Grounds for disciplinary

proceedings against judges

and justices
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics
Arellano University School of Law Arellano Law Foundation

2015-2016

Resolution to protect members of

judiciary from baseless complaints
First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the applicability
of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, a Resolution Prescribing Measures to
Protect Members of the Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded
Administrative Complaints, which took effect on November 3,
2003.
Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious
administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary
for purposes of harassment, we issued said Resolution, which
provides:

Cont

2. If the complaint is
(a)filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or
Judge;
(b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before such
filing; and
(c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must
forthwith be recommended for dismissal.

Cont
If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator
must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10)
days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a
report and recommendation not later than thirty (30) days from
receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the
recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of
the respondent, or, if it is not possible to do so, within six (6)
months from such date without prejudice to the release of the
retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to
be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of
action alleged in the complaint.

Power of the Supreme Court

Article 8 Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Philippine Constitution 1987

By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can

oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all
laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers. Maceda v. Hon.

Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993

Competence to review a judicial order

or decision belongs to the Court
No other entity or official of the Government, not the
prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not
any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial
order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and
pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or
order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.- De Vera v.

Pelayo, 335 SCRA 281(2000)

Powers, functions, and duties of the

Office of the Ombudsman
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public
official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety
in the performance of duties.
xxx
7

Ombudsman Act of 1989 [R.A. 6770]

Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute
on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases.

xxx

xxx

Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions.- The Office of

the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may
be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.
8

When criminal complaint against a Judge or

other court employee arises from their
administrative duties
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court
employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court
employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
- Maceda v. Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781. April 22,

1993

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could

entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge's certification submitted to
the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can,
whether a referral should be made first to the
Supreme Court.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of
petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination
of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending
case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a
determination.
The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its
personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. - Maceda v. Hon.

Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993

10

Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an

investigation over the acts of a judge in the exercise
of his official functions alleged to be in violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the
absence of an administrative charge for the same acts
before the Supreme Court.
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal
or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner
judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action. - Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-

Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001

11

Whether the MTC can take cognizance of a complaint of

reckless imprudence against an incumbent judge
pending the resolution of an administrative complaint
arising from the same facts
On January 31, 2003, complainant filed a letter complaint before the
Ombudsman-Vizayas, charging Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia, then Presiding
Judge of the MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental with the crime
of murder and the administrative offenses of grave misconduct and
abuse of authority.
The complaint arose from the death of complaianants husband, on
November 12, 2002, as a result of a vehicular mishap between a Toyota
Land Cruiser driven by Judge Garcia and the motorcycle driven by the
deceased.
The Graft Investigation Officer found the existence of probable cause for
the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide and
recommended the filing of the corresponding charges against Judge
Garcia.

12

Cont

Judge Garcia filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the

following grounds:xxx; (2) that the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged and over his person;
and,xxx.
Petitioner [ judge] argues that respondents violated this Courts
pronouncements in Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman, directing the
Ombudsman to refer all cases against judges and court
personnel filed before his office to the Supreme Court; and, in
Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, restricting not
only the Ombudsman and the prosecution arm of the
government, but also other official and functionary thereof
in initiating or investigating judges and court personnel.

13

Held
In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against petitioner was
in no way related to the performance of his duties as a
judge.
From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal charges against
the petitioner before the MCTC was warranted by the above
circumstances.
To reiterate, the case filed against petitioner before the MCTC is
a criminal case under its own jurisdiction as prescribed by law
and not an administrative case. To be sure, trial courts retain
jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by
judges of the lower courts. Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 167409,

March 20, 2009

14

When to file administrative case

against judges
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial
remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and
exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are prerequisites for the taking of other measures against the persons
of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or
criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. -

Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311. October 3, 2003

15

Cont
Prosecution of the judge can be had only if there be a final
declaration by a competent court in some appropriate
proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the
challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of malice or
bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of
the judge in rendering said judgment or order or under the
stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311. October 3, 2003

16

Anonymous complaint
First, we clear the objection of respondent judge that the lettercomplaint should not be given due course because it is only
anonymous. Section 1, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that the disciplinary proceedings against judges and
justices may be instituted under either of three ways:
1. by the Supreme Court motu proprio;
2. upon a verified complaint; or
3. upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public
records of indubitable integrity.
Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Gedorio, A.M. No.

RTJ-05-1955, May 25, 2007

17

Lack of verification is
only a formal defect
As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not
have taken cognizance of the complaint because the lettercomplaint was not verified, as required in Rule 139-B, 1 of the
Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys,
suffice it to say that such constitutes only a formal defect and
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject
matter of the complaint. "The verification is merely a formal
requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which
are alleged are true and correct the court may simply order
the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive
strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice
may be served." (Fernandez v. Atty. Novero Jr., A.C. No. 5394,
December 02, 2002)

18

Effect of retirement of respondent judge

Respondent's retirement from office did not render the present
administrative case moot and academic. Neither does it free him
from liability. (Lagcao v. Judge Gako, A.M. RTJ-04-1840, August
2, 2007)

19

Death of respondent judge

The dismissal of the administrative case against Judge Butacan
by reason of his demise is in accordance with Bote v. Judge
Eduardo where the Court held that in view of the death of
Judge Escudero, for humanitarian reasons, it is inappropriate to
impose any administrative liability of a punitive nature; and
declared the administrative complaint against the respondent
Judge, dismissed, closed and terminated. - RE: Application for
retirement/gratuity benefits xxx., A.M. No. 12535-ret., April
22, 2008

20

Judge also liable if court employee

fraternized with litigant
Unfortunately, these standards were not met by respondent
Judge Alagar in this case having tolerated unknowingly his
employee to fraternize, receive or give personal favors no
matter how small, with party litigants in a case pending before
his sala.
Thus, while this Court finds the respondent Judge to have acted
with impartiality and propriety in dealing with the complainants
in Criminal Case No. 4252 , we find fault on his part in
failing to supervise the conduct and behavior of his court
employee for the latters improper use of his vehicle, to the
detriment of the courts image. - Balderama v. Judge Alagar,

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1449. January 18, 2002

21

Having lunch with counsel

For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel is not wrong
per se. The Canons, however, provides that as much as possible
he should be scrupulously careful to avoid any suspicion that his
social or business or friendly relationship is an element in
determining his judicial course. Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr.,
is counsel of the petitioner in an annulment case pending
before him, the respondent judge should have thought twice
about joining counsel for lunch, especially in the courtroom at
that. - Pertierra v. Judge Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799.

September 12, 2003

22

Private phone call to litigant

prohibited
If at all, the judge could have only been guilty of judicial
indiscretion or impropriety when he admittedly made a private
phone call to, or sent for, the complainant, and talked to him in
the chambers.
It need not be overemphasized that making private phone
calls to, sending for and talking to the complainant in the
judges chambers, as in this case, undermines even more the
peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. - Dacera, Jr. v.

Judge Dizon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. August 2, 2000

23

Effect of reconciliation of the parties

The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative
proceeding does not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear
the administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in
administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal injury of
the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may
have been committed against the public service. (Flores v.
Judge Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499, October 6, 2008)

24

Conviction in a criminal case

Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not
necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the
respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the
dismissal of the administrative case.
Conversely, conviction in the criminal case will not automatically
warrant a finding of guilt in the administrative case. We
emphasize the well-settled rule that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, and each must
be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to
it. In other words, the disposition in the first two will not
necessarily govern the third, and vice versa. (Velasco v. Judge

Adoracion G. Angeles A.M. No. RTJ-05-1908, August 15,

2007)

25

Effect of resignation from office

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by
the Court without prejudice does not render moot and
academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that
the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge
by his resignation and its consequent acceptance without
prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the
pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority to
pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the
charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications. (Non-disclosure before the JBC of the

administrative case filed against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC

no. 013, August 22, 2007)

26

Grounds for outright dismissal

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring
judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from
the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice;
(2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year
before such filing; and
(3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the
respondent. (Miguel Colorado v. Judge Ricardo M.

Agapito, A.M. no. MTJ-06-1658, July 3, 2007)

27

Warning is not a penalty

A warning, however, no matter how stern, is not a penalty. -

Rosauro M. Miranda v. Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang, Sr., A.M.

No. RTJ-01-1665, November 29, 2001

28

Gross ignorance of the law

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision,
order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official
duties must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the case before
us, the administrative complaint does not even allege that the
erroneous decision of respondent was thus motivated. - Sps.

Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447.

September 27, 2000

29

Rendering an unjust judgment

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal
and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished under
Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of which are:
(a) the offender is a judge;
(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for
decision;
(c) the judgment is unjust; and
(d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust.
The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be
rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be
unjust. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-

1447. September 27, 2000

30

There is no liability at all for a mere

error
An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not
supported by evidence or both. The source of an unjust judgment
may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere error.
It is well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error
which he commits, provided he acts in good faith.
Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in rendering
judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the
sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been
actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or
some other similar motive. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad,

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

31

Cont
Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the
law does not constitute the crime. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge

Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

32

When good faith will not be applied

We need not belabor jurisprudence to accommodate
respondents argument which in effect posits that not every
judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative
sanction. So we have ruled and so we have acted, but only in
cases within the parameters of tolerable judgment.
Where, however, the issues are so simple and the facts so
evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still
err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law which, hopefully,
was not merely feigned to subserve an unworthy purpose.

Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447.

September 27, 2000

33

Complaint for gross ignorance of the law

is impermissible if case is appealed
The main issue for our resolution is whether the instant
administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law is
permissible in light of the filing by complainants of a notice of
appeal and a petition for certiorari assailing respondent judges
decision and his order of execution.
In the present case, the complainants filed this administrative case
against respondent judge while their appeal and petition for
certiorari challenging his decision and order were still pending
with the RTC. Following our settled pronouncements cited above,
the instant complaint is impermissible. Camacho v. Judge

Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1252. December 17, 2002

34

Period to decide or resolve the case

submitted for decision
The 90-day period to decide or resolve the case submitted for
decision, fixed no less by the Constitution, is a mandatory
requirement. Hence, non-compliance thereof shall subject the
erring judge to administrative sanction as this Court may deem
appropriate.
It is only in certain meritorious cases, i.e., those involving
difficult questions of law or complex issues or when the judge is
burdened by heavy caseloads, that a longer period to decide
may be allowed but only upon proper application made with
the Supreme Court by the concerned judge.- Dr. Seares v.

Judge Salazar, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1160 November 22, 2000

35

Judge attended the hearing of his

brother
Judge Dojillo sat beside the counsel of his brother and actively
coached, aided, assisted, and guided said counsel by now and then
saying something, handing piece of writing, reminding, and or
stopping the counsel from manifesting something to the court, and
other similar acts.

36

Cont
Respondent, in his defense, stated that he attended the hearing
of his brothers election protest case just to give moral support
and, in the process, also observe how election protest
proceedings are conducted. Although concern for family
members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent,
being a judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon
to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the
entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the
mere appearance of impropriety in all activities. - Vidal v. Judge

Dojillo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591. July 14, 2005

37

Judge is a heckler
The regular session of a municipal council was interrupted by a
heckler in the audience hurling various accusatory remarks and
insults at the council members. The heckler is a judge, the
incident, the subject of this case.
All told, Judge Malanyaon did not dispute the facts as laid down
by the complainants and the latters witnesses. He justified his
behavior though as the fulminations of a righteously
outraged citizen which according to him should be
segregated from his function as a judge.
Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to task for his
outrageous behavior as it clearly violates the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Hon. Decena v. Judge Malanyaon AM No. RTJ-02-

1669. April 14, 2004

38

No dichotomy of personality
Thus, the Court has to dismiss outright Judge Malanyaons
suggestion that his actions be evaluated as one of a taxpayer
or ordinary citizen and not as that of a judge.
In fact, his utterances were not made under a cloak of
anonymity, for the members of the council, as well as some of
the people in the gallery knew very well that he was a judge. It
is highly probable that his invectives took on a greater
imperative on the listeners precisely because he was a judge,
with all the authority attendant to the office. -Hon. Decena v.

Judge Malanyaon AM No. RTJ-02-1669, April 14, 2004

39

Comment on Certiorari filed by public

respondent judge in behalf of private
respondent
Further, respondent judge, in signing and filing a comment with the
court on behalf of one of the parties, engaged in the private practice
of law.

Under Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and Rule
5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of law.
In filing such comment, respondent judge violated the provision in
the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the

petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file
an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If
either party elevates the case to a higher court, the public
respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However,
unless otherwise specifically directed, they shall not appear or
participate in the proceedings therein. - Tuzon v. Judge Cloribel-

Purugganan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662 [2001]

40

Can the members of the Supreme Court be

removed from office only by impeachment?
Justice Reyes maintains that Members of the Court may be removed
from office only by impeachment. Since removal from office is a
disciplinary or administrative sanction, it follows that there is no
manner by which a Justice of this Court may be disciplined for acts
done during his incumbency. Considering that the power to impeach a
Justice of this Court is lodged in the legislative branch of the
government, the Court is without authority to proceed against and
discipline its former Member. He added that what constitutes
impeachable offenses is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature, and that
the misconduct of leakage is not one of the impeachable offenses. - In

Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v.

Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC :
August 11, 2009

41

Cont
When Justice Reyes compulsorily retired upon reaching the
mandatory age of 70, his perceived mantle of protection and
immunity, that the mode of his removal from office can be done
only through impeachment, no longer exists. His duties and
responsibilities as a Justice having ceased by reason of his
retirement, he is reverted to the status of a lawyer and,
consequently, can be subjected to appropriate sanctions for
administrative offenses, particularly, an act of misconduct. The
fact that the Investigating Committee, created per Resolution
dated December 10, 2008 of the Court, commenced the
investigation during the incumbency of Justice Reyes is of no
moment, as he was then not yet a respondent in an
administrative matter against him. - In Re: Undated Letter of Mr.
Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R.
No.179120 A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11, 2009

42

Res ipsa loquitor

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose
its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face,
would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or
misconduct. - Atty. Macalintal v. Judge The, A.M. No. RTJ-97-

1375. October 16, 1997]

43

Res ipsa loquitor

In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without
further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the
facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of their administrative liability. Query of Atty.

Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19,

2009

Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further

investigation after considering his actions based on records
showing his unethical misconduct. - In re: Complaint against

Atty. Asoy, Adm. Case No. 2655 July 9, 1987

A trial-type hearing is not de riqueur. - In re: Complaint
against Atty. Asoy, Adm. Case No. 2655 July 9, 1987

44

Quantum of evidence
It is likewise a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the
burden of proving the allegations in the complaint with
substantial evidence falls on the complainant. - Bautista v.

Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]

45

Quantum of evidence required for removal of

judge from office
Jurisprudence dictates
The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule
where the charges on which the removal is sought is
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or
incompetence. The general rules with regard to admissibility of
evidence in criminal trials apply. - Jabon v. Judge Sibanah E.

Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [2005]

46

Acts of a collegial court

It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31, 2004
was not rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his individual
capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members
reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a
charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the
ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.
Consequently, the filing of charges against a single member of a
division of the appellate court is inappropriate. - Bautista v. Justice

Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]

The act of a single member, though he may be its head, done without
the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the
collegial body itself. ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et, al.

A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010

47

Rendering knowingly unjust judgment"

does not apply to a collegial court
Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment"
refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to
him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would
pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but
the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same,
either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents
should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the
members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who
reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently,
that a charge of violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act
on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot
prosper. - Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-

CA-J [2006]

48

Judge's conviction by the RTC does not

necessarily warrant her suspension
The mere existence of pending criminal charges against the
respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or
suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the door
to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous
criminal cases against them.
By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction by
the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We
agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction of
the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA,
the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys
the constitutional presumption of innocence. - Re: Conviction

of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008

49

Existence of a presumption indicating the guilt

of the accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence
It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption
indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating
presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any
evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner,
the presumption of innocence continues. - Re: Conviction of

Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008

50

Preventive suspension not applicable

to judges
Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve
that, while it is true that preventive suspension pendente lite
does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on preventive
suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in
the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. Re: Conviction of

Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008

51

Preventive suspension for erring

lawyer
Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court.
- After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period
therefor, the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance of
the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the
Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice of his
profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section
27, during the pendency of the investigation until such
suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court.

52

Collegial court needs to

act as one body
Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality of the
Fourth Division despite their having separately conducted hearings,
considering that the three of them were in the same venue and were
acting within hearing and communicating distance of one another.
The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would
base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it
must be made directly available to each and every one of its members
during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full
participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their
cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of
the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating
distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they
explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of
them sat together in session. - ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice

Ong, et, al. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010

53

Thank you for your attention!!

54