Certificate of sale
was issued to TRB being the highest bidder and the sales was registered in

the Registry of Deeds and was annotated at the back of the transfer
certificate of title. Panay railways failed to redeem the property prompting
the TRB to move for consolidation of title and there after a new TCT was
issued in their name. Later on TRB filed for writ of possession against the
petitioner of the subject property which petitioner did not contest in fact the
petitioner guaranteed the peaceful possession of TRB of the subject property.
The problem arose when the petitioner discovered that some of the
properties were foreclosed that were not covered with the mortgage
contract, which in turn led to them filing a complaint for partial annulment of
the sale and conveyance of the property with damages. Respondent on the
other hand avered in its motion to dismiss that petitioner (1) petitioner had
no legal capacity to sue; (2) there was a waiver, an abandonment and an
extinguishment of petitioners claim or demand; (3) petitioner failed to state
a cause of action; and (4) an indispensable party, namely TRB, was not
impleaded.
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order[6] granting the Motion to Dismiss
of respondents. It held that the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner
was a judicial admission of TRBs ownership of the disputed properties. This
admission thus operated as a waiver barring petitioner from claiming
otherwise. On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without
paying the necessary docket fees. Immediately thereafter, respondents filed
a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees. In
its Opposition,[7] petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet familiar with
the revisions of the Rules of Court that became effective only on 1 July 1997.
Its representative was likewise not informed by the court personnel that
docket fees needed to be paid upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal.
Furthermore, it contended that the requirement for the payment of docket
fees was not mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal interpretation
of the procedural rules on appeals. On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued
an Order[8] dismissing the appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41[9] of the Revised
Rules of Court. Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the
Order[10] alleging that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case after the
former had filed the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner also alleged that the court
erred in failing to relax procedural rules for the sake of substantial justice. On
25 November 1997, the RTC denied the Motion.[11]
On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial court had acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied procedural rules.

On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision[12] on the Petition. It

held that while the failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful
fees within the reglementary period was a ground for the dismissal of the
appeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
jurisdiction to do so belong to the CA and not the trial court. Thus, appellate
court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the appeal and set aside the latters assailed Order dated 29 September
1997. Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration. It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CAs
Decision, this Court issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which
took effect on 1 May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The circular expressly provided that trial
courts may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss an appeal for being filed
out of time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period. Subsequently, Circular No. 48-2000[13] was issued on
29 August 2000 and was addressed to all lower courts. By virtue of the
amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the questioned Orders of the trial
court by issuing the assailed Amended Decision[14] in the present Petition
granting respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
The CAs action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given retroactive effect.
It also alleged that the CA should consider the case as exceptionally
meritorious. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rexes V. Alejano, explained that he was
yet to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court, which became
effective a little over a month before he filed the Notice of Appeal. He was
thus not aware that the nonpayment of docket fees might lead to the
dismissal of the case.
Eventually the CA issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
Issue: Did CA committed grave abuse of discretion sustaining the RTCs
dismissal of the notice of appeal alleging that the CA has exclusive
jurisidiction of the notice of appeal and that while dismissible it should be
relaxed for the substance of justice.
Held.
NO. Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not

preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive

application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither
is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has
been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil
or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.
The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the
appeal has no merit. When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule
41 through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTCs dismissal of the action may be
considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the CA committed
no reversible error when it sustained the dismissal of the appeal, taking note
of its directive on the matter prior to the promulgation of its Decision. As
early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia, [17] we have held that the payment of
the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection
of an appeal.The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees.[18] Moreover, the right to appeal is
not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with the law
DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit